City of Manila v.

Judge Cuerdo
G.R. No. 175723 (February 4, 2014)

Topic: Split Jurisdiction

Issue: Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

Held: Yes, the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case.

Ratio: In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can
reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,
then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the
Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court
would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same
subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The
Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the
CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax
cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA
that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case
while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to
conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the C A
or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and
legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the
RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist
with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in
order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.
Edcel Lagman v. Pimentel III
G.R. No. 235935 (February 6, 2018)

Topic: Expanded or Extended Jurisdiction

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216 (Mindanao Martial Law).

Held: No

Ratio: Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court's judicial power to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
first part is to be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter part, an innovation of the 1987
Constitution, became known as the court's expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now delve
into acts of any branch or instrumentality of the Government traditionally considered as political if such act was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

In seeking the Court's review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216 on the strength of the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 alternately invoke the Court's expanded (certiorari)
jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII.

In Lagman, We emphasized that this Court's jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is special and
specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 193 and 594 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the
standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article
VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers.
Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper
tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. We held that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court's
constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against
possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the same
special and specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. Necessarily, and by parity of reasoning, a certiorari petition invoking the Court's
expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress' extension of
the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the Congress' extension of such proclamation or suspension is limited
only to a determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. By its plain language, the Constitution provides such
scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority under Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed
at balancing (or curtailing) the power vested by the Constitution in the Congress to determine whether to extend such
proclamation or suspension.
Duero v. CA
G.R. No. 131282 (January 4, 2002)

Topic: Jurisdictional Estoppel

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC after he has
successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom.

Held: No

Ratio: For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied,
estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio
Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not
do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief
from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion
for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when
the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from
judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration.

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that
the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action.

Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court).

Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and its Order that private respondent turn over the
disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are annulled and set aside.
Gonzaga v. CA
G.R. No. 144025 (December 27, 2002)

Topic: Jurisdictional Estoppel

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Gonzaga is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage; active participation in the proceedings in
the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners
vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s
jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision
and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only
because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
Manila Bankers v. Ng Kok Wei
G.R. NO. 139791 (December 12, 2003)

Topic: Jurisdictional Estoppel

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC

Held: Yes

Ratio: Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have
consistently held that a complaint for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the
owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active participation in the
proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner
confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question
the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. 173946 (June 19, 2013)

Topic: Jurisdictional Estoppel

Issue: Whether or not respondent is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court

Held: Yes

Ratio: At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel should not be an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded
by the fact that jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals and, finally, before
this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in this
case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the issue of jurisdiction.

1. Aspects of Jurisdiction

Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was filed
more than six years after her amended answer was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at
various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing the
doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. petitioner claimed that respondent’s failure to raise the
question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in
the proceedings conducted by the trial court.

Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects,
namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case;
and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. The aspect of
jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

Previously held, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the
subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the
person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the
principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.

As a question of jurisdiction raised here is that over the person of Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the
answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since “lack of jurisdiction over the
person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it
by silence.”
Agan v. Piato
G.R. No. 155001 (January 21, 2004)

Topic: Hierarchy of Courts

Issue: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the case considering that the case involves factual questions

Held: Yes

Ratio: Private respondents and respondents-intervenors reiterate a number of procedural issues which they insist
deprived this Court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant cases on its merits. They continue to claim that the cases
at bar raise factual questions which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve, hence, they must be remanded to the trial court
for reception of evidence. Further, they allege that although designated as petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the cases
at bar are actually actions for nullity of contracts over which the trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Even assuming that
the cases at bar are special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, they contend that the principle of hierarchy of courts
precludes this Court from taking primary jurisdiction over them.

We are not persuaded.

There is a question of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the facts alleged. Even a cursory
reading of the cases at bar will show that the Court decided them by interpreting and applying the Constitution, the BOT
Law, its Implementing Rules and other relevant legal principles on the basis of clearly undisputed facts. All the operative
facts were settled, hence, there is no need for a trial type determination of their truth or falsity by a trial court.

We reject the unyielding insistence of PIATCO Employees that the following factual issues are critical and beyond the
capability of this Court to resolve, viz: (a) whether the National Economic Development Authority- Investment Coordinating
Committee (NEDA-ICC) approved the Supplements; (b) whether the First Supplement created ten (10) new financial
obligations on the part of the government; and (c) whether the 1997 Concession Agreement departed from the draft
Concession Agreement contained in the Bid Documents.

The factual issue of whether the NEDA-ICC approved the Supplements is hardly relevant. It is clear in our Decision that
the PIATCO contracts were invalidated on other and more substantial grounds. It did not rely on the presence or absence
of NEDA-ICC approval of the Supplements. On the other hand, the last two issues do not involve disputed facts. Rather,
they involve contractual provisions which are clear and categorical and need only to be interpreted. The interpretation of
contracts and the determination of whether their provisions violate our laws or contravene any public policy is a legal issue
which this Court may properly pass upon.

Respondents’ corollary contention that this Court violated the hierarchy of courts when it entertained the cases at bar
must also fails. The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and
appellate courts generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to
repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before
appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.

It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a
strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary. As the cases at bar merely concern the construction of
the Constitution, the interpretation of the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations on undisputed contractual
provisions and government actions, and as the cases concern public interest, this Court resolved to take primary
jurisdiction over them. This choice of action follows the consistent stance of this Court to settle any controversy with a high
public interest component in a single proceeding and to leave no root or branch that could bear the seeds of future
litigation. The suggested remand of the cases at bar to the trial court will stray away from this policy.
Liga ng mga Barangay v. Atienza
G.R. No. 154599 (January 21, 2004)

Topic: Hierarchy of Courts

Issue: Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme Court

Held: No

Ratio: Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of
the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.

Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has
been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in certain cases.

SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced because the non-
observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the
petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the President of the Philippines, which would have greatly
affected all local government units. We reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative department is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true when
what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with
Congress.
St. Mary Crusade Foundation v. Riel
G.R. No. 176508 (January 12, 2015)

Topic: Hierarchy of Courts

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the instant special civil action (cetiorari) directly in this Court is in disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Held: Yes

Ratio: With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for judicial reconstitution, nothing
more was left for the RTC to do in the case. As of then, therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to
the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. By
allowing the period of appeal to elapse without taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to
certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. That the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary course of law is clear from
Section 1 of Rule 65, which requires that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Indeed, no error of judgment by a court will be corrected by certiorari, which corrects only
jurisdictional errors.

Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is
allowed only when there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the
observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus
afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
There being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of
courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction and Development Co.
G.R. No. 196795 (March 7, 2018)

Topic: Hierarchy of Courts

Issue: Whether or not the direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review as
sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts

Held: No

Ratio: In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections: The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts
was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and
efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized
into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in
scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the
doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the
parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when the initial dispute—an ejectment case—is,
by nature and design, a summary procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.

Moreover, this Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in this case. In Barcenas v. Spouses Tomas and Caliboso:

Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the
RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule
41, which reads:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. —

(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this Court on questions of
law only; or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA — as they in fact did.

Thus, petitioner's resort to this Court is proper and warranted under the circumstances.
Bureau of Customs v. Gallegos
G.R. No. 220832 (February 28, 2018)

Topic: Hierarchy of Courts

Issue: Whether or not the direct resort to this Court is in disregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts

Held: Yes

Ratio: Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible
representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section
1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision, which in this case, is the RTC's omnibus order. The
purpose of the motion is to enable the court or agency to rectify its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To
dispense with this requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with the
requirement.

Here, petitioners maintain that since the petition raises purely questions of law, their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration is not fatal. Except for this bare allegation, however, petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for
dispensing with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. Indeed, "petitioners may not arrogate to themselves
the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not."

Likewise, the direct filing of this petition in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The concurrence
of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, CA and the RTC to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.29
Stated differently, although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari,
direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same.30 The
Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent
cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it.31 Absent any showing of any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition will cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in this case.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this petition is procedurally infirm, and thus, dismissible.
Katon v. Palanca
G.R. No. 151149 (September 7, 2004)

Topic: Residual Prerogatives

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition

Held: Yes

Ratio: Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3)
res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we
explained thus:

"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these
instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for
qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim
when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x."

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon
the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

"A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule
39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied) The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in
which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal.
This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but
prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-
called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction
under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general
residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more
fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed,
when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.