A.C. No. 4947 June 7, 2007 Disbarment.
Disbarment. He likewise claimed that he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment1 dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-
movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for the latter's alleged violation of a suspension order
earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges:
4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law and in fact filed
pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of his motion for
reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal,
and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and be
disbarred.
Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:
On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition2 praying for the disbarment of her
estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly
immoral conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter.
On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution3 finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.4
During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the instant
Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension
order earlier issued by the Court with his continued practice of law.
In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005,5 denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras' motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) – Acting on the respondent's motion
for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of February 14, 2005 which suspended him
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of
merit.
The Court further Resolves to NOTE:
(a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for reconsideration
with leave of Court;
(b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of the motion for
reconsideration; and
(c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying that
respondent be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and to REQUIRE the
respondent to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt
and/or Disbarment.
After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation6 , stating that he
had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the
day after he received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006.
It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the Court
issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from receipt.
Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required
Comment7 was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or violate any of the
pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to an erring lawyer – disbarment – or to
hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions.
In a number of cases,8 we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a
punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the
public from members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble
profession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of
the court to assure respect for court orders by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly
administration of justice.
We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Court's suspension
order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one- year
suspension from law practice.9
It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its
lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must be
respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize
again that a resolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively.10 Court orders are to be respected not because the justices or judges who issue
them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the government. This is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of
men.11
Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to follow, obey
and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005
due to his deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary angiogram and bypass graft 12 .
He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with
the Court's order.
Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-
movant's counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An
examination of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and petitioner's
counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress that mutual
bickerings and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will
not receive sympathy from this Court.13 Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, fairness, candor and
civility.14
All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras' failure to promptly
comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present case would be more consistent with the
avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the
dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of
the court.15
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is
hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this
Court's resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the
same act.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
In a Decision[2] dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months
for falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for
immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served simultaneously. [3] Respondent moved for
reconsideration[4] but the Court denied it with finality in a Resolution[5] dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion[6] to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty.
Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a
pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension order. [7] Moreover, complainant claimed that
respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension
order.[8] On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second motion for contempt and disbarment,[9] claiming that, on
March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension order
issued against respondent.[10] Complainant filed two (2) more motions for contempt dated June 8, 2001[11] and August
21, 2001[12] raising the same arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments, [13] and
complainant filed her replies[14] to both comments. Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension[15] dated
May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent
admitted that he started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension. [16] Also,
complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the
pendency of his motion to lift suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation.[17]
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order[18] on the status of respondent'
suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his
suspension.[19] Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry through a Letter[20] dated
March 21, 2003 signed by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of
Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and recommendation. [21]
In a Report and Recommendation[22] dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order
declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the
Court.[23] Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of
the period stated in the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable him
to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became
effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution denying his motion for reconsideration with
finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were to be served simultaneously, the period of suspension should
have ended on May 22, 2002.[24] To date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the suspension.
Soon thereafter, in a Resolution[25] dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and
recommendation on the pending incidents referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was
constrained to issue a Resolution[26] dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report regarding the
said incidents. In response, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter[27] to the Court, conveying that the
Board of Governors had passed a Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's suspension from the practice
of law.[28] However, in view of the pendency of respondent's motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook
to transmit the case records to the Court as soon as said motion is resolved.[29] Thereafter, in a letter[30] dated
September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. The Court
received the records and relevant documents only on February 15, 2016.[31]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation[32] dated January 16, 2012, instead of resolving only the pending incidents
referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against respondent
which had been resolved with finality by the Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and Resolution dated January
22, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years for falsifying his wife's signature in the bank loan documents and for immorality.[33]
In a Resolution[34] dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.[35] Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for reconsideration,[36] alleging that
his administrative liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had been settled more than a decade ago in
the Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to suspend him anew for another year based on the same
grounds would constitute administrative double jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to
the IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to declare him in contempt and his motion to lift
the suspension. Such motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015.[37]
The Issues Before the Court
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while
he was suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the Court to
lift the suspension order. However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such matters.
Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's liability based on the 1995
complaint filed by herein complainant – which was already resolved with finality by no less than the Court itself. To
make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and
therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to
resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in resolving
the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for
valid and compelling reasons,[38] as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues
raised.[39] Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for
further proceedings.[40] However, in light of the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission that
he resumed practicing law even without a Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to
resolve the matters raised before it even without the IBP's factual findings and recommendation thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and
experience."[41] During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing
law.[42] It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the
suspension period.[43] The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting
the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law.[44]
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001
and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension.
However, soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to
accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the Department of
Agrarian Reform.[45] Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting
the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and
willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of in this case – are
grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law,[46] to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law [47] shows that the Court consistently
imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their suspension.
Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The
Court is mindful, however, that suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just recently,
respondent had already been disbarred from the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys in Paras v. Paras.[48] In Sanchez v. Torres,[49] the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment
can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously disbarred. [50] Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on
the lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court
held that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer
be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can no longer
be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes. That
being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and academic.
As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 2001[51] and indicating therein
the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.
As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings
on their behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared
the pleading and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by complainant was dated
February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty.
Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters referred to it
for investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to ensure
proper administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, considering
that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[ Adm. Case No. 778, August 14, 1936 ]
BENEDICTO M. JAVIER, COMPLAINANT, VS. SILVERIO Q. CORNEJO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
The respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practising lawyer of Lipa, Batangas, is charged with malpractice (a) for
trying to collect from a brother attorney a sum of money by means of threat, and (6) for having instigated Severina
Paz Teodoro to file a complaint against the herein complainant, Attorney Benedicto M. Javier, for malpractice
(Administrative Case No. 757) knowing fully well that the charges therein preferred were malicious, flimsy and
unfounded.
The complainant in support of his first charge refers to a letter dated December 2, 1935, in which demand was made
upon him by the respondent for the delivery of P195 representing the amount collected and received by the said
complainant by virtue of a judgment rendered in a certain civil case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal wherein
Severina Paz Teodoro was the judgment creditor and the herein complainant was her counsel. In the same letter
the complainant was given ten days within which to turn over the said P195, otherwise a complaint would be filed
against him in this court. He was furthermore urged to settle the matter in due time for the preservation not only of
his good name but also that of the legal profession.
We find nothing improper in this letter of the respondent to the complainant which would justify us in taking
disciplinary action against the respondent. The letter is an extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum of
money which Severina Paz Teodoro had represented to the respondent as owing to her and which she sought to
recover through his professional services. It was an honest effort on the part of the respondent to serve the
interests of his client. The lawyer owes entire "devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability", to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied (Code of Ethics, adopted by the
American Bar Association and the Philippine Bar Association, No. 15; In re Tionko [1922], 43 Phil., 191, 194).
As to the second ground, it is alleged that the respondent in connivance with one Gregorio
Tapia, induced Severina Paz Teodoro to accuse the herein complainant before this court of malpractice. It
appears that herein complainant was respondent in Administrative Case No. 757 of this court upon a charge of
unlawful conversion of a judgment fund amounting to P195 pertaining to his client, Severina Paz Teodoro. This
charge, however, was dismissed by resolution of this court on July 10, 1936. Now the complainant comes back
against the herein respondent and charges him with having maliciously instigated the filing of the complaint in the
aforesaid Administrative Case No. 757.
We find that Administrative Case No. 757 was instituted in this court on March 18,1936 and that respondent Silverio
Q. Cornejo intervened as counsel for the complainant therein on December 2,1935. But long before these dates,
Severina Paz Teodoro and her son Feliciano Patefla had already been demanding from the herein complainant the
return of the amount alleged to be due them (Exhibits B and C). The last demand letter (Exhibit C) was made on
March 23,1931, and its receipt acknowledged by the herein complainant in the same month (Exhibit E). This letter
demanded the payment of the remaining balance of P166.50 from the sum which the herein complainant had
collected and received as judgment fund of his erstwhile client Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon
his failure to remit the amount demanded, the matter would be brought to the attention of this court. The
complainant in Administrative Case No. 757, therefore, already knew on March 23,1931, long before
the respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo entered the scene, where to seek relief.
It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.
The complaint against the respondent is dismissed for lack of merit. So ordered.
CANON 8CAMACHO V PANGULAYAN
VITUG; March 22, 2000(kiyo miura)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics
FACTS
- 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly
published certainobjectionable features- the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were
expelled- the 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise to a civil case calling for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and
associates representing the defendant,AMACC- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-admission
agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of thestudents by their parents- following this, the
Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among other things, that 4 of the students hadacknowledged
their guilt and agreed to terminate all proceedings- apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission
agreements through negotiations with said students and theirparents without communicating with Camacho
ISSUE
WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics
HELD
YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which states:
“A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much
less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented
by counsel and he should not undertake to
advise him as to law.”
CAMACHO VS PAGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICEA.C. 4807MARCH 22, 2000PRINCIPLE:
CANON 9: Lawyer should not communicate upon subject of controversy with aparty represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate orcompromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. Lawyer mustavoid everything that may tend to mislead
party not represented by counsel andshould not advise him as to law.
FACTS:
9 students of AMA were expelled for having apparently caused to be publishedobjectionable features or articles in the school paper.Denial of the
appeal to AMA President Aguiluz gave rise to Civil Case 97-30549.CAMACHO was the hired counsel of the expelled students in an action for
theIssuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injuction in the said civil case. While thecivil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-
admission Agreements wereseparately executed by the expelled students without the knowledge of CAMACHO.CAMACHO led a complaint
against lawyers comprising the PANGULAYAN ANDASSOCIATES Law firm (lawyers of AMA)because without his knowledge they procuredand
effected on separate occasions compromise agreements (letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements) with 4 of his clients which in effect
required them to waive allkinds of claims they may have with AMA.CAMACHO averred that such an act was unbecoming of any member of
thelegal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension.PANGULAYAN in his defense claimed that the agreements were executed for
thesole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case.
ISSUE:
W/N PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES SHOULDBE SUSPENDED/DISBARRED?
HELD:
YES.It would appear that when individual letters of apology and Re-admissionAgreements were formalized, CAMACHO was already the retained
counsel of theexpelled AMA students.PANGULAYAN and associates having full knowledge of this fact still proceededto negotiate with the
expelled AMA students and their parents without at leastcommunicating the matter to their lawyer CAMACHO. This failure of
PANGULAYAN and associates, whether by design or oversight, isan excusable violation of the canons of profession ethics and in
utter disregard of aduty owing to a colleague. The excuse that agreements were executed for settling the administrative
casewas
belied by the Manifestation which states “9
signatories agreed among others toterminate ALL civil, criminal and administrative proceedings they may have againstAMA arising
from their previous
dismissal”
. Hence, PANGULAYAN should besuspended for 3 months.
- respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his colleague- the Board of Governors of
the IBP passed a resolution suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case against theother
respondents since they took no part in it-
the court concurred with IBP’s findings but reduced the suspension to 3 months
[ A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016 ]
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER, ATTY. FRANCISCO I.
CHAVEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS. RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL R. MORTA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
On 8 February 2006, the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche (complainant), through its founding partner, Atty.
Francisco M. Chavez, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[1] before this Court. Complainant sought the disbarment of Attys.
Restitute S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta (respondents) for violation of Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It was alleged that respondents falsely and maliciously accused complainant and its lawyers of
antedating a Petition for Review filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005. [2]
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The circumstances, which led to the filing of this administrative complaint, occurred in connection with Criminal
Case No. Q-05-136678. The latter was a case for libel then pending against Eliseo F. Soriano before Branch 218 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.[3] Complainant acted as the legal counsel of Soriano in that case while
respondents represented private complainant Michael M. Sandoval.[4]
On 11 October 2005, lawyers from complainant law firm, led by Atty. Chavez, appeared before the RTC to seek the
cancellation of Soriano's scheduled arraignment.[5] During the hearing, Atty. Chavez informed the RTC that a Petition
for Review had been filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005. The Petition questioned the
resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding probable cause to indict Soriano for
libel.[6] Atty. Chavez presented an extra copy of the Petition for Review before the RTC, and explained that the main
copy of the Petition stamped received by the DOJ was still with the office messenger, who had personally filed the
pleading the day before.[7] Citing the filing of the Petition for Review, Atty. Chavez moved for the suspension of the
arraignment for a period of 60 days pursuant to Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[8] The RTC, however, denied the motion and proceeded with Soriano's arraignment.[9]
The events that transpired during the arraignment led complainant to conclude that Presiding Judge Hilario Laqui of
Branch 218 was biased against its client.[10] Consequently, it filed a Motion for Inhibition on 18 October 2005
requesting Judge Laqui to voluntary inhibit himself from the case.[11]
On 11 November 2005, respondents filed with the RTC a pleading entitled "A Vehement Opposition to the Motion
for Inhibition"[12] (Vehement Opposition) to contradict complainant's motion. The following statements, which have
become the subject of the instant disbarment complaint, were contained in that pleading:
A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for Inhibition
COMES NOW, private complainant, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court respectfully
states:
1. Allegedly, the Presiding Judge exhibited bias, partiality, prejudice and has pre-judged the case against the
accused when he proceeded with the arraignment despite the pendency of a petition for review filed with the
Department of Justice.
2. They alleged that on October 10, 2005, or the day before the scheduled arraignment, they have filed the
petition.
3. They cited Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, where it is provided that upon
motion, the arraignment of the accused shall be suspended when a petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending.
4. We contemplated over this matter. If indeed the petition was duly filed with the DOJ on October 10, 2005,
why is it that the accused did not present a copy of the petition stamped "received" by the DOJ? Why did he
not make a manifestation that he forgot to bring a copy? He could have easily convinced the Presiding Judge
to suspend the arraignment upon a promise that a copy thereof will be filed with the court in the afternoon
of October 11, 2005 or even the following day.
5. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the accused was able to antedate the filing or mailing of the
petition.[13] (Emphases supplied)
The allegation of antedating was reiterated by respondents in a Comment/Opposition to the Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the RTC on 6 December 2006:
4. It is our conclusion that the accused and his lawyers were able to antedate the filing or mailing of the
petition. We cannot conclude otherwise, unless the accused and his battery of lawyers will admit that on October
11, 2005 that they suddenly or temporarily became amnesiacs. They forgot that they filed the Petition for Review
the day before.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
In the Complaint-Affidavit it filed with this Court, complainant vehemently denied the allegation of antedating.[15] As
proof that the Petition for Review was personally filed with the DOJ on 10 October 2005, complainant attached to its
Complaint-Affidavit a copy of the Petition bearing the DOJ stamp.[16]
In their Comment dated 4 May 2006,[17] respondents alleged that the filing of the disbarment complaint against
them was a mere harassment tactic. As proof, they cited the non-inclusion of another signatory to the Vehement
Opposition, Public Prosecutor Nadine Jaban-Fama, as a respondent in the Complaint.[18] They also contended that
the statements they had made in their pleadings were covered by the doctrine of privileged communication.[19]

In a Resolution dated 7 August 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[20]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP
In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 July 2008,[21] Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco found respondents guilty
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility:
We agree with the complainant that the accusation that they antedated the mailing of the DO.I petition is violative
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the duty of all lawyers to observe civility and propriety in their
pleadings. It was somewhat irresponsible for the respondents to make such an accusation on the basis of pure
speculation, considering that they had no proof to support their accusation and did not even make any attempt to
verify from the DO.I the date and the manner by which the said petition was filed. Moreover, as held in Asa, we will
have to disagree with the respondents argument on privileged communication, the use of offensive language in
pleadings filed in the course of judicial proceedings, constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary
action.
xxxx
In Asa, the Supreme Court found Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo guilty of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and admonished her to refrain from using offensive and improper language in her pleadings.
Considering that the respondents' accusation that the complainant and its lawyers antedated the mailing of Bro.
Eliseo Soriano's DOJ Petition is somewhat more serious than an allegation of wanting additional attorney's fees for
opening doors and serving coffee, we believe that the penalty of reprimand would be proper in this case.
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel
Morta be reprimanded for using improper language in their pleadings with a warning that a repetition of the same
will be dealt with more severely.[22]
On 14 August 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391, which adopted and approved
Commissioner Limpingco's Report and Recommendation:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for
using improper language in their pleadings Atty. Restituto Lazaro and Atty. Rodel Morta are REPRIMANDED with a
Warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.[23]
On 14 November 2008, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14 August 2008.
They argued that the Complaint against them should have been dismissed on the following grounds: (a)
complainant's failure to implead the public prosecutor, who must be considered an indispensable party to the case,
since the pleading in question could not have been filed without her conformity; (b) as the subject pleadings had
been signed by the public prosecutor, their contents enjoyed the presumption of regularity and legality, upon which
respondents were entitled to rely; (c) respondents relied in good faith on the review, supervision and direction of
the public prosecutor in the filing of the pleading in question; and (d) the statements in the pleading were covered
by the doctrine of privileged communication.[24] Respondents also contended that Atty. Chavez should be disciplined
for the derogatory statements made against them in the pleadings he submitted during the IBP investigation.
Complainant filed a Comment/Opposition[25] to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on 8 January 2009.
On 22 March 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 granting respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration and recommending the dismissal of the instant case on the basis of complainant's failure to
implead an indispensable party:
RESOLVED to GRANT Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, considering that complainant's non-joinder of an
indispensable party makes the presumption that Respondents acted according to regulations and in good faith in
the performance of their official duties. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the case against Respondents is hereby DISMISSED with stern Warning to be more circumspect.
To date, this Court has not received any petition from complainant or any other interested party questioning
Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. However, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645,[26] we must ultimately decide disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar, regardless of the acts of the complainant.[27] This rule is consistent with our obligation to
preserve the purity of the legal profession and ensure the proper and honest administration of justice.[28] In
accordance with this duty, we now pass upon the recommendation of the IBP.
OUR RULING
After a judicious examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to SET ASIDE Resolution No. XXI-2014-
146 of the IBP Board of Governors. Not only are the grounds cited as bases for the dismissal of the complaint
inapplicable to disbarment proceedings. We are also convinced that there is sufficient justification to discipline
respondents for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Non-joinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding.
In Resolution No. XXI-2014-146, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the instant case because of complainant's
purported failure to implead an indispensable party. Although this ground for dismissal was not explained at length
in its resolution, the IBP Board of Governors appeared to have given credence to the argument proffered by
respondents. They had argued that the public prosecutor was an indispensable party to the proceeding, and that
her non-joinder was a ground for the dismissal of the case. That ruling is patently erroneous.
In previous cases, the Court has explained that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[29] These
proceedings are neither purely civil nor purely criminal,[30] but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of its officers.[31] Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied,[32] but are construed in a manner that
allows us to determine whether lawyers are still fit to fulfill the duties and exercise the privileges of their office.[33]
We cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against respondents merely because the public prosecutor has not
been joined as a party. We emphasize that in disbarment proceedings, the Court merely calls upon members of the
bar to account for their actuations as officers of the Court.[34] Consequently, only the lawyer who is the subject of
the case is indispensable. No other party, not even a complainant, is needed.[35]
In this case, respondents are only called upon to account for their own conduct. Specifically, their pleadings contain
the accusation that complainant antedated the filing of a petition before the DOJ. The fact that Public Prosecutor
Jaban-Fama also signified her conformity to the pleadings containing these statements is irrelevant to the issue of
whether respondents' conduct warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
Respondents cannot utilize the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of the public prosecutor as a defense
for their own misconduct.
Respondents cannot excuse their conduct by invoking the presumption of regularity accorded to official acts of the
public prosecutor. It must be emphasized that the act in question, i.e. the preparation of the pleadings subject of
the Complaint, was performed by respondents and not by the public prosecutor. Hence, any impropriety in the
contents of or the language used in these pleadings originated from respondents. The mere fact that the public
prosecutor signed the pleadings after they were prepared could not have cured any impropriety contained therein.
The presumption that the public prosecutor performed her duties regularly and in accordance with law cannot
shield respondents from liability for their own conduct.
The claim of respondents that they relied in good faith on the approval of the public prosecutor is likewise
untenable. As lawyers, they have a personal obligation to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility. This
obligation includes the duty to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional
colleagues, including opposing counsel. Respondents cannot disregard this solemn duty solely on the basis of the
signature of a public prosecutor and later seek to absolve themselves from liability by pleading good faith.
Respondents violated Canons 8 and JO of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
There being no cause for the dismissal of the instant case, the Court now proceeds to determine whether
respondents have indeed violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We note that the essential allegations of the Complaint-Affidavit have already been admitted by respondents. In the
Comment[36] they submitted to this Court, they even reproduced the pertinent portions[37] of their pleadings that
contained the allegations of antedating. Accordingly, the only question left for us to resolve is whether their conduct
violates the ethical code of the profession.
After a thorough evaluation of the pleadings filed by the parties and the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco, the Court finds respondents guilty of violating Canons 8 [38] and 10[39] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly urged lawyers to utilize only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of
pleadings, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[40] Their arguments, whether written or oral, should be
gracious to both the court and the opposing counsel and should consist only of such words as may be properly
addressed by one honorable member of the bar to another.[41] In this case, respondents twice accused complainant
of antedating a petition it had filed with the DOJ without any proof whatsoever. This allegation of impropriety
undoubtedly brought complainant and its lawyers into disrepute. The accusation also tended to mislead the courts,
as it was made without hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary support. The Court cannot
condone this irresponsible and unprofessional behavior.
That the statements conveyed the perception by respondents of the events that transpired during the scheduled
arraignment and their "truthful belief regarding a perceived irregularity" in the filing of the Petition is not an excuse.
As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822:
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion
for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other
members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the
cause with which they are charged.[42]
Respondents' defense of absolute privilege is likewise untenable. Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of
judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof
is privileged.[43] While lawyers may enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability for privileged statements made in
their pleadings, they remain subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance
of their duty as members of the legal profession.[44]
We believe, though, that the use of intemperate and abusive language does not merit the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.[45] Nonetheless, respondents should be disciplined for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and sternly warned that the Court will deal with future similar conduct more severely.[46]
A final note. We find it necessary to remind the IBP of its duty to judiciously investigate and evaluate each and every
disciplinary action referred to it by this Court. In making its recommendations, the IBP should bear in mind the
purpose of disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar — to maintain the integrity of the legal profession
for the sake of public interest. Needless to state, the Court will not look with favor upon a recommendation based
entirely on technical and procedural grounds.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 22 March 2014 issued by the IBP Board of Governors is
hereby SET ASIDE. Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta are hereby ADMONISHED to use only respectful and
temperate language in the preparation of pleadings and to be more circumspect in dealing with their professional
colleagues. They are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of
the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-
7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning
of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA),
(4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and
cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate
that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man
and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed
is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with
our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married"
on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a
"secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will
be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession
may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but
only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course
of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of
the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-
laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney
and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur.
270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It
follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to
the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune
time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant
case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to
those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is,
as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where
in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . .
.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law
— accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers
and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching
their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony
with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and
the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But
this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession
for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work
for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before
me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may
give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add
that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer
in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without
a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law.
Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal
role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer
and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting
by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules
of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in
person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney,
and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses
of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of
a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice.
And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many
approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE —
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice
on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
 specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . .
. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining
an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating
to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal
contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in
connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It
is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has
long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients
of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129
Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.
W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
 instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care
of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale
or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or
the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that
the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice
of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal
if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for,
and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not
a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and
the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons
over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and
not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice
of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he
pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious
Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken
to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered,
we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
 Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative,
even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is
a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
[ ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1261, Dec 29, 1983 ]
TAN TEK BENG v. TIMOTEO A. DAVID +
DECISION
211 Phil. 547
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David (admitted to
the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-
half of the attorney's fees received by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:
"December 3, 1970
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng
"M a n i l a
"Dear Mr. Tan:
In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be followed in
connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as
follows:
"1. On all commission or attorney's fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of the collection that we
shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50
from domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved.
"2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.
"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the cases referred to us by
our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.
"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be turned over to our
clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor
are your clients.
"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in
connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be sincere, honest and fair with me.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Illegible
TIMEOTEO A. DAVID
P.S.
I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.
(Sgd.) Initial
"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last paragraph of
this letter.
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng
MR. TAN TEK BENG"
The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer David
not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound
himself not to deal directly with the clients.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual accusations
of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential
Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any
civil action to enforce the agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as
assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of
office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part
of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.
This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were
scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not
materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his
counsel.
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan City but it
was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor General's Office was informed
of that fact. A report on this case dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court.
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21
of Act No. 190).
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession,
not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional" (2 R. C. L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58
Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is condemned in
certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:
"34. Division of Fees. - No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a
division of service or responsibility."
"35. Intermediaries. - The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such registration.”
intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the
client. x x x"
"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. - A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or
HELD:Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828, providing “ The
other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure." (Appendix,
Malcolm, Legal Ethics). practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokets,
We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We
discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal constitutes malpractice, “ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
ethics) but because David should have known better.
in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a
"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C. J. S. 743). profession and not a business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached
to his record in the Bar Confidant's office. suspension.
SO ORDERED. 1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.

IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 3/23/29- MALPRACTICE For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded. IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA
Category: Legal Ethics

FACTS:The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that in the last 53 PHIL 37 3/23/29- MALPRACTICE
general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows: Category: Legal Ethics

“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as FACTS:The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that in the last

notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows:

renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and “LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as

can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can

any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and

and is willing to help and serve the poor.) can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation,

municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow: and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home

residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:

as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my “ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my

profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession

transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my

informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to

your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be

informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in
 establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one
month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however,
registration.” was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and
insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
HELD:Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828, providing “ The decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
[A.C. NO. 6672 : September 4, 2009]
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokets, PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
constitutes malpractice, “ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
profession and not a business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer
suspension. legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded.
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent's services
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944 instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent's" calling card:6
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, Front
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
LAW OFFFICE
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
OZAETA, J.:
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in
Fe Marie L. Labiano
the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Paralegal
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and Tel: 362-
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. 7820
confidential. Rm. M-01 Fax: (632)
Legal assistance service 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar 362-7821
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105 Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926)
Tel. 2-41-60. 2701719
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, Back
thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the
Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical
rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in
the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof. SERVICES OFFERED:
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision. CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession ABROAD.
who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled
the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the
CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant's professional practice in
violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer's
services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or
skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed
by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as
profited from referrals' suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.
Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list
nor receiving benefits from Labiano's "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano's connection to his
office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he
has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash
bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may
not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the client's cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client's
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his
client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client's cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court's
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to
protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the
legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed
penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best advertisement is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this
reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer's name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the
legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared
to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling
cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be
circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA 22, January 9, 1973]
16AUG
[Per Curiam]
FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the “earnest recommendation” — on the basis of
the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and “consistently with the
views and counsel received from its [the Commission’s] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar” — that “(the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar,
after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
HELD:
YES. On all issues.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec.
13 of the Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of law.”
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is “perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable,” within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.
In re Edillon
(A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978])
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?
Held:
It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and
his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Ratio Decidendi:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover, there
is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was
greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X,
Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.