The Asian financial crisis was a period of financial crisis that gripped much of East Asia and

Southeast Asia beginning in July 1997 and raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to
financial contagion.

The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht after the Thai government
was forced to float the baht due to lack of foreign currency to support its currency peg to the U.S.
dollar. Capital flight ensued, beginning an international chain reaction. At the time, Thailand had
acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt even before the
collapse of its currency.[1] As the crisis spread, most of Southeast Asia and Japan saw slumping
currencies,[2] devalued stock markets and other asset prices, and a precipitous rise in private debt.[3]

Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis. Hong Kong,
Laos, Malaysia and the Philippines were also hurt by the slump. Brunei, mainland China, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Vietnam were less affected, although all suffered from a loss of demand and confidence
throughout the region. Japan was also affected, though less significantly.

Foreign debt-to-GDP ratios rose from 100% to 167% in the four large Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies in 1993–96, then shot up beyond 180% during the worst of the
crisis. In South Korea, the ratios rose from 13% to 21% and then as high as 40%, while the other
northern newly industrialized countries fared much better. Only in Thailand and South Korea did
debt service-to-exports ratios rise.[4]

Although most of the governments of Asia had seemingly sound fiscal policies, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to initiate a $40 billion program to stabilize the currencies of South
Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, economies particularly hard hit by the crisis. The efforts to stem a
global economic crisis did little to stabilize the domestic situation in Indonesia, however. After 30
years in power, Indonesian President Suharto was forced to step down on 21 May 1998 in the wake
of widespread rioting that followed sharp price increases caused by a drastic devaluation of the
rupiah. The effects of the crisis lingered through 1998. In 1998, growth in the Philippines dropped
to virtually zero. Only Singapore and Taiwan proved relatively insulated from the shock, but both
suffered serious hits in passing, the former due to its size and geographical location between
Malaysia and Indonesia. By 1999, however, analysts saw signs that the economies of Asia were
beginning to recover.[5] After the crisis, economies in the region worked toward financial stability
and better financial supervision.[6]

Until 1999, Asia attracted almost half of the total capital inflow into developing countries. The
economies of Southeast Asia in particular maintained high interest rates attractive to foreign
investors looking for a high rate of return. As a result, the region's economies received a large inflow
of money and experienced a dramatic run-up in asset prices. At the same time, the regional
economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea experienced high growth
rates, of 8–12% GDP, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This achievement was widely acclaimed
by financial institutions including IMF and World Bank, and was known as part of the "Asian
economic miracle".
Thailand
From 1985 to 1996, Thailand's economy grew at an average of over 9% per year, the highest
economic growth rate of any country at the time. Inflation was kept reasonably low within a range
of 3.4–5.7%.[30] The baht was pegged at 25 to the U.S. dollar.

On 14 May and 15 May 1997, the Thai baht was hit by massive speculative attacks. On 30 June
1997, Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh said that he would not devalue the baht. However,
Thailand lacked the foreign reserves to support the USD–Baht currency peg, and the Thai
government was eventually forced to float the Baht, on 2 July 1997, allowing the value of the Baht
to be set by the currency market. This caused a chain reaction of events, eventually culminating
into a region-wide crisis.[31]

Thailand's booming economy came to a halt amid massive layoffs in finance, real estate, and
construction that resulted in huge numbers of workers returning to their villages in the countryside
and 600,000 foreign workers being sent back to their home countries.[32] The baht devalued swiftly
and lost more than half of its value. The baht reached its lowest point of 56 units to the U.S. dollar
in January 1998. The Thai stock market dropped 75%. Finance One, the largest Thai finance
company until then, collapsed.[33]

On 11 August 1997, the IMF unveiled a rescue package for Thailand with more than $17 billion,
subject to conditions such as passing laws relating to bankruptcy (reorganizing and restructuring)
procedures and establishing strong regulation frameworks for banks and other financial
institutions. The IMF approved on 20 August 1997, another bailout package of $2.9 billion.

Right after the 1997 Asian financial crisis income in the northeast, the poorest part of the country,
rose by 46 percent from 1998 to 2006.[34] Nationwide poverty fell from 21.3 to 11.3
percent.[35] Thailand's Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, fell from .525 in 2000
to .499 in 2004 (it had risen from 1996 to 2000) versus 1997 Asian financial crisis[36]

By 2001, Thailand's economy had recovered. The increasing tax revenues allowed the country to
balance its budget and repay its debts to the IMF in 2003, four years ahead of schedule. The Thai
baht continued to appreciate to 29 Baht to the U.S. dollar in October 2010.

Indonesia
In June 1997, Indonesia seemed far from crisis. Unlike Thailand, Indonesia had low inflation,
a trade surplus of more than $900 million, huge foreign exchange reserves of more than $20
billion, and a good banking sector. But a large number of Indonesian corporations had been
borrowing in U.S. dollars. During the preceding years, as the rupiah had strengthened respective
to the dollar, this practice had worked well for these corporations; their effective levels of debt and
financing costs had decreased as the local currency's value rose.

In July 1997, when Thailand floated the baht, Indonesia's monetary authorities widened the
rupiah currency trading band from 8% to 12%. The rupiah suddenly came under severe attack in
August. On 14 August 1997, the managed floating exchange regime was replaced by a free-
floating exchange rate arrangement. The rupiah dropped further. The IMF came forward with a
rescue package of $23 billion, but the rupiah was sinking further amid fears over corporate debts,
massive selling of rupiah, and strong demand for dollars. The rupiah and the Jakarta Stock
Exchange touched a historic low in September. Moody's eventually downgraded Indonesia's long-
term debt to "junk bond".[37]

Although the rupiah crisis began in July and August 1997, it intensified in November when the
effects of that summer devaluation showed up on corporate balance sheets. Companies that had
borrowed in dollars had to face the higher costs imposed upon them by the rupiah's decline, and
many reacted by buying dollars through selling rupiah, undermining the value of the latter further.
Before the crisis, the exchange rate between the rupiah and the dollar was roughly 2,600 rupiah to
1 U.S. dollar.[38] The rate plunged to over 11,000 rupiah to 1 U.S. dollar on 9 January 1998, with
spot rates over 14,000 during 23–26 January and trading again over 14,000 for about six weeks
during June–July 1998. On 31 December 1998, the rate was almost exactly 8,000 to 1 U.S.
dollar.[39] Indonesia lost 13.5% of its GDP that year.

In February 1998, President Suharto sacked Bank Indonesia Governor J. Soedradjad Djiwandono,
but this proved insufficient. Amidst widespread rioting in May 1998, Suharto resigned under
public pressure and Vice President B. J. Habibie replaced him.

South Korea
The banking sector was burdened with non-performing loans as its large corporations were
funding aggressive expansions. During that time, there was a haste to build great conglomerates to
compete on the world stage. Many businesses ultimately failed to ensure returns and profitability.
The chaebol, South Korean conglomerates, simply absorbed more and more capital investment.
Eventually, excess debt led to major failures and takeovers. The Hanbo scandal of early 1997
exposed South Koreas economic weaknesses and corruption problems to the international
financial community.[40][41] Later that year, in July, South Korea's third-largest car maker, Kia
Motors, asked for emergency loans.[42] The domino effect of collapsing large South Korean
companies drove the interest rates up and international investors away.[43]

In the wake of the Asian market downturn, Moody's lowered the credit rating of South Korea from
A1 to A3, on 28 November 1997, and downgraded again to B2 on 11 December. That contributed
to a further decline in South Korean shares since stock markets were already bearish in November.
The Seoul stock exchange fell by 4% on 7 November 1997. On 8 November, it plunged by 7%, its
biggest one-day drop to that date. And on 24 November, stocks fell a further 7.2% on fears that
the IMF would demand tough reforms. In 1998, Hyundai Motor Company took over Kia
Motors. Samsung Motors' $5 billion venture was dissolved due to the crisis, and
eventually Daewoo Motors was sold to the American company General Motors (GM).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided US$58.4 billion as a bailout package.[44] In
return, Korea was required to take restructuring measures.[45] The ceiling on foreign investment in
Korean companies was raised from 26 percent to 100 percent.[46] In addition, the Korean
government started financial sector reform program. Under the program, 787 insolvent financial
institutions were closed or merged by June 2003.[47] The number of financial institutions in which
foreign investors invested has increased rapidly. Examples include New Bridge Capital's takeover
of Korea First Bank.
The South Korean won, meanwhile, weakened to more than 1,700 per U.S. dollar from around
800, but later managed to recover. However, like the chaebol, South Korea's government did not
escape unscathed. Its national debt-to-GDP ratio more than doubled (approximately 13% to 30%)
as a result of the crisis.

Philippines
In May 1997, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the country's central bank, raised interest rates by
1.75 percentage points and again by 2 points on 19 June. Thailand triggered the crisis on 2 July
and on 3 July, the Bangko Sentral intervened to defend the peso, raising the overnight rate from
15% to 32% at the onset of the Asian crisis in mid-July 1997. The peso dropped from 26 pesos per
dollar at the start of the crisis to 46.50 pesos in early 1998 to 53 pesos as in July 2001.

The Philippine GDP contracted by 0.6% during the worst part of the crisis, but grew by 3% by
2001, despite scandals of the administration of Joseph Estrada in 2001, most notably the "jueteng"
scandal, causing the PSE Composite Index, the main index of the Philippine Stock Exchange, to
fall to 1,000 points from a high of 3,448 points in 1997. The peso's value declined to around 55.75
pesos to the U.S. dollar. Later that year, Estrada was on the verge of impeachment but his allies in
the senate voted against continuing the proceedings.

This led to popular protests culminating in the "EDSA II Revolution", which effected his
resignation and elevated Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency. Arroyo lessened the crisis in
the country. The Philippine peso rose to about 50 pesos by the year's end and traded at around 41
pesos to a dollar in late 2007. The stock market also reached an all-time high in 2007 and the
economy was growing by more than 7 percent, its highest in nearly two decades.

Mainland China
The Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), had been pegged in 1994 to the U.S. dollar at a ratio
of 8.3 RMB to the dollar. Having largely kept itself above the fray throughout 1997–1998, there
was heavy speculation in the Western press that China would soon be forced to devalue its
currency to protect the competitiveness of its exports vis-a-vis those of the ASEAN nations,
whose exports became cheaper relative to China's. However, the RMB's non-
convertibility protected its value from currency speculators, and the decision was made to
maintain the peg of the currency, thereby improving the country's standing within Asia. The
currency peg was partly scrapped in July 2005, rising 2.3% against the dollar, reflecting pressure
from the United States.

Unlike investments of many of the Southeast Asian nations, almost all of China's foreign
investment took the form of factories on the ground rather than securities, which insulated the
country from rapid capital flight. While China was unaffected by the crisis compared to Southeast
Asia and South Korea, GDP growth slowed sharply in 1998 and 1999, calling attention to
structural problems within its economy. In particular, the Asian financial crisis convinced
the Chinese government of the need to resolve the issues of its enormous financial weaknesses,
such as having too many non-performing loans within its banking system, and relying heavily on
trade with the United States.
Hong Kong
In October 1997, the Hong Kong dollar, which had been pegged at 7.8 to the U.S. dollar since
1983, came under speculative pressure because Hong Kong's inflation rate had been significantly
higher than the United States' for years. Monetary authorities spent more than $1 billion to defend
the local currency. Since Hong Kong had more than $80 billion in foreign reserves, which is
equivalent to 700% of its M1 money supply and 45% of its M3 money supply,[citation needed] the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority (effectively the region's central bank) managed to maintain the peg.

Stock markets became more and more volatile; between 20 and 23 October the Hang Seng
Index dropped 23%. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority then promised to protect the currency.
On 23 October 1997, it raised overnight interest rates from 8% to 23%, and at one point to
'280%'.The HKMA had recognized that speculators were taking advantage of the city's
unique currency-board system, in which overnight rates(HIBOR) automatically increase in
proportion to large net sales of the local currency. The rate hike, however, increased downward
pressure on the stock market, allowing speculators to profit by short selling shares. The HKMA
started buying component shares of the Hang Seng Index in mid-August 1998.

The HKMA and Donald Tsang, the then Financial Secretary, declared war on speculators. The
Government ended up buying approximately HK$120 billion (US$15 billion) worth of shares in
various companies,[48] and became the largest shareholder of some of those companies (e.g., the
government owned 10% of HSBC) at the end of August, when hostilities ended with the closing
of the August Hang Seng Index futures contract. In 1999, the Government started selling those
shares by launching the Tracker Fund of Hong Kong, making a profit of about HK$30 billion
(US$4 billion).

Malaysia
In July 1997, within days of the Thai baht devaluation, the Malaysian ringgit was heavily traded
by speculators. The overnight rate jumped from under 8% to over 40%. This led to rating
downgrades and a general sell off on the stock and currency markets. By end of 1997, ratings had
fallen many notches from investment grade to junk, the KLSE had lost more than 50% from above
1,200 to under 600, and the ringgit had lost 50% of its value, falling from above 2.50 to under
4.57 on (23 January 1998) to the dollar. The then prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad imposed
strict capital controls and introduced a 3.80 peg against the U.S. dollar.

Malaysian moves involved fixing the local currency to the U.S. dollar, stopping the overseas trade
in ringgit currency and other ringgit assets therefore making offshore use of the ringgit invalid,
restricting the amount of currency and investments that residents can take abroad, and imposed for
foreign portfolio funds, a minimum one-year "stay period" which since has been converted to an
exit tax. The decision to make ringgit held abroad invalid has also dried up sources of ringgit held
abroad that speculators borrow from to manipulate the ringgit, for example by "selling short".
Those who did, had to repurchase the limited ringgit at higher prices, making it unattractive to
them.[49] It also fully suspended the trading of CLOB (Central Limit Order Book) counters,
indefinitely freezing approximately $4.47 billion worth of shares and affecting 172,000 investors,
most of them Singaporeans,[50][51][52] which became a political issue between the two countries.[53]
In 1998, the output of the real economy declined plunging the country into its first recession for
many years. The construction sector contracted 23.5%, manufacturing shrunk 9% and the
agriculture sector 5.9%. Overall, the country's gross domestic product plunged 6.2% in 1998.
During that year, the ringgit plunged below 4.7 and the KLSE fell below 270 points. In September
that year, various defensive measures were announced to overcome the crisis.

The principal measure taken were to move the ringgit from a free float to a fixed exchange rate
regime. Bank Negara fixed the ringgit at 3.8 to the dollar. Capital controls were imposed while aid
offered from the IMF was refused. Various task force agencies were formed. The Corporate Debt
Restructuring Committee dealt with corporate loans. Danaharta discounted and bought bad loans
from banks to facilitate orderly asset realization. Danamodal recapitalized banks.

Growth then settled at a slower but more sustainable pace. The massive current account deficit
became a fairly substantial surplus. Banks were better capitalized and NPLs were realised in an
orderly way. Small banks were bought out by strong ones. A large number of PLCs were unable to
regulate their financial affairs and were delisted. Compared to the 1997 current account, by 2005,
Malaysia was estimated to have a $14.06 billion surplus.[54] Asset values however, have not
returned to their pre-crisis highs. Foreign investor confidence was still low, partially due to the
lack of transparency shown in how the CLOB counters had been dealt with.[55][56]

In 2005 the last of the crisis measures were removed as taken off the fixed exchange system. But
unlike the pre-crisis days, it did not appear to be a free float, but a managed float, like
the Singapore dollar.

Singapore
As the financial crisis spread the economy of Singapore dipped into a short recession. The short
duration and milder effect on its economy was credited to the active management by the
government. For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore allowed for a gradual 20%
depreciation of the Singapore dollar to cushion and guide the economy to a soft landing. The
timing of government programs such as the Interim Upgrading Program and other construction
related projects were brought forward.[57]

Instead of allowing the labor markets to work, the National Wage Council pre-emptively agreed
to Central Provident Fund cuts to lower labor costs, with limited impact on disposable income and
local demand. Unlike in Hong Kong, no attempt was made to directly intervene in the capital
markets and the Straits Times Index was allowed to drop 60%. In less than a year, the Singaporean
economy fully recovered and continued on its growth trajectory.[57]

United States and Japan

The "Asian flu" had also put pressure on the United States and Japan. Their markets did not
collapse, but they were severely hit. On 27 October 1997, the Dow Jones industrial plunged 554
points or 7.2%, amid ongoing worries about the Asian economies. The New York Stock
Exchange briefly suspended trading. The crisis led to a drop in consumer and spending confidence
(see 27 October 1997 mini-crash). Indirect effects included the dot-com bubble, and years later
the housing bubble and the subprime mortgage crisis.[58]
Japan was affected because its economy is prominent in the region. Asian countries usually run
a trade deficit with Japan because the latter's economy was more than twice the size of the rest of
Asia together; about 40% of Japan's exports go to Asia. The Japanese yen fell to 147 as mass
selling began, but Japan was the world's largest holder of currency reserves at the time, so it was
easily defended, and quickly bounced back. The real GDP growth rate slowed dramatically in
1997, from 5% to 1.6%, and even sank into recession in 1998 due to intense competition from
cheapened rivals. The Asian financial crisis also led to more bankruptcies in Japan. In addition,
with South Korea's devalued currency, and China's steady gains, many companies complained
outright that they could not compete.[58]

Another longer-term result was the changing relationship between the United States and Japan,
with the United States no longer openly supporting the highly artificial trade environment and
exchange rates that governed economic relations between the two countries for almost five
decades after World War II.

1.乔治·索罗斯的个人及一些支持他的资本主义集团的因素

2.国际金融市场上游资的冲击。在全球范围内大约有 7 万亿美元的流动国际资本。国际炒
家一旦发现在哪个国家或地区有利可图，马上会通过炒作冲击该国或地区的货币，以在短
期内获取暴利。

3.亚洲一些国家的外汇政策不当。它们为了吸引外资，一方面保持固定汇率，一方面又扩
大金融自由化，给国际炒家提供了可乘之机。如泰国就在本国金融体系没有理顺之前，于
1992 年取消了对资本市场的管制，使短期资金的流动畅通无阻，为外国炒家炒作泰铢提供
了条件。

4.为了维持固定汇率制，这些国家长期动用外汇储备来弥补逆差，导致外债的增加。

5.这些国家的外债结构不合理。在中期、短期债务较多的情况下，一旦外资流出超过外资
流入，而本国的外汇储备又不足以弥补其不足，这个国家的货币贬值便是不可避免的了。

内在因素

1.透支性经济高增长和不良资产的膨胀。保持较高的经济增长速度，是发展中国家的共同
愿望。当高速增长的条件变得不够充足时，为了继续保持速度，这些国家转向靠借外债来
维护经济增长。但由于经济发展的不顺利，到 20 世纪 90 年代中期，亚洲有些国家已不具
备还债能力。在东南亚国家，房地产吹起的泡沫换来的只是银行贷款的坏账和呆账；至于
韩国，由于大企业从银行获得资金过于容易，造成一旦企业状况不佳，不良资产立即膨胀
的状况。不良资产的大量存在，又反过来影响了投资者的信心。

2.市场体制发育不成熟。一是政府在资源配置上干预过度，特别是干预金融系统的贷款投
向和项目；另一个是金融体制特别是监管体制不完善。

3.“出口替代” 型模式的缺陷。“出口替代”型模式是亚洲不少国家经济成功的重要原因。但
这种模式也存在着三方面的不足：一是当经济发展到一定的阶段，生产成本会提高，出口
会受到抑制，引起这些国家国际收支的不平衡；二是当这一出口导向战略成为众多国家的
发展战略时，会形成它们之间的相互挤压；三是产品的阶梯性进步是继续实行出口替代的
必备条件，仅靠资源的廉价优势是无法保持竞争力的。亚洲这些国家在实现了高速增长之
后，没有解决上述问题。
世界因素

（1）经济全球化带来的负面影响。经济全球化使世界各地的经济联系越来越密切，但由此
而来的负面影响也不可忽视，如民族国家间利益冲撞加剧，资本流动能力增强，防范危机
的难度加大等。

（2）不合理的国际分工、贸易和货币体制，对第三世界国家不利。在生产领域，仍然是发
达国家生产高技术产品和高新技术本身，产品的技术含量逐级向欠发达、不发达国家下
降，最不发达国家只能做装配工作和生产初级产品。在交换领域，发达国家能用低价购买
初级产品和垄断高价推销自己的产品。在国际金融和货币领域，整个全球金融体系和制度
也有利于金融大国

奥迪是高档汽车和摩托车的制造商，其品牌包括奥迪，杜卡迪和兰博基尼。该公司总部位于
德国英戈尔施塔特， 在全球 100 多个市场中销售其产品。 该公司在 2015 年雇用了大约 85,000
名员工，其中 60,000 名在德国。该公司公布的收入为 584 亿欧元（686 亿美元），营业利润
为 48 亿欧元（56 亿美元）。在 2005 年至 2015 年之间，奥迪的年收入和单位销售额均以每
年 8％的速度增长，其税前利润以每年 18％的速度增长，在 2015 年达到 53 亿欧元。表 1 比
较了奥迪品牌在 2010 年的业绩。 2014 年是其直接竞争对手。
奥迪最大的品牌是奥迪系列汽车。奥迪品牌的总部也设在英戈尔施塔特（Ingolstadt） ，2016
年，奥迪在全球运营 11 个生产工厂。

2015 年，全球品牌代理机构 Interbrand 将奥迪评为全球最有价值品牌第 44 位。12 奥迪还

因其创新而获得了多个奖项。 2016 年 5 月，在一场考虑了 20 家汽车制造商和 50 个品牌的
1400 项创新的竞赛中，奥迪获得了“最创新高端品牌”大奖。六个月前，奥迪连续第三年
被德国杂志《 Auto Bild》和《 Computer Bild》组织的“互联汽车奖”竞赛中评为最成功
的品牌。奥迪制定了雄心勃勃的创新目标，并表示：“到 2020 年，50％的价值创造将基于
移动应用程序（应用程序） ，软件，电子系统和数字服务。”奥迪相信“这将彻底改变我们
的行业和产品。”
确实，数字化是奥迪众多重大变革背后的推动力。用奥迪前任酋长 Axel Strotbek 的话来说
财务官：“数字化是我们成功故事的关键。”到 2016 年，各种数字化工作如火如荼。例如，
奥迪是：
●使用“智能”技术（例如电子车辆跟踪卡）简化其制造流程
●在其“ Enterprise 2.0”计划中通过内部社交计算平台鼓励并促进员工协作
●使用“奥迪城”网络物理车辆配置器改善和个性化销售体验
●通过“奥迪连接”将数字服务整合到汽车中。
所有这些数字化工作都得到了奥迪 IT 部门的支持。 Audi IT20 由 Mattias Ulbrich 领导，
他于 2012 年成为 AUDI 的 CIO 兼 IT 和组织主管。2015 年，Audi IT 雇用了大约 950 名全职
员工。它支持 AUDI，其全资子公司和全球范围内的全国销售公司内的所有 IT 功能。奥迪 IT
还为大众集团其他品牌服务并支持多种功能（例如车载 IT）。奥迪的共享经济出行服务
到 2016 年，奥迪将基于共享经济探索新的收入来源。这些新资源来自出行服务，可帮助人
们从一个地方到另一个地方，无论他们是否拥有汽车。但是，如果这些出行服务取得成功，
则可能会威胁到 AUDI 的传统业务模式，因为客户可能会从拥有奥迪汽车转变为成为 AUDI 的
订户
移动服务。
在 AUDI 内部，奥迪商业创新有限公司（ABI）正在探索和试行各种移动服务。例如，2014 年
底，ABI 在瑞典斯德哥尔摩启动了“ Audi unite”。这项出行服务允许最多五人的团队共
享一辆高档汽车，为期两年。每个驾驶员都使用一个移动应用程序来检查共享汽车的位置并
将其保留以备将来使用。收集到的有关每个人的汽车使用情况的数据使该小组能够根据实
际使用情况划分每月成本，包括维护和清洁费用。22 该公司还在 2014 年启动了一个名为
“奥迪选择”的计划。这项移动服务可在柏林使用，并为客户提供一年内驾驶三种不同的奥
迪二手车的机会。 2015 年 4 月，ABI 推出了“按需提供奥迪”服务，该服务允许客户使用
移动应用程序以每天租金的价格租用奥迪汽车。与其他汽车租赁服务不同，奥迪礼宾部会在
租赁期开始时将汽车带到客户所在的位置，并在结束时从任何位置取车。该服务最初是在旧
金山提供的，其次是慕尼黑，并且可能还将在其他国家/地区推出。
“奥迪在家”是 2015 年 11 月在旧金山和迈阿密推出的另一项出行服务。在这些市场中，奥
迪与精选豪华住宅合作，提供共享的奥迪汽车共享库，方便将其停放在物业的车库中。居民
可以使用移动应用程序预订汽车以供个人使用。
出行服务与策略
提供移动服务给 AUDI 带来了根本的战略挑战：该公司必须将其移动服务与直接竞争对手（特
别是戴姆勒和宝马）以及本地共享经济公司（如 Uber 和 Zipcar）的移动服务区分开。
通过高级出行服务与众不同
戴姆勒和宝马分别在 2008 年和 2011 年推出了 car2go 和 DriveNow 汽车共享计划，距离 AUDI
开始推出自己的出行服务几年（表 2 概述了这两种服务） 。
鉴于 car2go 的主导地位，提供类似的服务可能会使 AUDI 陷入“军备竞赛”，以覆盖可用车
辆的数量或进行价格战，这两者都是不可取的。此外，据报道，到 2017 年年中，戴姆勒和
宝马正在就合并 car2go 和 DriveNow 进行高级谈判。27 因此，在出行服务市场起步较晚的
情况下，奥迪需要确定如何从战略上定位自己，以与这些产品区分开来。宝马和戴姆勒均位
于高端汽车制造领域，但他们使用各自的入门车型（分别是 Minis 和 1 Series BMW 以及
Smart 和 Mercedes A 和 B 级汽车）为相对细分的人群提供出行服务。目标观众。
奥迪决定通过寻求将其在高端汽车领域的地位转移到出行服务领域，提供与竞争对手不同
的服务。正如奥迪连接开发操作系统总监 Marcus Keith 所说：“问题是，在（数字化程度
更高的世界）中，溢价的定义是什么？是时间吗它在车上有特色吗？方便吗？”
奥迪试图通过试验不同的移动服务来回答这类问题。所有实验都涉及将出行服务与高端奥
迪车型相结合。奥迪在家中与开发商，物业经理和豪华住宅居民合作开发出行服务（例如，
居住社区 LUMINA 宣传“独家”服务是为了成为居民 29）。奥迪点播服务提供礼宾服务，将
汽车带给用户，而无需用户收车。奥迪团结为更广泛的受众群体提供了一辆高端汽车。确实，
许多奥迪精选客户在不同季节选择了三种高端车型，例如夏天的敞篷车，冬天的四轮驱动
SUV 和剩余时间的豪华轿车。
通过整合实现差异化
但是，寻找与其他高档汽车制造商脱颖而出的方法还远远不够。奥迪的出行服务还与其他共
享经济公司（例如 Uber 和 Zipcar）竞争，尽管到目前为止，这些竞争对手中没有一家专注
于高端细分市场。
但是，奥迪却发现了差异化的另一个来源。与纯粹的出行服务公司不同，所有 AUDI 的出行
服务都使用配备 Audi Audi 的汽车，这些汽车由 AUDI 制造和拥有。尽管像 Uber 和 Airbnb
这样的共享经济公司通常因其轻资产型商业模式而羡慕不已（Uber 不拥有汽车，Airbnb 不
拥有住宅） ，但奥迪仍坚信，出行服务与汽车制造商之间的联系是潜在的经济来源。与非综
合性移动服务提供商的竞争优势。
例如，奥迪汽车出行服务的一项关键要求是找到一种安全的方式来打开和启动带有智能手
机上“数字钥匙”的豪华车，而无需将物理钥匙留在车内。奥迪为满足这一要求的 ABI 开发
了一种数字钥匙解决方案-鉴于 Zipcar 使用的许多不同的汽车品牌，这一壮举使像 Zipcar
这样的公司很难复制。
开发数字钥匙是将汽车共享服务转移到高端市场的前提条件。但是，从长远来看，仅此一项
是否足以使奥迪能够与移动服务成功竞争，这是令人怀疑的。因此，奥迪还探索了针对与竞
争对手不同的细分市场的服务。
通过细分共享用户来区分
奥迪（AUDI）试图与众不同的另一种方式是通过细分共享资产的用户。 AUDI 的不同出行服
务针对不同的群体或汽车共享用户群体进行了试验：通过 Audi unite，封闭的家庭成员，
朋友或邻居可以共享汽车；在奥迪在家中，特定建筑物的所有租户共享汽车；与奥迪共享车
队，一家公司的员工共享汽车。 AUDI 试图回答的问题是：“哪些合适的人群愿意共享并能
够从共享汽车中受益？”