BAUTISTA V. BORROMEO INC.
* that theyhave good and substantial
- The Ford truck of Petitioner Roberto
Tan ting driven by Bautista(other
petitioner) were involved in a traffic
accident along Epifanio de los Santos.
- The Helper of Borromeo's delivery
panel truck sustained injuriies which
resulted in his instant death
- Borromeo had to pay Delgaod's widow
the sum of PHP 4,444 compensation and
funeral expenses (under Workmen's
Compensation Act)
- Borromeo file in the MTC in
Madanlayung Rizal to recover from the
petitioners the compensation and funeral
expenses because he believed that the
vehicular acident was caused by
petitioners negligence
- During the hearing the petitioner did
not appear and the MTC rendered in
judgement in favor of Borromeo
- Petitioners moved to set aside the
decision but was denied
- Petitioners then file a petition for relief
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
* claiming excusable negligence for the
failure of petitioners counsel to appear
in the MTC
defense in that "there ws no contractual
relationship between the parties,
whether express or implied"
WHETHER OR NOT the respondents
have an obligation to pay their
employee’s widow death benefits.
The obligation of Borromeo to pay the
widow of its employee compensation
and funeral expenses arose from law –
Sec. 23 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. The same law also provides that it
shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation
from his employer or sue another person
for damages; “and in case compensation
is claimed and allowed in accordance
with this Act, the employer who paid
such compensation or was found liable
to pay the same, shall succeed the
injured employee to the right of
recovering from such person what
he paid”.
There is no need to establish any
contractual relationship between
Delgado and the petitioners because in
this case there is none. The cause of
action of the respondent corporation is
one which does not spring from a
creditor-debtor relationship. It arises
by virtue of its subrogation to the
right of Quintin Delgado to sue the
guilty party. Such subrogation is
sanctioned by the Workmen's
Compensation Law aforesaid.
PELAYO V. LAURON
-Arturo Pelayo, a physician filed a
complaint against Marelo Lauron and
Juana Abellana.
-On the night of the October 13, 1906,
Dr. Pelayo was called to render medical
assistance to the defendants daughter in
law who was about to give birth.
- It was deemed that the operation was
difficult for child birth, but regardless Dr.
Pelayo proceeded with the job of
operating on th subjeect and also
removed the afterbirth.
-Unfortunately, the daughter-in-law died
as a consequence of said childbirth. Thus,
the defendant refuses to pay. The
defendants argue that their
daughter-in-law lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house
without any relation, that her stay there
was accidental and due to fortuitous
event.
The just andequitable value of services
rendered by him was P500.00 which
thedefendants refused to pay without
alleging any good reason. With this,
theplaintiff prayed that the judgment be
entered in his favor as against
thedefendants for the sum of P500.00
and costs. RTC absolved the
defendant.CA affirmed the RTC ruling
ISSUE: Whether or not the
defendants should be held liable for
the fees demanded by the plaintiff
upon rendering medical assistance
to the defendants’ daughter-in-law.
No. The Court held that the rendering of
medical assistance is one of the
obligations to which spouses are bound
by mutual support, expressly determined
by law and readily demanded. Therefore,
there was no obligation on the part of
the in-laws but rather on the part of the
husband who is not a party.
Thus, decision affirmed.
HELD:
No. According to Article
1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157),
obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit
acts and omissions or by those which
any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not
presumed. Those expressly determined
in the Code or in special law, etc., are the
only demandable ones.
The rendering of medical assistance
in case of illness is comprised among
the mutual obligations to which the
spouses are bound by way of
mutual support as provided by the
law or the Code. Consequently, the
obligation to pay the plaintiff for the
medical assistance rendered to the
defendant’s daughter-in-law must
be couched on the husband.
In the case at bar, the obligation of
the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at
such critical moments is especially
established by the law and the
compliance therewith is unavoidable.
MARTINEZ VS. MARTINEZ
PEREZ V POMAR

August 27, 1902, Don Vicente Perez filed

a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, asking for the rate
of compensation for the services he
rendered being an English interpreter
between the defendant and the military
authorities at Tabacalera Company.
Ruled in his favor for such sum. The
complaint also asked that the defendant
be condemned to the payment of
damages in the sum of $3,200, gold,
together with the costs of suit. Petitioner
also asked that Eugenio Pomar be
condemned to pay damages.

According to the complaint it was alleged

that Eugenio Pomar, as general agent of
the Compañia General de Tabacos,
verbally requested the plaintiff last
December, 8, 1901, to act as interpreter
until May 31, 1902.
Perez services were ready whenever
needed. Because of that he abandoned
his own soap company business, Pomar
assured him that Tabacalera Company
always generously repaid services. The
defendant even gave him flattering
promises of employment with the
company, but Perez refused. his only
proof as to the same was Mr. Pomar’s
word as a gentleman.
To answer the complaint, Pomar denied
everything. Instead, he said that Perez
borrowed money from him for his
business, and that he delivered 36
arrobas of oil worth $106, and three
packages of resin for use in coloring his
soap. Respondent only accompanied him
in his trips because he wanted to extend
his business relations, and Pomar
occasionally accompanied him because
of friendship, and especially because of
the free transportation given him.
Because of that Perez acted as
interpreter in the conferences by his own
free will, without Pomar requesting him,
so no legal relation between him and the
company existed.
whether Perez was at the disposal of
Pomar for 6 months. No contract was
filed or any other innominate contract,
but there was tacit and mutual consent
as to the rendition of services.
Pomar accepted the service, and Perez
rendered it expecting that the benefit
would be reciprocal. An obligation arises
from this scenario. There was an
innominate contract facio ut des. No
salary was fixed for the services, so the
court must determine its value, to be
determined by the custom and frequent
use of the place in which such services
were rendered. The court ruled to Perez.
Pomar should pay 200 Mexican pesos,
less 50 pesos as to the costs of the suit.
MARITIME COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES V. REPARATIONS

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is

oblige to pay the continued service
rendered by the petitioner.

Held:

Yes, because from the testimonies at

trial, it appears that Perez indeed
rendered services as interpreter of
English. He obtained passes and
accompanied Pomar in his journeys in
Laguna. But, it doesn’t appear on record
G.R. No. 156437
March 1, 2004
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
vs. GRACE BAPTIST CHURCH and
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On June 13, 1986, Respondent Grace
Baptist Church wrote a letter to NHA
manifesting
intent to purchase Lot 4 and 17 of the G
eneral Mariano Alvarez Resettlement
Project in Cavite. The latter granted
request hence respondent entered into
possession of the lots and introduced
improvements thereon.
On February 22, 1991, NHA passed are
solution approving the sale of the subject
lots to respondent Church for 700 per
square meter, a total of P430,500.
Respondents were duly informed.
On April 8, 1991, respondent church
tendered a check amounting to P55,350
contending that this was the agreed
price. NHA avers stating that the price
now (1991) is different from before
(1986).The trial court rendered a
decision in favour of NHA stating that
there was no contract of sale, ordering to
return the said lots to NHA and to pay
NHA rent of 200 pesos from the time it t
ook possession of the lot.
Respondent Church appealed to the CA
which affirms the
decision of RTC regarding “no contract
of sale” but modifying it by ordering NHA
to execute the sale of the said lots to
Church for 700
per square, with 6% interest per annum
from March1991. Petitioner NHA filed a
motion for reconsideration which was d
enied. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON NHA can be compelled
to sell the lots under market value?
HELD:
No, because the contract has not been
perfected.
The Church despite knowledge that its
intended contract of sale with the NHA
had not been perfected proceeded to
introduce improvements on the land. On
the other hand, NHA knowingly granted
the Church temporary use of the subject
properties
and did not prevent the Church from ma
king improvements thereon. Thus the
Church and NHA, who both acted in bad
faith, shall be treated as if they were
both in good faith. In this connection Art
448provides: “
The owner of the land in which
anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land and if its value
is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does
not choose to appropriate the building o
r trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree, on case
of disagreement, court shall fix.

CRUZ vs JM TUASON & CO., INC
Nature: Defendant-appellees appeal to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint to recover
expenses on the improvements from the
appellee’s land and compel them to
convey to him the 3,000 sq m of land.
Facts
-Plaintiff Cruz made permanent
improvements on the 20 quinones land
claimed by the Deudors. These
amounted to Php30,400 and he also
incurred expenses of Php7,781.74
-1952- Defendants JM Tuason and
Araneta availed Cruz’s services to be
their intermediary to make amicable
settlements (compromise agreement)
for them with the Deudors of Civil Case
Q-135. This civil case involved 50
quinones of land where the 20 quinones
was part of. He did so on the defendants’
promise that they will convey to him
3000sq m of the given land.
-Mar 16, 1963- The compromise
agreement between the Duedors and the
defendants was approved but the
defendants refused to convey to Cruz the
3000sq m of land that he now occupies.
Cruz filed a petition against defendants
-Defendants filed motion to dismiss
saying:
oThey do not owe Cruz for the cost of
the improvements he made because that
transaction was between him and the
Deudors. (reimbursement)
oThey do not need to convey to him
3000sq m of land based on their
“alleged” agreement because it is
unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds which covers the sale of real
property or of an interest therein.
(statute of frauds)
oThe plaintiff’s action to compel such
conveyance if it were true already
prescribed because the contract started
in 1952 but he filed for acquisition only in
1963. It is stated in the law that he may
only file action within 10 years. Thus his
action already prescribed. (statute of
limitations)
-Cruz commented that:
oThey should reimburse him for the
improvements because they benefitted
from it and it would be unjust
enrichment on their part not to do so
given he fulfilled his part. He bases it on
Art2142 NCC that “certain lawful
voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to
quasi-contracts so that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefitted at the
expense of another.” He furthers that
while there was no written agreement
between him and the defendants, it was
an agreement nonetheless thus is a form
of quasi-contract and extra contractual
obligations arise from it.
oAs to the 3000sq m of land, the Statute
of Frauds does not apply because it
applies only to executory contracts but
not where the contract has already been
partly executed. Thus performance of
the contract takes it out of this statute.
oThe period for filing action has not
prescribed because under the terms of
their agreement, he shall own the land
as of the date of signing the agreement
but the title to the 3000sq m land shall
be delivered within 10 years after this
signing. Now as long as this 10-year
period had not elapsed yet, he shall not
have any right to compel the defendants
to execute or deliver the document
because they had no obligation to do so.
After this 10-year period elapsed can he
only file action. Thus when the 10-year
period ended on Mar 16, 1963, the
period of prescription began only on Mar
17, 1963.
oSince the contract was not in writing,
he had 6 years before his cause of action
prescribes.
Issue
Does the statute of frauds bar his
cause of action?
Can the defendants be compelled
to convey the 3000sq m of land and
to reimburse him for the
developments there based on the
obligation arising from the
quasi-contract with Cruz?
Held
NO.
The Statute of Frauds does not apply to
this case because though there is no
evidence of the agreement between Cruz
and the defendants, the contract is not
considered as “a sale of real property or
any interest therein” where there was no
transaction that occurred.
NO.
Cruz misinterpreted Art2124. This
provision states that a quasi-contract
cannot emerge against one of the parties
if the subject matter is already covered
by another contract with another party.
In this case, the defendants were correct
that Cruz should have filed the motion
against the Deudors on the
reimbursements and they in turn would
seek relief from the defendant
companies for these. Because this land
was already subject to the contract
between Cruz and the Deudors as to the
improvements, it cannot be subjected to
a quasi-contract between Cruz and the
defendant companies where these
companies had a prior contract with the
Deudors on the land as well.
(2)
From the very language of this provision,
it is obvious that a presumed
quasi-contract cannot emerge as against
one party when the subject mater
thereof is already covered by an existing
contract with another party. Predicated
on the principle that no one should be
allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another, Article 2124 creates
the legal fiction of a quasi-contract
precisely because of the absence of any
actual agreement between the parties
concerned. Corollarily, if the one who
claims having enriched somebody has
done so pursuant to a contract with a
third party, his cause of action should be
against the latter, who in turn may, if
there is any ground therefor, seek relief
against the party benefited. It is
essential that the act by which the
defendant is benefited must have been
voluntary and unilateral on the part of
the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian
puts it, "The act is voluntary. because
the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound
by any pre-existing obligation to act. It is
unilateral, because it arises from the sole
will of the actor who is not previously
bound by any reciprocal or bilateral
agreement. The reason why the law
creates a juridical relations and imposes
certain obligation is to prevent a
situation where a person is able to
benefit or take advantage of such lawful,
voluntary and unilateral acts at the
expense of said actor." In the case at bar,
since appellant has a clearer and more
direct recourse against the Deudors with
whom he had entered into an agreement
regarding the improvements and
expenditures made by him on the land of
appellees. It Cannot be said, in the sense
contemplated in Article 2142, that
appellees have been enriched at the
expense of appellant
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF
SAUDI ARABIA v. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
BANKING CORPORATION
437 SCRA 1 (2003), THIRD DIVISION
National Commercial Bank of Saudi
Arabia (NCBSA) filed a case against
respondent Philippine Banking
Corporation (PBC) to recover the
duplicate payment of the proceeds of a
letter of credit issued by NCBSA in view
of the fact that both the head office and
Makati branch of PBC collected the
proceeds.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
ruled in favor of NCBSA. PBC filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The motion,
however, did not contain a notice of
hearing. PBC tried to cure the defect by
subsequently filing a Motion to Set
“Motion for Reconsideration” for Hearing
nine days after the period for filing the
Notice of Appeal had expired which was
vigorously opposed by NCBSA.
NCBSA called for the strict application of
the Philippines‘ rules of procedure to
prevent any more delay in the disposition
of the case, which has been pending for
more than seventeen years. On the other
hand, PBC invokes a just and fair
determination of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unrippled
doctrine that a motion filed without
the requisite notice of hearing may
be cured by subsequently filing a
motion to set “the motion” for
hearing
HELD:
The requirement of notice under
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 in connection
with Section 2, Rule 37 of the Revised
Rules of Court is mandatory. The
absence of a notice of hearing is fatal
and, in cases of motions to reconsider a
decision, the running of the period to
appeal is not tolled by their filing or
pendency. In the case at bar, it is not
disputed that PBC‘s Motion for
Reconsideration of the August 24, 1993
decision of the trial court did not contain
the requisite notice of hearing.
The motion for reconsideration, however,
being fatally defective for lack of notice
of hearing, cannot be cured by a belated
filing of a notice of hearing. More so in
the case at bar where the Motion to Set
the “Motion for Reconsideration” was
filed after the expiration of the period for
filing an appeal.
PBC‘s appeal for justice and fairness
does not lie, however, there being
nothing on record to show that it has
been a victim of injustice or unfairness.
On the contrary, as found by the Court of
Appeals in its original decision, PBC had
the opportunity to participate in the trial
and present its defense and had actually
made full use of the remedies under our
rules of procedure. More importantly,
there was no oppressive exercise of
judicial authority that would call for the
annulment of the trial court‘s resolutions.
G.R. No. 173227. January 20, 2009
Sebastian Siga-an, petitioner, vs.
Alicia Villanueva, respondent.
Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for
sum of money against petitioner.
Respondent claimed that petitioner
approached her inside the PNO and
offered to loan her the amount of
P540,000.00 of which the loan
agreement was not reduced in writing
and there was no stipulation as to the
payment of interest for the loan.
Respondent issued a check worth
P500,000.00 to petitioner as partial
payment of the loan. She then issued
another check in the amount of
P200,000.00 to petitioner as payment of
the remaining balance of the loan of
which the excess amount of P160,000.00
would be applied as interest for the loan.
Not satisfied with the amount applied as
interest, petitioner pestered her to pay
additional interest and threatened to
block or disapprove her transactions with
the PNO if she would not comply with his
demand. Thus, she paid additional
amounts in cash and checks as interests
for the loan. She asked petitioner for
receipt for the payments but was told
that it was not necessary as there was
mutual trust and confidence between
them. According to her computation, the
total amount she paid to petitioner for
the loan and interest accumulated to
P1,200,000.00.
The RTC rendered a Decision holding
that respondent made an overpayment
of her loan obligation to petitioner and
that the latter should refund the excess
amount to the former. It ratiocinated
that respondent’s obligation was only to
pay the loaned amount of P540,000.00,
and that the alleged interests due should
not be included in the computation of
respondent’s total monetary debt
because there was no agreement
between them regarding payment of
interest. It concluded that since
respondent made an excess payment to
petitioner in the amount of P660,000.00
through mistake, petitioner should
return the said amount to respondent
pursuant to the principle of solutio
indebiti. Also, petitioner should pay
moral damages for the sleepless nights
and wounded feelings experienced by
respondent. Further, petitioner should
pay exemplary damages by way of
example or correction for the public good,
plus attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
Issue: (1) Whether or not interest was
due to petitioner; and (2) whether the
principle of solutio indebiti applies to the
case at bar.
Ruling: (1) No. Compensatory interest is
not chargeable in the instant case
because it was not duly proven that
respondent defaulted in paying the loan
and no interest was due on the loan
because there was no written agreement
as regards payment of interest. Article
1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to
monetary interest, specifically mandates
that no interest shall be due unless it has
been expressly stipulated in writing. As
can be gleaned from the foregoing
provision, payment of monetary interest
is allowed only if: (1) there was an
express stipulation for the payment of
interest; and (2) the agreement for the
payment of interest was reduced in
writing. The concurrence of the two
conditions is required for the payment of
monetary interest. Thus, we have held
that collection of interest without any
stipulation therefor in writing is
prohibited by law.
(2) Petitioner cannot be compelled to
return the alleged excess amount paid
by respondent as interest. Under Article
1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of
loan pays interest when there has been
no stipulation therefor, the provisions of
the Civil Code concerning solutio indebiti
shall be applied. Article 2154 of the
Civil Code explains the principle of
solutio indebiti. Said provision provides
that if something is received when there
is no right to demand it, and it was
unduly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises. In such a
case, a creditor-debtor relationship is
created under a quasi-contract whereby
the payor becomes the creditor who then
has the right to demand the return of
payment made by mistake, and the
person who has no right to receive such
payment becomes obligated to return
the same. The quasi-contract of solutio
indebiti harks back to the ancient
principle that no one shall enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another. The
principle of solutio indebiti applies where
(1) a payment is made when there exists
no binding relation between the payor,
who has no duty to pay, and the person
who received the payment; and (2) the
payment is made through mistake, and
not through liberality or some other
cause. We have held that the principle
of solutio indebiti applies in case of
erroneous payment of undue interest.
Article 2232 of the Civil Code states that
in a quasi-contract, such as solutio
indebiti, exemplary damages may be
imposed if the defendant acted in an
oppressive manner. Petitioner acted
oppressively when he pestered
respondent to pay interest and
threatened to block her transactions with
the PNO if she would not pay interest.
This forced respondent to pay interest
despite lack of agreement thereto.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages
is appropriate so as to deter petitioner
and other lenders from committing
similar and other serious wrongdoings.