MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME

G.R. No. L-52179 195 SCRA 692 April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR
MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.

Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney.
However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack
of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence
of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The
owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and
failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a
motion to dismiss.

Discussions:

The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of
the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they
are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or
that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.

Ruling:

Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the
State until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with
the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.

The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its
judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of
the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision, he
held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.

Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability
is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state
does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that
the defendant is liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts
committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions.

Merritt vs GPI
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

MERRITT VS GPI
G.R. No. L-11154 34 Phil 311 March 21, 1916
MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital
Ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or
horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency
as a contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanent injuries
and the loss of wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for
Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized the
plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said
suit.

On this appeal, Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred:
“in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as
claimed in the complaint,” and
“in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days
and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by
plaintiff in his complaint.”

On the other hand, the Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
erred:
in finding that the collision between the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent or
employee of the Government;
in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; and
in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.

Issues:

Whether or not the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to
commence against it.
Whether or not the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government.

Discussions:
The waiver of immunity of the State does not mean concession of its liability. When the State
allows itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it
can, that the State is liable.

Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that “The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.
Rulings:

 By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-
existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
 In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer
acting as a special agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated by
Justice Story of United States “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.”

Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte

Facts:

Sabas Torralba was employed as a truck driver of the provincial government of Ilocos Norte.
While driving his truck, he ran over Proceto Palafox, resulting to the latter’s death. Sabas was
prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of
Palafox instituted a civil case against him and the Province.

Issue:

Can the Province of Ilocos Norte be held liable for the death of Palafox?

Held:

NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its
employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case, the driver
was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty.
Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act. However tragic and
deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary
consideration. (Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, 102 Phil 1186)
 Republic vs Villasor
government funds are not subject to garnishment

REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671 54 SCRA 83 November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY
OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD.,
GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents

Facts:

The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of The Court
of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm Forces of the
Philippines.

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein,
confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings.
The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said decision final
and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the
said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the
aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of
Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit
with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the AFP.

Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of
jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and
garnishment are null and void.

Issues:

Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.
Discussions:

The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be sued without its consent”.
This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and express an
affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice.
Another justification is the practical consideration that the demands and inconveniences of
litigation will divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing matters demanding
its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or special deposit, they
remain government funds and are not subject to garnishment. An exception of the rule is a law
or ordinance that has been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government
obligation.

Rulings:

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty

that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-
suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties,
the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-suability of the State, public
funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
 Department of Agriculture vs NLRC
Doctrine of non-suability

DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.

Facts:

The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested
by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the
DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay,
as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security
agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the
security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the
property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the
motor vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against
the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on
the non-suability of the State.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issues:

Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Discussions:

Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first
be brought to the Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s
immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the
(Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims
against the Government must be strictly observed.

Rulings:

No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State
may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money
claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of
civil action between private parties.”
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security guards
clearly constitute money claims.
 PNB vs Pabalan
Implied Consent

PNB VS PABALAN
G.R. No. L-33112 83 SCRA 595 June 15, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, La Union,
AGOO TOBACCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION, and PANFILO P. JIMENEZ, Deputy Sheriff, La Union, respondents.

Facts:

The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized
by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA).

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the
questioned funds are of public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied
upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice
of garnishment.

Issues:

Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.

Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with
the petitioner bank is valid.

Discussions:

The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent to
be sued was given impliedly when the State enters into a commercial contract. When the State
enters into a contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign
immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public
corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
Rulings:

PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The
government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its
sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to
rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB
La Union is denied.
The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment. Funds of public
corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of
execution be imposed immediately.

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents,

Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the
cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to
P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of
execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was
deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for
reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The
RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said
dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution.

Held:

It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net
amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of
P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-
settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that
the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its
public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected.
However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already.
This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be
exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

UP V. DIZON (G.R. NO. 171182; AUGUST 23, 2012)

CASE DIGEST: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN,
RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and
JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN, Petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, Respondents. (G.R. No. 171182; August 23, 2012)

FACTS:

University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of
the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing.
However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on
January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The
denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the
OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course
to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of
Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already
issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003
(although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently,
the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the
release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?

II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time?

HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of
public funds; suability vs. liability of the State)

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution"

performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government
instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced
from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No.
714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act
1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution,
constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the
UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the
UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the
use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional
objectives.

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly
stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made
between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability
on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against
the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and
executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.

HELD:

The period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of record.
(The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule;
computation of time)
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally
garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the
supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that
a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest
court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and
has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution
unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the
exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in
clear violation of the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB
Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of
the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly
made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by
counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second
paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon
the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall
only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."

Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that
the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still
not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due
to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the
RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period
resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and
the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.

However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that
the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive
application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any
serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the
denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of
the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the
UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal,
conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. GRANTED.