The Kashmir Question Penultimate Phase PDF

Criterion
January/March 2010
Volume 5, Number 1
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Scourge of Terrorism Editorial 3
The Kashmir Question: Penultimate Phase A.G. Noorani 7
Crisis of State & Government in Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad 31
Bangladesh Economy and Global Crisis Kazi Anwarul Masud 64
Desert Carrots: Baghdad’s House of Wisdom Toheed Ahmad 90
The Hudood Ordinances of Pakistan and S. Iftikhar Murshed 108

the Denial of Justice
Liaquat Ali Khan - An Unheralded Sultan M Hali 132

Founding Father of Pakistan
1971-Lessons Et Cetera Iqbal Ahmad Khan 170
Essays
Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women Aisha Khan 187
Globalization Challenges and Javed Masud 198

the Changing Role of the State
Why is it Necessary to De-Hyphenate Imtiaz Gul 210

Pakistan from ´´Afpak´´?
Editorial
Editorial
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND THE

SCOURGE OF TERRORISM
Decision makers and intellectuals in Pakistan resent the term “Af-

Pak.” The claim is made that Pakistan cannot be equated with Afghanistan
because it is far superior to that hapless, war-ravaged, corruption-ridden
country where the rule of law and good governance are non-existent.
The same people profess belief in the sovereign equality of states but
such equality does not extend to countries such as Afghanistan. Yet it
is undeniable that the problems that Pakistan faces are as intractable as
those encountered by Afghanistan.
When Socrates professed ignorance at the Delphic oracle a

mysterious voice proclaimed that he was “the wisest of men” and the
timeless advice “Gnothi Seauton (know thyself)” was given to him.
This applies as much to nations as it does to people. It is true that
Afghanistan bleeds but Pakistan bleeds no less. More people have died
in terrorist-related violence in the country in 2009 than in Afghanistan.
Statistics compiled by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS)
reveal that 3,021 people were killed and 7,334 were injured in 2,586
terrorist attacks which included 87 suicide bombings. This represented a
45 percent increase in incidents over 2008. The insurgency-related tally
for Afghanistan, according to a UN report, was 2,412 civilian deaths
signifying a 14 percent rise from the 2008 figure of 2,118.
The findings of the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies vary from

the UN report inasmuch as it is claimed that 25,447 people, including
extremists, were killed or injured in militancy-related violence in
Pakistan in 2009, eclipsing the 8,812 such casualties in Afghanistan. In
CRITERION – January/March 2010 3

Editorial
comparison, at the height of the violence in Iraq four years ago, there
were some 3,000 fatalities in that country each month.
The UN report on Afghanistan claimed that approximately 70

percent of civilian deaths in 2009 were caused by the insurgents. As a
result of military action by NATO and allied forces 596 non-combatants
were killed compared to 828 in 2008. A survey commissioned by ABC
News, BBC and ARD German television in December 2009 found that
42 percent (up from 27 percent in 2008) of 1,534 Afghan respondents
blame the violence in their country on the Taliban while 17 percent
(down from 36 percent the previous year) felt that the US, NATO and
Afghan forces were responsible. While conceding that the survey has
an error margin of plus or minus 3 percentage points, the claim was
made that there is a steep drop in public support for the Taliban-led
insurgency.
Similarly in Pakistan, whatever little sympathy there may have been

for the Taliban is no longer publicly articulated. The military operations
against them in Swat and subsequently in South Waziristan, according
to the findings of the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, resulted in the
killing of 7,945 terrorists in 2009. More important, there is overwhelming
popular support for the army action which has resulted in the pacification
of Swat and the ouster of the Taliban from South Waziristan. The down
side is that the inept political leadership has done little to consolidate the
gains and the foreboding that the liberated areas could again revert to
the control of extremist groups is not far-fetched.
In the third week of October 2009, four days after the commencement
of the South Waziristan operation, the Taliban carried out a terrorist
attack on the International Islamic University in Islamabad in which
six students, three of them girls, were killed. The renowned Palestinian
scholar, Abdullah Azzam, who previously headed the Rabita al-
Alam al-Islami and later established the Al Qaeda in Peshawar as a
response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, had once taught at
the University. He later fell out with his deputy, Osama bin Laden, and
was assassinated along with his two sons in November 1989. Around
the time that the University was attacked a number of local levies were
4 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.1

Editorial
killed in the Khyber Agency by a terrorist group established by the
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) called the Abdullah Azzam Brigade.
The terrorist incident at the Islamic University which is a centre for
the study of sharia, and like most universities in Pakistan, is under the
influence of the religious right, signaled both a change in TTP policy
as well as an act of desperation. In a rare display of anger against the
Taliban, students of the Punjab University led by the Vice Chancellor
staged a demonstration. The opportunity was missed by the government
to begin the process of weaning campuses away from the influence of
religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami who are opposed to the
military action and favour dialogue with the TTP.
The religious parties in Pakistan along with political organizations

such as Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf ascribe the Taliban insurgency
and the extremist violence to the US-led invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan. However none of them concede that the violence in
Pakistan has also been stoked by Iran and Saudi Arabia in the form
of sectarian terrorism. The terrorist attack of 28 December 2009 on
the ashura procession in Karachi left at least 43 dead and many times
that number injured. The damage to property is estimated at around 30
billion rupees. Incidents such as this, from which Afghanistan has been
immune, keep recurring.
Sectarian terrorism is a product of fierce competition between Iran

and Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Muslim world. The struggle
between the two countries has to be seen from a historical perspective.
Till the 15th century Iran was a sunni majority country but this changed
in the beginning of the 16th century when Ismail Safavid came to power
and made the ithna ashari school of shiaism the state religion. Those
who did not convert were confronted with the choice of either facing
death or exile. The few who survived were confined to Baluchistan,
Kurdistan and Khuzestan. Since the 1920s, petroleum has been the
main industry and the affluence thus generated enabled the government
to pursue more assertive internal policies. After the 1979 revolution,
orthodox shiaism became the state ideology as a result of which the
sunnis became even more marginalized. Of the estimated 14 million
sunnis in Iran, who account for about 10 percent of the population, none

Editorial
are in government.
In Saudi Arabia the armed struggle of the Wahabis was directed

against the traditional sunnis as well as the shia minority. Abdul Aziz
bin Saud whose struggle for supremacy began in 1902 culminated in
1932 with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. With
the ascendency of the House of Saud, the Wahabi interpretation of
Islam became the official ideology as a result of which the shias, who
constituted between 3 and 5 percent of the population, were persecuted
and confined to the eastern provinces. In March 1938 vast oil reserves
were discovered and, like in Iran, the burgeoning wealth prompted the
state to vigorously enforce the Wahabi ideology.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 was not inward looking and the
export of its ideology became a part of state policy. Pakistan which has
the world’s second largest shia population, more than in shia majority
Iraq, became fertile ground for Iran’s external enterprise. To neutralize
Iranian influence in the country, the Saudis sponsored anti-shia groups
and sectarian terrorism became a recurring nightmare in Pakistan.
Shias and sunnis had always coexisted peacefully in the country but
this was to change after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet incursion
into Afghanistan. In the period 1989-2009 there were 2,481 incidents
of sectarian terrorism resulting in more than 4,000 deaths. The nexus
between sunni extremist groups such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-
Sahaba and Al Qaeda is undeniable. The Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has declared
shias to be “American agents” and therefore they are the “near enemy”
in the global jihad.
Even if Afghanistan is eventually stabilized and normalcy is restored

in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan will still have to
contend with the problem of sectarian terrorism. The inescapable truth
is that the situation in Pakistan is no less serious than that prevailing in
Afghanistan. The arrogance of those who object to such comparison
is unwarranted. The wisest of men, as Socrates learnt at the Delphic
oracle, are those who know themselves.

THE KASHMIR QUESTION:
PENULTIMATE PHASE
A. G. Noorani*
Abstract
Any settlement must conform to three tests and abide by four limits. It
must be acceptable to all the three parties – India, Pakistan and Kash-
mir, all of whom have limited choices. India cannot accept Kashmir’s
secession from the Union nor Pakistan the LoC as an international bor-
der. Kashmiris will not accept any solution which does not concede
azadi or self-rule, realistic in the circumstances, and which does not re-
unite the State. The four points (formula) meet the tests and abide by the
limits. There is no secession; the LoC does not become an international
boundary and by the joint mechanism Pakistan acquires a say in East
Kashmir as India does in West Kashmir. De facto, though not de jure,
the LoC goes as a barrier and the State is reunited with both its parts
guaranteed self-rule.
This is a “non-territorial” solution which skirts the deal-breaker of sov-

ereignty. The UN Security Council last discussed Kashmir on 5 Novem-
ber 1965 in the aftermath of the 1965 war. In 1972 the parties pledged
themselves at Simla to a bilateral approach. Whether it was based on an
oral understanding to settle on the basis of the status quo may be con-
tested. What is incontestable is that during a tour of West Kashmir on
7 November 1973 Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto offered the area
choice between its present status and as a Province of Pakistan. The
implications are obvious. Author.
Like the stragglers in the forests of South East Asia who were pa-
* A.G. Noorani is a eminent Indian scholar, legal expert and columnist.
A.G. Noorani
thetically unaware of the cease-fire in World War II, very many in India,
Pakistan, and both parts of Kashmir go about mouthing slogans and
proposing solutions of old blissfully unaware that time has passed them
by. Change never provides the familiar comforts of old.
The Kashmir Question has now entered its last but one phase; both,
as a dispute between India and Pakistan and as a problem between the
Kashmiris. This writer’s survey of the negotiations between the two
States from 1947 to 2006 brought out the impossibility of success from
1948 to 2004. Nehru had privately resiled from the commitment to hold
a plebiscite in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, though the fervour of his
public pledges to hold one did not abate till 1954. The record shows that
Pakistan as well as the interested powers were well aware of this. But
Pakistan could not possibly accept his offer of a settlement on the basis
of a status quo which resulted from the victory of superior might. Its
own venture to accomplish political results by recourse to war in 1965
failed and aggravated a bad situation. None of Nehru’s successors had a
desire or political clout to alter course. (Vide Bilateral Negotiations on
Kashmir; Criterion; Oct-Dec. 2006; Vol. I No. 1; pp. 26-52).
The last five years have seen a sea change in the political situation
on both its aspects, external and internal. Externally, Indo-Pak negotia-
tions reached the very gates of a final settlement. A skeletal framework
has been erected to await the infusion of political blood and flesh with
diplomatic creativity. Internally, Kashmir has been in ferment.
India has been negotiating with Pakistan on the substance of the

dispute; not on CBMs alone, but on a settlement of the dispute. This
implies, surely, recognition of the existence of a dispute and Pakistan’s
status as a party to it. Neither country regards as untouchable Kashmiris
who oppose its stand. India talks to leaders of the unionist parties, the
National Conference (NC) led by Dr. Farooq Abdulah and his son Omar
now Chief Minister of the State and the leaders of the People’s Demo-
cratic Party (PDP), its patron Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, former Chief
Minister, and its President, his daughter Mehbooba. It has also engaged
in talks with leaders of the All Parties’ Hurriet Conference (APHC), like
Mir Waiz Maulvi Umar Farooq besides others like Yasin Malik. The

The Kashmir Question: Penultimate Phase
former President Gen (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf received Omar Farooq
as well as Mehbooba besides leaders of the APHC.
Leaders of the NC no longer look askance at such parleys but sup-

port them as do, more consistently, the leaders of the PDP. The divide
between them has blurred. The former talks of greater autonomy; the
latter of self-rule. Debate on the difference between the two is as en-
lightening as one on the sex of the angels. Even more significant is the
blurring of the divide between the unionists and the separatists. With a
large army presence, especially in the rural areas and a pliant official
machinery, besides other factors, the elections to the Lok Sabha (lower
House of Parliament) in 2004 and 2009 and to the State’s Legislative
Assembly in 2002 and 2008 cannot be said to be fair by accepted inter-
national standards. But they were a significant, substantial improvement
on the polls to the Lok Sabha and to the Assembly earlier. The impres-
sion persists, and rightly so, that none can come to power without New
Delhi’s blessings. That said, the crude blatant rigging of old has given
way to more subtle exertions. The result is that the NC felt obliged to
woo the electorate on a platform which, as everyone knows, appeals to
the people – a settlement with Pakistan and azadi which everyone de-
fines in his own way. If the APHC had contested the polls, the Assembly
would have had a radically different composition and character.
The NC could drum up a coalition with the Congress in 2009 on

the support of the seats it won in Srinagar despite a low-voter turnout
thanks to the call for a boycott given by Syed Ali Shah Geelani and his
faction of the Hurriet. Erudite, he published in November 2009 a work
on Iqbal; honest to the core, and endowed with impeccable manners, his
intransigence has undermined his relevance. He attacks Pakistan for its
policies in Balochistan as well as in the N.W.F.P. Since any settlement
worth the name must be acceptable to the people, it is important to bear
in mind the domestic situation.
The Report of a Joint American-Russian Study entitled “Afghani-

stan and Kashmir” sponsored by The Asia Society, New York and the
Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, dated 28 June 1992 lamented
“One remarkable feature of the Kashmir problem is the political and

A.G. Noorani
mental inertia of the leadership of both countries. Over the past sev-
eral decades they adjusted to the then existing situation, which could be
characterized as a balance of contradictions. The disturbance of that bal-
ance by a virtual uprising of a segment of Kashmiri Muslims living in
the Srinagar Valley has created a regional threat of unpredictable conse-
quences. This uprising, and subsequent events, constitute the “second”
Kashmir crisis, qualitatively different from the situation that both India
and Pakistan had, sometimes grudgingly, adjusted to.” This has ceased
to be true since 2004.
On 2 February 2007, President Musharraf said “Our relations with

India, have never been this good before in our history, and we ought
to be happy about that …. I am fairly optimistic that we will be able
to move forward to a resolution of all disputes” (The Times of India, 3
February 2007).
He had good reason for the confidence. In July 2001 the Agra sum-
mit collapsed when Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee went back on an
agreed draft. (Vide the writer’s article The Truth about Agra; Frontline,
29 July 2005. The texts of documents published there exposed the lies/
falsehoods brazenly retailed by the External Affairs Minister Jaswant
Singh). That was an unambitious exercise. The Draft Declaration sought
to do no more than recognize the primacy of the Kashmir question and
set up institutionalized consultations, at a higher level than before, on
a whole range of disputes, including Kashmir. It did not touch the sub-
stance at all; only the procedure.
A misimpression still lurks about Vajpayee as a “moderate.” That

he was not except in style. A Prime Minister in earnest would not have
nominated one R. K. Mishra, as his interlocutor to parley with Niaz A.
Naik after the Lahore summit with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 21
February 1999. A good few in Pakistan claimed that had Kargil not in-
tervened, Kashmir would have been resolved in six month’s time. Agra
belied them. No BJP Government, looking over its shoulder at its par-
ent, the RSS, could have solved the issue.
It is important to dilate on this episode because much of the dis-

course overlooks an important milestone. In 2004, for the first time

since 1948, India acquired a Prime Minister who was committed to a
Kashmir solution, was prepared to reach out to Pakistan and the Kash-
miris, and yet had a shrewd understanding of the constraints which the
years had imposed. Around the time he was to take the oath of office as
Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh said in an interview to Jonathan
Power: “Short of secession, short of re-drawing boundaries, the Indian
establishment can live with anything. Meanwhile, we need soft borders
– then borders are not so important” (The Statesman; 20 May, 2004). He
made another point, an economist that he was. The Kashmir problem
inhibited India’s rise to its full stature.
Already in 2001-2002 Pervez Musharraf had been urging both sides

to “move beyond their stated positions.” In Manmohan Singh he ac-
quired a partner in this exercise, where he had none before. By 2007
they had all but sewn up the framework of an accord. Progress was
achieved gradually in stages. The concepts that were aired reveal the
richness of the nuances that underlay their understanding.
Musharraf made five major changes in the policy that put paid to
rhetoric but were in line with past offers. Partition pure and simple was
offered by Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon to the United State’s Per-
manent Representative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, in
Karachi on 10 February 1958 (Foreign Relations of the United States;
South Asia 1958 Vol. XVIII; p. 59). Ayub Khan invited India to suggest
alternatives to plebiscite (Criterion; Vol. I, No. 1; pp. 40-41). The Z.A.
Bhutto – Swaran Singh talks centred on partition.
The five major changes are : 1) setting aside the U.N.’s resolutions
on plebiscite; 2) substituting self-governance for self-determination; 3)
discarding religion as a criterion; 4) advising Kashmiris to talk to New
Delhi; and 5) accepting the Line of Control (LoC) provided it is coupled
with joint management, an issue pre-eminently susceptible to compro-
mise.
Musharraf declared, on 25 December 2003, that in the quest for

accord “we have left that [U.N. resolutions on plebiscite] aside.” The
President elaborated his ideas in nine major pronouncements. (1) 25

A.G. Noorani
October 2004: Identify seven regions; demilitarize them and change
their status. (2) 18 April 2005, in New Delhi: The LoC cannot be made
permanent but it can and should be made “irrelevant.” Boundaries “can-
not be altered.” (3) 20 May 2005: “Self-government must be allowed to
the people of Kashmir.” Religious basis is ruled out. (4) 14 June 2005:
Complete independence is ruled out. (5) 21 October 2005: Open the
LoC.
(6) 8 January 2006, to an Indian TV channel: (a) “Something be-

tween autonomy and independence. I think self-governance fits in well;”
(b) “Let us [India and Pakistan] work out self-governance and impose
the rules” in both parts. Kashmiris will be involved; (c) demilitariza-
tion, and (d) joint management. “There have to be subjects which are
devolved; there have to be some subjects retained for the joint manage-
ment;” (e) India and Pakistan will be “guaranteeing it and overseeing
it” with each “having a stake in guaranteeing the situation in the other
half of Kashmir.” (7) 25 January 2006: What “we cannot give to them
[Kashmiris] and what residual powers would be left with the joint man-
agement mechanism, which would have people from Pakistan, India
and the Kashmiris” should be defined.
(8) 23 June 2006, to CNBC: “I am proposing demilitarization as a

concept of a final settlement actually. Demilitarise Kashmir, give self-
governance to the people of Kashmir and have a joint management ar-
rangement on top… we could debate and modify the idea… I think it is
the people of Kashmir themselves who need to now generate the kind
of ideas and pressure on the Indian Government…. I am very glad to
say that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been interacting with all
groups of Kashmiris and I am quite sure he is talking of some kind of a
resolution obviously.
(9) 1 August 2006, interview to this writer for Frontline in which he

elaborated on all these points.
Now compare this with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s formu-

lations. He made four important pronouncements besides his interview
to Jonathan Power in May 2004. (1) 16 September 2005, in New York:

It would require ingenuity to reconcile the three positions: (a) the Indian
position that the border would not be redrawn (b) the Pakistani position
that the status quo was unacceptable and (c) the Prime Minister’s own
formulation that while the border would not be redrawn, it was possible
to make the border irrelevant (Harish Khare in The Hindu, September
17, 2005). (2) 25 February 2006, at the First Round Table Conference
(RTC) in New Delhi. “There is a need to evolve a common understand-
ing on autonomy and self-rule for the State of Jammu & Kashmir and I
am confident that working together with all groups, both within and out-
side the mainstream, we can arrive at arrangements within the vast flex-
ibilities provided by the Constitution, arrangements which provide real
empowerment and comprehensive security to all the people of Jammu
and Kashmir.” (3) 24 March 2006, in Amritsar, Manmohan Singh made
four points: (a) a step-by-step approach; (b) dialogue by both India and
Pakistan “with the people in their areas of control.” (c) “I have often
said that borders cannot be redrawn but we can work towards making
them irrelevant – towards making them just lines on a map. People on
both sides of the LoC should be able to move more freely and trade
with one another; (d) “The two parts of Jammu & Kashmir can with the
active encouragement of the governments of India and Pakistan, work
out cooperative consultative mechanisms so as to maximize the gains
of cooperation.” (4) 25 May 2006, at the RTC in Srinagar the Prime
Minister made the last point somewhat stronger by posing the question.
“What are those institutional arrangements which can bring people from
both sides of the LoC closer to each other?”
Thus both leaders were agreed on four points: (1) Jammu & Kash-
mir cannot be made independent; (2) borders cannot be redrawn (that
is, the State cannot secede from the Union of India); (3) the LoC can be
made “irrelevant;” and (4) the two parts of Kashmir can be linked by
“institutional arrangements.”
The concurrence on some important points was almost textual. The

Prime Minister told the media on 17 September 2006, as he was re-
turning from the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) meeting in Havana:
“President Musharraf recalled what I had stated before that borders can-
not be redrawn, and his statement that they cannot accept the LoC as a

A.G. Noorani
permanent solution. We both agreed that we have to find a via media to
reconcile these two positions. And I do believe that we should work in
all sincerity to think out of the box to deal with this situation.”
Compare this with the President’s remarks to Geo TV on 23 October

2006. He was asked whether he was not feeling some “frustration” since
Manmohan Singh had said that borders will not be redrawn though the
President had shifted his stand from Pakistan’s 60-year-old position (of
U.N. resolutions) and offered many options. Musharraf replied: “No.
They say that the borders will not be drawn a second time. We say that
the LoC is not acceptable as a permanent border. We need to find a via
media between these two positions which would mean self-governance
with a joint management system at the top for both sides of the LoC and
you make the LoC irrelevant.”
Abrogation of the LoC or its rescission denotes an actual fact. Ir-

relevance is an expression of opinion. Manmohan Singh’s remark “just
lines on a map” provides the clue. The line remains; but only to indicate
limits of two sovereign jurisdictions. It will, however, cease to divide
the people of Jammu and Kashmir – and thus become “irrelevant” to
their lives. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar was wont to distinguish between a bar
and a hyphen. A bar divides, a hyphen separates and unites. The LoC
will cease to be a bar. It will become a hyphen; a de jure division but de
facto unity of the State.
Musharraf hinted in his remarks to the South Asia Free Media As-
sociation (SAFMA) on 20 May 2005. “The solution exactly lies some-
where in a compromise of the three. In fact, it lies in the third statement
that is boundaries becoming irrelevant. We need to find a via media.”
In plain words, if the LoC is rendered “irrelevant,” it will become

acceptable if – and only if – a joint mechanism is also put in place and
Kashmiris are conferred self-governance.
My interview with President Musharraf was intended to elicit clari-

fication on his pronouncements, in the light of the Prime Minister’s pro-

nouncements, in order to ascertain the areas of common ground and the
precise points of difference.
The President made these significant points: 1. “Demilitarisation

can be by steps;” begin as talks begin and end with conclusion of an
accord. 2. The Prime Minister’s suggestion, of “institutional arrange-
ments” between the two parts of Kashmir “is a starter. This is a very
good term.” The term “institutional arrangements” is “what I think is
correct. But we need to define the modalities.” 3. Asked if an irrelevant
LoC meant that “de jure the sovereignties end at the line on the map,
but de facto the State becomes one,” the President replied: “Yes, that
kind of an arrangement … needs discussion and thought.” 4. “We need
to define what is the maximum autonomy that you are talking of and
what is the self-governance that I am talking of. We need to see how the
people should govern themselves. Also “we have to find a word which
replaces ‘autonomy,’ because it creates negative optics.” He suggested
“a joint framework for self-governance.” An India-Pakistan accord on
the quantum of powers each part of Jammu & Kashmir should enjoy in
equal measure would meet these criteria.
The heart of the problem is to devise an “institutional arrangement”

which does not abrogate the LoC yet gives Pakistan – and India – as
the President put it, “some responsibility and some commitment; some
involvement, I would say, in having their say on both sides of the bor-
der.”
The “four elements” he formulated on page 303 of his book In the

Line of Fire: A Memoir; (Simon & Schuster) in greater precision than
before, facilitate fleshing out the themes.
Those four points are: “1. First, identify the geographic regions of
Kashmir that need resolution. At present the Pakistani part is divided
into two regions; Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir. The Indian part is
divided into three regions: Jammu, Srinagar and Ladakh. Are all these
on the table for discussion, or are there ethnic, political, and strategic
considerations dictating some give and take?

A.G. Noorani
2. Second, demilitarize the identified region or regions and curb
all militant aspects of the struggle for freedom. This will give comfort
to the Kashmiris, who are fed up with the fighting and killing on both
sides.
3. Third, introduce self-government or self-rule in the identified

region or regions. Let the Kashmiris have the satisfaction of running
their own affairs without having an international character and remain-
ing short of independence.
4. Fourth, and most important, have a joint management mecha-

nism with a membership consisting of Pakistanis, Indians, and Kash-
miris overseeing self-governance and dealing with residual subjects
common to all identified regions and those subjects that are beyond the
scope of self-governance.
This idea is purely personal and would need refinement. It would

also need to be sold to the public by all involved parties for accep-
tance.”
As happens all so often in Indo-Pak relations an incident, the Mum-

bai train blasts on 11 July 2006 impeded progress. The President and the
Prime Minister set up “an India-Pakistan Anti-Terrorism Institutional
Mechanism” on 16 September, 2006 when they met in Havana during
the NAM summit. On Kashmir they said “there have been useful dis-
cussions. There is a need to build on convergences and narrow down
divergences” (italics mine; press release Ministry of External Affairs,
New Delhi).
The task was left to the highly publicized back channel compris-
ing Tariq Aziz and Satish Lambah. The fate of this Mechanism and for
that matter, of other issues is beyond the purview of this article. It bears
mention though that a Joint Commission that was set up by an Agree-
ment signed on 10 March 1983 languished. It was restored to life on 4
October 2005 and held its second meeting on 21 February 2007. (For
An able survey of the diplomatic record vide Nabiha Gul; Pakistan Ho-
rizon; Vol. 60(2); April 2008; pp. 47-64).

Foreign correspondents of repute reported the progress in the back
channel; not altogether accurately, though. Farhan Bukhari and Johnson
reported in the Financial Times (London) on 29 May 2007 “the five ele-
ments” which were only a fleshing out of the Four Points. More signifi-
cant was this revelation. “‘The deal is there to be done and what is more,
a lot of it is written down and cannot be denied,’ says one diplomat privy
to the discussions, who believes the BJP is keen to slow down the talks
so it can do the deal if it wins power in 2009 and would ‘pick holes’
in any earlier attempt by Congress. ‘Of course, it binds nobody, but it
means that even if governments in both countries change, unless the
new leaders turn out to be irresponsible, we’ll still make progress.’”
Steve Coll’s report in The New Yorker of 2 March 2009 won greater
attention. It was entitled “The Back Channel: A Reporter at Large.” The
core of his report bears quotation in extenso: “The most recent version
of the non-paper, drafted in early 2007, laid out several principles for
a settlement, according to people who have seen the draft or have par-
ticipated in the discussions about it. Kashmiris would be given special
rights to move and trade freely on both sides of the Line of Control.
Each of the former princely state’s distinct regions would receive a mea-
sure of autonomy – details would be negotiated later. Providing that
violence declined, each side would gradually withdraw its troops from
the region. At some point, the Line of Control might be acknowledged
by both governments as an international border. It is not clear how firm
a commitment on a final border the negotiators were prepared to make,
or how long it would all take; one person involved suggested a time line
of about ten to fifteen years.
“One of the most difficult issues involved a plan to establish a joint

body, made up of local Kashmiri leaders, Indians, and Pakistanis, to
oversee issues that affected populations on both sides of the Line of
Control, such as water rights. Pakistan sought something close to shared
governance, with the Kashmiris taking a leading role; India, fearing a
loss of sovereignty, wanted much less power-sharing. The envoys wres-
tled intensively over what language to use to describe the scope of this
new body; the last draft termed it a ‘joint mechanism.’ ”

A.G. Noorani
“Manmohan Singh’s government feared that successor Pakistani re-
gimes would repudiate any Kashmir bargain forged by Musharraf, who
had, after all, come to power in a coup. The Indians were not sure that
a provisional peace deal could be protected ‘from the men of violence
– on both sides,’ the senior Indian official who was involved recalled.
And they wondered whether the Pakistan Army had really embraced
the non-paper framework or merely saw the talks as a ploy to buy time
and win favor in Washington while continuing to support the jihadis. ‘I
remember asking Tariq Aziz, ‘Is the Army on board? Right now?’ the
senior official recalled. “As long as Musharraf was the chief, had the
uniform, I think he had a valid answer. He said, ‘Yes, the chief is doing
this.’ ”
In March 2007 Musharraf had gravely undermined his own author-

ity by summoning the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad
Choudhary and demanding his resignation. On 18 May 2007 Talat Hus-
sain of Aaj TV asked him whether the back channel had drawn up the
“buniyadi contour” of a Kashmir accord. The President replied: “Yes,
it is a fairly fair assessment. We have made progress on the Kashmir
dispute, but we have to reach a conclusion. It is a very very difficult
situation and as I keep saying it is a sensitive issue. Sensitivity ye hai kay
agar hamne kisi solution pe pahunchna hai, dono ne give up karna hai
kuchh. Aur dono ne jab give up karti hain to dono ki oppositions hain
apne apne mulk, main, to shor sharaba aur ye voh, Yahan to phir vohi
consensus wali baat aa gai. Aap jo kahte hain na consensus develop
karo, array bhai kaise yahan consensus develop karo?” (The sensitivity
is that if we have to arrive at a solution, both have to give up something,
both have oppositions in their countries so there will be protests. So here
again the issue of consensus comes in. It is easy to say “develop consen-
sus” but how does one achieve this?”)
The President’s fears came all too true; but more on the Indian
side than within his own country. When his Foreign Minister Khur-
shid Mahmud Kasuri visited New Delhi, on 21 February 2007 he was
warned by L. K. Advani, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Home
Minister against “any haste.” This, from a man who had single-handed-
ly wrecked the Agra summit at the very last moment when it was on the

verge of success. The next day, the former prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajayee administered the same caution to the visitor; namely, the ac-
cord should not be rushed through. An aide repeated the admonition
with the assurance that Pakistan would get a better deal from the BJP
which, he predicted, would return to power. The 2009 elections to the
Lok Sabha ruined its prospects for the future as well.
So swift and significant was the progress after Manmohan Singh

became Prime Minister in May 2004 that Vajpayee was provoked to
write to him on 16 June 2005 expressing his concern at “the disturbing
turn that the peace process with Pakistan has taken” and at the promi-
nence that was being given to the Hurriet. The Prime Minister stood his
ground in his reply on 20 June 2005.
Two years later on 13 March 2007 Advani renewed the charge.

“General Musharraf’s four-point formula about J & K has introduced
new and unacceptable dimensions to our already complex situation,
the concept of joint supervisory mechanism, soft borders, demilitar-
ization and self-governance are aimed at diluting India’s sovereignty
over J & K. Why have we not rejected this outright? Observations
attributed to you about making borders irrelevant have further contrib-
uted to the prevailing confusion.”
He asked for clarification. The issues he raised are certain to be

raised again if and when success greets these efforts which is why Man-
mohan Singh’s reply of 14 March 2007 is reproduced in full: “I have
carefully noted your views. It has been our effort to build a consensus
on such issues of national interest and it was in that spirit that we had
the occasion earlier of discussing our ties with important countries, in-
cluding Pakistan. Several ideas having a bearing on improving relations
between India and Pakistan are being discussed at various levels. In
carrying on these discussions on different subjects, full regard is being
given to our administrative and constitutional requirements and also to
the overriding imperatives of national security. At the same time we do
not believe in conducting diplomacy in public and have conveyed our
positions on these questions through the appropriate channels.

A.G. Noorani
“I have publicly stated a number of times that the dialogue with
Pakistan cannot make meaningful progress unless Pakistan lives up in
letter and spirit to the commitments it made in January 2004 on con-
trolling terrorism. Subject to this, we are prepared to explore creative
and cooperative solutions that can bring long lasting peace and amity
between the two countries.”
In the Congress Party there has always existed a significant core

which shared the BJP’s communal outlook, as Nehru’s Autobiography
noted. The outlook prevailed in all these circles before the Jan Sangh
was set up in 1951 and its heir the BJP in 1980. A wider core in the
Congress has reservations on Manmohan Singh’s policies on the Kash-
mir question and on Pakistan. He has in his own quiet and firm way per-
sisted in his policies within the Cabinet, the party and a large segment
of the Establishment, the media included. He has, sad to add, received
less acknowledgment of this courageous course than is his due from in-
fluential Pakistanis. In consequence they undermined the response that
the task required.
On Pakistan’s side the new and democratic regime understandably

looked askance at policies followed by the military dictator. Yet official
pronouncements do offer hope that the baby of the achievement of a
consensus will not be thrown out with the bath water of partisan poli-
cies.
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani told an Indian TV channel, on

10 May 2008, that the proposals discussed with India were “half-baked
things that did not have the mandate of Parliament.” He added, how-
ever, that there should be a rethinking on the Kashmir issue and his gov-
ernment could “go beyond” the UN resolutions. “I think it (the Kashmir
issue) needs to be debated; there should be a rethink about it and may be
Parliament thinks the same.”
On the four-point proposals he said “actually, that was the Presi-

dent’s idea. This is not the idea of the newly-elected government.” This
was formally correct; it, however, overlooked the fact that when he

spoke as he did, an Indo-Pak consensus was already in place. It bears no
basic structural change. It can be enriched with new insights.
At a joint press conference with India’s Minister for External

Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee, in Islamabad on 21 May 2008, Foreign
Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that the new government was
“open to innovative ideas that can facilitate movement” on resolving
Kashmir while studiously refraining from commenting on the Four-
Point proposals.
Qureshi repeated his hints on 11 July 2008 in a speech at the Brook-

ings Institution in Washington, D.C. on 11 July. “We have to look at
innovative ways of resolution (of Kashmir). We have our minds open
on such issues.”
The four-points won endorsement from Syed Salahuddin, head of

the United Jehad Council and of the Hizbul Mujahideen. He hailed them
on 26 February 2007 as a possible first step which, indeed, they were.
(Kashmir Uzma, a Srinagar Urdu daily of 27 February 2007 “pahlaqa-
dam”).
Predictably Syed Ali Shah Geelani had no use for them. Among
the separatist leaders Mir Waiz Maulvi Umar Farooq adopted the most
constructive stand. He said on 20 March 2007: “The Hurriyat Confer-
ence will soon strengthen its public contact programme to make people
aware of the four-point formula of President Musharraf.” In an inter-
view to Kavita Suri published in The Statesman on 10 October 2002,
he said; “An autonomous region with the other side being a party to it
could address the issue in such a way that India can sort of live with that;
Pakistan can also live with that too, and Kashmiris can also get some-
thing they have been aspiring for. So we should be ready to discuss all
the options and, as I have said earlier, autonomous identity for Kashmir
could be the solution.”
This is no different from the PDP’s demand for self-rule or the NC’s
for greater autonomy. His colleague, Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhat, said at a
seminar in New Delhi on 7 November: “Pakistan wants all Kashmiris

A.G. Noorani
to put their heads together. This includes the PDP, the NC, the JKLF
and even Geelani.” On the same day and at the same forum, Mehbooba
Mufti said the differences with the separatists had blurred and a fair
amount of consensus had emerged.
The Hurriet split in 2003. A promising platform to serve as a repre-

sentative interlocutor was destroyed by ego clashes. India and Pakistan
took turns to promote the destruction. It had a promising beginning.
The process leading to the formation of this body was initiated by

the Mir Waiz. After his father Mir Waiz Maulana Farooq had been as-
sassinated in May 1991, he showed considerable courage and maturity
at a very young age. On 27 December 1992 he called a meeting of repre-
sentatives of various parties at the historic Mujahid Manzil in Srinagar,
which once housed Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference and later
the Plebiscite Front headed by his trusted friend Mirza M. A. Beg. The
meeting set up a Screening Committee. Its report was considered by a
full Assembly of representatives of the constituents on 8 March 1993
which, in turn, adopted a Committee to draft the Constitution.
The draft Constitution was adopted by the Assembly on 31 July

1993. Initially representatives of 29 organisations signed the Constitu-
tion of the All Parties Hurriet (Freedom) Conference in Srinagar. The
Objectives Clause (Chapter II para 2) sufficed to expose the divisions.
“The objects for which the All parties Hurriet (Freedom) Conference
has been formed shall be as follows:
“(i) To make peaceful struggle to secure for the people of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir the exercise of the right of self-determination
in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the resolutions adopted by the
U.N. Security Council however the exercise of the right of self-deter-
mination shall also include the right to independence. (ii) To make en-
deavours for an alternative negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute
amongst all the three parties to the dispute viz. (a) INDIA, (b) PAKI-
STAN, (c) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR,
under the auspices of U.N. or any other friendly countries, provided
that such settlement reflects the will and aspirations of the people of the

State. (iii) To project ongoing struggle, in the State before the Nations
and governments of the world in its proper perspective as being a strug-
gle directed against the forcible and fraudulent occupation of the State
by India and for the achievement of the right of the self-determination
of its people. (iv) To make endeavours, in keeping with the Muslim ma-
jority character of the State, for promoting the building up of a society
based on Islamic values; while safeguarding the rights and interests of
the non-Muslims. (v) To make endeavours for the achievement of any
objectives which may be ancillary or incidental to the objectives speci-
fied above.”
“EXPLANATION: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared

that in this Article; negotiated settlement shall not be deemed to include
any settlement within the framework of the Constitution of India.”
By emphasizing the “Muslim majority character of the State” the

APHC proclaimed its irrelevance to Jammu and Ladakh. The Explana-
tion reflected a vain hope that “the occupation of the State by India”
could be ended by the APHC’s exertions. Time exposed a contradic-
tion between sub-para (ii) and the Explanation. What if Pakistan itself
agreed with India on a “non-territorial” solution and a significant num-
ber of Kashmiris accepted the four points?
The self-rule which those points envisage can only be conferred

by India on West Kashmir and Pakistan on East Kashmir as part of an
overall settlement which provides also for a joint mechanism for both
sides. (Incidentally, is it not time we adopted this nomenclature rather
than “Indian-occupied Kashmir” and “Pakistan occupied Kashmir”?).
The APHC showed initial promise thanks to a rapport between the

two top seniors Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Ghani Lone. In 2000
seeds of distrust sown by New Delhi in Jail during their imprisonment
sprouted. In 2003 the APHC split, Pakistan rushed to proclaim Gee-
lani’s faction as “the real” APHC only to switch to the Mir Waiz when
Geelani went on a limb of his own.

A.G. Noorani
In all these years the APHC showed no ingenuity in formulating a
plan of peaceful action. It became a party of strikes, hartals and bandhs
inflicting grave hardship on the people. Its failure to respond to Sala-
huddin’s announcement of cease-fire in 2000 reflected a lack of politi-
cal sense and sense of realism. For all the noise it emitted, the APHC
had nothing to show by way of results in the entire decade of its fitful
existence. Amidst an obscene clash of egos, the leaders vied with one
another desperately to secure recognition of their representative creden-
tials from Islamabad, New Delhi and OIC.
Geelani was the only one to admit on 16 June 1998 with characteris-
tic courage and honesty. “We are not in a position to stop the use or mis-
use of the gun. There is no rapport between the APHC and the gunmen.”
The Hurriet was then a united body. Devoid of an electoral mandate or
sanction of armed militancy the APHC’s leaders have only themselves,
and such following as each can command, to offer as their credentials.
But negotiate they cannot without stripping themselves of the fig

leaf of separatism which the APHC’s Constitution held out tantaliz-
ingly. They cannot publicly accept even the greatest autonomy within
the Constitution of India. New Delhi will not concede secession and
Islamabad has long ceased to demand that it do so. It wants only that the
separatists and New Delhi kiss and make up thus enabling it to sell the
four-point deal to the people of Pakistan.
It is not a bad deal for the people of Kashmir at all. The State of
Jammu & Kashmir will be re-united de facto, though not de jure. Only
those bereft of imagination will cavil at it. The possibilities which free
movement across the LoC of persons, goods and ideas will throw up are
incalculable. The expression “just lines on a map” is a metaphor. Trans-
lated into action what precisely will be the facilities which feuding India
and Pakistan will afford to the hapless people of Kashmir?
Sadly in all the discourse Kashmiris have refused to offer any con-
crete suggestions to give meaning and efficacy to the four points. What
will be the quantum of self-rule? What will be the guarantees against its
violation, in the light of India’s systematic violation of Article 370 of

the Constitution. A provision designed to guarantee J & K’s autonomy
was perverted to destroy it since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru. It was
“eroded” he blithely remarked in 1963 and promised its further “ero-
sion.”
The joint mechanism must have play at the joints; potentiality for
growth. The one place where one would have expected creativity is
Kashmir University. Its teachers of note fill newspaper columns with
articles that proclaim abiding zeal for azadi but not a capacity for reflec-
tion and realism.
To this, it must be said there are three exceptions. One is the coura-
geous stand of the Mir Waiz, noted earlier. The offer is the unionists’
able detailed exercises in fleshing out their rival concepts of autonomy
and self-rule.
First came the Report of the State Autonomy Committee submit-

ted to the State Government headed by Farooq Abdulah in April 1999.
The printed text omits the reservation of Piyaray Lal Handoo ! “I en-
dorse the recommendations” implying that he disagreed with the well
documented survey of erosion of autonomy. It sought, basically, a re-
turn to the autonomy that subsisted under the Delhi Agreement in July
1952 between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the State’s Premier
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. It focused exclusively on Union – Kash-
mir relations to the total exclusion of the external dimension – Pakistan.
The Report was formally endorsed by the State’s Legislative Assembly
on 26 June 2000. The NC was then a partner of the BJP in the coalition
it led at the Centre. Omar Abdullah, the Chief Minister’s son, was a
Minister in the Government. The Union Cabinet brusquely rejected the
resolution and the Report. The Cabinet’s decision was made public. The
BJP has always demanded deletion of Article 370. If this be the BJP’s
stand on autonomy, one can well imagine its stand on resolution of the
dispute with Pakistan.
Perusal of a special compilation of “Assembly Debates on Autono-

my Report” published by the Assembly’s Secretariat shows the surge of
Kashmiris resentment even in members of the NC.

A.G. Noorani
In 2002 the PDP formed a coalition with the Congress. Such is the
compulsion of demography and politics that Jammu and the Congress
will ensure coalition rule with the Congress (read: New Delhi) as the
king maker. In 2009 Omar Abdullah formed a coalition with the Con-
gress.
The PDP made a bold bid for popular mobilization on the twin
planks of human rights and autonomy which included the external di-
mension. It advocated strenuously a settlement with Pakistan. In 2002
it drew up an outline for self-rule. In October 2008 the PDP published
“The Self-Rule Framework for Resolution.” It says: “The centerpiece
of the governance structure under self-rule is the cross border institu-
tion of Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir. The Regional
Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir will replace the existing Upper
House of state assembly, and will be a kind of a regional senate. Mem-
bers of the Regional Council will be from J&K as well as from Pakistan
administered Kashmir. At present the state assembly of J&K holds 20
seats for representatives from across the line of control. These will be
given up and replaced by the same number of seats in the Regional
Councils of Greater Jammu and Kashmir. This will serve as a major
cross-border institution, which will ensure long-term coordination of
matters and interest relating to the state.
A footnote on the dispute between India and Pakistan concludes:

“The resolution of territorial disputes is obviously emotional and goes
directly to each country’s definition of national interests. No nation
wants to make territorial concessions, especially when it can have stra-
tegic implications. Nonetheless, the failure to resolve or at least bypass
such territorial issues has prevented the two neighbours from normaliz-
ing relations and dealing with pressing social and economic issues. Thus
it is important that any territorial differences be resolved or bypassed on
a mutually acceptable basis in accordance with economic rationality and
political sagacity.”
This is a clear hint of a “non-territorial” solution. The PDP’s self-

rule formula fits the four points like a glove, envisaging as they also

do “self-rule” for both parts of the State. Its Election Manifesto also
pledged the PDP to “Make ‘Self-Rule’ happen.”
The NC rejoined in the same month with its “Vision Document for
Jammu & Kashmir.” Its accent was on good governance, not autonomy.
It stood pat on its Autonomy Report.
Meanwhile Manmohan Singh was at work on two fronts. He met the

APHC leaders on 5 September 2005 and 3 May 2006 and Yasin Malik
on 11 February 2006. They had met earlier L. K. Advani on 22 January
2004 and 27 March 2004. The Prime Minister convened Round Table
Conferences of the political parties, which all the separatists boycotted.
They were held on 25 February 2006, 24 May 2006 and 24 April 2007.
The RTCs set up five working groups, one on economic issues, another
on good governance. The other Working Groups also submitted useful
Reports; especially the ones by M. H. Ansari now Vice-President, on
good governance and M. K. Rasgotra on relations across the LoC. Jus-
tice Saghir Ahmad is yet to submit the Report of the Group on relations
between Srinagar and New Delhi – the most important issue before the
RTC.
In contrast there is no sign of ferment or movement in West Kash-

mir. On the contrary as recently as June 2006 nomination papers of 33
candidates of the JKLF were rejected because they stood for azadi, not
accession to Pakistan.
Results on the Indo-Pak front are depressing. There has been little
movement since the Mumbai blasts of 26 November 2008. The summits
at Yekaterinburg on 16 June 2009 and at Sharmel Sheikh on 16 July
2009 yielded little result.
In an article published in The New York Times on 10 December 2009

President Asif Ali Zardari urged the U.S. to mediate. This is unfortunate
for three reasons - India will not accept mediation, it is unnecessary and
will wreck progress. Kissinger once famously said do not ask an Ameri-
can for advice because if you do, he will give it. Americans are raring to
have a go at mediation on Kashmir and with hare-brained ideas, too.

A.G. Noorani
Farooq Kathwari’s venture was sincere and well meant. But The
Kashmir Study Group he set up was unwieldy and comprised some
whose relationship with realities was tenuous. This writer has listened
in embarrassment to more than one of its members as he patted himself
resoundingly on his back while holding forth on the Group’s indispens-
able contribution to the progress in talks on Kashmir with laboured far-
fetched pointers of “affinities” between the four-point proposal and the
Group’s Report. Like beauty, affinity lies in the eyes of the wide-eyed
beholder.
The Kashmir Study Group’s exertions had not the slightest impact
on Indo-Pak deliberations. The first set of proposals in 2000 were wildly
unrealistic – J & K to be a “sovereign” entity, without an “intentional
personality.” The KSG thus instantly counted itself out of reckoning.
The second set (2005) - “five self-governing entities” was cumbrous.
Neither the “American specialists” nor its NGOs nor the seminars have
contributed. The proposals were unrealistic and Indians and Pakistanis
spoke at the seminars like “patriots” as a Pakistani participant revealed.
The writer’s impression was no different.
In extended talks with this writer on 1 August 2006 and later, on

and off the record, President Pervez Musharraf did not even once make
the slightest reference to the KSG’s venture though many a model was
cited. Nor did he mention it when speaking pointedly of models in a TV
interview on 12 May 2007.
On 28 October 2009 Manmohan Singh said: “We had the most

fruitful and productive discussions ever with the Government of Paki-
stan during the period 2004-07 when militancy and violence began to
decline. Intensive discussions were held on all issues including on a
permanent resolution of the issue of Jammu & Kashmir.”
How close the two sides had come, he revealed on 2 May 2009
“General Musharraf and I had nearly reached an agreement, a non-terri-
torial solution to all problems but the General got into many difficulties
with the Chief Justice and other forces and the whole process came to a
halt.” (italics added).

Meanwhile New Delhi has set about instituting a dialogue with the
separatists. On 14 October 2009 Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram
said in Jammu: “The Prime Minister has given me the task of finding a
solution to the J&K problem… We cannot afford to pass on this issue
to generations ahead.” He has rightly opted for “quiet diplomacy with
all the political groups in Kashmir … We’ll build a consensus, which
would then be made public.”
He outlined, on 30 October a business-like procedure. Talks will

be held one-on-one or with two or three to “discover the contours of
the proposals of each group.” He amplified: “Then we can perhaps put
down on paper what is the outline of the package.” He would visit Srina-
gar once every six weeks to review the progress on the Prime Minister’s
reconstruction package; presumably also on the progress in his inter-
locutor’s soundings. No previous government had shown such serious-
ness. Clearly Manmohan Singh means business and so does the Home
Minister.
This process is not to the exclusion of Pakistan. It envisages a settle-

ment with Pakistan of which “self-rule” is an integral component. Prog-
ress has been held up by the Battle of Dossiers after 26 November 2008.
One hopes the impasse is resolved soon. We have reached the very gates
of a solution to the Kashmir dispute on our own by following a purely
indigenous route. The next step towards it will mark the end of the pen-
ultimate phase in this process.
Transition to the last phase is inevitable even if the skeletal frame-

work is discarded or wrecked. For, the wreckers will have no viable
alternative to put forth but “UN resolutions” or “Kashmir is an internal
affair.” Matters will get worse in Kashmir. The new generation which
grew up during the militancy will be more assertive, not more quiescent.
The Four Point formula will be revived. The people have no respect for
wreckers.
Any settlement must conform to three tests and abide by four lim-
its. It must be acceptable to all the three parties – India, Pakistan and
Kashmir, all of whom have limited choices. India cannot accept Kash-

A.G. Noorani
mir’s secession from the Union nor Pakistan the LoC as an international
border. Kashmiris will not accept any solution which does not concede
azadi or self-rule, realistic in the circumstances, and which does not
reunite the State. The four points meet the tests and abide by the limits.
There is no secession; the LoC does not become an international bound-
ary and by the joint mechanism Pakistan acquires a say in East Kashmir
as India does in West Kashmir. De facto, though not de jure, the LoC
goes as a barrier and the State is reunited with both its parts guaranteed
self-rule.
This is a “non-territorial” solution which skirts the deal-breaker

of sovereignty. The UN Security Council last discussed Kashmir on 5
November 1965 in the aftermath of the 1965 war. In 1972 the parties
pledged themselves at Simla to a bilateral approach. Whether it was
based on an oral understanding to settle on the basis of the status quo
may be contested. What is incontestable is that during a tour of West
Kashmir on 7 November 1973 Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of-
fered the area choice between its present status and as a Province of
Pakistan. The implications are obvious.
With this accord both parties would do well to withdraw from the
UN Security Council their complaints and counter-complaints made 62
years ago. The UN Secretary General had erased it from the Council’s
agenda not long ago but restored it.
The non-territorial accord will acquire life over time, improve the
lot of the people and, one hopes, heal the wounds. The Memorandum
of Agreement can provide for a Review of these “Arrangements,” say
15 or 20 years later with a view to their improvement. Time is a great
healer and the time is come for India and Pakistan finally to give the
Kashmiris the opportunity to lead their lives by their own lights.

CRISIS OF STATE & GOVERNMENT
IN PAKISTAN
Shamshad Ahmad*
Abstract
(The story of Pakistan is one of remorseless tug and pull between the ci-
vilian and military rulers on the one hand, and the liberal and religious
forces on the other. In the process, the country has failed to develop a
sustainable democratic system based on constitutional supremacy and
institutional integrity. The main casualties have been the rule of law,
the state institutions and the process of national integration. It is the
story of a society that has been going round in aimless circles for the
last 62 years. Indeed, since independence, the people of Pakistan have
had no role in determining the course of their history or the direction
of their country’s political, economic and social policies. They have
been exploited in the name of ideology and external threats while the
real domestic challenges facing the nation have remained unaddressed.
Pakistan’s difficulties have been aggravated by long spells of military
rule, which never allowed democracy to take root in its soil.
It is not important whether we have a parliamentary or presidential

system because both, if rooted in the will of the people, are democratic.
It is time we seriously considered giving a chance to a genuinely dem-
ocratic presidential system, especially “designed for and tailored” to
Pakistan’s needs. We must understand that we are not Turkey or France
and should look at other more authentic but practical presidential mod-
els. We also need to explore “a proportional reorientation” system to
ensure greater access to non-feudal, non-elitist educated middle class
people in assemblies and governmental cadres. Author).
* Shamshad Ahmad is a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan.
Shamshad Ahmad
I. THEORY OF STATE & GOVERNMENT

Every community, however remote from the centers of civilization
its habitat may be and however primitive its culture, is organised
politically albeit in a rudimentary form. Moreover, in all regions today,
allegiance to the political organisations of the community is normally
self-inclusive and compulsive. Each individual whether he likes it or not
is a member of some state.
The state is as old as recorded history; and political theory is as

old as the state itself. It is also said that systematic political theory
appeared first among the Greeks of about the 5th century BC. This is true
in one sense; in writings available from earlier periods, there is little
explicit discussion of what could now be construed as major questions
of political theory.
A doctrine concerning the right location of political supremacy or

the proper sphere of governmental activity has ordinarily some logical
relation to a theory of the rational or moral basis of political authority in
general. A system of political doctrines sets up, or else assumes, some
universal criterion for judging the reasonableness or justice of any given
governmental organisation or policy. When certain powers are ascribed
to a state over its subjects, there has to be some sort of a theoretical
standard by which to appraise the soundness of the claims.1
Ever since the Platonic period, philosophers have sought to determine

the nature and meaning of a “good society and a good state” often giving
their own interpretations of what an ideal society and an ideal state ought
to be. Four of them, namely, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, in
particular, have made a great contribution to the development of the
concept of an ideal state as well as on “methods of government.” Each
one of them established a set of premises and, based on them, suggested
idealistic or pragmatic approaches to the structure of society, role of
leadership, rights of individuals and the nature and basis of justice.
Their interpretations have been formulated in western political

thought as diverse concepts of state and methods of government. The
foremost in this philosophical chain, however, is Plato’s ideal of the city

Crisis Of State & Government in Pakistan
state and his concept of the philosopher king. In Plato’s Republic (375
BC), justice is the central question addressed as a “concomitant virtue”
that results from harmonious cooperation among “virtuous individuals”
participating in the affairs of the state.2
According to Plato (428-348 BC), justice prevails only when each

person assumes his responsible role in the state and contributes to it
according to his “virtuous talents.” He elaborates that “in a just society,
each man does what he is best fitted to do by nature, accepting the task
which he is most able to accomplish; not only does he perform his own
special work, but he minds his own business as well.” He emphasized:
“indeed, interference with others who are attempting to carry on their
proper tasks creates conflict and disharmony, the essence of injustice.”3
Aristotle (384-322 BC) in his “Politics,” besides giving a

philosophical “theory of the State,” provides the conceptual framework
of the state, citizenship and the nature of government. He also makes a
detailed study of the “methods of government.” His greatest contributions
to political theories are his differentiation between the lawful monarch
and the willful tyrant, his argument that people have the right, by virtue
of their natural collective judgment, to elect their leaders and to hold
them accountable, and his concept that the state and society are man’s
vital necessity.
For Aristotle, good governance is a relative matter; there is no best

form for all peoples at all times. A good government is one whose rulers
seek the welfare of the people, whereas a corrupt government is one
whose rulers are primarily interested in their own wellbeing. A good
government degenerates into a corrupt one when the rulers begin to
devote themselves to private gain instead of public welfare. Thus each
good form of government has its corresponding corrupt form.4
Aristotle also applied the principle of “moderation in all things” to

the problem of evaluating any State: for example, was it too large or too
small for its population and location, or for the character and skills of
its people? He concluded that the good State is one in which the middle
class constitutes a majority.

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In Aristotle’s view, extremes must always be avoided, for too many
individuals in a given occupation will disturb the equilibrium of the
State. Too many soldiers, too many public officials, or too many of any
other group except the great middle class will harm or even destroy the
State. He cited the example of Sparta which was destroyed by over-
emphasis on the military way of life. The lesson of history is that the
basic nature of man requires peace, not war, and a State, in order to
survive and prosper, must be organized for peace, not war.
The political philosophy of Machiavelli (1469-1527) was based

on the “doctrine of necessity” (sounds familiar!) that justified any
ruler in using every means necessary, fair or foul, to maintain a strong
government. “The end justifies the means, even though that end is for the
sole benefit of the tyrant.” In his classic work, The Prince, Machiavelli
analyses as to what the ruler whom he calls “the Prince” needs to do to
maintain his full personal power, and to what extent and by what means
the Prince should keep faith with his subjects. He was of the view that
the “Prince should keep faith with his people by resorting to both law
and force.”5
Machiavelli’s philosophy of government is premised on his

assumption that in the absence of virtuous citizens, there are only “corrupt
masses” and since the end justifies the means, they can be controlled only
by a Prince through his “deceitful and vicious behaviour.”6 Machiavelli
also believed that to gain political power, it is necessary either to be “the
child of fortune and be born into power” or to “acquire power through
deceit and conquest.” To retain power, it will be necessary to eliminate
enemies within the state, and in destroying his enemies, “the ruler must
get rid of them decisively without mercy, lest some individual suffering
from minor injuries return to seek revenge.”
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) believed that the state must have

sufficient civil power to enforce covenants and to curb the basically anti-
social instincts of individuals. His philosophy is based upon a “social
contract” theory which constitutes a conceptual foundation for western
democracies. In his view, man is fundamentally an “untrustworthy
corrupt being” who has to protect himself from his fellows just as beasts

in the jungle do. Man, according to Hobbes, is not only so corrupt but
also so quarrelsome and belligerent that, except for very brief intervals
between quarrels, he is constantly fighting others.
For Hobbes, the “social contract” is essentially a means of establishing

civil rights by implementing the “golden rule” (Do unto others what you
would have them do to you), instead of nature’s law that might makes
right. A question, however, remains as to what happens if one party to
the “contract” refuses or fails to live up to the responsibilities by which
he is bound. Hobbes’ answer is that a “power” greater than those who
are party to the contract, does see that those who have so engaged do
fulfill their obligations under penalty of punishment.
This “power” or individual who himself is above the law (immune)

is called Leviathan, a moral God whose power to act issues from “natural
right” for he is the strongest power on earth (or at least in the nation).
This power is assumed to be the king, but if a power mightier than he
should arise on the horizon and subdue him, then “potentate” would
become the Leviathan. Where there is no king with absolute power, the
“contract” is made with an assembly of men, and the state is called
a “Commonwealth.”7 In substance, his theory amounted to identifying
government with force; at least, the force must always be present in the
background whether it has to be applied or not. 8
John Locke (1632-1704) is equally important to the “social contract”

theory. His philosophy was contained in two essays published in 1690
with the avowed purpose of defending the 1688-1689 Revolution in
England replacing James II with William III. Convinced that the crown
had been brought under parliamentary control and that religious liberty
had been restored, Locke published his two treatises on government in
1690 as vindication of the Revolution. The First Essay on Government
argued against the monarchy’s divine right to rule; the Second against
the absolutist theory of government, especially as advocated by Hobbes.
Like Hobbes, he believed that human nature allowed men to be selfish
but in his view, human nature is also characterized by reason and
tolerance.9

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Locke advocated governmental separation of powers and
believed that “revolution” is not only a right but an obligation in some
circumstances. He also placed more emphasis on natural liberty and
rights than on natural self-interestedness, and shared the assumption
with Rousseau that society must reflect the needs and desires of its
citizens as the foundation for the “social contract.” These ideas seem
to have had profound influence on the Constitution of the United States
and its Declaration of Independence.10
There may be no ideal state but in his “Social Contract,” Jean

Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) presented his ideal of a state, simple and
small enough for the individual to take an active part in its government,
thus ensuring that a citizen’s needs are answered by the State. Rousseau
accepted Hobbes’s concept of absolute sovereignty, but equated
sovereignty with the legislative power of the people as a whole. His
democratic philosophy upholds the principle that sovereignty resides
in the people alone and that all other power is dependent upon this
fundamental sovereign power. He was not, however, as optimistic as
Locke about human nature and acknowledged the dominance of instincts,
emotions and faith over reason in the human soul.
As to the form of an ideal State, Rousseau favored a Republic ruled

by laws, in which the government, run by popularly elected officials,
would implement the general will, while in his view absolute sovereignty
rests with the citizens as a body politic. Each individual will share in the
general will which ought to prevail for the good of all. He believed
that the particular structure is of minor consequence but there is no
substitute to a democratic system in which the sovereign power rests
with the people, for they alone are in possession of an inalienable will.
Although power may be delegated, the will cannot be delegated. 11
In Rousseau’s view, “sovereignty, being nothing but the exercise of

the general will, can never be alienated.” According to him, there is no
substitute to a democratic system in which sovereign power rests with
the people, for they alone are in possession of an “inalienable will.” He
concluded that “if there were a people of gods, it would govern itself
democratically.”12

II. CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY:
The concept of sovereignty has had a long history of development,
and it may be said that every political theorist since Plato has dealt with
the notion in some manner, although not always explicitly. The foremost
in this philosophical chain is Jean Bodin (1530-1596) who is considered
to be the modern initiator of the concept of sovereignty, with his 1576
treatise Six Books on the Republic which described the sovereign as a
ruler above human law and subject only to the divine or natural law.
Jean Bodin predefined the scope of the divine right of kings, stating
“Sovereignty is a Republic’s absolute and perpetual power.” According
to him, sovereignty is absolute, thus indivisible, but not without any
limits: it exercises itself only in the public sphere, not in the private
sphere. It is perpetual, because it does not expire with its holder. In other
words, sovereignty is no one’s property: by essence, it is inalienable.
He also used the concept of sovereignty to bolster the power of the
king over his feudal lords, heralding the transition from feudalism to
nationalism.13
The concept of state sovereignty, the principles of international

law, and the politics of the “balance of power” have been seen as the
cornerstones of the modern state system. The first has been elevated
to the dignity of a political theory and later to that of a juristic idea
underlying the whole structure of modern international jurisprudence.
The second has evolved into a system of public law in the community
of nations. The third has become an avowed principle of foreign policy,
accepted and acted upon so consistently by all the great states that it may
well be viewed as the central theme about which the web of diplomacy
is woven.14
The doctrine of sovereignty developed as part of the transformation

of the medieval system in Europe into the modern state system, a process
that culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In some ways the
emergence of the concept of sovereignty ran parallel with the similar
emergence of the idea of private property, both emphasizing exclusive
rights concentrated in a single holder, in contrast to the medieval system
of diffused and many-layered political and economic rights.15

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Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) identified state as an organic whole
in constant process of development, and designated “constitutional
monarchy” as the highest form of state, not democratic in the sense that
sovereignty resides in the people but representative in the sense that the
ruler is the figurehead of an organic totality, exemplifying the world
spirit. He asserted that “sovereignty is in the personality of the whole,
and is represented in the person of the monarch.”16
The Hegelian doctrine was reflected in autocratic constitutions

set up in the German states during the first half of nineteenth century.
Particularly in the Prussian constitution of 1851, and in academic treatises
upon that document, one found excessive assertions of the principle of
political authority.17
III. CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP

“...The strongest is never strong enough to be always the
master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into
duty...” –Jean Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract.
Historically, different social arrangements and legal structures have

warranted different forms and styles of leadership and governance.
Leadership is always a complicated amalgam of an individual personality,
the needs of and expectations of a community and the exigencies of
the age. The diverse theories of state and government have over the
centuries led to one of the great continuing inconclusive discussions:
whether a society creates its leaders or is created by them.”18
Plato’s preferred ruler was “the philosopher king” provided there is

such a “superior person who could rule with perfect wisdom and justice.”
According to him: “until kings become philosophers, or philosophers
kings, there is no hope for the state.” In the absence of a “philosopher
king,” Plato considered a Republic administered by an aristocracy
of the best qualified persons (morally and intellectually) as the most
wholesome government.19
For Aristotle, good governance was a relative matter as there is

no best form for all peoples at all times. He differentiated between the

“lawful monarch” and the “willful tyrant,” and favoured a government
that sought the welfare of the people.
In imperial China, Han Fei Tzu (280-230 BC) idealized the leader
as a “distant” figure of enlightened subtlety who kept very close counsel
and ruled not by virtue but by law. Having been a prince in the ruling
house of Han province, Han Fei Tzu addressed problems of authority and
governance as basic to the system of a state. He perceived that “nature
abhors a vacuum” and set a leader in this empty space to shape and mould
his people. Through the leader, the citizens were to be formed not only
as individuals but as members of a community. His doctrine envisaged
methods to be followed by government to ensure the “governed people
are not allowed to do what is bad.” 20
The legendary Lycurgus, depicted by Plutarch, inaugurated in Sparta

a systematic society in which the good of the community so dominated
the will of individual citizens that virtue and law were one and there was
no need for strong personalities among subsequent leaders. Lycurgus
would have been rejected by Ibn Khaldun, the great fourteenth century
Arab social scientist, who believed that social forces, not individuals,
generated history; consequently Ibn Khaldun’s ideal leader is a gentle
person whose mission is to promote the interests of his subjects.21
Machiavelli’s concept of “leadership” relied more on the ends

rather than the means. His “prince” had to be strong, pragmatic and
ruthless enough to unite the then city states of Italy. In the absence of
virtuous citizens, he believed, there are only “corrupt masses” who
can be controlled only by a “prince” through his “deceitful and vicious
behaviour.22
Machiavelli’s Prince has to be a “hypocritical and vacillating”

personality wearing the face of “mercy, faith, integrity, humanity, and
religion” to create a public image, but often acting contrary to those
very ideals. Only a few perceptive individuals will discover his real
character and they will not dare protest or move against “the vulgar tide”
adhering to the mighty Prince, who will continue to hold the balance of
power.23 For Machiavelli’s “prince” it is necessary to be “the child of

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fortune and be born into power” or to “acquire power through deceit
and conquest.”24
Rousseau’s “Social Contract” visualized a democratic system in

which the sovereign power rests with the people, for they alone are
in possession of an inalienable will and all other power is dependent
upon this fundamental sovereign power. In his view, only a popularly
elected government can implement the general will.25 Hegel, on his part,
glorified the state power beyond limits and considered its authority as
inevitably embodied in an “autocratic and powerful” government. He
recognized sovereignty of the general will but according to him, only
“wise rulers” knew what that will was.
All these theories aside, in practical terms, history is replete with

tales of political figures who not only equated themselves with the state
but also viewed their reign as a mere extension of their own egos and
idiosyncrasies. Even today, there is no dearth of “willful rulers” of all
sorts, elected or unelected, civilian or military, casting their shadows
across the world. State is once again, for all citizens and in all matters,
the highest arbiter of conduct and opinion, and is entitled to choose
its own means of asserting its supremacy. Ends justify the means no
matter what happens to democratic norms and fundamental rights and
freedoms. Modern patterns of power and leadership now represent a
curious convergence of Machiavellian “doctrine of necessity” and
Hegelian “philosophy of the state.”
“Take me to your leader” is easier said than done in today’s world.

Nations are not led by leaders any more. Modern civilization has
become an aberration of nature, for “man is born free and everywhere
he is in chains.” Countries, including those considered mothers and
champions of democracy are no longer governed by moral imperatives.
We are now familiar with what the former US President George W. Bush
considered to be the limits of his power—nothing. Sometime he even
claimed divine authority.
In pursuing his war on terror, George W.Bush claimed to be in direct

communication with God and insisted he was driven with a mission

from God. He once spontaneously expressed his mindset when he said:
“I am driven with a mission from God. God tells me: George go and
fight those terrorists in Afghanistan; and I did. Then God tells me George
go and end the tyranny in Iraq; and I did.” In the name of God, Bush
played havoc with the world. Apparently, he also had a divine mission
to protect and strengthen world’s military dictators and authoritarian
regimes. He used them as pawns of his global belligerence.
On several occasions in public appearances during his presidency,

George W. Bush was defending his policies including the one on
domestic spying without court approval, citing the inherent “war
powers of the presidency” under the U.S. Constitution. In doing so, the
president pointed to his status as commander-in-chief and the resolution
— approved by Congress after the 9/11 attacks — authorizing him to
use “all necessary and appropriate force” against the terrorists. It was an
obvious overreach of presidential prerogative; it all smacked of France’s
Louis XIV’s famous dictum: “L’etat, c’est moi”— “I am the state.” 26
IV. THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY:

Ever since the emergence of the nation-state, the world has experienced
many forms of political systems ranging from monarchies to republics;
from aristocracies to oligarchies and from tyranny to democracy. The
explanation and appraisal of democracy however has been a favourite
theme of ever-ongoing discussion since the earliest times of political
speculation. After centuries of trial and error, democracy has emerged
as the preferred choice. It is now considered universally applicable and
is also the most prevalent model of government in our era.
The arguments for democracy have been set forth in three principal
forms: namely, the doctrine of natural rights, the theory of the wellbeing
of the many, and the idealist view that democracy facilitates the full
realization of the most characteristic potentialities of human personality.
27
The theory that man has a natural right to participate in government
received its full expression in the terms that became the formulas
for future democratic doctrine, applicable notably in the seventeenth
century parliamentary revolution in England (1688). John Locke sought
to establish scientific justification for this revolution by constructing

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a theoretical foundation for the whole structure of a just and rational
political authority.
The utilitarian argument is that, “since political government has

no other end than the wellbeing of the individual men and women
that make up society, and since each individual’s wellbeing ought to
count for as much as that of any other individual, a society is properly
organised politically to the extent that its constitution and policy tend
to promote the interests, conserve the rights, and extend the capacities
and opportunities for happiness of the greatest number of individuals
in the community.”28 Democratic governments are supposed to meet
these requirements as they are least likely to subordinate the welfare of
the majority of the community to any particular person or segment of
society. Democracy means government by those who have the greatest
concern for and the greatest awareness of the interests and rights of the
people at large.
The idealist conception of democracy is concerned primarily with

less tangible values; not with democracy’s demonstrable benefits in
preserving order and security, extending physical comforts, and providing
means of education and culture, but with its effects in developing the
latent intellectual and spiritual qualities of individuals. Democracy’s
superior virtue, it is argued, following John Stuart Mill, lies in the fact
that it calls into activity the intelligence and character of ordinary men
and women.29
The modern version of democracy is a representative system in which

the problem is how to secure a system of voting that ensures the election
of representatives who reflect as completely as possible the varieties of
opinion of the electorate. The question of representation is thus the most
fundamental problem of today’s democracy. “Pure” democracy, in which
the politically qualified members of the community meet together for
the discussion and decision of public questions, is universally regarded
as suitable only for small communities with simple collective needs. It
has never widely existed and has now generally disappeared.30

Government by popular majorities means rule by the average man,
who is generally less intelligent, controlled in his opinions and conduct
more by emotion than by reason, of limited knowledge, lacking the
means of leisure necessary for the acquisition of information, knowledge
and understanding, and suspicious of any superior ability in others.
What political virtue, it is asked therefore, is there in mere superiority
in numbers? Our own national poet philosopher acknowledged this by
saying that “democracy is a form of government in which heads are
counted, not weighed.” In practice, it may indeed be the most difficult of
all forms of government since it requires the widest spread of intelligence
and education. In the words of a cynic, “you must not enthrone ignorance
just because there is so much of it.”
But all this notwithstanding, one thing is clear. In today’s radically

transformed world, there is no alternative to a democratic form of
government. With national boundaries redrawn, and new concepts and
ideas having replaced old ones, the dominant themes of world affairs
today are those of globalization and integration through greater economic
interaction between nations and peoples, promotion of development
and democracy as mutually reinforcing imperatives and respect for
fundamental freedoms and human rights.
V. PAKISTAN’S DILEMMA:
The sum-total of the above-cited historical contributions leads
us to the conclusion that states and methods of their governance are
always based on a “social contract,” which provides for the security and
protection of its citizens and their property by utilising the whole force
of the community. In joining this arrangement, each person is, in fact,
preserving his freedom, and obeying no one but himself.
For any state in the contemporary world, its constitution is its

solemn and inviolable “social contract” which guarantees fundamental
freedoms and basic rights of its citizens, including their inalienable
right to choose or change their government through independently cast
ballot, and which establishes the power and duties of the government
and provides the legal basis for its institutional structure.

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For the people of Pakistan, the challenge remains to find their place
in the annals of political history. For our political illiterates, however,
‘a good society and a good state’ or for that matter ‘good methods of
government’ remain merely philosophical expressions with no practical
relevance. To them, the essence of politics today is nothing else but
power and bounty, no matter how they achieve these.31
The nature and form of our political system has long been the subject
of debate in our country with no clarity in the minds of our people as
to which system suits them most. At the time of our independence,
we inherited, like India, a parliamentary tradition but soon lost track,
groping in the maze of political chaos and confusion. Since then, while
India has persisted with the basic norms of parliamentary democracy, we
have been experimenting with distorted versions of almost every form
of government ranging from democracy to dictatorship, from civilian to
military rule, and from parliamentary to presidential system.
Viewed from this perspective, we must confess, the evolution of

the political system in our country has been a tale of woes and wiles.
We have been experimenting with different systems at different times
and sometime all at the same time. We have done things in the name of
democracy that no other country in the world has ever experimented.
With an ingrained culture of “political opportunism and ineptitude” we
have yet to discover a theory of state and methods of government which
will suit the genius of our nation.
After the Quaid’s death, we in Pakistan have remained confronted

with an endemic leadership crisis, and have been experiencing systemic
aberrations with endless political merry-go-rounds and jockeying for
power. Consistency has never been a virtue as our history of frequent
governmental breakdowns and military coups reflect. For decades, we
have had a parliamentary system without parliament ever functioning
as a “full sovereign body” or playing a role in the decision-making
process.
Even today, “legislating” is a business beyond our parliament’s

purview. The legislators give priority to their own perks and privileges.

To them, genuine pluralism, good governance, the rule of law, the
separation of powers, institutional integrity, and normative standards
are secondary.
We have also been experimenting with our own version of the

presidential system, at times under chief martial law administrators,
including a civilian one, with no precedent and no relevance to established
models of world republics. Our present “neither parliamentary-nor-
presidential” system under a military dictator’s legacy in the form of
Seventeenth Amendment also has no parallel in political philosophy or
contemporary history.
The closest parallel to our system of government is perhaps the

Cromwell era of the seventeenth century in England known for its
assorted political experiments. These included the establishment and
dissolution of several parliaments, military rule, rule of the saints,
establishment and collapse of the ‘lord protectorate’ and finally an
unsuccessful attempt by Cromwell in the form of ‘humble petition and
advice’ to legalise his power through parliamentary authority.32
But Cromwell was at least conscientious enough to admit that the

source of his authority was force, not law. And he died a frustrated man
within seven months after he dissolved the last parliament in disgust,
having utterly failed in securing any popular basis for his power.33
In Pakistan, as in the England of the Cromwellian era, fundamental

values of freedom, democracy and human dignity have been breached
with impunity. Constitutions have been violated in letter and spirit with
‘a custom-made’ judiciary always available to sanctify military coups.
The tragedy of our nation is that democracy was never allowed to
flourish. Machiavelli’s political philosophy based on the “doctrine of
necessity” became an integral part of our body politic. We have become
an archetypal example of the Machiavellian princedom in which the
willful ruler uses every means to maintain his rule.
In Pakistan, this doctrine was repeatedly sanctified allowing

successive dictators, civil or military, to circumscribe the supremacy

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and integrity of the Constitution. Ironically, almost in every instance,
there was someone from the judiciary to provide a legal cover to this
unconstitutional power play which not only reinforced the systemic
aberrations of our body politic but also prolonged the staying power of
the “willful ruler” as well as the agony of the nation.34
In his historic address to Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly

on 11 August 1947, the Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had
urged the federal legislature to function as a fully “sovereign body.”35
Unfortunately neither the Constituent Assembly nor the subsequent
parliaments in our history have been able to function as a “full sovereign
body” as was envisioned by the Quaid. He also reminded the legislators
of their “onerous responsibility” of framing the future Constitution of
Pakistan and functioning, as a full and complete sovereign body, as the
federal legislature of Pakistan.36 It took our politicians nine years and
several governments to frame our first Constitution in 1956 which was
abrogated in less than three years.
Since then, we have had two Constitutions, one promulgated by

a field marshal president on 8 June 1962, which was first overtaken
by the proclamation of “emergency” on 6 September 1965, when the
armed conflict with India began and then abrogated altogether by the
next chief martial law administrator president on 25 March 1969, and
the other adopted by an “elected” legislature of the truncated Pakistan
in 1973, which has since been amended 17 times leaving very little of
the original text in its essence. It is a different Constitution altogether.
A cycle of frequent political breakdowns and resultant long spells

of military rule disabled our institutional framework unleashing a
culture of political opportunism. Mostly, we have had a “trivialized”
parliament playing no role in the country’s decision-making. Since our
independence, we have been experimenting with almost every form of
government from democracy to dictatorship, from civilian to military
rule, and from parliamentary to presidential system. We also tried a half-
baked version of socialism, the outcome of a personalized and arbitrary
decision by an elected prime minister nationalizing in one stroke our

banks, schools and colleges and major industries. Subsequently, the tide
had to be reversed at huge national losses.
The Quaid had the ability to see far ahead of his times. Addressing the
officers of the Army Staff College, Quetta, on 14 June 1948, he reminded
the armed forces of their constitutional responsibilities, urging them “to
understand the true constitutional and legal implications of their oath of
allegiance.” Indeed, he had foreseen the ominous writing on the wall.
The tale of our country’s subsequent political history is a sad reflection
on our successive failures to uphold and preserve the sanctity of our
Constitution. We have had long spells of military rule, and paid a heavy
price in terms of broken oaths and resultant institutional paralysis.37
We lost half the country after our first-ever “free and fair elections.”
We have executed an elected prime minister and exiled two others. We
have had three constitutions — two of them abrogated by successive
military rulers within a period of 10 years, and the third one adopted by
an “elected” legislature of a truncated Pakistan in 1973 which has since
been amended by two military rulers 17 times and what remains is a
mutilated document with no semblance to the original text.
India, despite its huge size and socio-economic challenges, remains

steadfast in its democratic experience and today enjoys global respect as
the world’s largest democracy. It has enjoyed a providential continuity
in its leadership and political institutions with the supremacy of the
constitution and sanctity of the recognised political processes remaining
inviolable. Governments have always changed through an electoral
process and the political leadership remains subservient to the will of
the people which is exercised on a regular basis through fair and free
elections.
Even a country like Bangladesh, which broke away from Pakistan

after being subjected to a military operation, is today respected globally
as a democratic country where governments change through elections. It
is also the home of the internationally acclaimed Grameen Bank which
gave the world the concept of micro-credit. This shows that democracy
does sharpen the innovative intellectual faculties of a nation.

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Sixty two years after independence, where do we stand as a nation
and as a member of the international community today? What has
happened to the vision that our Quaid had delineated for our country as
a democratic and progressive state which he thought would be “one of
the greatest nations of the world?” These are painful questions and need
an equally painful self-reappraisal to be able to find their answers. A
cursory look at Pakistan’s chequered constitutional and political history
might give us some idea.
VI.THE CHEQUERED HISTORY:

Pakistan’s post-independence political history has been replete
with endemic crises and challenges that perhaps no other country in
the world has experienced. It has gone through traumatic episodes,
including costly wars and perennial tensions with India, loss of half the
country, territorial setbacks, political breakdowns, military take-overs,
economic stagnation, social malaise, societal chaos and disintegration,
sectarianism, and a culture of violence and extremism.
Ever since its birth, Pakistan’s quest for survival has been as
compelling as it has been uncertain. It has been engaged in a precarious
struggle to define a national identity and evolve a political system for
its ethnically and linguistically diverse population. Pakistan is known
to have over twenty languages and nearly 300 distinct dialects. This
diversity contributed to chronic regional tensions and provincial
disharmony which not only impeded the process of constitution-making
but also remained a .potential threat to central authority.38
While the provincial arenas continued to be the main centers of

political activity, those who set about creating the centralized government
in Karachi were either politicians with no real support or civil servants
trained in the old traditions of the British Indian administration. The
inherent weaknesses of the Muslim League’s structure, together with
the absence of a central administrative apparatus that could coordinate
the affairs of the state, proved to be a crippling disadvantage for Pakistan
overall.39

Besides the military and the civil bureaucracy which wielded real
authority, Pakistan underwent the Byzantine intrigues of politicians thus
unleashing continuous political and economic crises. The politicians
were corrupt and addicted to power for securing only the interests of
the elite. They foisted themselves as the representative authority and the
hope of a democratic state that could provide socio-economic justice
and fair administration to all Pakistani citizens remained elusive. The
raging controversies over the issue of the national language, the role of
Islam, provincial representation, and the distribution of power between
the center and the provinces delayed constitution making and postponed
general elections.40
At the time of independence in 1947, we inherited the Government

of India Act, 1935, which remained our constitutional framework
with necessary adaptations and modifications in the form of Indian
Independence Act 1947 passed by the British Parliament. Under this
Act, a “sovereign” Constituent Assembly was established with the twin
tasks of (a) drafting the new Constitution of Pakistan, and (b) acting as
the Federal Legislature of Pakistan.41 For nine years, we “practiced”
democracy with a quasi-parliamentary system in a political void for we
had no constitution of our own.
The first major step in framing the constitution was the adoption of
the Objectives Resolution in March 1949 defining the basic principles
of the new state. It provided that Pakistan would be a state “wherein the
principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice,
as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed; wherein the Muslims
shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective
spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as
set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah; [and] wherein adequate provision
shall be made for the minorities to freely progress and practice their
religions and develop their cultures.”42
Seven years of debate failed to produce agreement on fundamental

issues such as regional representation or the structure of a constitution.
This impasse prompted Governor General Ghulam Mohammad to
dismiss the Constituent Assembly on 24 October 1954 in what was the

Shamshad Ahmad
first coup, though a civilian one, in Pakistan’s history which resulted
in a constitutional deadlock. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld
the action of the governor general, arguing that he had the power to
dissolve the Constituent Assembly and veto legislation it passed. This
preeminence of the governor general over the legislature was referred to
as the viceregal tradition in Pakistan’s politics.43
The new Constituent Assembly, which was soon elected, produced

the Constitution of the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” which came into
force on 23 March 1956. It provided a parliamentary form of government
with a President elected by the members of the National Assembly and
two Provincial Assemblies, and a Cabinet of Ministers headed by a
Prime Minister appointed by the President. This Constitution remained
operative for about two and a half years. The political instability resulting
from frequent changes of governments at the Centre and in the Provinces
led to the abrogation of the Constitution and declaration of Martial
Law throughout the country on 7 October 1958. The Commander-in
Chief of the Pakistan Army, who was acting as the Chief Martial Law
Administrator, became the President of Pakistan on 27 October 1958.44
On 1 March 1962, Field Marshal (as he had by then become)

Muhammad Ayub Khan promulgated a new Constitution which came
into force on 8 June 1962. It provided essentially a presidential system
with no checks and balances. This Constitution was rendered superfluous
when on 6 September 1965 (the day the war with India broke out),
emergency was proclaimed in the country suspending all the fundamental
rights available under the Constitution.45 The country continued to be
governed by the emergency measures till 16 February 1969, when the
Proclamation of emergency was revoked by the President.
After a political agitation and resultant disturbances all over the

country, President Ayub was forced to relinquish his office on 25 March
1969. He handed over all powers to his “natural” successor, General
Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, who took
over as the Chief Martial law Administrator and assumed the office of
the President. The new military ruler abrogated the Constitution and
dissolved the National and Provincial assemblies.

On 4 April 1969, General Yahya Khan as Chief Martial Law
Administrator issued a Provisional Constitution Order which was to
serve, along with the Proclamation of Martial Law dated 25 March
1969, as a guide-post for “the working of the machinery of Government”
and for the State of Pakistan “to be governed as nearly as might be in
accordance with the abrogated Constitution of 1962.” All fundamental
rights were annulled. It was during this period that under the Provisional
Legal Framework Order (1970) issued on 30 March 1970, fateful general
elections were held in December 1970, which then led to the break-up
of Pakistan, the worst tragedy that could happen to any country.46
The next Constitution, adopted by the parliament of the truncated

Pakistan and enforced on 23 March 1973 provided for a federal
parliamentary system of government with the chief executive’s authority
vested in a popularly elected Prime Minister, who subject to support of
the majority in the Parliament was to function as head of government.
The federal legislature was a bicameral Majlis-e-Shoora (parliament)
composed of the Senate (Upper House) and the National Assembly
(Lower House).47
On 5 July 1977, another Martial Law was proclaimed and the

Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Mohammad Ziaul Haq, assumed office
as Chief Martial Law Administrator. He declared that the Constitution
would remain in abeyance. The Parliament was dissolved and the
civilian governments at the Centre and in the Provinces ceased to hold
office. Later, when the President elected by the former parliament
resigned, Gen.Ziaul Haq became President but also retained his post
of Chief Martial law Administrator. On 24 March 1981, he issued the
Provisional Constitutional Order 1981 restoring selected articles of the
Constitution.
General elections on a non-party basis were held in the country under

the amended 1973 Constitution in February 1985. Prior to this event, a
referendum was conducted on 19 December 1984, which indirectly was
used as an affirmative vote for President Ziaul Haq to continue as the
President for the next five years. Civilian governments were installed
both at the federal as well as provincial levels. Mohammad Khan Junejo,

Shamshad Ahmad
a member of the National Assembly from Sindh, was appointed Prime
Minister.
Martial Law was lifted on 30 December 1985. Prior to this, the

National Assembly and the Senate had approved the Constitution (8th
Amendment) Bill in October/November 1985 as a result of which the
powers of the executive at the federal level were divided between the
Prime Minister and the President. This amendment turned out to be the
most detrimental to the people’s faith in the democratic system. It gave
the president complete control and power over the “elected” set-up. Since
then successive presidents, civilian and non-civilian, took recourse to
the 8th Amendment to dismiss governments and legislatures at will.48
Under the amended Constitution, the system for electing the president
was also changed. The presidential electoral body was reconstituted
and restricted to the National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial
Assemblies sitting together. Under the 8th Amendment, it was made
obligatory for the Prime Minister to keep the President fully informed
of the affairs of the Federation and of the proposals for legislation. At
the same time, in exercise of his functions, the President was required to
act in accordance with the advice tendered by the cabinet or the Prime
Minister. The balance of power was thus blatantly in favour of the
president.
The legislative powers between the Federation and the Provinces

were distributed as shown in two lists under Part V of the Constitution
(i) federal Legislative List and (ii) the Concurrent Legislative List.
While legislation in the Federal List was only the prerogative of the
Federation, the Concurrent List was open to both the Provinces and the
federation with equal right to frame laws.49
On 29 May 1988, President Ziaul Haq dissolved the National

Assembly and removed Prime Minister Junejo under article 58-2-b of
the Constitution. He claimed that Junejo was conspiring against him in
order to undermine his position, and accused the National Assembly of
corruption and failure to enforce Islamic way of life. He also expressed
his intention to hold new elections on a non-party basis as in 1985, but the

Supreme Court ruled that this went against the spirit of the constitution.
Political confusion ensued as a result of Zia’s proposal to postpone the
elections to re-structure the political system in the name of Islam. There
was fear that Zia may impose martial law and the Muslim League became
divided between supporters of Zia and Junejo. The political uncertainty
continued till President Ziaul Haq was killed in a mysterious air crash
on 17 August 1988. 50
In accordance with the stipulations of the constitution, the chairman

Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, was sworn in as president and elections
were announced. For the first time in fifteen years, the November 1988
elections were based on political party platforms. None of the parties
secured an outright majority in the National Assembly but the Pakistan
People’s Party won the largest number of seats. Benazir Bhutto, the PPP
chairperson, became prime minister after her party managed to cobble
together a working majority in coalition with a number of smaller parties.
Her government was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in
1990 under the 8th amendment, and this was upheld by the Supreme
Court. Fresh elections were accordingly held and the PML-N leader,
Mian Nawaz Sharif, was elected Prime Minister.
The game of political snakes and ladders continued with abandon.

Nawaz Sharif was removed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1993
after a tense “turf-related” struggle between the two. Elections were held
again and Benazir returned to power in 1993. Her second government
was also short-lived as it was dismissed in 1996 by Farooq Leghari, who
had been her hand-picked choice as the president. The next elections
resulted in a landslide victory for Nawaz Sharif who became Prime
Minister for another term in February 1997.51
Despite his “heavy mandate,” Nawaz Sharif’s government was

toppled on 12 October 1999 by the Army and Gen. Pervez Musharraf
took over as the Chief Executive with full powers of a Prime Minister.
In 2002, he removed the elected President, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, and
assumed that office himself. He also amended the Constitution with
impunity. The 17th Amendment left the 1973 Constitution totally changed
in its substance. A Parliament was elected in 2002 which virtually had

Shamshad Ahmad
no role to play in national affairs. It was a “trivialized” parliament meant
only to rubber-stamp the decisions of the military ruler, who had become
increasingly powerful because of the post-9/11 US backing for him.
VII. MUSHARRAF’S ‘BELLYACHE’ ERA:

Ironically, Musharraf himself acknowledged that given Pakistan’s
checkered political history, alternating between martial law and sham
democracy, the way to true democracy had been “difficult, requiring
travel on several different paths at once.” In his book, In the Line of
Fire, he claims: “Our main political parties have in reality been no more
than family cults, a dynastic icon at their head. Remove the icon, and the
party evaporates.” Did he do anything to change the situation?
On the contrary, at the advice of a close friend and associate, he

established a “king’s party” of his own, the “Q League.” This new entity
was also not without a dynastic cult, a feudal one, which derived its
power from no one other than himself as its “uniformed” icon. He knew
only too well that the “Q League” could not survive without him as, in
his own words, “Remove the icon, and the party evaporates.”52
Musharraf also tried to impose his own brand of governance on the

country as described by him in Part IV of his book under the heading
“Rebuilding the Nation.” He moved along with his personal agenda
under the pretence of “putting the system right” through what he claimed
was a “silent revolution” in the guise of a new local government system
and police reforms. The ill-disguised purpose of both was not to rectify
the existing system but to manipulate grass-roots support for the “king’s
party.”
The damage that both these mechanisms, for the ostensible purpose
of “national reconstruction,” have done to the country’s professional
administrative machinery and the corruption they have spawned
constitute major impediments in the way of efficient governance. It is
vitally important that the entire local government structure created by
Musharraf along with the self-serving police system be dismantled.53

Apparently, Gen. Musharraf was himself conscious of the spurious
nature of these reforms. He acknowledged this at the bottom of page
333 of his book in the context of what he described as the “serious
downside” of democracy in Pakistan. According to him, this is the
problem with democracy in “illiterate, feudal, tribal, and parochial
societies.” Alluding to his “devolution” plan, he reminded the people of
Pakistan not to “bellyache” about the poor quality of parliamentarians
and ministers because there are none others that they can elect. In other
words, he gave them his “devolution” plan with all its “bellyache”
effects only to tell them: you asked for it.54
But Musharraf should have also known that Pakistan’s peculiar

socio-economic and political culture, based on feudal and tribal structure,
economic disparity, illiteracy, and inequality of wealth and power is only
symptomatic of a lopsided situation that cannot be corrected by bellyache-
giving “devolution” plans or by putting the police at the beck and call
of the feudal lords, the chaudharis and the waderas. Unfortunately,
despite Musharraf’s reforms, nothing is right in our political system.
It is neither parliamentary nor presidential, and is without any parallel
in contemporary history. The Pakistani people are losing faith in the
democratic system. They feel it is genetically corrupt, haphazard and
based on the machinations of the military and the bureaucratic elite.
This perception was reinforced by the fact that Nawaz Sharif was
elected prime minister in 1990 but dismissed in 1993 even though he had
liberalized the economy, restored confidence of domestic and foreign
investors, the impact of which was that investments increased by 17.6
percent. Alongside this the GDP registered a growth of 6.9 percent while
the inflation rate was kept below 10 percent. President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan was accused of conspiring with Benazir Bhutto in the dismissal
of Sharif. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, the Supreme Court
declared the dismissal of the National Assembly and Sharif government
unconstitutional and reinstated the elected political dispensation.55
The most grotesque travesty of all norms of justice was Musharraf’s

National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) of 5 October 2007. As he was
nearing the completion of his five-year presidential term, he had earlier,

Shamshad Ahmad
in March 2007, ignited a constitutional and judicial crisis by removing
Pakistan’s Chief Justice through an illegal “presidential reference” in
order to preempt any ruling by the latter on his eligibility for re-election.
He was determined to remain in power at any cost and by all means, no
matter what happened to the country or its people. However this back-
fired as the Chief Justice was reinstated on 20 July 2007 by a bench of
the Supreme Court headed by Justice Khalilur Rahman Ramday. Prior
to the restoration of the Chief Justice there had been a massive and
unprecedented public outcry against his dismissal.
On 6 October 2007, a day after the promulgation of the infamous

NRO, Musharraf got himself re-elected as president for another five-
year term in violation of the Constitution. The election was not only
farcical but also betrayed shameless political manipulation. The support
of the Q-League for Musharraf was never in doubt and it was ensured
that the main opposition party, the PPP, would not stand in the way. The
main purpose of the NRO was to indemnify the leadership of the PPP
from criminal prosecution as a quid pro quo for Musharraf’s re-election
in violation of Pakistan’s Constitution. 56
The NRO unveiled the real face of Pakistan’s politics of “loot and
plunder” about which Musharraf had been trying to convince the people
ever since he usurped power. The message he sought to convey was
that it was this rampant corruption that justified military take-overs
in the country. By granting “amnesty” for all “politically-motivated”
corruption charges from January 1986 to 12 October 1999 in the name
of “national reconciliation” and “political harmony,” General Musharraf
in fact achieved two sinister objectives. First, he managed to besmear
the image of Pakistan’s politicians as he had depicted them in his book
In the Line of Fire; and, second, he neutralised the country’s largest
political party during the process of his controversial “re-election.”57
It was political expediency, and not any lofty ideal of national

reconciliation, that underpinned this arrangement. Benazir Bhutto was
to return to Pakistan to be elected as prime minister while Musharraf
was to shed his military uniform and continue as the president in the
new American-choreographed political dispensation. The NRO was

challenged in the courts of law and Musharraf sensed trouble for his
political future. He accordingly tried without success to persuade Benazir
Bhutto not to return to Pakistan.
On her return from exile in October 2007, it did not take Benazir
Bhutto long to discover the real mood of the people. She heard the
thunder of the gathering political storm and the populist slogan of “Go
Musharraf Go.” She spontaneously started working in line with the
Charter of Democracy that she had co-authored with the PML-N leader,
Nawaz Sharif, in August 2006. A democrat to the core, Benazir Bhutto
could not let her name be sullied by association with a dictator. She
realised democracy would not return through dubious deals, and joined
the people in their struggle for the independence of the judiciary.
Addressing a rally at Liaquat Bagh on 27 December 2007, Benazir

Bhutto told her supporters: “I put my life in danger and came here because
I feel this country is in danger. People are worried. We will bring the
country out of this crisis.” She also alluded to the dangers she faced, as
she had been doing ever since she returned to Pakistan in October after a
long self-imposed exile. Within minutes of her departure from the rally,
she was killed in a terrorist attack under mysterious circumstances.
Though two years have passed since that tragic event, her
assassination is yet to be properly investigated. At another level, the
country has drifted into an abysmal political chaos and confusion. No one
knows what lies ahead for this tortured nation, which stands completely
torn apart and emotionally shattered. With a dictator’s legacy of the
notorious 17th Amendment still intact, the country remains shorn of
genuine democracy. Governance is at its worst. Corruption has soared to
alarming levels. The NRO, being an outright constitutional subversion
and judicial circumvention, is dead.58 The cases that had been set aside
under this defunct ordinance will now be settled through the courts.
The assemblies that had elected Musharraf for his first term were
nearing the completion of their tenures and he hastened to have himself
re-elected by the same rubber stamp federal and provincial legislatures.
General Musharraf then shocked the world through his 3 November

Shamshad Ahmad
action -by not only promulgating a “provisional constitutional order”
(PCO) but also illegally removing those judges of the superior courts
who refused to take fresh oath under the PCO. It was an undeclared
‘martial law’ in the name of “emergency” and an assault in one stroke
on the constitution, the judiciary, the media and the fundamental rights
of the people.59 It was a re-play of Louis XIV’s arrogant assertion: “It is
legal because I wish it.”
VIII. 18 FEBRUARY 2008 ELECTIONS:

The 18 February 2008 election finally presented the people of
Pakistan an opportunity to give their verdict. We now have a government
which the people brought to power to bring an end to dictatorship.
Pakistanis opted for democracy and showed to the world that contrary
to what General Musharraf had been telling his Western audiences, they
were fully capable of practicing real democracy with all its fundamental
norms and values.
The people of Pakistan do not accept the mutilated constitution as

it now exists. They want this basic law to be restored to the form it was
on 12 October 1999 as the legal basis of their governmental structures
and powers. Only then can there be institutional integrity as well as
a guarantee for their fundamental freedoms and rights, including their
inalienable right to choose or change their government through the
democratic method of free and fair elections.
The people thought that with their vote for a change in the system,
“real” democracy would finally return to their country. But till now
this has proved to be a forlorn hope. What prevails is a farce in the
guise of democracy. The PPP Co-Chairperson, Asif Ali Zardari, has got
himself elected as president without relinquishing his party post. This
is a violation of the tradition and an ethical code established by Quaid-
e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1947 when, as Governor General, he
refused to remain head of the Muslim League.
Furthermore, Zardari, for the first one-and-half years of his

presidency, despite solemn pledges that he would rescind the 17th
Amendment, tenaciously clung to this legacy of his dictator predecessor.

He continued to wear the shallow mask of democracy but refused to
divest himself of General Musharraf’s absolute powers. For an elected
president, there is no justification to continue to draw his strength from
undemocratic legislative instruments left behind by a military ruler.
In the Charter of Democracy, the leaders of the two mainstream

political parties, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, had reaffirmed their
commitment to the restoration of the 1973 Constitution as it stood on
12 October 1999, and also to the fundamental values and freedoms
as available in all democratic societies. Despite the pious reiterations
that the Charter of Democracy would be faithfully implemented, it
seems to have been declared “a no go area” for the “elected” National
Assembly.
For us, perhaps, this is one more agonizing moment to reflect on

what, after all, is wrong with our nation. It is nothing but our governance
failures and leadership infirmities as well as the lust for power that
continue to undermine the democratic process and the institutional
integrity of the country. Democracy is not all about elections or the
principle of universal suffrage. It is about the people who are the final
arbiters of their destiny and for whose welfare the elected leaders must
devote themselves.
The people may vote as they have been “voting so affectionately”

for three decades for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, but ultimately it is history
that intervenes with its judgment in cases where the people made a
wrong choice. Despite the US backing till the last, General Musharraf
did not survive more than a year of his “unconstitutional” new term.
History didn’t let him complete his five years. He was forced to quit, and
now stands doomed to ignominy.
President Zardari has been in office just a little over a year and a half
but history is already judging him. It is between history and Zardari
now. The question is if democracy can make history in America, why
doesn’t it make history in our country? Don’t we have anyone with
credibility to bring stability to our country? Where is our Obama? Or
shall we look for a Harry Potter to come and rescue our nation!!

Shamshad Ahmad
But changing faces alone will not do. In order to root out our
domestic weaknesses and systemic aberrations, we need nothing short
of a revolution. Land reforms and the undoing of privileges for the
“privileged” at state expense should be the first step. It is time to say
good bye to political dynasties and the feudal and elitist political culture.
It is time for the genuine empowerment of the people. Only men and
women of integrity, not the corrupt breed of politicians currently at the
helm, can provide the leadership that the country so desperately needs.
IX. CONCLUSION:
The story of Pakistan is one of remorseless tug and pull between the
civilian and military rulers on the one hand, and the liberal and religious
forces on the other. In the process, the country has failed to develop a
sustainable democratic system based on constitutional supremacy and
institutional integrity. The main casualties have been the rule of law, the
state institutions and the process of national integration. It is the story
of a society that has been going round in aimless circles for the last 62
years.
Indeed, since independence, the people of Pakistan have had

no role in determining the course of their history or the direction of
their country’s political, economic and social policies. They have been
exploited in the name of ideology and external threats while the real
domestic challenges facing the nation have remained unaddressed.
Pakistan’s difficulties have been aggravated by long spells of military
rule, which never allowed democracy to take root in its soil.
The question of provincial autonomy still remains the key to

addressing the issues of federalism in the country. There is also a strong
underlying resentment in Balochistan (and in other provinces also)
against what is seen as continued “Punjabi dominance,” inequitable
distribution of power and resources, and exploitation of the province’s
natural wealth. In East Pakistan too, the problems started with a similar
deep-rooted sense of deprivation and a feeling of political and economic
alienation which, over time, became a politico-constitutional crisis
involving a demand for larger autonomy, and leading eventually to the
break-up of the country.

Our Constitution has been amended time and again for reasons
of political power and expediency. If any changes are needed in the
Constitution to redress provincial grievances, they should be made
to remove the underlying causes of injustice and socio-economic
deprivation of the people of smaller provinces. These are exceptional
times warranting exceptional responses to our problems. We must avoid
reaching a point of no return.
Given Pakistan’s peculiar socio-economic and political culture,

based on feudal and tribal structures, accompanied by crippling poverty
and illiteracy and the pathetic performance in our political conduct since
independence, we, like most developing countries, are perhaps not yet
fit for the parliamentary system. Britain struggled for centuries to reach
its current parliamentary status. For us, it would be too long and too
arduous a journey that we cannot afford especially if we are chasing
only illusory goals.
It is not important whether we have a parliamentary or presidential

system because both, if rooted in the will of the people, are democratic.
It is time we seriously considered giving a chance to a genuinely
democratic presidential system, especially “designed for and tailored”
to Pakistan’s needs. We must understand that we are not Turkey or
France and should look at other more authentic but practical presidential
models. We also need to explore “a proportional reorientation” system
to ensure greater access to non-feudal, non-elitist educated middle class
people in assemblies and governmental cadres.
If the history of the power game in our country is any guide, and if
our political inadequacies have any lesson for us, we need to extricate
ourselves from the parliamentary marshland and look for an alternative
form of government that suits our nation’s “genius,” and in which the
sovereign power rests with the people who alone possess the “inalienable
will.” Cromwell knew that “no system of government, however efficient,
can long survive unless it rests upon the consent of the governed.”

Shamshad Ahmad
References:
1 Recent Political Thought: Francis W. Coker (Calcutta, 1957)
2 The Republic, Book VII: Plato
3 Ideas of the Great Philosophers: William Sahakian
4 Politics, Book III: Aristotle
5 Ideas of Great Philosophers: William Sahakian
6 Ibid
7 Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes, (London, 1651)
8 A History of Political Theory: George H. Sabine (London, 1959)
9 Two Treatises of Government: John Locke (1690)
10 Visions of Politics: Quentin Skinner (Cambridge)
11 The Social Contract: Rousseau; Translated by Henry J. Tozer (London, 1902)
12 Ibid
13 Jean Bodin et son temps; Henri Baudrillart, (Paris 1853)
14 Ibid
15 Sovereignty; Barrry Buzan, Answers.Com
16 Recent Political Thought; Francis W. Coker, (Calcutta, 1957)
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
19 Ibid
20 Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings; Aspen Institute, New York
21 Ibid
22 Recent Political Thought; Francis W. Coker,1957
23 Ibid
24 Ibid
25 Ibid
26 The Boulder Daily, Colorado 27 January, 2006
27 Recent Political Thought: Thomas W. Coker, PP 2991-307 (Calcutta, 1957).
28 Ibid
29 Ibid
30 Ibid
31 Challenges to Political Stability: Shamshad Ahmad (Dawn, June 09, 2006)
32 British History: Ramsay Muir PP 281-285 (London, 1950)
33 Ibid
34 Ibid
35 Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-1948 (Islamabad
1989)
36 Ibid
37 Moving Away from the Quaid’s Vision: Shamshad Ahmad (Dawn, March 23, 2005)
38 Dreams Unfulfilled: Shamshad Ahmad (JBD Lahore, 2009)
39 Pakistan: A Political History; Asia Society’s Encyclopedia of Asian History (2008)
40 Ibid
41 Pakistan Year Book 1969; Government of Pakistan; National Publishing House Ltd,
Karachi
42 Ibid
43 Pakistan: A Political History; Asia Society’s Encyclopedia of Asian History (2008)
44 Ibid
45 Ibid

46 Ibid
47 Ibid
48 Ibid
49 Ibid
50 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 In the Line of Fire: Pervez Musharraf (Simon & Schuster, NY, 2006)
53 Ibid
54 Ibid
55 A Political History; Asia Society’s Encyclopedia of Asian History (2008)
56 A dictator’s ‘akhri mukka’: Shamshad Ahmad (The News, November 21, 2009)
57 Ibid
58 Ibid
59 Turning strength into right: Shamshad Ahmad (Dawn, February 18, 2008)

BANGLADESH ECONOMY AND
GLOBAL CRISIS
Kazi Anwarul Masud*
Abstract
The contagion of global meltdown that started in the US has caught
up with the others. What should then the least developed countries
such as Bangladesh do? Ever since the Asian recession of 1997-98, the
US has been described as “the buyer of last resort” taking in imports
that could not profitably be absorbed in the Asian markets. Our export
basket consists of few items involving low technology, and now with
buyers’ conservatism the price of our exportable goods is bound to
come down further. The other foreign exchange earner, remittances
of our workers abroad also faces uncertainty as no one knows what
shape the construction sector will take in the coming months and years.
Remittance, a quarter coming from the developed countries, will shrink.
It is impossible to put figures to these variables as these will depend
on the evolving condition of the global economy. The rate of interest
being reduced by the central banks throughout the world is designed to
encourage investment. Devaluation of the Bangladesh currency would
make sense had demand elasticity of the country’s exportable surplus
been price responsive. It would also make our imports dearer. Since
external factors appear to be unfavorable in the short term, Bangladesh
has to develop its agriculture that accounts for 30 percent of its GDP at
present. Monetary policy should be conservative. The tax net should be
extended and tax payers must pay their dues. Corruption, that eats away
about 3 percent of our growth, has to be brought under control. Author.
* Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Economy and Global Crisis
There will always be skeptics about the benefits of globalization for
developing countries. “Conventionally the colonization of the future,”
writes political thinker Ziauddin Sardar, “was known as westernization.
Now it goes under the rubric of globalization.” He lamented that
the real power of the West is not located in its economic muscle and
technological might. Rather it resides in its power to define. The non-
Western civilizations simply have to accept these definitions or be
defined out of existence.
But that the globalization is an irreversible process has been

demonstrated by the overwhelming effects on the economy due to the
current global meltdown and the recession of the major economies of
the world. The rich-poor divide, a historical phenomenon, is mostly
due to the reluctance of the rich to share their prosperity with others.
The occasional handouts given to the developing countries along with
lectures as to their deficient institutional reforms and corruption (the
allegations are true in many cases) have rarely brought the poor out of
poverty as most of the so-called aid is taken away by the donors in the
form of import payment and consultancy fees. The Scottish philosopher
Robert Owen once remarked that it was necessary for the greater part
of the people to live in misery to enable the privileged segment of the
society to live in the splendor that they have been used to.
The demise of socialism came as a great relief to the capitalist

society who clung to Adam Smith’s cardinal principle that a minimalist
role by the government can ensure the highest level of prosperity for any
nation, a principle totally embraced by Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher. The collapse of Wall Street compared by Joseph Stiglitz to
the fall of the Berlin Wall has reminded the world that one percent of
the people owning 20 percent of the wealth, as now in the US, cannot
bring about social cohesion. On the contrary this could have tinder box
effect and result in societal explosion. Following the continuing disaster
of the global meltdown, G-20 states held a summit meeting. Regarding
developing and least developed countries, G-20 members promised
“reform of the Bretton Wood Institutions so that they can more adequately
reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to
increase their legitimacy and effectiveness. In this respect the emerging

Kazi Anwarul Masud
and developing economies, including the poorest countries, should
have greater voice and representation. The Financial Stability Forum
(FSF) must expand urgently to a broader membership of the emerging
economies.” Despite the large scale-down of economic activities in
the developed countries, the G-20 leaders rejected protectionism and
pledged not to turn inwards in times of financial uncertainty. Despite the
apparent cohesion displayed by the developed countries, the tone and
tenor of statements made by some of their leaders gave the impression
of disguised acrimony for the lack of oversight by those whose job it
was presumed to be. The least developed countries will remain most
disadvantaged as usual in this melee of global disorder. The ILO’s
Global Employment Trends of January 2009 stated that more people in
the world are looking for jobs than in 2007 and if recession deepens then
the global job crisis will get worse. The World Bank’s Global Economic
Prospects forecasts that the global economy will expand at less than 1
percent in 2009 and the volume of world trade will fall for the first time
in 26 years. South Asia will be among the regions with extreme poverty
that will afflict 95 million people.
Yet Bangladesh’s fate is inextricably linked with the developed

economies as the latter are not only the destination for its exports but
also the major source of foreign capital. Similarly, India is the largest
import source for Bangladesh and the supplier of essentials both at times
of need and on other occasions as well. Being surrounded on three sides
by India and with a population and area many times more than that
of Bangladesh, real politik demands that we maintain the best possible
relations with India. One must realize that Indo-Bangladesh relations
cannot be modeled along the lines of the former Soviet Union-Finland or
Luxembourg-Belgium or France-Monaco equations because Bangladesh
has a population of 150 million and furthermore also has a fair amount
of resources. It is, therefore, not illogical for Bangladesh wanting to
be accorded the respect that a sovereign country should have. But in
these days of pooled sovereignty (European Union) or circumscribed
sovereignty, states have a responsibility not to undermine each other’s
security and this was endorsed by 1985 UN Summit of World leaders.
Bangladesh, therefore, has to be mindful of New Delhi’s allegations

of harboring and providing safe havens to Indian insurgents within its
territory.
Indo-Bangladesh relations are bedeviled by an assortment of

problems which include the equitable sharing of water resources, the
delimitation of the maritime boundary, occasional firing along the border
by the BDF and BSF, the trade gap in favor of India, tariff and non-tariff
barriers on exports from Bangladesh and transit facilities. For long these
issues, which are essentially economic, have been dealt with politically
by successive Bangladesh governments as a pressure point on India.
Like many small countries in terms of political and military power, the
development of Bangladesh‘s relations with India can be best explained
to the people if it is done within the context of SAARC.
New Delhi’s initial hesitation about SAARC was prompted by a

foreboding that this regional body would be used as a forum by other
member states to gang up against India. At another time, a consideration
which weighed heavily among decision makers in Delhi was that excessive
involvement in the SAARC process could generate a perception that
India sought to establish its hegemony in the region. However it was the
loss of privileged markets in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
after the end of the Cold War that finally convinced India that SAARC
could provide alternative markets for the export of Indian goods. The
Free Trade Arrangement with Sri Lanka is reported to have increased
Sri Lankan exports to India many folds. In the case of Bangladesh, the
Indian offer to take in readymade garments at low tariffs has attracted
some Bangladeshi exporters. One must, however, remember that more
than half of our GDP is linked to the global economy and 85 percent of
our exports go to the developed countries. India can be a supplement
and not a substitute for our exports and aid dependency on the West. So
is the case with India. The argument given that our low wage gives us a
competitive edge over China and India in our exports is flawed.
But India also has extra-regional ambitions and aspires to become

a G-10 member as well as secure a permanent seat in the UN Security
Council. UN reforms, central to which is the expansion of the Security
Council, is particularly important as it is being discussed for the first time

Kazi Anwarul Masud
since World War II to reflect the changing global power structure. New
Delhi must realize that becoming a permanent member of the Security
Council is to a considerable extent contingent upon its maintaining
good relations with its neighbours. As the biggest country in the South
Asian region it has to go the extra mile in promoting mutually beneficial
cooperation with SAARC member states. Energy is one such area of
cooperation.
Both India and Bangladesh are energy-starved countries. There is an

enormous potential of importing energy for Bangladesh from Nepal and
Bhutan through West Bengal. As the two exporting countries are eager
for this, the consent of India is essential. If India were to monopolize
the entire quantum of surplus energy for its own needs it would be seen
as not only indifferent to the needs of its neighbor but it would also be
a setback to the prospects of confidence building in the SAARC region.
Mira Kamdar, a senior fellow of the World Policy Institute (India,
Richer, Poorer, Hotter, Armed) referring to Goldman Sachs BRIC
Report pegging India as the future number two economy in the world
after China writes; - “billions of individuals in India and China cannot
adopt an American level of consumption over the next quarter century,
even if the Americans were to reduce their consumption dramatically.
There simply is not enough oil, wood, metal or other basic resources
left.”
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s landslide election victory presents

an opportunity as well as a challenge to lift the country from poverty to
relative prosperity. The government has to move earnestly and quickly to
generate resources to finance and subsidize agricultural inputs to alleviate
the plight of farmers. Efforts have also to be made to bring down the
prices of essential commodities and jumpstart developmental projects.
This however is easier said than done because the kleptocracy of the
BNP-Jamaat that ruled the country from 2001-2005 has bequeathed an
empty treasury to the newly elected government. Furthermore, because
of the global economic crisis, external capital, assistance and foreign
investment will not be readily available.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) AND
DEVELOPMENT
In developing countries in particular, macro-empirical work on the
FDI-growth relationship has shown that subject to a number of crucial
factors, such as human capital base in the host country, the trade regime
and the degree of openness of the economy, the FDI has a positive
impact on the economy. It is said that the determinants for the level of
FDI include: infrastructure, macro-economic stability, the availability
of skilled labour and sound institutions. The South Asia Center for
Policy Studies (SACEPS) is of the opinion that slow rates of capital
formation have held South Asian growth back relative to other regions
and investment is a major determinant of capital accumulation. It
therefore follows that investment generation in the private sector should
be an important policy for South Asian governments. In comparing the
performance of investment in East Asia and South Asia, despite the huge
gap in the quantity of investment in the two regions, SACEPS found that
low growth rate, shallow credit and financial markets, high proportion of
dependent population, high level of public dis-saving and lower level of
FDI are the main factors responsible. In addition, poor governance, low
quality of infrastructure delivery, high transaction costs, unpredictable
law and order situation, and poor judicial enforcement are causes of
low growth in South Asia. Notwithstanding Raul Prebisch’s skepticism
about accretion of national wealth through foreign investment that often
has high social cost, the world is now confused whether, in view of
the global meltdown, Adam Smith’s theory of minimalist role by the
government can lead a country “to the highest degree of opulence from
lowest barbarism” is not an outdated theory after all. Advocates of
capitalism ignored the reality that a perfect marriage between demand
and supply is a theoretical concept, particularly in places where a few
firms forming syndicates control the supply and price of commodities.
In economies like ours, captains of industry and commerce also often
dictate state economic policies either as pressure groups on the political
authority or on their election as members of parliament. With the
withering away of idealistic politics and the advent of commerce-based
politics and expensive elections, politicians in both the developed and
developing worlds have increasingly become dependent on donations
from industrialists to finance their elections. Donations are not given

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for idealistic reasons and those providing the funds expect returns on
their “investment.” Such a concentric relationship invariably leads to
inequity and social stratification in terms of wealth and power.
EQUITY AND GROWTH

In the case of the US, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman lamented that
the fruits of growth have been remarkably small for most Americans
- people are perhaps materially better off than they were before but
nearly not as much as they should have been given the extent of the
more productive US economy. By the end of the World War II, the US
had become a middle class dominated country with a much more equal
society but by the 1970s America had turned into a pre-tax and transfer
society with an inequality similar to that which existed at the time of
1929 crash.
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz saw the US growth having a powerful

demonstration effect in the sense that growth not only increased supply
but also peoples’ aspirations. Stiglitz, however, cautioned that a “market
economy did not automatically guarantee growth, social justice, or even
economic efficiency; achieving those ends requires that government play
an important role” and consequently he became an advocate for “moral
growth.” While the conventional wisdom is that democracy being more
accountable to the masses should have a greater possibility to reduce
poverty, both Milton Friedman and Joseph Stiglitz are skeptical that
democracy can be sustained in poor countries unless these countries
achieve rapid growth. This accords with the views expressed by Stanford
University’s Professor Larry Diamond that the Third World is witnessing a
democracy recession due to serious problems of governance with pockets
of dissatisfaction, and unless income inequality is reduced, freedom is
guaranteed, and economic growth is generated many of the struggling
democracies would eventually lean towards authoritarianism.
Political theorist Benjamin Barber termed the Western style of

capitalism as “infantilisation:” money is made to satisfy infantile
desires that in an orderly society would be seen as childish exuberance
for extravagance. Barber’s criticism rests on his argument that early
capitalism encouraged virtues with the working men’s “robust motion

of agency and spirited grittiness” while the decay that typifies later day
capitalism suffers from the paradox that “the needy are without income
and the well-heeled are without needs.”
According to analysts, the people trapped in the culture of poverty

have a strong feeling of marginality, helplessness, dependency, and the
feeling of alienation within one’s own society. Closely associated with
the concept of the culture of poverty is the cycle of poverty also known
as the “development trap” denoting low income, poor education, poor
housing and poor health. Since these disadvantages work in a circular
fashion it becomes difficult to break out of this cycle.
Francis Fukuyama thinks that basically four conditions have to

exist to facilitate democratic transition: (a) the level of development, (b)
culture, (c) neighborhood effect, and (d) ideas. Virtually all industrialized
economies are functioning democracies while relatively very few poor
countries are democracies. There are of course exceptions. Albeit Francis
Fukuyama is not totally convinced that Islamic culture which does not
separate the temporal from spiritual authorities and is therefore unable
to sustain a true liberal democracy. Such societies use “one man, one
vote, one time as a route to establishing theocracy of the sort that exist
in Iran today,” is necessarily reflective of the situation prevailing in the
entire Islamic world.
It is true that, barring exceptions, virtually all industrialized countries

are functioning democracies. Indeed once a country attains per capita
GDP of US dollars six thousand it transforms itself from an agricultural
society to an industrialized one and the country attains sustainable
democracy. Empirically it has also been found that not a single country
which became democratic ever reverted back to authoritarianism. This
is probably because the expanding property-owning middle class have
a stake in the survival of democracy. Harvard University’s Professor
Daniel Bell in his End of Ideology wrote: “The ideologist--Communist,
existentialist, religionist-- wants to live at some extreme, and criticizes
the ordinary man for failing to live at the level of grandeur. One can
try to do so if there is the genuine possibility that the next moment

Kazi Anwarul Masud
could be actually, a transforming moment when salvation or revolution
or genuine passion could be achieved.”
Max Weber in a poignant essay entitled Politics as a Vocation,

posed the problem as one of accepting the “ethics of responsibility”
or the “ethics of ultimate ends.” For the latter--the “true believer” all
sacrifices, all means, are acceptable for the achievement of one’s belief.
But for those who take on responsibility, who forgo the sin of pride, of
assuming they know how life should be ordered or how the blueprint
of the new society should read, one’s role can be only to reject all
absolutes and accept pragmatic compromise.” In gist, the state must
ensure that the system and services needed for a market economy to
function efficiently exist. Importantly the legal system embodying the
commercial and corporate law must exist. The state must also ensure
an environment of competition which both Adam Smith and Karl Marx
agreed that capitalists naturally do not want competition and try to avoid
it. The basic infrastructure and social services must also be provided by
the state.
In the final analysis there is no unique constellation of conditions

that would require the state to play its role which would vary according
to the stage of development an economy is already in. This strand of
argument was further confirmed by Harvard University Professor David
Scott as follows: - “Economic development requires the transformation
of institutions as well as the freeing of prices, which in turn requires
political and social modernization as well as economic reform. The state
plays a key role in this process; without it, developmental strategies
have little hope of succeeding. The creation of effective states in the
developing World will not be driven discipline. And in a world still
governed by “states rights,” real progress in achieving accountable
governments will require reforms beyond the mandate of multilateral
institutions.”
Though the newly elected government in Bangladesh has a decidedly

left-of-center background, given the realities of the present day world the
economy has to run on free market basis with governmental intervention
in areas when necessary. While the international community anxiously

awaits to see if Barack Obama and the European leaders succeed in their
stimulus plans on which will depend the fate of capitalism as practiced in
the West and in most developing countries after the Second World War,
Bangladesh may have to delve deeper into the further possibilities of
regional cooperation, food security in the SAARC countries, balanced
trade amongst one another, coordinated position on adverse effects of
climate change, terrorism affecting the socio-economic and political
development of all countries in the region, and a realistic approach to
the unresolved issues between India and Pakistan. If Greece, Spain
and Ireland could be brought at par with other EU countries, then
SAARC member states should shed their past prejudices and remove
the roadblocks in the way of cooperation in order to proceed apace with
the modernization of the region.
The contagion of global meltdown that started in the US has caught

up with the others. What should then the least developed countries such
as Bangladesh do? Ever since the Asian recession of 1997-98, the US
has been described as “the buyer of last resort” taking in imports that
could not profitably be absorbed in the Asian markets. Our export basket
consists of few items involving low technology, and now with buyers’
conservatism the price of our exportable goods is bound to come down
further. The other foreign exchange earner, remittances of our workers
abroad also faces uncertainty as no one knows what shape the construction
sector will take in the coming months and years. Remittance, a quarter
coming from the developed countries, will shrink. It is impossible to put
figures to these variables as these will depend on the evolving condition
of the global economy. The rate of interest being reduced by the central
banks throughout the world is designed to encourage investment. The
devaluation of the Bangladesh currency would have made sense had
the demand elasticity of the country’s exportable surplus been price
responsive. It would also make our imports dearer. Since external factors
appear to be unfavorable in the short term, Bangladesh has to develop
its agriculture that accounts for 30 percent of its GDP at present. The
monetary policy should be conservative. The tax net should be extended
and tax payers must pay their dues. Corruption, that eats away about 3
percent of our growth, has to be brought under control.

Kazi Anwarul Masud
Eventually the Bangladesh administration will be faced with the
choice of taking a path between political and developmental approach to
democracy promotion. The political approach proceeds from a relatively
narrow conception of democracy focused on elections, political liberty
and a society in which democrats have an upper hand over non-
democrats. The developmental approach rests on a broader notion of
democracy encompassing concern for equality and justice. It favors
democratization as a process of long term political and socio-economic
development. Democracy is valuable in its own right but is secondary
to a core developmental rationale. The early concept of economic
development basically placed emphasis on growth and industrialization.
Europe and the US were considered as developed and the other areas of
the world were considered as primitive versions of European nations
that would develop by stages. Walt W Rostow’s Stages of Economic
Growth stressed that Europe and North America were at a linear stage
of development and that the underdeveloped countries would eventually
catch up. He argued that all countries must develop through a number
of stages starting with traditional agrarian society and culminating in a
modern industrialized society. The key to this transformation was seen
to be mobilization of domestic and foreign resources for investment
in economic growth. Capital formation was considered as crucial
to accelerate development. High savings leading to high growth was
described as a “virtuous circle” and low savings leading to low growth
as a “vicious circle” that could be controlled through governmental
intervention (Hans W Singer’s doctrine of balanced growth). This
robotic development presupposed that the fruits of growth would trickle
down from the top to the lower echelons of a society but ignored the
concept of equity and justice that every community demands.
If one goes into the basic factors of production, land, labor, capital
and organization one would find that Bangladesh is a mixed economy.
Land is primarily owned by the private individuals and we do not
have any system of cooperative farming. The farmers are, however,
dependant, on the government for agricultural inputs like diesel for
irrigation, fertilizer, seeds etc. The Bangladesh government’s decision to
halve the price of most fertilizers and reduce the price of diesel has been
welcomed by the farmers. The International Rice Research Institute does

not hold out any hope of increased land for farming or any ease in the
fertilizer market in the future. Given the global population increase and
consequent increase in food prices coupled with the natural tendency
of some businessmen to reap abnormal profit, the “invisible hand” of
governmental intervention in the market would become a necessity if
the Awami League-led government is to fulfill its election promise to
bring the price of essentials within the reach of the common people. It is
possible even in the face of the global meltdown that the government of
Sheikh Hasina may face criticism from market fundamentalists for not
following the Washington Consensus despite the failure of the World
Bank in the African experience relating to agricultural subsidies. The
African experience demonstrates that the Bretton Woods institutions are
not infallible and the decision taken by the Sheikh Hasina government
will bear fruit for both the growers and the consumers. Heather
Clysdale estimates that Bangladesh’s food supply is already threatened
by flooding due to melting glaciers in some areas and droughts due to
heat in others. Moreover, the typhoons and monsoons that routinely
pummel Bangladesh are intensifying because of climate change. She
adds that the soft, malleable coast is vulnerable to the rising seas. Even
if greenhouse gas emissions were to stop today, scientists believe that
the warming already underway will cause seas to rise between one and
two inches over the next century. If nothing is done to curb emissions,
sea levels could climb more than three feet. If this happens, 15 percent
of Bangladesh could be under water. The mangrove forests of the low-
lying Sundarban islands, a world heritage site, as well as the Bengal
tiger and hundreds of bird species would disappear.
The challenge that will have to be faced by the Bangladesh

government will be immense. The US Agriculture Department in its
July 2008 report predicts that the global economic meltdown combined
with food and fuel hikes (though fuel price went down substantially but
is again rising) will contribute to the ongoing deterioration in global
food insecurity with particular negative impact on developing countries
that are the most food insecure. The FAO/WFP crop and food supply
assessment mission to Bangladesh in its August 2008 report estimates
that 40 percent or 56 million people are “absolute poor” i.e., unable to
acquire the minimum level of food required to maintain normal health;

Kazi Anwarul Masud
within this 27 million were categorized as “hard core poor” i.e., unable
to acquire two-third of the minimum level mentioned earlier; and 11
million as ‘ultra poor” i.e., unable to acquire half of the minimum
requirement. The prevalence of absolute, hard core and ultra poor
increased from 2000-2005 due to population growth. For Bangladesh
external sources would reduce i.e., Myanmar due to cyclone Nargis will
not be able to export 600,000 tons of cereals, part of which would have
come to Bangladesh. In Thailand too exportable quantity is expected
to decrease. Added to supply side constraint, the price of cereals and
food-led inflation paints a discouraging picture. It would be absolutely
necessary for the government to stock food and to import much ahead
of any emergency that may occur. Besides, if the price of essentials is to
be kept under control then subsidy has to be given regardless of what the
World Bank/IMF may be advising. After all the Common Agricultural
Policy of the European Union and US Farm Act is nothing but subsidy
given to the farmers in the West.
This should naturally bring up the question of the type of economic

philosophy that the Bangladesh government should follow. If there were
supporters of unbridled capitalism who doubted the social democracy
practiced by Scandinavian countries and held on to Adam Smith’s
minimalist role of the government for economic prosperity, the present
global meltdown should have convinced that their brand of economic
philosophy just does not work. Stalinist authoritarian communism
having been obliterated from global governance some would favor
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee’s “transformative democratic
socialism” that provided a strong welfare state, fiscal redistribution,
and selective nationalization as a model. British Labor Minister
Anthony Crosland felt that it was possible to achieve greater social
equality without the need for fundamental economic transformation. He
favored fruits of accelerated growth to be invested in pro-poor public
services than in fiscal redistribution. A complementary view has been
expressed by Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz supportive of an economic
development where, in his words, there will be: “moral growth that is
sustainable, that increases living standard not just today but for future
generations as well, and that leads to a more tolerant, open society.” The

idea is to avoid a situation as in the US today where 20 percent of the
wealth is possessed by only one percent of the population.
The developing world, particularly the least developed among

them, being mostly open economies and consequently being dependant
on the West for aid and trade would be badly affected. Our main export
earners are export of readymade garments and remittance of Bangladeshi
expatriates working abroad. The EU and the US account for most of our
exports and our remittances come from the Middle East and the Western
countries. As their economies are in recession, coupled with the price of
oil ranging till a few months ago below $50 a barrel, the job loss in the
main areas of employment is likely to increase. As it is, more than fifty
percent of the people are unemployed/underemployed in Bangladesh.
Remittance helped our import and balance of payment support. The
crutch on which a part of our economy was dependant would vanish. The
present government will have to take measures to extend the tax net,
force people to apprehend tax dodgers, widen the export basket, widen
the war on corruption in all areas etc., to make up for the expected loss
of external revenue. Bangladesh has one of the lowest tax-GDP ratios in
the world. Another way of state earning could be to expeditiously bring
back into the country the money illegally stashed away by the rich and
the powerful during BNP-Jamaat rule (2001-2005).
The pre-meltdown business as usual had ignored the problem

identified by UNDP of “a silent crisis, a crisis of underdevelopment,
of global poverty, or ever mounting population pressure, of thoughtless
degradation.” An eminent economist had remarked that following
neo-classical economics, that unrestricted international trade would
allow the poorer countries to come closer to the rich, runs counter to
historical experience as well as common sense (Issues in World Politics,
edited by Brian White et. al.). From the statements of the Bangladesh
Prime Minister, it appears that the government’s primary responsibility
will be to ease the unbearable burden of daily life of the people by
reducing the price hike. The World Bank had estimated that the price
hike had pushed an additional four million into the category of poor
people. Once that problem is tamed, the government is likely to turn
its attention towards vision 2021. Analysts of the voting pattern of the

Kazi Anwarul Masud
election have reached the conclusion that the youth and the first time
voters, fed up with the unbridled corruption of BNP-Jamaat coalition
during their 2001-2005 rule, which was characterized by wastage of
state money, incompetence, inability to generate energy production,
had voted overwhelmingly for the Awami League-led combine because
Sheikh Hasina and her party had come forward with a vision for the
future.
In the contemporary era, democracy is being widely advocated by the

Western world particularly after the tragic and fateful events of 9/11. The
realization has finally dawned upon the major global powers that the
“democracy deficit” they turned a blind eye towards during the Cold
War years ultimately boomeranged upon the West in the form of Islamic
extremism. Authoritarian rulers were supported to the hilt by providing
them financial and military assistance because of the Cold War dynamics.
This generated anger and frustration among the local people who felt
that the Western countries, by supporting their tyrannical rulers, did not
care about their fundamental rights. Many of the Third World countries
that were dependant on the largess provided to them by the superpowers
were abandoned by the latter after the end of the Cold War. This reduced
them to the status of failed states and/or failed governance which, in
turn, generated instability and violence within these nations. Because
the UN Charter specifically forbids external interference that could be
construed as violation of sovereignty, the failed states have so far been
more or less immune to intrusion by others. The concept of inviolability
of state sovereignty, however, underwent change when non-state actors
inflicted death and destruction upon unsuspecting civilians in repeated
acts of terrorism such as the events of 9/11, the Madrid and London
bombings, and in Bangladesh by the Islamic extremists belonging
to Jamatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB). The New York Times,
Wall Street Journal, Time magazine etc., had reported on the rise of
Islamic militancy in Bangladesh only to be dismissed by the previous
government as concoctions of the media aimed at slighting the country
internationally. Though the kingpins have since been executed, it would
be premature to conclude that the country has totally got rid of Islamic
extremists. Extremist violence could resurface as there are more than

sixty thousand madrassas or religious schools that churn out students
who are indoctrinated in obscurantist dogma in the name of religion.
MELTDOWN EFFECTS ON BANGLADESH

The World Bank had estimated that the price hike, partly due to the
rise in the international price of rice, has added four million Bangladeshis
to the poor class. The county lost about two million metric tons of rice
(7.3 percent of domestic production) in twin floods of July-August
and cyclone in November 2007. Food prices rose by 14 percent and
25 percent in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh in January-
March 2008 compared to the same period of 2007. As Bangladesh
is a net importer of rice, low income households spend 80 percent of
their earnings on food. The World Rice Commerce 2008 Conference
emphasized price stability in order to avoid price volatility. The reduction
of prices of essential commodities is probably the foremost challenge
confronting the Bangladesh government. It is encouraging that the new
political dispensation appears determined to intervene in the market to
destroy syndicates who have stolen massive amounts of money from
the people by artificially raising the prices of commodities. Analysts
generally agree that “for a capitalist system to evolve in an effective
developmental sense, it must have two hands and not one: an invisible
hand that is implicit in the price mechanism and a visible hand that
is explicitly managed by the government.” The reduction and eventual
eradication of poverty will be a formidable challenge for the government
and the enormity of the problem cannot be underestimated because 40
percent of the people live below the poverty level.
One must, however, admit that the world, and Bangladesh is

no exception, is facing a food crisis which has to be tackled in all
earnestness. The Madrid Conference on Food Security held on 26-27
January 2009 underlined the existence of the global crisis. Professor
Jeffery Sachs presided over an ad-hoc advisory group meeting prior to
the Madrid Conference and the dire prediction was that desperate hunger,
exacerbated by the global meltdown, would afflict one billion people
out of the estimated 6.5 billion inhabitants of the earth. The meeting
recommended boosting of productivity of small holders that would result
in more food and food security for farm families, greater income for

Kazi Anwarul Masud
the poorest of the poor, and escape from poverty by commercialization
of subsistence agriculture. The meeting was optimistic that massive
scale up of food yield and productivity through application of improved
technology is possible. This would entail infusion of money through
the Financial Coordination Mechanism (FCM) as a part of the World
Bank’s Global Food Crisis Response Program (GECRP) and the Multi
Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). Critical inputs would thus be provided to
small farmers and this would help in the transition from subsistence
farming to commercial farming. The problem with any initiative that
involves contribution from donor countries has been historically fraught
with danger. The promise by the developed countries to give 0.7 percent
of their GDP as aid and assistance made decades back is yet to be
redeemed.
Intra-regional political disputes often, as in the case of India and

Pakistan, arrest the economic development of a region. In such cases
the relatively more developed economy is looked upon by the less
developed ones in terms of center-periphery/ metropolitan-subaltern
relationship that existed during the colonial era. The fear of the less
developed countries is that they may turn into a hinterland of the more
advanced economies and this discourages the former to strengthen their
economic bonds with the latter. Besides imbalance in trade is considered
responsible for the asymmetric trade relationship without recognizing the
fact that the less developed economies have a far smaller export basket
and their main focus of export is to the developed countries and less
within the region. In the regional context the more developed economies
could consider granting zero tariffs and removing the para-tariff barriers
for the least developed countries of the region. The European Union,
Japan, Canada and the US have accorded duty-free and quota-free access
to LDCs under different programs. Earlier GATT had made the General
System of Tariff Preferences (GSP), a permanent provision for greater
market access for the products of developing countries. Some analysts,
however, have criticized such facilities on the ground that UNCTAD “in
effect has tried to make the LDCs into wards, contributing to the specious
belief that these countries are simply too poor to reform. As a result the
LDCs have been abetted and encouraged by UNCTAD in their failure
to address misguided policies in particular domestic over-regulation,

weak property rights, skewed trade regimes, and lack of democracy that
have stunted growth.” This is probably true, but in the context of South
Asia, instability, intra-regional tensions and the involvement of external
powers has impacted on growth and development.
The British newspaper, The Guardian reported (27-01-2009) that

America’s massive military aid package to Pakistan has come under
scrutiny after allegations that as much as 70 percent of $5.4 billion in
assistance has been misspent. Since 2002, the US has paid the operating
costs of Pakistan’s military operations in the tribal belt along the Afghan
border, where Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters are sheltering. Pakistan
has committed over 100,000 troops for the military operation; the US
foots the bill for food, fuel, ammunition and maintenance. The cash
payments averaging $80 million a month had been the cornerstone
of US support for former President Pervez Musharraf. But over the
past 18 months, as militants seized vast swaths of the tribal belt and
repelled a string of Pakistani offensives, the funding has come under
the microscope. American officials processing the payments at the US
embassy in Islamabad have concluded that the Pakistani expense claims
have been vastly inflated The official said the US did not know what
happened to the remaining 70 percent - approximately $3.8 billion -
but suspected that some may have been spent on F-16 fighter jets or a
new house for an army general. Ordinary Pakistanis are angry with both
sides. Anti-American sentiment had touched a new high while anger
towards Musharraf contributed to the thrashing his party received in the
February 2008 election. Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the US Armed
Sevices Committee voiced his opinion after a three day trip to the region
last year that the US officials had little confidence that a segment of the
army was seriously trying to stop the flow of arms and Taliban fighters
from infiltrating into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Levin questioned the
efficacy of more than $10 billion military and financial aid given to
Pakistan since 9/11. In January this year United States President Barack
Obama’s Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, appearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee as part of her confirmation process said
that the Obama administration would condition military aid to Pakistan,
on the latter’s commitment to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.
Clinton told the chairman of the Committee, Senator John F Kerry, that

Kazi Anwarul Masud
the Obama administration intended to follow through on Congressional
legislation authored last year by Senators Joe Biden (now the vice-
president) and Richard Lugar to provide Pakistan with $1.5 billion in
American assistance for the next five years, the bulk of which would
be development and economic assistance. But Clinton reiterated that
with regard to the military aid, the US wanted to really look hard at
seeing whether it can condition some of that on the commitment for
the counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism mission. Earlier, Clinton
acknowledged the concerns expressed by some of the lawmakers over
the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the security of Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal, if it failed to bring terrorism under control. She reiterated the
administration’s determination to ensure that the extremists “don’t find
save havens in Pakistan or plan attacks against us or any other country.”
This foray into US-Pakistan relations was necessary to demonstrate that
sustainable economic growth will continue to elude a region if there is
no peace and stability. Instability also invites extra-regional intervention
and further exacerbates tensions among countries in the region as is
evident in the South Asian experience where hostilities between India
and Pakistan have stood in the way of growth and development.
South Asian growth has been hostage to the India-Pakistan tensions

for more than six decades while the world has advanced by leaps and
bounds. Though Pakistan has got back a democratic dispensation after
decades of direct and indirect military rule, the mindset of the authorities
in the county, particularly the military establishment, has not changed.
Islamabad’s differences with New Delhi have strengthened the former’s
conviction on the need of strategic depth in Afghanistan in the event of
a Pakistan-India conflict. This has not only complicated the relationship
between Pakistan, India and Afghanistan but also made the US-led
NATO/ISAF forces more vulnerable to attack because of the ease with
which the Taliban/Al Qaeda can infiltrate either way across the Durrand
Line. Ever since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan has
looked towards the West, particularly the US, for acquiring a defence
capability against India. The US was responsive and provided military
assistance to Pakistan because of India’s espousal of non-alignment as
the guiding principle of its foreign policy during the Cold War years
and its close relationship with the former Soviet Union as well as other

Warsaw Pact countries. This changed dramatically with the collapse of
the Berlin Wall and the demise of communism. A post-9/11 US-India
strategic relationship was framed and given concrete shape during the
Bush administration despite Pakistan being touted and feted as a major
non-NATO ally by the US for its so-called war on terror.
The declining relevance of Non-Aligned Movement and the loss of

Soviet and Eastern European markets goaded Indian policy makers to
seek greater intra-regional trade. As mentioned earlier, the security threat
has often been used to scuttle projects that would have been mutually
beneficial to the parties concerned had those been allowed to proceed.
Unfortunately, the South Asian region has restricted its understanding of
the definition of “security” in militaristic terms. To quote Stephen Sachs
of Merton College, Oxford, (The Changing Definition of Security), and
among many others, the Max Weberian traditional definition implicit
in the effective monopoly of the use or the licensing of violation as an
integral constitutive element of a state, and any threat to this monopoly
as a security threat has lost its relevance. Now better termed as “human
security” it envelops individual safety in areas of basic needs “access
to clean food and water, environmental and energy security, freedom
from economic exploitation, protection from arbitrary violence by state
agents or domestic partners, diseases like the AIDS pandemic etc. Some
security experts give more importance to “structural violence” that
goes beyond physical violence to include “the indirect violence done to
individuals when unjust economic and political structures reduce their
life expectancy through lack of access to basic material needs.” Indeed
they believe that true security cannot be achieved till “hierarchical
social relations and divisive boundary distinctions are recognized and
substantially altered and all individuals participate in providing for their
own security.” Though debates abound about the all-inclusiveness of
the term “security” that would detract the security provider from the
essential ingredients, it however, recognized that the threat resulting in
severe degradation of the quality of life of the people and narrowing
the range of policy choices available to the government should be also
regarded as breaches of security.

Kazi Anwarul Masud
SACEPS (South Asia Center for Policy Studies) in an assessment of
South Asian Macro Economic issues highlighted some of the difficulties
due to asymmetric economic conditions among member countries.
Overall the region suffers from a low savings ratio and the dependence
of the LDCs on foreign aid and concessional loans from international
financial institutions. Besides, with the exception of India and perhaps
Pakistan, all other members of SAARC suffer from Balance of Payment
difficulties. Given the present global meltdown the prospect of regional
development to a higher level appears doubtful mainly because of the
dependence of all South Asian countries on the West for their exports
and other capital transfers. SACEPS thinks that lack of good governance,
accountability, poor implementation of economic projects, weak
enforcement of laws relating to commercial transactions that discourages
foreign investment, bad infrastructure etc., have stood in the way of
South Asian integrated economic development. Structural banking
sector weakness as evidenced by the recent warning by the Bangladesh
Bank to 11 commercial banks for giving loans exceeding their deposit
limit and for extending loans to unproductive sectors as well as for
the import of luxury commodities are reflective of this malaise. There
are also problems in other areas, for example, agriculture is plagued
by low productivity, rising cost of production, lack of development in
agro-processing etc. A study gives the picture that Bangladesh has a
compulsion to improve politico-economic relations with India because
the latter can provide security and our need for manufactured goods,
such as steel, chemicals, light engineering goods, capital goods, coal
and limestone. It is to be noted that while more than 80 percent of Indian
total equity is spread among South East Asian and African countries,
only about 10 percent was invested in South Asia. The study referred
to above cite a few obstacles responsible for the limited intra-regional
trade: most South Asian countries being primary producers tend to
export similar items; with the exception of Sri Lanka, high tariff and
non-tariff barrier discourages intra-regional trade; lack of adequate
transport and informational links as well as political differences affect
economic decisions.

ENERGY AND GROWTH
It is generally recognized that reproducibility is a key concept of
the economics of production (Energy and Economic Growth, David
Stren & Cutler Cleaveland). While capital and labor are reproducible,
energy remains an important non-reproducible factor of production.
The importance of energy in the economic development of a country
can hardly be overemphasized. Mainstream economists think that while
land, labor and capital are primary factors of production, fuels and
materials are intermediary inputs. Energy Bangle (Revisiting the Energy
Situation in Bangladesh) paints a dismal picture of the Bangladesh
energy situation. According to the report Bangladesh power is generated
from natural gas (82 percent), oil (9 percent), hydro (4 percent) and coal
(5 percent). While the total installed capacity of power generation is
5245 MW, the achievable power generation capacity is around 4200
MW leaving a shortfall of 800MW. Less than half of the population is
served by electricity and per capita electricity consumption is only 170
Kwh(FY 2006). Natural gas reserves in Bangladesh vary widely. The
Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) reported gas reserve of 3 trillion cubic feet
(TCF) as of January 2006. PetroBangla put the reserve at 15.3 tcf in
2004. The Ministry of Finance estimated in 2004 a reserve of 28.4 tcf
of which 20.5 tcf was recoverable. In 2001 the US Geological Survey
estimated an “ undiscovered reserve” of 32.1 tcf. The other sources of
energy are oil that is mostly imported, coal and hydro. Energy Bangla
estimated that natural gas requirement from 2000 to 2050 would be
40 to 44 tcf if growth rate is three percent; 64 to 69 tcf with a growth
rate of 4.5 percent; 101 to 110 tcf with a growth rate of 6 percent; and
141 to 152 tcf with a growth rate in GDP of 7 percent. It is evident that
natural gas would not be able to sustain the economic development of
the country if we aspire for growth rate of 10.5 by 2017 and produce
electricity of 7000 MW by 2013 and 20000 MW by 2021. This aim
can be realized if Bangladesh were to deepen regional cooperation in
the production of electricity since the Himalayan rivers flow through
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Pakistan. It is estimated that the
Himalayan rivers flowing through Nepal have a hydro power potential of
83000 MW while in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan the estimated hydro
power potential is 70000 MW, 1772 MW and 21000 MW respectively.

Kazi Anwarul Masud
The Chuka project in Bhutan completed with Indian assistance has the
potential to benefit Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan.
Taking a broader measure of poverty, 2.6 billion people consume

less than USD 2 a day as per 2005 prices. This number of people has
remained relatively unchanged since 1981 although it is now a lower
proportion of the population. The new estimates do not yet reflect the
increase in food prices since 2005. The share of vulnerable employment
in total employment is the highest in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa,
South-East Asia and the Pacific, and East Asia. In all these regions the
majority of workers do not enjoy the possible security that wage and
salary jobs could provide. Taking into account that a wage and salary job
in poor regions may still not ensure all the components of a decent job, it
becomes understandable that only a minority of working people have a
job that is well paid, respects their fundamental rights and ensures some
security in case of job loss. Similar to other Asian regions, economic
growth in recent years has resulted in impressive reductions in working
poverty in South Asia. However, poverty levels in South Asia remain
much higher than in South-East Asia and East Asia. Extreme working
poverty decreased from 57.2 percent in 1997 to 47.1 percent in 2007.
Most of the change occurred during 2002-2007. Given the detailed
employment scenario in the ILO report, it is difficult to visualize clearly
the prospect of overseas employment of Bangladeshis. Remittance of
Bangladeshis from abroad is the mainstay of our external economy as
more than a quarter comes from expatriates living in the developed
countries and the rest from the Arab countries who have also not escaped
the adverse effects of global meltdown coupled, till recently, with less
than $50 per barrel from more than $150 they used to get earlier. This
loss of petro-dollar earnings will have a serious effect on the construction
industry in the Arab world where many Bangladeshis were employed.
Lost jobs for Bangladeshis has many facets: they will be unable to repay
the loans taken to get visas for these jobs, the sustenance expected by
their families from overseas earning will not be there anymore, and they
will add to the burden of the society till such time they can get jobs, a
difficult proposition, or can become gainfully self-employed.

In the background of this difficult global employment situation,
consequent upon the global meltdown that was described by Joseph
Stiglitz as “the fall of the Wall Street is for market fundamentalism what
the fall of Berlin Wall was for Communism,” the Bangladesh government
has correctly taken an integrated policy of poverty reduction, solution
of the unemployment problem, and provide a meaning to the life of
the people of Bangladesh. The Awami League manifesto describes the
need for employment generation in the agriculture sector, provision for
training and loans for self-employment, sub-contracting systems between
small and big/medium scale industries successfully achieved in Japan
and South Korea. It has also identified the need for the special training
for the labor force to be sent abroad. Considering the fact that 28 million
remain unemployed, the Manifesto aims at decreasing the number to
24 million by 2013 and 15 million by 2021. These are achievable goals
considering because the global meltdown will not remain a long term
feature but may be a cyclical phenomenon furthered by greed and lack of
oversight by the regulators in the euphoria of unbridled capitalism. The
argument is not being made to reinstall socialism that failed to provide
answers to the development aspirations of the poor who were the primary
victims of capitalism but to provide an egalitarian system advocated by
Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman who felt that, even in the case of the
US, the majority of the people did not get the reward of development
in consonance with the advancement of the economy. Security of
states from non-state actors with transnational links and/or aggrieved
people can lead to restlessness among the working population and
enthuse pseudo-religious leaders to recruit disaffected and marginalized
sections of the society in their evil quest for opposing modernization
and imposing their obscurantist world view that has neither tolerance
nor any pity for the suffering masses. If the three legs of modernity
rested on the discovery of the “new world,” the Renaissance and the
Reformation it was basically a victory of superiority of modern values
over pre-modern, primitive and traditional mores that used to regulate
the lives of the people. In the religious sphere, modernity brought about
replacement of divine providence by the autonomous rational human
mind. But then the Awami League does not preach agnosticism or
atheism but only encourages people to follow their own religion without
interference of others or imposition of laws of a particular religion on

Kazi Anwarul Masud
the people belonging to other faiths. The Center for Policy Dialogue’s
(State of the Bangladesh Economy in the run up to the National Election
2008) analysis of the share of different sectors of the economy to the
GDP in FY 08 to FY 21 to achieve the goals of the manifesto appears
realizable. The share of agriculture in FY 08 was 20.87 percent that has
to be reduced to 15 percent in FY 21, similarly the share of industry
has to brought up from 30 percent to 40 percent, and that of the service
sector has to be reduced from a little over 49 percent to 45 percent. The
realization of these goals would largely depend on the development of
the social sector accompanied by sustainable economic growth.
The hope and expectation of the people of Bangladesh is that Prime

Minister Sheikh Hasina will provide transformational as opposed to
transactional leadership. In his The Power to Lead, Professor Joseph
Nye of the Harvard University states that transformational leaders
“induce followers to transcend their self-interest for the sake of the
higher purpose of the group that provides the context of the relationship.”
The people are thus inspired to undertake “adaptive work” and do more
than would be normally expected of them for the greater good of the
community and not for the sake of promoting their “self-interest alone.”
An example of such a leader in the South Asian context was the founder
of Bangladesh, Banglabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who motivated
the entire Bengali nation in their struggle for liberation. On the other hand
transactional leadership, writes Nye, “motivate followers by appealing to
their self-interest. Transactional leaders use various approaches but all rest
on reward, punishment and self-interest.” What is often needed is smart
power which in itself is a mix of soft and hard power. To produce smart
power, Sheikh Hasina may have to provide the people of Bangladesh a
combination of transformational and transactional leadership because of
the changed context from 1971 which was dominated by the unanimous
desire of the Bengalis for liberation. In the ultimate analysis one hopes
that the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina will continue beyond this
term with the approval of the people so that the collective dream of a
prosperous Bangladesh can be realized.

REFERENCES
1. Joseph Stiglitz; The Ethical Economist.
2. Joseph Stiglitz; Taming Capitalism Anew; 30 March 2006.
3. Paul Krugman; Viewpoints; 21 May 2007.
4. Larry Diamond; Democratic Recession.
5. Francis Fukuyama; The End of History and the Last Man.
6. Daniel Bell; End of Ideology.
7. Max Weber; Politics as a Vocation; (essay).
8. Alan Greenspan; Days of Turbulence.
9. Joseph Schumpeter; Creative Destruction.
10. FAO/WFP; Crop and Food Assessment Mission to Bangladesh.
11. Thomas Crothers; Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental.
12. Bruce Scott; The Great Divide in the Global Village.
13. Brian White, ed.; Issues in World Politics.
14. Bruce Bueno and George Downs; Social Coordination
15. Robin Broad and John Cavanaugh; The Hijacking of Development Debate.
16. Benjamin Baber; Political Theorist.
17. Sarath Rajapatirana; The Least Developed Countries – the tyranny of definition.
18. Milton Friedman; “The Case for Free Trade;” Hoover Digest.
19. Manuel Castells; The rise of the Fourth World – The Information Age.
20. Gertrude Himmelfarb; The Idea of Poverty.
21. Joseph Nye; The Power to Lead.
22. Wikipedia; Bangladesh Agriculture.
23. Wikipedia; Democratic Socialism.
24. Wikipedia; Washington Consensus.
25. ILO; Global Employment Trends; January 2009.

DESERT CARROTS: BAGHDAD’S
HOUSE OF WISDOM
Toheed Ahmad*
Abstract
The Byzantine mind at the time was in the grip of theological hairsplitting
which had not time or use for matters ‘secular’ like philosophy and
science. The Byzantines although they were Greek speaking, and were
the direct inheritors of Greek culture, had always feared secular Hellenic
knowledge as it was thought to be injurious to Christian spirit. There
was no space yet in Constantinople for humanism of any kind. Their
Emperors had Greeks locked away in dungeons lest they soil the mind of
a righteous Christian. Books anyway were scarce and expensive as they
did not have recourse to paper and so their texts were written on skins
only; the papyrus could not be used outside Egypt as it was susceptible
to humidity.
This while the Graeco-Arabic translation movement spread over two

centuries had hardly any doctrinal content. No worthwhile opposition to
this translation movement is recorded in the writings of scholars of Islam
of the period. Although some western scholarship has belatedly tried
to imagine a conflict between the scientists and the religious scholars
the one big achievement of the movement was to bridge the “western’
divide between reason and faith and thus free the human spirit to create
knowledge and power to conquer nature. How this fragrant stream of
consciousness went on to fertilize Europe is another story. In the words
of Mark Graham, “the Greeks belonged to Islam as much as they
belonged to Christendom. It was they who saved the Greeks when the
Christians were burning them. It was they who translated them, debated
* Toheed Ahmad is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.
Desert Carrots: Baghdad’s House of Wisdom
them, commented on them and improved upon their systems. The West
belongs as much to Islam, a rich part of its own history that has only
begun to be written.” The magic in this examination has been that of the
art and science translation in its unparalleled fullness. Author
The ninth century Baghdad hosted a House of Wisdom, Bayt al

Hikma, where the ancient wisdom of Greece, Persia and India was
salvaged for humanity. Here books of knowledge - Mathematics,
Natural and Moral Sciences, Astronomy, Medicine and Technology,
were translated from Greek, Old Persian and Sanskrit, into Arabic. This
House symbolizes a movement, which not only produced a startling
amount of original work in these fields but also made the so-called
European Renaissance possible. This movement was hardly talked about
in the world because Europe chose to ignore or to downplay it during
the centuries when it was occupied in waging sectarian wars, grabbing
colonies and plundering others’ wealth to pave their own thrones,
palaces and churches with gold, developing science and technology and
creating knowledge. Nobody in the world knew of the role that Baghdad
played in preserving knowledge and creating one of the richest periods
of civilization in human history. The Muslims themselves were unaware
of it, and probably still are, mired as they have been in a slumber of the
colonized and the deracinated. After avoiding this inconvenient truth
for a thousand years, the West has begun to talk about this House of
Wisdom as a world-changing phenomenon.
What exactly was this Bayt al Hikma? Why was it founded and
what were the reasons for its extraordinary success? It has been
variously described as a Royal Library, a Translator Centre, a Research
and Development Centre, a Think Tank. It was all of these and more
at various times till its destruction with the city by Halaku in 1258.
The fact that the House of Wisdom does not easily fit into a known
category of modern scholarship deepens its mystery, and reflects the
poverty of the Western architecture of knowledge (which, sadly, is all
that my generation has recourse to). But for the purpose of this article
we shall examine the role of Bayt al Hikma as a Translation Centre,
where ancient knowledge was systematically translated for study and
updation through discussion and experimentation.

Toheed Ahmad
According to Dimitri Gutas writing in his seminal book, Greek
Thought, Arabic Culture (1998), “The Graeco-Arabic translation
movement of Baghdad constitutes a truly epoch-making stage, by any
standard, in the course of human history. It is equal in significance to, and
belongs to the same narrative as, I would claim, that of Pericles’ Athens,
the Italian Renaissance, or the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and it deserves to be recognized and embedded in
our consciousness.” Why did the Abbasid Caliphate, the world’s largest
empire of its time, choose to focus on translating Greek language books
of the ancients, how were these books obtained, and who translated
them? Why could the Christian Byzantine court, with all its wealth and
learning, not grow such a translation movement?
A quick look at the historical and cultural environment in which this

movement took root is warranted. Referring to the rapid expansion of the
Islamic world in early centuries, Gutas notes, “The historic significance
of the Arab conquests can hardly be overestimated. Egypt and the Fertile
Crescent were reunited with Persia and India politically, administratively,
and most importantly, for the first time since Alexander the Great, and for
a period that was to last significantly longer than his brief life time. The
great economic and cultural divide that separated the civilized world for
a thousand years prior to the rise of Islam, the frontier between the East
and the West formed by the two great rivers that created the free flow of
raw materials and manufactured goods, agricultural products and luxury
items, peoples and services, techniques and skills, and ideas, methods,
and modes of thought. The salutary impact of this event was magnified
by the fact that it came in the wake of the disastrous Byzantino-Persian
wars of 570-630 AD which devastated the area, decimated the local
populations, and disrupted trade.”
The Abbasid Revolution put an end to the Umayyad Caliphate and

resulted in considerable reduction of the dominant role of Arab tribes
and chieftains. The Arab conquests had greatly expanded the Islamic
empire but the Umayyad court remained inward looking and chose to
exclude the Persians and Central Asians from gaining influence over
state matters. Arabic was the sole language of teaching and learning.
Nestorian Christians and some pagan clans in northern Iraq were

shunned. The Abbasids chose to make their domain inclusive by drawing
in all religious minorities, especially the Sasanian Persian aristocracy.
This unleashed a creative interaction among diverse people, speaking
different languages, practicing different faiths. In the backdrop of
rising trade relations among various parts of the Islamic regions which
engendered prosperity, the removal of barriers of race, language and
religion, the human mind was set free to think the highest thoughts and
dream the biggest dreams. Another result of the Arab conquests was the
introduction of paper-making technology into the Islamic world from
China. This greatly facilitated the spread of knowledge as paper quickly
came to be widely used during the first years of the Abbasid era.
And this while in the tenth century Europe, “The chaos and
disorder that swept in with the barbarian invasions of Western Roman
Empire, beginning in the fourth century had just about destroyed formal
education and the perpetuation of classical knowledge. The wonders
of classical learning were all but forgotten, or at the best, pushed to
the extreme margins of European consciousness. Invaluable texts were
lost through inattention, destroyed by the illiterate hordes, or simply
rendered unintelligible by the general ignorance of would-be scholars or
simply by the lost ability to read Greek. The aristocracy of the Roman
Empire read Greek Masters in the original, so there was no need at the
time for Latin translations of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the
engineering wonders of Archimedes or the geometry of Euclid. The
wholesale disappearance of Greek as the language of learning meant
centuries of knowledge virtually vanished from the collective mind of
Latin-speaking Europe” (Jonathan Lyons in The House of Wisdom: How
the Arabs Transformed Western Civilization, 2009).
In his review of Jonathan Lyons’ fascinating book for Time Online,

Ziauddin Sardar writes, “When Baghdad opened its gates as the new
capital of the Abbasid Caliphate, the prime cite in the city was occupied
by the Royal Library completed around 765 AD. It was built by Caliph al
Mansur, who devised a method for measuring the circumference of the
earth and was the second in a long line of Abbasid Caliphs who valued
thought and learning above all else. The Library was officially called
The House of Wisdom. It was a monumental structure, accommodating

Toheed Ahmad
translators, copyists, scholars, scientists, librarians and the swelling
volumes of (Pahlavi) Persian, Sanskrit and Greek texts that floated
into Baghdad. Not surprisingly it became the magnet for seekers of
knowledge from the Muslim world” (as also from Europe very soon
after the end of the First Crusade).
Indeed the second Caliph al-Mansur is credited with initiating the

translation movement in Baghdad. The historian al-Mas’udi reports that
he was the first caliph to have books translated from foreign languages
into Arabic, among them Kalila wa Dimna (a Sanskrit book of animal
fables called Panchatantra whose Persian version is known as Anvar
Saheli) and Sindhind (an ancient mathematics text written in Sanskrit
by Hindu Brahmagupta called “Brahma Sphuta Siddhanta” – Opening
of the Universe). Aristotle’s books on logic and other subjects were also
translated for him, as also the Almagest of Euclid and other ancient books
from classical Greek, Byzantine Greek, Pahlavi and Syriac. In fact while
putting down local rebellions against Baghdad rule in the Persian eastern
regions where Zoroastrian ideology had deeply permeated, al-Mansur
was shrewd enough to adopt a policy of “ideological cooptation, that is,
he appropriated as Abbasid the Zoroastrian ideology espoused by the
rebel leaders to preempt its appeal and significance. Once Zoroastrian
Sasanian cultural attitudes became acceptable in Baghdad right after its
foundation, the translation of secular knowledge into Arabic became
part of the process.” (Gutas).
It is generally agreed that the Bayt al Hikma was modeled on the

Royal Library of the Sasanian Empire (226-642) that chiefly contained
Persian lore, reports about wars, and epics of love and romance. These
books were kept in buildings called the House of Wisdom and hence the
naming of Baghdad’s renowned institution. Gutas goes into details of
various sources on the nature and functions of the Bayt al Hikma and
concludes that, “It was a library, most likely established as a ‘bureau’
under al-Mansur, part of the Abbasid administration modeled on that of
the Sasanians. Its primary function was to house both the activity and
the results of translations from Persian into Arabic of Sasanian history
and culture. As such there were hired translators capable to perform this
function as well as bookbinders for the preservation of books. Under

al-Mamun it appears to have gained an additional function related to
astronomical and mathematical activities.”
He goes on to make a sweeping statement which is not shared by

later authors in the bibliography (given below) that the Bayt al Hikma
was “Certainly not a Centre for the translation of Greek works into
Arabic; the Graeco-Arabic translation movement was completely
unrelated to any of the activities of the Bayt al Hikma.” “Among the
dozens of reports about the translation of Greek works into Arabic that
we have, there is not even a single one that mentions the Bayt al Hikma.
The Bayt al Hikma was also not an ‘academy’ for teaching the ‘ancient’
sciences as they were being translated. Finally it was not a ‘conference’
centre for the meetings of scholars. What the Bayt al Hikma did for the
Graeco-Arabic translation movement, however, is to foster a climate in
which it could be both demanded and then conducted successfully. If
indeed the Bayt al Hikma was an Abbasid administrative bureau, then it
institutionalized the Pahlavi into Arabic translation culture. This means
that all the activities implied or suggested by this culture – the Zoroastrian
ideology of the recovery of ancient Avestan texts through re-translation
Greek works and all that it implied – could be conducted as semi-official
activities, or at least as condoned by official policy. The example set
by the caliphs and the highest administrators was naturally followed
by others of lesser rank, both civil servants and private individuals.”
Further research, as it is thrown up by readings of hundreds of thousands
of manuscripts stocked away in world libraries shed more light on the
phenomenon that the House of Wisdom was.
Jonathan Lyons, a former editor at Reuters and a foreign

correspondent whose book is mentioned above is currently pursuing a
Ph.D. programme in sociology of religion at George Mason University
in Virginia, USA - his thesis is titled “War without End – One Thousand
Years of Anti-Islam Discourse.” The translations and the books written
in Abbasid Baghdad, for him, would have a decisive influence on
Western thinkers beginning with the scholastic theologians of medieval
Paris and Bologna and culminating in the revival of Greek learning in
the Renaissance. Chief among these influences was the notion that that
religion and science, faith and reason could co-exist. This gave Western

Toheed Ahmad
medieval man ‘permission’ to explore the universe without impinging
on the majesty of God.
About his House of Wisdom, he wrote “I am trying to show that

the notion these days of a Clash of Civilizations which really took hold
after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, is not without
serious shortcomings.” William Dalrymple, in his review of the book
commented that it is “A wonderful and important book which for the
first time presents the Western debt to medieval learning in a clear and
accessible manner. The House of Wisdom shows how the melting pot
of the Islamic world brought together different systems of thought and
sciences, so fusing the learning of ancient India, Persia, Babylonia and
the Hellenistic world for the first time, then passing on that knowledge
to the hungry medieval West. It is a fascinating book which opens up a
whole new world and in the process rolls back centuries of Islamophobic
propaganda.” Another reviewer observed, “Jonathan Lyons has written
a wide-ranging and highly engaging exploration of the intellectual and
scientific glories of the Islamic civilization. At a time when Islamic
culture is routinely demonized as backward and barbaric when compared
with the advancements of the West. The House of Wisdom reminds us
that it wasn’t so very long ago that the shoe was on the other foot.”
Dr. Dimitri Gutas, who is Professor of Arabic and Graeco-Arabic

at Yale University, writes in the introduction to his book that this
translation movement “represents an astounding achievement which,
independently of its significance for Greek and Arabic philology and
history of philosophy and science, can hardly be grasped and accounted
for otherwise than as a social phenomenon (the aspect which has been
very little investigated.) To elaborate: The Graeco-Arabic translation
movement lasted, first of all, well over two centuries; it was no
ephemeral phenomenon. Second, it was supported by the entire elite of
Abbasid society: caliphs and princes, civil servants and military leaders,
merchants and bankers, and scholars and scientists; it was not the pet
project of any particular group in the furtherance of their restricted agenda.
Third, it was subsidized by an enormous outlay of funds, both public
and private; it was no eccentric whim of a Maecenas or the fashionable
affectation of a few wealthy patrons seeking to invest in a philanthropic

or self-aggrandizing cause. Finally, it was eventually conducted with
rigorous scholarly methodology and strict philological exactitude – by
the famous Hunain ibn Ishaq (a Nestorian Christian) and his associates
– on the basis of a sustained programme that spanned generations and
which reflects, in the final analysis, a social attitude and the public
culture of early Abbasid society.” Support for the translation movement
cut across all lines of religious, sectarian, ethnic, tribal and linguistic
demarcations. The patrons were Arabs and non-Arabs, Muslims and non-
Muslims, Sunnis and Shias, merchants and landowners. He goes on to
refute the two theories pushed by some scholars, one that this translation
movement was the result of the scholarly zeal of a few Syriac-speaking
Christians who being fluent in Greek and Arabic decided to translate
certain works out of altruistic motives for the improvement of society,
and the second which attributes it to the wisdom and open-mindedness
of a few ‘enlightened rulers’ who promoted learning for its own sake.
In the rapidly evolving social climate of Baghdad, demand for

applied knowledge of the society, and for theoretical knowledge by the
scientific and philosophical tradition fuelled the translation movement.
Astrology was the field for which there was the most practical need. The
practical need for astrological history and horoscopy and other parts of
astrology made it predominant in the concerns of the first scholars of the
Abbasid court. The advent of al-Mansur’s caliphate saw the manifold
increase in translations of astrological treatises. These were initially
made from Pahlavi some of which were translations from Greek made
during Sasanian times at Gundeshapur in northeastern Iran. Most of
the astrologers of the period, in addition to their deep involvement in
the translation movement, were also responsible for the composition
of independent treatises. The pattern that was set by astrology was to
be repeated with all other translated sciences. Political considerations,
ideological or theoretical orientations, or practical need would initially
occasion translations. Their study and use would result in original Arabic
compositions in that particular field, and the development of research
on the particular subject, in this way, would further generate the need
both for more accurate translations of texts already available and for
translations of new texts.

Toheed Ahmad
Another major social need that gave an impetus to the translation
movement was the requirement for the education of the secretarial
class that was to administer the empire inherited by the Abbasids. The
administration was modeled on that of the Sasanian and so was the
education of this class as far as secular training was concerned. The
subjects that these bureaucrats had to master to be able to discharge their
duties were essentially practical matters like accounting, surveying,
engineering, and time keeping, etc., and it is in connection with these needs
that the mathematical sciences – arithmetic, geometry, trigonometry, and
astronomy – became the focus of the earliest translation activity.
Gutas cites an interesting passage from the introduction of a ninth

century text called Education of the Secretaries:
“In addition to my works (which provide linguistic, literary, and

religious training), it is indispensable for [the secretary] to study
geometrical figures for the measurement of land in order that he can
recognize a right, an acute and an obtuse triangle and the heights of
triangles, the different sorts of quadrangles, arcs and other circular figures,
and perpendicular lines, and in order that he can test his knowledge in
practice on the land and not on the [survey-] registers, for theoretical
knowledge is nothing like practical experience.
“The Persians [i.e., the Sasanians] used to say that he who does not
know the following would be deficient in his formation as state secretary.
He who does not know the principles of irrigation, opening access-canals
to waterways and stopping breaches; [measuring] the varying length of
days, the revolution of the sun, the rising-points [on the horizon] of stars,
and the phases of the moon and its influences; [assessing] the standards
of measure; surveying in terms of triangles, quadrangles, and polygons
of various angles; constructing arched stone bridges, other kinds of
bridges, sweeps with buckets, and noria waterwheels on waterways; the
nature of the instruments used by artisans and craftsmen; and the details
of accounting.”
It is to be noted that in addition to the very specific kinds of knowledge

in all the major mathematical sciences that a secretary ought to acquire,

it was necessary for him also to have the ability to apply this knowledge.
“This is a very significant statement which goes far in establishing that
in the cultivation of the theoretical sciences, a significant amount of
attention was directed to their application…Such a statement compels
us to see correspondence between the translation and cultivation of the
sciences at a theoretical level and the application of some of them by
those classes who were professionally engaged in them,” notes Gutas.
We can see the importance of this correspondence between translation
and the immediate adoption of its product by the failure of successive
translation movements in the history of Urdu language. The translation
endeavours carried out at Calcutta’s Fort William College were successful
because the civil and military bureaucracy and traders of the British
Raj used the literature and dictionaries thus produced to learn Urdu to
better carry out their jobs. As opposed to this, the translation efforts of
Sir Syed’s Scientific Society, the Delhi College, Jamia Osmania and
Lahore’s Oriental College science and technology were never applied,
either in education or in the society, and amounted to nothing more than
paper exercises. Apparently the society had raised no demand for these
translations, which were made because a handful of people thought that
a civilized society should translate knowledge into its own demotic
language. Because of the absence of such a social ownership, Urdu
translations remained a dead letter as it were.
Algebra was another mathematical science that developed very

early and aimed to address practical needs. For its application to
engineering and irrigation problems, it was useful to the secretaries very
much like geometry. During early Abbasid period, Islamic law was also
developing rapidly and algebra became an essential tool for working
out all the intricate details of inheritance laws. In the introduction to his
masterwork Algebra, the great al-Khwarzami tells that Caliph al-Mamun
“encouraged me to compose a compendious work on algebra, confining
it to the fine and important parts of its calculations, such as people
constantly require in case of inheritance, legacies, partition, law-suits,
and trade, and in all their dealings with one another where surveying,
the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other objects of
various sorts and kinds are concerned.” The book is so structured that
after an introductory section which is purely mathematical, the rest of

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the text is devoted to solving various problems of trade transactions,
surveying, legacies, marriages, and slave emancipation, with specific
representative cases discussed in each area.
According to Michael Hamilton Morgan, al-Khwarzami was

summoned by Caliph al-Mamun at the founding of the House of
Wisdom in 832 in Baghdad and asked to assist in the search for God
in the numeral. “The Central Asian man (al-Khwarzami) sees turbaned
mathematician-astronomers working together in rooms using maps, star
charts, astrolabes, and other measuring instruments, thinking through
problems together, checking each other’s work, poring over translations,
and discussing endlessly. For a man who has often done much of his
work alone and hardly found thinkers who were his equal, to find such
intelligence and competition gathered in one place is both exhilarating
and intimidating. But he knows this is an unparalleled opportunity and
he will make as much of it as he can.” This is an illustration of how
Michael Morgan describes the House of Wisdom as “the world’s first
think tank, an example of networking computing, using the networked
human brains rather than machines.”
In his search, al-Khwarzami comes across references to

Brahmagupta’s Sanskrit text called ‘Opening of the Universe’ which
he believed was almost certainly what he was looking for. He got the
text translated into Arabic under the title of Sindhind. (History tells us
that the Sanskrit original of Brahmagupta’s book was lost, so was its
Arabic translation but a Latin translation of the work done centuries
later survived). “The one thing (in the translated text) that stuns and
shakes him the most is the Hindu character shaped like a dot, a pin point
of blackness like a negative star. The dot is the foundation of an entire
vision of mathematics, of science, and the universe. The black dot, which
in its basic form means nothingness, is the source from which all higher
mathematics can now spring. The nothingness of the dot will grow to
become the centre of the source code behind the physical universe..…
The zero, he realizes, must be accepted on pure faith. It cannot be proven.
And in a terrible irony, which he considers sharing with his patron al-
Mamun, he sees that the ultimate value of rationalist mathematics is
pure revelation, just as God was revealed, not quantified.”

Referring to Abbasid era contribution to mathematical astronomy
and the invention of the astrolabe, Michael Morgan says that when
scholars at Oxford University first saw this device they were fascinated
and as they built their own instruments, they incorporated the old Arab
script and Arab names of the stars into the design. “Those star names,
which will endure until the time of space travel and beyond, will echo
the days of the House of Wisdom.. Even as probes continue to move
deeper and deeper into space, they will orient themselves on stars named
in Arabic by forgotten Muslim astronomers. The very names of the stars
will sound of that old desert language of poetry: Vega, Altair, Deneb,
Betelgeuse, Rigel, Aldebaran, Fomalhaut, Algeuze, Elfeta, Alferaz, and
Mirac.”
Another interesting observation of Michael Morgan Hamilton in his

inspiring book “Lost History” is worth citing here. Abbasid “Baghdad
will also grow into the world capital of poetry. This will result not only
from the city’s wealth, diversity, and inventiveness, it will also come
from the fusion of two of the world’s most poetic cultures and languages
– Arabic and Persian. Both have already long held poetry to be the highest
forms of literary communication and in Baghdad poetry will fill the role
that journalism and fiction will take up 1300 years later. The leading
poets of Baghdad will include Bashshar ibn Burd, an eroticist drawing
on the sensual tradition of the pre-Islamic Arabia and Persia, ibn Ilyas
and Abu Nawas, who troll the dark side of Baghdad, living lives and
writing poems drenched in sex and drinking with a touch of blasphemy
thrown in; ibn Walid, poet of love and drinking songs; and ibn Ahnaf
and ibn Dawud, who rise above the erotic and titillating to write of an
exalted kind of romantic love, which experts see as the predecessor to
later courtly love and songs of the troubadours” (in Europe).
After mathematical sciences, let’s take a quick look at developments

in Philosophy, clearly a discipline for which there was the least amount
of practical need. Nevertheless, it could be made socially relevant and
it appears that such were the considerations for its development through
translation. The first philosopher in Arabic is a-Kindi (died circa 870)
who had gathered a circle of scientists and collaborators around him.
Al-Kindi was not only a philosopher but a polymath in the translated

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sciences and wrote on astrology, astronomy, arithmetic, geometry and
medicine. The translation movement in early Abbasid Baghdad fostered
such a broad and encyclopaedist view that led him to acquire and to
develop a research programme whose aim was to acquire and complete
the sciences that were transmitted from the ancients. The purpose of this
approach, as al-Kindi says in a number of introductions to his essays, was
to advance knowledge, not merely repeat it by memorization. Al-Kindi’s
goal was to approach mathematical accuracy in his argumentation. He
held mathematical or geometrical proof to be of the highest order. He
says that in his philosophical writings, “he regularly employs certain
proofs where his method is quite clearly derived from the Elements of
Euclid.” Such was the influence of the translated scientific literature
and the incipient original scholarship in Arabic that this ideal of the
unassailable proof was widespread in the ninth century and formed the
model of many a discussion in the ‘humanistic’ disciplines. Second, al-
Kindi’s originality resides in his attempts to apply this approach to the
theological and religious discussions of his time. In order to do so, he
tried to gain access to the most ‘scientific’ i.e., methodologically rigorous
disciplines in these subjects and accordingly he had several translations
of primarily metaphysical Greek texts made for him, foremost among
which was Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
That the translation movement enjoyed a very wide support in early

Abbasid society in Baghdad is obvious enough through its sheer spread
and longevity. “In the second Abbasid century,” Gutas observes, “the
translation movement reached its apogee with the work of Hunayn
ibn Ishaq (and his son Ishaq ibn Hunayn) and his associates, and
generated, because of its success, two very significant developments:
first, scholarship in all fields covered by the translated literature became
so widespread and so profound in Baghdadi society that commissions
for original works on scientific and philosophical subjects composed
in Arabic became as current as commissions for translations from
the Greek; and second, because of the spirit of research and analysis
it inculcated different fields of scholarly endeavour unrelated to the
translations gained in sophistication, a plethora of ideas was available
for ready consumption, and the areas covered by the translation literature
were no longer the only ones to impress powerful minds. Intellectual

debates of all sorts became the order of the day and patrons became
interested not only in the transmitted knowledge from the Greeks
but in the main problems posed by this knowledge and in the various
ideological challenges to it.”
For a more precise understanding of the dynamics of this society

that generated the need and support for the movement, it is necessary to
describe closely the significant social groups or strata that sponsored the
translation movement. The sponsors came from all ethnic and religious
groups: Arabic, Syriac, and Persian speakers, and Muslims, Christians
of all sorts, Zoroastrians, Buddhists and pagans. According to Gutas, the
four major groupings of sponsors or patrons were: (a) Abbasid caliphs
and their families; (b) courtiers; (c) officials of the state and military
administration; (d) scholars and scientists.
The success and establishment of the translation movement made

intellectuals, in broad terms, out of all members of the ruling elite.
While the early Abbasid caliphs counted translation as part of their
ideology and foreign policy (for example in their hostile relationship
with Byzantium), the rate and vigour of such patronage attenuated with
the later caliphs. In a general way it is observed that their activities
of patronage correlate positively with the strength of the office of the
caliph itself and the real power of its successive holders. Real power,
however, began to elude later caliphs. Other than caliphs, princes are
frequently mentioned as patrons of scientific and philosophical activity,
most famous among whom is Ahmad, the son of Caliph al-Mu’tasim
(833-842), who was tutored by the philosopher and scientist al-Kindi
himself. Ahmad commissioned many translations of mathematical and
astronomical texts. Other members of the immediate families of caliphs
who sponsored the translation movement and scientific production
were ladies of the court. The mother of Caliph al-Mu’tazz (866-869)
commissioned from the great Hunayn himself translation of a book on
eight-month embryos.
Among the intimates of the caliphs and their families should be

placed the courtiers, individuals of learning, wit and graceful manners
who were sought after for their company. Their social function was

Toheed Ahmad
significant, i.e., to represent the cultural attitudes of the learned elite
as appreciated by the rulers and, conversely, the cultural predilections
of the rulers as catered to by the state. Courtiers came from different
backgrounds and were elevated to their status for different reasons. The
chief of Caliph al-Mu’tasim’s guard was Al-Fath ibn Haqan, son of a
Turkish soldier. He was raised in court together with al-Mu’tasim’s son,
the future caliph al- Mutawakkil (847-861), with whom he became close
personal friends. He remained so throughout al-Mutawakkil’s reign and
ran a brilliant courtly salon for intellectuals. He gained lasting fame for
his devotion to letters, his very rich personal library, and his profound
promotion of scientific and literary learning.
The secretaries of the Abbasid administration and related state

functionaries constituted one of the most important social groups who
patronized and promoted the translations and works based on them.
The early Abbasid caliphs relied in this regard on Sasanian models. The
Barmakees (a noble Persian family of Buddhist converts originating
from the Gandhara region who enjoyed unquestioned supremacy in these
posts for the first half century of the Abbasid caliphate, were naturally
carriers of Sassanian practice including its culture of translation. They
were among the sponsors of the translation movement and of works
relating to astronomy and agriculture. They are said to be responsible
for the Indian embassy to the court of Caliph al-Mansur, which resulted
in the transmission, and translation of the Sindhind. After the fall of
the Barmakees, the Abbasid caliphs selected their viziers from among
thoroughly Arabized Muslim Persians, the Tahirids. In addition, the
caliphs selected high court functionaries from among the Arab and non
Arab Christians of Iraq. Despite the new directions from which members
of the secretarial classes were recruited they would enthusiastically
support the translation movement.
Besides the support of the political and social elite, scientists and
scholars of all groups commissioned translations of Greek texts for their
practice and research. Physicians were among the most prominent and
significant of these patrons, among whom was the great Hunayn and his
associates who translated a great number of Galen’s works. Al-Kindi
commissioned translations of scientific subjects about which he also

wrote original essays. He was particularly keen on learning about Greek
philosophy, particularly physics and metaphysics to achieve scientific
certainty in the discussions of religious issues.
As we wrap up this brief look at some of the known factors (these

may be modified as more factors will emerge as the large number of
Arab manuscripts of the period are translated and analyzed) that made
the translation movement of the Abbasid caliphs such a resounding
success, let’s look at the translation culture of the period. Apparently
the translators in the first century of the Baghdad caliphate were
scholars of the subjects of the books they translated, not professional
translators who specialized in any particular branch of knowledge. After
the initial translations of Greek works through the Sasanian Pahlavi
intermediaries, when sponsors wanted to have books translated directly
from Greek, specialists were not readily available. Though there were
enough Greek speakers in Syria and Palestine, there were no Graeco-
Arabic translators available. Most of the early translators from Greek
were Christian clerics of various denominations, whom the Abbasid
patrons could approach in their official capacity. As the demand for
Graeco-Arab translations grew because of the needs of the scientists
and philosophers, so did the supply and competence of translators. It
was the development of Arabic scientific and philosophical tradition
that generated the wholesale demand for translations from Greek (and
Syriac and Pahlavi), not that the translations gave rise to science and
philosophy in Abbasid Baghdad. Translations improved with time as the
translators’ Greek improved and they became professional translators
whose ultimate purpose was financial. According to one contemporary
account competent translators could earn as much as 500 dinars a month,
which at the time was equivalent to 2125 grams of gold, a salary that at
today’s gold rates would be unthinkable in Pakistan.
A question that was raised in the beginning remains to be answered,

why did the Byzantines, a great centre of Christianity, stay away from
this knowledge revolution in their neighbourhood? One reason put
forward is that the eighth and the ninth centuries were the ‘dark age’ of
Byzantine with very little firsthand information on the period. Second,
the Byzantine mind at the time was in the grip of theological hairsplitting

Toheed Ahmad
which had not time or use for matters ‘secular’ like philosophy and
science. The Byzantines although they were Greek speaking, and were
the direct inheritors of Greek culture, had always feared secular Hellenic
knowledge as it was thought to be injurious to Christian spirit. There
was no space yet in Constantinople for humanism of any kind. Their
Emperors had Greeks locked away in dungeons lest they soil the mind of
a righteous Christian. Books anyway were scarce and expensive as they
did not have recourse to paper and so their texts were written on skins
only; the papyrus could not be used outside Egypt as it was susceptible
to humidity.
This while the Graeco-Arabic translation movement spread over two

centuries had hardly any doctrinal content. No worthwhile opposition to
this translation movement is recorded in the writings of scholars of Islam
of the period. Although some western scholarship has belatedly tried to
imagine a conflict between the scientists and the religious scholars the
one big achievement of the movement, as noted above, was to bridge the
“western’ divide between reason and faith and thus free the human spirit
to create knowledge and power to conquer nature. How this fragrant
stream of consciousness went on to fertilize Europe is another story. In
the words of Mark Graham, “the Greeks belonged to Islam as much as
they belonged to Christendom. It was they who saved the Greeks when
the Christians were burning them. It was they who translated them,
debated them, commented on them and improved upon their systems.
The West belongs as much to Islam, a rich part of its own history that
has only begun to be written.” The magic in this examination has been
that of the art and science translation in its unparalleled fullness.
Bibliography
1. Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad
and Early Abbasid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th centuries), Dimitri Gutas, Routledge, 1998
2. How Islam Created the Modern World, Mark Graham, Amana Publications, Beltsville,
MD, USA, 2006
3. Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, George Saliba, MIT Press,
Cambridge MT, USA, 2007
4. Lost History: The Enduring Legacy of Muslim Scientists, Thinkers and Artists, Michael
Hamilton Morgan, National Geographic, 2007

5. The House of Wisdom: How the Arabs Transformed Western Civilization, Jonathan
Lyons, Bloomsbury Press, 2009
6. Alladin’s Lamp: How Greek Science Came to Europe Through the Islamic World,
Jonathan Freely, Knopf, 2009
7. Science and Islam: A History, Eshan Masood, Icon Books, London, 2009

THE HUDOOD ORDINANCES OF
PAKISTAN AND THE DENIAL OF
JUSTICE
S. Iftikhar Murshed*
Abstract
The Hudood Ordinances deviate from the spirit of Islamic law which
is founded on the rights of the people. Not only has this been ignored
in the ordinances, but some of the injunctions of the Qur’an have also
been misinterpreted. For instance, zina or adultery is the only offence
specified by the Qur’an that punishes those who accuse others of the
crime but are unable to meet the quadruple evidentiary requirement of
four witnesses to establish guilt. If adultery is not proved, the accused
are considered innocent and are not liable to any form of punishment
under tazir which relies on circumstantial evidence and is not sanctioned
by the Qur’an. Furthermore rape, which is a crime of violence, is not
a sub-category of the Qur’anic zina law which pertains exclusively to
consensual extramarital sex. In Islamic jurisprudence, it is a crime
under hiraba and the perpetrator, not the victim, is punished if proven
guilty. Absolute prohibition is also not deducible from the Qur’an
because intoxicants are not included among things forbidden or haram.
The amputation of the hand for theft is a punishment of the last resort.
It has to be seen in the context of the fundamental principle of Islamic
law that no duty (taklif) can be imposed on the individual without his
being granted a corresponding right (haqq) which means that the state
must first fulfill its part of the social contract by providing economic
and social security to all citizens. If a person is compelled by extreme
poverty to steal, it implies that the state has failed to provide him the
* Iftikhar Murshed is the publisher of Criterion.

The Hudood Ordinances of Pakistan and the Denial of Justice
means to earn a reasonable livelihood and, therefore, cannot impose a
punishment of such severity on him. Till the Hudood laws are repealed
in their entirety, the long night of oppression, that women in particular
have undergone, will not come to an end. Author
If bad laws are the worst form of tyranny as Edmund Burke

believed, then this was proved by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s
Hudood Ordinances promulgated in 1979 and enforced the following
year. The fundamental principle that was ignored is that Islamic law is
founded on the rights of people and those who aim to establish a Muslim
state based on the shariah commit the supreme folly of starting “with
the hudood punishment. This is the end result of Islamic law, not the
beginning. The beginning is the rights of people. There is no punishment
in Islam which has no corresponding right.”1 These rights were violated
with the introduction of the hudood laws and women, in particular,
suffered the most. In the process the actual injunctions of the Qur’an
were misinterpreted and distorted. Till then Pakistan’s criminal legal
system was founded on Anglo-Saxon law and this included the colonial
era’s Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act
which was applied countrywide minus the tribal areas where customary
law prevailed.2Though this system continued, the procedures and
punishments for some of the offences were changed and the claim was
made that these modifications, known as the Hudood Ordinances, were
in conformity with the textual commandments of the Qur’an.
Hudood, the plural of Hadd which means boundary or limit, has

been defined as an “Arabic term indicating crimes that are textually
specified (i.e., in the Quran and sunnah) and are accompanied by
stipulated punishments. Often they are called the grand sins, kaba’ir.
These include zina (adultery), qazf (slander), hiraba (highway robbery),
khamr (the drinking of alcohol) and ridda (apostasy).”3
The criminal laws which collectively constitute the 1979 Hudood

Ordinances of Pakistan are: (i) the Offence of Zina Ordinance relating
to adultery, fornication, rape and abduction; (ii) the Offence of Qazf
Ordinance dealing with false accusation of zina which includes both
adultery and fornication; (iii) The Prohibition Order proscribing the

S. Iftikhar Murshed
use of alcohol and drugs; (iv) the Offence Against Property Ordinance
pertaining to theft and armed robbery, and; (v) the Execution of
Punishment of Whipping Ordinance. Alongside these a sixth ordinance
amending the Code of Criminal Procedure was also promulgated.4
Adultery, rape, theft, armed robbery and the consumption of alcohol
were already offences in Pakistan prior to the Hudood Ordinances which
introduced two new crimes namely, Qazf and fornication.5
A former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Munir, who

is remembered as much for his insightful 387-page report on the
anti-Ahmadi disturbances of 1953 in Lahore as for his controversial
validation in 1958 of constitutional deviations under the infamous
doctrine of necessity, observed that the Hudood Ordinances of 1979
did not include apostasy and murder. Both, according to Justice Munir,
constitute hudood offences and the judge does not have the discretion
to alter the punishments because these are mandated by the Qur’an and
the sunnah.6
The punishments prescribed under the Hudood Ordinances are

harsh but these were justified on the ground that they were recognized
by Muslim jurists as being in conformity with the laws of Islam. What
resulted was a distortion of Islamic tenets because some of the laws
thus enacted were completely at variance with the actual injunctions
of the Qur’an. The reason was that spurious Traditions of the Prophet
influenced the jurists.
Several scholars have dwelt at length on this problem. For instance

Justice Munir commented that there could be no two opinions about the
authenticity of the Quran, “but the moment we enter hadis, which is a
record of the actions, sayings and approvals of the Holy Prophet, we
enter into a field of controversy. That most of the Ahadis were invented
or fabricated does not admit of any doubt. Abu Daud accepted only
4,800 out of 500,000 Ahadis and Bukhari relied only on 2,000 out of
40,000 narrators of Hadis. According to Tabqat-ul-Kubra, Abdulla, the
son of Imam Ahmed bin Hanbal stated that his father had reduced into
writing ten million traditions which he could repeat from memory. And
this despite the Holy Prophet’s warning that his sunnah was not to be

recorded unless ‘ye know for a surety.’ And several compilations were
burnt during the Khilafat-i-Rashida. This was done lest the authority of
the Qur’an be affected. ‘My words do not’ the Prophet had said ‘abrogate
the word of God but the word of God can abrogate my sayings’ (Mishkat,
Book V. Col. XVI). The Holy Prophet himself burnt one collection, two
others were burnt, one by Hazrat Abu Bakr and the other by Hazrat
Usman (The Qur’anic Law of Crimes, by Mir Waliullah, pp. 42-43).”7
The Offence of Zina Ordinance

The punishment for adultery ordained by the Qur’an is a hundred
stripes.8 In Islamic law, the term zina or adultery “signifies voluntary
sexual intercourse between a man and a woman not married to one
another, irrespective of whether one or both of them are married to other
persons or not: hence, it does not – in contrast with the usage prevalent
in most Western languages – differentiate between the concepts of
‘adultery’ (i.e., sexual intercourse of a married man with a woman other
than his wife, or a married woman with a man other than her husband) and
‘fornication’ (i.e., sexual intercourse between two unmarried persons).”9
In this sense the inclusion of fornication as a punishable offence under
zina in the Hudood Ordinances was in accordance with Islamic law.
The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979

prescribes stoning to death for rape or zina if the crime is committed by
married adult Muslims or a hundred lashes for adult non-Muslims or
single Muslims. The claim that this is in accordance with the sunnah is
unacceptable. The Qur’an does not differentiate illicit sexual relations
between married and unmarried adults and, as such, the punishment is
the same whether the offender is married or single. Furthermore, there is
no death penalty in the Qur’an for extramarital sex and it is inconceivable
that Prophet Muhammad could have violated its laws. Stoning to death
for this offence is a Jewish punishment and was awarded by the Prophet
to “a Jew and Jewess in one case and others apparently occurred before
the revelation of” the law relating to adultery. 10
The Qur’an is free from contradictions and its injunctions on a

particular issue, which are often repeated in its various chapters, reinforce
and explain each other. If, as some Muslim jurists believe, stoning to

S. Iftikhar Murshed
death is mandatory for adultery despite there being no warrant for such
punishment in the Holy Book, then this cannot be reconciled with the
Qur’anic ordinance that the penalty is halved for a person in bondage.11
Commenting on this injunction, Maulana Muhammad Ali (1874-1951)
observes: “It is plainly laid down here that if a married slave-girl commits
adultery, her punishment is half of the punishment prescribed for the free
married woman who commits adultery. This shows that the Holy Qur’an
never contemplated stoning as the punishment for adultery because it
could not be halved, as a matter of fact the Holy Book nowhere speaks
of stoning; the only punishment for adultery it speaks of is a hundred
stripes (24:2).”12
The death penalty for this crime was challenged as un-Islamic in

the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan in 1981.13The court, which was
established the previous year, is an appellate body and consists of eight
judges three of whom are from the ulema (religious scholars) and hence
have no legal experience. Of the five judges who heard the case, only
one upheld stoning to death, three were of the opinion that it was not
Islamic and one believed that it was permissible as a tazir sentence i.e.,
“a fall-back position from Hadd.”14
The judge who claimed that Islam ordained stoning to death, Justice
Karimullah Durrani, was apparently confused because he also stated
that verse 3 of chapter 24, titled An-Nur (The Light) of the Qur’an
“prohibits marriage between an adulterer and a non-adulterer.” He then
attempted to substantiate this by quoting the translation of the verse as:
“The adulterer shall not marry save an adulteress or an idolatress and
an adulteress no one shall marry save an adulterer or idolater. All that
is forbidden unto believers.”15 The obvious implication is that capital
punishment was never envisaged by the Qur’an because the question
of marriage does not arise if adulterers are to be put to death. Justice
Durrani must have believed that the English rendition of the Qur’anic
passage quoted by him was accurate or else he would not have used it
in a court of law and especially when it was deliberating on an issue
of such importance. However this did not deter him from upholding
the death penalty as Islamic and he cited a number of Ahadis including
one in which Ali ibn Abi Talib (598-661), the fourth of rightly guided

caliphs, objected to this form of punishment in the case of a woman
who had been sentenced to stoning by Caliph Usman on giving birth
to a child after only six months of marriage. Ali is said to have proved
from two verses of the Qur’an that it was possible for a woman to give
birth after six months of conception. Accordingly, Usman revoked the
sentence “but the woman could not be saved as she had by then been
stoned to death.”16
Whereas the Qur’anic verse cited by Justice Durrani rules out capital
punishment, the translation of the passage he relied upon is inaccurate
because it violates a fundamental principle of Islamic law i.e., “once a
crime has been expiated by the transgressor’s undergoing the ordained
legal punishment (in this case, a hundred stripes), it must be regarded
insofar as the society is concerned, as atoned for and done with.” 17
Therefore if the offenders have been punished, there can be no religious
justification disallowing them from marrying persons who have never
been guilty of adultery.
Muhammad Asad (1900-1992) in his The Message of the Qur’an

resolves this problem by rendering the verse as: “The adulterer couples
with none other than an adulteress – that is, a woman who accords (to
her own lust) a place side by side with God; and the adulteress couples
with none other than an adulterer – that is, a man who accords (to his
own lust) a place side by side with God: this is forbidden unto the
believers.” The twelfth century philosopher, historian and theologian,
Abu’l-Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi, famed for his Qur’an commentary titled
Mafatih al-Ghayb (“The Keys of the Unseen”) from the Qur’anic line
“ With Him are the Keys of the Unseen” (6:59),18 was of the view that
the formulation of this verse is a mere statement of fact and cannot be
construed as an injunction. Asad explains that the verb yankihu, which
appears twice in this passage cannot, “have the customary meaning of ‘he
marries’ but must, rather, be understood in its general sense – applicable
to both lawful as well as unlawful sexual intercourse – namely, ‘he
couples with.’ It is in this sense that the great commentator Abu Muslim
(as quoted by Razi) explains the above verse, which stresses the fact
that both partners are equally guilty inasmuch as they commit their

S. Iftikhar Murshed
sin consciously – implying that neither of them can excuse himself or
herself on the ground of having been merely ‘seduced.’”19
As a majority of the judges in the Federal Shariat Court were of the

view that stoning to death for adultery was not Islamic, the punishment
was set aside. This unleashed countrywide protest rallies organized
by the ulema. Zia-ul-Haq succumbed to the pressure and enacted a
constitutional amendment empowering the Federal Shariat Court to
review its own judgments.20 The judges, with the exception of one,
were replaced and in 1981 the government filed a review petition. The
reconstituted court announced its decision on 20 June 1982 with the
comment that the Federal Shariat Court was not competent to examine
the Islamic character of the Hudood Ordinances. Five of the six judges
upheld stoning to death (rajm) as a Hadd punishment while one was
of the view that it was an Islamic punishment but under tazir. 21 Thus
it was political expediency and not any selfless commitment to the
actual injunctions of the Qur’an that prompted the revision of the earlier
judgment.
In rounding off his judgment validating stoning to death for adultery

one of the judges said “this is a matter of pure belief and faith as followers
of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) and his Caliphs which requires
no reasoning or arguments.”22 Thus the judge had no compunction of
sentencing a person to death without thought or reason on the basis of
his belief alone. Yet in several of its passages the Qur’an emphasizes the
use of reason, for instance, “Verily, the vilest of all creatures in the sight
of God are those deaf, those dumb ones who do not use their reason.”23
In another verse, it describes itself in the words “In (all) this, behold,
there are messages indeed for people who think!”24 To Aristotle “Law is
reason free from passion” and if justice is to be served, reason, and not
emotion, must govern the verdicts of the courts.
The Qur’an requires the evidence of four firsthand witnesses, as

against two for all other criminal and civil suits, to prove adultery.25 The
mandatory punishment of a hundred stripes which has to witnessed by
an unspecified number of people26 can, therefore, seldom be imposed.
Even in the unlikely event that adultery is proved, the purpose of the

seemingly harsh punishment is to shame rather than cause serious
corporal injury. According to Maulana Muhammad Ali, “It aimed more
at disgracing the culprit than at torturing him. In the time of the Prophet,
and even for some time after him, there was no whip, and flogging was
carried out by beating with a stick or with the hand or with shoes. The
culprit was not stripped naked, but he was required to take off thick
clothes.” 27
During the first hearing at Pakistan’s Federal Shariat Court in

1981when stoning to death was declared un-Islamic, Justice Agha Ali
Hyder referred to the opinion expressed by Maulana Abul A’la Maududi
(1903-1979): “If the offender was old or infirm a broom with a hundred
sticks was considered sufficient, so that one blow would meet the ends
of justice.” The judge was attempting to prove that understanding
human nature is fundamental to the spirit of Islam.28 The fallibility of
all humans is recognized by the Qur’an which declares “man has been
created weak.”29
Furthermore, the opinion of important Islamic jurists is that

for adultery to be proved the four witnesses must have actually seen
penetration failing which the evidence is considered insufficient. This
conclusion is founded on an authenticated Tradition according to
which the Prophet repeatedly ignored the confession of a man that he
had committed adultery. When the latter persisted, the Prophet cross-
examined him in some detail in order to determine whether penetration
had actually occurred.30 Eventually the person was punished because of
his confession but the woman was neither prosecuted nor was her alleged
indiscretion even investigated. The indispensible prerequisite for the
evidence to be admissible is that the witnesses must be of irreproachable
probity and there must not have been any intrusion into the privacy of
the accused. Under these conditions it is virtually impossible to establish
guilt unless the act was performed in public. The Qur’an undoubtedly
forbids adultery in the strongest possible terms but the inescapable
implication is that the punishment is for public indecency rather than for
private extramarital sexual intercourse.31 Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni
of the DePaul University, Chicago, who was nominated for the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1999 for his work on the international criminal justice

S. Iftikhar Murshed
system, writes: “the requirement of proof and its exigencies lead to the
conclusion that the policy of the harsh penalty is to deter public aspects
of this form of sexual practice.”32
The Qur’anic requirement of four witnesses was intended to protect

citizens, in particular women, against slander and false accusations of
adultery as is evident from the passage: “And as for those who accuse
chaste women (of adultery), and then are unable to produce four witnesses
(in support of their allegation), flog them with eighty stripes; and ever
after refuse to accept from them any testimony – since it is they, they
that are truly depraved!”33
The import of the verses on the zina laws as enunciated and

elaborated in the Qur’an is that the honour not only of women but
also of men has to be safeguarded. Among the specified hadd crimes,
it is only for adultery that punishment is mandated for the accusers if
they are unable to substantiate their allegations through the quadruple
evidentiary stipulations. Even then, the two preconditions for such
evidence to be admissible are that the four witnesses must have actually
seen penetration during the illicit sexual act without intrusion into the
privacy of the accused. If these stringent evidentiary requirements are
not met then those leveling the accusations are to be punished with
eighty stripes and the accused are considered innocent insofar as the
state is concerned. Adultery is a major sin and punishable by the state
only if conclusively proved. Individuals are responsible for their private
sexual indiscretions to God.
From this it follows that unproven accusations of adultery cannot

be punished under tazir as in other hadd offences. Circumstantial
evidence which is the basis of the tazir punishments in Pakistan for
adultery is not in accord with Islamic jurisprudence. In 1981 tazir was
challenged in the Federal Shariat Court on the ground that the only form
of punishment recognized by the Qur’an was hadd.34 However, instead
of examining this important issue on merit, the court dismissed the
petition on technical grounds. By allowing adultery to be prosecuted as a
tazir punishment, the zina ordinance of Pakistan violates the mandatory
evidentiary requirements specified by the Qur’an. Lawyers and human

rights activists have no doubt that the tazir punishment of zina is “the
most insidious element” of the hudood laws. It has been, and continues
to be, extensively applied and the impact is that thousands of citizens,
mostly women, languish in prison.35
The preamble of the zina ordinance claims that its purpose is “to
modify the existing law relating to zina so as to bring it in conformity
with the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah.” By including rape or zina-bil-jabr
within its ambit, it violates the letter and spirit of the Qur’anic law on
adultery. The textual formulation of the Qur’an on the subject pertains
only to consensual extramarital sexual intercourse and not rape.
This distortion of Islamic law under the zina ordinance was partially
rectified by the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act,
2006 which was approved through only a minimum number of majority
votes by the National Assembly of Pakistan on 15 November 2006, by
the Senate a few days later and came into force on 1 December of that
year. Consequently rape was taken out of the Hudood Ordinances and
included in the Pakistan Penal Code. What needs to emphasized here
is that this crime of violence should never have been subsumed as a
sub-category of the zina ordinance as it is not permissible under Islamic
legal principles.
In Islamic law it is the perpetrator of rape and not the victim that is
punished. According to a well-authenticated Tradition, when a woman
reported to the Prophet that she had been forced to commit adultery, he
punished the perpetrator but not the woman.36 Similarly Caliph Umar
ibn al-Khattab punished the rapist of a slave girl but did not prosecute
her.37 These and other Traditions as well as the writings of Islamic legal
scholars absolve rape victims of any transgression.
In Islamic jurisprudence rape is not categorized as a criminal offence

under zina but under the hadd crime of hiraba which involves forcible
taking, highway robbery, terrorism and waging war against the state.
In a well-thought-through paper, Columbia University’s Asifa Quraishi
has demonstrated that it is in discussions of hiraba that the crime of rape
appears.38 For example in the Fiqh-us-Sunnah which summarizes the

S. Iftikhar Murshed
main traditional schools of Islamic law, hiraba is defined as “a single
person or group of people causing public disruption, killing, forcibly
taking property or money, attacking or raping women (hatk al’arad),
killing cattle or disrupting agriculture.”39
The classification of rape under hiraba is also confirmed by some

of the most eminent scholars of Islamic law. According to the Maliki
School, a person who “obstructs the road, even without the intention to
take money, intending to harm someone, or intending to rape a woman”
is liable for punishment under hiraba.”40 This was elaborated by Ibn
‘Arabi (1165-1240) in his comments on an incident in which a group
was attacked and a woman among them was raped. The question arose
whether the crime was an offence under hiraba as weapons were not
used and neither was any money taken. Ibn ‘Arabi’s terse response was
“hiraba with the private parts” had occurred and this was infinitely
worse than the mere taking of money.41
Ibn Hazm (994-1064), the renowned Cordova-born theologian of

Arab-Persian decent, who, as a follower of the Zahiri (exoterist) School
of Law, believed that only the “explicit” and not the hidden meanings
of the Qur’an were admissible. Despite this literalist predilection, he
defined a hiraba offender as “One who puts fear on the road, whether
or not with a weapon, at night or day, in urban areas or in open spaces,
in the palace of a caliph or a mosque, with or without accomplices, in
the desert or in the village, in a large or small city, with one or more
people…making people fear that they’ll be killed, or have money taken,
or be raped whether the attackers are one or many.”42
These views of some of the most outstanding thinkers and scholars

leave little doubt that in Islamic jurisprudence rape, which is a crime of
violence, is an offence under hiraba and cannot be included as a sub-
category of the Zina Ordinance. In a hiraba prosecution, the rapist and
not the victim is the focus. The almost impossible condition of four
witnesses is dispensed with and circumstantial evidence including those
of forensic experts is admissible. The classification of rape as a zina
offence with its stringent evidentiary requirements has resulted in the

persecution instead of the protection of women. Thus criminals went
free while the victims were punished.
In 1983 alone, 1,684 cases of zina were reported to the police, the
following year the number increased to 1,842.43 The Pakistan National
Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), which was established
in 1999 as an advisory body for the eradication of laws discriminatory to
women, reported that 80 percent of the female prisoners in 2003 had been
convicted for alleged adultery after they had failed to prove allegations
of rape. A human rights survey conducted in mid-2006 revealed that a
staggering 200,000 Hudood-related cases were pending in the courts
and this had resulted in the unjust detention of those awaiting sentence,
mostly women. By early 2007 there were 6,500 imprisoned females in
Pakistan.44
These figures, like all statistics, are cold-blooded and do not depict
what these victims of the law, particularly women, have undergone
since the promulgation of the Hudood Ordinances. Rape victims have
been violated while in police custody, they have been ostracized by their
peers and in, a patriarchal society with its skewed code of honour, many
have been killed by their own families. To cite just one example, 15 year
old Jehan Mina, a rape victim who had become pregnant, was awarded
a hundred stripes for adultery on account of her pregnancy while her
assailant went free for want of evidence. Her father had died some
years earlier, her mother had remarried and entrusted her to the care of
her grandfather who wanted to kill the child because of the “dishonor”
she had brought to the family. By the time Jehan was convicted on 22
February 1983 she had given birth and the sentence was changed to
three years’ rigorous imprisonment “in view of her tender age” and was
to be enforced after two years in order to enable her to care of the infant.
In the words of an eminent lawyer “such compassion is sometimes
more revolting than the sentence itself.”45 Thousands of other similar
incidents have been documented by human rights group but nothing has
been done to strike down the Hudood laws.
In June 2006, the Council of Islamic Ideology, which is an advisory

body with no power of enforcement, proposed that women detained

S. Iftikhar Murshed
under Hudood charges be released on bail. In a unanimous decision
in April 2007 the Council ruled that a woman forced to have sexual
intercourse should not be considered guilty of adultery but should,
instead, be viewed as a victim of rape. The press note issued on the
occasion stated: “In this case (rape), the woman will be a complainant
and the state will be bound to investigate, arrest the rapist and punish
him if the crime is proved.”
According to Justice Dorab Patel, a former judge of the Supreme

Court of Pakistan, rape, even in a civilized jurisprudence, is difficult
to prove because it is usually un-witnessed. The burden of proof rests
with the prosecution and, under the rule of prudence, courts cannot
convict a person accused of rape on the exclusive testimony of the
victim. Common sense is however abandoned under the Hudood laws
because rape victims are prosecuted for adultery on the basis of two
questionable assumptions. First, the allegation of rape was false because
the accused was acquitted and second, the allegation is an admission of
sexual intercourse and implies a confession of adultery. In other words
the implied confession is an admission of guilt while an allegation of
rape is a repudiation of guilt. Justice Dorab Patel recalled: “The law
declared on this question by the Supreme Court in Rehmani’s case (PLD
1978 SC 200) is clear beyond any doubt. We held in this case that only a
statement which is a clear admission of guilt, or of the facts constituting
the guilt, is a confession. We also pointed out that a statement cannot be
treated as a confession by relying on the inculpatory part and excluding
the exculpatory part.”46 The assumption that an unproven allegation of
rape amounts to confession is, therefore, contrary to the law declared by
the Supreme Court.
The Prohibition Order

The former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Muhammad Munir,
was of the opinion that the absolute prohibition of intoxicants “is not
deducible from the Qur’an, because these are not included in the things
which were declared haram (forbidden).”47 At the time of Prophet
Muhammad two types of alcoholic beverages, sakar and khamar, were
known in Arabia and only these are referred to in the Qur’an. The former
was derived from dates and the latter from grapes through a process

which involved boiling in water till two-thirds of the liquid evaporated
and the residue was lawful for drinking. Two verses of the Qur’an favour
its use and two are against it.48
Justice Munir was convinced that cut and dried answers on prohibition
were not available in Islamic jurisprudence and “the lawfulness or
otherwise of intoxicating drinks is not so simple as it is considered to
be.” The Qur’an expressly prohibits carrion, blood, swine flesh and
animals sacrificed other than in the name of God and that is where it
ends.49 The four textual references in the Holy Book to intoxicants are:
(i) “They will ask thee about intoxicants and games of chance.
Say: ‘In both there is great evil as well as some benefit to
man; but the evil which they cause is greater than the benefit
which they bring.’”50
(ii) “O you who have attained to faith! Do not attempt to pray

while you are in a state of drunkenness, (but wait) until you
know what you are saying…”51
(iii) “O you who have attained to faith! Intoxicants, and games

of chance, and idolatrous practices, and the divining of the
future are but a loathsome evil of Satan’s doing: shun it, then,
so that you may attain to a happy state!”52
(iv) “And (We grant you nourishment) from the fruit of date-
palms and vines: from it you derive intoxicants as well as
wholesome subsistence – in this behold, there is a message
indeed for people who use their reason.” 53
Though the Qur’an neither categorically prohibits the consumption

of intoxicating drinks nor indicates any punishment, the Mishkat al-
Masabih, which contains 4434 to 5945 Traditions of the Prophet
in 29 books, prescribes 80 lashes. There has been a substantial
amount of discussion on the subject. Burhan-ud-din Ali Abi Bakr al-
Marghinani’s (1152-1197) Hidaya, an authoritative guide to fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence) which is the basis of Anglo-Islamic law in Pakistan and

S. Iftikhar Murshed
India, dwells at some length on the differences of views expressed by
jurists especially Abu Hanifa (699-767). Known also as Al-Imam al-
Azam(the Great Imam), Abu Hanifa’s opinion was that “Khamar is the
name of an intoxicant made from grapes and by a particular process.
Therefore, all other intoxicants made from figs, dates, wheat and barley
are not khamar and the Qur’anic Ordinances relating to Khamar cannot
apply to them.”54 In other words intoxicants made from these substances
“can be drunk in moderate quantities or as a medicine but not so as to
produce a state of khamar which is a word derived from the same root
as mukhammirat and according to all lexicographers means a state of
stupefaction or loss of senses.”55
The implication, therefore, is that the motive of the law or the ratio
legis is that the use of Khamar is prohibited because it intoxicates.
Scholars such as Mir Waliullah (1887-1964) believed that imbibing any
other intoxicant is a sin and a culpable offence if taken in such quantities
so as to result in inebriation i.e., stupefaction or loss of senses.56 Abu
Hanifa’s opinion is that punishment for drunkenness is permissible if the
person cannot comprehend what is said to him, is unable to differentiate
between a man and a woman or between two objects while two of his
disciples believed that he should not be able to speak coherently and
many jurists agree with this definition. According to Imam Shafi’i
(767-820) a state of intoxication is established if a person cannot walk
without staggering or becomes giddy.57With the exception of the Hanafis,
Islamic jurists are of the opinion that drinking spirits is unlawful. Imam
Abu Hanifa’s conclusion is that it is neither unlawful nor punishable
provided it is taken in moderate quantities or as a medicine.58
What emerges is that there is no unanimity of opinion among Muslim

jurists whether the taking of intoxicants is prohibited in Islam. Yet, under
the Hudood laws of Pakistan, the punishment is not only harsh but its
application also defies logic and common sense. The punishment for
drinking as per the Ordinance is eighty lashes on the evidence of two
witnesses. If however a person is drunk and the medical report confirms
that he has been imbibing, hadd is not applicable unless two witnesses
testify that they have seen him drinking. “On the other hand, if a person
sips a spoon of an alcoholic beverage in the presence of two pious male

Muslims, he is awarded hadd.”59Furthermore the taking of narcotics and
drugs does not invite hadd under the Ordinance.
The Offence Against Property Ordinance.

The Qur’an states: “It is but a just recompense for those who make
war on God and his apostle, and endeavour to spread corruption on
earth, that they are being slain in great numbers, or crucified in great
numbers, or have, in result of their perverseness, their hands and feet cut
off in great numbers, or are being (entirely) banished from (the face of)
the earth: such is their ignominy in this world. But in the life to come
(yet more) awesome suffering awaits them – save for such (of them) as
repent ere you (O believers) become more powerful than they: for you
must know that God is much-forgiving, a dispenser of grace. ”60 Though
the words clearly show that the verses deal with the punishment that
is to be awarded to those who wage war, instigate rebellion and create
disorder in the land, the Hudood Ordinance on the Offence Against
Property “Enforcement of Hadood Ordinance 1979” considers the
passage as prescribing punishment for highway robbery accompanied
by murder or otherwise and accordingly awards the following penalties,
as summarized by Justice Munir, for these crimes which are not even
mentioned in the cited Qur’anic passage:
(i) “When no murder has been committed nor any property has
been taken away whipping not exceeding 30 and 3 years
rigorous imprisonment.
(ii) “Where no property is taken away but hurt is caused as for

hurt under the existing law.
(iii) “Where property of a certain value has been taken away but
no murder has been committed, cutting of the right hand from
the wrist and left foot from the ankle.61
The jurists in Pakistan who based the punishments in the Offence

Against Property Ordinance on the quoted passage of the Qur’an cite
classical commentators that the text is a legal injunction. A closer look at
the textual formulation suggests that this is an inaccurate interpretation

S. Iftikhar Murshed
because the four passive verbs “slain,” “crucified,” “cut off,” and
“banished” are in the present tense and do not indicate the future or
the imperative mood. It is, therefore, not a divine commandment but a
statement of fact. What is implied is that a deviation from all ethical and
moral values leads to strife for the attainment of mundane objectives
such as power and wealth for which communities and nations have gone
to war through the ages.
Furthermore it is inconceivable that the Qur’an would ordain

that those “who make war on God and His apostle” should be slain,
crucified, mutilated and banished “in great numbers” as that would
imply “arbitrariness on the part of the Divine Law-Giver.”62Only a group
of persons, or even a single individual, may be involved in fomenting
rebellion and endeavouring “to spread corruption” and it would therefore
violate all norms of justice if people are punished “in great numbers” for
the wrong-doings of a few.
Commentators also have difficulty in explaining the phrase they “are

being (entirely) banished from (the face of) the earth.” Some believe it
means the transgressors will be banished from the land of Islam, but not
once is the word “earth (ard)”used in the Qur’an in such a restrictive
sense. Others have advanced the absurd proposition that the offenders
should be incarcerated “in a subterranean dungeon” as that “would
constitute their banishment from the face of the earth!”63
The Qur’anic passage does not mention highway robbery or murder

and neither does it contain any legal injunction but Pakistani jurists have
derived laws from it pertaining to property under the category of hiraba
offences because they believe violence or taking forcibly as in dacoity is
involved.64Punishment for non-violent theft or saraqa has been enjoined
in the Qur’an but the manner in which it has been interpreted is literal
and ignores the underlying spirit of the laws in the scripture.
The punishment for theft as specified in the Qur’an is harsh: “Now

as for the man who steals and the woman who steals, cut off the hand
of either of them in requital for what they have wrought, as a deterrent
ordained by God: for God is almighty wise. But as for him who repents

after having thus done wrong and makes amends, behold, God will
accept his repentance: verily, God is much-forgiving, a dispenser of
grace.”65The extreme severity of this form of punishment has to be seen
from the fundamental principle of Islamic law that no obligation or duty
(taklif) can be imposed on the individual without his being granted a
corresponding right (haqq) by the community or state. Implicit in the
failure to fulfill duties and obligations is punishment. However, the
punishment cannot and must not be inflicted if the government has not
fulfilled its part of the social contract by providing the corresponding
right in respect of the obligation. Unless the state guarantees and provides
social security within its economic resources to every member of the
community, whether a believer or a non-believer, it cannot impose the
punishment.
In an Islamic society, each individual is entitled to a share in the

economic resources of the community. Islam recognizes that poverty is as
soul-destroying as unrestrained materialism and this was acknowledged
by Prophet Muhammad who said: “Poverty may well turn into a
denial of truth (kufr).”66Islam, like other religions, emphasizes God-
consciousness and spirituality but it also discourages the renunciation
of worldly pursuits, “…But as for monastic asceticism – We did not
enjoin it upon them…”67If material progress results in a more equitable
distribution of wealth then such advancement is in accord with the tenets
of the religion. The Qur’an thus emphasizes unity between the spiritual
and the temporal aspects of mortal existence because it flows from the
oneness of God. Moderation is the norm and the human race is told
“And thus have We willed you to be a community of the middle way”68
and this is the bedrock on which Islamic society is founded.
In the context of the punishment for theft, the implication is that the
state must first ensure that “every man, woman and child has (a) enough
to eat and wear, (b) an adequate home, (c) equal opportunities and
facilities for education, and (d) free medical care in health and in sickness.
A corollary of these rights is the right to productive and remunerative
work while of working age and good health, and a provision (by the
community or the state) of adequate nourishment, shelter etc., in cases of
disability resulting from illness, widowhood, enforced unemployment,

S. Iftikhar Murshed
old age or under age.”69 These rights can only be assured by a welfare
state which has the resources at its disposal. If such resources are not
available as during the early years of the Prophet’s ministry, then the
privations have to be shared equally by the entire community without
which there cannot be social justice. Pakistan is not a welfare state that
is envisaged by Islam nor are its resources distributed equitably. Till
poverty is eradicated the state does not even have the right to enact a law
that prescribes the amputation of the hand of a person who is impelled
by poverty to steal.
Furthermore, the formulation of the Qur’anic passage on theft makes

it clear that the punishment of cutting off of the hand is not awarded
if the thief repents and implicitly it is not imposed if the offence is
committed for the first time. It therefore applies to a habitual thief.70Some
commentators also believe that the phrase “cutting off of the hand” may
be construed either literally or metaphorically. If “taken metaphorically,
it would simply mean restraining a thief by imprisonment or otherwise.”
71
This is probably a correct interpretation as in classical Arabic idiom,
the amputation of “one’s hands and feet is often synonymous with
destroying one’s power” i.e., rendering a person incapable of committing
the offence.72
Justice Munir refers to Section 95 of the proviso of the Offence

Against Property “Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance 1979” which
states “where the Ordinance provides that if a person commits the
offence for the third time he would be imprisoned for life. But if he is
sincerely penitent the High Court may release him on such terms and
conditions as it may deem fit.”Thus for the first offence, the thief loses
his right hand while for the second his left foot up to the ankle. Such
a person “will present a funny appearance and will hardly be able to
commit theft for the third time, and if he is entitled on the third offence
to get his freedom, can he not be put in a penitentiary on the commission
of the first offence if he is given time to repent and reform himself.”73The
same views were also expressed by several other jurists, notably Justice
Muhammad Sharif a former member of the Islamic Commission.

The hadd punishments awarded under the Ordinance on property are
ludicrous. For example a person’s hand can be amputated if two adult
male Muslims see him stealing anything worth more than two thousand
rupees from an enclosed space but even if any number of women or
non-Muslims see him making away with millions he is not liable for
hadd and is awarded punishment under tazir. “Similarly, a Rolls Royce
can be stolen with impunity of hadd, since the robbers did not take it
from an enclosed room.” 74
Conclusion
There has been no dearth of commissions and committees starting
from the Zari Sarfraz Commission in 1983 that have examined and
critiqued the Hudood Ordinances of Pakistan. In 1997, the Commission
of Inquiry on Women headed by Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid recommended
the repeal of these laws.
In 2003 the Pakistan National Commission on the Status of Women

established a 15-member Special Committee chaired by Justice Majida
Rizvi to advise the government on eradicating laws discriminatory to
women and make recommendations on the Hudood Laws. The members
of the committee observed that the ordinances had been hurriedly drafted
and enforced with indecent haste. Justice Majida Rizvi was of the view
that the Hudood laws “do not reflect the correct principles of Islamic
criminal law and are not in accordance with Islamic injunctions.” Justice
Shaiq Usman felt that the defects of the ordinances were so basic that
amending these would not serve any purpose and might even result in
more injustice. Twelve of the fifteen members of the Special Committee
recommended that the ordinances be repealed.
During an interview in September 2008, Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman

Ramday of the Pakistan Supreme Court claimed that the Hudood
Ordinances had in fact not made any sharp changes to the existing laws.
Soon after the creation of the Federal Shariat Court in 1981 he had been
deputed by the Punjab government to assist the court in reviewing all
the laws that had been in place since 1841in order to determine whether
any of them were contrary to the injunctions of Islam. The findings of
the court were that hardly any of the laws enacted during the colonial

S. Iftikhar Murshed
era were repugnant to Islam “and whatever little un-Islamic provisions
were found, unfortunately were the ones enacted after 1947 and not
by the British.” Justice Ramday cited the Qanoon-e-Shahadat which
sought to bring the Evidence Act of 1872 in line with the requirements
of Islam but in actual fact little was changed except the nomenclature
of the law. This was because the Qur’an specifies only a few laws and
all that is required of society is the doing of justice. Implicit in this is
the recognition that new laws would have to be enacted and constantly
reviewed in accordance with the constantly changing needs of the
people.75
It may be correct that little in the Anglo-Saxon laws was found

repugnant to Islam and were accordingly retained. Nevertheless the few
new laws and procedures that were introduced with the promulgation
of the Hudood Ordinances reflected the misogynistic predilections of a
patriarchal society and not the gender egalitarian emphasis of Islamic
doctrine. The impact was entirely negative. Though hadd penalties such
as stoning to death, the amputation of a limb and the flogging of women
have not been executed, so long as these punishments remain in the
statute books ordinary citizens, particularly women, will continue to
live in fear.
Furthermore, the Qanoon-e-Shahadat which lays down the

evidentiary procedures for tazir punishments (the rules of evidence for
hadd are included in the Ordinances) may have introduced only nine
new sections and merely changed the numbering of the Evidence Act of
1872, but these additions have generated controversy and protests. The
emphasis in the Qanoon-e-Shahadat is the ocular evidence of witnesses
of sound character whose number is determined in accordance with
the offence: “The Court shall determine the competence of a witness
in accordance with the qualifications prescribed in the injunctions of
Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah for a witness, and,
where such witness is not forthcoming, the Court may take the evidence
of a witness who may be available.” The original text of the new law
specified the testimony of two men or of two women and one man for
all matters. After vehement public protests this was amended thereby
implying “that either the recommended law was not truly Islamic or

the fundamentalists had compromised their beliefs under pressure.” The
new law has had no impact because the Evidence Act of 1872 continues
to be applied by the courts.76
The recommendations for the repeal of the Hudood Ordinances have

fallen on deaf ears because of the fear that this could unleash a violent
backlash from the extremist fringe of Pakistani society. Even if the hadd
punishments, which have till now not been carried out, are revoked it
will make little difference unless the arbitrary tazir penalties, which
have been enforced and caused so much suffering, are also abrogated.
It is not hadd punishments alone that have to be struck down from the
statute books but the Hudood Ordinances in their entirety.
A former chief justice of the Dhaka High Court once remarked “Law
is an expression of the common sense of the race. A Portuguese proverb
says: ‘Like king, like law; like law, like people.’ It obliges us to do what
is proper and not simply what is just. It is, therefore, a repository of the
morals of the people. It does not, by itself, generate justice, which has
to be imported in its application.” 77The application of laws that do not
protect but persecute ordinary citizens can never generate justice. When
such laws are wrongly presented as being divinely ordained they are
immoral. These reasons warrant the immediate repeal of the Hudood
Ordinances only then will the long night of tyranny come to an end.
Note. All quotes from the Qur’an are from Muhammad Asad’s The Message of the
Qur’an.
References:
1. Hasan Gai Eaton’s prologue in Muhammad Asad’s The Message of the Qur’an, p. v;
published by the Book Foundation, Bristol, England; 2003.
2. Jahangir, Asma; Jilani, Hina; The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? p. 23; Sang-
e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 2003.
3. Encyclopedia of Islamic Civilisation and Religion; p.239; edited by Ian Richard Netton;
Routledge, New York; 2008.
4. Muhammad, Munir; From Jinnah to Zia; pp. 124-125; Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore;
1980.
5. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction?; p.24.
6. From Jinnah to Zia; p.125.
7. Ibid.; p.142.

S. Iftikhar Murshed
8. Qur’an; “An-Nur (The Light),” 24:2.
9. Asad, Muhammad; The Message of the Qur’an; p. 594; published by The Book
Foundation, Bristol, England; 2003.
10. Ali, Muhammad (Maulana); The Holy Qur’an; p.679; Specialty Promotions Co. Inc.
Chicago; 1973.
11. Qur’an; “An-Nisaa (Women),” 4:25.
12. Ali, Muhammad (Maulana), The Holy Qur’an; pp. 197-198.
13. PLD 1981 FSC 145 Hazoor Baksh.
14. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction?; p.24.
15. Ibid.; p.27.
16. Ibid.; p.28.
17. Asad, Muhammad; The Message of the Qur’an; p.595.
18. Glasse, Cyril; The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (Revised Edittion); Stacey International;
London; 2002.
19. Ibid.; p.595.
20. Constitution (Amendment) Order 1981 (P.O. No. 5 of 1981) Section 3 (w.e.f. 13 April
1981) cited in The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? p.29.
21. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? pp. 29-30.
22. Ibid.; p.30.
23. Ibid.; “Al-Anfal (Spoils of War)” 8:22.
24. Qur’an; “Az-Zumar (The Throngs)” 39:42.
25. Ibid.; “An-Nur (The Light)” 24:4.
26. Ibid.; “An-Nur (The Light)” 24:2.
27. Ali, Muhammad (Maulana), The Holy Qur’an, pp. 679-680.
28. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? p.27.
29. Qur’an; “An-Nissa (Women)” 4:28.
30. Bukhari 8:528-35 (Bk. Nos. 806, 810, 812-14). Abu Daud 3: Nos. 4413-14.
31. Salama, Mamoun M.; “General Principles of Criminal Evidence in Islamic Jurisprudence,”
In the Islamic Criminal Justice System; edited by M. Cherif Bassiouni; 1982; Oceana
Publications, Inc.
32. Bassiouni, Cherif M; “Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights in
the Islamic Criminal Justice System;” In the Islamic Criminal Justice System; Oceana
Publications, Inc.
33. Qur’an; “An-Nur (The Light)” 24:4.
34. PLD 1981 FSC 284 Iqbal Shah.
35. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? p.32.
36. Bukhari. 8 Chapter 7. Mishkat al-Masabih 1:762 (citing hadith in Tirmidhi and Abu
Daood).
37. See Malik 392. Al-Maqdisi 8:129
38. Asifa Quraishi, “Her Honour: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a
Woman-Sensitive Perspective,” Michigan Journal of International Law (1997. Vol. 18,
287).
39. Sabiq, 1993, 450 – Sayed, Sabiq. Fiqh-us-Sunnah; 10th Edition. Mecca: Baq al Loq.
40. Al-Jaziri, Abdur Rahman; Kitab Al-Fiqh ‘Ala Al-Mathahib al-‘Arba’a; p.410-11; Cairo,
1981; Dar al-Irshad lil Talif wa-al-Tab’ wa al-Nashr.
41. Quoted by Asifa Quraishi in “Her Honour: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of
Pakistan from a Woman-Sensitive Perspective,” Michigan Journal of International Law,
1997. Vol. 18, 287.

42. Quoted by Asifa Quraishi from Fiqh-us-Sunnah; Mecca: Bab al-Loq, 1993; 2:450.
43. Ibid; p.32.
44. Vilani Peiris; “Musharraf’s reform of Pakistan’s rape law – a cynical manoeuvre” (24
January 2007); World Socialist Web Site.
45. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? pp. 55-57.
46. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? p. 14.
48. Ibid.; pp. 125-126.
49. Qur’an; “Al-Baqarah (The Cow)” 2:173; “Al-Maa’idah (The Repast)” 5:3.
50. Ibid; “Al-Baqarah (The Cow)” 2:219.
51. Ibid; “An-Nisaa (Women)” 4:43.
52. Ibid; “Al-Maa’idah (The Repast)” 5: 90.
53. Ibid; “An-Nahl (The Bee)” 16:67.
55. Ibid.; p.127.
56. Waliullah, Mir; Muslim Jurisprudence and the Qur’anic Law of Crimes; pp.76-77.
57. Hamiltion, Charles; The Hedaya:. Commentary on the Islamic Laws,(Translation);
Grady’s edition; p. 194.
58. From Jinnah to Zia; pp. 127-128.
59. The Hudood Ordinance, A Divine Sanction? p.53.
60. ur’an; “Al-Maa’idah (The Repast)” 5:33 34.
61. From Jinnah to Zia; p.129
62. Asad, Muhammad; Message of the Qur’an; p.172.
63. Ibid.
64. Munir, Muhammad; From Jinnah to Zia; pp.128-129.
65. Qur’an; “Al-Maa’idah (The Repast) 5:38-39
66. Quoted by As-Suyuti in Al-Jami as-Saghir.
67. Qur’an; “Al-Hadid (Iron)” 57:27.
68. Ibid.; “Al-Baqarah (The Cow)” 2:143.
69. Asad, Muhammad; The Message of the Qur’an; p.174.
70. Ali, Muhammad (Maulana); The Holy Qur’an; p. 252.
71. Ibid.
72. Asad, Muhammad; The Message of the Qur’an; p. 172.
73. Munir, Muhammad; From Jinnah to Zia; p.130.
74. The Hadood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? p.49.
75. Criterion; vol. 3 no. 3 (July-September 2008) “Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman
Ramday,” pp. 21-22.
76. The Hudood Ordinances, A Divine Sanction? pp.30-31.
77. Forward by Justice S.M. Murshed, in Justice M.R. Kayani’s A Judge May Laugh and
Even Cry; p. vi; Pakistan Writers Cooperative Society; Lahore; 1983.

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN - AN
UNHERALDED FOUNDING FATHER
OF PAKISTAN
Sultan M Hali*
Abstract
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was the last honorary secretary of the
All India Muslim League, the leader of the AIML bloc in the interim
government, and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan. As the right hand
man of the Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, he assisted the Quaid
in the making of Pakistan. So great was his contribution that the Quaid
used to say that “I found Pakistan, Liaquat founded Pakistan.” Selfless,
honest to a fault and totally dedicated to the cause of Pakistan, he
rallied the nation under one flag when Jinnah passed away only a year
after the country’s independence. Despite his sacrifices for the cause of
the country, he remains the most maligned Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Author
Pakistan lost both its founding fathers in the first few years of its
inception. The Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, knew he was
suffering from a terminal illness which he kept a closely guarded secret.
He was racing against time. Had his ailment become known, those who
opposed the creation of Pakistan would have awaited his demise and the
freedom struggle of the subcontinent’s Muslims would have collapsed.
Jinnah barely survived a year after Pakistan’s independence and for
most of it he was incapacitated. It fell upon his closest companion and
* Group Capt. Sultan M. Hali (retd), Sitara-e-Imtiaz (M), is a former Naval and Air Attache
at the Pakistan Embassy in Riyadh. He is also a columnist and the host of a television talk
show.
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN - An Unheralded Founding Father of Pakistan
staunch follower, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to pull Pakistan through
those early challenge-filled years of its birth.
A statesman of international stature, Liaquat combined in himself

not only the rare virtues of scrupulous honesty and simplicity but was
also known to be a firm disciplinarian. These qualities earned him
numerous friends and admirers as well as many detractors who either
had personal scores to settle or had became pawns of the enemies of
Pakistan. On 16 October 1951, Quaid-e-Millat Nawabzada Liaquat
Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, was gunned down by a
hired assassin, while he was about to commence his address to a public
gathering in Rawalpindi. As he fell, reciting the Kalima, his final words
were “Allah Pakistan ko apni amaan main rakhay” (God save Pakistan).1
This was the first political murder in Pakistan and by no means the last.
The tragic event, however, changed the course of the country’s history.
Unfortunately, Liaquat Ali Khan’s achievements and selfless efforts to
stabilize and build a prosperous Pakistan have been clouded in senseless
character assassination by those who plotted his removal. Resultantly,
even the death anniversary of this founding father passes unheralded
and unobserved. The aim of this article is to undertake a brief review of
the life and accomplishments of this great personality and to objectively
examine some of the charges leveled against him. A determination needs
to be made whether these allegations were founded on truth or were
biased.
Early Life
Liaquat Ali Khan, the second son of Nawab Rustam Ali Khan, also
known as Ruken-ud-Daulah, Shamsher Jang, Nawab Bahadur, was
born on 1 October 1896. Liaquat’s ancestry goes back to Nausherwan
the Just, the Sassanid king of Persia.2 He was one of the few landlords
whose estates stretched over two provinces of India; the Punjab and the
UP. Liaquat’s schooling was at Aligarh where he distinguished himself
by academic excellence and an avid interest in extracurricular pursuits.
According to the 1911 Aligarh Calendar, edited by Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed,
Liaquat was then in Class VI of the Mohammadan Anglo Oriental
(MAO) Collegiate School. He was the monitor of his class and captain
of the cricket team of his hostel, English House, having secured a double

Sultan M Hali
promotion earlier. The double promotion came to him in a somewhat
dramatic fashion. He was to be awarded a book for topping the class,
but he caused a sensation by refusing to accept the prize. Upon being
called to explain his extraordinary conduct, Liaquat said that he could
purchase any number of books but would accept the prize if a double
promotion went with it. This somewhat unusual behaviour impressed
the Inspector of Schools who, while presiding over the prize distribution
ceremony, accepted Liaquat’s precondition.3
Liaquat Ali Khan graduated in 1918 from the M. A. O. College and

was offered a job in the Indian Civil Services which he declined. The
same year he married his cousin, Jehangira Begum and, after his father’s
death, proceeded to England for higher studies. He secured a Masters
degree from Exeter College, Oxford, in 1921 and was called to the Bar
the following year at the Inner Temple.
Parliamentary Career
On return from England in 1923 Liaquat Ali Khan entered politics
motivated by the consuming passion of liberating his homeland from
British rule. Right from the beginning, he was determined to eradicate
the injustices and ill-treatment meted out to the Indian Muslims by
the colonial power. Initially, like most of the Muslim leaders of the
time, Liaquat believed in Indian nationalism but his views gradually
underwent a change. The Congress leaders invited him to join their party,
but he declined and decided instead to become a member of the Muslim
League in 1923. Liaquat Ali started his parliamentary career from the
U.P. Legislative Assembly in 1926 as an independent candidate. Later
he formed his own party, The Democratic Party, within the Legislative
Assembly and was elected as its leader. He remained the member of the
U.P. Legislative Council till 1940 when he was elected to the Central
Legislative Assembly.
Liaquat Ali Khan soon acquired a reputation as an eloquent speaker

and a parliamentarian of sterling character who never compromised on
his principles even in the face of severe odds. He used his influence
and good offices to arrest the growing trend towards communal tension
and was a member of the Muslim League delegation that attended the

National Convention held at Calcutta to discuss the Nehru Report in
December 1928. The convention rejected the Quaid’s compromising
formula for communal co-operation and consequently alienated him
from the Congress for ever.
Liaquat Ali married again in 1933. His second wife, Begum Ra’ana,
was a distinguished economist and an educationist who stood by her
husband during the ups and downs of his political career.4After the
failure of the Round Table Conferences, the Quaid-i-Azam returned to
England in self-imposed exile as he was disgruntled by the infighting
and squabbles among the Muslim leaders. However Liaquat Ali Khan
had the foresight to realize that Jinnah was the only leader who could
unite the Muslims and lead them to their destiny and he, therefore, took
it upon himself with the support of his wife, to persuade him to return
to India. The newly-weds had a number of meetings with the Quaid and
were finally able to convince him to come back to India to take up the
mantle of leadership of the Muslims of the subcontinent. Recounting the
meeting at Hampstead between Jinnah, Liaquat, Miss Fatima Jinnah and
herself, to Hector Bolitho, the author of Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan,
Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali Khan reminisced:
After dinner, Liaquat repeated his plea that the Muslims wanted
Jinnah and needed him. I had hero-worshipped Mr. Jinnah for a
long time. I chirped in ‘And I’ll bring them back to the fold.’ He
smiled at me ‘you do not know the women; you do not know the
world.’ But he listened to Liaquat and in the end he said, ‘You go
back and survey the situation, test the feelings of all parts of the
country. I trust your judgment. If you say come back, I’ll give up
my life here and return.’5
Liaquat Ali Khan did as asked and it was only after he had sent
a telegram to the Quaid, confirming what he had told him in London
did Jinnah decide to return. Had Liaquat not taken this initiative Jinnah
would have remained in England indefinitely and the freedom struggle
of the Indian Muslims might not have culminated in the emergence of
Pakistan.6

Sultan M Hali
On his return, Jinnah started reorganizing the Muslim League and was
impressed by Liaquat Ali Khan’s commitment and leadership abilities.
The annual session of the All India Muslim League met at Bombay on
12 April 1936. The new General Secretary of the party was to be elected
and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan was the favourite and tipped to win. But
Jinnah considered Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan as eminently suitable
for that difficult post. He accordingly let his views be known to some
of the leaders, and support for Liaquat began to gather momentum. The
result was that in the open session, the Quaid-i-Azam himself moved a
resolution, proposing Liaquat Ali Khan as the Honorary Secretary. The
Quaid said: “Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan is my right hand.” He paid
rich tributes to the untiring work put in by Liaquat who, he said, had:
“ worked and served the League day and night, and that it was beyond
the capacity of any one man to shoulder the burden and responsibility
of work that he had been called upon to do.” He added that he could not
think of anyone else better suited for the post than Liaquat Ali Khan,
whose name was before the meeting as “He commands the universal
respect and confidence of the Muslims of India.” The resolution was
unanimously adopted amid thunderous applause and Liaquat continued
to hold that office till the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. In 1940, he
was made the deputy leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary party.
The Quaid-i-Azam was unable to take active part in the proceedings of
the Assembly on account of his heavy political work; thus the whole
burden of protecting Muslim interests in the Assembly fell on Liaquat
Ali’s shoulders. In addition he was also a member of the Muslim Masses
Civil Defense Committee, which was formed to keep the community
safe from Congress activities and to strengthen the League’s mission.
The laurels won by Liaquat spurred jealousy among those who aspired to
replace him as the Honorary Secretary of the All India Muslim League.
Such elements were always waiting at the wings and were prepared to
strike whenever the opportunity arose.7
Unfortunately, petty politics and the myopic vision of some Muslim

leaders created impediments for Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. The
Unionist Party had opposed Pakistan, the Muslim League, Jinnah and
Liaquat Ali Khan. After Jinnah’s death their wrath turned on Liaquat
Ali Khan. Although Liaquat was a trusted lieutenant of the Quaid, the

Unionists opposed him because the Muslim League had defeated them
in the polls. Salahuddin Khan, in his book Had There Been No Jinnah
writes:
“From this stage, conflict between the Congress and the Muslim
League became increasingly sharp. The Muslim League under the
skilful leadership of Jinnah set itself to strengthen its organization,
extend its basis of support among the Muslim masses, and
consolidate the various Muslim groups and organizations so as to
make the Muslim League the main Organization of the Muslims
in India. During the period 1937-45 a decisive change took
place in the position and relative strength of the Muslim League,
as it won increasing mass support among the Muslims. The
1946 elections reveal the changed position. In the Central and
Provincial Legislative Assembly elections the Muslim League
won 460 out of 533 Muslim seats. There can be no doubt,
that during this period the Muslim League had established its
position as the major political organization among Muslims in
India. It had been the original aim of the Congress to include
equally Hindus and Muslims. But, in practice, this aim was
never realized in the proportions of membership won. In January
1938, according to a press statement issued by Nehru, out of
3.1 million members of Congress, only1, 00,000, that is 3.2%
were Muslims; overwhelming majority of the newly awakened
sections of the Muslims turned to the Muslim League as their
political organization.”8
It was Liaquat Ali Khan, who had the prudence and foresight to
convince the Quaid to start party publications to project the views
of Muslim League. The Hindus already had a number of dailies and
weeklies, while the Muslims lagged way behind in this important area.
He first started an Urdu weekly, Manshoor, and later he felt more than
others the need for a publicity organ and it was Liaquat’s proposal to
Jinnah which led to the launching of Dawn.
Then I think we should consider the question of a press, because

it is needed most at this time (11 December 1939) so that the

Sultan M Hali
people of England may come to know our point of view. If it is
not possible to have an English Daily Paper, we should at least
have a weekly. I have prepared a draft of a prospectus and articles
of association for a limited co. to be started for this purpose.9
Despite his extremely busy schedule, Liaquat devoted a fair share

of his time to the party publications. After the inception of Dawn, its
printing machinery, quotations from suppliers, the procurement of scarce
newsprint and allied matters began to figure extensively in Liaquat’s
letters to Jinnah.
Liaquat Ali Khan won the Central Legislature election in 1945-46

from the Meerut Constituency in U.P. in a dramatic sweep. The Muslim
League had secured all the seats to the Central Assembly. An exuberant
Liaquat proclaimed:
“The hundred percent (success) which the Muslim League has

achieved in the Central Assembly elections is unprecedented
in world history. No political party in any country working a
system of democracy has ever won so complete a victory over
its opponents.”10
The pace of events gave Liaquat Ali Khan no respite and his agenda
became increasingly crowded. Even before the final and consolidated
results of the Central Assembly were published, he was well on his way to
organizing the campaign for the provincial assemblies elections. Between
early December and late January, Liaquat Ali Khan had traversed the
whole of Northern India from Peshawar to Patna. He was also elected
Chairman of the League’s Central Parliamentary Board. He assisted the
Quaid-i-Azam in negotiations with the members of the Cabinet Mission
and the leaders of the Congress during the final phases of the Freedom
Movement. When the Government asked the Muslim League to send
their nominees for representation in the interim government, Liaquat
was asked to lead the League in the cabinet. He was given the portfolio
of finance, which he handled brilliantly. He influenced the working
of all the departments of the Government and presented a poor man’s
budget, formulating it on sound economic and national foundations. He

succeeded, for the first time, in relegating British business interests to
the background and crafted a budget to place the least burden on the
Indian lower and middle classes. The budget was based on the underlying
principles of social justice which had the potential of uniting the poor
of the two major communities.11 With an eye towards the emergence of
Pakistan, which Liaquat was convinced was inevitable, he foresaw that
the new nation would be strapped for cash and would desperately require
funds. Accordingly as Finance Member (Minister), he tasked the Central
Bank of India to have currency notes printed and deposited in banks in
Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi, Lahore and Dhaka. After 14 August 1947,
especially when India withheld Pakistan’s share of the finances, these
deposits came in handy for the cash-starved nation in defraying some of
its expenses and disbursing the salaries of government servants.12
Liaquat Ali Khan saw through the British attempt to coax the Muslim
League into accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Cabinet delegation
examined the demand for Pakistan and sought to offer instead wide
autonomy for Muslim provinces within a united India. They obviously
did not understand that Liaquat would not take the bait as is evident
from his speech shortly afterwards:
The demand for Pakistan today is not based on fear of the Hindu
majority at the Centre but is the urge of a nation to mould its
national life in accordance with its own ideals and culture
and cannot be satisfied without having full sovereignty which
necessarily implies full control over all the Departments without
exception.13
Liaquat’s power of persuasion and his skills as a negotiator were

grudgingly recognized by the British. After Liaquat had forestalled the
attempt to secure the withdrawal of the Muslim League members from
the interim government, the Viceroy reported to the Secretary of State:
“I argued with Liaquat for over an hour and used all the arguments
given in paragraph 5 and 6 of your 20252 (as well as others) I
completely failed to convince him as I had previously failed in
my last interview with Jinnah.”14

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The Congress and the British were hand-in-glove till the very end
to put obstacles in the way of the emergence of Pakistan. First they tried
to dupe the interim cabinet into resigning their posts so that they would
not be influential in the pre-independence administrative arrangements.
When this failed, a last ditch attempt was made to dislodge the Muslim
League members through the proposal that its nominees be relegated to
the status of a shadow cabinet. It would not even be a parallel government
for its jurisdiction in central subjects would be prematurely limited to
the areas constituting Pakistan. Jinnah rejected the proposal on legal
grounds. When the Viceroy persisted, Liaquat firmly retorted that he
could not “possibly play second fiddle in the Finance Department after
having Ministerial charge of it for so long.”15
This blunt and categorical rejection of the Congress-Mountbatten

scheme jolted the Viceroy. In reply to Lord Mountbatten’s demand that
he and his colleagues send in their resignations in accordance with the
reconstitution proposal, Liaquat wrote:
I shall be grateful if you let me know the basis and details of your
plan for the reconstitution of the government because a decision
can be taken only when the full implications of your proposals
are known to us.16
Mountbatten’s plans thus came to naught and his frustration must

have been exacerbated because he had obtained the resignations of the
Congress members but had failed to secure those of the Muslim League
for whose removal the whole exercise had been undertaken. London too
upheld Jinnah’s objection and the Reconstitution Plan had to be revised.
It was decided that:
The personnel who have chosen to serve in the Pakistan

Departments which will be organized at once in Delhi will be
in charge of Members of the Pakistan Cabinet. The remaining
personnel will staff India Departments which will be in charge of
Members of the India Cabinet.17

Once the administrative division of India was underway, the
Muslim League completed its preparations for the transfer of power. The
machinery it had at hand for establishing a new centre was nowhere near
the structure that the independent Government of India would inherit.
Pakistan suffered considerably as it was unable to secure an equitable
share of its assets. Although at every turn Pakistan was deprived of its
rightful dues with the connivance of the Congress and Mountbatten, it
managed to salvage the barest minimum to enable it to establish itself
as a viable state. The role played by Liaquat in the Interim government
during this difficult period was crucial. He constantly sought the guidance
of Jinnah especially over the legal aspects of reconstitution and was also
ably assisted by competent colleagues, notably Nishtar.18
Independence
Liaquat Ali Khan was nominated as Pakistan’s first Prime Minister
by Jinnah. As Prime Minister designate, his first message to the Muslims
from Delhi on 5 August, 1947 was:
“Now that the great day has come when we have not only achieved
freedom from foreign domination but also regained our long lost
opportunity for national development, I wish to convey to our
people a message of goodwill and good cheer on this day when
the Muslim state of our dreams has become a reality. Let us not
forget that his has been achieved not by the efforts of Muslims in
Pakistan alone, but even more by the sufferings of millions living
in Muslim minority provinces. I hope that although henceforth
the frontiers of the two states will divide the Muslims of this
Subcontinent, the ties of brotherhood will endure, because the
Islamic fraternity knows no political or geographical barriers.
I have no doubt that the Muslims of Pakistan will ever regard
the Muslims of Hindustan as part of themselves and give them
equal opportunities in their own state. I am confident also that
the Muslims in Hindustan will be loyal citizens of their state
and play an important and honorable role in the progress and
prosperity.”19

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As Prime Minister
Pakistan got off to a rough start and had to contend with myriad
problems. These challenges were serious and had to be immediately
addressed by Liaquat Ali Khan who was sworn in as Prime Minister
on 15 August 1947. His assumption of office was expected because as
the leader of the Muslim League bloc in the interim government, he
had prepared his party to become the successor authority in Pakistan.
In the peculiar circumstances of the transfer of power, it would be the
Governor-General Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah who would
function as the chief executive, and not the Prime Minister. Jinnah
barely lived a year after independence, and his governor generalship
was the culmination point of his life’s mission namely the establishment
of Pakistan as a sovereign and independent state. Liaquat Ali Khan, on
the other hand, served as Prime Minister for almost a whole term and
this constitutes a distinct and perhaps the most challenging phase of his
political life.
Liaquat Ali Khan described the creation of Pakistan as an unparalleled

event in history. Though this had been achieved without a war of liberation
or a bloody revolution, he did rest on his laurels and knew only too well
that the ravages of partition, the influx of refugees and the absence of a
federal government structure would make the consolidation of Pakistan
more difficult than its attainment. The organization of Pakistan’s armed
forces was hardly complete when the Kashmir war broke out.
Jinnah had once complained bitterly that the British had connived
to ensure that the outcome of partition would be “a mutilated, truncated,
moth-eaten” Pakistan. If the country was to survive its economy had
to be urgently resuscitated and Liaquat’s success in this area has not
been fully appreciated. Well-thought-through policies were crafted
and implemented. In time, the process of industrialization gathered
momentum and bold fiscal and monetary policy decisions, which
included the refusal to devalue the currency, were taken. The skeptics
who were convinced that Pakistan was not viable were proved wrong.
In this period the government also responded in a mature and measured
manner to the Korean crisis. This phase of Pakistan’s history ended
abruptly with Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination. Though nearly six

decades have passed since that tragic event, it still remains shrouded in
mystery.20
Refugees
In the early dawn of its existence, the foremost problem faced by
Pakistan was that of refugees and communal riots. Marauding hordes of
extremists attacked the exodus of humanity from both sides. Muslims
were fleeing India; Hindus and Sikhs were fleeing Pakistan. Jinnah’s
plea to regard religion as a personal matter, not an affair of the state,
was ignored. No one was prepared for the communal rioting and the
mass movements of population that followed the 3 June 1947 London
announcement of imminent independence and partition. The most
conservative estimates of the casualties were 250,000 dead and 12 million
to 24 million refugees. The actual boundaries of the two new states
were not even known until 17 August when they were announced by a
commission headed by a British judge. The boundaries - unacceptable
to both India and Pakistan - have remained. To stop further bloodshed,
Liaquat decided to take the bull by the horns and flew to Delhi on 2
April 1950, to confront his Indian counterpart Nehru. The two held
detailed discussions for six days and the Nehru-Liaquat pact evolved
which alleviated the fears of the minorities and reduced the danger of
the two fledgling nations going to war again.21
West Pakistan lost Hindus and Sikhs. These communities had

managed much of the commercial activity of that part of the country.
The Sikhs were especially prominent in agricultural colonies. They were
replaced largely by Muslims from India, mostly Urdu speakers from
the United Provinces. Although some people, especially Muslims from
eastern Punjab (in India), settled in western Punjab (in Pakistan), many
headed for Karachi and other cities in Sindh, where they took the jobs
vacated by the departing Hindus. Muslims from Bihar and West Bengal
headed for East Pakistan in search of refuge and safety. In 1951 close
to half of the population of Pakistan’s major cities were immigrants or
muhajirs from India.22
After the 1947 partition, 7.5 million Hindu and Sikh refugees from
Pakistan crossed over to India and 7.2 million Muslim refugees from

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India crossed to Pakistan. It was the largest recorded refugee movement
in history. There was little international assistance in this massive
humanitarian crisis.23
Liaquat Ali Khan was opposed to the refugees being huddled in one
city or province and endeavoured to spread them all over Pakistan so that
they could amalgamate in the society and contribute to the progress and
development of the country more meaningfully.24 The arriving mass of
humanity was virtually destitute. They had left their homes and hearths,
had been looted, raped and lost family members to the marauders.
Liaquat did his very best to resettle them. During the early days of the
exodus, he realized that the only force which could protect the refugees
was the new Pakistan army. However, the members of the Indian armed
forces, who had opted for Pakistan, were widely dispersed and to get
them across to Pakistan was a difficult task. Some of them who tried
reaching Pakistan by train, were killed or injured by the looters and
arsonists. Liaquat Ali Khan accordingly devised “Operation Sea Cross,”
to transport Muslim military personnel by ship via the Indian port of
Bombay (Mumbai) to enable them to reach Pakistan safely and assume
their duties including escorting the refugees.25
Defence
The creation of Pakistan’s defence forces also encountered
formidable obstacles. The Indian Congress wanted the nationalization
of the pre-partition armed forces while the Muslim League insisted
that these forces should be divided between the two countries. The
British and the Congress opposed the division for different reasons. The
Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinlek, who did not
support the idea of India’s partition, favoured a unified defence system
and set himself against any talk of division of the military establishment.
He stated clearly that “the separation of Hindustan from Pakistan instead
of eliminating the fundamental enmity of the Hindus for the Muslims is
likely to inflame it.”26 He also predicted:
A Hindustan outside of the British Commonwealth might well

be tempted to an inevitable urge to conquer and absorb Pakistan,
and thus restore the unity of India.27

Auchinlek’s dire prediction was also the real reason for the Congress
not wanting Pakistan to have its own defence capability. It dreamt that
Pakistan would crumble and beg to be reunited with India. If this did not
happen then New Delhi would undo partition militarily by occupying
a defenceless Pakistan. Liaquat, who fully understood that without a
military capability Pakistan would not survive, wrote to the Viceroy on
7 April 1947, stressing the need for a concrete plan to divide the armed
forces:
Both processes - reorganization and nationalization - are

proceeding on the basis of a united India, having a single Army,
Navy and Air Force. The fundamental constitutional issue of a
United or Divided India is thus being prejudiced on a most vital
point to the grave detriment of the Muslims.28
Liaquat underscored his argument by explaining that without its own

armed forces Pakistan would collapse like a house of cards.29 He asked
the Quaid to also pursue this issue of vital importance with the Viceroy.
Mountbatten proved to be as wily as ever and adopted different stances
with Jinnah and Liaquat. He was aggressive with Liaquat insisting
that he would not allow a division of the army so long as he was in
charge. To Jinnah, Mountbatten held out the assurance that the common
defence body could be monitored politically to prevent the majority
from overriding the minority.30Liaquat persisted that unless there was
an independent Pakistan army on the ground, at the time of partition, he
would refuse to take power.31
Around this time a sinister plan was unearthed and, ironically, this
left no alternative other than to divide the armed forces. Liaquat Ali Khan
received reports that Hindu army officers were planning to seize power
through a coup and assassinate both him and Jinnah or imprison them
to preclude the possibility of the partition of India. Liaquat immediately
informed Jinnah and Mountbatten. The latter brushed the report aside as
sensational and non-serious but Jinnah did not underestimate the danger
and wrote to the Viceroy and Auchinleck. The matter was placed before
the Defence Committee where Liaquat’s contention was upheld.32 The
Commander-in-Chief deputed the Viceroy’s “Blackwatch Regiment”

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for the protection of Jinnah and Liaquat33 and halted the nationalization
process and the formation of the “Azad Hind Force,” which was
suspected of plotting the coup. At the recommendation of the Defence
Committee, the Viceroy’s Executive Council directed the Armed Forces
Committee to immediately draw up plans to ensure the disposition of
troops in a manner that the maximum number of Muslim units is placed
in the Pakistan area and the other units in India by 15 August 1947 or as
early as possible.34
The complexities of the partition and post-partition issues were

further compounded because promises and pledges were seldom
honoured on issues pertaining to the rights of Pakistan. Thus India
reneged on the division of assets especially defence equipment. Post
partition, the military assets of British India were to be divided between
India and Pakistan on an unjust ratio of 64:36 but despite even this
Pakistan received only a fraction of its share and that too in a dilapidated
state. In addition to his responsibilities as Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali
Khan was also the Defence and Commonwealth Affairs minister. Some
other decisions taken by him as Defence Minister, have served Pakistan
well. He had the vision to create natural and artificial boundaries around
the country for example; he ordered the digging of the BRB canal along
the Wagah border. The Indians were to learn the importance of what
they call “Khawjal Canal” during the 1965 war because this waterway
provided Pakistan a natural defense barrier against the advancing Indian
army.35
Kashmir
The seeds of the Kashmir issue which has bedeviled Pakistan-India
relations since 1947 were again sown by the British in connivance
with the Congress leadership. The Boundary Commission under its
Chairman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, assigned the task to partition India, was
heavily influenced by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. Liaquat Ali Khan
sensed this and he concluded that the entire Muslim majority area of
Gurdaspur was being awarded to India, thereby providing the latter
access to Kashmir. This was an extremely serious development with
far-reaching consequences. Liaquat accordingly drew the attention of
Lord Ismay about the matter in a note which he sent through Chaudhry

Muhammad Ali. Ismay, however, expostulated that “…the final report
of Sir Cyril Radcliffe is not ready and therefore, I do not know what
grounds you have for saying that Gurdaspur has been allotted to the East
Punjab.”36
However the conspiracy became obvious from the vivid account by

Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, on his meeting with Ismay:
There was a map in the room and I beckoned him to the map
so that I could explain the position to him with its help. There
was a pencil line drawn across the map of the Punjab. The line
followed the boundary that had been reported to the Quaid-i-
Azam. I said that it was unnecessary for me to explain further
since the line already drawn on the map indicated the boundary I
had been talking about. Ismay turned pale and asked in confusion
who had been fooling with his map.37
Chaudhry Mohammad Ali’s account is amply corroborated by Sir

George Abell’s letter to Sir Ivan Jenkins, enclosing a rough map of
Radcliffe’s demarcation and the description letter by H.C. Beaumont,
Radcliffe’s Secretary.38 Christopher Beaumont’s private papers, released
after his death by his grand nephew, reveal that Lord Mountbatten heavily
influenced Sir Cyril Radcliffe to favour India in the partition plan.39
India was thus enabled by Lord Mountbatten to have a direct

access to Kashmir and occupy it by force even though it had a majority
Muslim population. The Maharaja of Kashmir acceded to India but the
Indian forces had occupied Kashmir before the accession papers were
signed.40
Pakistan sent its forces to aid the local Kashmiris liberate their
homeland and this triggered the first Kashmir war. The UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 47 of 21 April 1947 which called for a
ceasefire and stated that the “final disposition of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people
expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial
plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.” In subsequent

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years four other resolutions were passed by the Security Council but the
promised plebiscite was never held. Since then, India and Pakistan have
gone to war in 1965, 1971 and a limited conflict at Kargil in 1999 while
Kashmir continues to be a flashpoint between the two countries.
Liaquat Ali Khan’s critics have blamed him on a number of counts

on the handling of the Kashmir issue. The first is that he precipitated the
crisis by sending tribal forces into Kashmir without Jinnah’s knowledge.
The second is that he was prepared for a compromise on Kashmir from
which he was pre-empted by Jinnah on 30 December 1947 by practically
divesting him of the powers and functions of Prime Minister. Finally
there is the accusation that Liaquat accepted a ceasefire on 31 December
1948, at a time when the Indian army was in retreat.41
All three are serious charges and warrant scrutiny. The first of these
accusations was leveled by K.H. Khurshid, earlier Private Secretary to
the Quaid-i-Azam and later, President of Azad Kashmir:
I met Liaquat in January of the same year (1949) in Lahore. I

said to him that the Quaid-i-Azam had not been informed of this
plan. [The tribal invasion of Kashmir]. He did not offer a verbal
answer but responded with a weak assent.42
This is a distortion of the facts which Liaquat’s detractors have

consistently employed in order to malign him. It does not accord with
Liaquat’s deportment with either the British or the Congress. Jinnah in
fact had not known but neither had Liaquat. For Khurshid to put the onus
on Liaquat is tantamount to characterizing Pakistan as the aggressor.
Khurshid was in Kashmir when hostilities broke out and he must have
been personally aware that it had been the massacre of Muslims in
Poonch which caused the tribal reprisal. In his radio broadcast from
Lahore on 4 November 1947 Liaquat Ali Khan referring to the Poonch
massacre said:
It was at this stage that the people of Kashmir in sheer desperation

turned on their oppressors. Kashmiris and specially the inhabitants
of Poonch have many relatives in Hazara and in West Punjab.

Consequently feelings in some parts of Pakistan rose very high
and some people from the tribal areas stirred by the atrocities in
Kashmir rushed to the aid of their brethren…
The armies of Pakistan have not marched into Kashmir as the

armies of India, in one guise or another marched into Junagadh
and Manavadar when these states acceded to Pakistan.43
The second charge that Liaquat had made some sort of compromise
before 16 December 1947, is both vague and ambiguous as it is not
clearly stated what the precise compromise was. We have the version
of Lord Mountbatten (carried by H.V. Hodson) that in an Indo-Pakistan
meeting held on 27 November 1947, when Liaquat was obviously ill, he
had agreed to use his influence with the tribals to withdraw completely
from Kashmir while India would withdraw the bulk - not all - of its
troops. This draft proposal which Liaquat presented in ‘a very fair
and impartial manner’ was rejected out of land by the Azad Kashmir
leaders who wanted a complete withdrawal of Indian troops before
plebiscite. As against the Mountbatten minutes, Chaudhry Mohammad
Ali who accompanied Liaquat to the 27 November meeting says that the
formulation recorded by him provided for complete withdrawal.44
The violent reaction of Nehru after this meeting also does not conform
to the impression that Liaquat had affected any compromise. There is an
outside possibility that Lord Mountbatten may have conveyed his own
noting to Jinnah, for Hasan Zaheer ties up these proposals with a 30
November 1947 entry by Jinnah in his Notebook:
Kashmir - no commitment - should be made - without my approval

of terms of settlement. Mr. Liaquat has agreed and promised to
abide by this understanding. [Emphasis original].45
“The date of the entry is significant and can only be related to the
27 November Delhi negotiations,” adds Hasan Zaheer. “The Quaid’s
annoyance might have been at this plan or the package deal of Hyderabad
and Kashmir offered by Patel or both.”46

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According to Ata Rabbani, Jinnah’s Aide-de-Camp, Sardar Patel is
said to have made this offer in the following words:
Talk of Hyderabad and Kashmir, and we can reach an

agreement’,—This was a new development but Liaquat Ali Khan
had no mandate to even discuss such a proposition, much less
make any commitment on behalf of the government of Pakistan.
On his return when the proposal was conveyed to the Quaid-
i-Azam, he straight away rejected it as unconstitutional and
illegal.47
The third and overlapping issue was reference of the Kashmir dispute
to the United Nations. History tells us otherwise. Nehru, in his duplicity,
on one hand had issued a statement on 21 November 1947 that the UN
had no power and, as such, peacekeeping in Kashmir should be left to
Indian troops, and,48 on the other hand, unknown to Liaquat, he wrote a
letter to the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, which contained threats
of cross border attacks on Pakistan.49 However, Pakistan’s stance on the
Kashmir issue at the UN has proved to be its main claim of legitimacy in
this long drawn out dispute. The counter complaint by Pakistan against
India, simultaneously filed in the UN Security Council, had an appendage,
a document called Pakistan’s Complaint Against India, which recalled
genocide beyond the confines of Kashmir, “Large numbers of Muslims -
running into hundreds of thousands - have been ruthlessly massacred…
Brutal and unmentionable crimes have been committed against women
and children.” Liaquat called upon the Security Council to ask India
to desist from acts of aggression against Pakistan. Most telling was
his demand that the UNSC appoint commissions to investigate all the
charges that he had made. The Pakistani army, which did not have the
weapons nor had it completed its reorganization, hardly qualified as a
regular force but, in spite of this, it was able to pressure the Indian side.
Given the paucity of resources, it was proving increasingly difficult to
hold on to the gains in Kashmir as well as protect the international border.
Yet, despite this increasingly difficult situation, Liaquat Ali Khan, had,
by 6 December 1948, completed preparations for a major operation.50
The next day (on 7 December) Chaudhry Mohammad Ali and Zafrullah

Khan sent a message from New York to the Defence Secretary, Iskander
Mirza:
We feel that while there remains any prospect of a peaceful

settlement through the UN Commission, we should refrain from
taking any action which would give India an excuse to break off
negotiations.51
Unfortunately, the charge of Liaquat accepting a ceasefire while the

Indian army was in retreat was leveled mainly by Begum Shahnawaz and
her son-in-law, Major General Akbar Khan. Begum Shahnawaz bore a
personal grudge against Liaquat. In July 1941, the Viceroy formed the
National Defence Council, expanding his Executive Council, he invited
Sir Sultan Ahmad, Begum Shahnawaz and the Premiers of Punjab, Assam
and Bengal to join, bypassing the Muslim League. Jinnah was incensed
at the British government’s trespassing on its preserve and asked the
invitees to resign. Sir Sultan, Begum Shahnawaz and A.K. Fazlul Haq
refused. Liaquat termed the Viceroy’s invitation to the Muslim League
leaders “a well thought out move on the part of the British Government
to create disruptions in the League circles.”52 He proposed to Jinnah that
the contemplated disciplinary action against the dissidents should not be
taken by the President alone but by the Working Committee and Council
together.53 Jinnah agreed with Liaquat’s suggestion and consequently
the dissenting members were expelled from the Muslim League. A.K.
Fazlul Haq, realizing his mistake, resigned from the National Defence
Council and regained his position in the League. Begum Shahnawaz on
the other hand felt slighted and directed her anger towards Liaquat. After
independence, her daughter, a highly ambitious lady and her husband also
harboured the same grudge against Liaquat and were the prime movers
behind the failed Rawalpindi Conspiracy against the government. Thus
their criticism does not carry much weight.
Soviet Union vs. US Relations

Liaquat Ali Khan has been blamed for opting for better relations
with US and ignoring invitations from the Soviet Union. Facts however
speak differently though even in the best of times the Pakistan-USSR
equation has been controversial. Moscow, for instance, initially

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withheld recognition of Pakistan and diplomatic relations between the
two countries were not established till as late as 1 May 1948. The USSR
was, in fact, wary of both India and Pakistan. In a frenzied outburst,
Stalin described India and the Indians as “imperialist lackeys, running
dogs”54 and for three years refused to accept the credentials of the first
Indian ambassador to Moscow, Vijay Lakshmi Pundit (Nehru’s sister).
She returned home, disgusted at such behavior.55 As for Pakistan, Stalin’s
impulsive comment was: “how primitive to start a country on religious
grounds.”
Liaquat Ali Khan was conscious of the looming Soviet threat. From
a historical perspective, he was also not oblivious to the expansion
of the Russian empire into the six Muslim states and the subsequent
integration of these central Asian republics into the USSR. In addition
there had been the forced deportation of the Chechens and Tartars to
Siberia for resisting the Sovietization of their Muslim culture. Liaquat
Ali Khan saw the growing relations between the USSR and Afghanistan
as a clear threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty. Furthermore, he was aware
that the Soviets were sponsoring the Communist Party of Pakistan to
foment trouble within the country.
It is alleged that Liaquat Ali Khan had declined an invitation to

visit the Soviet Union prior to visiting the US. The fact is that Stalin’s
invitation to Liaquat was delivered at the Pakistan Embassy in Tehran on
4 June 1949 and the date proposed for the visit was 14 August 1949. As
this coincided with Pakistan’s first Independence Day after the passing
away of Jinnah, it was suggested that the visit should commence from 16
August or any later date but the Soviets never responded.56 Eventually,
Liaquat Ali Khan visited the USA in May 1950 and in response to
questions from the media prior to his departure as well as during the
visit, he said that he was more than willing to visit the Soviet Union but
was waiting for a confirmation of the proposed date from Moscow. The
misperception about his anti-Soviet stance was probably propagated
by the Communist Party of Pakistan, which later collaborated in an
abortive coup against the Liaquat government and is also suspected of
involvement in his assassination.57

In the US, Liaquat impressed his hosts. Ex-president Harry S
Truman told Qutubuddin Aziz in an interview on 5 October 1957:
“Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was the first elected head
of Government of a Muslim State who I invited to pay an official visit to
the United States of America in May 1950 and he and his wife, Begum
Ra’ana Liaquat Ali Khan, made an excellent impression on us.”58
The perception that Liaquat pursued a pro-West foreign policy is also
incorrect. At the time of his visit to the United States, Pakistan was
non-aligned and had not taken sides by joining any power bloc in that
period. Pakistan had in fact recognized the Peoples’ Republic of China
despite the US opposition to the communist government in Peking.
Liaquat Ali Khan’s Pakistan was also not the recipient of any foreign
aid although the superpower rivals of the Cold War era were looking for
allies, offering them money and arms.59 In his meetings with American
officials and the leaders of industry, banking and trade, he meticulously
avoided giving the slightest hint that Pakistan was interested in getting
American assistance. On returning home, Premier Liaquat Ali said:
“The people in America were also highly impressed by the fact that
for the last three years, ever since its creation, Pakistan has presented a
balanced budget and has been maintaining a favourable trade balance
with other countries.”
Pakistan joined the US-led SEATO and CENTO pacts long after the
assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. It was in July 1957, that President
Dwight D. Eisenhower requested Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed
Suharwardi for permission to establish a secret intelligence facility and to
allow U-2 flights from Pakistan. A facility was accordingly established in
Badaber (near Peshawar) as a cover for a major communications intercept
operation run by the American National Security Agency (NSA). This
culminated in the 1 May 1960 incident when a U-2 was shot down by
the USSR over its territory and the pilot, Gary Powers, was captured
alive. The incident severely compromised Pakistan’s security and its
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated sharply.60 India on the other
hand, worked hard to foster a cooperative relationship with the USSR
and Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the US may have induced Moscow to tilt
towards New Delhi.

Sultan M Hali
Dr. Reza Kazimi writes that Liaquat’s visit served to decrease,
not increase his admiration of the west. The imputation that the Soviet
initiative towards Pakistan in 1949 was behind the American invitation
is probably correct, but this was also partly due to the alarm raised by
India.61 Kazimi expresses the view that the assessment given by Sir
Girja Shankar Bajpai, India’s Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, to
the British High Commissioner on 15 June 1949 may have proved scary
for the west:
Russia by treating Pakistan as the leading Muslim nation might

strive for a new pro-Soviet alignment of Muslims and Arabs
throughout the Middle East. More specifically, Bajpai was
anxious that Liaquat would raise the Afghan question with Stalin
and then threaten Afghanistan with a Soviet invasion of Northern
Afghanistan.62
Former Ambassador Shahid M. Amin has argued that “the Soviets

themselves could not settle convenient dates for a visit,” and that, even
during his visit to the United States, Liaquat had declared his intention
to visit the Soviet Union. He also notes that “Failure to visit a country
in response to its invitations has hardly ever become the cause of long-
term estrangement.”63
Liaquat Ali Khan was the propounder of an independent foreign

policy, as is evident from his address at a public meeting in Gujranwala
on 8 March 1951:
Pakistan is tied neither to the apron strings of the Anglo-

American bloc, nor is a camp follower of the Communist bloc…
Pakistan can pursue an independent course because it is not
under the obligation of any foreign country. We have not been
given assistance by any country of the world and whatever we
have achieved has been through our own resources. Therefore
the question of subservience in foreign policy does not arise…
So long as I am directing the destiny of the nation, Pakistan will
play its role in the maintenance of peace in the world and figure
prominently in the international field.64

In an interview to Nicholas Mansergh, in March 1947, Liaquat played
down the equation between the United States and Pakistan: “We did not
dislike them; we just feel that there is nothing in common. Therefore
we are likely to think of Britain as an associate since we know her. The
Soviet Union is an uncertain factor, and her materialism is repugnant to
Muslims.”65
The materialism of the USSR as being repugnant to Muslims was

also articulated by Jinnah on 7 September 1947. By the phrase “uncertain
factor,” Liaquat could not have meant that the USSR would collapse,
rather, that its policy towards to a new Muslim country, near Central
Asia, would be uncertain. The Pakistan Cabinet pre-empted Liaquat by
retaining his reservations about the USSR, but discarded them with regard
to the US. The stage was set for spreading a myth about the Moscow
visit. Liaquat had thwarted two military coups - one in India in 1947,
and one in Pakistan in 1951. His reputation was bound to suffer.66
Objectives Resolution
The harshest criticism Liaquat encountered was from his own
countrymen - and most of this was focused on his failure to give Pakistan
a constitution. Another strand in this negativism led to the allegation
that the Prime Minister had no constituency in the country he had helped
to create. Yet it was through the bullet rather than the ballot that Liaquat
Ali Khan was removed. His efforts towards crafting a constitution in
those initial days of trial and tribulation therefore warrant scrutiny.
Liaquat Ali Khan presented the Objectives Resolution, a prelude to

future constitutions, in the Legislative Assembly and it was adopted by
the house on 12 March 1949. This basic document has been described
as the “Magna Carta” of Pakistan’s constitutional history and Liaquat
termed its passage as “the most important occasion in the life of this
country, next in importance, only to the achievement of independence.”
Under his leadership a team also drafted the first report of the Basic
Principle Committee and work began on the second report.
The credit for finalizing the Objectives Resolution, which became

the bedrock upon which modern Islamic constitutions of Pakistan were

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built, goes to Liaquat Ali Khan. The Resolution affirms that “the state
shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives
of the people,” and, “this,” argued Liaquat, “is the very essence of
democracy, because the people have been recognized as the recipients
of all authority and it is in them that the power to wield it has been
vested.”67
Liaquat Ali Khan further emphasized, “Islam does not recognize

either priesthood or any sacerdotal authority, and, therefore, the question
of a theocracy simply does not arise in Islam. If there are any who still
use the word theocracy in the same breath as the policy of Pakistan
they are either labouring under a grave misapprehension, or indulging
in mischievous propaganda.”68
As for the form of Government to be introduced in Pakistan, Liaquat

was categorical that “We want to build up a truly liberal government
where the greatest amount of freedom will be given to all its members.
Everyone will be equal before the law, but this does not mean that his
personal law will not be protected. We believe in the equality of status
and justice. At present our masses are poor and illiterate. We must raise
their standards of life, and free them from the shackles of poverty and
ignorance.”69
The Objectives Resolution is included in the Annex of the current

Constitution of Pakistan by virtue of Article 2A of the Constitution.70
East Pakistan
Liaquat Ali Khan paid special attention to East Pakistan and this
was never forgotten by its people. In September 1949, India devalued
its currency and asked Pakistan to follow suit. Liaquat refused and this
prompted New Delhi to impose a trade embargo as a result of which
Pakistan’s economy came under severe strain because India, at the time,
was the largest buyer of jute, the country’s premier cash crop. The jute
growers of East Pakistan thus found themselves in grave difficulty as
there were no jute mills in East Pakistan. Liaquat did not panic and
instead urged West Pakistani industrialists such as Adamjee, Bawani,
Ispahani and Dawood to establish jute mills in East Pakistan. In early

1950, the Indian Prime Minister threatened to use “other methods” and
massed troops along the border with East Pakistan as a pressure tactic.
Liaquat stood his ground and took effective measures to counter the
Indian moves.
To bring the East Pakistanis into the mainstream, Liaquat went

the extra mile to ensure their recruitment into the civil bureaucracy
by introducing special quotas and reducing the height restriction for
the relatively short statured Bengalis to enable them to join the armed
forces. As a result of these and other measures his popularity soared in
East Pakistan and he contested the elections from that province which
he won unopposed.71 Though more than half-a-century has passed since
Liaquat’s assassination he is still fondly remembered in what was the
former East Pakistan but which in 1971 became the independent state
of Bangladesh.
Charges and Opposition by Feudals

After independence Liaquat Ali Khan faced stern opposition from
the powerful feudal class. Their animosity dated back to pre-partition
politics. In the 1946 elections, Liaquat Ali Khan and the Muslim League
won hands down at the expense of the pro-Congress Unionists in the
Punjab because of strong grass roots support for Pakistan. The feudal
establishment led by Khizar Hayat Khan fervently opposed the Quaid-e-
Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan and, after partition, though they had resisted
the creation of Pakistan, their energies focused on securing power by
fair means or foul. After Jinnah’s demise, they targeted Liaquat Ali
Khan with a vengeance. As the latter’s personal probity and impeccable
political track record were widely acknowledged, they accused him
instead of ethnic bias. The propaganda broadside unleashed against
Liaquat was that as a Muhajir from the U.P. he brazenly favoured
the latter. The truth is that Liaquat Ali Khan was born in Karnal, East
Punjab, with friends and relatives on both sides of the border and had
very strong ties to East Punjab. However this fact was ignored and he
continued to be stigmatized.72 Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, the son of
Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan, in his memoirs has also leveled various
charges of nepotism, delaying the drafting of the Constitution and
letting the Muhajirs monopolize the property claims and the job market.

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He even went to the extent of suggesting that Liaquat Ali Khan was
responsible for the evolution of the MQM and the eventual strife between
the Sindhis and Muhajirs. As if this was not enough, Shaukat Hayat
Khan claimed that Liaquat only allowed people from his home province
and its adjoining areas to migrate to Pakistan in order to establish a
constituency for himself in Karachi.73
So mindful was Liaquat Ali Khan to these allegations that when his
mother, first wife and sons migrated to Pakistan with the regular caravans
of refugees, he did not send the Prime Minister’s car to receive them nor
did he allow them any special treatment. They were treated like any
other Muhajir.74 Liaquat also advised his sons not to settle in Karachi
but to move to Lahore so that the Muhajirs do not get concentrated in
one location only.75 As for Liaquat Ali Khan getting any personal benefit
for himself, an incident narrated by Brigadier Noor Hussain, ADC to the
Quaid and later Khawaja Nazimuddin should be enough to clear his name.
The Brigadier states that on Eid Day in 1950, Khawaja Nazimuddin,
the second Governor General, invited Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan,
his wife and Fatima Jinnah for lunch. During the meal, Ra’ana Liaquat
Ali Khan addressing the Governor General, said, “Khawaja Sahib, if
something happened to my husband, my two sons and I would be out on
the street, since we don’t even have a roof over our head.” Before the
host could respond, Liaquat interjected: “First the five million people of
Pakistan have to be settled. Once each and every one has been settled,
only then my turn will come.” Liaquat was killed within a year. He
had left behind vast estates in India, but never claimed even an inch of
land in Pakistan. He also donated his palatial house in New Delhi to
the Government of Pakistan, to be used as the Chancery building and
later as the official residence of the High Commissioner of Pakistan to
India. At the time of his death, there were only a few hundred rupees
in his bank account. When his corpse was taken to the hospital, it was
discovered that his socks and vest had holes in them; both the sleeves
of his sherwani were darned at the elbows. His widow had to take up a
government job to support herself and her children.76
The accusation of nepotism was also bereft of truth. In his

book, Liaquat Ali Khan: Builder of Pakistan, Professor Ziauddin’s

book Liaquat Ali Khan: Builder of Pakistan wrote: “He chose the old
Muslim Leaguers who had supported the Quaid and had fought for
Pakistan. It did not matter where the supporters originated - the test was
loyalty to Pakistan.”77
Liaquat Ali Khan was charged as being ambitious. Rajmohan

Gandhi, the grandson of Mohandas Gandhi, in his book Understanding
the Muslim Mind, while profiling some of the Muslim leaders of India,
mentions an interesting episode. He writes that when the creation of
Pakistan became imminent, Liaquat Ali Khan was asked by a group of
reporters, what position he was aspiring for in independent Pakistan,
would he be the Governor General or the Prime Minister? His spontaneous
response was: “It will be an honour for me even to serve as an ordinary
peon in independent Pakistan.”78
As for his ambition, on 27 December 1947 he had sent in his

resignation to the Quaid-e-Azam:
You are the architect of Pakistan and as such, I feel that you
should have only such persons around you in building it up who
can command your complete confidence and goodwill. I would
never dream of doing anything which would, in any way injure
Pakistan in the slightest degree, but as everyone knows, my health
has not been well for the last two months, my slipping out quietly
will not create any misunderstanding or difficulties.79
A myth emerged that after the creation of Pakistan there were sharp
differences between Liaquat and the Quaid-e-Azam. Among other things,
Liaquat’s resignation is held out as evidence of this. However, Jinnah’s
ADC, Brigadier Noor Hussain, who remained with him till his demise,
strongly refutes this, stating that Liaquat Ali Khan respected the Quaid
from the core of his heart, and Jinnah used to say: “I found Pakistan but
Liaquat founded Pakistan.”80 Brigadier Noor also recalled that out of
sheer respect for the Quaid, Liaquat always walked a step behind and
to the left of his leader. Every photograph or video of the two walking
together bears this out.81 Even the personal correspondence between the
two clearly depicts the mutual respect and affection between them.82

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Both Dr. Syed Reza Kazimi and Roger D. Long have dismissed the idea
that tensions prevailed between Liaquat and Jinnah and that after 1947
this evolved into enmity.83
Coming back to the fierce opposition if not the outright hatred that
the feudal overlords had for Liaquat, his grandson, Nawazada Mushrraf
Ali Khan, states that the notes left behind by the slain Prime Minister,
indicate that he was planning to abolish feudalism and intended to
announce this at the address at Rawalpindi. Apparently, the power
hungry feudal clique got to know of this and plotted his assassination.84
Rawalpindi Conspiracy/Coup
The attempted coup in February 1951 is a blot in Pakistan’s history.
The masterminds were a handful of disgruntled military officers, members
of the disenchanted Communist Party and some intellectuals. It is widely
known that Major General Akbar Khan and his wife Begum Nasim,
a political activist and daughter of Begum Jehan Ara Shahnawaz, the
veteran Muslim League leader, who bore a grudge against Liaquat, were
the prime movers of the conspiracy. Begum Nasim was very ambitious
and highly critical of the government while her husband blamed Liaquat
Ali Khan for agreeing to the ceasefire in Kashmir thereby depriving
the troops the opportunity of “liberating the whole of Kashmir.” The
Communist Party was bitter because of the government’s clamp down
on them as a result of which they could no longer take part in political
activities. General Akbar convened a meeting at his residence in
Rawalpindi on 23 February 1951 which was attended by Faiz Ahmad
Faiz, Syed Sajjad Zaheer, the then secretary general of the Communist
Party, and Muhammad Hussain Ata, another leader of the party. Besides
civilians, Lieutenant Colonel Siddique Raja and Major M Yousaf Sethi
also participated. Under the plan, the Governor General and Prime
Minister were to be arrested; the Governor General was to be forced
to dismiss the Prime Minister and General Akbar was to form the new
government which would organize general elections in the country. The
new dispensation was to allow the Communist Party to participate in
the political process and, in return, the latter would support to the new
government. The daily Pakistan Times, under the editorship of Faiz, was
to come forward with favourable write-ups and columns. The group

was arrested along with a number of other co-conspirators, tried and
sentenced to varying terms. Begum Nasim was, however, acquitted.
Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali Khan

Any assessment of the life and achievements of Liaquat Ali Khan
would be incomplete without a mention of Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali
Khan. Born in Almora, India, in 1905, she was a forceful advocate
of women’s rights. Ra’ana also gained first-hand experience of the
hardships of the oppressed and downtrodden at a very early stage in her
life. Her mother used to regularly visit a sanatorium in Almora. It was
there, according to Begum Liaquat, that she learned to help and care for
others.
She first met her husband, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, during
the time of the Simon Commission. As a member of the Legislative
Assembly, Liaquat had come to debate the unpopular constitutional
reforms that were being introduced by the Simon Commission. Begum
Liaquat, then a student, attended the event carrying placards of “Simon
Go Home.” Liaquat Ali Khan, winning the debate, became an instant
hero with her friends. She later sold him a ticket to a stage show to raise
funds for flood relief in Bihar. They were married in December 1932.
Till Liaquat’s untimely death nineteen years later she was his constant
companion.
Like her husband, Ra’ana was deeply involved in politics and the
couple shared similar goals. She also became part of another defining
moment in Pakistan’s history when she accompanied her husband to
the Quaid’s Hampstead Heath residence in London, May 1933, to
request him to return to India and to resume the leadership of the Indian
Muslims.
It was in 1942, when rumors of Japanese invasion were ripe, that

the Quaid-e-Azam said to her “Be prepared to train the women. Islam
doesn’t want women to be shut up and never see fresh air.”85 Begum
Liaquat never looked back.

Sultan M Hali
At this point in Pakistan’s history there weren’t many nurses in
Karachi, so Begum Liaquat asked the army to train women to give
injections and first aid. Women were thus sent for three to six month
courses and, as a result, para-military forces for women were formed.
During this period, girls were also personally encouraged by Begum
Liaquat to take up nursing as a profession. They were taught the rifle
drill and also given lessons on decoding ciphers, typing and a host of
other skills so they could be useful in times of national crises like the
refugee crisis of 1947. It was a direct result of this crisis that the All
Pakistan Women’s Association, (APWA) was established by her in
1949. As the founder and life-long president of APWA, Begum Liaquat
played a pioneering role in the advancement of women in the political,
educational, economic and other fields. A chain of schools, colleges,
industrial homes and institutions were set up by the APWA. Gradually
APWA became the main instrument in the struggle for the emancipation
of Pakistani women. Begum Liaquat firmly believed that education
and economic independence were two of the most important factors that
would help women recognize and achieve their just rights in society.
In the field of education, she founded the Ra’ana Liaquat Ali Khan
College of Home Economics which opened home economic colleges in
Karachi, Lahore and Dhaka. The other important women’s organizations
that she founded included the Business and Professional Women’s Club,
the Friends of APWA (for the wives of diplomats accredited to Pakistan)
and the International Women’s Club.
For the working women, she established a string of industrial

homes and work places where they could earn a respectable living.
Among these institutions the prominent ones were: The Ra’ana Liaquat
Model Colony for Craftsmen Karachi, Gül-e-Ra’ana Nusrat Industrial
Community Centre Karachi, Voluntary Health and Nutrition Association
and Pakistan Cottage Industries Shop.86
Begum Liaquat’s achievements didn’t just stop there. She was

the first Muslim woman delegate to the UN in 1952. She was also the
first woman ambassador of the country, representing Pakistan in the
Netherlands, Italy and Tunisia. From 1973 to 1976, she was elected

Governor of Sindh, once again the first Pakistani woman to hold such a
post.
In recognition of her life-long struggle for women’s rights, she was

awarded the United Nation’s Human Rights Award in 1978. Her other
awards and medals include the Jane Adam’s Medal in 1950 (USA),
Woman of Achievement Medal 1950 (USA), Mother of Pakistan in 1950
(USA), Nishan-I-Imtiaz in 1959, Grand Cross of Orange Nassau in 1961
(the Netherlands), International Gimbel Award 1961-62, Woman of the
World in 1965 chosen by the Turkish Women’s Association, Ankara and
Vavaliera di Gran Croce in 1966 (Italy).
Another instance from her life which probably best illustrates

her unswerving commitment to the rights of women was when she
fearlessly took on then military ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq, in the 1980s.
Despite her illness and old age, she vehemently criticized the General
for promulgating so-called Islamic laws that were contradictory to
the actual teachings of Islam and clearly against women. Zia-ul-Haq,
because of Begum Liaquat’s stature in society and the respect that she
commanded, was constrained to leave her alone. She passed away on 13
June 1990 and was buried next to her husband in the precincts of the
Quaid-e-Azam’s Mausoleum.
Who killed Liaquat?

A number of conspiracy theories abound, some of them fanciful,
about the identity of the person or persons involved in the cold-blooded
murder of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister. His assassin, an Afghan
national, named Said Akbar was immediately shot dead by police Sub-
Inspector Mohammad Shah 87and thus the country was never to know
the identities of those who had planned and abetted the heinous crime.
It is nevertheless intriguing that the senior officer of the Special Police,
Mr. Aziz Uddin, was killed in a mysterious plane crash while carrying
the documents pertaining to the inquiry into the assassination. Whatever
evidence that had been collated was thus destroyed. Later investigations
revealed that the cause of this crash was an act of sabotage.88 Said Akbar
and his brother had been involved in insurrection against the government

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of Afghanistan but strangely enough the assassin had been in contact
with the Afghan Consul in Peshawar.89
Some believe that the feudal overlords were responsible for the
murder. A number of them were conspicuously absent, despite the
requirements of protocol, from the venue of the public gathering that
Liaquat was to address when he was gunned down. Among others,
his grandson, Nawabzada Musharraf Ali Khan, subscribes to this
theory because the Prime Minister was to announce the abolishment of
feudalism in his address.
Another theory is that the Communists and the convicted coup-

plotters of March 1951 had been behind the assassination.90 According to
a report around that time a representative of Finlays in Lahore revealed
that his company had received a letter signed by “ex-Major General
Akbar Khan, Hyderabad Central Jail” inquiring as to prices of tractors
and other agricultural equipment and stating that the writer expected
to engage in large scale cultivation “within six months.” General
Akbar Khan was the ringleader of the Rawalpindi conspiracy, and this
communication if true would seem to indicate that at least the chief
protagonist expected to be released in the near future.91
Though more than half a century has passed since the assassination
of Liaquat Ali Khan, it is still not known who was responsible. Similarly
Zia-ul-Haq’s assassination has never been conclusively investigated and
it is a strange coincidence that former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
should also meet her end at the same venue where Liaquat Ali Khan was
killed. Two years have gone by since her murder and yet the masterminds
are still to be brought to justice.
Conclusion
Khalid Hasan’s editorial carried by The Nation of 28 February
1997, titled: “Banish the factotums, sir”, aptly comments on the life
of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister. “In the early years of Pakistan, the
leaders lived with simplicity. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, who used to be rich in
his own right before independence, lived simply. He was accessible and
there were hardly any barriers between him and those who considered

him the Quaid-i-Azam’s heir and his most trusted deputy. We all know
that when the Nawabzada died, he had no money in the bank. That is the
example our present-day leaders need to follow and not that of oriental
potentates, colonial overlords and slave plantation kings.” 92
Liaquat Ali Khan may be unheralded but his epitaph was aptly
provided by Dawn in its editorial October 1951:
“A few yards away for the body of the founder of the Pakistan now
rests in eternal sleep the body of the builder of Pakistan. Both died in
harness and both died for Pakistan. The Quaid-e-Azam worked his body
way to waste; the Quaid-e-Millat fearlessly exposed his body to danger
for his love of duty and country. The master and the disciple, the twin
servants of Islam who in this century added perhaps the most glorious
chapter to Islam’s temporal history, now meet heaven. Like twin stars,
unseen but their presence always felt, their blessings will be continually
showered on the land which the one founded, and the other built up to a
state of stability and strength from which progress forward is inevitable
because of its own momentum. It is now for the nation which they
served so well, to carry on their work, and in particular make the blood
of martyred Liaquat blossom to all of us.”93
References:
1 Moin Ansari, ‘The Day Democracy died in Pakistan’ available at http://www.friendskorner.
com/forum.
2 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi Liaquat Ali Khan—His Life and Work, p-4, Oxford
University Press, 2003, ISBN 978-0-19-579788-6
3 Ibid p-8
4 The Story of Pakistan ‘Liaquat Ali Khan’ at http://www.storyofpakistan.com.
5 Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan, London, 1954, p. 105
6 Brigadier Noor A Husain, in PTV program Defence and Diplomacy: “Liaquat Ali Khan’s
Death Anniversary” hosted by Sultan M. Hali, telecast on 16 October 2009
7 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi Liaquat Ali Khan—His Life and Work, p-43, Oxford
University Press, 2003, ISBN 978-0-19-579788-6
8 Salahuddin Khan, Had There Been No Jinnah, PanGraphics (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad, 1989,
Pages 14-15.
9 Quaid-i-Azam Papers, National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad, F335, pp. 58-59
10 Dawn, Delhi, December 1945, p.1, quoted by Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali

Sultan M Hali
Khan-His Life and Work, p-103, Oxford University Press, 2003
11 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali Khan-His Life and Work, p-221, Oxford
University Press, 2003
12 Brigadier Noor A Husain, narrated in PTV program Defence and Diplomacy: “Liaquat
Ali Khan’s Death Anniversary” hosted by Sultan M. Hali, telecast on 16 October 2009
13 Hopes and Fears, by a noted journalist (Delhi, p. xxix. This account of the visit of the
Cabinet delegation is by a journalist who wished to remain anonymous. The preface
was written by Pattabhi Sitarammaya, leader and historian of the National Congress.
Liaquat’s statement was in reply to Abdul Kalam Azad’s offer of a day before, on 15
April 1946, based on 4 points: (1) Complete Independence (ii) united India (iii) one
federation composed of fully autonomous units and (iv) two lists of Central subjects one
compulsory and the other optional.
14 Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power, N. Mansergh
and E.W.R. Lunby eds., ix, 153, 154
15 Ibid. p-738
16 Ibid. p-953
17 Ibid.
18 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali Khan-His Life and Work, p-216, Oxford
19 ‘Liaquat Ali Khan, The Man, One Of The Founding Fathers, The Freedom Fighter, The
Liberator Of Kashmir & The First Prime Minister’ available at: http://www.friendskorner.
com/forum/f137/column-rawalpindi-secrets-columns.
20 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali Khan-His Life and Work, pp-289-290, Oxford
21 Liaquat-Nehru Pact 1950, The Story of Pakistan http://www.storyofpakistan.com
22 The Library of Congress Country Studies, quoted by Liaquat Ali Khan, the Quaid-i-
Millet, Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington in ‘Problems at Independence’
23 Saumitra Mohan, Refugee Problem in South Asia, 18 September, 2009, PTI, http://www.
jansamachar.net
24 Nawabzada Musharraf Ali Khan, grandson of Liaquat Ali Khan, narrated in PTV program
Defence and Diplomacy: “Liaquat Ali Khan’s Death Anniversary” hosted by Sultan M.
Hali, telecast on 16 October 2009
and E.W.R. Lunby eds., vii, p.802
27 Ibid. p.801
28 Ibid. X, p. 151
29 Ibid. p.152
30 Ibid. p.160
31 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi narrated in PTV program Defence and Diplomacy:
“Liaquat Ali Khan’s Death Anniversary” hosted by Sultan M. Hali, telecast on 16 October
2009
32 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali Khan-His Life and Work, pp. 265-267, Oxford

33 Brigadier Noor A Husain, and Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi narrated in PTV program
and E.W.R. Lunby eds., p. 427
35 ‘The Nehru Doctrine Faces Liaquat Ali Khan’s Patriotic Fist’ available at: http://www.
friendskorner.com/forum/f137/column-rawalpindi-secrets-columns
and E.W.R. Lunby eds., pp. 662, 663
37 Lord Mountbatten, ‘Time to Look Forward’ London, 1949, p.30 cited in Chaudhry
Muhammad Ali,
38 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali Khan-His Life and Work, pp-277-278, Oxford
39 S.M. Hali, ‘The partition conspiracy’, The Nation, 15, August 2007, p.2007
40 Narrated by Brigadier Noor A Hussain in PTV program Defence and Diplomacy on
“Jaswant Singh’s book on Quaid”, hosted by Sultan M Hali on 27 August 2009.
41 Dr. Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali Khan-His Life and Work, p. 306, Oxford
42 K.H. Khurshid, Memories of Jinnah, Karachi, 1990, p.82
43 M. Rafiq Afzal (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan,
Lahore, 1967, pp. 131-3
44 H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 462-4
45 Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Lahore, 1988, reprint, p. 299
46 Hasan Zaheer, The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951, Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1966, p.120
47 Ata Rabbani, I was the Quaid’s ADC, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 157
48 Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, New Jersey, 1954, p. 89
50 Ibid pp. 311-312
51 Hasan Zaheer, The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951, Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1966, p.139
52 Mohammad Noman, Muslim India, Allahabad, 1942, pp. 430-1
53 Quaid-i-Azam Papers, National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad, F10092, pp. 90-91
54 Ashok Kapur, Diplomatic ideas and practices of Asian states, International studies in
sociology and social anthropology, p. 33, Leiden ; New York : Brill, 1990
55 Ibid. p.34
2009
57 Ibid.
58 Qutubuddin Aziz, ‘Quaid-i-Millat’s visit to the United States- The foundation of
friendship and economic co-operation’ available at: http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/

Sultan M Hali
spedition/liaqat_ali_khan/page2.htm.html
59 Ibid.
60 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960_U-2_incident
62 Mohammad Riaz, ‘Who secured the US invitation’ Dawn, 1 February 1985, Mag, p.1
63 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, pp. 41,42 ISBN 0-19-
579801-5
64 M. Rafiq Afzal (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan,
Lahore, 1967, pp. 338-9
65 Nicholas Mansergh, Independence Year, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999,
p.245
66 M.R. Kazimi, A Concise History of Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.
194
67 Prof Dr M Yakub Mughal ‘A worthy successor to the Quaid’
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Annex - Text of the Constitution of Pakistan,
2009
72 Prof. Ziauddin Ahmad , Liaquat Ali Khan: builder of Pakistan, p.27
73 The Nation that Lost its Soul: Memoir of Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan, p. 178, Lahore Jang
publishers 1995
75 Ibid.
76 Brigadier Noor A Husain, Nawabzada Musharraf Ali Khan and Dr. Muhammad Reza
Kazimi narrated in PTV program Defence and Diplomacy: “Liaquat Ali Khan’s Death
Anniversary” hosted by Sultan M. Hali, telecast on 16 October 2009
77 Professor Ziauddin, Liaquat Ali Khan: Builder of Pakistan, p. Royal Book Company
78 Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, Penguin Books, ISBN
: 9780140299052
79 Roger Long, Jinnah and his Right Hand in M. R. Kazimi’s M.A. Jinnah: Views and
Reviews, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 158
80 Brigadier Noor A Husain, narrated in PTV program Defence and Diplomacy: “The
Quaid’s last 100 Days” hosted by Sultan M. Hali, telecast on 11 September 2009
82 Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Jinnah-Liaquat Correspondence, Pakistan Study Center,
2000.
83 Muhammad Reza Kazimi, Liaquat Ali Khan: His Life and Work, Oxford University
Press, 2003 and Roger D Long, Dear Mr. Jinnah: Selected Correspondence and Speeches

of Liaquat Ali Khan, Oxford University Press 2004
85 Muneeza Shamsie, A Life devoted to human welfare, Dawn, 11 June, 1982
86 Death of a Pioneer, Daily News, 16 June 1990
87 Jamna Das Akhtar , Ian Stephens, Political Conspiracies in Pakistan, Asia Publishing
House – Delhi, 1969, pp. 13-16
88 Ibid.
89 Secret Telegram from Secretary of State, Oct. 20, 1951, Documents from the U.S.
National Archives, declassified and available at: http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/
pakistan/pakintrigue.htm
90 Restricted Telegram from Consulate General, Calcutta, Oct. 19, 1951
91 Political and Economic Summary, September 29-October 6, 1952, Oct. 6, 1952
92 Khalid Hasan’s editorial “Banish the factotums, sir”, daily The Nation of 28 February
1997.
93 Editorial, Dawn, October 1951

1971-LESSONS ET CETERA
Iqbal Ahmad Khan*
Abstract
(The 1971 debacle represented a turning point in the history of
Pakistan. There were many lessons Pakistan could have learnt from this
national trauma. Regrettably, we chose to ignore these. The Hamoodur
Rahman Commission Report, the most authoritative account of the
factors which led to the catastrophe, was not made public. The Report’s
recommendations were not implemented. We continue to pay the price
of ignoring the lessons of history. Some of the episodes related to the
crisis also continue to be debated. Foremost among them the famous
‘American Tilt’ and Bhutto’s alleged remark ‘Udhar Tum, Idhar Hum.’
At times, it appears that the debate surrounding these developments is
colored by prejudice and pre-conceived notions, rather than hard facts.
Author)
The 1971 civil war, the secession of East Pakistan, the third Indo-
Pakistan war and creation of the independent state of Bangladesh
represents the most tragic period in the 62 year volatile history of
Pakistan. That the unbelievable savagery, bloodletting and suffering
which accompanied the partition of British India would be re-enacted
barely 24 years later was unimaginable. A wide array of factors
contributed to the great tragedy. Among the major ones were a growing
sense of deprivation within East Pakistan, the demand for provincial
autonomy and a greater share in the resources of the country. There
was the belief among Bengalis that for some reason their modesty,
appearance and love for the arts was mistaken for weakness leading
* Iqbal Ahmad Khan is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.

1971-Lessons et Cetera
to its corollary that their legitimate demands could be ignored with
impunity. The absence of democracy which stifled the aspirations of the
biggest province in terms of population and the existence of a neighbor
ever willing to exploit internal weaknesses in the body-politic of its
adversary further compounded the situation. The military government
of the time, divorced from reality and unable to grasp the complexities
of the political situation, was totally mistaken in its assessment of the
depth of Bengali resentment. It grossly underestimated the strength
and determination of its foe, India, and overestimated its own power
and cohesiveness thereby leading the nation through incompetence
and lies to perdition. The result, as expected by everyone, including
Pakistan’s foreign allies, was the inevitable disintegration of the country
and the humiliation of the nation, nay the entire Islamic fraternity. The
capitulation of the Pakistan army, the highly unfavorable reports and
commentaries in the Western media and the revelation by Bangladeshi
leaders of the atrocities committed in erstwhile East Pakistan greatly
distraught our friends.
Prior to delving into the lessons that need to be learnt from the
separation of East Pakistan, it would be appropriate to examine the ‘et
cetera’ portion of this article’s title. There were two intensely debated
developments in the crisis. Unfortunately, the heat of the debate seems
to have obscured the facts leaving behind views based on limited
knowledge and that too colored by personal prejudice. One aspect
of the crisis pertains to the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was then
Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the other relates to
the perception of the so-called ‘American tilt.’
Despite the passage of 38 years and the publication of the Hamoodur

Rahman Commission report, the part played by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in
the events leading to the break-up of Pakistan continues to be debated
passionately. While space does not permit a comprehensive account
of Bhutto’s role, it is important for the sake of objectivity and history
to respond to those who remain unswervingly convinced that the
responsibility for the disintegration of the country lies at his doorstep. In
support of their claim they do not tire of incessantly recalling Bhutto’s
pronouncement of ‘Udhar tum, Idhar hum’ at a public meeting in

Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Karachi a few days before army action in East Pakistan. There could not
be a more glaring example of a quote torn out of context and perversely
distorted to malign a national leader and his political party for working
towards the country’s disintegration.
On 14 March 1971 Bhutto met President Yahya Khan in Karachi.

The latter was on his way to Dacca to discuss the fast evolving political
situation in the country with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the
Awami League which had swept the polls in East Pakistan. The purpose
of the meeting was to brief Yahya Khan on the position of the Pakistan
People’s Party regarding issues confronting the country in the post-
election period. Bhutto contended that the PPP was the majority party
in West Pakistan and the people expected it to safeguard the interests of
the province. The same day i.e., 14 March the PPP Chairman addressed
a public meeting in Karachi where he essentially reiterated what he had
earlier conveyed to the president. In his speech he said that the 1970
elections had thrown up two major political parties - the Awami League
in East Pakistan and the PPP in West Pakistan. Unfortunately, neither
did the Awami League win a single seat in West Pakistan nor did the
PPP in East Pakistan. There was thus a polarization of political forces.
It, therefore, seemed logical to assume that if the Awami League were to
form the government at the centre it could face serious problems in gaining
acceptance in West Pakistan. Given the charged political atmosphere in
the country the wise course appeared to be that a national government be
formed comprising the Awami League and the PPP. He repeated that a
government of solely the Awami League would not be viable because, and
here he injected the words ‘Udhar tum, Idhar hum’ meaning that you are
restricted to East Pakistan and the PPP to West Pakistan. By no stretch of
the imagination did Bhutto mean that the Awami League should rule in an
independent East Pakistan and the PPP in an independent West Pakistan.
The Urdu daily ‘Azad’ ran the sensational headline ‘Udhar tum, Idhar
hum’ which was picked up by Bhutto’s opponents and used to portray
him as an advocate of two Pakistans. Ever mindful of history and hence
of setting the record straight, Bhutto addressed a press conference the
next day to rebut the insidious propaganda being spread by mischievous
elements. He strongly condemned the deliberate distortion of his speech
and reiterated his position that power be transferred at the Centre to the

majority parties of both wings and in the provinces to the majority party
in each province.1
The other issue which has greatly exercised Pakistani emotions and
continues to be cited as yet another example of American perfidy was
the allegation that the United States failed to live up to its assurances to
Pakistan regarding its security. In the events leading up to the war the
government of Pakistan officially, both in Islamabad and in Washington,
urged the US government to come to its assistance in view of Indian
threats to Pakistan and subsequently on account of India’s actual
invasion of East Pakistan. In this respect they cited the US-Pakistan
Agreement of Cooperation concluded between the two countries on 5
March 1959. Its preamble stated that the “Government of the United
States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world
peace, the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan.”
The agreement obligated the US to take appropriate action “as may
be mutually agreed upon” to defend Pakistan against aggression.2 The
agreement was concluded in the aftermath of the Joint Resolution to
Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East adopted by the US
Congress on 9 March 1957. This resolution is cited in the US-Pakistan
agreement. The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things, the
use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by “any country
controlled by international communism” so long as such use of force
was consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the
United States.
Interestingly, during a telephone conversation President Nixon’s

Assistant for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry Kissinger suggested
to the Pakistan ambassador in Washington General (Retd.) N.A.M. Raza
that he should, in his contacts with the State Department, invoke apart
from the treaties the unsigned aide memoire and the secret clauses as
well.3 According to a footnote to the document No.164 the assurance
offered to Pakistan in 1962 cited by Kissinger during the crisis, pertained
to United States assistance to Pakistan in the event of Indian aggression
against Pakistan. The assurance was delivered in an aide-mémoire
presented to Pakistani President Ayub Khan on 5 November 1962. The
aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any qualification relating

Iqbal Ahmad Khan
to constitutional constraints. A Department of State press release issued
on 17 November 1962 declared that the United States had assured
Pakistan that, if India misused United States military assistance in
aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take “immediately,
in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action to thwart
such aggression.”4
The fact that Kissinger had to advise the Pakistan ambassador to

proceed along these lines was reflective of the differences within the
Nixon administration on the policy and strategy that the US needed to
adopt in addressing the South Asian crisis. In the top echelons of the
US government President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger advocated tangible
US political, diplomatic and military assistance to Pakistan, whereas
the State Department was of the view that US should continue to urge
Pakistan to move towards a political solution rather than settle the
issue through use of force. This becomes apparent when in a telephone
conversation Dr. Kissinger tells the Secretary of State Rogers that “there
is a shade of difference between State’s and the President’s view. He
would like to tilt towards Pakistan and not India and your people go
the other way.5 Even though Secretary Rogers differed from Kissinger’s
assessment the divergences in approach surfaced from time to time as
the crisis in South Asia evolved.
President Nixon’s tilt towards Pakistan came as a consequence of

his appreciation that India was using Pakistan’s predicament (no doubt
the result of Pakistan’s own short-sighted policies) to dismember its
neighbor and to establish its pre-eminent position in South Asia. In
this venture India had the complete support of its long-time ally the
Soviet Union. On 9 August 1971 both countries concluded a twenty year
treaty of peace and friendship. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, an academician and
a former US ambassador to the United Nations believes that the Indo-
Soviet treaty provided concrete benefits to both parties. “For India, the
treaty explicitly provided for Soviet diplomatic support and implicitly
laid the basis for the continuing flow of military hardware that had
already started to arrive on a massive scale in the months preceding the
treaty. The signing of the treaty, coupled with the presence of a million-
man Soviet army on the Chinese border, served as a crucial guarantee

to India against any overt Chinese action to help Pakistan in India’s
forthcoming action against Pakistan.”6
The Indian plan was spelled out by Kissinger on 8 December. He

believed that an Indian victory in East Pakistan was inevitable. Once
East Pakistan had been overrun it would transfer its forces to West
Pakistan, smash its land and air forces and annex Pakistan’s part of
Kashmir. Kissinger believed that such a move would unleash centrifugal
forces in West Pakistan with Balochistan and NWFP going their separate
ways. This view was endorsed by the CIA which had obtained reliable
information that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had laid down three
objectives for the Indian forces. These comprised:
(i) Liberation of Bangladesh.

(ii) The incorporation into India of the southern area of Azad
(Pakistan-held) Kashmir.
(iii) The destruction of the Pakistani armored and air force so that
Pakistan can never threaten India again.7
Thus the Indian objective was to cut Pakistan down to a size

which would sue for peace and respect unquestionably India’s regional
supremacy. The Soviet Union’s goal was to deliver a blow at the US
alliance system in the region and to humiliate China. The Soviet Union
also wanted to teach Pakistan a lesson for having acted as a facilitator in
the establishment of relations between the US and China.
President Nixon believed that the US could not allow a country

which had provided significant help in the strategic opening to China
to be targeted in such a fashion. He also felt that the United States
should supplement Chinese political, diplomatic and military support to
Pakistan by adopting measures to thwart the Indo-Soviet designs in the
region. “I felt it was important to discourage both Indian aggression and
Soviet adventurism, and I agreed with Kissinger’s recommendation that
we should demonstrate our displeasure with India and our support for
Pakistan,” wrote Nixon in his memoirs.8

Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Additionally, President Nixon was greatly displeased with Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During an official visit to the United
States in November 1971, a couple of weeks prior to the Indian Army
marching into East Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi was received in the Oval office
by President Nixon. In the meeting Indira Gandhi assured him that India
was not motivated in any way by anti-Pakistan attitudes. She told the
US President, “India has never wished the destruction of Pakistan or its
permanent crippling. Above all, India seeks the restoration of stability.
We want to eliminate chaos at all costs.” Nixon writes in his memoirs
that, at the very time, Mrs. Gandhi was conveying these assurances
to him, her generals and advisors were planning to intervene in East
Pakistan and were considering contingency plans for attacking West
Pakistan as well.9 Later in the month when the Indian army crossed
into East Pakistan, Nixon believed that the Indian Prime Minister had
purposely deceived him. In his memoirs, he reproduces a brief reflection
that he wrote in his diary:
As I saw Gandhi’s assassination and heard his words on violence,

I realized how hypocritical the present Indian leaders are, with
Indira Gandhi talking about India’s victory wings being clipped
when Shastri went to Tashkent, and her duplicitous attitude
towards us when she actually had made up her mind to attack
Pakistan at the time she saw me in and assured me she would
not. Those who resort to force without making excuses are bad
enough - but those who resort to force while preaching to others
about their use of force deserve no sympathy whatever.10
It was in these circumstances and in the context of the above

indicated attitudes and assessments that the US government took two
major initiatives, one diplomatic and the other military. In a letter to the
Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, President Nixon asserted that Indian
military forces were being used to impose political demands and to
dismember the sovereign state of Pakistan. He further stated that the
Soviet Union had aligned itself with this Indian policy. Nixon urged
utmost restraint on the part of both the US and the Soviet Union and
urgent action towards ending the conflict and restoration of the territorial

integrity of states in the sub-continent. Kissinger was instructed to take
follow up action to President Nixon’s letter to the Soviet authorities.
Simultaneously, a naval task force of ten ships led by the aircraft

carrier, Enterprise, was dispatched from the US Seventh Fleet off South
Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal. This was meant to be a signal from the
US regarding its commitment to the continued territorial integrity of
West Pakistan. According to Shirin Tahir-Kheli, “this move, ordered by
Nixon, coupled with Kissinger’s ‘background’ briefing to the press that
Moscow’s inability to restrain the Indians could jeopardize the entire
fabric of East-West relations, was meant to ensure that both New Delhi
and Moscow understood the seriousness of any Indian move into West
Pakistan.”11
In response to these moves, the Soviet Union’s initial reaction was not
encouraging from the US and Pakistani standpoints. However, following
a number of demarches from the US government the senior Soviet
diplomat, Vorontsov, assured the US that it was prepared unconditionally
to guarantee that there would be no Indian attack on West Pakistan or
on Kashmir. This assurance was extended on 15 December the day the
US naval task force steamed into the Bay of Bengal. The next day the
Pakistani forces surrendered in East Pakistan but on 17 December India
offered a cease-fire on the western front which was promptly accepted
by Pakistan. The acceptance of the Indian offer came only a day after
General Yahya had vowed to carry on the war against India until victory
was achieved. According to President Nixon, “The Indo-Pakistan war
involved stakes much higher than the future of Pakistan - and that was
high enough. It involved the principle of whether big nations supported
by the Soviet Union would be permitted to dismember their smaller
neighbors. Once that principle was allowed, the world would have
become more unstable and unsafe.”12
The American “tilt” towards Pakistan during the East Pakistan crisis
and the Indo-Pak war was quite evident. It did not and was never meant
to save East Pakistan, because developments there had reached a stage
where it was simply not tenable that the province could exist as part
of Pakistan. The tilt however did prevent further disintegration of the

Iqbal Ahmad Khan
country. This according to Shirin Tahir-Kheli was acknowledged by
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his interview with Sulzberger which appeared in
the New York Times of 13 February 1972.13
The surrender to the Indian forces in East Pakistan represented the

most tragic and the most humiliating episode in the 24 year history of
Pakistan. According to Sisson and Rose, “The terms of surrender were
initiated by General Manekshaw, presented to General Niazi and Aurora
at the Ramna Race Course, the scene of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s most
significant political moments. Ironically, it was here too that General
Niazi, commander of the forces of Muslim Pakistan, surrendered his
arms to three generals of “Hindu” India - one a Parsi, another a Sikh and
the third a Jew.”14
The document of surrender sealed the disintegration of Pakistan.

Half the country was lost. Pakistan suffered 9183 total casualties. It had
3132 officers, JCOs, and soldiers killed or missing and India took over
90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war from East Pakistan.15
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who replaced Yahya Khan as the president of

Pakistan, established a commission of enquiry on 26 December 1971 to
enquire into the circumstances that had led to the surrender of the armed
forces in East Pakistan and to the ordering of the cease-fire in West
Pakistan. The commission was headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan,
Justice Hamoodur Rahman. The other two members of the commission
were Justice Anwarul Haq and Justice Tufail Ali Abdur Rahman of the
Supreme Court.
In its report the commission came, inter alia, to the conclusion that
there was an imperative need “to book those senior Army Commanders
who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of
the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy,
their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and willful neglect
in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice
in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to
resist the enemy.”

The Commission was also of the view that “that proper and firm
disciplinary action, and not merely retirement from service, is necessary
to ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct
displayed during the 1971 war. We believe that such action would not
only satisfy the nation’s demand for punishment where it is deserved, but
would also serve to emphasize the concept of professional accountability
which appears to have been forgotten by senior army officers since their
involvement in politics, civil administration and Martial Law duties.”
The Commission concluded that the process of moral degeneration

among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces began with their involvement
in Martial Law duties in 1958 and these were intensified when Martial
Law was re-imposed in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan. There
was indeed “substance in the allegations that a considerable number of
senior Army officers had not only indulged in large scale acquisition of
lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted
highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their
professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership.”16
The Commission succeeded in its avowed objective of putting the

record straight on most questions agitating the minds of the Pakistani
nation with regard to the debacle in East Pakistan. The report of the
Commission was regrettably not published. It is generally believed that
it was on the request of the army that Mr. Bhutto decided not to make the
report public. The army contended that its surrender in East Pakistan had
caused tremendous disappointment among the people and demoralization
within the armed forces. The publication of the report, which was
extremely critical of the army’s top brass, its overall performance
and had spelled out in detail its shortcomings, would exacerbate the
situation. Bhutto acquiesced to the army’s request, even though it was
in his personal interest to have the report published. At that time there
was a widespread belief among certain sections of the population that
the report had placed the onus for the debacle on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
When the report did eventually see the light of day, this impression
turned out to be totally baseless. Neither was the report published, nor
its recommendations adopted and no lessons learnt. Having not learnt
the lessons of history, the likelihood was that history would repeat itself.

Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Six years later another general staged a coup, usurped power, dismissed
the legitimately elected government, told the nation a pack of lies,
formed an alliance with the clergy and sent, arguably the most popular
Pakistani prime minister to the gallows. The hope of the report’s authors
that their work would teach the nation some fundamental and important
lessons could unfortunately not be realized. To illustrate, in the rump
Pakistan the size of the Pakistan army was more than when East and
West Pakistan were together.
There were a host of reasons which led to the collapse of Pakistan

and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Fundamental
to these was the inability of the military government to comprehend
the complex situation, its incapability to formulate and to effectively
implement a sound strategy and finally the proclivity of the military
cabal to take major decisions without an understanding of the wishes of
the people and sans civilian input. The usurpation of power at gunpoint
by General Yahya Khan and the complete control over national resources
this entailed generated the perception that the junta would not let go and
this handicapped the military government right from the outset.
The principal recommendation of the Hamoodur Rahman

Commission was to take a hard look into the subversion of the
constitution by the generals, the usurpation of power and professional
incompetence. This regrettably was not done and the price had to be paid
by the nation as later events would demonstrate. Admittedly, article 6 was
incorporated in the 1973 constitution which made any attempt to subvert
the constitution by the show or use of force an act of high treason.17
Pakistan should have imbibed a lesson from the Greek experience. In
the 1970s a democratically elected and a confident civilian government
in Greece charged, tried and found guilty some colonels who had made
a mockery of law by staging coups and counter-coups and expropriating
the national resources of the state. Those found guilty were sentenced to
prison terms as provided for under the law of the land. This was nearly
forty years ago. Since then Greece has been a coup-free country and has
been contributing constructively to the political and economic growth of
the European community.

It needs to be noted that all major setbacks that Pakistan has suffered
in the past have occurred either during the tenure of military governments
or were triggered by the military. These include the 1965 Indo-Pak war,
the disastrous Pakistan-India conflagration of 1971, the loss of Siachin
and the Kargil misadventure. That democracy is the form of government
best suited to the conditions and the genius of the people of Pakistan
and that Bonapartism needs to be preempted at all cost is the important
lesson that the county ought to learn from the 1971 disaster.
The differences between the Awami League and the military

government swirled out of control on the former’s demand for provincial
autonomy as epitomized by the party’s Six Points. Point 2 of the Six
Point formula envisaged that the federal government would deal with
only two subjects, namely defense and foreign affairs and also currency
subject to certain conditions. All the other residuary subjects would vest
in the federating states. The tension was exacerbated by the differences
in political culture of East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan was
accommodative towards India whereas in West Pakistan, particularly
within the military, the attitude bordered on hostility. The Awami
League felt that a significant devolution of power from the centre to the
provinces was essential for the acquiring of resources and economic
development. Similarly, it was opposed to military pacts and desired a
scaling down of the defense expenditure. India was watching hawk-like
the fast evolving situation in its neighborhood, waiting to pounce when
the right opportunity presented itself. The grossly incompetent military
leadership in Pakistan led by an alcoholic and sexually intemperate
leader who during working hours had very few lucid moments provided
the Indians not one but many opportunities. The government thus ended
up fighting its own people within and the external enemy without. The
armed forces were hampered by poor leadership. Externally Pakistan
became increasingly isolated. The inevitable happened on 16 December
1971 with the surrender at Paltan Maidan. The threat to Pakistan’s security
did not come from an external source, but was essentially internal -
the inability of successive governments, in particular the military and
quasi-military ones, to provide for the political and economic needs
of the people and their welfare and security. This is only possible if

Iqbal Ahmad Khan
democratically elected governments continue to hold sway and there is
a paradigm shift from a national security to a welfare state.
An analysis of the decision making process reveals that at best, it

was restricted to a few generals a thousand miles away from the theatre
of conflict. At worst, it was the product of the president’s own limited
thinking. General Yahya Khan’s principal adviser reportedly told the
Hamoodur Rahman Commission that often Yahya would postpone
decisions when faced with arguments that did not accord with his views,
and then later on he would come up with whatever solution he felt
comfortable with.18 Shuja Nawaz’s comments on various institutions
set up specifically to address the likes of the East Pakistan crisis are
revealing. In his book, Crossed Swords, he states that the Defense
Committee of the Cabinet, comprising the president and ministers
involved with defense planning existed on paper but had not met more
than two times in the five years preceding the 1971 war. Similarly, the
Secretaries Coordination Committee on defense planning that afforded
civilian officials an opportunity to contribute to the overall coordination
of defense strategies and plans and produce a War Book had remained
largely dormant.19
To a large extent, as a consequence of the methodology of decision-

making, the decisions which were finally taken had little grounding in
reality. General Yahya Khan presented a pathetic picture when he testified
before the Hamoodur Rahman Commission. He blamed his colleagues,
the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, politicians including
Mr.Bhutto and the Russians for aiding India. The most amazing portion
of his testimony was his assertion that “I can confidently say that no
military historian would call this a military defeat.” This divorce from
reality and resort to hyperbole was also evident in the field. Towards the
end of November 1971 General Niazi replied thus to a communication
received from General Hamid. “Reassuring you and pledging afresh at
this critical juncture of our history we will Inshallah fully honor the
great confidence that has been reposed in us and no sacrifice will be
considered too great in defending our sacred fatherland….God willing
we will take the war onto Indian soil to finally crush the very spirit of

non-believers through the supreme force of Islam. Pray and believe that
ultimate victory will be ours. Inshallah.” 20 Two weeks later the general
had surrendered ignominiously, staining the glorious religion that he
invoked and the fair name of his country.
Despite the warnings given by the authors of the Hamoodur Rahman

Commission Report on the pitfalls of the army’s encroachment into the
civilian domain, there have since been two disastrous interventions by
the military. Between them they cover twenty years of the country’s
history. The democratically elected but weak civilian governments
had the unenviable task of cleaning the mess left behind by military
dictators. Even when civilian governments have been in power they
have worked under the shadow of the military which has continued to
operate with impunity outside its jurisdiction. As a consequence there
exists considerable resentment among the people as they are deeply
concerned at the democratic process being repeatedly derailed.
It is in the smaller and backward provinces that the suffering is the

greatest when the military takes over. The demand by the Balochis for
provincial autonomy, for a greater share of the resources of Balochistan
and opposition to the establishment of cantonments in the province is
reminiscent of East Pakistan prior to its transformation into Bangladesh.
On the positive side the country now has a democratically elected
representative government functioning in Islamabad, the international
community is fully supportive of the democratic dispensation and the
hope is that the army might have learnt its lessons.
References:
1 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; The Great Tragedy; p.36.
2 US-Pakistan Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, 5 March 1959.
3 Declassified State Department document No. 164 on South Asia. Transcript of the
telephone conversation between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and the Pakistan Ambassador (Raza), Washington, 8 December 1971.
4 Footnote to State Department declassified document No. 164 on South Asia.
5 Declassified State Department document No. 155: Transcript of telephone conversation
between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 23 November 1971.
6 Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, Dr.; The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence

Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Relationship.
7 CIA Memorandum on “Implications of an Indian Victory over Pakistan” dated 9 December
1971, as cited on p. 308 by Shuja Nawaz in his book Crossed Swords.
8 Nixon, Richard: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon; Vol. 1.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.; p. 658.
11 Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, Dr.; The United States and Pakistan: Evolution of an Influence
Relationship; p.44.
12 Nixon, Richard; The Memoirs of Richard Nixon; p.657.
13 Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, Dr.; The United States and Pakistan: Evolution of an Influence
Relationship; p.49.
14 Sisson and Rose; War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh;
p.234.
15 Nawaz, Shuja; Crossed Swords, Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within; Oxford
University Press,2008; p.310.
16 Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report.
17 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
18 Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report.
19 Nawaz, Shuja; Crossed Swords, Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within; p.312.
20 Sisson and Rose; War and Secession p.230

Essays
Essay
GENDER EQUALITY AND

EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN
Aisha Khan*
The UN Millennium Declaration was approved by 191countries

at the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit. This was the largest
ever gathering of world leaders in which 147 heads of government
participated.
The landmark Declaration recognizes the centrality of women in the

development processes. The governments committed themselves to the
promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women as the
effective way for combating poverty, hunger and disease and thereby
stimulating truly sustainable development.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) issued by the

UN Secretary General in 2001 collectively constitute a roadmap for
implementing the Millennium Declaration. The MDGs comprise eight
goals:
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty.

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education.
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women.
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality.
Goal 5: Improve maternal health.
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability.
Goal 8: Develop global partnership for development.
* Aisha Khan is the CEO of the Mountain and Glacier Protection Organization (MGPO).

Essay
These are supplemented by 18 numerical time-bound targets and
48 indicators aimed at improving living conditions and remedying
key global imbalances by 2015. Goal 3 calls for gender equality and
women’s empowerment.
From the 1975 UN International Year of Women through the Decade

of Women (1976-1985) in which the most significant achievement is the
1981 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, to the global summits and conferences of the 1990s, the
United Nations has been a key forum for women’s advocacy.
These conferences include the Conference on Environment and

Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where the vital role of
women in environmental management and development and the need
for their full participation to achieve sustainable development was
recognized. The International Conference on Human Rights (Vienna
1993) where women’s human rights were spelled out for the first time,
The International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo
1994) where formal recognition was given to women’s reproductive
rights, The World Summit on Social Development (Copenhagen 1995)
where the link between gender equality and poverty was explicitly
recognized and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in
1995 where the advocates won a broad-based agenda for promoting and
protecting women’s human rights worldwide, established the principal
of shared power and responsibility between women and men in all areas.
Women’s advocate groups have been successful in establishing strategic
mechanisms, influencing resolutions and winning crucial commitments
to shape a global policy agenda that recognizes gender equality and
women’s empowerment as essential components of poverty eradication,
human development and human rights.
The MDGs have broad support from the 191 UN member states,
affiliated UN agencies and international trade and financial institutions
that are all committed to the 2015 timeline. In this regard the review and
follow-up processes to UN conferences and summits of the past decade
will provide a critical opportunity to implement the policy gains of the

Essay
International Women’s Movement. In this context the MDGs offer three
main challenges to women’s advocates:
• To ensure a gender sensitive approach to the implementation at

the national level, integrating gender across all the goals.
• To demand adequate resources and equitable global economic
policies that are consistent with social and environmental needs.
• To link MDGs to other ongoing global and national policy
processes.
Gender equality is not an isolated goal but an essential ingredient

for achieving all the MDGs be it poverty eradication, protecting the
environment or access to healthcare. The MDGs are mutually reinforcing
and success in meeting the goals will have a positive impact on gender
equality just as progress in gender equality in one area will help to
advance each of the other goals.
The gender dimension has always played a significantly important

role in human development. However the concept of this role has
evolved with the evolution of society from agrarian to industrial and
from industrial to the age of technology. This progression of mankind
from an agro-based to a techno-oriented society has changed the social
order and with it the roles of both men and women. Unfortunately,
women were not allowed the space to keep pace with this transition in a
wholesome manner and were forced by the new economic empowerment
of men and the sudden change from the rural to the urban landscape
with all its attendant socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural
demands, to play a different role from what their gender had hitherto
been accustomed.
The majority of the world’s poor are women. Gender equality has a
direct impact on economic growth and the reduction of poverty by raising
productivity, improving efficiency, increasing economic opportunities
and empowering women. Of the 150 million children aged 6-11 who do
not attend school, over 90 million are girls. Of the 876 million illiterate
over 15 years, two-thirds are women. Over 500,000 women die each year
in pregnancy and childbirth. Globally 48 percent of adults living with

Essay
HIV/AIDS are women. The World Health Organization estimates that
80 percent of all sickness in the world is attributable to unsafe water and
sanitation. Water-borne diseases kill 3.4 million people annually, mostly
children. Millions more fall ill with diarrhoea, malaria, schistosomiasis,
arsenic poisoning, trachoma and hepatitis, diseases that are preventable
by access to clean water and health care information. Women have a
strong link with the environment. The survival of their household and
communities depends on their access and use of natural resources
like land, water, forests and plants but their role is generally ignored.
Moreover the task of fetching water is mainly borne by women and
girls and this inhibits their involvement in activities such as education
and income generation as well as political and social work. Women also
bear the main burden of caring for the sick which limits their income-
generating activities and education, but medical costs associated with
illness, increase household debts and deepen poverty.
Women’s empowerment therefore needs to be made an integral part

of broader issues such as health, education, economics, politics, legal
systems and decision making bodies to yield long term positive results
for the transformation of society.
The MDGs are a set of minimal goals that are necessary but not
sufficient for human development. They do not represent gender equity
and the structural transformation envisaged in UN conferences and
human rights instruments. All country reports submitted in 2003 failed
to mention gender in relation to Goal 7 i.e., ensuring environmental
sustainability.
Achieving Goals 1-7 will depend on the extent the UN system,

national governments and international trade and financial institutions
are able to develop Goal 8, namely, a global partnership for development.
The current target which includes global trade and financial systems,
good governance, official development assistance, market access and
debt, do not adequately address the systemic inequities and power
imbalances within the global economic system that undermine the
goals. The emphasis has been more on what the poor countries need
to do without specifying any timeframe, quantifiable benchmarks or

Essay
instruments to hold rich countries, economic institutions and corporations
accountable.
According to a report compiled by the Women’s Environment and

Development Organization “Governments worldwide have adopted
a piecemeal and incremental approach to women’s rights that cannot
achieve the goals in the landmark platform of action adopted at the
1995 UN conference in Beijing.” The report further states that across
all regions women are often still considered unequal to men; in the
workplace, at home, in the government; and assigned roles accordingly.
The report blames powerful trends for the inequality, growing poverty,
militarization and fundamental opposition to women’s rights which has
resulted in worsening the plight of women worldwide.
This gender-blind macro-economics and national policies keep

women concentrated in the informal sector and in the lowest paying
jobs in the formal economy. Women still earn less than men for the same
job and remain under-represented in decision making. This systemic
inequity and power imbalance needs to be corrected.
In Pakistan, the word gender is often misunderstood and misused.

Gender does not refer exclusively to women nor does it imply a western
approach to life. It reiterates that the concept applies to women and
men, as well as their relation to one another and how they relate to their
environment, deal with situations, utilize resources and make decisions
about their lives and the future.
Gender equality is also misconstrued by the general public who think

that women want equal numbers in all areas of work whereas it simply
means recognition of the reality that men and women have different
needs and priorities and contribute to development in different ways.
The key component in gender development is equity. This requires

giving equal opportunity to women and men to create a level playing
field in which both can achieve their maximum capacity in their own
chosen area of work and interest without social disadvantages. Gender
equity leads to gender equality.

Essay
Gender equality and equity pave the way for gender mainstreaming.
This can only start with an understanding of the different positions of
women and men and girls and boys in society. Gender does not refer
to women and men but to the relationship between them and the
way behaviours and identities are determined through the process of
socialization. Gender mainstreaming is therefore a strategy for making
the concerns of both women and men and their collective and individual
experiences form an integral dimension of design, implementation
and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and
societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally.
All this leads to empowerment which can be defined as people taking

control of their lives and living it in a way that reflects their hopes and
aspirations with dignity and respect and in harmony and balance with
nature.
Equity, equality and empowerment therefore constitute the 3 Es

which form the basis for sustainable development, world peace and
prosperity for all.
The MDGs, whether taken individually or collectively, point to a

basic human need; the need for every human being to be treated with
respect and dignity. There are 200 countries in the world today with a
combined population of more than 6 billion of which women comprise
50 percent.
A myriad of differences exist between these countries in ethnic

customs, cultural traditions, religious beliefs, economic indicators and
socio-political opportunities for the populations in general and women
in particular. It is difficult to conceptualize a model to unify them under
one value system. But in the midst of all these differences there is one
constant factor that unites women from all over the world: their struggle
to attain respect and dignity in the international arena and at the national
level on the basis of equality so as to jointly preserve world peace and
create an environment for ensuring a sustainable world order. This quest
for dignity is also the common denominator for all women in Pakistan
no matter what their ethnic, social or religious background.

Essay
Equality of the genders is enshrined in all the faiths, sanctified in the
scriptures and now guaranteed legal protection under the constitution in
all the countries of the world.
The issues facing women in Pakistan pose multiple challenges.

While education, healthcare and income generation contribute to
knowledge, physical health and more money, they do not necessarily
create the conditions in which women, especially in the rural areas, are
treated with respect and dignity. Society itself threatens to cast women
into the wilderness/ vulnerability net if she strays from tradition or
dares to venture out to forge a life for herself which is perceived as
unconventional. The rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan since 2000 has
seen a radical shift in the way society perceives women and women
perceive each other. There is a subtle variation of the same in work
places in the urban centres. Social protection therefore plays a very
important role in allowing women the freedom to think without fear of
judicial prosecution or societal persecution.
The devastating earthquake in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and parts

of the North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan in 2005, has added
the dimension of disaster management, risk reduction and rebuilding
lives with social, economic and gender-related challenges that were not
envisaged before. Gender equality and empowerment of women play a
key role in a land where substantial areas of its territory are vulnerable
to tectonic activity with the potential for massive natural disasters
that can increase the number of women in the vulnerability net which
includes widows, orphans and the elderly as well as the disabled and the
landless.
In recent times the attempt at Talibanization of the country through

an obscurantist misinterpretation of religion by vested interest groups
to gain control of society and impose stringent laws against the rights
of women has further restricted the freedom of women, exposed them
to violence and imperilled their lives. The number of women at risk
has increased as a result of the war against terror and this makes social
protection a very critical aspect of empowerment.

Essay
Social protection means providing legal protection to women, at
home, in the work place and at different levels of engagement in society
as well as in their social interactions within the community. This will
help to bring change in social consciousness and sensitize society
towards the issues faced by women.
While domestic violence is acknowledged more openly by women,

their voices are muffled in instances where they are subjected to forced
marriage, rape and harassment especially at work for fear of censure by
society as well as the compulsions of poverty.
The threat and use of violence against women combined with

their economic dependence, traditional strictures and discriminatory
legislation does not allow them the space to seek justice from the courts
on the one hand and, on the other, the fear of persecution from society
prevents them from exercising their rights. It is this palpable but silent
and invisible pressure that allows society to violate the fundamental
pledge in the constitution that guarantees equality between men and
women. This perception of harassment without assurance of social
support or the right to legal redress has psychological constraints which
prevent women from voicing their independent views and holds them
back from speaking out against the subtle ways through which their
dignity is consistently infringed. This, in turn, whittles away their self-
confidence and contributes to mental health problems thereby raising
formidable barriers in the way of empowerment.
Women may be provided education and healthcare but this has to

be accompanied by the creation of conditions under which they can
live in dignity. Empowerment will remain a mere delusion if there is
no substantive change in the way society treats women. Dignity cannot
be achieved without rights. The first step in this direction is through
constitutional guarantees and the second is by sensitising society to the
imperative of granting these rights reinforced by the conviction that
their violation is unconscionable. Laws are man-made and their purpose
is to guide people to do the right thing. The utopian assumption is that
a society evolves to a stage where it censures all discriminatory acts as
crimes of conscience and desists from committing them not from fear

Essay
of punishment but from moral inability to live with injustice. Such a
passive evolutionary approach can only prolong the anguish of women
though their problems are in need of urgent redress.
When a society deprives a human being of his rights it deprives him

of his dignity. Women are no different from men in this regard. Their
disabilities grow after their rights are held back from them. Unfortunately
this adds up to a circular argument where women are first denied equal
opportunities, then kept away from active participation on the pretext
of inadequate skills and finally held responsible for not playing a pro-
active role in society.
For most of the six decades since the country’s independence,

women in Pakistan have suffered due to neglect and a lack of political
commitment as well as growth-oriented rather than equity-oriented
economic policies. This, coupled with the wrong interpretation of the
constitution, has resulted in the introduction of laws that violate the
fundamental pledge in the constitution that guarantees equality between
women and men. Consequently Pakistani women have continued to
suffer as a result of the inequities of patriarchal structures, rigid orthodox
norms and primitive traditions. Successive governments have tried to
reform the discriminatory laws against women but have only had mixed
success in getting society to change itself. The quality and quantum of
change are not satisfactory and women still remain a deprived segment
of society.
Pakistani political parties with liberal credentials have tried to end

the discrimination permitted under law. The first steps were taken in
1961 when the Family Law Ordinance was promulgated to ensure that
women got their rights under Islam or at least those rights not disputed
by the jurists. But rights go on being infringed despite constitutional
injunctions to the contrary. The divorce laws continue to favour the
husband insofar as he can divorce a wife against the injunction of
the Qur’an. Furthermore, Qur’anic laws that favour women are not
institutionalized. For instance, it is the duty of the husband to financially
support his wife. If he fails to do that there is no law to call him to
account.

Essay
In 2000 a Women’s Commission was set up under Justice Majida
Rizvi. The Commission submitted its report in 2003 asking the
government to do away with the Hudood laws, which, among other
travesties, disqualify women as witnesses to a capital crime. Islamic
reformists are in favour of amending these laws because their abolition
will not contravene the spirit of Islamic tenets; but society in Pakistan is
not yet willing to accept the recommendation.
The main issues impeding the emancipation of women in Pakistan

are poverty, illiteracy and inadequate healthcare. From this stems the
basis of discrimination against them in all other spheres which lead to acts
of violence including honour killing, stripping them of dignity through
economic subservience and making them victims of armed conflict and
its multiple traumas, suffering from increased mortality of the girl child
by way of neglect and most importantly by becoming psychologically
dependent on notions perpetuated by vested interest groups that extol
such virtues of womanhood that keep them subservient to men. In this
context the challenge is more daunting as women are pitted against
women. The mother still favours the boy child, has a subjective attitude
towards her daughter-in-law and applies a different set of rules for girls
and boys at home. The process of social discrimination starts at home -
from the cradle - and is nurtured and sustained by women. Mothers take
pride and instil a sense of superiority in boys and, in the process, sacrifice
the education, health and nutrition of the girl child. This sense of security
associated with men stems from women’s reliance on men as providers
because agriculture still forms the basis of the country’s economy. The
majority of women remain confined to domestic responsibilities which
are labour intensive but non-monetized work.
However the fight for rights through the legislative process and
through change in society should not be at the cost of sacrificing inherent
feminine qualities. Equal rights should not mean reduction of men
and women to uniformity of functions. Women must have rights that
safeguard their difference from men. The way women relate to the world
in which they live is inherently different from men. Women can only be
satisfied with equal rights if their different sensibility is preserved.

Essay
Although it is possible for women to act like a man, especially in
politics, nature gives women the ability to recreate the world differently.
The various roles she plays as mother, wife, sister and daughter empower
her with different kinds of capacities that the male-dominated world has
only just begun to understand.
Men are naturally inclined to concepts based on ideas. There cannot

be any compromise on the purity of an idea. Men have fought wars on
the rigidity of their inviolable concepts. The entire Cold War period was
devoted to a polarisation based on this intellectual concept.
After the Cold War men do not know much about a world based on
relationships that bend and fluctuate, worsen and improve in a hiatus
of guiding concepts. Perhaps the day of the woman has come. She has
spent ages located in the middle of a grid of relationships that has taught
her to endure and repair and at times manipulate for the good of her
family. Today her success in the corporate world gives us an inkling of
what she can do if her inherent difference from men is preserved and her
rights restored to her.
There can only be an enduring change in the status of women when

there is a paradigm shift in the way society perceives the role of women
and women themselves rid their minds of gender prejudices and biased
concepts. Laws alone are not enough to end discrimination; it is society
that needs to change and most importantly it is women who need to
change and treat their own gender with respect and dignity, equity and
equality.

Essay
GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES AND

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE
Javed Masud*
The forces unleashed by globalization have changed the world and

so rapid has this change been that yesterday’s experiences may have
lost their relevance today, and tomorrow may represent yet another form
of transformation. There is a lurking fear that the new world is emerging
as a crueler place conspicuous by the domination of the powerful over
the weak. To some, globalization merely signifies the cultural and
economic invasion of the West, as reflected in the proliferation of fast
food chains and designer shops. On a parallel track, there is also an
increasing realization that the world of yesterday cannot be resurrected
and consequently nostalgia for the bygone era would only prevent
countries and individuals from availing the benefits of the opportunities
that are now more equitably distributed than ever before. In this new
“flattened world,” to use Friedman’s description,1 an individual born
and bred in the poorest country can now hope to compete with those
born into luxury provided he or she is prepared to accept the challenges.
It was never imaginable that a simple commerce graduate in a college,
say in Faisalabad, could actually master the technicalities of trading on
the Wall Street if he has the enthusiasm, inclination and application to
benefit from the age of the internet.
The principal gift of globalization is the access to information and its

instantaneous dissemination. As a consequence, geographical boundaries
or physical location do not constrain nations and states to work closely
together. Not only has this made the world flatter but also smaller and
more promising. No longer do individuals have to journey towards
* Javed Masud, a recipient of the Sitara-e-Imtiaz, is the former Chief Executive of Pakistan
Credit Rating Agency and a former Consul General of Pakistan in Seoul.

Essay
foreign shores to seek out greener pastures. They can now become full
participants in global operations while enjoying the comfort of living in
their own countries, indeed in their own homes. Thus, being a part of the
global supply chain for products or services has provided opportunities
never dreamt of before. However, this windfall is limited to knowledge
workers with other skilled and semi-skilled workers deriving only modest
benefits from this revolution. Given the nature of demand generated by
globalization, the impact is particularly remarkable in those countries
that had in the past several decades invested heavily in human resource
development particularly in higher education. These countries now
dot the global landscape and include East European countries, Ireland,
India, China, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. For all these
countries, globalization has ensured that prospects continue to improve
with the increasing pace of globalization. Countries which have lagged
behind in this field continue to rely on the earnings of migrant workers
or are only beginning to partake of the emerging opportunities. Such
countries, like Pakistan, can at best hope to capture that segment of the
global marketplace, which will be vacated by the front-runners as they
graduate towards the higher end of the supply chain.
The technological revolution which has spurred globalization has

also impacted closely not only on interstate relations but also on the
manner in which nation states conduct their internal functions. And this
is the central theme of this article. The potential benefits for nation states
are multiple as well as diverse. The state bureaucracy could become
considerably leaner; input for policy-making can be sourced globally
and in a time-efficient manner; the speed of decision-making and work
processing is now much faster; communication both in terms of speed
and form is far more efficient. In brief, it is now much easier than ever
before for states to provide good governance to its citizens. Globalization
also poses new challenges with intensifying competition owing to a
freer trading environment. The electronic media explosion, yet another
fallout of globalization, has also led to enhanced expectations of citizens
for good governance. They are now far more aware of the essentials
of efficient governance and also of their own rights. This places added
pressure on governments to deliver. It would be instructive to examine

Essay
how, if at all, the global revolution has influenced state functions in
Pakistan.
Functions which are generally recognized as the exclusive

responsibility of the state encompass territorial defence, diplomacy,
macroeconomic management, preservation of justice and internal
security, protection of the environment, provision of social and physical
infrastructure, promotion of agriculture, industry, energy, mining and
service sector including banking and finance and mobilization of
resources (taxation). Although the scope of many of these functions
remains unaltered, the manner in which these have been carried out in
the past needs to be re-visited and, in some cases, drastic changes are
warranted. Again, the needed changes are likely to vary from country to
country.
With reference to territorial defence, what is of paramount importance

is to determine whether the state is to be viewed as a national security
state or as a welfare state. In Pakistan, historically - and for good reasons
- national security concerns have taken precedence over social welfare
concerns. The longstanding confrontation with India and the enduring
suspicion about the latter’s aggressive designs, compelled Pakistan
to adopt this course of action. It is now time to evaluate this policy
dispassionately and objectively. If one were to recognize India’s emerging
stature as a regional economic power, it becomes evident that there has
been a paradigm shift in its national priorities. Territorial aggrandizement
through military aggression no longer features among New Delhi’s
priorities because, among other reasons, this could seriously jeopardize
its pivotal position as a part of the global supply chain. Furthermore,
the inescapable reality is that capturing a part or the whole of Pakistan
would only add to India’s difficulties rather than bring it any benefit. It
follows, therefore, that New Delhi cannot possibly, at this point in time,
have aggressive designs against Pakistan. Pakistan, at best, represents
a mere irritant to India and the latter seems to have come to terms with
this, Kargil notwithstanding. At another level, the Kargil adventure has
adequately demonstrated that India has the will and the capacity to ward
off any irritants of this nature. Under these circumstances, Pakistan’s
quest for amassing military hardware or expansion in the size of the

Essay
armed forces requires to be scaled down as the foremost national priority.
In recent years, there is an increasing realization that the main threat to
the country’s national security is from within rather than from external
forces. The rising intolerance and consequential internal strife suggest
a society at war with itself. The obvious and immediate requirement is
the strengthening of institutions and mechanisms which could help in
reversing this trend thereby restoring the writ of the state. While any lasting
solution cannot be divorced from ensuring a democratic, representative
government, in the short run, the internal security infrastructure needs
to be strengthened. This would require a considerably higher resource
allocation for preservation of justice and internal security. Currently, the
relative share in budgetary allocations is glaringly inadequate with less
than 3 percent allocation for “Public Order Safety Affairs.” 2
In the area of foreign policy, interstate relations are no longer

conducted in the manner they were in the past. The era of diplomatic
missions being able to effectively pursue state objectives is perhaps over.
In the prevalent unipolar international order, the relative importance and
clout of states is measured largely by their economic strength. It follows
therefore that the core ingredient of contemporary diplomacy must
be economic and not political. This, in turn, renders largely irrelevant
the creation and maintenance of flag-hoisting diplomatic missions in
countries which neither offer significant trade prospects nor any other
economic gains in terms of investment and technology. This necessitates
the strengthening of Pakistan’s diplomatic presence in certain countries
and scaling down its representation in others. Furthermore, this needs to
be rationalized objectively. Currently, there is an absence of any cogent
attempt to correlate the size and strength of a country’s diplomatic
mission in another country with the volume of its trade and economic
relationship with that country. It is significant and instructive that the
South East Asian countries which have had phenomenal success both in
attracting foreign investment and increasing exports have not achieved
this through the presence of strong diplomatic missions or large trade
and economic offices.
A claim persistently propounded in Pakistan is that the visits abroad

by heads of state and senior dignitaries promote the national interest.

Essay
This script was reiterated threadbare during the tenure of the last as well
as the current government in order to justify the record number of foreign
trips by the President and the Prime Minister. It would, for instance,
be very difficult to determine the likely tangible benefits accruing to
Pakistan from visits to countries such as Argentina or Bosnia or Poland
and several others. Although the several visits to China demonstrate
the significance of this bilateral equation, there is not much to show
in terms of any tangible results. Given the huge size of the Chinese
economy and its consistently high growth, the opportunities for bilateral
trade and Chinese investment in Pakistan remain largely untapped. The
annual pilgrimage to Davos is another ‘Pakistan Special.’ No other
country considers it worthwhile for its President or Prime Minister to
participate in the Davos meetings with such regularity. And to what
end? The unconvincing reason advanced is that Davos provides an
opportunity to introduce Pakistan to foreign investors and to brief them
about the ‘land of opportunity.’ Contrast these joy-rides to the very few,
short and purposeful visits of leaders of other countries. On his first
visit to India in 2005, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao insisted on
visiting Bangalore before getting to Delhi.3 This gesture reflected the
high priority that China attaches to collaboration with India in the field
of I.T. Given China’s edge in hardware and India’s strength in software
development, the collaboration has promising prospects. Pakistan’s
leadership, on the other hand, remains fascinated merely by the heady
protocol arrangements and shopping opportunities!
In the area of macroeconomic management, the required changes are

of particular significance. In essence, the scope of activity by government
needs to be redefined with the objective that the government’s role is
restricted to acting as a facilitator of economic activity rather than a
direct participant. It is in this context that the privatization programme
undertaken by past governments in recent years is the right agenda. At the
same time, this exposes the government to the new challenges of effective
regulation of private sector activity. This requires a qualitative change in
the quality of human resource and in the structure of bureaucracy. While
the government has succeeded in creating new regulatory structures
like SECP, OGRA and NEPRA, Pakistan still has miles to go in order

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to change the mindset and attitudes of public functionaries to come to
terms with this changing role of the state.
The need for improving the efficiency of government is critical

but not attainable through any ready, easily identifiable means. This
obviously requires a comprehensive set of measures and reforms in the
administrative structure. However, the focus of these measures must be
substantially different from the attempts made so far primarily through
a large number of commissions and committees established by the
government. In all these earlier exercises, the main preoccupation was
the removal of inequities in different service groups. This issue is not
critical for efficiency improvement. What is of far greater importance is
the need to identify weaknesses in the decision-making process and in
systems and procedures. It is equally important to concentrate on skill and
management improvement - through improved training - and to create
an environment in which such improvements are duly recognized and
appropriately rewarded. The desired output from these measures could
take considerable time to materialize. What are the solutions available
to the government in the interim period? A possible alternative is to
identify certain core positions in some of the key agencies concerned
with macroeconomic policy formulation and implementation and to
appoint suitably qualified individuals from outside the mainstream
bureaucracy.
In recent years, the government has tried to fill the skill gap by
hiring individual consultants in various ministries and departments. The
benefits of this experiment in terms of enhanced efficiency remain to be
seen. However, according to press reports, the consultants are appointed
arbitrarily and in many cases without any specific terms of reference. It
would, therefore, be difficult for the government to monitor and evaluate
the output generated by such consultants.
With greater focus on the role of the state as facilitator, there is also
need to strengthen the capacity for effective policy management. In the
area of policy management, the government remains responsible for:

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i. creation of a predictable investment environment;
ii. determination of a long-term industrial strategy;
iii. creation of a competitive industrial environment; and
iv. creation of a mechanism whereby the regulatory framework
is subjected to continuous monitoring.
The requirement of creating a predictable environment is a

prerequisite for stimulating investment but no serious effort seems to
have been made so far in this direction. Frequent changes in policy, tariff
structure, tax laws etc., continue as before. As a consequence, potential
investors are constrained to take long-term investment decisions in the
uncertain environment of merely speculating on the direction and nature
of future changes. What is of fundamental importance to both domestic
and foreign investors is the political stability of government. This, in
turn, can only be guaranteed if the manner in which one government is
replaced by another is predictable and based on a transparent electoral
process. Although the current government owes its legitimacy to a
reasonably fair general election, it has yet to demonstrate its ability to
create a stable political environment.
Recognizing the freer movement of capital as a result of globalization,

the government is making efforts at attracting foreign direct investment.
While frequent claims are being made about the success of this effort,
a large part of inflow relates to acquisition of assets of privatized units.
This could at best be of limited benefit to the national economy, as it does
not add to the stock of productive assets. There has also been a growing
interest from overseas investors in real estate projects in Pakistan. While
this could provide some benefit in terms of employment opportunities
and increased demand for construction material, investment of this
nature does not involve any transfer of technology. At the same time,
the negative fallout of foreign investment in privatized assets or in real
estate projects, is the enhanced liability of the state in terms of servicing
obligations against repatriable profit from such investment without
enhancing the foreign exchange earning capacity of the country. This
dilemma is already evident with outflows of annual profit repatriation
since the year 2000 already having gone up from a nominal amount of
US$96 million to over US$900 million by 2009 - an increase of almost

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ten times. Other countries (like China, India, Vietnam and Thailand) that
are drawing significant benefits from inflow of global capital are quite
sensitive to the nature of foreign investment coming in. A substantial
part of FDI relates to manufacturing facilities (e.g., China) or in the
utilization of indigenous skill-based and knowledge-based manpower
(e.g., India). This strategy has a strong positive impact on the local
economy in addition to stimulating the foreign exchange earnings of
such countries. This underscores the need for evolving a long-term
investment policy.
While a well-staffed high profile Board of Investment (BOI) has

been established, the main purpose appears to be to act as a marketing
platform for attracting foreign investment. The focus hitherto has been
on a series of conferences held within Pakistan and abroad. However,
contrary to claims made by BOI from time to time, there is hardly any
tangible evidence of BOI’s contribution in increasing FDI. The website
of BOI contains a plethora of facts but hardly anything of significance
which could induce investor interest. The information is outdated -
with a lot of actual data not updated beyond 2005. There is a list of
28 companies/firms that were supposed to be attractive potential joint-
venture partners for foreign investors. Several of these names represent
retail shops; and some are foreign trading companies. Obviously, hardly
anyone of the listed names has joint-venture credentials. In short, the
information contained in the website is hardly likely to inspire any
interest among potential foreign investors.
While the government has relinquished its right to decide on

industrial sanctioning, no alternative mechanism has been developed.
Consequently, questions like the location of industry, its capacity and
evaluation of sponsors’ capability have come within the exclusive
purview of the financing agencies. This implies that investment decisions
would be based entirely on financial considerations rather than on both
financial and economic evaluation. In other words, in case project
viability merely flows from tariff distortions rather than any productive
benefit to the economy, it could be justified on financial considerations.
Similarly, factors like negative externalities (e.g., environmental
degradation) could be disregarded. More fundamentally, given the current

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and continuing distortions in the market, the dilemma of additional
projects leading to duplication of facilities or sanctioning projects with
low or negative value addition would remain unresolved. It is obvious,
therefore, that these issues should continue to form a part of the public
policy framework. It is imperative that the government develops a long-
term industrial strategy and establishes systems and procedures for
ensuring that the private sector conforms to that strategy. This does not
mean a reversion to the regulated culture and policy instruments of the
past. It merely underscores the need to direct regulations to critical areas
as is being done successfully in several countries today, particularly in
Japan and Korea. In this context, particular mention may be made of
the formulation of industrial strategy and its implementation by MITI
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan) and MTI (Ministry
of Trade and Industry in Korea). In Korea, despite a dominant private
sector, the formulation and implementation of the industrial strategy has
been the exclusive prerogative of the state. This includes both the macro
policy framework as well as guidelines applicable to particular sectors
or sub-sectors. To quote one example, it has been the helping hand of
the state which has transformed the industrial sector through a phased
plan: from the initial labour intensive industries to capital intensive to
skill intensive and now to knowledge intensive.
The Planning Commission in Pakistan, the apex body responsible

for long-term planning, has been in limbo for the last many years. The
government has recently decided to re-activate the organization and
recognize its importance in providing policy input. The Commission
has been tasked to act as a “think tank” and to help in formulating a
long-term vision for the country. Pakistan currently faces daunting
challenges both on the economic and social front. It is critical at this stage
that a long-term policy as well as strategy is formulated to face these
challenges. According to a recent British Council report on Pakistan
titled Next Generation, Pakistan’s population in the next twenty years is
likely to grow to as high as 265 million. According to the same report,
this would require the creation of as many as 36 million new jobs in the
next ten years to absorb the rapidly rising work force. There are other
many dire consequences of such a scenario - the shortage of housing,
the shortage of clean drinking water and the shortage of education and

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health facilities for this growing population. At this juncture, therefore,
the role of the Panning Commission should be to analyze the changing
demographic and social structure of Pakistan and to estimate the kind
of resources that are required to be mobilized over the years in ensuring
the country’s survival. It is equally important to caution the government
whether or not such resources are likely to be generated. Without such
an exercise, it would be difficult to expect any drastic reduction in
Pakistan’s expenditure priorities or indeed the fundamental changes
required in its national security outlook as well as in its foreign policy.
The provision of social and physical infrastructure would continue to

remain an important function of the government. However, the adequacy
of resource allocation as well as efficient delivery of services continues
to be a major constraint. While increased resource allocation would be
a function of reviewing national expenditure priorities, improvement in
service delivery is a more formidable challenge.
There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that in Pakistan - as

perhaps in most other developing countries - efficiency levels in activities
like health, education and all those providing merit goods are far lower
than public enterprises generating marketable output. To quote Arturo
Israel:
“Many units in the ‘hard’ sectors and subsectors, such as industry,
telecommunication, electric power, have been able to maintain in
the public sector a minimum level of operational effectiveness,
even under extremely unfavourable general economic conditions.
This has been so largely because the hard technologies impose an
operational discipline that ‘soft’ activities such as education, the
provision of many services in agriculture and health, most of the
activities in rural areas, especially at lower levels of development,
and most of the activities of the central government do not have.
What the ‘hard’ activities have is specificity, the possibility of
defining objectives and outcomes, and of tracing those outcomes
in the short run.” 4
Given the limited capacity of the government in efficient delivery of

social services, it may be worthwhile to consider identifying some of the

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well-managed NGOs to act as vehicles for delivery of social services.
The funding support that government may provide to such NGOs might
well represent a more efficient utilization of resources.
The proposed re-structuring of the role of government and changes in

some of the specific functional responsibilities would obviously require
considerable additional resources. A part of the requirement could be
generated from re-ordering of national expenditure priorities. However,
resources so released may still not be adequate to meet the higher needs
and, consequently, reliance has to be placed on mobilization of additional
taxes. Considering that the tax/GDP ratio in Pakistan is among the lowest,
there is clearly a need for raising additional revenue through taxation.
While there has been much talk in recent years of re-structuring the
Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and creation of a taxpayer friendly
environment, there has been a limited success in expanding the tax base.
It appears that the main obstacle in the way of this objective is the lack
of will on the part of policy-makers. Two recent changes in taxation
structure support this hypothesis. In 2005, wealth tax was abolished; and
more recently, in 2006, tax on rental property was slashed to 5 percent of
gross rental value as against the average incidence of about 25 percent
that this head of income attracted previously. Capital gains tax on shares
remains exempt and the exemption has been further extended beyond
2009. It is indeed ironic that the two sectors which, during the ‘economic
boom’ years of the Musharraf era, generated unprecedented wealth (real
estate and the stock market), remain entirely outside the tax net. What is
even more serious is that these “concessions” clearly demonstrate that
policy-making remains hostage in the hands of the elite and consequently
there is limited concern to ensure equity while considering alternative
proposals for increasing the tax revenue. Without fundamental structural
changes in tax policy, the tax/GDP ratio will continue to stagnate at
below 10 percent which is the lowest in the region.
The aforesaid observations suggest that Pakistan has yet to come

to terms with the imperatives of globalization. As a result, increased
opportunities of attracting investment flows, expanding the export base,
participating in businesses and activities progressively being transferred
from the ‘west’ to the ‘east’ appear to be largely beyond the country’s

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grasp. Pakistan today is at the crossroads: if it does not put its house in
order, and soon, it is doomed to fall by the wayside while other countries
steal the march in the intensifying race for global competitiveness. To
quote Friedman5 yet again, the conventional classification of countries
as developed, developing or under-developed is no longer relevant.
Instead, countries should now be appropriately classified as smart,
smarter or the smartest. Pakistan has to try acting smart today in the
hope that it can soon progress to the smarter category. There is truth in
the old African proverb:6
“Every morning in Africa, a gazelle wakes up. It knows it must run

faster than the fastest lion or it will be killed. Every morning a lion
wakes up. It knows it must outrun the fastest gazelle or it will starve to
death. It does not matter whether you are a lion or a gazelle. When the
sun comes up, you better start running.”
Yes, Pakistan has to start running. It cannot continue to bask in the

sun till its limbs get atrophied.
References:
1 Thomas L. Freidman; The World is Flat; Penguin Books; 2006.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Arturo Israel; The Changing Role of the State, (World Bank Working Paper Series,
August, 1990).
5 Freidman.
6 Quoted from Freidman.

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WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO
DE-HYPHENATE PAKISTAN FROM
´´AFPAK´´?
Imtiaz Gul*
When President Barack Obama unveiled his “AfPak Strategy”

on 27 March 2009, most people in Pakistan reacted with outrage and
rejection. The “Af-Pak” construct meant, for the first time in its sixty-
two year existence, their country had been downgraded and bracketed
with the war-ravaged, violence-torn and dysfunctional Afghanistan. The
Pakistan government did little to protest or reject the Af-Pak ‘construct’
because it still seems to be in a defensive posture, fighting the
consequences of the pro-militancy policies it pursued from the late
1980s to 2001, when the US-led alliance steam-rolled the Taliban regime
and replaced it with a new political order in Afghanistan.
The Afghans have their own history, culture and way of life, “all
complicated by decades of war, internal massacres, displacement, abject
poverty, and incessant meddling by foreign governments near and far -
of which the United States has been the most powerful and persistent.
Afghans do not think or act like Americans. Yet, Americans in power
refuse to grasp that inconvenient point.”1
Pakistan, on the other hand, boasts an entire different ideological

and historical context as well as a much more versatile ethno-linguistic
social mix.
* Imtiaz Gul, the author of The Al Qaeda Connection – Taliban and Terror in Tribal
Areas (Penguin), heads the Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad. Email:
imtiaz@crss.pk

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An evaluation, based on only facts, of what distinguishes Pakistan
from Afghanistan is warranted:
Historical Overview of Afghanistan:

From monarchy to warlordism and eras of peace, this is a brief
overview of Afghanistan’s history.
Afghanistan was a monarchy from 1747 to 1973, and in 1973, Sardar

Mohammed Daoud, brother-in-law of King Zahir Shah, seized power
in a military coup. Daoud was murdered in 1978 in a coup staged by
the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA], with
PDPA General Secretary Nur Muhammad Taraki taking over as prime
minister. In 1979, a palace shootout brought former Defence Minister
Hafizullah Amin into power. On 26 December 1979, Hafizullah Amin
was murdered by Soviet troops who had already been on the ground
there. The exiled Babrak Karmal was installed as the country’s leader.
The Soviet occupation resulted in a huge exodus, with some five million
Afghans leaving the country; most of them settled in Pakistan.2
On 3 July 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed a directive

authorizing covert CIA operations against the Soviet-installed regime
in Afghanistan. In 1986, the Soviets replaced Karmal with Muhammad
Najibullah, the former chief of the Afghan secret police. The Soviet
Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in February 1989 and the
vacuum thus created resulted in fierce clashes among the Mujahideen
factions as a result of which warlord zones emerged throughout the
country. In the mid-1990s, Afghanistan was dominated by in-fighting
between rival militia groups prompting the emergence and rise of the
Taliban who were able to capture Kabul by 27 September 1996 and
establish their writ in approximately 90 percent of the country by 1998.
About three months after the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban refusal to
hand over Osama bin Laden spurred the US-led invasion of Afghanistan
resulting in the collapse of the Taliban regime by December 2001. Mulla
Omar, chief of the Taliban, however, remained at large and Pashtun
royalist Hamid Karzai was sworn in as head of an interim power-sharing

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government. Hamid Karzai won the elections held in October 2004, and
secured a second term in the fraud-tainted election of October 2009.
The US-led forces, however, continue fighting the war on terror in
Afghanistan.
Social Indicators:
According to ‘the Fund for Peace,’ a Washington-based organization
working for sustainable security, all of Afghanistan’s social indicators
either worsened or stayed the same in the FSI [Failed State Indicators]
2009. The overall social situation in Afghanistan, described by the
organization, is summarized in the following bullet points.
• The demographic pressures indicator increased from 9.1 in the

FSI 2008 to 9.3 in the FSI 2009, with a high annual population
growth rate of about 2.69 percent resulting in a large youth bulge
(44.6 percent of the population under the age of 15), and a high
infant mortality rate of 152 deaths per 1,000 live births.
• Afghanistan has about 400,000 orphans. An estimated seven
million people remain susceptible to hunger throughout the
country.
• The indicator for refugees and displaced persons remained high
at 8.9 in the FSI 2009.
• About 132,000 people are internally displaced as a result of
drought, violence and instability.
• Afghanistan’s group grievance indicator worsened from 9.5 in
the FSI 2008 to 9.6 in the FSI 2009.
• The human flight indicator worsened from 7.0 in the FSI 2008 to
7.2 in the FSI 2009.
• In 2008, there were 21 migrants for every 1,000 Afghans, one of
the highest outward migration rates in the world.
• Afghanistan’s public services indicator also worsened significantly
from 8.3 in the FSI 2008 to 8.9 in the FSI 2009.
• An estimated 57 percent of men and 87 percent of women are still
considered illiterate, reducing Afghanistan’s ability to develop
economically.
• An estimated one-quarter of the population has no access to

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health care and there is only about one medical facility for every
27,000 Afghans. The long-standing conflict has also devastated
Afghanistan’s infrastructure and transportation systems.
Source: The FfP www.fundforpeace.org
Economic Indicators:
Afghanistan’s uneven development indicator worsened from 8.1 in
the FSI 2008 to 8.4 in the FSI 2009, according to the Fund for Peace.
Other economic indicators are as follows:
• 18 million Afghans still live on less than $2 a day and five million
Afghans live below the poverty line.
• Afghanistan’s illicit drug industry, which comprises 60 percent or
more of the economy, is not included in Afghanistan’s economic
growth.
• In 2008, the Taliban’s income from opium trafficking alone was
estimated at $100 million.
• Afghanistan’s economic indicator improved slightly from 8.5 in
• Afghanistan’s GDP growth exceeded 7 percent in 2008. However,
the country still has an unemployment rate of 40 percent, $8.5
billion of external debt, and a GDP per capita of $800, making it
one of the world’s poorest countries.
Political/military Indicators:
All of Afghanistan’s political and military indicators worsened in the
FSI 2009, according to the Fund for Peace. The organization claims:
• The indicator for the legitimacy of the state worsened from

9.2 in the FSI 2008 to 9.8 in the FSI 2009 as a result of the
government’s inability to combat corruption, militant violence,
and drug trafficking.
• Afghanistan’s security situation deteriorated, with 2008
considered to be the bloodiest year since the end of the NATO
operation in 2001.

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• In November 2008, the Taliban rejected a peace offer by President
Karzai, stating that negotiations cannot be held till all foreign
troops have left Afghanistan.
• Many individuals within the government are still corrupt and
operate with impunity. Karzai’s efforts to combat corruption
have not yielded results, and Afghanistan is considered to be one
of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 176th out of
180 in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perception
Index.
• The human rights indicator worsened from 8.4 in the FSI 2008 to
8.8 in the FSI 2009.
• Afghanistan’s National Security Directorate has been accused
of operating its own prisons and torturing its detainees, and the
local militias are reported to have done the same.
• Warlords in the north have used property destruction, rape, and
murder to prevent displaced Pashtuns from reclaiming their
homes.
• The indicator for the security apparatus worsened from 9.6 in the
FSI 2008 to 9.9 in the FSI 2009.
• Afghanistan’s factionalized elites indicator also worsened from
8.8 in the FSI 2008 to 9.1 in the FSI 2009 as a result of the
extreme ethnic and political polarization within the government
and among the warring factions.
• Afghanistan’s score for external influence remained at the high
of 10.0 in FSI 2009.
• In June 2008, the number of British troops in the country increased
to 8,000 and the United States deployed an additional 4,500
troops. Other NATO allies also increased their troop strength
throughout 2008.
• Afghanistan’s war-torn economy is still largely dependent on
foreign aid. Reconstruction aid from USAID alone in the past
eight years has amounted to $32 billion.
Core Five State Institutions

The Fund for Peace has depicted the overall situation in Afghanistan
in the following graph.

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Leadership Military Police Judiciary Civil Service
Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor

Afghanistan’s legacy of the last 30 years

An entire generation of Afghans has grown up knowing nothing
but invasion, war, bombing, repression and insurgency. Those years of
war have left a terrible legacy in Afghanistan. It has always been a poor
country; today it faces huge challenges. According to UNICEF:
• Afghanistan has the second highest infant mortality rate in the

world.
• One in seven children is an orphan.
• One in eight women dies in childbirth.
• Only 28 percent of adults are literate. Women’s literacy rate is
less than a third of that of men.
• Average annual income is $US250.
• Life expectancy is 44 years.
• 30 percent of children aged 5 to 14 years are forced to work.
• More than 70,000 Afghans have been killed or maimed by
landmines since de-mining began in 1989.”3
Historical Overview of Pakistan:

Pakistan has a completely different historical perspective from that of
Afghanistan. For a comparative study of the history of the two countries,
the following excerpt from the Fund for Peace report is relevant:
“Pakistan declared its independence on August 14, 1947, ending

nearly 100 years of direct British rule as well as economic control
dating back to 1757. The country was declared a republic in 1956 with
Iskandar Mirza as president. Two years later President Mirza declared
martial law amidst widespread civil unrest. Commander-in-Chief Ayub
Khan used his powers as the administrator of martial law to depose
Mirza in a coup d etat on October 27, 1958 abrogating the constitution.

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Khan assumed the title of President and kept the country under martial
law until 1962, when a new constitution was introduced. Ayub Khan
illegally turned power over to General Yayha Khan following his
resignation in 1969 also abrogating his own made constitution. In 1970,
present-day Bangladesh, then the province of East Pakistan, demanded
independence from Pakistan. Bangladesh’s newly-formed government-
in-exile formally declared independence in March 1971, and successfully
defeated occupying Pakistani forces in December 1971 with the help of
the Indian military. General Yahya Khan resigned from office four days
after losing East Pakistan, leaving Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the
Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP), in control of the government. In 1973,
Bhutto’s government drafted a new constitution, which declared Islam
the state religion and installed Bhutto as the new prime minister.
Bhutto’s nationalization efforts made him increasingly unpopular as

his term progressed; in January 1977 several opposition parties formed
the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in an effort to defeat Bhutto’s
PPP in the 1977 elections. The elections, held in March 1977, were
considered by both Pakistanis and outside observers to have been rigged,
as evidenced by an overwhelming PPP victory. This led to massive
demonstrations in several cities. Seeing that he would be forced to
compromise with PNA leaders, Bhutto agreed to enter into negotiations.
However, before the two parties could reach a compromise, General
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the Chief of Army Staff, seized control of the
government in a military coup on July 5, 1977. After 10 years of virtual
dictatorship, Zia promised to hold new elections in 1988; however,
he was killed in a suspicious plane crash on August 17, 1988, before
elections could be held. Following Zia’s death, elections took place
in November 1988 and Pakistan returned to civilian rule for 11 years,
seven of which were under the administration of Benazir Bhutto, the
leader of the PPP. Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998 during
the Prime Ministership of Nawaz Sharif.
In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf seized power from Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif in a military coup, the fourth since 1956. Though
Musharraf retained vast executive powers as president, he allowed his
prime ministers to control certain policy areas. In an attempt legitimize

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his rule, Musharraf called for indirect presidential elections in 2007,
which he won overwhelmingly amid boycotts by many opposition
parties. In August 2008, the opposition began efforts to impeach
Musharraf, based on his mismanagement and increasingly autocratic
reign, during which time he fired a popular Supreme Court Chief Justice.
Diplomatic and internal pressure forced Musharraf to resign on August
18, 2008 rather than face an impeachment trial. On September 6, 2008,
Asif Ali Zardari, husband of Benazir Bhutto, the PPP leader who was
assassinated during an electoral campaign, was elected president by the
Pakistani Parliament.”4
Economic Indicators 1999-2009

Here is the complete story of Pakistan’s gradual economic growth
depicted in figures from 1999 to 2009. Economic Pakistan, a source for
Pakistan economy updates, has prepared this comparison.
Pak Economy in 1999: $ 75 billion GDP per Capita Income in 1999: $ 450
Pak Economy in 2007: $ 160 billion GDP per Capita Income in 2007: $ 926
Pak Economy in 2008: $ 170 billion GDP per Capita Income in 2008:
$1085
Pak revenue collection 1999: Rs. 305 Pak Foreign reserves in 1999: $
billion 1.96 billion
Pak revenue collection 2007: Rs. 708 Pak Foreign reserves in 2007: $ 16.4
billion billion
Pak revenue collection 2008: Rs. 990 Pak Foreign reserves in 2008: $ 8.89
billion billion
Pak Exports in 1999: $ 8 billion Debt servicing 1999: 65% of GDP
Pak Exports in 2007: $ 18.5 billion Debt servicing 2007: 28% of GDP
Pak Exports in 2008: $ 19.22 billion Debt servicing 2008: 27% of GDP
Poverty level in 1999: 34% Literacy rate in 1999: 45%
Poverty level in 2007: 24% Literacy rate in 2007: 53%
Pak Development programs 1999: Rs. 80
billion
Pak Development programs 2007: Rs. 520
billion
Pak Development programs 2008: Rs.
549.7 billion
Source: Economic Pakistan
http://economicpakistan.wordpress.com/

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Latest Economic Situation:
Pakistan’s economy has been gradually picking up on sound footing,
as reflected in the aforementioned economic indicators. The economy
has marked significant advancement in different sectors during the
current financial year. On 16 September 2009, Pakistan’s official news
agency, APP [Associated Press of Pakistan] carried a report containing
a comparison of the recent overall economic situation with that of the
last year’s corresponding period. The main features of this comparison
are given below.
• Inflation eased to a 20-month low in August 2009, dropping to

10.69 percent after edging up 11.2 percent in July 2009.
• Trade deficit narrowed almost by 39 percent during the first two
months of financial year 2009-10 as against the same period of
the last financial year. Trade deficit during July-August (2009-
10) was recorded at $2.194 billion as against the deficit of $3.564
billion recorded during July-August (2008-09), according to
Federal Bureau of Statistics.
• Imports witnessed negative growth of 26.32 percent by falling
from $7.008 billion during July-August (2008-09) to $5.163
billion during the current financial year (2009-10).
• Exports also declined by 13.78 percent during July-August
as compared to the same month of last financial year. Under
‘Strategic Trade Policy framework 2009-12, the government has
set export growth target of 6 percent for the current fiscal year, 10
percent for the next fiscal, and 13 percent for the year 2011-12.
• Pakistani workers remitted a record amount of $780.53 million
in August, 2009 as against $592.30 million in the same month of
the last fiscal year (August 2008), showing a jump of $188.23
million or 31.78 percent, according to State Bank of Pakistan.
• During the first two months (July-August) of FY10, an amount
of $1.525 billion was sent home by overseas Pakistanis, showing
an impressive 25 percent rise when compared with $1.219 billion
received in the same period last year.
• Reduction in imports and increasing overseas remittances led to a
contraction in the current account deficit in July, which narrowed
to $606 million in July from $1.18 billion deficit recorded in the

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last year.
• The foreign exchange reserves in the week ended on September
totaled $14.24 billion which had hit a record fall $6.6 billion by
November of last year
• The revenue collections during July 2009 were also increased
2.4 percent over corresponding period of the last year as Federal
Board of Revenue (FBR) collected Rs. 74.07 billion of revenues
during the time.
• The atmosphere for doing business in Pakistan has also witnessed
positive changes as Pakistan IFC- World Bank’s Ease of Doing
Business 2010 report says that Pakistan has gained top ranking
amongst its South Asian competitors.
• Pakistan is currently ranked at 85 out of 183 countries ahead of
all the BRIC countries [fast-growing developing economies of
Brazil, Russia, India and China].”5
Political/Military Indicators:
According to the Fund for Peace, the indicator for legitimacy of
the state improved from 9.5 in the FSI 2008 to 9.1 in the FSI 2009,
due to a reduction in tensions over Musharraf’s rule. Other indicators
related to political and military issues, given by the organization, are as
follows:
• The public services indicator worsened from 7.1 in the FSI 2008
to 7.5 in the FSI 2009.
• The human rights indicator improved significantly from 9.5 in
• The security apparatus indicator improved from 9.6 in the FSI
2008 to 9.5 in the FSI 2009.
• The Pakistani military is among the best-equipped and best-
trained in the region.
• Pakistan is also a nuclear power, having conducted successful
tests in 1998.
• The Pakistan military has carried out a successful operation in
Swat, restoring the writ of the state there.
• The internally displaced persons of Malakand Division, who had
to leave their homes in the wake of the military operation, have

Essay
safely returned to their homes. In the Northwest Frontier Province,
as well as in the southwestern province of Balochistan, local
militias exercise significant control over their communities.
• The factionalized elites indicator improved from 9.8 in the FSI
2008 to 9.6 in the FSI 2009.
• The Pakistani civil service is generally well-trained and
professional. However, poor salaries and benefits make it
difficult to recruit new employees and make current civil servants
susceptible to corruption.
Core Five State Institutions

The Fund for Peace has portrayed Pakistan in the following graph.
Leadership Military Police Judiciary Civil Service
Weak Good Weak Moderate Moderate

Source: The FfP, www.fundforpeace.org
How Pakistan is different from Afghanistan:

The history of Afghanistan is replete with feuds, infighting and
wars. The country remained a monarchy from 1747 to 1973. Now for
about eight years again, Afghanistan has been in a war - US vs Taliban.
Pakistan, however, has been a parliamentary democracy. Though there
had been some military adventures in the country’s history [mentioned
in ‘Historical Overview of Pakistan’ above], but the people eventually
brought their public representatives back to the assembly. There is a
political democratic system functioning in Pakistan.
Afghanistan, a war-torn country, has no infrastructure at all in any

field. Whether it is health, education or any other sector, the country
lacks a system. There is no law and order in any part of the country. The
warlords have established their own zones where only their own rule
prevails. The writ of the US-backed government in Kabul is virtually
non-existent in most of the country as 80 percent of Afghanistan either
has a strong Taliban presence or is under their control.6 Afghanistan has
been and is a country at war, there is total chaos against a backdrop of

Essay
devastation and destruction. As evident from the facts and figures given
above, all the indicators are showing a negative trend.
The graph prepared by the Fund for Peace, a Washington-based

organization promoting sustainable security, shows that performance of
Afghanistan’s all the five key institutions - Leadership, Military, Police,
Judiciary and Civil Service - has been poor. While contrary to that, the
graph on Pakistan prepared by the same organization suggests that the
country’s performance in these five institutions has been good [Military],
moderate [Judiciary and Civil Service], and weak [Leadership and
Police]. This clearly shows a major difference between Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
Pakistan is a country being run under a democratic system. Every

national institution is working, taking the country as a whole ahead. Most
of the indicators in the fields of economy, education, health, employment,
infrastructural development etc., are showing signs of growth.
In the perspective of the ongoing conflict in Pakistan, Mosharraf

Zaidi, an eminent columnist, describes some features of the country
as: “Pakistan is a country of nearly 180 million people. We speak at
least eight major languages. We sustain 10 cities with more than one
million people. We make telecom companies rich beyond their wildest
dreams, buying up and using more than 85 million active mobile phone
subscriptions. We love to watch politics on over 25 news channels. We
reject violent extremism in poll after poll- both the IRI and Pew Global
Attitudes Survey confirm this. We reject religious political parties in
election after election - the desperate and confused religious political
establishment confirms that.”7
As for law and order, what Pakistan has to face today is the direct
consequence of the US-led Jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s
and then the US invasion of Afghanistan that began with the bombing of
Kabul on 7 October 2001 in the aftermath of 9/11 terror attacks. There
was no suicide attack, bomb blasts, Taliban phenomenon, militancy etc.,
before that event. Though Pakistan was dragged into the problem, but
even then it performed well in curbing militancy on its soil. This is the

Essay
country that has busted and handed over about three-fourth of the Al-
Qaeda leadership to the United States. The country’s army has carried
out many successful operations in FATA including Mohmand, Bajaur,
Khyber and also in Swat. The militants’ hideouts were pounded by the
military jets, totally destroying or displacing them in these areas.
The Swat operation is an example of outstanding military success in

the shortest possible time. More than three million Internally Displaced
Persons [IDPs] have now returned home in the Malakand Division
and are living peacefully there. There has been no parallel success in
Afghanistan despite the presence of about 120,000 foreign forces there
for about eight years. The situation in the two countries cannot be
equated.
On 17 October 2009, the army embarked on the Rah-e Nejat

operation against the Taliban in South Waziristan - the headquarters
of the militants in Pakistan. This has also been a resounding success
and the militants have fled the area. In desperation they have increased
the frequency of terrorist attacks in the country’s major cities. Despite
the mounting civilian casualties this has not dampened the resolve of
the people to completely eradicate terrorism and extremist violence
from their soil as is evident from their unstinted support to the military
operation.
As for the Afghan economy, agriculture is the mainstay but less than
10 percent of the land is cultivated, a large percentage of the arable land
was damaged by warfare. Formerly subsistence crops including wheat
and other grains, fruits, and nuts were grown but now the opium poppy,
mainly for the international illegal drug trade, is the most important cash
crop, and the country is the world’s largest producer of opium.
As a result of civil war, exports have dwindled to a minimum,

except for the illegal trade in opium and hashish. The country has also
become an important producer of heroin, which is derived from opium.
Afghanistan is heavily dependent on international assistance.

Essay
Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing,
clean water, electricity, medical care and jobs. Criminality, insecurity,
and the Afghan Government’s inability to extend the rule of law to all
parts of the country, pose challenges to future economic growth. It will
probably take the remainder of the decade and continuing donor aid and
attention to significantly raise Afghanistan’s living standards from its
current level, among the lowest in the world. Other long-term challenges
include: budget sustainability, job creation, corruption, government
capacity, and rebuilding the war torn infrastructure.
Pakistan, however, from the time of its independence, started with

a purely agricultural economy, but soon its industrial sector gathered
momentum and in the 1960s the country became a model of growth.
There have however been setbacks but despite this Pakistan is considered
one the growing economies of the world.
An official statement claims that Pakistan’s economy is the 26th

largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power, and the 47th
largest in absolute dollar terms. In 2005, it was the third fastest growing
economy in Asia. Pakistan’s economy mainly encompasses textiles,
chemicals, food processing, agriculture and other industries.8
The economic figures mentioned in the previous pages show that

Pakistan’s economy has been continuously growing, suggesting that
the country is moving ahead. Pakistan does not need foreign aid to pay
salaries to its security personnel. The country has a big defense budget
with a focus on modernizing and strengthening its defense capability.
Similarly, there is no comparison between Afghanistan and Pakistan

in the fields of politics and military. Afghanistan does not have any
political structure because the country has not known peace for decades.
Pakistan on the other hand, despite its problems, has functioning
political parties with their own manifestos and is emerging as a stable
democracy.
Pakistan has the world’s 6th largest army – numbering at least

600,000. While in Afghanistan, the active personnel are about 190,000,

Essay
who along with the presence of 120,000 foreign troops have not been
able to establish sustainable peace.
This paper attempts to reiterate known facts in a dispassionate

manner. The inescapable conclusion is that since Pakistan and
Afghanistan clearly stand apart as two different countries in historical,
social, economic and political perspective, the terminology ‘Af-Pak’ is
inappropriate and does not reflect the reality on the ground.
References:
1 Ann Jones, www.tundra-security.com
2 Channel 4 News, Afghanistan: a brief history, 2009,
3 Afghanistan: a Brief History, 2009, http://www.hopeforafghanchildren.org/learn-more/
afghan-intro/. Accessed on Oct 20 2009.
4 Country Profiles, Fund for Peace, 2009 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=387&Itemid=544. Accessed on Oct 22,
2009.
5 Ashraf Wani, Mohammad, Indicators show Pakistan Economy Picking up Speed,
Associated Press of Pakistan, Sep 16, 2009, http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=86073&Itemid=57. Website accessed on Oct 27
2009.
6 Pugliese, David, “Taliban has permanent presence in 80 percent of Afghanistan, say
ICOS”. Sep 10, 2009. http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/
archive/2009/09/10/taliban-has-permanent-presence-in-80-percent-of-afghanistan-says-
icos.aspx. Accessed on October 25, 2009
7 Zaidi, Musharraf, “The Truth of this conflict”, The News, November 17, 2009
8 Economy of Trade of Pakistan; http://www.embassyofpakistan.com/economy_trade.php.
Accessed on October 27, 2009

CORRIGENDUM
Ms Shahwar Junaid whose article, “Internal Security Challenges for

Pakistan,” was carried by Criterion (October-December 2009, Volume 4
Number 4) has reservations on the edited version of one of the paragraphs.
She has asked the last paragraph in page 145 which reads: “Sectarian
tension was exacerbated and found expression in bomb attacks time and
again on Shia and Sunni mosques, as well as target killings of scholars
and religious leaders of both sects. It was suggested that the Ulema of
the two sects should, without reservation, condemn any such incident
and be seen standing together for instance, at funeral prayers for the
victims of sectarian violence to pre-empt serious civil disorder. This did
not materialize” be replaced by the original formulation as under:
“Inter-sectarian tension was fanned from time to time by bomb

attacks on Shia and Sunni mosques and the target killing of scholars and
religious leaders of both sects of Islam. It was suggested that Ulema of
both sects should, without reservation, condemn any such incident and
be seen standing together thereafter at funeral prayers etc. to prevent civil
disorder. Recognizing that the only beneficiaries of sectarian tension
were vested interests and not Muslims as a whole, the Muttahida Majlis-
i-Amal came into being. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, a moderate and
learned religious scholar of the old school who knew Persian, Arabic as
well as several West European languages and was also a sophisticated
politician, became the first head of the MMA. The MMA eventually
became an effective political force. When the people were looking for
leadership alternatives to seasoned politicians who had disappointed
them they were swept into power in the NWFP and Baluchistan, giving
established power groups a shock. The MMA continues to effectively
block attempts to inflame inter-sectarian tension.”
Back Issues Available
Price per issue is Rs. 200/- (Inclusive of postage)
Payments can be made by cross cheque payable to Criterion and
sent to House 16, Street 15, F-6/3, Islamabad
Volume 1 Number 1
October-December 2006
The Contemporary Challenge to Global Peace and Security – S. Iftikhar Murshed
Bilateral Negotiations on Kashmir: Unlearnt Lesson – A.G. Noorani
Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad – Navid Zafar
Islamic Polity and the Constitutional Process in Pakistan – Walid Iqbal
Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan – Shamshad Ahmad
Pitfalls and Economic Prospects of Pakistan – Dr. A.R. Kemal
Education in Pakistan: Some Reflections – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad
Volume 2 Number 1
January-March 2007
My Vision for Pakistan – Shaukat Aziz
Problems and Prospects of Peace and Development in the SAARC Region: A Per-
spective from Bangladesh – Mohammad Mohsin
Baluchistan: Pakistan’s Existential Dilemma – Tanvir Ahmad Khan
Search for a Viable Solution to the Jammu and Kashmir Problem – Anwar Kemal
On Economics and Civil War & Terrorism – Syed Mansoob Murshed
Emerging Monopolies in the Pakistani Media – Muzaffar Abbas
Iran’s Nuclear Programme – Challenge and Response – Javid Hussain
Volume 2 Number 2
April-June 2007
Causes of the Rebellion in Waziristan – Khalid Aziz
Globalization: Its Lures and Discontents in the Muslim World – S.M. Naseem
Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan – Dr. Tariq Rahman
The Death of Zia-ul-haq – Khalid Ahmed
Pakistan and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women – Sabrina Khan
Current Afghan Ground Realities – Rustam Shah Mohmand
Role of Media in National Development in the 21st Century – Javed Jabbar
The Kashmir Dispute: A Kashmiri Viewpoint – Abdul Hameed Karimi
Volume 2 Number 3
July-September 2007
Using Trade as a Driver of Political Stability: Prospects in Indo-Pak Context –
Moeed Yusuf
Pakistan: On or Off? Examining the Future of US-Pakistan Relations in the War on
Terror and Beyond – Farhana Ali
The Parliamentary System in South Asia – A.G. Noorani
Fundamentalism, Extremism and Islam – Dr. Anis Ahmad
OIC – Retrospect a Prospects – Tayyab Sddiqui
The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection – Khaled Ahmed
Turning on the Faucets of Thought – Anjum Niaz
Volume 2 Number 4
Political Uncertainty and Extremist Violence – Editorial
The Politics of Economic Policy Reforms – Ishrat Hussain
Kashmir Dispute: Is there a Viable Solution? – Zamir Akram
The Roots of Sectarianism in Pakistan – Khaled Ahmed
Need for a Pak-Afghan Treaty on Management of Joint Water – Khalid Aziz
Defining Moments: The Political Implication of State Policy – Shahwar Junaid
Iran, the United Stated and Regional Stability – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Some Reflections on Islam and Governance – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad
Volume 3 Number 1
January-March 2008
The Broken Pledge – Editorial
Pakistan Peoples Party and the War on Terror – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Pakistan – US Relations and the War on Terror – Zamir Akram
Balti Tandoori and Chicken Tikka Masala: Culture as National Power –
Toheed Ahmad
Militancy in the Pashtun Belt; Perspective of a Peace Jirga – Khalid Aziz
Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs – Mukhtar Ahmad
Should Islam Modernize Itself? – Dr. Khalid Zaheer
Stock Market Performance in Pakistan: A Scrutiny – Inayat A. Mangla
Musharraf’s Kashmir Policy: An Appraisal – Tayyab Siddiqui
Combating Terrorism through Film – Mushfiq Murshed
Volume 3 Number2
April-June 2008
New Government, Old Problems – Editorial
Governance Reforms in Pakistan – Ishrat Hussain
A Liberal Islam in South Asia – A.G. Norani
Muslim Radicalism, Western Concerns – Tanvir Ahmad Khan
The Bomber Under the Burqa – Farhana Ali
The Law of Aerial Bombardment and Civil Casualties: Kosovo and Afghanistan –
Prof. Hayatullah Khan
Security Alliances and Security Concerns: Pakistan and NATO – Shahwar Junaid
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Legacy and the Rebuilding of Pakistan – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Of Tongues and Languages: The Tao of Translation – Toheed Ahmad
Dimensions and Consequences of NATO Expansion to Eurasia: Reviewing Iran’s
Security Environment – Arif Kemal
Volume 3 Number 3
July-September 2008
Impeachment of President – Editorial
Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday – Criterion Team
Jinnah’s Worldview/Outlook on World Affairs – A.G. Noorani
The MQM and Identity Politics in Pakistan – Niloufer Siddiqui
Transformation of Al Qaeda – Khaled Ahmed
Patterns of Regional Cooperation: Options for Pakistan – Shahwar Junaid
Nations of Saints and Scholars: a Portrait of Ireland – Toheed Ahmad
The Status of Women in Pakistan: A Ray of Hope – Talat Farooq
FATA at the Crossroads – Ayaz Wazir
Volume 3 Number 4
Suicide Terrorism at the Islamabad Marriott – Editorial
How to Develop the Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Belts – Shahid Javed Burki
Jinnah & Muslims of India – A.G. Noorani
The Haroon Report - A.G. Noorani
Notes on Pakistan’s Trade and Industry Policy – Faizullah Khilji
Some Thoughts on Democracy – Kazi Anwarul Masud
Pakistan Muslim League: a Reality Check – Talat Farooq
Pakistan: Religion, Terrorism and Democracy – K.S. Dhillon
Volume 4 Number 1
January-March 2009
The Mumbai Attack – Editorial
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – Syed Rifaat Hussain
Jinnah & the Nizam of Hyderabad-A Tragic Liaison – A.G. Noorani
A Critical View of the Political Developments in Pakistan – Kazi Anwarul Masud
War and State Expansion: A Theoretical Framework – Talat Farooq
Drugs, Counter Narcotics & State Building in Afghanistan – Nazia Hussain
Economic Governance in Pakistan – Ishrat Husain
The Muslim World in a Bind-Whither the Ummah? – Khalid Saleem
Volume 4 Number 2
April-June 2009
Terrorism and Political Turmoil– Editorial
Jihad vs. Terrorism – A.G. Noorani
The USSR’s Last Gamble – The Why and Wherefore – Khalid Saleem
Islam and Western Modernism: Is There a Way Forward? – Talat Farooq
Mumbai Attacks and the North Arabian Sea – Muhammad Azam Khan
Education: the Perennial Questions – Mahvesh Khan
Navid Zafar – S. Iftikhar Murshed
India – Emerging Global Power – Tayyab Siddiqui
Minorities and Human Rights – Raja Tridiv Roy
Volume 4 Number 3
July-September 2009
Pakistan and the Challenge of Extremism - Editorial
Supreme Court of Pakistan: The Case of Missing Persons – Dr. Tariq Hassan.
The Islamic State: A Mirage – A.G. Noorani
Islam and Apostasy – S. Iftikhar Murshed
Analysis and responses to the Global Food Crisis – Veena Jha
Pakistan’s Economic Problems: Some Non-Conventional Therapies –
Anwar Kemal
The Inequitable Tax Structure – Shamim Ahmad
The Transition to Democracy – Cyril Almeida
A Deconstruction of Some Myths about the Pakhtun - Farhat Taj
A Blueprint for Victory - Lt. Gen. (r)Javed Alam Khan
Afghanistan: The Case for a UN Peace Keeping Force – Saeed Khalid
Defeating Terror: Lessons from Recent History – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Volume 4 Number 4
Octobre-December 2009
Terrorism and the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan – Editorial
Notes on the Financial Crisis, Global – Faizullah Khilji
Imbalances, Recovery and the East Asian Response: What We Know and What We
Do Not Know The SINO-PAK Boundary Agreement – A.G. Noorani
The Afghan Turmoil From 1747 to 2001 – S. Iftikhar Murshed
Internal Security Challenges for Pakistan – Shahwar Junaid
Promoting Political Parties and an Independent Legislature in Afghanistan –
Niloufer Siddiqui
Institutional Role Behind Civil-Military Equation – Muhammad Ismail Khan
A Strategy to Fight Militancy? – Cyril Almeida
Between Dreams and Realities – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Cooperative Mechanism to Save Kashmir Environment and Water Wars –
Iftikhar Gilani
The Price of ‘Sea Blindness’ – Muhammad Azam Khan
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Criterion

Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Scourge of Terrorism Editorial 3

The Kashmir Question: Penultimate Phase A.G. Noorani 7

Crisis of State & Government in Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad 31

Bangladesh Economy and Global Crisis Kazi Anwarul Masud 64

Desert Carrots: Baghdad’s House of Wisdom Toheed Ahmad 90

The Hudood Ordinances of Pakistan and S. Iftikhar Murshed 108

Liaquat Ali Khan - An Unheralded Sultan M Hali 132

1971-Lessons Et Cetera Iqbal Ahmad Khan 170

Globalization Challenges and Javed Masud 198

Why is it Necessary to De-Hyphenate Imtiaz Gul 210

PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND THE

Decision makers and intellectuals in Pakistan resent the term “Af-

When Socrates professed ignorance at the Delphic oracle a

The findings of the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies vary from

CRITERION – January/March 2010 3

The UN report on Afghanistan claimed that approximately 70

Similarly in Pakistan, whatever little sympathy there may have been

4 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.1

The religious parties in Pakistan along with political organizations

Sectarian terrorism is a product of fierce competition between Iran

CRITERION – January/March 2010 5

In Saudi Arabia the armed struggle of the Wahabis was directed

Even if Afghanistan is eventually stabilized and normalcy is restored

6 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.1

This is a “non-territorial” solution which skirts the deal-breaker of sov-

India has been negotiating with Pakistan on the substance of the

8 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.1

Leaders of the NC no longer look askance at such parleys but sup-

The NC could drum up a coalition with the Congress in 2009 on

The Report of a Joint American-Russian Study entitled “Afghani-

CRITERION – January/March 2010 9

On 2 February 2007, President Musharraf said “Our relations with

A misimpression still lurks about Vajpayee as a “moderate.” That

It is important to dilate on this episode because much of the dis-

10 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.1

Already in 2001-2002 Pervez Musharraf had been urging both sides

Musharraf declared, on 25 December 2003, that in the quest for

CRITERION – January/March 2010 11

(6) 8 January 2006, to an Indian TV channel: (a) “Something be-

(8) 23 June 2006, to CNBC: “I am proposing demilitarization as a

(9) 1 August 2006, interview to this writer for Frontline in which he

Now compare this with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s formu-

12 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.1

The concurrence on some important points was almost textual. The

CRITERION – January/March 2010 13

Compare this with the President’s remarks to Geo TV on 23 October

Abrogation of the LoC or its rescission denotes an actual fact. Ir-

In plain words, if the LoC is rendered “irrelevant,” it will become

My interview with President Musharraf was intended to elicit clari-

14 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.1

The President made these significant points: 1. “Demilitarisation

The heart of the problem is to devise an “institutional arrangement”

The “four elements” he formulated on page 303 of his book In the

CRITERION – January/March 2010 15

3. Third, introduce self-government or self-rule in the identified

4. Fourth, and most important, have a joint management mecha-