FIRST DIVISION THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF RAPE COMMITTED IN THE
AFTERNOON OF 1 JUNE 1993." 4
[G.R. No. 119368. August 18, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCELINO "Senoy"
ERARDO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
In an information, dated 21 June 1993, herein accused-appellant Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo was charged
with the crime of rape committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 1st day of June 1993, around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon, in Barrio Site,
Barangay Labangan, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of Julie Ann Kiam, a woman who was deprived of reason, against
her will and consent.
Contrary to law." 1
When arraigned on 3 May 1994, Accused-appellant Erardo, with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Francis
Villamar, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged. 2
After trial, on 26 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46,
through the Honorable Judge Emilio L. Leachon, rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Accordingly, therefore, the Court finds the accused, Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to indemnify the victim-complainant Julie Ann Kiam in the amount of P40,000.00. cdtech
The Court likewise orders the immediate commitment of the accused Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo to the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila after the promulgation of this judgment/decision of
the court.
It is so ordered." 3
Hence, this appeal, where the accused-appellant Erardo assigns the following errors to the trial
court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE TESTIMONY OF
DR. HURLEY DE LOS REYES, THE PHYSICIAN WHO EXAMINED THE ALLEGED VICTIM,
THAT THE LATTER’S VAGINA CONTAINED OLD HYMENAL LACERATIONS AND COULD
NOT HAVE POSSIBLY INFLICTED [SIC] ON THE LAST THREE DAYS (DATE OF THE
ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME).
II
The events (as related by prosecution witness Jennylyn Cordero) which led to the filing of the complaint
and information, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 1 June 1993, Jennylyn Cordero (the victim’s aunt), while
sitting in the balcony of her house attending to her child, saw her niece, the victim Julie Ann Kiam, a 12-
year-old mental retardate, waving at the accused-appellant Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo, a neighbor. Julie
Ann was walking towards a thicket, and accused-appellant followed her there. Concerned for her niece’s
safety, Jennylyn, after leaving her child in the care of a neighbor, followed Julie Ann and the accused-
appellant Erardo to the bushes. Thereupon, she saw accused-appellant in the act of pulling his pants over
his exposed sexual organ, and the victim Julie Ann, sitting close to him on the grass, naked from the
waist down.
At that point, Jennylyn Cordero confronted accused-appellant with the question, "Bakit mo
pinagsasamantalahan and pamangkin kong retarded?" 5 Accused-appellant ignored the question and
hurriedly left. Thereafter, Jennylyn Cordero ushered the victim Julie Ann to her house where they
waited for the latter’s mother, Delia Cordero-Kiam (who is Jennylyn’s sister-in-law).
Mrs. Kiam was shocked and angry upon hearing Jennylyn’s account of what had transpired. Not
knowing who, or what government office could help her, Mrs. Kiam sent for her father (her husband,
Julie Ann’s father, was in Manila at that time), who promptly arrived the next day. He advised Mrs.
Kiam to have Julie Ann examined by a doctor; and then to file a criminal case for rape in court.
Julie Ann was examined by one Dr. Hurley de los Reyes on 3 June 1993, and the corresponding medical
certificate was issued. The victim’s family then proceeded to the police station where they filed a
complaint for rape against accused-appellant Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo.
To corroborate Jennylyn Cordero’s testimony, the prosecution presented the victim’s mother, Mrs. Delia
Cordero-Kiam who testified that accused-appellant Marcelino Erardo went to her house on 2 June 1993
to ask for her (Mrs. Kiam’s) forgiveness for what he had one to her daughter Julie Ann. According to
Mrs. Kiam, Accused-appellant admitted that he indeed engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim
Julie Ann, but claimed that he took care not to hurt her. 6 Mrs. Kiam further testified that after
consulting with other members of her family, she had her daughter Julie Ann examined by a doctor, and
thereafter, they filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant Marcelino Erardo.
The prosecution also presented Dr. Hurley de los Reyes who testified that he was the doctor who
examined the victim Julie Ann Kiam three days after the date of the alleged rape, and that he found no
injuries on the external parts of her body. He declared that he found hymenal lacerations on the victim’s
vagina which he estimated to be around one (1) to two (2) weeks old, and which could have been caused
by a round blunt object such as a male penis. 7
The testimony of one Dr. Ray Sague, a resident physician of the National Center for Mental Health in
Mandaluyong City, was also presented. Said witness testified that the victim Julie Ann Kiam, suffers
from mental retardation, and has, in fact, the mentality of a three-year-old child. 8
Finally, the prosecution presented the victim, Julie Ann Kiam, herself who, on direct examination,
testified thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
Q (Atty. Eufrocino Ramos, private prosecutor): Do you know the accused Senoy Erardo in this
case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A (Julie Ann Kiam): Yes, Sir.
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to point him out?
A Yes, Sir. Q Who?

Q Point him out now. A Senoy Erardo, your Honor.

(Interpreter: At this juncture, witness is pointing to the lone accused sitting on the bench, and who, when x x x
asked his name, responded that he is Senoy Erardo.)

x x x Q (Atty. Villamar): Aside from the penis of Senoy Erardo, you also saw other penis of some other men?

A None, Sir." 10
Q Now, this Senoy Erardo whom you pointed, what did he do to you?
On re-direct, Julie Ann Kiam testified thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A He "iyot" me, Sir.
"x x x
Q What do you mean by "iyot" ?
Q (Atty. Ramos): When your auntie saw you that afternoon, prior to that, what did Senoy use in
A "Tusok", Sir. penetrating you?

Q What was "tusok" to you? A Wood, Sir.

A His "titi" penis, sir. Q What else?

Q Where were you hit by this "titi" he "tusok" you? A "Titi", Sir.

(Interpreter: The witness, your Honor, is pointing to her private organ.) Q How long is the "titi" or penis?

Q When the accused made "tusok" or penetrated you, how did you feel? (Interpreter: The witness is demonstrating how big is the penis by using her hands which estimated by
counsels to be four and one-half (4 & 1/2) inches, your Honor.)" 11
A I cried, Sir.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he never even saw
x x x the victim Julie Ann Kiam in the afternoon of 1 June 1993. According to accused-appellant, he reported
for work in the saltfarm of a certain Mr. Jack Chua on that day, and was in said saltfarm from 7:00 a.m.
to 12:00 noon, and from 1:15 to 6:00 p.m. Accused-appellant further testified that on 2 June 1993, a day
Q Why did you cry, according to you? after the alleged rape, he was called to the house of Delia Cordero-Kiam, the victim’s mother, where he
was confronted with the accusation of allegedly raping Julie Ann Kiam, and asked to give the amount of
A Because it is painful, Sir." 9 P100,000.00 to settle the case. Finally, Accused-appellant testified that there was no quarrel or
misunderstanding between him and any member of the victim’s family; and, that they in fact had a
On cross-examination, the victim, Julie Ann Kiam, testified thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "good relationship" prior to 1 June 1993. 12

"x x x
Q (Atty. Francis Villamar, counsel for the accused): Ms. Witness, you said that Senoy Erardo made
some penetration to you which you called "tusok", is it not a fact that what is inserted to you is a finger?
A (Julie Ann Kiam): Yes, Sir, finger.chanrobles law library : red
Q (by the Court): Aside from finger, is there anything that was inserted to your vagina?
A Wood, your Honor.
To corroborate accused-appellant’s testimony, the defense presented his brother Zosimo Erardo who
testified that on 2 June 1993, one Kagawad Santiago Bicol went to his house to verify the complaint for
rape of Delia Cordero-Kiam against his brother Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo; that later that day, he
accompanied his brother, the accused-appellant, to the Kiam residence where they were confronted by
Delia Cordero-Kiam, Jennylyn Cordero, and one Rebecca Cordero; and, that on that same
occasion, Accused-appellant denied that he raped Delia Kiam’s daughter Julie Ann. Zosimo Erardo
further testified that the Kiam family asked for the amount of P100,000.00 to settle the case, but that
accused-appellant refused to pay. 13 It is noteworthy that, on cross-examination, the same witness
testified that thereafter, his brother, the accused-appellant, left Barangay Labangan and was gone for
several months. 14

Q Have you seen a human penis? The defense was supposed to present one Mr. Andres Andrade, Accused-appellant’s co-worker, to
testify that accused-appellant was at the aforementioned saltfarm between 1:15 to 6:00 o’clock in the
A Yes, your Honor. afternoon of 1 June 1993. However, the prosecution and the defense entered into a stipulation that said
witness if presented would testify as above-stated, and so the defense dispensed with the presentation of
Q Do you have [sic] sexual intercourse before, Miss Witness? Andres Andrade.

A Yes, your Honor. In convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, especially that of the victim, Julie Ann Kiam herself. Said the
court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As borne out by the transcript of stenographic notes, the victim Julie Ann Kiam, was able to answer
clearly the questions propounded to her by counsels of both parties and the court. The Court is
convinced by the manner of the testimony of the victim that she was in fact raped by the accused
Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo thru the latter’s insidious approaches and employment of trickery and
intimidation on a hapless retarded minor child of twelve summers . . .
In this case, the prosecution has clearly proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt thru the
testimonies of all its witnesses named above and the documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, the
defense was able to present the accused and his brother Zosimo Erardo only, and their testimonies were
permeated with strong denials of the commission of the crime. . . ." 15
We are inclined to agree with the findings of the trial court.
Under the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) by using force or intimidation;
(2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and,
(3) when the woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. 16
In this case, the victim Julie Ann Kiam, at the time of the incident, was a twelve-year-old woman with
the mentality of a three-year-old child. 17 This Court has held that carnal knowledge of a woman above
twelve (12) years of age but with the mental age of a child below twelve (12) years, even if done with
her consent, is rape 18 because a mental retardate can not validly give her consent to or oppose the
sexual act. 19
In his appeal to this Court, Accused-appellant Erardo submits that the trial court erred in finding that he
committed the crime of rape against Julie Ann Kiam on 1 June 1993. He argues that it is incredible that
prosecution witness Jennylyn Cordero did not even utter a word upon seeing the alleged act of rape, but
merely ordered her niece, the victim Julie Ann Kiam, to go home. 20
This contention is untenable, Jennylyn Cordero had testified under oath that she did ask accused-
appellant why he took advantage of her mentally-retarded niece, 21 before taking the victim to her
house. While it is true that this alleged utterance was not mentioned in her affidavit, Jennylyn Cordero
explained, to the satisfaction of the court, that this was so because the officer who was taking her sworn
statement never asked her about it. 22
At any rate, testimonial evidence in court carries more weight than affidavits. 23 Testimonies given
during trials are much more precise and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements. Ex-parte
affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for varied reasons, at times because of
partial or innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Witnesses can be expected everytime,
except when told, to distinguish between what may be consequential and what may be mere
insignificant details. 24
Furthermore, the fact that Jennylyn Cordero neither screamed nor asked for help upon discovering the
dastardly act on her niece, does not lessen her credibility as a witness. This Court has held that not every
witness to or victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectations
of mankind. 25 Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the
witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be expected or drawn.
26chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Accused-appellant likewise submits that the lower court erred in not taking into consideration the
testimony of Dr. Hurley de los Reyes, the physician who examined the victim, that the latter’s vagina
contained old hymenal lacerations which could not have possibly been inflicted in the last three (3) days
(before examination). Accused-appellant contends that since the medical examination was conducted
three (3) days after the alleged commission of rape, this implies that the hymenal lacerations already
existed prior to the date of the alleged rape.
This contention is likewise unavailing.
This Court has ruled that the claim that another person is responsible for the old healed lacerations prior
to the date of the examination does not negate the commission of rape by accused-appellant when this
has been demonstrated in vivid detail by complainant herself. 27 The absence of fresh lacerations does
not prove that she was not raped. 28
We now deal with the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi. As aforestated, Accused-appellant was
allegedly at his place of work at the time of the commission of the rape. Significant, however, is the fact
that accused-appellant’s place of work and the scene of the crime are located in the same barrio (Site),
and accused-appellant had not positively shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission thereof. Time and again, this Court has ruled that alibi
is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the victim and
prosecution witnesses. 29
In the case at bar, the victim Julie Ann Kiam herself, on both direct and cross-examinations, pointed to
the accused-appellant Marcelino Erardo as the man who had raped her. 30 This Court has held that when
the victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof. 31
The fact that the victim in this case is a mental retardate is of no consequence, as it is a settled rule that a
mental retardate, for that reason alone, is not disqualified from being a witness. 32 This Court has
likewise held that a mental retardate who has the ability to make perceptions known to others is a
competent witness. 33
Moreover, the trial court had observed that the victim Julie Ann Kiam was able to answer clearly the
questions propounded to her by counsels of both parties and the court; and the trial court was convinced
from the manner by which she testified that she had in fact been raped by accused-appellant Marcelino
"Senoy" Erardo 34 Well-settled is the rule that when the question of credence as to which of the
conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense where a rape was committed is in issue, the trial
court’s answer is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more
competent to so conclude, having seen closely the way the witnesses testified, their deportment, and the
peculiar manner in which they gave their testimonies and other evidence in court. 35
Finally, other circumstances exist which point to the guilt of Accused-Appellant. In his testimony,
defense witness Zosimo Erardo stated that his brother, the accused-appellant Marcelino Erardo, left
town after the rape incident and that he was gone for "several months. 36 Accused-appellant himself
admitted that he went to Panay for a month before surrendering himself to the authorities. 37
While the flight of an accused person after the commission of an offense creates no legal presumption of
guilt, it is nevertheless a circumstance which is admissible in evidence against him, and, if not explained
in a manner consistent with his innocence, is to be considered as tending to show that he was the person
who committed the deed. 38
It is also worthy to note the testimony of Mrs. Delia Cordero-Kiam that accused-appellant, together with
his brother, went to her house to ask for her forgiveness. This Court has ruled that such an act (of asking
for forgiveness) is undeniably indicative of guilt. 39
In sum, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant Marcelino "Senoy" Erardo is
guilty of the crime of rape as charged.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua, as meted out by the trial court on accused-appellant, is in accordance
with law. However, the amount of indemnity for the victim is hereby raised from Forty Thousand
(P40,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to conform with prevailing jurisprudence which
awards moral damages of P50,000.00 in the rape of young girls with ages ranging from thirteen (13) to
nineteen (19) years, rape of a mental retardate, forcible abduction with rape and statutory rape. 40
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision, dated 26 January 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46) is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that indemnity to the
victim which accused-appellant is adjudged to pay is raised from P40,000.00 to
P50,000.00.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 90047. June 18, 1990.]
L.M. HANDICRAFT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, LEOVIGILDO M. DIAPO, JR.,
VIRGILITA M. DIAPO AND LEONORA Q. MABASA, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS AND ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 90425. June 18, 1990.]
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. L.M. HANDICRAFT MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, LEOVIGILDO M. DIAPO, JR., VIRGILITA M. DIAPO, LEONORA Q.
MABASA AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Capuhan & Quimpo Law Office, for Petitioners.
Ocampo, Quiroz, Mina & Associates for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COMMERCIAL LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAWS; PROMISSORY NOTE; VALID
AND ENFORCEABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The promissory notes executed by the parties are all
valid and enforceable and must be paid in accordance with the agreement. The guaranty agreements
which secured the payment of the obligations were freely and intelligently signed by Leovigildo M.
Diapo, Jr., Virgilita M. Diapo and Leonora Q. Mabasa. The allegations of fraud and bad faith on the part
of the Allied Banking Corporation were not substantiated. Petitioners’ defense that the promissory notes
and bank documents that they signed were in blank is far from credible. Furthermore, petitioner
Leovigildo M. Diapo, Jr. himself, in his letter dated October 21, 1981 offering a settlement of the
accountabilities amounting to P2,498,940.00 thereby effectively made an admission of their outstanding
obligation to the Allied Banking Corporation. Clearly then, petitioners in G.R. No. 90047 have no valid
ground to disavow their solidary liability on the unpaid promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreements.
2. ID.; CENTRAL BANK ACT; IMPOSITION OF PENALTY CHARGE FOR UNPAID LOANS;
VALID. — Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation is entitled to the 1% penalty charge as agreed upon
by the parties herein. Paragraph 2 of the promissory notes explicitly states that respondents (in G.R. No.
90425) agree to pay jointly and severally a penalty equivalent to 1% of the amounts due for every month
that the loan remains unpaid from maturity date. This provision in the promissory notes is valid under
the rules and regulations of the Central Bank and is intended to protect the bank from borrowers who
fail to comply with their obligation to pay on the due date.
3. ID.; ID.; SERVICE CHARGE FOR LOANS EXTENDED BY BANKS; RULE. — The bank is
entitled to a 2% per annum service charge only and not to a 2% per month service charge as ordered by
the trial court. As in the payment of penalty charges, respondents in G.R. No. 90425 also agreed to the
deduction of customary service charges recited in the second paragraph of the promissory notes. Under
Central Bank Circular No. 504, commercial banks, specialized banking institutions, and non-bank
financial intermediaries authorized to engage in quasi-banking functions are allowed to collect a
maximum 2% service charge for amounts not over P500,000.00 on a per annum basis on the loan
principal or the outstanding balance thereof. Hence, the 2% per month service charge stated in the
dispositive portion of the trial court must be modified to 2% per annum.
4. ID.; ID.; PENALTY AND SERVICE CHARGES IMPOSED BY BANKS; NOT DELETED BY
REASON OF LOSSES SUFFERED BY BORROWER. — The losses suffered by private respondents
in G.R. No. 90425 do not justify the deletion of the penalty and service charges. Said charges were
clearly stated in writing in the contract which private respondents acknowledged and signed. The bank
cannot be said to have withheld the information regarding these charges as the same were specified in
the promissory notes. Having been agreed upon, said charges must be paid.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
These two petitions originated from an action to collect sums of money with damages filed by Allied
Banking Corporation against L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corporation, Leovigildo M. Diapo, Jr.,
Virgilita M. Diapo and Leonora Q. Mabasa. The complaint filed by the said bank is based on 20
promissory notes executed by L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corporation and guaranteed by the three
above-named persons which were either not paid or not fully paid despite formal demands.
After due trial, the lower court rendered a Decision favorable to the Allied Banking Corporation dated
January 4, 1988 with the following dispositive portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants, ordering them to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the following amounts, with
interests, plus stipulated service charges of 2% per month and penalty charges of 1% per month from the
date of the filing of this complaint January 15, 1982, until fully paid, pursuant to the causes of
action:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. First cause of action 9% p/a P 91,000.00
Second cause of action 9% p/a P 32,000.00
Third cause of action 9% p/a P 70,000.00
Fourth cause of action 9% p/a P 75,000.00
Fifth cause of action 9% p/a P 58,000.00
Sixth cause of action 9% p/a P 96,800.00
Seventh cause of action 14% p/a P196,000.00
Eighth cause of action 14% p/a P 70,200.00
Ninth cause of action 14% p/a P140,200.00
Tenth cause of action 14% p/a P 50,000.00
Eleventh cause of action 13.38% p/a P 61,000.00
Twelfth cause of action 14% p/a P 74,000.00
Thirteenth cause of action 16% p/a P462,100.00
Fourteenth cause of action 16% p/a P 60,000.00
Fifteenth cause of action 16% p/a P151,600.00
Sixteenth cause of action 16% p/a P 87,000.00
Seventeenth cause of action 16% p/a P 49,040.00
Eighteenth cause of action 16% p/a P 48,000.00
Nineteenth cause of action 16% p/a P387,000.00
Twentieth cause of action 16% p/a P141,000.00.
II. P5,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees.
III. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." 1
Not satisfied with the Decision of the trial court, L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corporation,
Leovigildo M. Diapo, Jr., Virgilita M. Diapo and Leonora Q. Mabasa appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals.
On August 31, 1989, the appellate court rendered its Decision which affirmed the Decision of the lower
court with the modification that the stipulated service charge of 2% per month and penalty charges of
1% per month should be deleted. 2
Both parties are now questioning the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals.
In G.R. No. 90425, petitioner Allied Banking Corporation alleges that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals should be modified by ordering the private respondents to pay petitioner, jointly and severally,
in addition to the amounts stated in the Decision of the trial court, the stipulated service charges of two
percent (2%) per annum and penalty charges of one percent (1%) per month from the date of filing of
the complaint on January 15, 1982, until full payment thereof and attorney’s fees equal to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total amount due and outstanding.
On the other hand, petitioners in G.R. No. 90047, namely, L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Co.,
Leovigildo M. Diapo, Jr., Virgilita M. Diapo and Leonora Q. Mabasa argue that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals should be reversed and set aside on the ground that the public respondent did not
declare the transactions sued upon as null and void for being contrary to law and for being usurious in
character and that the Court of Appeals should have declared that there was bad faith, fraud, undue
influence and breach of trust on the part of the Allied Banking Corporation. The three petitioners therein
also do not accept their liabilities on the personal guaranties as found by the trial court.
The petition in G.R. No. 90047 is devoid of merit. The promissory notes executed by the parties are all
valid and enforceable and must be paid in accordance with the agreement. The guaranty agreements
which secured the payment of the obligations were freely and intelligently signed by Leovigildo M.
Diapo, Jr., Virgilita M. Diapo and Leonora Q. Mabasa. The allegations of fraud and bad faith on the part
of the Allied Banking Corporation were not substantiated. Petitioners’ defense that the promissory notes
and bank documents that they signed were in blank is far from credible. Furthermore, petitioner
Leovigildo M. Diapo, Jr. himself, in his letter dated October 21, 1981 offering a settlement of the
accountabilities amounting to P2,498,940.00 thereby effectively made an admission of their outstanding
obligation to the Allied Banking Corporation. Clearly then, petitioners in G.R. No. 90047 have no valid
ground to disavow their solidary liability on the unpaid promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreements.
Turning Our attention to G.R. No. 90425, We find the petition of Allied Banking Corporation partly
meritorious. We agree with petitioner Bank that the Court of Appeals erred in deleting the payment to it
of service and penalty charges as ordered by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its Decision, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants, ordering them to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the following amounts, with
interests, plus stipulated service charges of 2% per month and penalty charges of 1% per month from the
date of the filing of this complaint January 15, 1982, until fully paid, pursuant to the causes of action." 3
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation is entitled to the 1% penalty charge as agreed upon by the parties
herein. Paragraph 2 of the promissory notes explicitly states that respondents (in G.R. No. 90425) agree
to pay jointly and severally a penalty equivalent to 1% of the amounts due for every month that the loan
remains unpaid from maturity date. This provision in the promissory notes is valid under the rules and
regulations of the Central Bank and is intended to protect the bank from borrowers who fail to comply
with their obligation to pay on the due date.
However, the bank is entitled to a 2% per annum service charge only and not to a 2% per month service
charge as ordered by the trial court. As in the payment of penalty charges, respondents in G.R. No.
90425 also agreed to the deduction of customary service charges recited in the second paragraph of the
promissory notes. Under Central Bank Circular No. 504, commercial banks, specialized banking
institutions, and non-bank financial intermediaries authorized to engage in quasi-banking functions are
allowed to collect a maximum 2% service charge for amounts not over P500,000.00 on a per annum
basis on the loan principal or the outstanding balance thereof. Hence, the 2% per month service charge
stated in the dispositive portion of the trial court must be modified to 2% per annum.
The losses suffered by private respondents in G.R. No. 90425 do not justify the deletion of the penalty
and service charges. Said charges were clearly stated in writing in the contract which private
respondents acknowledged and signed. The bank cannot be said to have withheld the information
regarding these charges as the same were specified in the promissory notes. Having been agreed upon,
said charges must be paid.
Regarding the prayer of petitioner Allied Banking Corporation that attorney’s fees in the sum equivalent
to 25% of the total amount due and outstanding be awarded to it. We deem it just and reasonable under
the circumstances to award the amount of P5,000.00, only as ordered by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing, the petition in G.R. No. 90047 is dismissed for lack of
merit. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17501 dated August 31,
1989 is affirmed, with the modification that respondents are ordered to pay jointly and severally
petitioner Allied Banking Corporation service charges in the amount of 2% per annum as well as penalty
charges of 1% per month computed from the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment
pursuant to the causes of action as enumerated in the dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial
court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED BANK, respondents.
Gancayco Law Offices for petitioners.
Jose A. Soluta, Jr. & Associates for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. seeks the
reversal of the decision of respondent court, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of June 11, 1991 is SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED;
the complaint is dismissed, and on the counterclaim, Transpacific is ordered to
pay Associated attorney's fees of P15,000.00.
Costs against Transpacific.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 47)
Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted several financial accommodations amounting
to P1,300,000.00 by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and secured by four (4)
promissory notes, a real estate mortgage covering three parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over
petitioner's stock and inventories.
Unable to settle its obligation in full, petitioner requested for, and was granted by respondent bank, a
restructuring of the remaining indebtedness which then amounted to P1,057,500.00, as all the previous
payments made were applied to penalties and interests.
To secure the re-structured loan of P1,213,400.00, three new promissory notes were executed by Trans-
Pacific as follows: (1) Promissory Note No. TL-9077-82 for the amount of P1,050,000.00 denominated
as working capital; (2) Promissory Note No. TL-9078-82 for the amount of P121,166.00 denominated as
restructured interest; (3) Promissory Note No. TL-9079-82 for the amount of P42,234.00 denominated
similarly as restructured interest (Rollo. pp. 113-115).
The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two other parcels of land
and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's stock inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold and
the proceeds amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were turned over to the bank and
applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Subsequently, respondent bank returned the duplicate
original copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.
Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded from Trans-
Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on PN No. TL-9077-82.
According to the bank, the promissory notes were erroneously released.
Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by respondent bank.
Later, it had a change of heart and instead initiated an action before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Br. 146, for specific performance and damages. There it prayed that the mortgage over the two parcels
of land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and that its obligation to the bank be declared as
having been fully paid.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Trans-Pacific, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and upon a clear preponderance of evidence
in support of the stated causes of action, the Court finds for the plaintiffs and
against defendant, and
(a) declares plaintiff's obligations to defendant to have been
already fully paid;
(b) orders defendant to execute and deliver to plaintiffs a
release on the i September 11, 1981 mortgage over TCT
(50858)
S-10086 and TCT (50859) S-109087, and ii December 20,
1983 chattel mortgage, within fifteen (15) days from the
finality hereof;
(c) orders defendant to pay plaintiffs Romeo Javier and
Romana Bataclan-Javier the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
moral damages; and
(d) orders defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00
as attorney's fees, plus expenses of the suit.
Defendant's counterclaims are dismissed for lack of merit.
With costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 101)
Respondent bank elevated the case to the appellate court which, as aforesaid, reversed the decision of
the trial court. In this appeal, petitioner raises four errors allegedly committed by the respondent court,
namely:
I
RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACCRUED INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT OF 492,100.00 HAS NOT BEEN
PAID WHEN ARTICLE 1176 OF THE CIVIL CODE PROVIDES THAT SUCH
CLAIM FOR INTEREST UPON RECEIPT OF PAYMENT OF THE
PRINCIPAL MUST BE RESERVED OTHERWISE IT IS DEEMED PAID.
 II
RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITH
THE DELIVERY OF THE DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING THE PRINCIPAL
OBLIGATION, THE ANCILLARY OBLIGATION OF PAYING INTEREST
WAS NOT RENOUNCED CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 1273
OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III
RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS FULLY PAID ITS OBLIGATION CONFORMABLY
WITH ARTICLE 1234 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
IV
RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF ASSOCIATED BANK (Rollo, p. 15).
The first three assigned errors will be treated jointly since their resolution border on the common issue,
i.e., whether or not petitioner has indeed paid in full its obligation to respondent bank.
Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that
petitioner has fully discharged its obligation by virtue of its possession of the documents (stamped
"PAID") evidencing its indebtedness. Respondent court disagreed and held, among others, that the
documents found in possession of Trans-Pacific are mere duplicates and cannot be the basis of
petitioner's claim that its obligation has been fully paid. Accordingly, since the promissory notes
submitted by petitioner were duplicates and not the originals, the delivery thereof by respondent bank to
the petitioner does not merit the application of Article 1271 (1st par.) of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made
voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action
which the former had against the latter.
Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be construed to mean the original copy of
the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document evidencing a
credit, it must be construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees
(Trans-Pacific) presented, not the originals but the duplicates of the three
promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is undisputed that the
documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it must
be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies
submitted by petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so
that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the
party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the
surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such
without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the possession of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice
(Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent bank.
This notwithstanding, we find no reversible error committed by the respondent court in disposing of the
appealed decision. As gleaned from the decision of the court a quo, judgment was rendered in favor of
petitioner on the basis of presumptions, to wit:
The surrender and return to plaintiffs of the promissory notes evidencing the
consolidated obligation as restructured, produces a legal presumption that
Associated had thereby renounced its actionable claim against plaintiffs (Art.
1271, NCC). The presumption is fortified by a showing that said promissory notes
all bear the stamp "PAID", and has not been otherwise overcome. Upon a clear
perception that Associated's record keeping has been less than exemplary . . ., a
proffer of bank copies of the promissory notes without the "PAID" stamps
thereon does not impress the Court as sufficient to overcome presumed remission
of the obligation vis-a-vis the return of said promissory notes. Indeed, applicable
law is supportive of a finding that in interest bearing obligations-as is the case
here, payment of principal (sic) shall not be deemed to have been made until the
interests have been covered (Art. 1253, NCC). Conversely, competent showing
that the principal has been paid, militates against postured entitlement to unpaid
interests.
In fine. the Court is satisfied that plaintiffs must be found to have settled their
obligations in full.
As corollary, a finding is accordingly compelled that plaintiffs (sic) accessory
obligations under the real estate mortgage over two (2) substituted lots as well as
the chattel mortgage, have been extinguished by the renunciation of the principal
debt (Art. 1273, NCC), following the time-honored axiom that the accessory
follows the principal. There is, therefore, compelling warrant (sic) to find in favor
of plaintiffs insofar as specific performance for the release of the mortgages on
the substituted lots and chattel is concerned. (Rollo, p. 100)
premised by:
Records show that Associated's Salvador M. Mesina is on record as having
testified that all three (3) December 8, 1990 promissory notes for the consolidated
principal obligation, interest and penalties had been fully paid (TSN, July 18,
1990, p. 18). It is, moreover, admitted that said promissory notes were
accordingly returned to Romeo Javier. (Ibid.)
The above disquisition finds no factual support, however, per review of the records. The presumption
created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima facie. If there be no
evidence to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the presumption loses its legal efficacy in
the face of proof or evidence to the contrary. In the case before us, we find sufficient justification to
overthrow the presumption of payment generated by the delivery of the documents evidencing
petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption, not of payment, but
of the renunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would be required than what normally
would be called for to prove payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of renunciation in the A The interest was not paid, but the principal obligation
delivery of a private instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy of was removed from our books, Your Honor.
the evidence of credit. Where several originals are made out of a private document, the intendment of
the law would thus be to refer to the delivery only of the original original rather than to the
Q And you returned the promissory note?
original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a copy. It would thus be absurd if Article
1271 were to be applied differently.
A We returned the promissory note. (TSN, July 18, 1990,
p. 22)
While it has been consistently held that findings of facts are not reviewable by this Court, this rule does
not find application where both the trial and the appellate courts differ thereon (Asia Brewery, Inc. v.
CA, 224 SCRA 437 [1993]). That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to the Associated Bank finds more than
ample confirmation and self-defeating posture in its letter dated December 16, 1985, addressed to
respondent bank, viz.:
Petitioner maintains that the findings of the trial court should be sustained because of its advantage in
observing the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying (citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 833) more so where it is supported by the records (Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos v. Court . . . that because of the prevailing unhealthy economic conditions, the business is
of Appeals, 192 SCRA 169). unable to generate sufficient resources for debt servicing.

This case, however, does not concern itself with the demeanor of witnesses. As for the records, there is Fundamentally on account of this, we propose that you permit us to fully liquidate
actually none submitted by petitioner to prove that the contested amount, i.e., the interest, has been paid the remaining obligations to you of P492,100 through a payment in kind (dacion
in full. In civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping en pago) arrangement by way of the equipments (sic) and spare parts under
Agency v. NLRC 200 SCRA 178 [1991]). Petitioner could have easily adduced the receipts chattel mortgage to you to the extent of their latest appraised values." (Rollo, pp.
corresponding to the amounts paid inclusive of the interest to prove that it has fully discharged its 153-154; Emphasis supplied)
obligation but it did not.
Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which reads:
There is likewise nothing on the records relied upon by the trial court to support its claim, by empirical
evidence, that the amount corresponding to the interest has indeed been paid. The trial court totally
We have had a series of communications with your bank regarding our proposal
relied on a disputable presumption that the obligation of petitioner as regards interest has been fully
liquidated by the respondent's act of delivering the instrument evidencing the principal obligation. for the eventual settlement of our remaining obligations . . .
Rebuttable as they are, the court a quo chose to ignore an earlier testimony of Mr. Mesina anent the
outstanding balance pertaining to interest, as follows: As you may be able to glean from these letters and from your credit files, we have
always been conscious of our obligation to you which had not been faithfully
Court: serviced on account of unfortunate business reverses. Notwithstanding these
however, total payments thus far remitted to you already exceede (sic) the original
principal amount of our obligation. But because of interest and other charges, we
Q Notwithstanding, let us go now specifically to find ourselves still obligated to you by P492,100.00. . . .
promissory note No. 9077-82 in the amount of consolidated
principal of P1,050,000.00. Does the Court get it correctly
that this consolidated balance has been fully paid? . . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid (sic) situation in as much as the
overall outlook of the industry has not substantially improved. Principally for this
reason, we had proposed to settle our remaining obligations to you by way of
A Yes, the principal, yes, sir. dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and spare parts mortgaged to you to (the)
extent of their applicable loan values. (Rollo, p. 155; Emphasis supplied)
Q Fully settled?
Petitioner claims that the above offer of settlement or compromise is not an admission that anything is
due and is inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
A Fully settled, but the interest of that promissory note has
Unfortunately, this is not an iron-clad rule.
not been paid, Your Honor.

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the

Q In other words, you are saying, fully settled but not truly
case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
fully settled?
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation,
the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
A The interest was not paid. existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission
is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980
ed.); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84,
Q Not fully settled?
9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a borrower's loan balance
(L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is
what petitioner did in the case before us for review.
Finally, respondent court is faulted in awarding attorney's fees in favor of Associated Bank. True,
attorney's fees may be awarded in a case of clearly unfounded civil action (Art. 2208 [4], CC). However,
petitioner claims that it was compelled to file the suit for damages in the honest belief that it has fully
discharged its obligations in favor of respondent bank and therefore not unfounded.
We believe otherwise. As petitioner would rather vehemently deny, undisputed is the fact of its
admission regarding the unpaid balance of P492,100.00 representing interests. It cannot also be denied
that petitioner opted to sue for specific performance and damages after consultation with a lawyer
(Rollo, p. 99) who advised that not even the claim for interests could be recovered; hence, petitioner's
attempt to seek refuge under Art. 1271 (CC). As previously discussed, the presumption generated by
Art. 1271 is not conclusive and was successfully rebutted by private respondent. Under the
circumstances, i.e., outright and honest letters of admission vis-a-vis counsel-induced recalcitrance,
there could hardly be honest belief. In this regard, we quote with approval respondent court's
observation:
The countervailing evidence against the claim of full payment emanated from
Transpacific itself. It cannot profess ignorance of the existence of the two letters,
Exhs. 3 & 4, or of the import of what they contain. Notwithstanding the letters,
Transpacific opted to file suit and insist(ed) that its liabilities had already been
paid. There was thus an
ill-advised attempt on the part of Transpacific to capitalize on the delivery of the
duplicates of the promissory notes, in complete disregard of what its own records
show. In the circumstances, Art. 2208 (4) and (11) justify the award of attorney's
fees. The sum of P15,000.00 is fair and equitable. (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 118940-41. July 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA,
EDWIN BENITO, PEDRO PARAAN, and JOSEPH FABITO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the
latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin
was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the
wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the road when the
jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he sustained. Catugas
survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito,
Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified
person. Mejia and Benito were taken into police custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan, the
following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead three days after the incident in
question, while the others have remained at large. Three separate criminal complaints for
murder,1 frustrated murder,2 and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended)3 were filed against them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter-affidavits, accused Mejia, Benito,
Paraan, and Fabito did not submit their counter-affidavits.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order4 declaring the accused to have waived their right
to be heard in preliminary investigation; finding a prima facie case against the accused; recommending
that they be charged with and prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of
R.A. No. 6539, as amended; and ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three separate informations for murder, frustrated murder,
and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, against the aforenamed persons. The
informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D, 94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D,
respectively. The first was later amended. The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla,
Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO
LANDINGIN inflicting upon him stab wounds which caused his instant death to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla,
Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab VIRGILIO
CATUGAS Y CASTAEDA inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, the accused having then
performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence
but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and
that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Catugas y Castaeda which
prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla,
Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with knives by means of violence against person by
stabbing to death TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432
with marking Lovely and thereafter with intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away said passenger
jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely owned and driven by Teofilo Landingin without
the latters consent, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by Judge Crispin C.
Laron (hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter consolidated and jointly tried. The third was assigned to
Branch 43 of the said court presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of innocence in each case.
I
THE CASES IN THE LARON COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (Frustrated Murder) in
the LARON court, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Virgilio Catugas, policemen
Dominguillo Gulen and Bernardo Clemente, Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma. Nora Landingin, and Dr. Roberto
Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was recalled as rebuttal witness. In their defense, accused Mejia, Benito,
Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand. They also presented as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot,
Shirley Lomboy, Conrado Benito, policeman Bernardo Clemente, and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence
in chief and Julia Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front of the CS1 Supermarket in
Dagupan City waiting for a transportation to take him to his home at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Later, a passenger jeepney plying the Dagupan City - Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo Landingin
arrived. He boarded it and occupied that portion of the passengers' seat behind the drivers seat. There
were already some passengers inside the jeepney, but they disembarked before the jeepney reached the
boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving behind Landingin, Catugas, and two other
passengers.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel, Calasiao, nine persons flagged down
the jeepney and boarded it. One of them, whom Catugas identified to be accused Edwin Benito, sat
beside the driver; the rest took the passenger seats behind the drivers seat. Catugas fully recognized
Benito because there was light at the ceiling of the jeepney and at the signboard portion of the jeepney
and the latter sometimes turned his face toward the back where Catugas was seated. Catugas had further
observed Benitos face, ears, and eyes. 9 He also recognized accused Mejia, Fabito, and
Paraan.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for Pangasinan Village Inn (PVI) in Bued,
Calasiao. But when they reached PVI, one of them said that his companions did not know where they
were going, and informed Landingin that he would take care of the fare upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon reaching Nansangaan, one of the nine passengers asked Landingin to drive a
little farther. Later, Mejia asked Catugas whether he was Landingins companion; Catugas answered in
the affirmative. Mejia then announced: [T]his is a hold-up; while Benito said: [N]obody will be able to
be saved his life [sic]. Another companion of Mejia said: Proceed. All of the nine drew their daggers and
stabbed Landingin and Catugas.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who conducted an autopsy on Landingins
cadaver, found three stab wounds - two of which were fatal. According to him, the cause of Landingins
death was cardiorespiratory arrest resulting from hypovolemic shock due to internal hemorrhage. 12 Nora
Landingin, wife of Teofilo Landingin, spent P1,500 daily during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for
his burial; and P16,000 for the tomb. Nora felt sad because of his death.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and landed on the road, was brought by
some people to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital.14 Dr. Roberto Valenzuela performed on Catugas
exploratory laparatomy debridement and found three multi-lacerations in the right upper extremities and
several others on the left upper extremities which could have been caused by bladed
instruments.15 Catugas survived and was confined for seven days. He spent more than P50,000 for his
hospitalization and medical expenses. The hospital billed him in the amount
of P44,667.25.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of the Mabini Police
Station, Mabini, Pangasinan, was approaching his residence at the poblacion in Sual, Pangasinan, on
board a police patrol car, he saw six men walking in front of his house. When he stopped the car, the
men ran away. He gave chase and caught two of them, namely, accused Mejia and Benito. Gulen
thought that they belonged to an akyat-bahay gang. When asked what they were doing, the two
answered that they were not doing anything and that they were not robbers. They told Gulen that they
were from Sta. Barbara. Benito even showed his drivers license and told Gulen that he did not commit
any crime and that he was willing to go to the police station. Gulen then brought the two and turned
them over to the police station in Sual, Pangasinan.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, entered in the
police blotter this turn-over and talked to the two. In the course of their conversation, Benito reported
that they rode on a jeepney, which was abandoned somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided to make a
follow-up of this report. With Benito as their guide, Clemente and three other policemen were able to
find the jeepney with the marking LOVELY in Sitio Nipa, Barangay Baguioen, Sual, Pangasinan. The
jeepney had bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought it to the police station and had the
matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente then instructed the radio operator to call the police
station of Sta. Barbara and inform it of the turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m. of 11 March
1994, the PNP elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and received the two, as well as the
passenger jeepney.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of Sual apprehended Joseph Fabito in
Sitio Looc, Poblacion Sual, as a murder suspect. He was turned over to the Sual Police Station. After
having been informed of this arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police Station took him into its custody. These
facts were entered in the Sual Police Station blotter.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingins jeepney that fateful evening of
10 March 1994, but denied having committed the crimes. They claimed that it was Romulo Calimquim
and his companions who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and drove away the jeepney. The following
is a summary of their version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, was the driver of the Elf truck of
Lito Lomboy of Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which was used in hauling sand and gravel. His co-accused
Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering sand and gravel, the accused
returned the truck and went to the house of Fabitos brother-in-law in San Miguel, Calasiao. After two
hours of waiting in vain for the brother-in-law, Paraan suggested that they go to the house of his future
brother-in-law in Bacayao Norte, Calasiao. After some snacks they proceeded to the town proper and
strolled for a while. Then, Benito thought that it was time to go home to Sta. Barbara and suggested that
they should. They proceeded to a waiting shed near the National High School to wait for a transportation
for Sta. Barbara. At the waiting shed, they saw Romulo Calimquim with three other companions, who
were also waiting for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged down an approaching
passenger jeepney. He and his companions boarded it. So did Benito and his companions. Calimquim
sat beside the driver. The rest took the back seat.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a huge body, who sat beside the
driver.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta. Barbara and that leading to the national
highway, the man who sat beside the driver (Calimquim, according to Benito; Mamaril, according to
Paraan) ordered the driver to proceed to the national highway; the driver did. But after reaching the
highway, in Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, the former ordered the latter to stop, announced that this is a hold
up, then stabbed the driver several times, pulled his body out of the jeepney, took over the wheel, and
drove the jeepney.22 In the meantime, at the back seat, one of the companions of Calimquim pointed a
knife at Benito; while the others told Benitos companions to lie on their belly. It was when Catugas
attempted to fight back that he was stabbed.23 Catugas was then thrown out of the
jeepney.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim from alighting from the jeepney.
Upon reaching a mountain in Sual, Pangasinan,25 the man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan,
and Fabito to alight from the jeepney. The group of Calimquim pointed knives26 and a gun27 at them.
Then suddenly there was a light coming from below. They ran away from the group of
Calimquim.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Benito and Mejia were together.29 Later, a policeman saw them. The two told the policeman that they
are not "troublesome persons. The policeman brought them to the Police Station of Sual. There, Benito
reported what had happened and accompanied the policemen to the place where the jeepney in question
was located.30 Afterwards, the two were detained at Sta. Barbara Police Station. While in detention, they
were informed that Calimquim was killed and his body was found in
Alaminos.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March 1994 and went to the house of
Roland, his brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him to request a barangay councilman to
accompany him to the police station. It was the barangay captain who accompanied him the following
day to the police station. There, the police authorities told him that he was among the assailants of
Landingin and that he was the one who stabbed Catugas in the night of 10 March 1994 and one of the
suspects in the carnapping of the jeepney of Landingin.32 Paraan was forthwith placed inside the jail.
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, he was by the seashore. He
stayed there until 6:00 a.m. and inquired from someone the location of the police station. He went to that
station which happened to be Sual Police Station. There, he narrated to the policemen what had
happened. When a policeman asked him whether he was the killer, he answered in the negative. At
around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail, where he was detained for three
months. Then, he was committed to the Provincial Jail.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was already driving a tricycle, the parents
of the accused met with him and informed him that the accused told them that they (the accused) did not
commit any wrong. Catugas answered that he had suffered several wounds and spent much for his
hospitalization and that since the accused were the ones apprehended, he would just tell a lie so he could
recover the amounts he spent. Catugas then asked P20,000 from each of the accused, or a total
of P80,000, and repeated this demand five to six times.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente, also proved that Romulo
Calimquim died due to a gunshot wound on 13 March 1994 in Barangay Paitan West, Sual, Pangasinan,
as evidenced by Entry No. 4338 of Page 260 of the Police Blotter. 35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed Landingin and that accused
Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones who stabbed him. He further declared that it was the parents of
the accused who offered to pay him, but he refused because such an offer could not be accepted by [his]
conscience.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She denounced as untrue the testimony
on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of accused were the ones who offered to pay him money. Julia
declared that they visited Catugas to ask him whether it was true that their children committed the crime.
On their first visit, Catugas told them that he could not yet answer that question; but when they returned,
Catugas told them that they had to pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the
accused.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on the identification
of the accused by Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive on the part of the latter, and the offer of the
parents of the accused to compromise the cases.
In its decision dated 17 November 1994,38 the LARON court convicted accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan,
and Fabito of the crime of murder and of frustrated murder, with treachery as the qualifying
circumstance and nighttime and band as aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, it sentenced the first
three accused to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder; and ten years and one day of prision
mayor to seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal for the crime of frustrated
murder. It credited Paraan with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, he being only
seventeen years old at the time of the commission of the crimes charged; and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua for murder, and six years of prision correccional to ten years and one day of prision mayor for
frustrated murder. The Court also ordered the four accused to pay the heirs of Teofilo Landingin the
amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and P12,000 for funeral
expenses; and to pay Catugas the amount of P44,687.25 for hospital expenses, plus costs.
II
THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act) in the CASTILLO Court, the
prosecution presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas and Nora Landingin. The former was recalled as
rebuttal witness. The accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand and presented as
additional witnesses Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito. Their testimonies were substantially the same
as those they made in the murder and frustrated murder cases in the LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed, he was thrown out of the
jeepney to the shoulder of the road and that one of the culprits took the wheel of the jeepney, started off
its engine, and drove off.39 He further declared that while he was confined at the hospital, the policemen
of Sta. Barbara investigated him, showed him pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspects
names,40 and took his statement.41 After he was discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with the father
of accused Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization expenses and asked P80,000, as a settlement
of the case, to be paid by the parents of the accused on an agreed date; but before that date came, he had
already testified against the accused.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin, further testified that her husband
owned the passenger jeepney in question, as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No.
19253856,43 and Official Receipt No. MVRR 91354948. 44 The jeepney was
worth P140,000.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked the version of the
defense on account of the following inculpating evidence, which, according to it, bolstered its finding
that the accused were the authors of the crime charged:
1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan speak of innocence and fear
for their lives during the ruthless incident, unfortunately they never sustained any bodily injury on their
bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt anybody, they could not have
concentrated on the persons of Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but they should
have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their persons (accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did not do anything except to passively stay at
the back seat of the jeepney motionless from the place of stabbing incident in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan
up to the mountains in Sual, Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to carnapp [sic] the passenger
jeepney of Teofilo Landingin then the logical conclusion that can be had in the instant
situation is for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all passengers for that matter,
including the four (4) accused to eliminate the presence of eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok in going to Sual,
Pangasinan without offering any slight resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that, Mok and company
belonged to the group of the four (4) accused who were responsible in perpetrating the
offense charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are the real offenders, why is it that during the
long span of travel from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never made any attempt to jump off the passenger
jeepney; neither did they show any positive signs to invite the attention of PNP members stationed along
the long route starting in Dagupan City, Binmaley, Lingayen, Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.
4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly claim innocence of the crime charged. In fact,
they averred that upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they reported to the responding peace officers what
happened to them and that their reports was recorded in the Police Blotter of Sual Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with absolute falsity and is
debunked by the entry in the Police Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the subject
certification negates accuseds statement of innocence. The subject entry which is contained
in the Book of Events of Sual Police Station belies any complaint/report made by accused
Edwin Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were kidnapped or deprived of their liberty with the
use of guns and bladed weapons. Upon the other hand, the Certification squarely bespeaks
of the incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at Sual Police Station for
they were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney involved in the above case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan, they likewise vehemently denied the
accusation lodged against them. Unfortunately, their conclusion of innocence crumbled when they
joined the group from the crime scene starting in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to their destination in
Sual, Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual, Pangasinan they scampered and run away to different
directions to avoid apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making any report to the nearest authority i.e.
Barangay Captain of the place they decided to escape which they did with impunity. The records in the
Police Blotter of Sual is negatived (sic) of any entry about the whereabouts of accused Paraan and
Fabito.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty
of the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. It sentenced the first three accused to
death; and Paraan, to reclusion perpetua on account of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. It also ordered them to pay the costs.
III
THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court is automatic pursuant to
Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659,47 the convicted accused filed with this Court their notices of appeal from
the decision of the LARON court and of the CASTILLO court on 18 November 1994 and 22 February
1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 118940-41,
and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed as G.R. No. 119407.
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellants Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No.
119407, the appellants filed a motion for the consolidation of these cases, which we granted on 27
February 1996.
In their Appellants Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants impute upon the trial court the
following errors: (a) in giving full faith and credence to the unsubstantiated testimony of prosecution
witness Virgilio Catugas relative to the incident in question; (b) in holding them as the persons who
stabbed the jeepney driver and Virgilio Catugas in the evening of 10 March 1994 despite the fact that
clear and convincing evidence were proffered to point at the real culprits, Romulo Calimquim and his
companions; (c) in rendering a verdict of conviction notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (d) in convicting them of the crimes charged instead of
the crimes homicide and frustrated homicide -- on the assumption that they are guilty.
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned errors. They submit that:
(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the identification of the appellants leaves much to be
desired. He should not be believed, for he could not even remember who among the appellants were
wearing short pants, hat, and shoes at that time. If policeman Gulen could not even identify in court
appellant Mejia whom he apprehended in the evening of 10 March 1994 and brought to the Sual Police
Station, it was with more reason that Catugas could not have identified the assailants since it was
nighttime. The possibility that Catugas got confused, if not mentally and physically drained, as a result
of the shocking incident is not far-fetched. There is then a very strong and compelling reason to believe
that Catugas mistook the appellants as the real hold-uppers.
(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their children did not commit any wrong, but
Catugas vacillated and testified falsely against accused-appellants when they were not able to produce
the amount of P20,000.00 each as earlier demanded from them. Catugas denial of their testimony is self-
serving and cannot overcome the positive testimony of Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin Benito augurs well with their claim of
innocence, when they were apprehended. Benito readily showed his drivers license, answered questions
propounded by policeman Clemente, and without hesitation he helped or guided the policemen in
locating the jeepney at the place where it was abandoned. He did not try to hide or conceal anything
when he was confronted about the incident. Moreover, when Benito and Mejia were picked up by a
policeman on that fateful night, they were not tainted with blood.
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be liable for homicide and frustrated
homicide, since treachery was not established.
In their Appellants Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following assignment of errors: (a) the facts
charged in the information do not constitute violation of the crime of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended; (b) The court a quo erred in convicting them of the crime charged on the basis of surmises and
conjecture; and (c) the court a quo erred in convicting them by relying fully on the evidence of the
prosecution and completely disregarding the evidence of the defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an essential ingredient of the crime
of carnapping,was not proved.They claim that from the evidence adduced it is very clear that the
incident was only a hold-up and that the jeepney was taken to Sual as escape vehicle.
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they discussed jointly, the appellants submit
that:
(1) The trial courts conclusion on their culpability was based on mere surmises and conjectures and
contradicted by the evidence on the record. The fact that the group of Calimquim did not hurt any of the
four appellants and that the latter offered no resistance does not prove appellants membership in
Calimquims group. That they did not even jump off the passenger jeepney or show positive signs to
invite the attention of the PNP stationed along the route from Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of
fear since Calimquims group pointed knives at each of them and ordered them to lie down in stooping
position. The absence of conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after they were released as
hostages, they ran in separate directions and did not join the group of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that Benito and Mejia were suspected of having
carnapped the passenger jeepney does not bind them, for it was made by a police officer and was
contrary to what they had reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and Fabito had escaped.
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of Catugas whose identification of the
appellants was based only on the pictures and on the information of the policemen. It was impossible for
Catugas to narrate in detail the participation of each accused, considering that the light in the jeepney
was dim and his principal attention was concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellants reporting of the incident disproved their membership in the group of Calimquim. If they
were members, their natural course would have been to hide from the authorities. Their voluntary
submission to the police immediately after the incident should have been given credence as part of
the res gestae.
In the Consolidated Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to affirm in
toto the challenged decisions for failure of the appellants to show that the trial court committed error in
finding the prosecution evidence clear, sufficient, and convincing to convict. Catugas, who made an
eyewitness account, had the opportunity to observe the appellants during the commission of the crime
and had no ill-motive to implicate the appellants falsely. As to the charge that he perjured because the
appellants were not able to produce the amount of P80,000 which he allegedly demanded from them, the
same should not be believed. The truth is, it was the parents of the appellants who approached Catugas
and offered him P80,000 in order that he would not testify against the appellants. Catugas did not accept
the offer, as it was against his principles to tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence, the trial court was correct in
convicting the appellants of murder for the death of Teofilo Landingin and frustrated murder for
stabbing Virgilio Catugas. Their conviction for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act is also proper,
since their main purpose was to get the jeepney and they killed Landingin in order that they could get it.
They presented no evidence to prove that they ran away with the jeepney for any lawful purpose.
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the identification made by the
prosecution witness Catugas cannot be denominated as clear, positive, and convincing; for, while it may
be true that he could have taken glimpse or glance at the faces of all the accused-appellants, this fact
alone is not adequate and fell short of the required test of positive identification. They strongly suggest
that Catugas had ill-motive to testify falsely against them in that he was not paid the P80,000 he
demanded.
IV
THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS
Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in order. The crimes charged in the
informations filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO court are irretrievably linked with or
related to one another. They arose out of the same incident, are founded on the same factual milieu, and
would be proved by testimonies of the same witnesses. The three cases then should have been
consolidated and jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of Dagupan City. What were jointly tried were
only the cases for murder and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or
forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the courts discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or
abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary
cost or expense; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties
litigants.48 In Raymundo v. Elipe,49 we held that although consolidation of several cases involving the
same parties and the same subject matter is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, joint
hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even filed with
the different branches of the same court, provided one of such cases has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO court nor any of the
parties caused, or moved for, a consolidation of the case for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act
(which has the higher docket number) with the cases for murder and frustrated murder in the LARON
court (which have lower docket numbers). It was only after the filing of their separate Appellants Brief
in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407 that the appellants moved to consolidate the latter with
the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could contribute some difficulty in the
appreciation of the evidence. The principal witnesses of the parties testified in all the three cases. Yet,
the assessment of their testimony and credibility in the LARON court must not be influenced by their
testimonies in the case before the CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution
witness Catugas was unclear in some details of the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the
other hand, there were details he disclosed in one of the courts which were not given in the other court.
The same observation may be had on the testimonies of the appellants before both courts. As one reads
the transcripts of the testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it would be quite difficult to avoid
forming impressions in light of the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our minds and mental
processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on evidence and the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants dictate that we resolve the appeals in
the cases before the LARON court and the case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the
evidence presented before such courts, respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 94-
00617-D and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D are absorbed in the violation of the
Anti-Carnapping Act in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 199350 is applicable to these cases because the crimes
were committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20
of R.A. No. 7659 and now imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. This Section, as amended, reads in full as follows:
SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. -- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years
and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or
force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more
than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Underscoring supplied for emphasis).
In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:
and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping. (stress supplied).
Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life imprisonment
to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase in the commission of
the carnapping to in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The
latter makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of
analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the crime of
carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form. In short, considering the phraseology of the amended
Section 14,51 the carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible
crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words IS KILLED, no distinction must be made between
homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the course of carnapping or
on the occasion thereof makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin -- whether it be homicide or murder --
cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should only be considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an
aggravated form, the prosecution had still to prove the essential requisites of the homicide or murder of
Landingin and that of carnapping. This should have been another reason for the consolidation of the
carnapping case in the CASTILLO court with the cases before the LARON court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, include
the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little differently, does murder or homicide in its
frustrated stage also qualify carnapping if it is committed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof? The answer must be in the negative in light of the use in said
Section 14 of the words IS KILLED. The unmistakable import thereof is that it refers only to
the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof, then it must be deemed to fall under the clause (of Section 14)
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person.
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the carnapping of
Teofilo Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a motor vehicle under the definition in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6539.52 The passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of gain, from Landingin by means of
violence against him which caused his death and against a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered
physical injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of the appellants? The LARON and
the CASTILLO courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.53 To overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established
by the prosecution.54 Save in certain circumstances as where, for instance, the accused admits the
commission of the acts alleged to constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden
is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of his defense. Indeed, unless the
prosecution successfully discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit only if
the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the
most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever
defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the accuseds innocence must be duly
taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged.56 If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is
not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty to acquit
him.57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies
of the witnesses in the cases before the LARON court and the CASTILLO court, we are not convinced
with moral certainty that the appellants committed the crimes charged. Reasonable doubt burdens our
conscience; our minds cannot rest easy on a verdict of conviction.
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants and the five others, namely, Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you mentioned the names of the person and I
Romulo Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a certain Mondragon, and another described as will now read:
John Doe. All nine were forthwith charged with the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and carnapping
in Criminal Cases Nos. 3310,58 3313,59 3311,60 respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you know them?
Barbara, Pangasinan, and then in the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D,61 and 94-00619-
D62 of the LARON court and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D63 of the CASTILLO court, respectively.
A In fact I do not know, however, based on the police investigation of Sta. Barbara
PNP, they were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito, Pedro
The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the group of Romulo Calimquim. The
Paraan, Mok Calimquim, alyas Dennis, Alex Mamaril, Dennis Abrigo alyas
prosecution has no proof to prove otherwise; but the LARON and the CASTILLO courts, through
Mondragon and one unidentified person.
inferences from certain facts, concluded that the appellants were. The conclusion is rather tenuous.
While the rigorous cross-examination of the appellants in all these cases has established close
relationship among the appellants by reason of their residence and work, (Benito, as sand-and-gravel can you tell this Court why these persons were written in your statement?
truck driver and Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan as his keepers), it miserably failed to establish any
relationship between them and the five others headed by Calimquim. What then looms large in our
minds is that the appellants and the five others happened to be passengers of Landingins jeepney by A Because of the police investigation.
accident, not by design. If the appellants were with the five others until Sual, Pangasinan, it was because
they were intimidated and made to lie down on their bellies inside the jeepney. Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not able to identify the accused, is that correct?

Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not belong to the group of Calimquim. Upon A I can recognize the others, sir.
arrival in the mountains of Sual, they fled from the Calimquim group when the first opportunity to do so
came. We find to be absolutely without basis the statement of the CASTILLO court that the appellants
abandoned Landingins jeepney in Sitio Nipa, Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, upon seeing the arrival of Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize?
concerned citizens and members of the Sual Police Station; the responding peace officers effected the
recovery of the subject jeepney sans the accused/culprits. No prosecution witness so testified. In the A Three (3) of them, sir.
CASTILLO court, no policeman was presented as witness for the prosecution. The evidence presented
by both the prosecution and the defense reveal that after appellants Benito and Mejia were picked up by
Policeman Gulen on the latters suspicion that they were members of an akyat-bahay gang, they COURT:
voluntarily informed the police authorities of the Sual Police Station of what had happened. It was this
information that brought the policemen to where the subject jeepney was located. Benito even Q What you do mean when you said that that you can recognize three (3) of them?
accompanied the policemen. This resulted in the recovery of the jeepney by the policemen. Appellant
Paraan also presented himself later to the Police Station of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito, although
apprehended by concerned citizens of the place to where he had fled, voluntarily reported what he knew A I can remember those persons who sat near me.
to the police authorities of Sual and Sta. Barbara.
Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you?
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters of the police
stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the appellants had declared in court A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the four accused.
is not conclusive evidence that they did not report the incident to the police authorities. They had no
participation in the preparation of the entries. Entries in the police blotters should not be given undue
significance or probative value, for they are normally incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] person who is [sic] wearing in [sic] red T-shirt?
partial suggestion of for want of suggestion or inquiries.64 The entries in question are sadly wanting in
material particulars. At the very most, they only recorded the impression that the appellants were A I saw his face, sir.
suspects.

Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring to Edwin Benito)?
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the prosecution had to
rely solely on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. The totality of his testimony in the cases before the
LARON court leaves much to be desired. The prosecutor who conducted the direct examination was A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir.65chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
unable to propound sensible questions to elicit clear answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events
surrounding the commission of the alleged crimes. This deficiency thus tempted the trial judge to ask Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the following admissions on cross-
more questions. Despite the latters participation, the testimony of Catugas fails to convince us that the examination:
appellants indeed participated in the commission of the crimes. On cross-examination in the LARON
court, Catugas categorically admitted that he did not know the names of the appellants and that he could
recognize only three of the nine accused. Thus: Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat besides [sic] the driver, is it not?

ATTY. TAMINAYA: A Yes, sir.

Q Please point to him? Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the appellants inflicted any of
the stab wounds on his body. Further compounding the uncertainty and unreliability of Catugas
testimony, he candidly admitted on cross-examination that only one person stabbed him. Thus:
A He was wearing a dark color.

ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?

Q How many times were you stabbed by them?

A I cannot tell, sir.

A Twice, sir.
Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you pointed to this person wearing in red T-shirt?

Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your?

A I can no longer remember, sir.

A I can identify him, sir.

Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do you remember his shirt?

Q How many persons stabbed you then?

A I dont know, sir.

A Only one (1) person, sir.67chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?

Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the nine stabbed him:
A I cannot remember, sir.

COURT:
Q You cant remember also whether one of these accused was wearing a hat at that time?

Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?

A I cannot remember, sir.

A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.

In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was stabbed by the nine persons. Thus:

Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab blows with respect to the other stab blow
COURT:
who delivered this stab blow?

Q Who were involved in stabbing?

A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.

A All of them, sir.

COURT:

Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed?

Proceed.

A The 9 persons, sir.

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who participated in the stabbing incident and who
Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are you referring to the five (5) other persons as
were the victims?
the companions of Gregorio Mejia who participated in stabbing you?

A Me and the driver, sir.

A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir.68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PROS. MARATA:
He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab wound, and then declined to
point to anyone of the herein four appellants as the person who did it. Thus:
Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons, four of whom were inside the courtroom?
COURT:
A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed wounds, sir. 66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you anymore? COURT:

A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness showing his scar near the shoulder.) Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?

Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who stabbed you among these nine (9) persons? A Because he pleaded to me, sir.

A I could not remember anymore, sir. Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are settling the case with Edwin Benito the
amount of P80,000.00?
Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this Court whether it was one among the four
(4) accused in this case who stabbed you on your right upper arm? A Yes, sir.

A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my shoulder because that is the last stab wound, COURT:
sir.69chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Proceed.
It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from Catugas testimony in the
CASTILLO court that the appellants had inflicted any of the stab wounds on Catugas.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court, Catugas categorically admitted that
Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that P80,000.00 because they are poor?
none of the appellants participated in the stabbing of Landingin. Thus:

A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have agreed of another date for them to pay, sir.
COURT:

COURT:
xxx

Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?

Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo Landingin, can you inform the Court if the
four (4) accused now or these two persons are among the four (4) accused now?
A That is already their counter proposal, sir.
70
A They are not here, sir. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you agreed to pay you P80,000.00 but he cannot
pay you at that very moment?
Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating the appellants. He
admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of the appellants, but before they could give the
money on the agreed date, he testified against the appellants in the LARON court. The following A Yes, sir.
exchanges between him and counsel for the defense before the CASTILLO court are revealing:
COURT:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Proceed.
Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able to talk with the father of Edwin Benito?
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00?
Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is that correct?
COURT:
A Yes, sir.
That is the settlement money.
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that correct?
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
A I was asking P80,000.00, sir.
Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you should not have testified in this case?
A PROSECUTOR MARATA: A Yes, sir.

Improper, your honor. ATTY. TAMINAYA:

ATTY. TAMINAYA: Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that expenses?

As follow-up question, your Honor. A I said, then we can at least help you, because he is saying that he suffered several wounds.

COURT: Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?

Sustained. Hypothetical. A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give P20,000.00 each.

ATTY. TAMINAYA: COURT:

Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened on the agreed date? Q How many times did he tell you?

A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, sir. A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him.72chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

COURT: But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for they could not afford it. Conrado so
declared, thus:
Q When you said you have already testified, you are referring to your testimony in RTC Branch 44?
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
A Yes, sir.71chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can you tell this court if he made mention to the
wife of Teofilo Landingin?
In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the impact of Catugas demand for
payment of P80,000 in consideration of his exculpatory testimony. It wanted to prove that the parents of
the appellants were in fact the ones who proposed. But the testimony of Conrado Benito, which the A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us that we would not tell the same to Mrs.
prosecution failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to see him to verify whether their Landingin.
children had indeed committed the crimes; but Catugas replied that since the appellants were the ones
apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that he could recover what he had spent. He then
Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?
demanded P80,000, which he equally apportioned among the parents of the four appellants. Conrado
Benito testified as follows:
A No sir, not even a single centavo.
Q What did you tell him?
Q Why?
A I told him that our children telling us that they did not commit any wrong and I told them to tell the
truth and we are not consenting them to whatever they have done if they have done something wrong. A We cannot pay because even payment for attorneys fees, we cannot
afford.73chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?
The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of
compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27
A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so much for his hospitalization, and he said also
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.74 There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants
that they were the persons who were apprehended and so, I will just tell a lie for the same because how
authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one
could I collect for the amount I spent if I will not tell a lie?
were to believe the explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he
incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible in
COURT: evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a liar? On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of the appellants in the
commission of the crimes charged.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (for Murder) and Criminal
Case No. 94-00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of Branch 44 and in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D
(violation of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City
are REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito
are ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt therefor has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt or
with moral certainty. Their immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful and
valid grounds for their further detention exist.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127569. July 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SENEN PRADES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court for automatic review is the August 13, 1996 judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. IR-3666, finding accused-appellant Senen Prades guilty of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The judgment likewise ordered
appellant to pay private complainant P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, as well as the
costs.1cräläwvirtualibräry
The information in Criminal Case No. IR-3666 alleges:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1994, at about 12:00 oclock midnight, as San Vicente Ogbon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a handgun, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said Emmie R. Rosales
against the latters will, and that the accused perpetrated the offense charged at the dwelling of herein
complainant and with the use of a firearm in threatening complainant, to the latters damage and
prejudice in such amount as may be proven in court.2cräläwvirtualibräry
With the assistance of counsel de oficio, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.3 The defense waived
the pre-trial4 and the case proceeded to trial in due course.
The private complainant and the physician who conducted a medical examination on her were presented
in the trial court to establish the case for the People. After the physician had testified as the first witness,
appellant absconded. The records of the case reveal that appellant escaped from his escort guard while
he was being transported from a hearing at the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City to the Tinangis Penal
Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur on March 29, 1995.5 Trial accordingly continued in absentia.
Private complainant Emmie R. Rosales was seventeen years old when the dastardly outrage befell her on
March 24, 1994. She testified that she and her younger sister, Melissa, were asleep in a room in their
house and were then the only persons at home because their grandfather, who lived with them, was in
the hospital at that time.6cräläwvirtualibräry
At around midnight, complainant suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy weight pressing down upon her.
She thereupon realized that a man, clad only in his underwear, lay on top of her. She was about to shout
when he poked a gun at her neck and warned her not to create any noise or he would kill
her.7cräläwvirtualibräry
Although the house lights were off, moonlight streamed through the sawali door of the room, enabling
complainant to see the intruder.8 She recognized him as appellant Senen Prades, her barriomate. It
appears that he gained entry into the house through a passageway in the kitchen.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant attempted to remove complainants pants and underwear even as he continued to jab the gun at
her neck. Complainant resisted him and struggled for twenty to thirty minutes until she was overcome
by his strength.10 He knelt on her knees and succeeded in removing her clothing.11 He then spread her
legs apart, forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina,12 and bodily pinned her down. He fondled her
breast and private parts and made push and pull movements with his genital organ for about two
minutes.13 Complainant was resultantly in pain as she felt blood ooze out of her vagina. 14 She continued
to struggle against appellant but to no avail.
After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled away from complainant and once again nudged her with the
gun. He warned her not to tell anyone about the event or he would kill her and her family. 15 Appellant
left complainant stunned and in tears. She did not inform anyone about the incident.
Several days later, complainant received two letters from appellant.16 She saw appellant hand the first
letter to her grandmother who later gave it to her.17 The other letter was given by appellant to
complainant through the latters sister.18 Aggrieved by all these circumstances, complainant decided to
disclose to her grandfather the sexual assault that transpired on March 24.
Complainant and her grandfather forthwith reported the matter to the Barangay Captain who advised
them to proceed to the police headquarters of Nabua, Camarines Sur. 19 After filing a report with the
police, complainant underwent physical examination at a rural health center in Sto. Domingo. 20 She then
instituted a complaint for rape against appellant.
Pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua, Camarines
Sur,21 appellant was arrested and detained at the municipal jail of Nabua. He filed a motion for bail but
the same was denied by the lower court.22 Trial commenced in Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court on
December 14, 1994.
Dr. Stephen A. Beltran,23 the Rural Health Physician of Nabua, Camarines Sur, testified that he
conducted a physical examination on complainant on April 8, 1994 and found indications of sexual
intercourse.24 The medical certificate issued by said physician revealed the following:
FINDINGS: VAGINAL EXAMINATION
(+) Hymenal laceration scar at 6:00 oclock
(-) Gross blood
(-) (S)eminal fluid
IMPRESSION: VAGINAL PENETRATION, COMPLETE.25cräläwvirtualibräry
As earlier noted, appellant escaped from confinement before the prosecution had completed the Furthermore, complainant had an extended and adequate look at the features of appellant during the
presentation of its evidence. A general warrant of arrest was issued for his apprehension and it was assault, with ample opportunity to recognize him. As this Court has repeatedly held, a man and a woman
ordered that he be included in the list of wanted criminals. 26 Appellant, however, has not been cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual act. 36 Not surprisingly, therefore,
recaptured up to now. complainant readily and positively identified appellant in court during the trial as the man who raped her
on March 24, 1994.
Fearing for her life and for the safety of her family members, complainant left her home in San Vicente,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, and moved to Naga City.27 All she hoped for was to begin a new life, away from Doctrinally, the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when, as in the instant case, she has no motive
the stigma created by the crime on her name and her family, and away from the dread of possibly being to testify against the accused or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggests that
killed by appellant who was at large and, perhaps, lurking in the shadows. she could have been actuated by such motive.37 We are thus convincingly assured that the lower court
prudently fulfilled its obligation as a factual assessor and a legal adjudicator. We accordingly give due
respect to the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the complaining witness.
After the presentation of its evidence, the prosecution rested its case. Because appellant had taken flight,
he was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence hence counsel for the defense was unable to
introduce evidence to dispute the charge.28cräläwvirtualibräry Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by, inter alia, force or intimidation. The
degree of the force or intimidation required is relative. It need not be overpowering or irresistible
because all that is necessary is that it is sufficient to consummate the purpose which appellant had in
In its decision dated August 13, 1996, the court a quo found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
mind.38cräläwvirtualibräry
the crime of rape, aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling, and imposed upon him the penalty of
death. The lower court issued another warrant of arrest for the capture of appellant. 29 It has not been
served to date as he remains at large, a fugitive from justice. Because appellant was condemned to suffer It is indubitable that complainant put up a struggle when appellant forced himself upon her. She was
the principal penalty of death, his conviction is now before the Court on automatic review. inevitably subdued by his strength and she ultimately succumbed to his venery. Even
assuming arguendo that complainant did not repel the physical aggression of appellant, this does not
preclude a finding that she was raped. It is well settled that physical resistance need not be established in
As its lone assignment of error, the defense alleges that the court below erred in finding appellant guilty
rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It is contended that the testimony of complainant on the
rapists advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. 39cräläwvirtualibräry
identity of appellant as the author of the crime is doubtful not only because there was insufficient
lighting in the room of the complainant, where the alleged act of rape took place, but also because
complainant had never been face to face with appellant prior to the incident.30cräläwvirtualibräry In the case now before us, although complainant had a companion who was asleep in the room when she
was attacked by appellant, she could not have dared risk her life by screaming for help because appellant
pressed a handgun at her neck and threatened to kill her and her family if she would resist him or report
The Court has exhaustively reviewed and objectively analyzed the records of this case, especially so
the incident. The evidence establishes that the sexual intercourse between appellant and complainant
because a capital offense is involved, and sees no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
was consummated through force and intimidation and ineluctably constituted the crime of rape. The fact
conclusions of the court below. We consequently affirm the conviction of appellant.
that it was committed in a room where there was another occupant does not rule out the
crime.40cräläwvirtualibräry
The contention that the identity of appellant has not been established deserves exiguous consideration
because it is undisputed that appellant was known to the victim long before the assault. They lived in the
In addition, and virtually foreclosing further chicanery by appellant, it is conceded that after the rape, he
same barrio31 and the wife of appellant was the goddaughter of complainants grandmother.32 Appellant
sent complainant two letters in which he implored her forgiveness and offered to leave his wife so that
also used to periodically pass by the house of complainant.33cräläwvirtualibräry
he could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed his own fate by admitting his crime under the seal of a
virtual confession in fact, if not in law.
The defense adverts to the fact that on the night of the occurrence, there were no lights in the room
where the rape took place. It is further claimed that it was impossible for moonlight to penetrate
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through
the sawali door and enable complainant to identify her assailant because the spaces in the sawali were as
mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
small as the diameter of a mungo bean x x x (a)nd these small spaces are set wide apart between the
admission of guilt.41 For this rule to apply, it is not necessary that a complaint be first filed by the victim
slats.34cräläwvirtualibräry
because all that is required is that after committing the crime, appellant or his representative makes an
offer to compromise and such offer is proved.42cräläwvirtualibräry
This contention must fail. The evidence shows that the crime scene was not in total darkness. As already
stated, complainant was able to identify appellant because the room was lit by moonlight that filtered
Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for
through the sparse, woven bamboo slats of the sawali door. The amount of light emitted by the moon is
forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise.43 The letters of appellant
relative. While there are evenings of pitch darkness, there are moonlit nights when the brightness of the
containing an appeal for condonation of his acts cannot but be construed as an implied admission of his
moon is sufficient to enable one to see distinct details of objects.
guilt.

In addition to this consideration, the house of complainant was a typical provincial home made of
The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the letters introduced in evidence by the
bamboo,35 usually consisting of bamboo stilts, interwoven slats of bamboo forming walls of sawali, and
prosecution and that said letters contained an admission of his guilt, thus confirming his culpability. If
similar materials. Such constructional pattern naturally allowed light to penetrate into the house and this
appellant did not forcibly rape complainant on the night of March 24, 1994, complainant may possibly
fact reasonably induces the conclusion that complainant was truthful in claiming that there was
have accepted appellants offer to live with her. At the very least, she would not have revealed her
sufficient illumination in the room which permitted her to identify her aggressor.
misfortune so as not to expose the despoliation of her virtue. That complainant chose to divulge the
incident and subject herself to the disgrace of public scrutiny and scandal buttresses the charge that she
had been criminally ravished by appellant.
Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense to discredit this affirmation of guilt derived
from the contents of the letters, the authenticity of said letters is no longer open to question. The letters
thus bolster and corroborate complainants testimony on the identity and guilty of
appellant.44cräläwvirtualibräry
Another factor supporting appellants conviction is his flight. By escaping from confinement during trial
and failing to turn himself in despite his subsequent conviction by the trial court, and despite the
standing warrant of arrest, appellant has become a fugitive from justice.
Flight is the evasion of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest,
detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.45 It is considered an indication of
guilt.46 A fugitive from justice, on the other hand, is one who flees after conviction to avoid punishment,
as well as one who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.47 By his flight and thereafter
becoming a fugitive, appellant waived his right to adduce evidence and consequently denied himself the
opportunity to dispute the charge against him.
It is a fundamental rule that criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution
and not on the weakness or, as in this case, the absence of evidence of the defense. We emphasize that
the flight of appellant, by itself, does not sustain his conviction because the law requires therefor no less
than the proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case before us, however, complainants testimony
and positive identification of appellant were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the physician
who examined her, the medico-legal report, and the letters of appellant in which he acknowledged his
guilt and sought complainants mercy. These considerations convince the Court that appellant was the
perpetrator of the crime. His flight and status as a fugitive from the law merely dispel any remaining
shred of doubt on his guilt.
Incidentally, to obviate any question as to the propriety of the course of action we have taken in this
case, that is, of subjecting the judgment of conviction of the trial court to automatic appellate review
despite the fact that appellant was partially tried and convicted by said court in absentia, and is and has
been a fugitive from justice since then and up to the present, we draw upon our ruling in People vs.
Esparas, et al.48 which declared:
x x x On August 20, 1996, we issued an extended resolution upholding the power of this Court to review
all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from confinement prior to the judgment of
the trial court, thus:
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all
death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court. x x x.
Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this
power which is bestowed by the Constitution. x x x.
On the question as to whether or not the Court can validly promulgate this judgment in the case at bar,
the answer is in the affirmative. As graphically elucidated in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.:49cräläwvirtualibräry
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120* is a new provision introduced by the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides for the promulgation of judgment in absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of
Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The amendment was intended to obviate the situation in the past
where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation
of judgment. In explaining the amendment, Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented:
Without this amendatory provision, the ends of public justice would be set at naught and, where the civil
liability ex delicto was instituted with the criminal action, the offended party could not enforce either the
primary liability of the accused or any subsidiary liability, where proper and involved in the case, as no
judgment could be promulgated. Since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions only require prior
arraignment as an indispensable requisite and the trial may thereafter proceed in the absence of the
accused, the judgment in this case being merely the procedural culmination of the trial, the promulgation
thereof can justifiably be made in absentia in the manner set out in this section (II Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium 369, [6th ed., 1989]).
If, for any reason, it should be claimed that the provision under discussion is intended to be the
procedure in the trial courts, the simple rejoinder is that there is no reason why, on considerations of its
rationale and procedural expediency, the same should not apply to the same factual situation in the
appellate courts. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the judgment is promulgated by
merely filing the signed copy thereof with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies of the same to be
served upon the parties,50 hence the appearance of the accused is not even required there as his presence
is necessary only in the promulgation of the judgments of trial courts.51 Thereafter, when the judgment
of the appellate court becomes executory, the records of the case together with a certified copy of the
appellate court judgment are returned to the court a quo for execution of the judgment.52 On this issue,
however, one member of this Court has submitted a separate opinion.
At this juncture, we also note that when the rape was committed the governing law was Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4111 and 7659, 53 under which the use of a
deadly weapon in committing the felony of rape was, as it still is, punished by reclusion perpetua to
death.
Reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties and Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides the rules for their application, one of which, pertinent to this case, is that when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.
Two aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, namely, nocturnity and dwelling. We
agree with the court below that nocturnity cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this
case because although the crime was committed late that night, the evidence does not positively
establish that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or that it was especially sought by the
offender to ensure its commission, or that the offender took advantage thereof for impunity. It cannot,
therefore, be considered herein under either the so-called objective or subjective tests for determining
the existence of this circumstance.
It is clear, however, that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is attendant in the commission of the
crime. Article 14(5) of the Revised Penal Code provides that this circumstance aggravates a felony
where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation. In the instant case, the aforesaid circumstance of dwelling was definitely present in the
commission of the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon. From all the foregoing considerations,
the presence of this aggravating circumstance mandates that the supreme penalty of death be imposed.
The lower court, however, erred in classifying the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party as being in
the character of moral damages. Jurisprudence has elucidated that the award authorized by the criminal
law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing
judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law.54 For that matter, the civil liability ex delicto provided by the
Revised Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation and indemnification, 55 all correspond to actual or
compensatory damages in the Civil Code,56 since the other damages provided therein are moral,
nominal, temperate or moderate, liquidated, and exemplary or corrective damages57 which have
altogether different concepts and fundaments.
We reiterate here that said civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct
from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations
and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.58 Evidently, therefore, the lower court
actually intended the award of P50,000.00 as indemnification to be paid to the victim.
On this score, we have to take note of a new policy adopted by the Court. The recent judicial
prescription is that the indemnification of the victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if
the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws.59 Applying the foregoing policy, the civil
indemnity to be awarded to the offended party in the case at bar is and should be P75,000.00.
One other cognate development in the case law on rape is applicable to the present disposition. The
Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may
additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems
just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.
Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil
cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein,
since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages60 are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on
her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in
the case need not go through superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial charade.
The People having established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction and the
penalty imposed by the court a quo is correct and must consequently be affirmed. Withal, four Members
of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty
is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case
No. IR-3666 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Senen Prades
is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Emmie R. Rosales, in the amount of P75,000.00 as
compensatory damages, and to pay the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, with costs in
all instances.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office
of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157221 March 30, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CESAR GALVEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255
dated March 30, 2001, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Isabela, Basilan
finding the accused-appellant Cesar Galvez (Galvez), guilty of Murder, but modifying the penalty of the
RTC from a sentence of "seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum" to reclusion perpetua.
The facts are as follows:
At around 11 o’clock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal,
Ricardo Francisco and Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from making copra to eat leftover dinner inside
the copra kiln in the farm of Perez in Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up from the
circle where they were eating to drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the ground shouting
"Dan ya tupa comigo" (Dan, I am hit). The rest of the group took cover, crawling to different directions.
After the attack, Rellios reported the incident to the barangay captain and they brought Enojarda’s dead
body to his family.3
On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) for Murder, which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz. at
Matarling, Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, armed
with an M16 armalite rifle, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rosalio Enojarda with the
said M16 armalite rifle, thereby inflicting gunshot wound on the body of the latter which caused his
death.4
The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Enojarda fell, the rest of the group took cover
and Rellios while in a crawling position, saw Galvez about 5 meters away holding an armalite rifle and
firing at their direction; Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize them as well
as the firearms they carried because they were approximately nine meters away; 5 Perez, also crawled
and hid in the bushes about 5 meters away; when the firing stopped, one of the attackers passed by about
two meters from where Perez was hiding and because the moon was bright, he recognized Galvez, his
cousin, who was wearing a fatigue uniform and armed with an armalite rifle; he also saw that Galvez
had three armed companions but did not recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying because
they were about nine meters from Galvez.6
Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified that he was staying at his father-in-law’s
house on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around 10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. He went home and slept
with his wife soon after.7 To corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo Ramillano, a visitor
at his father-in-law’s house and Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store owner. 8 He also presented
Athena Elisa Anderson, Document Examiner and Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory of
Region 9, Zamboanga City, who testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his hands showed that
there was no nitrate present;9 and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic Examiner, who testified that
the shells found at the scene of the crime were not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.10
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27, 1995 with the following findings:
From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this case, this Court finds the following facts to
be undisputable, to wit:
1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio Enojarda, while making copra in the
coconut land of Danilo Perez at Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan, was shot to death by one of
the four (4) men. How many gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of his body was hit
by the gunfire, the evidence is found wanting.
2) That a day before the incident and on the date of the incident which was July 27, 1991, the
accused Cesar Galvez has not fired any firearms.
xxx
3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite rifle…allegedly found by Barangay Captain
Inocente Manicap from the scene of the crime and later turned over to PFC Samuel Omoso,
the Police Investigator of this case, did not come from the M16 armalite rifle with Serial No.
117460, the gun issued to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations omitted).11
Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Rellios and Perez, were
credible and trustworthy as there was no motive to perjure themselves; that the testimony of defense
witness SPO2 Ramillano was full of loopholes; and that the testimony of the store owner was
insufficient to disprove the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime. 12
The RTC concluded:
xxx since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired his M16 armalite rifle on that night of July 27, 1991,
and those five (5) empty shells were not fired from his armalite, then xxx the bullet that hit and
instantly killed Rosalio Enojarda on that night of July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo Perez
came from the gun fired by any of the three (3) unidentified persons who were the companions of
the accused, Cesar Galvez at the night of the incident xxx.13 (emphasis supplied)
Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still convicted Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since Galvez
was seen by two witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his unidentified
armed companions.14 The trial court also held that the offer of Galvez to have the case settled out of
court is an indication of his guilt.15
The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial matters surrounding the commission of the crime, being
carefully and meticulously examined and studied, this Court finds the accused SPO2 Cesar Galvez, a
member of the Philippine National Police GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in committing
the crime of Murder as alleged in the Information and which crime is defined and penalized under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, but considering his good military records after the commission of the
crime, hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum, which is the
minimum period of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to death. And to indemnify the heirs of
the late Rosalio Enojarda, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the Court the amount
of P500.00 as judicial costs and other accessory penalties attached to the penalty of Reclusion Temporal.
And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the military ranks he now hold [sic] in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused shall immediately be committed to the
Provincial Jail where the Provincial Warden is directed to immediately transfer him to the National
Penitentiary at San Ramon Penal Colony at Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.
And the property bail bond he has posted for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and its
pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the bondsman.16
Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18255, which rendered its Decision
on March 30, 2001 affirming his guilt but modifying the penalty to be imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CESAR GALVEZ is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.17
The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally liable based on conspiracy when such fact
was not alleged in the Information. However, it still found Galvez guilty of Murder. 18 The CA reasoned
that: the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that Galvez used
another gun in shooting the victim; the eyewitnesses of the prosecution identified Galvez as the
perpetrator if not one of the perpetrators of the crime; alibi, which was offered by Galvez, is the weakest
of all defenses and cannot prevail over positive identification; the offer of Galvez to the wife of the
victim to have the case settled is also a strong indication of Galvez’s culpability; and treachery was
adequately established as the attack was sudden, unexpected and did not accord the victim an
opportunity to defend himself.19 The CA further held that since there was no mitigating circumstance,
the proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua.20
Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 21,
2001, stating that it was a mere rehash of the arguments already addressed in the decision. 22
The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution23 accepting the case;
committing the accused to the Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the accused and the
Solicitor General that they may file additional briefs with this Court.24
In his Appellant’s Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court erred:
I
… IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER FOR THE
DEATH OF ROSALIO ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991 DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDINGS THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT FIRE HIS RIFLE ON THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT
THE BULLET THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO ENOJARDA COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED
FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES BELONGING TO ANY OF THE THREE UNIDENTIFIED
PERSONS WHO WERE NOT CHARGED NOR INDICTED TOGETHER WITH THE ACCUSED IN
THE SAME CRIMINAL INFORMATION IN QUESTION.
II
… IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO RELLIOS, WHILE IN CRAWLING
POSITION WHOSE CHESTS WERE ALMOST TOUCHING THE GROUND AND UNDER
CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD SEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH
M16 ARMALITE RIFLE IN THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991 DESPITE DANILO PEREZ’ [sic]
POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO IDENTIFY THE
ACCUSED WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN COURT IN THE MANNER AND
CIRCUMSTANCE NARRATED BY HIM.25
In his Supplemental Appellant’s Brief, Galvez further claims that it was seriously erroneous:
I.
…TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
THE OTHER MALEFACTORS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
II.
…TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION,
MORE SO THE THEORY OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THERE BEING
NO OTHER PERSONS CHARGED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
III.
…TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES
FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE INFORMATION, IN EFFECT DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
[THE] RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM.
IV.
…TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO ALLEGED EYE WITNESSES
WHOSE DECLARATIONS WERE CLEARLY BELIED DURING THEIR CROSS EXAMINATION.
V.
…NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
VI.
…TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED, BASELESS PRESUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A
CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS PRESUMED. 26
Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental Appellant’s Brief adding that:
VII
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN AND BALLISTIC TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOT THE DECEASED USING AN M16 RIFLE OTHER THAN THE
ONE ISSUED TO HIM.27
Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt
because an accused is always presumed to be innocent unless proven otherwise;28 when circumstances
yield two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the
other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must side with that which will acquit the accused; in
this case, the RTC found undisputed the fact that he did not shoot the victim on the night of July 27,
1991 and the firearm that was used in killing the victim was owned and possessed by another man, as
shown by the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests; the statement of Danilo Perez that he
saw the accused on the night of July 27, 1991 is not credible since Perez was in a crawling position with
his chest almost touching the ground at the time he allegedly saw the accused; Judge Memoracion, who
penned the decision could not have assessed the demeanor of the prosecution witnesses while testifying
as it was another judge who heard and received their testimonies;29 the two defense witnesses, who
corroborated his (Galvez’s) alibi are unbiased and unrelated to him; while alibi is the weakest defense, it
is the only defense if it is the truth and it assumes importance where the prosecution evidence is weak;
the statement of the trial court that the offer of the accused to have the case extra-judicially settled is a
tacit admission of guilt is also unsubstantiated as there is nothing in the records that shows that the
accused made an offer to settle the case out of court.30
For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General argued that: the paraffin test and the ballistic
examination are not conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident; in this case, the
paraffin test was conducted on Galvez two days from the date of the incident; Galvez was also positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of four armed men who attacked them during the incident;
Perez clarified that while he was in a crawling position, he was looking upward, thus, he was able to
identify Galvez; between Galvez’s alibi and the positive declarations of witnesses whose testimonies
have not been assailed nor discredited by improper motive, the latter deserves greater credence; the trial
court correctly convicted Galvez of murder as there was treachery since the victim was not in a position
to defend himself from the attack of the accused; the proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as there was no mitigating circumstance; 31 Galvez is also liable for
temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 since pecuniary loss has been suffered although its exact amount
could not be determined, and exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 due to the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery; the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be awarded to the
heirs of the victim together with the ₱50,000.00 awarded by the trial court for moral damages. 32
After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court resolves to acquit Galvez.
Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may be held liable for the acts of
his co-accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be
made liable for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and not
collective.33
As explained in People v. Tampis,34
The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the information. Absence of a
particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act
constituting conspiracy renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual
acts of his co-accused. Thus, each of them would be held accountable only for their respective
participation in the commission of the offense.35
The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v. Quitlong, the Court explained:
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not
enough for an accused to bear and respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that
such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and
procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no
person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself among the grasses?
The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. x x x
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you were already hiding among the grasses?
x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to
during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or
A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where I was hiding about two meters from me.
one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in
order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty
with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by where you were hiding, who was that culprit?
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act
of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he
faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.36 A: Cesar Galvez, sir.

Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is imperative that the prosecution xxx
prove Galvez’s direct participation in the killing of the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do.
COURT:
The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses Rellios and Perez that they saw Galvez fire an armalite rifle in their direction on the night in After you heard the shots how long after you saw him passed by?
question. The positive identification of these witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the negative
results of the paraffin and ballistic tests.37
xxx

We disagree.
Q: Was it 30 minutes after?

The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. While this Court does not
ordinarily interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there xxx
appears on the records, however, facts and circumstances of real weight which might have been
overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to render the law and apply A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.
justice.38
Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused) passed by together with his companions around
During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows: 20 to 25 minutes after you heard the shots, is that what you want to impress this Court?

Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening on July 27, 1991 what A: Yes, Your Honor.
happened?
xxx
A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine where it came from and one of our
companion was hit.
Q: Did you see him really shoot?

Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who was hit?
A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied)

A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.

During his cross-examination, Perez further testified:

xxx
Q: So, when you said the explosions came from different directions, was not true?

Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion Rosalio Enojarda, what did you do?
A: We heard shots but we do not know where it came from, what we did was to drop and crawl.

A: I dropped and crawled, sir.

COURT: (To the witness)

xxx
You did not see the one firing?
Yes, your Honor, because I crawled.
Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings you saw this accused and companions pass by?
A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time but I think it has about 20 to 25 minutes. 40
xxx
Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at Mr. Enojarda?
A: No sir.41 (Emphasis supplied).
Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination the following:
Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr. Enojarda?
A: No sir.
COURT: (To the witness)
In other words you were only presuming that it was him.
A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.
ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing)
Did you understand the question when you were asked by the Court. Since you did not actually
see Mr. Galvez shoot at the victim, and reportedly you saw him only five minutes thereafter, you
only presume Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. Enojarda?
A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above testimonies, the following circumstances appear to have been established: (1) at
around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their two companions were eating merienda near the copra
kiln when they were sprayed with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the ground; (3)
Rellios, Perez and their two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover; (4) about five minutes after
the first burst of gunfire, Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing at Rellios, Perez and
their two companions as well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5) about 20 to 25 minutes after
the first burst of gunfire, Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an M16 armalite
rifle along with three armed companions, after which, their group left the scene of the crime.
However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable
doubt.
It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be observed in assaying the probative value of
circumstantial evidence:
x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and,
(d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable
doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the
series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The
guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is
more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that
the accused is the author of the crime.43
as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable
doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused;44 and that every circumstance or doubt
favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account. 45
The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are mainly based on the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said testimonies reveals, however, other
circumstances that should be appreciated in favor of Galvez, to wit:
(a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez with three other armed companions
minutes after Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that they saw him in the
vicinity before the shooting of Enojarda.46
(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.47
(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at Enojarda and that he merely assumed
that Galvez was the one who shot the victim when the latter passed by him.48 Rellios testified
that he only presumed that Galvez shot at Enojarda.49
(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with Galvez50 and that he does not know
any motive why Enojarda was killed.51
In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances for or against Galvez, the following
must always be borne in mind: that the Information charged Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime
of Murder; that the three other armed men were not included as John Does; and that there was no
allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Galvez was the sole author of the
shot that killed Enojarda. The "incriminating circumstances" do not point to Galvez as the sole
perpetrator of the crime. The presence of the three armed men raises the probability that any one of
those men inflicted the fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses merely presumed
that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.
Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently establish
that Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no evidence that Galvez was seen or was together
with the three other armed men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that precludes the Court
from concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.52 It cannot be said therefore that there was
positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial evidence.
In People v. Comendador,53 the Court held:
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice
in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.54 (Emphasis supplied)
And in Dela Cruz v. People,55 the Court stressed, thus:
To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the
prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond the point
of moral certainty – certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are
to act upon it. It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of
innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An
acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s innocence may be
doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction, and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be
considered.56 (Emphasis supplied).
And when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive, motive
is vital. As held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,57
Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the crime. However, motive
becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or
inconclusive. Motive is thus vital in this case.58
In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that he did not know of any motive on the part of Galvez
to kill Enojarda.59 This is a circumstance that should be taken in favor of Galvez.
In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v. People,60 to wit:
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption of
innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt – one which requires
moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act
upon it. As we have so stated in the past –
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this
standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment.61 (Emphasis supplied)
There could not be any doubt that the facts, as established by the circumstantial evidence, failed to
exclude the possibility that another person shot Enojarda. There were three other armed men, any one of
whom could be the culprit.
When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the commission of the crime is
established.62 Indeed, the State, aside from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden of correctly
identifying the author of such crime.63 Both facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt
on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.64
Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental brief before this Court that it was erroneous for the CA
to have affirmed the RTC ruling that Galvez’s offer to the victim’s wife to settle the case is a tacit
admission of guilt.65
While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt,66 such principle is not applicable in this case.
The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made on offer of compromise,67 is the March 3,
1993 Order of the RTC which reads as follows:
Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in Court
together with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and manifested that there is a possibility of
understanding and settlement between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for new
assignment.68
Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted as evidence during the
trial. The victim’s widow or any prosecution witness did not testify on any offer of compromise made
by Galvez. We have held that when the evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is amorphous, the
same shall not benefit the prosecution in its case against the accused.69
The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of compromise will not amount to
an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,70 the Court pronounced that:
…In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that
in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be
entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the
accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a
claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.71 (Emphasis
supplied).
As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed
made such an offer under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain
that it was given for some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt or
an attempt to avoid its legal consequences.
In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged implied admission of
guilt. In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the accused, explained that:
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the
presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence.
In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or
social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more
important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating his guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the defendant’s guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues.72
xxx
The presumption of innocence, x x x is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere
form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability
that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose
is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted
against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the
authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot
be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence
must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to
do so.73
Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in favor of Galvez, there could not be a moral certainty
as to the guilt of Galvez. The prosecution has not proven the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
It may be pointed out that the following circumstances support the conviction of Galvez as charged:
(a) the negative findings of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not prove that Galvez did not
fire a gun;
(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the
crime with a lawful purpose, yet he put up alibi which is inherently weak;
(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that
he was at their house on the night in question; and
(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer.
These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the discharge of its duty to prove the guilt of Galvez
beyond reasonable doubt.
It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun, as
held by this Court in People v. Pagal74 and People v. Teehankee75 which were cited by the CA in its
Decision, since it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as
when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards. 76 Such principle, however, has no
bearing in the present case. In the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court concluded that a negative
finding does not prove that the accused therein had not fired a gun because the accused were positively
identified by witnesses as having shot their victims, unlike in the case at hand where Galvez is not
positively identified by direct or circumstantial evidence that he shot Enojarda. If the principle should be
given any weight at all, it should be in favor of Galvez, that is, considering that he is not positively
identified, then, the negative results of the paraffin test bolster his claim that he did not shoot Enojarda,
and not the other way around.
The argument that the negative result of the ballistic examination does not prove that Galvez did not fire
a gun during the incident as it was possible that he used another gun, should also be struck down. It is
the prosecution which has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other than the one issued to
him and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the one that killed the victim. It is not for Galvez to
prove the opposite of the possibility adverted to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his innocence.
Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not conclusively prove
that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same negative results cannot be used as circumstantial evidence
against Galvez to prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the basic precepts of
criminal law which presumes the innocence of the accused. Every circumstance favoring an accused’s
innocence must be duly taken into account, the proof against him must survive the test of reason, and the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.77
That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the crime with a
lawful purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present his wife
and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in question,
pertain to the weakness of Galvez’s alibi which may cast doubt on his innocence. However, these
circumstances do not prove beyond reasonable doubt Galvez’s guilt. Although an accused must
satisfactorily prove his alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the prosecution to prove the
accused’s guilt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of
innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the presumption remains.78 Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and
not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions.79
That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer is a prerogative
given to the accused and should not be given evidentiary value to establish his guilt. In People v.
Saavedra,80 the Court held that an accused has the right to remain silent and his silence should not be
construed as an admission of guilt.
Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability.81 Conviction must be based on
the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation is upon the
shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not the accused to prove his
innocence.82 The prosecution’s job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.83 Thus, when the evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be
rejected and the accused absolved and released at once.84
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to
send people to jail but to render justice.85 Under our criminal justice system, the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.86
It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the Prosecution, justice could not be rendered in this
case for the untimely death of Enojarda. Justice, however, would also not be served with the conviction
of the herein accused. It is well to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed
with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly
crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is
bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or
political persuasion – whether privileged or less privileged – to be invoked without fear or favor.
Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what
the prosecution has not proved.87 (Emphasis supplied)
As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its burden of proving Galvez’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court has no choice but to acquit him.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case
No. 1816 dated February 2, 1995 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255
dated March 30, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant Cesar Galvez is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless
he is being lawfully held for another crime and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days
from notice.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138503. September 28, 2000.]
ROBERTO FERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Roberto Fernandez seeks to
set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated December 24, 1998 in CA-G.R. CR No. 18830
which affirmed in toto the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of Makati in
Criminal Case No. 88-538 finding petitioner and his co-accused Efren O. Olesco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa through falsification of public document.chanrob1es virtua1 law
library
The petitioner, Roberto Fernandez (FERNANDEZ) together with Efren O. Olesco (OLESCO) and
Nicanor R. Gatchalian, Jr. (GATCHALIAN) were charged with the crime of estafa through falsification
of public document in an information 3 that reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 14th day of December, 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are all
private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another
by means of deceit and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products,
Inc., represented by Atty. Oscar P. Beltran, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, upon their
false manifestation and fraudulent representation that they have the power and capacity to secure a
defendant counterbond for the lifting of a writ of preliminary attachment in the sum of P500,000.00 to
be used by the said complainant in Civil Case No. 3226 of Branch V of the Regional Trial Court of
Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City in which the said complainant was the party defendant and which
representation and manifestation the accused knew to be false, succeeded in inducing the same
complainant to give and to deliver to them the sum of P50,000.00 which is equivalent to 10% of the face
value of said counterbond representing the premium thereof in consideration of Counterbond No. JCR
00300 dated December 14, 1987 purportedly issued by the First Integrated Bonding & Insurance Co.,
Inc. and notarized by Notary Public Benito Salandanan of Manila which the accused falsified by making
it appear that the same was signed by Eduardo V. Gadi and that it was regularly issued by the said
bonding and insurance company when, in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the same was not
issued by it, and the accused, once in possession of said money, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously appropriate and use the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products, Inc., represented by Atty. Oscar P.
Beltran, in the aforestated amount of P50,000.00." 4
On April 29, 1988, the three (3) accused were arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty with the
assistance of counsel. 5 Thereafter, trial ensued. The case against GATCHALIAN was dismissed due to
his death during the pendency of the trial. 6
At the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Atty. Oscar P. Beltran, President of Sta. Ines
Melale Forest Products Corporation, Manuel de Castro, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 137, Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Melencio P. Cruz, a helper-assistant of insurance agent Manuel "Boy" Reyes,
Consuelo San Juan, court interpreter and representative of the Clerk of Court of Branch 5, Regional
Trial Court of Agusan Del Norte, Butuan City and Atty. Rogelio B. Mendoza, legal counsel of the First
Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc.
The prosecution also offered in evidence Official Receipt No. 157 dated December 14, 1987 in the
amount of P50,000.00 issued by Hexagon Surety Services, Inc. signed by accused Efren Olesco 7;
Machine copy of Counter Attachment Bond No. JCR 00300 dated December 14, 1987 issued by First
Integrated Bonding and Insurance Corporation with a face value of P500,000.00 8; another machine
copy of the same Counter Attachment Bond No. JCR 00300 filed by defendant Ines Melale Corporation
in Civil Case No. 3226 pending before RTC Branch 5, Butuan City 9; parts of the Case Records of Civil
Case No. 3226 brought by witness Consuelo San Juan as part of her testimony 10; Sinumpaang Salaysay
of witness Melencio Cruz consisting of two pages with his signature thereon 11; Manifestation and
Motion of Atty. Rogelio Mendoza dated January 04, 1988 filed before RTC, Branch 5, Butuan City 12;
and letter dated January 8, 1988 of Atty. Oscar Beltran to Col. Fernando Angara of the Southern Police
District, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila requesting "police assistance in the investigation of a
possible commission of the crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of Documents." 13
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner FERNANDEZ filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was
denied by the trial court. 14 Despite such denial, both accused Roberto Fernandez and Efren Olesco
opted not to present evidence for their defense.
The facts established by the evidence are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sometime in December 1987, the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte, Branch V, Butuan City,
issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of private complainant Sta. Ines Melale
Forest Products, Inc. (MELALE) defendant in the therein pending Civil Case No. 3226 filed by Kalilid
Wood Industries Corporation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In order to secure the lifting or discharge of the writ, MELALE, through its President, Atty. Oscar
Beltran (BELTRAN), called up his friend Mr. Manuel de Castro (DE CASTRO), Deputy Sheriff of RTC
Branch 137, Makati at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning of December 14, 1987 and requested him to
look for a bonding company which can issue a counter attachment bond for his company’s use in the
said civil case. 15 DE CASTRO obliged and from the third floor of the Chateau Building on F. Zobel
Street, Makati where he holds office, he went down to the ground floor to see Manuel "Boy" Reyes
(REYES), an insurance agent. Unfortunately, REYES was not around at that time. It was Melencio Cruz
(CRUZ), a compadre and helper-assistant of REYES, who attended to him and with whom DE
CASTRO talked about the request of BELTRAN. CRUZ told DE CASTRO that he had to ask
OLESCO, known to him as a Branch Manager of Interworld Assurance Corporation, whose office is at
the second floor of the same building. When CRUZ returned to his office, he had with him an
application form and indemnity agreement form for a counter attachment bond from Interworld
Insurance which according to him, was given to him by OLESCO. CRUZ gave the blank form to DE
CASTRO who in turn brought the form to BELTRAN who accomplished the same. 16 At around 4:45
o’clock that afternoon, DE CASTRO returned and delivered the already accomplished bond application
form to CRUZ who in turn brought the same to OLESCO’s office. Twenty minutes later, OLESCO and
CRUZ came down together and handed to DE CASTRO (who was then waiting at CRUZ’s office,
Counterbond No. JCR 00300 dated December 14, 1987 in the amount of P500,000.00 issued by the First
Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company and not by Interworld Insurance Company, signed by
Eduardo V. Gadi and notarized by Notary Public Benito Salandanan of Manila. 17 In return, DE
CASTRO handed OLESCO the amount of P50,000.00 as premium payment for the bond. When asked
by DE CASTRO why the Counterbond is a First Integrated Insurance Company bond and not an
Interworld Insurance bond, OLESCO allegedly answered that Interworld Insurance Company branch in
Butuan City was already closed. He added that in procuring the bond, "he asked the help of Roberto
Fernandez and Nicanor Gatchalian, Jr. for the issuance of the bond." OLESCO acknowledged receipt of
the amount of P50,000.00 by issuing Hexagon Surety Services, Inc. Official Receipt No. 157 also dated
December 14, 1987 18 which CRUZ also signed as witness that OLESCO actually received the
P50,000.00. 19 Thereafter, BELTRAN filed the counterbond with the RTC of Agusan del Norte, Branch
V in Butuan City to support MELALE’s pending motion to quash the writ of preliminary attachment
earlier issued against it.
On January 8, 1988, BELTRAN learned that Atty. Rogelio Mendoza (MENDOZA), Legal Counsel of
First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., filed a Manifestation and Motion 20 before the
said RTC denying the issuance by First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc. of the
aforementioned counterbond for the reason that the same was spurious or fake inasmuch as the First
Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc. had no officer or employee by the name of Eduardo
Gadi and that the counterbond does not have the letter head of the First Integrated Bonding and
Insurance Company.
Immediately thereafter, BELTRAN called DE CASTRO and requested him to arrange a confrontation
with OLESCO, GATCHALIAN and FERNANDEZ. During the confrontation, only OLESCO and
FERNANDEZ came and allegedly assured BELTRAN that the counterbond was genuine. Prior to the
confrontation, BELTRAN never met accused OLESCO and FERNANDEZ. 21 On January 8, 1988,
BELTRAN also wrote then Superintendent Fernando Angara of the Southern Police District, Fort
Bonifacio, Makati 22 formally requesting for police assistance in the investigation of a possible
commission of the crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of Documents" which thereafter led to the filing of
the information against FERNANDEZ and OLESCO.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On September 21, 1995, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged the dispositive portion of the decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused EFREN OLESCO and ROBERTO
FERNANDEZ Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed ESTAFA thru falsification of
public document, and sentences them to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional medium as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor medium as
maximum.
Both accused are ordered to jointly and severally indemnify complainant Santa Ines Melale Forest
Product Corporation in the sum of P50,000.00.
With cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED." 23
From the judgment of conviction, only FERNANDEZ appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the trial court’s decision. 24
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied 25 hence the instant petition for review where the
petitioner raises the following arguments for consideration:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
WITHOUT TAKING; INTO ACCOUNT THE FINDING OF THE COURT A QUO THAT AS OF
THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE THERE WAS NO DIRECT
EVIDENCE PROVING THAT PETITIONER HAD INDEED CONSPIRED IN COMMITTING THE
OFFENSE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED ON THE
BASIS OF MERE PRESUMPTION.cralaw : red
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT
INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CONVICTION CONSIDERING
THAT THE COURT A QUO FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN OR OTHERWISE STATED, THE
COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OF LAW.
1. Whether or not the offense of estafa thru falsification of a public document was in fact established.
2. Whether or not conspiracy attended the commission of the alleged offense." 26
In support of his petition, the petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
judgment of conviction because the trial court found no direct evidence linking him to the offense
charged. He claims that the Court of Appeals relied on the mere imputations of his guilt made by the
private complainant BELTRAN in his testimony in violation of the res inter alios acta and the hearsay
rules. Moreover, considering that there was no positive and conclusive evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the conspiracy; the alleged conspiracy between petitioner and co-accused OLESCO
was based on mere conjecture. He should consequently be acquitted of the crime charged.
The core issue involved in this case is whether or not FERNANDEZ is guilty of committing the crime of
estafa through falsification of public document in conspiracy with OLESCO.
After a careful review of the case, we rule in the negative and find the petition meritorious.
FERNANDEZ is charged with the crime of estafa described under Paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e. swindling or estafa committed by any person who shall defraud another by
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions or by means of other similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud and in this particular case, in conspiracy with two other accused as defined
under Article 8, of the Revised Penal Code. 27
To secure a conviction for this kind of estafa, the following requisites must concur, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
(3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the
offended party to part with his money or property; and
(4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 28
In convicting the petitioner, the trial court applied the rule that if a person had in his possession a
falsified document, used it (uttered it), took advantage of it and profited thereby, he is, in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, presumed to be the material author and the forger of the falsification. 29 We
quote the trial court’s ratiocination as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The unrefuted evidence for the prosecution established the fact that the counter bond with serial no.
JCR 00300 under the name of First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company, Inc. is a fake bond. The
complainant received the same from accused Efren Olesco and Roberto Fernandez they being the
persons who secured the issuance of said bond. Being the source of said fake bond and there being no
explanation from the accused how they came into possession of said fake bond, the presumption that
they are the author of said fake bond attaches to them. That presumption has not been rebutted. Mere
denial of their participation without supporting proof would not be sufficient to exculpate them from
liability. The crime committed is Estafa thru falsification of public document. The falsification of the
surety bond (Counter bond) a notarized document, was resorted to by the accused in order to defraud
complainant." 30
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s reasoning and
added that the petitioner’s participation in the issuance of the fake counterbond was proved by the
testimony of DE CASTRO and was confirmed by the testimony of BELTRAN. record.

We disagree. COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

To our mind, the evidence is not sufficient to form a basis for petitioner’s conviction. That is an answer to the question, that remain in the record.

First of all, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses linking FERNANDEZ to the commission of the Q: Now Mr. Witness, you said that on December 14, 1987, you went to the Office of Atty. Oscar
crime are all hearsay in nature for they are not based on the witnesses’ own personal knowledge. Beltran and he handed you also a P50,000.00, do you know what that P50,000.00 was that intended for?

Prosecution witness DE CASTRO testified that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library A: That is intended for the 10% premium of the principal amount of money.

ATTY. BAÑARES:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"What happened when Mr. Olesco give (sic) you the First Integrated Counter attachment bond?
A: I examined the bond and asked him if the bond is okey (sic) .
Q: Now what did you do with that P50,000.00 that Atty. Beltran gave you that was intended for the
premium?
A: When I came back to the Office of Mr. Melecio Cruz, I told him to tell Olesco that I have the money
so that he can give me the bond.

ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We will object to that your Honor we are asking that statement of the witness be stricken off the record We are asking that the statement be stricken off the record. The question is very clear, what did you do
because it is not responsive to the question.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary with that P50,000.00 that Atty. Beltran gave you?

FISCAL ISRAEL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library FISCAL

Why it is not responsive? After receiving the P50,000 — what did you do?

ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library A: I bring (sic) it at (sic) Chateau building in the office of Mr. Reyes.

The question is what is the result and he said I examined and I asked him if the bond is okey (sic). That Q: After that what else happened, what did you do with that P50,000.00 which you brought with you?
is no responsive to the question.
A: I called Mr. Cruz that I have the money and he told Mr. Olesco that I have money for the premium.
FISCAL ISRAEL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
He should conduct an examination and that is the result.
I object to the question your Honor, that is not the question. The question is what happened for the
ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library money that was given to you?

That should be ask (sic) in the proper manner. FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library No, what did you do?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Alright reform Fiscal. ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: When you said (sic) conducted an examination of the First Integrated Counter Attachment Bond,
how did you conduct your investigation?
A: I look (sic) at the bond and when I saw that it was issued by First Integrated Insurance Company, I
asked Mr. Olesco why is it that it came from First Integrated Insurance Company while he gave me an
Interworld Insurance application bond.
Q: What was the reply of Mr. Olesco?
What did you do with the P50,000.00?
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Just a moment, there is no really direct answer. What did you do with that amount of P50,000.00?
A: When Efren Olesco give (sic) me the counter attachment bond and after asking him the veracity of
the signatories in the bond, I handed to him the P50,000.00.

A: Mr. Olesco told me that their Interworld branch in Butuan was already closed and he asked the help
of Mr. Roberto Fernandez and Mr. Gatchalian for the issuance of the bond.
ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
May I moved for he striking out of the answer to the last question. Mr. Fernandez be stricken off the
ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
You Honor please, may we ask that the first portion of the statement of a witness be stricken off the
record for being no responsive to the question. The answer should be confine on what happened to the
P50,000.00.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
When Mr. Olesco give (sic) him the counter attachment bond, that is the time that he handed (sic).
What the witness mentioned is that he asked the help of Fernandez and Gatchalian.
ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: You said that you asked the help of . . .
There is a statement about perusal.
A: I did not asked (sic) the help, it was Efren Olesco (sic) asked the help of Mr. Fernandez and
FISCAL ISRAEL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Gatchalian.

That is insofar as the counter bond.. Q: You said that Mr. Olesco told you that he asked the help of Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Gatchalian. Now,
do you know what kind of help was Mr. Melecio Cruz would ask if you know and did he tell you what
ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library kind of help would Mr. Cruz ask (sic) Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Gatchalian?

You give (sic) it to Olesco? COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A: Yes, sir and I handed to him. Remove that portion Fiscal.

FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library FISCAL ISRAEL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Mr. Olesco received that P50,000.00? Did you ask him what kind of help?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any proof or evidence to show that Mr. Olesco received that P50,000.00?
A: After I gave him the P50,000.00, I asked him (sic) an official receipt and he handed to me an official
receipt.
Q: I am showing to you an Official Receipt No. 157 dated December 14, 1987, will you please go over
the Official Receipt if that is the receipt that you are referring to that was given by Mr. Olesco?
A: He already told me that when I asked him why is it that it is the First Integrated bond while the
application form that he gave us is Interworld Insurance Company?
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told me that he asked the help of Fernandez and Gatchalian to secure the First Integrated bond
because the Butuan branch of Inteworld was already closed.
ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A: Yes, sir. For purposes of the record your Honor please, the answer of the witness is hearsay your Honor.

Q: May I request that this Official Receipt be marked as Exhibit "A" dated December 14, 1987. COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: Under this Exhibit which is now marked as Exhibit "A" Mr. Witness there appears a signature above That is what (sic) told to him.
the typewritten name Efren Olesco, do you know whose signature is that?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary Q: Do you know if he was able to secure the help of Mr. Fernandez and Gatchalian?

A: That is the signature of Efren Olesco. ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Efren Olesco? He was only told your Honor.

A: He signed it in front of us. FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: Which we request your Honor that the same be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "A-1" . If he knows because he was told by Mr. Olesco to help, now, the question is if he knows, if he was able
to secure?
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A: I do not know.
Mark it.
Q: Then from the Office of Mr. Melencio Cruz after Mr. Olesco told you that he would asked (sic) the
Q: Now, Mr. Witness you made mentioned (sic) of Mr. Olesco having gone to one Mr. Roberto help of Mr. Gatchalian and Mr. Fernandez to help him about this bond, then what else happened?
Fernandez, is that correct?
ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We will object your Honor please, misleading. The witness never testify that he talk (sic) to Olesco.
There is no mentioned (sic) about that your Honor. Witness testify (sic) that it was Melencio Cruz who told him that Olesco asked the help of
Gatchalian.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary A: I told him that I will first ask Mr. Olesco about it.

ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Q: Do you know this Mr. Olesco?

We refer to the record, first the witness testified a while ago your Honor please. A: Yes, sir.

FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Q: Please look around Mr. Witness and, tell the Court if he is here inside the court room?

Because if I can recall there was an answer from the witness. A: He is here your Honor.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Fernandez and Gatchalian for the issuance of that bond, First Integrated bond.
ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That was an answer for the second question your Honor. The question is that: when the witness said and
testified that he asked Olesco why it was the First Integrated while the application was an Interworld.
Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom wearing a green shirt and when asked his name
answered in the name of Efren Olesco.
Q: And were you able to go to Mr. Efren Olesco on that day of December 14, 1987?
A: Yes, sir.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Q: What did you tell him?

Yes. A: I told him that Mr. Noel de Castro is applying for a counter bond.

ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Q: What was the reply of Mr. Olesco, if there is any?

But he never testified that he conversed with Olesco who told him that Olesco will ask the help of A: He told me to prepare some documents sir.
Fernandez; and Gatchalian. What the witness testify was that it was Melencio Cruz who told him that
Olesco will ask the help of Gatchalian. Q: What document are your referring to?

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library A: The application forms sir.

No. Q: Did you prepare this document?

ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library A: Yes, sir. I got it from Mr. Noel de Castro.

I submit your Honor, after all I will cross-examine the witness. ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library I moved for the striking out of the answer your honor. It is not responsive to the question.

It was Olesco who told him (sic) he asked the help of Fernandez and Gatchalian. COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ATTY. BAÑARES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Strike out the last portion of the answer.

That was the answer to the later question, may we just place on record our objection your Honor so that
when the transcript of the stenographic notes shall have already been transcribed we can raise the same
objection at the earliest possibility. 31
In an attempt to corroborate his testimony, the prosecution presented CRUZ whose testimony
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Q: You mention of an application, application for what is this?
A: Yes, sir. After preparing the application it would enter the bonding company and the bond will be
issued.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Q: Aside from the document required by Mr. Olesco is there any other document required?

"Q: This Noel de Castro you mentioned you entertained on that December 14, 1987 can you tell the A: Yes, sir. After I finished preparing the document he issued the bond sir.
court what kind of document from the Office of Mr. Manuel Reyes he wish to get?chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary Q: Can you still remember what kind of bond Mr. Olesco issued?

A: counter bond sir. A: First Integrated bond sir.

Q: What did you do after Noel de Castro informed you that is in need of a counter bond? Q: If a copy shown to you can you recognize the same?
A: Yes, sir. Q: I am showing to you a copy of Official Receipt No. 157 please go over the same and tell the court if
this is the receipt your are referring to? May I make of record your honor that this is a xerox copy?
Q: I am showing to you a xerox copy of defendant’s counter bond, can you tell us what relation is this to
the one you mentioned? ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A: It was Mr. Olesco who give (sic) the bond to Mr. Noel de Castro. The best evidence is the receipt your honor.

Q: Did you see this given by Mr. Olesco to Mr. De Castro? COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A: Yes, sir. Let the witness answer.

Q: I am showing to you a xerox copy of a counter bond and go over the same and tell the court if that is A: Yes, sir.
the copy of the one you mentioned?’
Q: What is the relation of this receipt to the one you mentioned?.
A: Yes, sir.
A: This is the receipt that I give (sic) to Mr. de Castro sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Below the receipt there is a signature over the name Efren Olesco, can you tell the court whose
Witness pointing to the bond your honor. signature is this?

FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We request your honor that this be provisionally marked as Exhibit Z. May we know the materiality of this your honor.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Mark it. As a proof your honor that Mr. Olesco received the money as payment for the bond.

Q: Mr. Witness when this counter bond was issued by Mr. Olesco and delivered to you were there other COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
document or other documents were delivered to Mr. De Castro?
Proceed, fiscal.
A: The receipt sir.
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Receipt for what?
May we request your honor that this receipt presented to by witness may provisionally marked as
A: For the payment of the bond sir. Exhibit Y and the signature over the name Efren Olesco be marked as Exhibit Y-1.

Q: You mean the premium? COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A: Yes, sir. Mark it.

Q: How much is the receipt? Q: Mr. Witness I see here another signature below the signature you pointed as a signature of Mr.
Olesco, whose signature is this?cralaw : red
ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A: That is my signature sir.
The receipt will answer to that question your honor.
Q: And what is the significance of your signature here?
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ATTY. AGOOT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Let the witness answer, if he knows.
Objection your honor the best evidence is the receipt itself.
A: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) sir.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: From whom (sic) Mr. Olesco received the amount of fifty thousand pesos?chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary Objection denied.

A: From Mr. Manuel de Castro sir. A: I was directed by Mr. de Castro to sign it sir for the purpose of proving that Mr. Olesco received the
money.
 INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Mr. Witness, relative to this case do you remember if you have executed a sinumpaang salaysay?
Your honor witness is reading the document handed to him by public prosecutor.
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir. This is my sinumpaang salaysay.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Q: I am showing to you a sinumpaang salaysay will you go over the same and tell the court what
relation is this to the one you mentioned? FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A: It is about the counter bond sir. With Exhibit H your honor we would like to confirm the testimony of the witness and we terminate our
direct examination." 32
Q: You go over that sinumpaang salaysay and inform the court what relation is that to the sinumpaang
salaysay you mentioned? Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception . . . ."
A: This is the sinumpaang salaysay I executed .sir. Thus, any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand.
Q: Your honor. 33 In the present case, neither DE CASTRO nor CRUZ, the prosecution’s main witnesses, had personal
knowledge that FERNANDEZ in any way helped or aided OLESCO in the facilitation or the
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library procurement of the counter bond. In fact, DE CASTRO admitted that he did not know if OLESCO was
able to secure the help of FERNANDEZ and GATCHALIAN. And even assuming that DE CASTRO
Your honor may we request that this sinumpaang salaysay be marked as Exhibit H. could testify to the alleged statements made by OLESCO implicating FERNANDEZ in the commission
of the crime, said statements may still not be utilized against FERNANDEZ, who never had the
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library opportunity to cross-examine OLESCO, for being violative of the res inter alios rule which ordains that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. 34
Mark it.
Secondly, although a conspiracy was alleged in the information, there is no evidence to prove that a
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library conspiracy existed between FERNANDEZ and OLESCO. As a manner of incurring criminal liability,
the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to establish a finding of criminal
Your honor please may we request hat the second page of this sinumpaang salaysay be marked as conspiracy, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 35 Nowhere in the decisions of the trial court and the
Exhibit H-1. Court of Appeals, do we find any mention in the testimonies of the witnesses, much less proof of the
existence of conspiracy between OLESCO and FERNANDEZ to defraud private complainant MELALE
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library or to commit the crime of estafa through falsification of public document nor was evidence adduced of
any act of FERNANDEZ that may be construed as an overt act in the furtherance of a conspiracy. Based
Mark it. on the evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that OLESCO conspired and/or connived with
the petitioner or vice versa both in the procurement, preparation and facilitation in the issuance of the
Q: Mr. Witness there is a signature on this Exhibit H-1, please inform the court whose signature is this spurious counterbond and in defrauding private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00.chanrob1es
above the name Melencio Cruz? virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A: That is my signature sir. Besides, evidence discloses that the petitioner was not present or with OLESCO during the whole day of
December 14, 1987 and did not witness or participate in any of those acts or events which happened on
INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library that day starting with the negotiation conducted by DE CASTRO through CRUZ for the procurement of
a counter attachment bond needed by BELTRAN; the accomplishment of the application form for the
Witness your honor pointing to a signature above the name Melencio Cruz. bond made by BELTRAN and the filing thereof with OLESCO made by DE CASTRO through CRUZ;
the preparation and delivery by OLESCO of the bond to DE CASTRO; the payment made by DE
Q: Again I see a signature over the word "saksi", whose signature is this? CASTRO to OLESCO of the cash amount of P50,000.00 as premium payment therefor; and the
acknowledgment by OLESCO of his actual receipt of said amount of P50,000.00 as evidenced by
A: I do not recognize whose signature are these sir. Hexagon Surety Services, Inc. Official Receipt No 157 dated December 14, 1987 which OLESCO
signed himself. In fact, the only evidence proffered tending to incriminate the petitioner is the testimony
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library of DE CASTRO who stated that OLESCO informed him that the bond was issued with the help of
petitioner FERNANDEZ and a certain GATCHALIAN which as previously stated, is inadmissible in
We request your honor that the signature of Melencio Andrada be marked as Exhibit H-1 a. evidence. 36 BELTRAN’s assertion that FERNANDEZ admitted that he delivered the counter bond and
that he facilitated in procuring the same during their alleged confrontation fails to persuade us
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library considering that this was not corroborated and was in fact contradicted by the testimony of DE
CASTRO who testified that only OLESCO delivered the counter bond to him. Moreover, the mere fact
Mark it. that FERNANDEZ allegedly claimed that the counterbond was genuine does not establish that he had
knowledge that the counterbond was spurious. Neither does it prove that he conspired with or
Q: Mr. Witness I want you to go over again Exhibit H and H-1 and examine its contents and tell the participated in the procurement thereof or was ever in possession thereof.
court whether you affirm the contents of this sinumpaang salaysay?
The Court of Appeals therefore erroneously applied the presumption that the person in possession of the
falsified document is the author thereof for the reason that there is no evidence to prove that
FERNANDEZ was ever in possession of, used, took advantage of and/or profited by the use of the fake
counter bond.
In all criminal cases, mere speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish
the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion no matter how strong can not sway
judgment. 37 Where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted even
though his innocence may be doubted since the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty can be overthrown only by proof reasonable doubt. 38 When the guilt of the accused has not been
proven with moral certainty, it is our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence of the
accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. 39
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Roberto Fernandez is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 177727 : January 19, 2010]
HAROLD V. TAMARGO, PETITIONER, VS. ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA
AND LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the November 10, 2006 decision[2] and May 18, 2007
resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610.
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at
around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The
police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and
executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during
a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he
(Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what
he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna. [4]
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Geron's affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor[5] issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and
three John Does.[6] On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for murder were filed against
them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of Atty.
Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail Franzielle. [7] Columna was
arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and
trial.[8]
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he
admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan
(alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent
Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. [9] The former was the ex-mayor and the
latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in
detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint
against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.[10]
On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor [11] who subjected
him to clarificatory questions.[12]
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for
mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his
political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was
their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd
and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a
kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were
dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted by the
Sandiganbayan.[13]
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columna's unsolicited handwritten
letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna's jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured
until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the
killings.[14] Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the
latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columna's letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory
hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the
hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of
the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been
employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.[15]
Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.
This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29,
2004, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during
the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested
that he be transferred to another detention center.[16]
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).[17] On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal
and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.[18] He opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial
confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that there was enough
evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents.[19] Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the
cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29. [20]
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas' motion for reconsideration
(MR) and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. [21] This time, he declared that the extrajudicial
confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was
not corroborated by other evidence.[22] As a result, on August 22, 2005, the trial prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied petitioner's MR.
The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in an
order dated October 26, 2005.[23] Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself
without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R.
Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She ruled
that, based on Columna's March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor,
there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the MR of the Antipordas in an order
dated February 6, 2006.
Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the RTC judge
gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the
substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there was no
probable cause against all the accused. It also held that Columna's extrajudicial confession was not
admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece
of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was
made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No.
94188. The CA denied reconsideration in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In a decision dated August
24, 2007, the CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari of respondents Antiporda.[24]
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on, he filed an
amended petition impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the CA decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94188. The Court treated this as a supplemental petition.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against
respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable cause
based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give
credit to Columna's recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her evaluation
and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while completely disregarding
contradicting evidence. They also contend that Columna's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible
against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court
has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.[25] It may either agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[26] The
court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. [27]
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1) Columna's affidavit
dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of this
affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4) the
May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutor's recommendation to file the murder charges. [28]
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columna's May 3, 2004 letter to
respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his participation in
the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004 affidavit where he stated that neither
he nor the respondents had any involvement in the murders and (3) his testimony during the October 22,
2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004
affidavit.
We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez[29] that
[although] there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of
reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic
right which the courts are created to uphold.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would have seen that, aside from
the pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on them. We quote with
approval the reflections of the CA on this point:
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving the motion to withdraw the
informations effectively sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment and evaluation of the
merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of the accused. Instead,
she should have made a circumspect evaluation by looking at everything made available to her at that
point of the cases. No less than that was expected and required of her as a judicial officer. According
to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case
based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the
records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any
evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public
prosecutor.[31]
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna's extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004
affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. [32] Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused[33] and is considered as hearsay against them.[34] The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient,
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if
a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.[35]
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. -- The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.[36] Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object
and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.[37] Otherwise, it
cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.[38]
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence
was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession
of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it would
be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown
court case.[39] When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing
more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint
should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and
expensive litigation.[40] The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda
remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna. [41]
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself whether
there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as co-conspirators. Given that
she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against respondents, her orders denying the
withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the petitions for certiorari of
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 118375 - October 3, 2003
CELESTINA T. NAGUIAT, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA
QUEAÑO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the decision of the Sixteenth
Division of the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 21 December 1994 1, which affirmed in
toto the decision handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. 2cräläwvirtualibräry
The case arose when on 11 August 1981, private respondent Aurora Queaño (Queaño) filed a complaint
before the Pasay City RTC for cancellation of a Real Estate Mortgage she had entered into with
petitioner Celestina Naguiat (Naguiat). The RTC rendered a decision, declaring the questioned Real
Estate Mortgage void, which Naguiat appealed to the Court of Appeals. After the Court of Appeals
upheld the RTC decision, Naguiat instituted the present petition.
The operative facts follow:
Queaño applied with Naguiat for a loan in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00),
which Naguiat granted. On 11 August 1980, Naguiat indorsed to Queaño Associated Bank Check No.
090990 (dated 11 August 1980) for the amount of Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P95,000.00), which was
earlier issued to Naguiat by the Corporate Resources Financing Corporation. She also issued her own
Filmanbank Check No. 065314, to the order of Queaño, also dated 11 August 1980 and for the amount
of Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P95,000.00). The proceeds of these checks were to constitute the loan
granted by Naguiat to Queaño.3cräläwvirtualibräry
To secure the loan, Queaño executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated 11 August 1980 in favor of
Naguiat, and surrendered to the latter the owners duplicates of the titles covering the mortgaged
properties.4 On the same day, the mortgage deed was notarized, and Queaño issued to Naguiat a
promissory note for the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), with interest
at 12% per annum, payable on 11 September 1980.5 Queaño also issued a Security Bank and Trust
Company check, postdated 11 September 1980, for the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P200,000.00) and payable to the order of Naguiat.
Upon presentment on its maturity date, the Security Bank check was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds. On the following day, 12 September 1980, Queaño requested Security Bank to stop payment of
her postdated check, but the bank rejected the request pursuant to its policy not to honor such requests if
the check is drawn against insufficient funds.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On 16 October 1980, Queaño received a letter from Naguiats lawyer, demanding settlement of the loan.
Shortly thereafter, Queaño and one Ruby Ruebenfeldt (Ruebenfeldt) met with Naguiat. At the meeting,
Queaño told Naguiat that she did not receive the proceeds of the loan, adding that the checks were
retained by Ruebenfeldt, who purportedly was Naguiats agent.7cräläwvirtualibräry
Naguiat applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage with the Sheriff of Rizal Province, who
then scheduled the foreclosure sale on 14 August 1981. Three days before the scheduled sale, Queaño
filed the case before the Pasay City RTC,8 seeking the annulment of the mortgage deed. The trial court
eventually stopped the auction sale.9cräläwvirtualibräry
On 8 March 1991, the RTC rendered judgment, declaring the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage null and
void, and ordering Naguiat to return to Queaño the owners duplicates of her titles to the mortgaged
lots.10 Naguiat appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, making no less than eleven
assignments of error. The Court of Appeals promulgated the decision now assailed before us that
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Hence, the present petition.
Naguiat questions the findings of facts made by the Court of Appeals, especially on the issue of whether
Queaño had actually received the loan proceeds which were supposed to be covered by the two checks
Naguiat had issued or indorsed. Naguiat claims that being a notarial instrument or public document, the
mortgage deed enjoys the presumption that the recitals therein are true. Naguiat also questions the
admissibility of various representations and pronouncements of Ruebenfeldt, invoking the rule on the
non-binding effect of the admissions of third persons.11cräläwvirtualibräry
The resolution of the issues presented before this Court by Naguiat involves the determination of facts, a
function which this Court does not exercise in an appeal by certiorari. Under Rule 45 which governs
appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be raised 12 as the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts.13 The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are in fact generally binding on the Supreme Court.14 A question of law
which the Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.15 There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 16cräläwvirtualibräry
Surely, there are established exceptions to the rule on the conclusiveness of the findings of facts of the
lower courts.17 But Naguiats case does not fall under any of the exceptions. In any event, both the
decisions of the appellate and trial courts are supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws.
Against the common finding of the courts below, Naguiat vigorously insists that Queaño received the
loan proceeds. Capitalizing on the status of the mortgage deed as a public document, she cites the rule
that a public document enjoys the presumption of validity and truthfulness of its contents. The Court of
Appeals, however, is correct in ruling that the presumption of truthfulness of the recitals in a public
document was defeated by the clear and convincing evidence in this case that pointed to the absence of
consideration.18 This Court has held that the presumption of truthfulness engendered by notarized
documents is rebuttable, yielding as it does to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as in this
case.19cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, absolutely no evidence was submitted by Naguiat that the checks she issued or WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the assailed decision is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
endorsed were actually encashed or deposited. The mere issuance of the checks did not result in the
perfection of the contract of loan. For the Civil Code provides that the delivery of bills of exchange and
SO ORDERED.
mercantile documents such as checks shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been
cashed.20 It is only after the checks have produced the effect of payment that the contract of loan may be
deemed perfected. Art. 1934 of the Civil Code provides: Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
"An accepted promise to deliver something by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the
parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perfected until the delivery of the object
of the contract." SECOND DIVISION

A loan contract is a real contract, not consensual, and, as such, is perfected only upon the delivery of the G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996
object of the contract.21 In this case, the objects of the contract are the loan proceeds which Queaño
would enjoy only upon the encashment of the checks signed or indorsed by Naguiat. If indeed the
checks were encashed or deposited, Naguiat would have certainly presented the corresponding PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
documentary evidence, such as the returned checks and the pertinent bank records. Since Naguiat vs.
SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused.
presented no such proof, it follows that the checks were not encashed or credited to Queaños account.

Naguiat questions the admissibility of the various written representations made by Ruebenfeldt on the
ground that they could not bind her following the res inter alia acta alteri nocere non debet rule. The
Court of Appeals rejected the argument, holding that since Ruebenfeldt was an authorized representative
or agent of Naguiat the situation falls under a recognized exception to the rule.22 Still, Naguiat insists
that Ruebenfeldt was not her agent.
Suffice to say, however, the existence of an agency relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is
supported by ample evidence. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Ruebenfeldt was not a
stranger or an unauthorized person. Naguiat instructed Ruebenfeldt to withhold from Queaño the checks
she issued or indorsed to Queaño, pending delivery by the latter of additional collateral. Ruebenfeldt
served as agent of Naguiat on the loan application of Queaños friend, Marilou Farralese, and it was in
connection with that transaction that Queaño came to know Naguiat.23 It was also Ruebenfeldt who
accompanied Queaño in her meeting with Naguiat and on that occasion, on her own and without Queaño
asking for it, Reubenfeldt actually drew a check for the sum of P220,000.00 payable to Naguiat, to cover
for Queaños alleged liability to Naguiat under the loan agreement. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an "agency by estoppel25 citing Article 1873 of the
Civil Code.26 Apparently, it considered that at the very least, as a consequence of the interaction
between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queaño got the impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of
Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaños impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One
who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, cannot
be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third
parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to
be.27 The Court of Appeals is correct in invoking the said rule on agency by estoppel.
More fundamentally, whatever was the true relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is irrelevant
in the face of the fact that the checks issued or indorsed to Queaño were never encashed or deposited to
her account of Naguiat.
All told, we find no compelling reason to disturb the finding of the courts a quo that the lender did not
remit and the borrower did not receive the proceeds of the loan. That being the case, it follows that the
mortgage which is supposed to secure the loan is null and void. The consideration of the mortgage
contract is the same as that of the principal contract from which it receives life, and without which it
cannot exist as an independent contract.28 A mortgage contract being a mere accessory contract, its
validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it. 29cräläwvirtualibräry
SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:p
The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well
as accused Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito Gambalan, Jr. the sum
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, and the amount of P1,500.00 representing the value
of the stolen revolver. 1 The Raquel brothers now plead for their absolution in this appellate
review.
In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for
robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch
16, 2 allegedly committed on July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of Kabacan.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress,
however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. 3
The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and
with page references to the transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor
General in the appellee's brief:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet
and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to
the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise,
heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at
him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless
(sic) while a man took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
 She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump
while two (2) other men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)
George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to
the police. The police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime
wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified
as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, March 21,
1988)
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested
that they were appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. 7 The lower court ordered the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. 8 In view of the penalty
imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to us. 9
Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in
convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite
absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.

Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police
station. (p. 27, ibid.)
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and
Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found
in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants
fled immediately after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)
We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the
evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the
crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband.
In her testimony on direct examination in court she declared as follows:

Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip
2, 1991) 4 (sic) at the window, did you see any when you pip (sic) at
the window?
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which
are presented in their brief in this wise: A; Yes, sir.

Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?
his parents he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan,
Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased
A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump
brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on
and I saw again two (2) persons who were running away,
July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities
sir.
accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of
Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name of accused Amado Ponce, to be an
owner of a parcel of land in Paatan. Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down
near the jetmatic pump and two (2) persons running away?
On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are
located in the same Barangay. Before July 4, he entertained no grudge against xxx xxx xxx
victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2, 1991, pp. 2-20).
Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when pump, who is this person?
his son Valeriano Raquel told him that he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan,
Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel,
A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado
also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place
of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his Ponce when the Police arrived. 10 (emphasis ours.)
house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even
accompanied them to Tungol where they arrested his son Valeriano. (TSN, April On cross-examination she further testified:
3, 1991, pp. 3-26).
Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where
T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on were you?
July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry
Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel was under his division then,
and was on duty on July 4, 1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20). 5 A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while
going to our room.

On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them
accordingly. 6
Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person
who was mask(ed) and got the gun of your husband
because he was mask(ed), is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
A: No, sir. 12 (Emphases supplied.)
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who
shot Agapito Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement executed in the Investigation Section
of the Kabacan Police Station on July 5, 1986, he declared that:

Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your 19Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing
house and got this gun? about 5 meters away from where you were then drinking,
what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which
was partly covered by a maong jacket. The other one wore
Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have
a hat locally known as "kipis" meaning a hat made of cloth
got this gun inside?
with leaves protruding above the forehead and seemed to
be holding something which I failed to recognize. The
FISCAL DIZON: other one wore a shortpant with a somewhat white T-shirt
with markings and there was a white T-shirt covering his
head and a part of his face as he was head-down during that
Already answered. time.

She was not able to identify, your Honor. 20Q: Did you recognized any of these men?

Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was

A: No. Because they walked fast. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
presented to you by the police, is that right?

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein
A: Yes, sir. 11
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado
Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused
xxx xxx xxx escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie
after you shouted for help and you saw two (2) person(s)
running, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized
against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the
opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is
elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. 14 That is exactly the situation,
and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that
not right?
A: I saw them running sir going around.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an
accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the
opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide
open for cross-examination and rebuttal. 15

Q: These two (2) persons were running going around? The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
A: They were running towards the road. principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
ATTY. DIVINO: rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 16
Going to the road.

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, 17 those

Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running exceptions do not however apply to the present case.
towards the road?
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no
evidence whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt.
Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr.
Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, 18 was negated by Dr. Anulao himself
who testified that he treated no person by the name of Danny Clemente. 19
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was
made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly
admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the
intelligence and investigation section of their police station:
Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his
constitutional right while on the process of investigation?
A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the
information from him . . . And after that I checked the
information that he gave.
Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should
be assisted by counsel?
A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation
you have in mind to investigate as to against (sic) him, and
you have to inform his constitutional right but if the
purpose is to interrogate him to acquire information which
will lead to the identity of the other accused we do not need
to inform him.
Q: Don't you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit; the
accused should be (re)presented by counsel that is the
ruling of the Supreme Court?
A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.
Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his
right?
A: No sir.
Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.
A: No counsel, Sir. 20
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the
right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of
counsel. 21 These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were
never observed.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of
guilt. 22 Without the positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is
not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to
them. 23 While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the
prosecution is probatively low in substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution
cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its
own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is
weak. 24
It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases
must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt
calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither
met nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-
appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 123070 April 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. CASIANO BUNTAG, ALIAS “CIANO” AND
DIEGO BONGO, Appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in
Criminal Case No. 7729, convicting the appellants Casiano Buntag alias “Ciano” and Diego Bongo of
murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, and directing them to jointly indemnify the heirs
of the victim Berno Georg Otte the sum of P50,000 as moral damages.
The Indictment
The appellants were charged with murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
That on or about the 9th day of February, 1992, in the municipality of Panglao, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill and without any justifiable cause, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with
treachery by the suddenness and unexpectedness of the acts, the victim who was unarmed being then
unaware thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the use of a bladed instrument one Berno Georg Otte (a German national), hitting and injuring the latter
on his chest, thereby causing his immediate death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim
in the amount to be proved during the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 248 in relation to Art. 14 all of the Revised Penal three times on the face. When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the chest. Buntag also
Code as amended. 2 ςrνll stated that he then ran back home, but Bongo followed him and cautioned him not to reveal the incident
to anybody or else he would be implicated. 20 Buntag subscribed and swore to the truth of his statement
on February 21, 1992 before Judge Antonio Sarce of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
The Case for the Prosecution

In the meantime, Municipal Health Officer Dr. Julita Lood-Cogo performed an autopsy on the cadaver
Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte, 3 a German national and a tourist, checked in at the Alona
of Otte and submitted her Post-Mortem Report which contained the following
Ville Beach Resort located in Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma Clarabal Bonga, 4 assigned
findings:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Otte to Room No. 9 5 and gave the latter his room key.

Stab wound, anterior chest, right, at the level of the 4th rib, approx. 2 cms. x 1 cm. in size, with a depth
On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resort’s restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the
of approx. 12 cms., directed upwards and medially, with a complete fracture of the 4th rib, right,
disco which was about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo Chapel. 6 ςrνll
involving a portion of the right lung and base of the heart.

At about 10:00 p. m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of the tables. 7 She
Cause of death:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
noticed that he had some companions whom she failed to recognize. 8 ςrνll

CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO HEMORRHAGE, SECONDARY TO STAB WOUND,

Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno “Ninoy” Guigue were also at the disco. At
around 2:00 a. m. of February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a night and walked
home, with their respective bicycles at their sides. 9 At the crossing to the Alona Beach, they saw a man
lying on the road but did not recognize him. They walked past the prostrate man. When they were about
twenty-five meters 10 away from the body by the road, they met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their
barriomates. 11 Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo jointly and simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their
lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigue’s uncle, Aquilino
Bongo. 12 In the process, they left their bicycles behind. Aquilino Bongo then accompanied Mihangos
and Guigue to where they left their bicycles. Mihangos and Guigue retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag
and Bongo were no longer there.
At around 5:30 a. m. of February 9, 1992, the police station of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by
radio call about a man, believed to be dead, lying at the side of the crossroad near the Alona
Beach. 13 PO1 Yolando E. Hormachuelos, together with PO1 Mauro Sumaylo and PO1 Dominie
Ragusta, 14 proceeded to the crime scene. They were accompanied by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr.
Julita L. Cogo, who confirmed that the man died due to a stab wound. 15 The policemen found a hunting
knife about one meter away from the body. 16 Constancio Geoivencal took pictures of the cadaver.
Hormachuelos took custody of the knife. 17 ςrνll
In the course of their investigation, the policemen learned that Mihangos and Guigue had seen the dead
body by the road. Hormachuelos fetched Mihangos and Guigue from their houses and brought them to
the road where the body of Otte was found. Mihangos and Guigue narrated how they found the body at
around 2:00 a. m. that day, as well as their encounter with Bongo and Buntag.
ANTERIOR CHEST, RIGHT. 21 ςrνll
On March 7, 1992, a criminal complaint for murder was filed against appellants Bongo and Buntag with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Attached to the records was Buntag’s sworn statement dated February
21, 1992. Only appellant Bongo submitted his counter-affidavit on February 27, 1992, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Antonio Sarce, 22 where he confirmed (a) Buntag’s account in his sworn
statement before Judge Sarce that they were with Otte at 1:00 a. m. on February 9, 1992 at the crossing
towards Alona Beach Resort, and (b) that he was armed with a hunting knife. He further stated therein
that while at the crossing, Buntag and Otte, who were both drunk, had an altercation and that he tried to
pacify them but in the process, Buntag pulled out his (Bongo’s) hunting knife from his waist and
stabbed Otte with it. 23 ςrνll
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a resolution finding probable cause
against the appellants for murder and issued warrants for their arrest. The court found Buntag’s sworn
statement and Bongo’s counter-affidavit self-serving.
On June 4, 1992, the day of the appellant’s arraignment in the Regional Trial Court, appellant Buntag,
through counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, filed a “Motion to Discharge (him) to be a Witness for the
Prosecution,” alleging inter alia:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1) That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of said accused whose discharge is
requested;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At about 1:00 p. m. that day, Hormachuelos took appellant Bongo to the police station and investigated
2) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
him without the assistance of counsel. Bongo admitted that he took Otte’s key to Room No. 9 and hid it
except the testimony of said accused, as can be shown by the affidavit of said accused in relation to the
near their house. He then drew a sketch showing the place where he hid the key, at the back of their
affidavits or sworn statements of Ponciano Horcerada, Isidro Mihangos, Benigno Guigue, Alfredo
house. Bongo also admitted that he was with appellant Casiano Buntag. The policemen went to Bongo’s
Guioguio, and PO1 Yolando [E.] Hormachuelos;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
house and recovered the key to Otte’s room as indicated by Bongo in his sketch.

3) That the testimony of herein accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
At 2:00 p. m., Guigue arrived at the police station and gave his statement to Hormachuelos. 18 At 3:00 p.
points;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
m., Mihangos gave his statement to SPO1 Proculo Bonao. 19 Hormachuelos then took custody of
Casiano Buntag and brought him to the police station where he was asked about his involvement in the
killing of Otte without the assistance of counsel. However, Buntag opted to keep silent. When apprised 4) That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; andcralawlibrary
that Diego Bongo had implicated him, Buntag, this time with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Nerio
G. Zamora, gave a statement on February 13, 1992 to a police investigator. He stated that at 1:00 a. m.
5) That the said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
on February 9, 1992, he was walking back home from the disco place where he caught up with Diego
Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo then ordered turpitude;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
him to box Otte but he refused, and moved back about three meters. Bongo himself then boxed Otte
6) That herein accused-movant hereby expresses his consent to be a witness for the government. 24
However, the prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that both accused were equally guilty. On
June 8, 1992, the court issued an Order denying the motion, and the appellants, assisted by their
respective counsels, entered pleas of not guilty. 25 ςrνll
During the trial, the prosecution presented Judge Antonio G. Sarce who testified that he conducted the
preliminary examination of the case and identified both Buntag’s sworn statement and Bongo’s counter-
affidavit as subscribed and sworn to before him (Judge Sarce) in his chambers.
After presenting all its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence the hunting knife, 26 the key to
room no. 9 of the beach resort, 27 the sworn statement of Buntag, 28 and Bongo’s counter-affidavit 29 to
prove that both appellants conspired to kill the victim and that they in fact killed the victim, and as part
of the testimony of Judge Sarce. Both appellants objected to the admission of the said sworn statements
and counter-affidavit solely on the ground that the statements executed by one accused was hearsay as to
the other accused. 30 By way of rejoinder, the prosecution alleged as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1. That exhibits A, B, C, D, E and all its submarkings are all relevant, pertinent and material evidence
against the accused in the above-entitled case, therefore, admissible in
evidence;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. That exhibits F and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter alios acta rule
because they are principally offered against accused Casiano Buntag, the affiant. The sworn statement of
Casiano Buntag is offered mainly as admission of said accused Casiano
Buntag;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. That exhibits G and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter alios acta rule
because they are principally offered against accused Diego Bongo, the affiant. The counter-affidavit of
Diego Bongo is offered mainly as admission of said accused Diego Bongo.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to admit in evidence all the
prosecution’s exhibits formally offered, for the purpose for which they are being offered. 31 ςrνll
The court admitted the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution. The appellants opted not to
adduce any evidence on their behalf. Instead, they filed, without leave of court, a “Motion to Acquit. ”
On June 7, 1993, the court issued an Order denying the motion.
On August 14, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment finding both the appellants guilty of the crime
charged. The decretal portion of the decision of the trial court reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this Court renders judgment finding the two (2) accused
Casiano Buntag, alias Ciano, and Diego Bongo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER, an act committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248, in relation to Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and does hereby sentences each one of them to the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accusatory penalties imposed by law.
There being no evidence disclosed as to the civil liability, this Court, therefore, limits in providing that
the accused shall pay jointly the heirs of the deceased Berno Georg Otte the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000. 00), by way of moral damages, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
The trial court relied, inter alia, on the sworn statement of Buntag dated February 21, 1992 33 and the
counter-affidavit of Bongo 34 in convicting them of the crime charged. Both the appellants appealed the
decision.
Although the appellants enumerated separate issues in their briefs, the same may be synthesized into
three issues, namely: (a) whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they
conspired to kill the victim Otte and that they, in fact, killed him; (b) whether or not the appellants are
guilty of murder; and, (c) whether or not the appellants are liable for moral damages to the heirs of the
victim. Appellant Bongo’s contention that he was deprived of his right to due process on his claim that
the transcripts of the respective testimonies of Dr. Julita Cogo, SPO1 Bonao and resort manager Bonga
were not transmitted to this Court is belied by the records. In a Resolution dated September 11, 2000,
the Court declared that, based on the records, the transcripts of stenographic notes in this case were
already complete. 35 ςrνll
The appellants contend that the prosecution failed to adduce direct or circumstantial evidence to prove
that they conspired to kill the victim, and that they, in fact, killed him. They argue that although the
prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence consisting of the extrajudicial sworn statement of appellant
Buntag and the counter-affidavit of appellant Bongo, such evidence is utterly insufficient to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, according to the appellants, the admissions made by appellant Buntag in his sworn
statement are binding on him only. Being prejudicial to appellant Bongo, such admissions are not
inadmissible against the latter unless repeated in open court by appellant Buntag, thus, affording
appellant Bongo the right to cross-examination. Likewise, the admissions of appellant Bongo in his
sworn statement are inadmissible against appellant Buntag, unless the former repeated his admissions
during the trial, affording the latter an opportunity to cross-examine the said appellant. The appellants
further aver that since they opted not to testify on their respective statements, there was no opportunity
for cross-examination. Consequently, the admissions made by one appellant in his sworn statement are
hearsay evidence against the other appellant, and vice versa. In fine, the appellants contend that the trial
court should have acquitted them of the crime charged.
We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that they conspired to
kill Otte and that they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However, we find and so hold, after an
incisive review of the records, that the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove
the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may
be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime. 36 Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. 37 It is not
necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the
conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. 38 ςrνll
The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of
conviction if the following requisites are established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and, (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 39 ςrνll
In People v. Delim, 40 we held, thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of
circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without
exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense
charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the
evidence of the prosecution. 41 ςrνll
In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the trial court relied not only on the counter-affidavit
of appellant Bongo 42 and appellant Buntag’s sworn statement, 43 but also on the other evidence on
record, namely, the knife used in killing the victim, 44 the key to Otte’s room, 45 and the collective
testimonies of the other witnesses of the prosecution.
The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused. 46 The same rule applies if the
extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the
declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible
against both accused. 47 The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission when repeated during the
trial is transposed into judicial admissions.
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts by the
accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or
truths charged. 48 It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient
to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. 49 A confession, on
the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged. 50 ςrνll
In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest in his sworn statement,
and not a confession. So did appellant Bongo in his counter-affidavit. Such admissions in the form of
affidavits, made in the Municipal Trial Court in the course of its preliminary investigation, are high
quality evidence. 51 MCTC Judge Antonio Sarce testified on the said sworn statement and counter-
affidavit and was cross-examined. 52 Moreover, some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one
appellant are identical with some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of the other, and vice versa.
This corroborates and confirms their veracity. Such admissions, made without collusion, are akin to
interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the other
appellant implicated therein to show the probability of his participation in the commission of the crime
and as corroborative evidence against him. 53 The Court rejects the appellants’ contention that they were
deprived of their right to cross-examine the other on the latter’s admissions against the other. Through
their common counsel, they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their respective statements by
the prosecution. They opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides, they had opportunity to cross-examine
Judge Sarce before whom they swore to the truthfulness of their statements. 54 ςrνll
In this case, the prosecution adduced the following circumstantial evidence which constitutes proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, indeed, conspired to kill and did kill the
victim:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1. Appellant Buntag admitted, in his sworn statement, 55 that, at about 1:00 a. m. on February 9, 1992, he
was in the company of appellant Bongo and the victim Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach, and that
appellant Bongo was armed with a hunting knife. Appellant Buntag identified the victim through the
latter’s picture, as well as the hunting knife used in the killing. 56 Appellant Bongo, in his counter-
affidavit, confirmed the truth of appellant Buntag’s admissions and also admitted that on the said date,
time and place, he was with appellant Buntag and the victim, and that he was armed with a hunting knife
which was tucked on his waist.
2. The appellants admitted in their respective statements that on the said occasion, Otte died from a stab
wound caused by a hunting knife.
3. Appellant Bongo admitted in his counter-affidavit that he took the key to the victim’s room and hid it
near their house where the policemen found it.
4. While both appellants were within the periphery of the situs criminis, Mihangos and Guigue sauntered
by with their bicycles at their sides. Suddenly, the appellants jointly and simultaneously lunged at them,
causing Mihangos and Guigue to believe that their lives were in peril, impelling them to run for their
lives and seek sanctuary in the house of Guigue’s uncle, Aquilino Bongo. By the time Mihangos and
Guigue returned to the situs criminis to retrieve their bicycles, the appellants had already left.
5. In his sworn statement, appellant Buntag admitted that after the victim was stabbed, he and appellant
Bongo fled from the situs criminis. This was corroborated by the testimony of Mihangos. The presence
of both appellants at the situs criminis and their flight from the scene are strong indicia of their
participation in the commission of the crime and their complicity therein. 57 Appellant Bongo opted not
to testify or adduce evidence to controvert the testimony of Mihangos and the admissions of the
appellant prejudicial to him.
6. The hunting knife of appellant Bongo which was used to kill the victim was left at the scene of the
crime where the policemen recovered it shortly thereafter.
7. The appellants admitted in their respective sworn statements that the victim was stabbed once with a
hunting knife. These admissions were corroborated by Dr. Julita Cogo’s finding that the victim was
stabbed once on the anterior chest area. 58 The doctor testified that the stab wound could have been
caused by a sharp-edged weapon. 59 ςrνll
8. Neither of the appellants brought the victim to the hospital for immediate medical attendance and
operation.
9. Although the appellants pointed to the other as the assailant in their respective statements, neither of
them reported the stabbing to the police authorities and claimed that the other killed the victim.
10. Neither of the appellants took the witness stand to deny any involvement in the killing of the victim.
The evidence of the prosecution, thus, stands unrebutted.
The appellants cannot rely on the exculpatory portions of their respective statements as basis for their
acquittal of the crime charged. In the case of appellant Buntag, he avers in his sworn statement that he
was ordered by appellant Bongo to box the victim and when he refused, appellant Bongo himself boxed
and stabbed the victim with the hunting knife. When appellant Buntag fled from the scene and went
back home, appellant Bongo followed and warned him not to divulge the incident so that he would not
be implicated. For his part, appellant Bongo turned the tables on appellant Buntag and claimed in his
counter-affidavit that the latter snatched the hunting knife from his waist and stabbed the victim in the
heat of their altercation. The stabbing was so sudden, he insists, that he was unable to stop appellant
Buntag from stabbing the victim.
We are not persuaded by the claims of the appellants for the following
reasons:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
First. Contrary to the claim of appellant Buntag that appellant Bongo boxed the victim, the necropsy
report of Dr. Cogo failed to show that the victim’s body sustained hematoma, bruises or contusions. The
findings of the doctor must prevail as against the bare statements of the appellants.
Second. Appellant Buntag admitted in his sworn statement that before he and appellant Bongo could
leave the situs criminis after the victim was stabbed, Mihangos and Guigue arrived. The appellants
lunged jointly and simultaneously at the two teenagers which so terrified the latter that they fled for their
lives. If, as appellant Buntag claims, he had nothing to do with the stabbing of the victim, he should
have sought the help of the teenagers, brought the victim to the hospital and reported to the police
authorities that it was appellant Bongo who stabbed the victim. Appellant Buntag failed to do so.
Neither did appellant Bongo seek the help of the two teenagers and report the stabbing to the police
authorities. Both appellants’ unexplained omission is another indication of their conspiracy and
complicity in the crime charged.
Third. Appellant Bongo took the key from the body of the victim and hid it near their house where the
policemen found it. The appellant has not explained why he had the key to the victim’s room and hid it
near their house. He owned the hunting knife used in stabbing the victim. He knew or should have
known that sooner or later, the policemen would trace the knife to him; and yet, appellant Bongo failed
to report the incident to the police authorities and surrender the knife to them.
Fourth. Appellant Bongo denied involvement in the killing and pointed to appellant Buntag as the
assailant only after the latter had executed his own sworn statement pointing to appellant Bongo as the
victim’s assailant. We are convinced that appellant Bongo’s denial of any involvement in the killing is
but a belated afterthought to escape criminal liability for the victim’s death.
The trial court convicted the appellants of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua. We note, however, that the trial court, in its
amended decision, made no finding on any attendant circumstance which would qualify the killing to
murder. It bears stressing that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, any qualifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of a crime must be alleged in the Information and proved by the
prosecution, conformably to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the
charges against him.
In this case, the Information alleged that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. The
prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the crime itself, but also the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. 60 Treachery cannot be based on speculations and surmises. In order
that treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that (a) the malefactor employed means, method or manner
of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and, (b) the
means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. In this
case, there was no eyewitness to the crime.
On the other hand, appellant Buntag, in his sworn statement, claimed that before the victim was stabbed,
appellant Bongo and the victim had an altercation; appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, stated that
it was appellant Buntag and the victim who had an altercation before the victim was killed. There is no
evidence that the appellants deliberately or consciously adopted a method or means of execution to
insure the death of the victim.
In fine then, the appellants are guilty only of homicide, punishable under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full range, which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. There being no modifying circumstance attendant to the crime, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be in its medium period.
The trial court awarded moral damages to the heirs of the victim, although the prosecution failed to
present any heir of the victim as witness. The trial court, likewise, failed to award civil indemnity ex
delicto to the heirs of the victim. The decision of the trial court shall, thus, be modified accordingly.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 7729 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Casiano
Buntag alias “Ciano” and Diego Bongo are found guilty, as principals, of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, each of the
appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its
medium period, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum. The award of moral damages is deleted. The said appellants are ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim Berno Georg Otte, P50,000 as civil indemnity,
conformably to current jurisprudence. 61 Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002.]
TERESITA P. BORDALBA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR
JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS,
EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY,
namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME
BACLAY, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October 20,
1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with modification
the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-
386.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square
meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of land situated on
the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses
Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extrajudicial partition, 3 written in the
Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel of land as —
2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con la Calle
Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con
propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta
avaluada, con todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ------------ P1,050.00. 4
and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent
Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed
Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Agelio
Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and
3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.
Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house, which his family
occupied since 1945.
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioner’s mother, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration 5 of the lot described with the
following boundaries:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
N - Fruelana Jayme & Road
S - Felicitas de Latonio
E - Agustin de Jayme
W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land
owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of
said land was adjudicated to her in an extrajudicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot
for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition 6 contending that said
application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extrajudicial partition. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application 7 dated January 10,
1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her
mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
North: Froilan Jayme and Road
East: Agustin Jayme
South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila
West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa 8
On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot. 9 Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision and
titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots, 10 as well as the disposition of two parcels thereof,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771
(FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;
2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in the name of Teresita
P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;
3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the name of Teresita P.
Bordalba;
4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the name of Teresita
Bordalba;
5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the name of Teresita P.
Bordalba;
6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 in the name of
Teresita P. Bordalba.
Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original Certificate
of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving the lot subject of
the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28,
the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala,
Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571
(FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Private respondents
also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug
and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith,
respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them actual, compensatory, and moral damages
plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through purchase
from her mother, 11 who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. In her
answer, petitioner traced her mother’s ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial
partition presented by private respondents, 12 and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores
occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination,
petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were
partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the
signature of her mother. 13
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent
No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its
cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural
Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as
valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses
Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772
in favor of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-57 (FP) and
all subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT No. 22771
(FP) as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;
2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in good faith and are the
legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771(FP);
3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage lien in its
favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued under the names of
the plaintiffs;
4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the issuance of the
certificate of title in their names;
5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the defendant Rural Bank of
Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;
6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;
(b) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and,
7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private respondents are
entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot
No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of the respondent court’s decision
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of the
subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of Title
issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 15
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters
occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same
violated the dead man’s statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit
from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed
lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding
those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has
not convinced us that this case falls under one of them. 16
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud
and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioner’s application, insofar as her
declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is
belied by the extrajudicial partition which she acknowledged, her mother’s aborted attempt to have the
lot registered, private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest’s opposition thereto, and by the occupancy
of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does not
permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself at
the expense of others. 17
As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, 18 suffice it to state that said rule finds no
application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness
as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with
the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness. 19
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based,
inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor
Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard
evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may
assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. 20
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis-à-vis the
boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by the fact
that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-
indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioner’s mother, second, to the predecessors-
in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their
boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the
predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini
Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of
the land allotted to their predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover,
petitioner’s mother acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further
admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel of land inherited by her
and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter,
while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Considering that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private respondents’
predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when
she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in
upholding the right of private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of
the lot in question to them.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No. 1242
(799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private respondents did
not show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition in relation to
Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in the
Deed, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme
East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua
South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme
West: Calle Plaridel
they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of Lot No.
1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, which they claim
Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to which the lot now known as
Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of
Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed.
With only one reference point, however, the south, east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C)
cannot be established with certainty to be within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition.
In Beo v. Court of Appeals, 21 of the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of possession
may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not only his ownership
but also the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So
that when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action has been exactly
determined, the action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff’s ownership rights in the land claimed
do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent of their 1/3
pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their claim over the
said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v. Malpaya, 22 the prudent recourse would
be to remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private
respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court in order
to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-44060. July 20, 1978.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias
"BENBEN", Defendant-Appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Defendant-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape by the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment, imposed a higher penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
this review pursuant to Section 34 of R.A.. No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948).
In his brief, Defendant-Appellant admitted having had sexual intercourse with the complaining witness
but he stoutly denied that he did so by employing force or intimidation against her. He claimed they
were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was the girl who invited him to her house where they
performed the act complained of which was actually their third sexual experience.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. In an opinion by Makasiar, J., expressing the views
of several members, the Court found the prosecution’s evidence weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive
to justify a conviction, taking into account certain circumstances which negate the commission of the
crime charged as: absence of proof to show force and intimidation employed on the complaining
witness; her non-disclosure of the offense to her parents at the earliest possible time; her silence or non
rebuttal of the defendant’s testimony that they were actually sweethearts and had two previous sexual
communications prior to the incident complained of; the medical report on the absence of lacerations on
the walls of the vagina; and the doubtful veracity of the testimony of the complaining witness and that of
her aunt on the matter of the defendant having a hunting knife with him on the day of the incident and
the statement that the complainant was in a "state of shock" after the experience.
There being only five (5) members for conviction, and seven (7) for acquittal, the defendant-appellant
was acquitted and his immediate release from confinement was ordered.
SYLLABUS
1. RAPE; INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONVICTION; FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION NOT PROVEN. — Force and intimidation were not proven where the evidence
showed that complaining witness did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged
sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant’s advances without
endangering her life. But she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her
neighbors and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she
could have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what
the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and when
the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing and/or hearing the voice of
her aunt Lita. Or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side when the copulation was going
on, and with it she could have possibly prevented the accused from consummating the sexual act. But
she did not.
2. ID.; ID.; NON-DISCLOSURE OF THE OFFENSE BY THE VICTIM. — That the complaining
witness did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped and it was only after her mother
arrived from a trip three (3) days after the incident, and confronted her about the rape incident that her
mother learned through her aunt that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused did to her
negate the commission of the crime charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse
between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary.
3. ID.; ID.; NON-REBUTTAL OF ACCUSED’S TESTIMONY ON PREVIOUS SEXUAL
COMMUNICATIONS. — The fact that the complaining witness did not bother at all to rebut the
testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that she and the accused were actually
sweethearts; and that they had two previous sexual communications before the incident complained of
negates the commission of rape.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSION BY SILENCE; REQUISITES. — The rule allowing silence of a person to
be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in
criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must
appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial;
(3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5)
that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue (IV
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of
admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by
the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
5. ID.; ID.; VIRGINITY; INDICATIONS OF PREVIOUS SEXUAL EXPERIENCE. — A female of
tender age, who was little over twelve and a half years of age, if she had no previous sexual experience,
must have been a virgin when she was allegedly raped .Where, however, she did not state that she felt
some pain as the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she was
bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that the
accused made four push and pull movements after which the latter ejaculated — such statements
indicate that the accused had an easy time doing it.
6. ID.; ID.; MEDICAL REPORT ON THE ABSENCE OF LACERATION. — If the complaining
witness’ story — that the intercourse alleged in the complaint was in fact her first experience — is to be
believed, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the lacerations even after the lapse
of three days from the coition. The absence of lacerations in the walls of the vagina, as testified to by the
medical examiner, eloquently confirms the truth of the accused’s assertion that before the incident in
question, he and Mirasol had two prior copulations.
7. ID.; ID.; DISCREPANCY BETWEEN TESTIMONY AND AFFIDAVIT. — The discrepancy
between the testimonies and the affidavit of witnesses may cast serious doubt on their credibility, such
as where the complainant in a rape case, and her aunt practically corroborated each other on the witness
stand on the matter of the accused having a hunting knife with him on the day of the incident, but such
particular point was not mentioned by the aunt in her affidavit which she executed five months before
she testified in court. The credibility of the witness is further weakened by the fact that the prosecution
did not bother to present such "hunting knife", at the trial.
8. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES IMPAIRING THE VERACITY OF TESTIMONY AND THE
COURT’S FINDING. — The testimony of the aunt of the complainant in a rape case to the effect that
she found her niece in a "state of shock", which testimony was summarized in the trial court’s finding
that "the victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door," is contradicted by
the evidence on record showing that complainant did answer the call of her aunt and opened the gate of
the house after she had put on her panties; that complainant only seemed to be afraid, besides trembling;
that the aunt did not show such concern for the complainant as to bring her to a doctor for medical
assistance, or to seek the assistance of the neighbors, but instead abandoned complainant "because she
(complainant) had to feed her pigs."cralaw virtua1aw library
 9. ID.; ID.; APPELLANT CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF SIMPLE SEDUCTION UNDER A RAPE
CHARGE. — A person accused of rape cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article
338 of the Revised Penal Code, where the same is not warranted by the wording of the information,
which does not allege deceit, although accused testified that he promised to marry the complaining
witness if "something happens to her body." Much less can simple seduction include rape.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Judge Agapito Hontanosas, presiding), the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused Bienvenido Paragsa of the crime
of Rape as charged in the Information beyond reasonable doubt and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the
maximum and to indemnify the complaining witness in the amount of P8,000.00 (People v. Rogato
Rivera, 58, O.G. and People v. Chan Et. Al., CA No. 03545-GR, August 11, 1967) with all legal
accessories and to pay the costs. Being a detention prisoner, he is entitled to the full credit of his
preventive imprisonment from the time of his confinement up to the date of the promulgation of this
judgment.
x x x "Abrasion of inguinal region
(pp. 10-19, rollo).
Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals on the accused, this
case is now before US for review pursuant to Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the alleged rape
victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan Emergency
Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu, who examined the offended party and submitted Exhibit A embodying his
findings thereon.
Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a little
over twelve and a half (12 1/2) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.), was alone in her parents’ house in Sitio
Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed. Her parents were
away at the time — her father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay, both in Negros Occidental
(p. 16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) — while the rest of the family were with Mirasol’s grandmother in Barrio
Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th grade student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p.
6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon instruction of her mother, she did not go to school that afternoon so that
she could look after the pigs and cook their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their house
cooking hog feed when the accused, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house
and closed the door after him. Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol’s neck,
encircled her abdomen with his right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife with his right hand
at her breast, and threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter, the accused
pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress and, with his two hands, removed her panties.
The accused then placed his hunting knife on the bed by Mirasol’s side, opened the zipper of his pants
while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol’s thighs, picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself
on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect penis into her sexual organ and then made four push and pull
movement until he ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., ibid.). In the process, Mirasol’s dress and
panties were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll up her dress and pull her
panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused was not holding the
hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to the storeroom of the house upstairs because
he heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol’s father, calling from outside the
gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not answer because she was then in the
act of putting on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., ibid.; p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her
panties, she opened the gate and saw her aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she
did not answer because she was afraid as the accused was still inside the house. She also did not tell her
aunt Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with her under threats and against her will. Her aunt
Lita then walked away.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her aunt Lita what
he did, he would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). After the incident, Mirasol went to Barrio
Codia later in the afternoon of the same day and joined her brother and sister and grandmother. She did
not reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol’s father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not also reveal
the incident to him because she was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother returned home on
July 16, 1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell her mother about what
happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac. It was her aunt Lita who revealed the matter to Mirasol’s
mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal the incident of July 13 to her
mother only when her mother asked her about it; because, according to her, she wanted to take revenge
on the accused (p. 15,, Dec. 3, 1971). Three days after her return from Sagay, Negros Occidental — on
July 19, 1971 — Mirasol’s mother brought her to the Bantayan Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu,
where she was examined by Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
"INTERNAL FINDINGS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but negative for spermatozoa" (Exh. A,
p. 8, rec.; p. 2, t.s.n., Nov. 16, 1971).
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger brother of
Mirasol’s father. Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the house of her brother-in-law, Ruperto
Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house of her brother-in-law in Tabagac.
Arriving there, she saw, through the gate which was made of split bamboos, the accused running away
when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of putting on her panties, to open the gate (p. 10,
t.s.n., Jan. 15, 1972). Mirasol opened the gate after she had put on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs.
Parochel asked Mirasol what the accused did to her, but Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and from
her hiding place she saw the accused emerge from his hiding place and run away, passing through the
gate of the fence. Thereupon, she told Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was also going
there(p. 15, t.s.n., ibid.).
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol’s father at about 4:00 o’clock the same afternoon but she did not talk to him
about what she saw earlier in Tabagak. However, she revealed the incident to her husband (p. 17, t.s.n.,
ibid.).
When Mirasol’s mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a conversation with
her regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol’s mother filed the corresponding
complaint against the accused (p. 18, t.s.n., ibid.).
Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of Mirasol, Mrs. Parochel
executed an affidavit which she subscribed and swore to before the municipal judge of Madridejos,
Cebu, on July 30, 1971, wherein she stated, among other things:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to the house of Ruperto
Magallanes, my neighbor;
"2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa ran from the bed where Mirasol
Magallanes was sitting on while putting on her panties;
"3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to me about the happening; and
that I was only thinking that something had happened" (Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been committed by
the trial court. These errors may, however, be boiled down to the issue of credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied
that he did so by employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were
sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter’s house where
they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had that afternoon was,
as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse (pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-9, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated: by two witnesses for the
defense, Mercedo Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18-19, 20, 25, t.s.n., Feb.
1, 1972).
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution’s evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and
inconclusive to justify a conviction.
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the
conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary.
Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation
against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant’s
advances without endangering her life. But she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not
far from her neighbors and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances
narrated by her, she could have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita
who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse
took place and when the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing
and/or hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. Or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side when
the copulation was going on, and with it she could have possibly prevented the accused from
consummating the sexual act. But she did not.
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped. It
was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and
confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned through her aunt Lita that she eventually
revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the
appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that
they had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of which happened on June 29,
1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept together in the evening of the
same day after the mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan,
Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).cralawnad
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements
uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as
an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he
was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his
rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were
within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would
be material to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316).
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on
the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth
of such assertion.
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the testimony of
Dr. Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol’s vagina, thus —
"Q Doctor, you testified that according to your findings a foreign body might have inserted the internal
organ of the offended party?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And as a matter of fact, in your examination there was no laceration?
"A There was no laceration" (p. 5, t.s.n, November 16, 1971; Emphasis supplied).
Considering Mirasol’s tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have been a virgin
when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain as the accused
tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she was bleeding during and after
the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that the accused made four push and
pull movements after which the latter ejaculated — indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the lacerations
even after the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July 13, 1971 was in fact her
first experience. WE believe the absence of lacerations in the walls of Mirasol’s vagina, as testified to by
Dr. Gandiongco, supra, eloquently confirms the truth of the accused’s assertion that before the incident
in question, he and Mirasol had two prior copulations.
And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complaining witness
and her aunt Lita is the matter of the hunting knife. While it is true that on the witness stand these two
witnesses practically corroborated each other on this particular point, the matter of the accused having a
hunting knife with him on the day of the incident was not, however, mentioned by Mrs. Parochel in her
affidavit, Exhibit 1, which she executed on July 30, 1971 — five months before she testified in court.
Besides, at the trial, the prosecution did not bother to present such "hunting knife."
A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs. Parochel, whose
testimony the trial court summarized, runs thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door."cralaw virtua1aw
library
". . . She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened. Mirasol was very pale,
trembling and in a state of shock, did not answer her inquiries . . ." (p. 3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis
added)
The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court by stating that —
"Mirasol’s aunt, Lita Parochel .. found her niece in a state of shock" (p. 4, Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee; p. 49, rec.; emphasis OURS).
A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes, shows that
contrary to the finding of the trial court, Mirasol answered the call of her aunt and opened the gate of the
house after she had put on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971); and that Mirasol only seemed to be
afraid, besides trembling (p. 23, t.s.n., 1972); nowhere in the record is any evidence of Mirasol having
been in a state of shock.
If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock —
1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of the house when she
heard her aunt Lita calling from the outside?
2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose any time to bring her to
a doctor or to a hospital for medical treatment or assistance;
3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the closet in a corner of the
ground floor, or she would have gone to the nearest police authority or barrio captain, who could have
easily apprehended the accused;
4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors; or
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was only about 50 meters away (pp. 7, 20,
t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). But what did she do? She abandoned Mirasol "because she (Mirasol) had to feed her
hogs" (p. 24, idem.).
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt discovered
her having sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her aunt would report the same
to her parents.
And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by appellant about 3 o’clock that
afternoon of July 13, 1971, why did she not report the outrage to Mirasol’s father — her husband’s
brother — whom she met about 4 o’clock that same afternoon, just one hour after the alleged rape?
Mrs. Parochel’s close relationship to her niece — daughter of her brother-in-law — vitiates her
credibility.
Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code,
for the same is not warranted by the wording of the information, which does not allege deceit, although
appellant testified that he promised to marry Mirasol if "something happens to her body." Much less can
simple seduction include rape.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY
ACQUITTED, WITH COSTS DE OFICIO, AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY
ORDERED UNLESS HE IS BEING DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.M. NO. P-04-1917 : December 10, 2007]
(Formerly A.M. No. 04-10-297-MTCC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. MRS. ELADIA T. CUNTING,
former Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Zamboanga
City, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This administrative case is the result of the financial audit conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Zamboanga City, the
antecedents of which are as follows:cra:nad
On September 4, 2003, the OCA received a copy of the letter of Atty. Linda Lim, complaining about the
Clerk of Court of the MTCC of Zamboanga City, respondent Eladia T. Cunting, who allegedly caused
the delay in the release of the full amount adjudged in favor of her client, and the dishonor of the checks
due to insufficiency of funds. This letter-complaint prompted the Fiscal Monitoring Division of the
OCA to form an audit team to investigate the financial state of the said court. The team audited the
books of accounts of the MTCC of Zamboanga City from September 15 to 19, 2003.
On November 10, 2003, the respondent wrote a letter to Hon. Efren S. Mariano, Executive Judge,
MTCC, Zamboanga City, stating as follows:
In anticipation that I will be obliged to answer for the amount of money that have not been fully
accounted for as a result of the audit, I wish to request you that said amount be charged to whatever
retirement benefits I may be entitled to, including the commutation of all my leave balances
accumulated over the years that I was an employee of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
It may likewise be informed that a number of parties have been coming to my residence, accordingly
upon advice of some court employees, seeking the refund of bail bonds posted in the respective cases
that these parties were involved in, which cases have been either provisionally or permanently
dismissed. For this reason, I thus request that my salaries, which I learned have been held in abeyance,
be used to answer for such refund of bail bonds. It may be informed that since payment of my salaries
and other remunerations is currently suspended, I am not in a position to personally answer for such
refund.1
On October 6, 2004, the audit team submitted its report to the OCA. The audit team found that
respondent had been remiss in the performance of her duties and that there were massive shortages in
the court's funds.
In accordance with the recommendation of the OCA, the Court issued a Resolution 2 dated December 1,
2004, directing the respondent to deposit the amounts of P10,049,496.60 to the Fiduciary Trust Fund
account, P972,634.02 to Judiciary Development Fund account, and P117,093.36 to the Special
Allowance for Judiciary account. She was also directed to submit the court orders, acknowledgment
receipts and other documents showing the unauthorized withdrawals from the said accounts. In the same
Resolution, the Court resolved to issue a Hold Departure Order against the respondent and to suspend
her pending the resolution of the case. The Court, likewise, directed the Legal Office of the OCA to file
the appropriate criminal charges against the respondent.
In a letter3 dated January 17, 2005, the respondent asked for an additional period of thirty (30) days
within which to comply with the December 1, 2004 Resolution. She averred that she needed additional
time to produce the documents required to be submitted and to prepare her answer to the charges
imputed to her. The Court granted the request for extension of time. However, the respondent did not
submit any document within the extended period.
On July 18, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution4 directing the respondent to show cause why she should
not be disciplinarily dealt with for failure to file her answer and submit the required documents. When
the respondent failed to comply, the Court issued another Resolution 5 on December 14, 2005, imposing
upon the respondent a fine of P1,000.00, or imprisonment of five (5) days, and requiring her to comply
with the previous orders of the Court. Still, the respondent failed to comply. In a Resolution 6 dated
March 19, 2007, the Court imposed upon the respondent an additional fine of P2,000.00. She was also
directed to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with the
Court's orders.
Thereafter, the OCA reevaluated the case and reassessed the respondent's liability to include the
withdrawals which the respondent failed to substantiate. The OCA reported, thus:
 First, the respondent left open the vault. On the day the audit team arrived at the MTCC of Zamboanga Add: Unconfirmed Deposits per Deposit Slips Without 72,814.25
City, respondent was attending a seminar in Dipolog City. The audit team noticed that the vault was Machine Validations (Schedule 1)
open making it accessible to any person in court. Shortage P 116,431.30

Second, the audit team found cash amounting to P10,670.30 stored in the vault. The team had to
The deposit slips without any machine validation are:
presume that this amount forms part of the court collections because the source of the money can not be
confirmed from the respondent who did not report for work during the entire period of the audit
notwithstanding the instruction of Judge Mariano for her to cut short her attendance in the seminar in Date Monthly Report Deposit Slip Amount
Dipolog City so she can attend to the needs of the audit team.
12-03-96 Nov. 1996 P 3,352.00
01-13-97 Dec. 1996 1,850.00
Third, there were missing accountable forms. The Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC of 02-03-97 Jan. 1997 1,535.00
Zamboanga City requisitioned several booklets of official receipts from this Court which the audit team
can not find among the records of the said court. These are: 04-10-97 Mar. 1997 8.00
07-07-97 June 1997 1,840.40
11-12-97 Oct. 1997 9,080.00
O.R. Serial Numbers No. of Booklet Date Mailed
09-13-99 Aug. 1999 9,000.00
Packed/Mailed
02-02-00 Nov. 1999 3,928.05
80501 to 81000 10 08.01.86
2-23-00 Jan. 2000 6,160.00
2653001 to 2653500 10 08.13.92 2-23-00 Jan. 2000 4,309.00
10438951 to 10439000 01 12.16.98 2-23-00 Jan. 2000 2.80
11148051 to 11148100 01 05.19.99 3-15-00 Feb. 2000 13,725.00
11148901 to 11148950 01 05.19.99 6-02-00 May 2000 3,333.32
13217801 to 13217850 01 07.14.00 6-02-00 May 2000 334.68
13218551 to 13218750 04 07.14.00 11-07-00 Oct. 2000 4,323.92
11-07-00 Oct. 2000 354.08
13218801 to 13218850 01 07.14.00
7-18-01 June 2001 3,267.00
14126101 to 14126250 03 01.31.01
01-08-02 Jan. 2002 3,515.00
15067151 to 15067250 02 07.31.01 04-21-03 March 2003 2,896.00
15561151 to 15561250 02 11.07.01 TOTAL P 72,814.25
16574151 to 16574250 02 06.04.02
17220501 to 17220800 06 11.07.01 Sixth, the audit team found out that respondent did not maintain a cash book for the Clerk of Court
18110151 to 18110250 02 04.23.03 General Fund for the period of September 1999 to June 2003. The team also noticed that respondent did
not regularly submit the monthly reports of collections for the Clerk of Court General Fund. The lacking
Total 46 monthly reports pertain to the months of November 2000, June 2001, October 2002, December 2002,
May 2003 and June 2003. As a result, the Accounting Division of this Court was not able to prepare the
Subsidiary Ledger for the corresponding months.
Fourth, the audit team found out that the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC of Zamboanga City
issued receipts which were not requisitioned from this Court.
Seventh, the audit team noticed numerous mistakes in reporting to this Court the collections in the Clerk
of Court General Fund. The team observed discrepancies between the amount indicated in the official
Fifth, the audit team discovered a shortage in the collections for the Clerk of Court General Fund in the receipts and the amount in the monthly reports, to wit:
amount of P116,431.30. The total collections for this fund from November 1996 to June 2003
is P537,069.54. Deducted therefrom is the amount of P493,452.49 representing the amount properly
deposited or remitted to the bank. This left an unremitted balance of P43,617.05. The audit team did not DATE O.R. NO. AMOUNT PER AMOUNT PER SHORT OVER
consider as valid deposits or remittances those amounts reflected in several deposit slips without any MONTHLY OFFICIAL
machine validation. These amounted to P72,814.25. Thus, insofar as these amounts are concerned, there REPORT RECEIPT
are doubts as to whether these deposits were actually made, hence, these have to be treated as unremitted
collections and added to the unremitted balance of P43,617.05. The total accountability of respondent 1/13/00 3782807 1.00 5.00 5.00
is P116,431.30. This is summarized as follows: 1/17/00 3782822 1.00 2.00 1.00
1/18/00 3782846 1.00 2.00 1.00
Total collections, November 1996 to June 2003 P 537,069.54
Less: Total Remittances/Deposits 493,452.49 1/18/00 3782849 1.00 5.00 4.00
Unremitted Collections 43,617.05
 1/19/00 3782855 1.00 10.00 9.00 The audit team deducted therefrom the amount of P2,259,358.67 representing the valid
remittances/deposits to the bank. This left an unaccounted balance of P271,924.39. The team added to
2/7/00 3783002 10.00 1.00 (9.00) the accountability of respondent the amount of P303,003.08 which was summed up from the deposit
slips without any machine validation. Under Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 (June 15, 2000), it was
2/8/00 3783017 5.00 250.00 245.00 stated that "[d]eposit slips that are not machine validated shall not be considered as deposits." The total
2/8/00 3783024 1.00 2.00 1.00 shortage was arrived at in this manner.

2/8/00 3783026 2.00 1.00 (1.00)

Total collections, November 1996 to June 2003 P 2,531,283.06
2/8/00 3783053 5.00 1.00 (4.00) Less: Total Remittances/Deposits 2,259,358.67
2/17/00 3783100 1.00 10.00 9.00 Unremitted Collections 271,924.39
Add: Unconfirmed Deposits per Deposit 303,003.08
2/17/00 3783101 10.00 1.00 (9.00) Slips Without Machine Validations
(Schedule 2)
2/18/00 3783107 1.00 10.00 9.00
Shortage P 574,927.47
2/18/00 3783122 5.00 1.00 (4.00)
2/18/00 3783124 5.00 1.00 (4.00) The deposit slips without machine validation are:
2/22/00 3783178 1.00 2.50 1.50
Date Monthly Report Deposit Slip
2/23/00 3783185 1.00 2.00 1.00 Amount
2/23/00 3781393 2.00 1.00 (1.00) 03-03-97 February 1997 P 7,288.60
04-03-97 March 1997 242.00
2/23/00 3781394 1970.00 2.00 (1968.00)
11-12-97 October 1997 7,270.00
2/23/00 3781395 1.00 1970.00 1969.00 03-12-98 February 1998 21,218.00
2/23/00 3781397 2.00 1.00 (1.00) 02-23-00 January 2000 7,760.00
02-23-00 January 2000 2,197.68
2/23/00 3781399 1.00 2.00 1.00
03-08-00 February 2000 26,366.70
03-93-00 3783314 1.00 10.00 9.00 03-15-00 February 2000 1,327.75
03-15-00 February 2000 756.15
3/7/00 3783356 5.00 1.00 (4.00)
04-10-00 March 2000 12,027.00
3/22/00 3783461 4.00 28.00 24.00 06-02-00 May 2000 55,179.35
3/22/00 3784533 1.00 5.00 4.00 06-02-00 May 2000 52.65
11-07-00 October 2000 5,185.00
3/22/00 3784534 1.00 2.00 1.00
11-07-00 October 2000 128.00
7/12/00 3784636 48.00 52.00 4.00 08-17-01 September 2001 146.00
7/19/00 3784718 208.00 68.00 (140.00) 11-29-01 November 2001 10,000.00
01-09-02 December 2001 28,357.39
8/14/00 12356849 2.00 4.00 2.00 02-08-02 January 2002 49,632.00
8/14/00 12356850 2.00 4.00 2.00 03-07-02 February 2002 11,740.60
09-25-02 September 2002 8,260.60
8/16/00 12356858 210.00 200.00 (10.00)
10-07-02 September 2002 19,500.25
9/14/00 12356972 8.00 4.00 (4.00) 12-13-02 November 2002 8,440.00
9/27/00 12356998 2.00 204.00 202.00 03-25-03 March 2003 130.00
05-05-03 April 2003 9,500.00
10/4/00 13218778 2.00 399.00 397.00
05-05-03 April 2003 5,212.67
TOTALS 2,522.00 3,263.00 741.5 05-09-03 April 2003 2,108.46
05-29-03 April 2003 541.23
08-06-03 June 2003 2,435.00
Eighth, there was also a shortage in the collections for the Judiciary Development Fund in the amount
of P574,927.47. The total collection for this fund from November 1996 to June 2003 is P2,531,283.06. TOTAL P 303.003.08
 The audit team discovered a discrepancy in the amount indicated in a deposit slip. The deposit slip dated There were also twenty-six (26) instances wherein the cash bail amounting to P264,000.00 was released
August 4, 1998, which was attached to the monthly report for July 1998, showed a deposit without any supporting court orders authorizing the release. These are:
of P11,400.00 while the machine validated slip indicated a deposit of P10,958.33 or a difference
of P481.67.
DATE O.R. NO. CASE NO. PAYEE AMOUNT

The collections for the Judiciary Development Fund were not accurately recorded in the monthly 4/16/97 749661 39712 L. Visitacion P4,500.00
reports. The audit team discovered discrepancies between the amount indicated in the official receipts
and those indicated in the cash book, the net effect of which is that the collections reported to the 4/25/00 3784223 42805-815 Atty. S. Sotto, Jr. 90000.00
Accounting Division of this Court were understated. These discrepancies are: 6/11/98 8081383 40995-001 T. Kwan 52500.00
10/24/98 8083093 41541 R. Liguitan 4500.00
DATE O.R. NO. AMOUNT AMOUNT PER SHORT
PER OFFICIAL (OVER) 8/18/98 8083105 40893 O. Aizon 1000.00
MONTHLY REPORT
REPORT 11/10/98 8083163 41367 L. Isidro 1000.00
02-06-97 647427 46.00 96.00 50.00 3/15/99 8206378 41680 L. Rodriguez 7500.00
02-25-97 647578 10.00 50.00 40.00
2/9/99 8206426 41994 A. Isahac 4500.00
04-07-97 749837 174.00 446.00 272.00
05-26-97 6641025 0.00 48.00 48.00 2/11/99 8206428 41272-73 H. Concepcion 2000.00
09-02-97 6717806 48.00 10.00 (38.00) 4/15/99 8206554 41965 R. Alfaro 6000.00
09-04-97 6717827 50.00 10.00 (40.00)
09-04-97 6717828 50.00 10.00 (40.00) 12/7/98 8206605 41669 T. Raz 2000.00
09-04-97 6717831 48.00 10.00 (38.00) 11/25/99 8403623 41758 P. Bello 1000.00
09-11-97 6717860 48.00 2.00 (46.00)
11/26/99 8403624 42511-12 E. Canseco 24000.00
11-05-97 6799025 10.00 50.00 40.00
12-02-97 6799361 48.00 10.00 (38.00) 11/25/99 11148923 41758 P. Bello 1000.00
12-02-97 6799362 48.00 10.00 (38.00) 11/26/99 11148924 42511-12 E. Canseco 24000.00
11-17-98 8205617 84.00 116.00 32.00
1/5/01 13218554 43501 F. Dionisio 4500.00
11-20-98 8205639 2.00 48.00 46.00
06-09-00 12355457 232.00 222.00 (10.00) 1/9/01 13218556 43402 I. Galvez 5000.00
06-09-00 12358578 15.00 50.00 35.00
1/23/01 13218566 43658 V. Alam-alam 7500.00
TOTALS P913.00 P1,188.00 P275.00
2/14/01 13218593 42181 R. Ramasamyalios 2000.00

Still in connection with the Judiciary Development Fund, there was no cash book for the months of 2/26/01 13218654 42180-81 R. de Mesa 4000.00
January to June 2003. There were no monthly reports for December 1996, November 1997, for the
entire year of 1999, November 2000, November and December 2002, and January to June 2003. 4/2/01 13218674 35569 R. Luisito 100.00
4/24/02 14126198 44530-31 R. Fernando 4000.00
Finally, the audit team discovered the biggest shortage in the Fiduciary Fund amounting
3/27/03 17220712 45440 R. Soler 6000.00
to P11,338,382.54. This was a result of a variety of irregular transactions. First, cash bail in the total
amount of P12,400.00 was released without any supporting court orders authorizing the release thereof. 3/28/03 17220713 45470 K. Lukman 6000.00
Neither were these accompanied by acknowledgment receipts whereby the accused acknowledges
his/her receipt of the released cash bail. These involve three (3) transactions, to wit: 4/16/97 749661 39712 L. Visitacion 4500.00
4/25/00 3784223 42805-815 Atty. S. Sotto, Jr. 90000.00
DATE O.R. NO. CASE NO. PAYEE AMOUNT
TOTAL P264,600.00
12-02-96 559919 96-34 E. Teodoro P 4,000.00
03-10-97 647322 39250 A. Garcia 4,200.00
03-10-97 647323 39250 L. Tingkasan 4,200.00 In eleven (11) transactions, cash bail amounting to P237,700.00 was released without any
TOTAL P 12,400.00 acknowledgment receipt. Since there was no proof that the accused actually received the released cash
bail, this amount shall be considered as part of the accountability of the respondent. These transactions
are:
 DATE O.R. NO. CASE NO. PAYEE AMOUNT Total Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund P 11,338,382.54
08-19-97 6641702 40140-143 R. Jalandoni P 6,000.00
09-02-97 6641724 39632 M. Akmad 1,000.00 Based on the foregoing, the OCA recommended that:
09-08-97 6641730 34895-896 S. Benasing 4,000.00
07-31-97 6641766 39457 L. Dayaganon 2,000.00 1. Ms. Eladia T. Cunting, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Zamboanga City, be FOUND
08-06-97 6641778 40060 M. Chiong 2,000.00 GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and gross misconduct;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
08-14-97 6641790 30326 N. Polalon 100.00
08-14-97 6641792 40146 C/S Candido 9,000.00 2. The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, be DIRECTED to process the
08-19-97 6641800 26201-06 L. Basid 203,000.00 terminal leave benefits of the respondent, dispensing with the documentary requirements, and to remit
the said benefit to the Fiduciary Fund account of the MTCC of Zamboanga
07-11-97 6641822 40002-04 C. Gestoso 6,000.00
City;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
09-26-97 6718274 40198-99 P. Perez 4,000.00
01-26-99 8206670 37717 C. Culs 600.00
3. Ms. Cunting be FOUND GUILTY of contempt of court for failing to return the missing funds despite
TOTAL P237,700.00 repeated demands;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Court fines were collected but not remitted to the Fiduciary Fund. This amounted to P321.50, the details 4. Ms. Cunting be DIRECTED to restitute the following amounts to their respective accounts:
of which are:
A. P116,431.30 - Clerk of Court General Fund
DATE O.R. NO. CASE NO. PAYEE AMOUNT
09-07-99 3520447 14126 J. Aminula P 110.00 b. P574,927.47 - Judiciary Development Fund
09-07-99 3520448 15141 J. Aminula 110.00
04-22-03 13219738 35694 N. Martinez 101.50 c. P10,899,019.037 - Fiduciary Fund
TOTAL P 321.50
5. Director Nestor M. Mantaring, National Bureau of Investigation, be DIRECTED to cause the arrest of
Confiscated cash bail amounting to P554,400.00 were withdrawn from the Fiduciary Fund account but Ms. Eladia T. Cunting and to detain her until she complies with the directive of this Court to restitute the
were not remitted to the [J]udiciary [Development] [F]und account. above-mentioned shortages.

The audit team discovered that respondent was collecting a fee of 1% for every money received by the The findings and recommendations of the OCA are well taken.
court such as cash bail, consignments, rental deposits, etc. However, there are no records that the fees
collected were remitted to the bank. The total fees collected by respondent amounted to P219,464.44.
The administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It requires
everyone involved in its dispensation -- from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks -- to live up to
Finally, the audit team computed the total cash bail, supersedeas bonds, consignations and rental the strictest standards of competence, integrity and diligence in the public service. 8 As frontliners in the
deposits that were supposedly unwithdrawn from the bank. This amounted to P10,212,693.75. However, administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. They
the total balance in the bank accounts maintained by respondent for the MTCC of Zamboanga City is must bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
nowhere near this amount. Current Account No. 1952-0007-28 has a balance of only P160,436.55 while otherwise, of the men and women who work there.9 craClerks of court, in particular, must be individuals
Savings Account No. 1951-0113-94 has only P1,761.20 for a total of P162,197.75. This should be of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and
deducted from P10,212,693.75 leaving a balance of P10,049,496.60. This represents the amount of its proceedings.10 They perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the court's funds,
unwithdrawn and unaccounted Fiduciary Fund collections for which the respondent is responsible. revenues, records, properties and premises.11 As such, they are responsible for ensuring that the court's
funds are promptly deposited with an authorized government depositary bank. Thus, they are liable for
any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. 12 This Court will not
All in all, the liability of the respondent for the Fiduciary Fund is P11,338,382.54 which is broken down countenance dishonesty and malversation, for these offenses diminish the faith of the people in the
as follows: Judiciary.13 craThe respondent failed to live up to these exacting standards. She had been grossly
negligent in her duties as shown by the following incidents: (1) she left open the court's vault while
No Court Order and Acknowledgment Receipt P 12,400.00 attending a seminar in Dipolog City; (2) she left P10,670.30 inside the vault; (3) forty-six (46) booklets
of official receipts were missing; and (4) she used receipts not requisitioned from the Property Division
No Court Order 264,600.00
of the OCA.
No Acknowledgment Receipt 237,700.00
Court fines collected but not remitted 321.50
Her most serious infractions were the shortages in the Clerk of Court General Fund, Judiciary
Confiscated Bonds which were withdrawn but Not remitted 554,400.00 Development Fund, and the Fiduciary Fund, which amounted to P12,029,741.31. Several irregularities
Commission on Cash Held in Trust but not Remitted 219,464.44 contributed to the accumulation of these shortages: (1) respondent did not deposit some amount of the
Unwithdrawn Cash Bond 10,049,496.60 court's collections as shown by deposit slips which were not machine validated by the bank; (2) monthly
reports were not regularly submitted to the Court; (3) reports submitted to the Court contained numerous
discrepancies between the amounts reported and the amounts appearing in the official receipts, deposit
slips or cash books; (4) she did not maintain a cash book for the Judiciary Development Fund; (5)
respondent withdrew cash bail from the Fiduciary Fund without court orders or without any
acknowledgment receipts; (6) fines imposed on the cash bail were not remitted; (7) confiscated cash
bails were not remitted to the Judiciary Development Fund; and (8) respondent did not remit the 1%
commission she collected on money received by the court.
The fact that respondent failed to exert any effort to defend herself from the charges against her
exacerbates her predicament. The natural instinct of a man is to resist an unfounded claim or imputation
and defend himself, for it is totally against human nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face of
false accusations. Silence, in such cases, is almost always construed as an implied admission of the truth
thereof. Thus, in the absence of any compelling reason to hold otherwise, we take respondent's silence
as a waiver to file her comment and an acknowledgment of the truthfulness of the charges against
her.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary
Worse, she had effectively admitted her accountability for the shortages in the court's funds when she
wrote the letter to Judge Mariano requesting that her accrued leave credits be used to answer for any
amount which the audit team would find unaccounted for. Dishonesty, particularly that which amounts
to malversation of public funds, will not be tolerated. Otherwise, courts of justice may come to be
regarded as mere havens of thievery and corruption.15 craThe seriousness of respondent's infractions
amounts to gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct, and merits dismissal from the
service. However, on July 26, 2007, the Court already dismissed respondent from the service also for
gross dishonesty and grave misconduct with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to reemployment in the government service.16 Nonetheless, this does not render the case
moot.17 Respondent cannot avoid administrative liability by her previous dismissal from the service. For
this case involving additional serious offenses, in lieu of dismissal from the service, the Court finds it
proper to impose on her a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.
The recommendation to hold the respondent in contempt of court is likewise warranted. Indifference to
the Court's Resolutions requiring the production of certain documents makes respondent guilty of
contempt of court. Such cavalier attitude disregards the duty of every employee in the Judiciary to obey
the orders and processes of this Court without delay.18 When the contempt consists in the refusal to do
an act which is still within the power of respondent to perform, she may be imprisoned by order of the
court until she performs it.19 craWHEREFORE, respondent Eladia T. Cunting is found GUILTY of
gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. In view of her previous dismissal from the
service, a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00 is imposed on respondent to be deducted from her accrued
leave credits.
Respondent is further ordered to RESTITUTE the following amounts to their respective accounts:
A. P116,431.30 - Clerk of Court General Fund
b. P574,927.47 - Judiciary Development Fund
c. P11,338,382.54 - Fiduciary Fund
The Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is likewise DIRECTED to
compute the respondent's earned leave credits and to forward it to the Finance Division, Fiscal
Management Office-OCA, which shall compute the money value of the balance, as well as other
benefits that she may be entitled to, to be included as payment of the fine and partial restitution of the
computed shortages.
In addition, the respondent is found GUILTY of contempt of court for her failure to comply with the
Court's orders. For this reason, the National Bureau of Investigation is DIRECTED to cause the arrest
of respondent Eladia T. Cunting and to detain her until she complies with the directive of this Court to
restitute the balance of the shortages, after deduction of the balance of her accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 144422 : February 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALDRIN LICAYAN y SUCANO (At
Large), Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Five-year old Rowena C. Bangcong, the only girl among her siblings, was beaten, raped and killed. Her
bruised and battered body which was flung into a nipa swamp was discovered the following morning
after a massive search.
For the brutal rape-slay of Rowena, herein accused Aldrin Licaya y Sucano was charged with Rape with
Homicide in an Information1 which alleges
That on the 25th day of June 1999 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, more or less at Barangay
Inobulan, Municipality of Salay, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with force and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) a five year old Rowena
C. Bangcong against her will and consent and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and struck (sic) the different parts of the victims body with the use of a
hard object, which accused previously provided himself, thus causing lacerated wounds, abrasions
hematomas and submerging the victim in water at the nipa swamp which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Section II, Chapter III, paragraph 5 of Article 266-B of R.A. 8353.
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.2 The case
thereafter proceeded to trial. However, after the prosecution had rested its case and formally offered its
evidence, accused escaped detention on April 26, 2000 by scaling the perimeter fence of the Provincial
Jail.3 He has remained at large to date despite efforts to apprehend him.
Counsel for the defense submitted the case for decision without presenting evidence in behalf of the
accused. Thereafter, the court a quo rendered judgment4 on June 14, 2000 imposing upon the accused
the extreme penalty of death thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by the Court sentencing accused to suffer the supreme
penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of Rowena Bangcong in the sum of P75,000.00, to pay moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Since accused is at large after he escaped detention while the case was still pending but after the
prosecution had presented its evidence, let a warrant for his arrest, or alias warrant of his arrest issue.
Once arrested let his custodian ship his person to the National Penitentiary without delay as provided by
law, there to await the result of the review of this case by the Highest Tribunal of the land.
SO ORDERED.
On automatic review, accused-appellant faults the trial court with a lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE THEREBY
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE DEATH PENALTY DESPITE THE GLARING
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 5cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, the Solicitor General recommends affirmance of the appealed Decision in toto.
The prosecutions version of the incident is summarized thus in the Peoples brief:
Appellant Aldrin Licayan and Bernard Agcopra were friends from way back. On June 25, 1999, after
years of absence, appellant went to Agcopra who had a machine shop in Barangay Inobulan, Salay,
Misamis Oriental, to apply for work as a grinder of engine valves. On this occasion, they drank rum to
celebrate their reunion. Romeo Bangcong, who was also Agcopras friend, joined them later in their
drinking bout. They finished drinking in Agcropas shop at 5:00 p.m.
The group continued drinking in the house of Wenny Rajal also in Barangay Inobulan, Salay, Misamis
Oriental. After consuming two bottles of Beer Grande, they bought a case of the same drink, which they
brought to the house of Romeo. When they arrived, Romeos wife Rosalinda and his children, Rey
Oriente, Raymundo and five-year old Rowena were there. Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink
beer anymore. He went with Romeo to the barangay captain leaving appellant in Romeos house. When
Romeo returned to his house, appellant was embracing and kissing Rowena, justifying it by saying that
he missed his daughter.
Appellant kept on embracing Rowena. At 6:00 p.m., more or less, Rowena asked that she be allowed to
watch television at neighbor Dorbits house fifteen meters away. An hour later, Romeo told Rey Oriente
to fetch Rowena. Thereafter, appellant also left, saying that he would look for Agcopra. When the boy
reached Dorbits house, he saw appellant there with Rowena. Appellant told Rowena: Day, come here
because your father asked you to go home so you can eat your supper. Appellant then held the hand of
Rowena and dragged her into a dark area. Rey Oriente, however, did not go with appellant and his sister,
thinking that they were heading for the Bangcong house.
When Romeo got tired of waiting for Rowena, he went to the Dorbit house to inquire about her. Rey
Oriente told him what happened, which caused him to cry. Neighbors were alerted and immediately
formed a posse to look for the girl. While searching for Rowena, they spotted appellant when they
trained a flashlight to him. Appellant ran towards the ricefield. The posse chased him, but failed to catch
him when he jumped into the deep Inobulan River. When appellant passed by a group of men who
offered him a drink, his clothes were wet and his body was muddy. He had no slippers. That same night,
appellant was arrested by the police.
The following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was found at the swamps, where appellant
told Rogelio Dahilan, Jr., one of the searchers, she would be. Photographs were taken of the girl. A
postmortem examination of the girl revealed that she had hematomas, lacerations, abrasions all over her
body, as well as a deep incomplete hymenal laceration at the 6:00 oclock position. The cause of death
was asphyxia by submersion in water. Rowena died a painful death. 6cräläwvirtualibräry
As stated earlier, after the prosecution had rested its case and formally offered its evidence, accused-
appellant escaped detention and has remained at large despite efforts to apprehend him. Once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court and is deemed to have waived any
right to seek relief from the court unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court.7 Accused-appellants escape should be considered a waiver of his right to be present at the trial and
the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent the court from
continuing with the trial because the escapee is deemed to have received notice. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
The fact of escape made accused-appellants failure to attend unjustified because he has, by escaping,
placed himself beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, the trial against the fugitive
should be brought to the ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the
evidence presented by the prosecution against the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It
should not wait for the fugitives appearance or re-arrest,9 for the State as much as the accused has an
interest in and is entitled to a speedy trial and disposition of the case.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its
conclusions and findings of guilt.10 The rules on evidence11 and case law sustain the conviction of the
accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: 1.] there must be more
than one circumstance; 2.] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3.] the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused.12cräläwvirtualibräry
In assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence, four basic guidelines must be observed:
1) it should be acted upon with caution;
2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and
4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.13 The peculiarity of
circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one
particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing
picture pointing towards the conclusion the accused is the author of the crime. 14cräläwvirtualibräry
The following circumstances pointed out by the trial court lead to the inevitable conclusion that the
accused-appellant perpetrated the crime:
First, before 1:00 A.M. of June 25, 1999, accused drank rhum with Bernard Agcopra, an automotive
mechanic with whom he applied for work. June 26th was anti-vesperas of the fiesta of Inobulan, Salay,
Mis. Or. Having consumed the rhum, the duo decided to take a motorbike to Bernard Agcopras shop in
order to test accuseds skill in grinding engine vale[s]. At Agcopra shop, they drank some more rhum
where they were joined by Romeo Bangcong. At 5:00 P.M., the three proceeded to the house of the
owner of the overhauled engine. While there, Agcopra ordered two bottles of beer grande, and after
consuming these the group bought one case of the same beer grande. The 3 brought this to the house of
Romeo Bangcong which is not far away.
Second, the three, accused, Bernard Agcopra and Romeo Bangcong, reached Romeos house. In the
house then were Romeos wife and children, Rosalina and Rowena, 5 years old. Accused was drunk. But
no sooner than they arrived that accused and Romeo started drinking the case of beer grande that they
had brought. Bernard Agcopra begged off. He went home. When Rey Oriente Bangcong, one of Romeos
children and elder brother of Rowena, arrived from school that afternoon of June 25th, which was
Friday, he saw accused drinking with his father and while so doing he kissed and embraced Rowena,
justifying it by saying that he missed his daughter. This happened in the presence of the Bangcong
family. At about 6:00 oclock, Rowena asked her fathers permission to view t.v. at the nearby house of
Dorbit, to which Romeo gave his permission. About an hour after that Romeo told Rey Oriente to fetch
his sister at Dorbits
Third, arriving at Dorbits house, Rey saw accused telling Rowena Day come here because your father
asked you to go home so that you can eat your supper. Accused was holding the hand of Rowena and
was dragging her. Soon Romeo Bangcong also arrived at Dorbits house looking for Rowena.
Fourth, the Bangcongs neighbors organized a search party. One group spotted accused 20 meters away.
He ran toward the direction of the rice field. They chased him but they failed to overtake him as he
jumped into the Inobulan River which is 5 arms length wise but deep. The searchers lost him.
Fifth, at about 4:00 oclock of June 26th accused told Jun-jun Dahilan who in turn told the searchers the
location of the body of Rowena. Referring to the place they found the dead and naked body of the victim
there.
Sixth, with muddy pants, wet and without slippers accused emerged at the place where Wilson Salvaa
and companions were drinking at about 9:30 P.M. of June 25th. He wore [a] stripe[d] blue shirt. He
accepted the offer to drink and then proceeded away from them.
Seventh, accused was the last person with whom Rowena was last seen. 15cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the foregoing circumstances are insufficient to prove his guilt.
He argues that: 1.] the first three (3) circumstances do not point to accused-appellants guilt; 2.]
prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano who was among those who organized the search party, is not
credible because he did not shout upon finding accused-appellant; 3.] the witnesses could not have seen
accused-appellant in the darkness; 4.] the witnesses could have seen somebody else; 5.] assuming that
accused-appellant was the one seen by the posse, he was not committing any wrong by running away;
6.] the claim of prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them where Rowenas body could be
found based on accused-appellants admission is hearsay; 7.] granting that accused-appellant revealed
where Rowenas lifeless body could be found, he never admitted having raped and killed her; 8.] the
admission made by accused-appellant to Dahilan, Jr. is inadmissible; 9.] the circumstance that accused-
appellant was seen with wet pants, muddy body and without slippers lacks probative value; and 10.]
there were no tell-tale signs that accused-appellant was dragging Rowena to the swamp.
state that different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.18cräläwvirtualibräry
The contention that accused-appellant could not have been identified from a distance of about twenty
(20) meters in the dark is untenable, considering that illumination produced by a flashlight or kerosene
lamp is sufficient to allow the identification of persons.19 In this regard, we have held that:
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitnesses could have
identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is
sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in
proper situations be considered sufficient illumination making the attack on the credibility of witnesses
solely on that ground unmeritorious.20cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellants argument that he did not commit any wrong in running away upon being espied by
the search party likewise deserves scant consideration. Courts go by the biblical truism that the wicked
flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion. 21 Accused-appellant has not
satisfactorily explained why he fled upon being spotted by the posse.
In People v. Templo,22 we held that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him. One type of act that can be given in evidence against him is flight. In
criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to
avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained
flight of the accused person may as a general rule be taken as evidence having tendency to establish his
guilt. In short, flight is an indication of guilt.23 What makes flight particularly damaging for accused-
appellant is that he fled twice, i.e. first, upon being spotted by the search party and second, by scaling
the perimeter fence of the Provincial Jail while he was in the custody of the law and undergoing trial.
Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by Rogelio Jun-jun Dahilan, Jr. as to the
location of the victims body is hearsay. Any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some
other person who was never presented on the witness stand,24 because it is the opportunity to cross-
examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. 25 In the instant
case, Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified that accused-appellant indeed told him where the victims body can be
found. What is more, the victims body was actually recovered at the location pointed by accused-
appellant.

We disagree.
Accused-appellants objection to the admissibility of his statement as to where he dumped the body of
the victim, which allegedly partakes of an extra-judicial confession, is just as tenuous. The impugned
The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but together. Like extra-judicial statement, as testified to by Dahilan, is as follows:
strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
Q While you were there and Aldrin Licayan was also there did you have a chance to talk to him?
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.16cräläwvirtualibräry
A Yes, Maam.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from
scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like weaving a tapestry of events that will Q What did you talk about?
culminate in a clear picture that will reveal a convincing scenario pointing towards the accused as the
author of the crime.17cräläwvirtualibräry
A I asked him Brod, as if I was guessing, where did you leave the child?

The credibility of prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano cannot be impeached by the mere fact that
Q What was his answer to your question?
he failed to rouse other members of the search party when he found the accused-appellant. Suffice it to
A He told me Did you remember the place where we were drinking?
Q What was your answer?
A I told him, Yes, at the place of Wennie Rajal.
Q What more?
A He said, Yes in the place of Wennie Rajal. From his place there was a curve[d] road or junction. And
in that junction the side of it is a ricefield. After the ricefield there is a nipa swamp. Try to see there
maybe I left the child there!
Q After getting that information from Aldrin Licayan what did you do?
A Me and my companions went outside the Municipal Hall and proceeded to the place where Aldrin
Licayan told us.
Q Did you reach the area described by Aldrin Licayan?
A Yes, Maam.
Q What did you see when you arrived in that place described by Aldrin?
A It is where we found the child.[26cräläwvirtualibräry
The foregoing is not an extra-judicial confession, but merely an extra-judicial admission. Sections
2627 and 33,28 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly delineates their distinction. In People v.
Agustin,29 we elucidated on the difference between the two in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt.
The records show that Rogelio Jun-jun Dahilan was neither a law enforcement nor a public officer
conducting a custodial interrogation of accused-appellant. He was merely a jeepney driver and an
acquaintance of accused-appellant who asked the whereabouts of the missing child of
his kumpadre because the victim was last seen with the latter.30cräläwvirtualibräry
In fact, there is no showing that Dahilan colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory
evidence against accused-appellant. Neither was he instructed by the police to extract information from
accused-appellant on the details of the crime. In People v. Andan,31 the accuseds spontaneous and
voluntary verbal confession made in a private meeting with the municipal mayor was admitted in
evidence because the same was not covered by the requisites of Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution.
...Constitutional procedure on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
orally admitted having committed the crime32cräläwvirtualibräry
Even assuming arguendo that accused-appellants admissions indeed partake of an extra-judicial
confession, the same would still be admissible not only on account of the foregoing considerations but
also because it is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court,33 an extra-judicial confession shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, which is defined as the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a
crime has actually been committed.34 Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged.35 In this case, aside from the admission made by accused-
appellant, the bruised and battered body of the victim herself recovered at the exact spot described by
accused-appellant conclusively established the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the admission is replete with details on the whereabouts of the victim who at that time had
not yet been found, thereby ruling out the probability that it was involuntarily made. The voluntariness
of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its it integrity, it being replete with details - which
could only be supplied by the accused - reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered
voluntary.36cräläwvirtualibräry
Contrary to accused-appellants claim, he was in fact seen grabbing and dragging the struggling victim
from the house where she was watching television by Rey Oriente, the victims elder
brother.37cräläwvirtualibräry
While accused-appellant indeed did not admit to anyone that he raped and killed Rowena, the prevailing
circumstances overwhelmingly point to his guilt. As stated earlier, direct evidence is not always
necessary to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A witness may not have actually seen
the very act of commission of a crime, hut he may nevertheless identify the accused as the assailant as
when the latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission
of the crime,38 as in this case.
In sum, the foregoing circumstances when viewed in their entirety are as convincing as direct evidence
and, as such, negate the innocence of the accused-appellant.39 In other words, the circumstantial
evidence against accused-appellant fully justifies the finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony committed.40cräläwvirtualibräry
We, therefore, find no compelling reason to reverse the ruling of the trial court insofar as accused-
appellants guilt is concerned. The crime of Rape with Homicide is defined and penalized by Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The definition of the felony was later
expanded and the same was reclassified as a crime against persons and incorporated as Articles 266-
A41 and 266-B42 in Title Eight, Chapter Three thereof.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.43 Death being a single indivisible penalty, the same
shall be imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the crime.44 Indeed, the penalty of death must be mandatorily imposed under Article 47
of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 47. In what cases death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of death penalty cases. -
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws except
when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or
is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme
Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide is now
P100,000.00.45 On the other hand, the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 given to the
victims heirs is proper taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victims family46 brought
about by her death.47cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 99-696 finding accused Aldrin Licayan y Sucano guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Rape with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering him to pay the heirs
of the victim, Rowena Bangcong, P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659,
upon finality of this decision, let a certified true copy of the record of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of clemency and pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8371. June 30, 1955.]
NICANOR P. NICOLAS as Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ,
as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, JIMMY WILLIAM
NELSON and PRESCILLA FONTANOSA, Respondents.
Provincial Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas in his own behalf.
Ricardo Conjares and Julian T. Ocampo for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; CONCUBINAGE; PRIOR SEXUAL RELATIONS DONE BEFORE
COMPLAINANT’S MARRIAGE. — Where the previous sexual relations sought to be proved were far
removed in point of time the illicit act now complained of, and having moreover taken place when there
was as yet no legal impediment to the same, they furnish no rational basis for the inference that they
would be continued after complainant’s marriage to one of the defendant had created such impediment
and made continuance of sexual relations between defendants a crime.
2. ID., ID.; IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT; MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE. — The evidence of
previous sexual relations between defendants done before complainant’s marriage to one of them, being
immaterial and irrelevant, the trial court cannot be compelled to admit it regardless of whether or not the
new Civil Code permits investigation or injury into the paternity of a natural child except in actions for
forcible acknowledgment.
DECISION
REYES, A., J.:
At the trial of a criminal case for concubinage filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Corazon
Vizcarra against the defendant Jimmy William Nelson and his co-defendant Priscilla Fontanosa, the
court ruled out testimony of three prosecution witnesses tending to show that a boy named Paul William
Nelson, born in Cavite on September 17, 1949, was the son of both defendants. The said testimony was
objected to as immaterial, but the objection was sustained on the ground that inquiry into the paternity of
a natural child is forbidden except in actions for forcible acknowledgment.
Contending that prior sexual relations between the defendants were admissible to show "propensity" to
commit the offense charged or disposition to maintain such relations even after the marriage of one of
the defendants to the complainant, the prosecution brought the present action for mandamus to compel
the trial court to admit the preferred evidence.
It is a rule of evidence that what one did at one time is no proof of his having done the same or a similar
thing at another time. But the rule is not absolute, for it is subject to the exceptions enumerated in
section 17 of Rule 123, Rules of Court, which reads —
"SEC. 17. Evidence of similar acts. — Evidence that one did or ommitted to do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or ommitted to do the same or a similar thing at another time;
but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage, and the like."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are not persuaded that the preferred evidence, when viewed in the light of facts brought out in the
present case, would come under any of the exceptions named. It appears from the order containing the
questioned ruling that the boy Paul was born five years before complainant’s marriage to one of the
defendants. This means that the previous sexual relations sought to be proved were far removed in point
of time from the illicit act now complained of, and having, moreover, taken place when there was as yet
no legal impediment to the same, they furnish no rational basis for the inference that they would be
continued after complainant’s marriage to one of the defendants had created such impediment and made
continuance of sexual relations between the defendants a crime."cralaw virtua1aw library
The evidence objected to being immaterial and irrelevant, the trial court cannot be compelled to admit it
regardless of whether or not the New Civil Code permits investigation or inquiry into the paternity of a
natural child except in actions for forcible acknowledgment.
The writ prayed for is, therefore, denied, but without special pronouncement as to costs.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126713. July 27, 1998
ADORACION E. CRUZ, THELMA DEBBIE E. CRUZ and GERRY E.
CRUZ, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ELISEO and VIRGINIA
MALOLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must be read together and interpreted in an
manner that reconciles and gives life to all of them. The intent of the parties, as shown by the clear
language used, prevails over post facto explanations that find no support from the words employed by
the parties of from their contemporary and subsequent acts showing their understanding of such
contracts, Furthermore, a subsequent agreement cannot novate or change by implication a previous one,
unless old and new contracts are, on every point, incompatible with each other. Finally, collateral facts
may be admitted in evidence when a rational similarity exists between the conditions giving rise to the
fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in
CA- GR CV 33566, promulgated July 15, 1996, which reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo, Rizal; and CA Resolution2 of October 1, 1996, which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioners Adoracion, Thelma Debbie, Gerry and Arnel (all surnamed Cruz) filed an action for partition
against the private respondents, Spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. On January 28, 1991, the trial
court rendered a Decision which disposed as follows:3cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs and against the defendants-spouses
1. Ordering the partition of the seven parcels of land totalling 1,912 sq. m. among the four (4) plaintiffs
and the defendants-spouses as follows:
a. Adoracion E. Cruz (1/5) --- 382 sq. m.
b. Thelma Debbie Cruz (1/5) --- 382 sq. m.
c. Gerry E. Cruz (1/5) --- 382 sq. m.
d. Arnel E. Cruz (1/5) --- 382 sq. m.
e. Spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos (1/5) --- 382 sq. m.
to whom Lot No. 1-C-2-B-2-B-4-L-1-A with an area of 276 sq. m.
covered by TCT No. 502603 and a portion of Lot No. 1-C-2-B-2-B-4-
L-1-B covered by TCT No. 502604 to the extent of 106 sq. m.
adjoining TCT No. 502603.
2. Ordering the parties herein to execute a project of partition in accordance [with] this decision
indicating the partition of the seven (7) parcels of land within fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this
judgment.
3. Ordering defendants-spouses to pay plaintiffs herein P5,000.00 as and for attorneys fees;
4. Cost of suit.
On appeal, Respondent Court reversed the trial court thus:4cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be meritorious, we REVERSE the appealed decision and render
judgment DISMISSING the complaint without prejudice however to the claim of plaintiff-appellees for
their shares in the proceeds of the auction sale of the seven (7) parcels of land in question against
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo pursuant to the Memorandum Agreement.
Cost against the plaintiff-appellees.
As earlier stated, reconsideration was denied through the appellate courts challenged
Resolution:5cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration in DENIED..
The Antecedent Facts
The facts of this case are undisputed. The assailed Decision relates them as follows:6cräläwvirtualibräry
Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz were spouses and their children were Thelma, Nerissa, Arnel and
Gerry Cruz. Upon the death of Delfin I. Cruz, [his] surviving spouse and children executed on August
22, 1977 a notarized Deed of Partial Partition (Exhibit 2) by virtue of which each one of them was given
a share of several parcels of registered lands all situated in Taytay, Rizal.
The following day, August 23, 1977, the same mother and children executed a Memorandum Agreement
(Exhibit H) which provided:
That the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the following registered
real properties, all situated at Taytay, Rizal, Philippines, x x x.
xxx
That sometime on August 22, 1977, a Deed of Partial Partition was executed among us before Atty.
Virgilio J. Tamayo, Notary Public on and for the Province of Rizal, per Doc. No. 1776; Page No. 14; of
his Notarial Register No. XLIX, Series of 1977;
xxx
That as a result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually partitioned and the
respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her;
That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their
respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves and by these
presents do hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall share alike and received equal shares
from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their individual names by
virtue of this deed of partial partition.
That this Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the contracting parties herein up
to and until the last lot covered by the Deed of [P]artial [P]artition above adverted to shall have been
disposed of or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided and their respective shares received by each
of them.
This Memorandum Agreement was registered and annotated in the titles of the lands covered by the
Deed of Partial Partition.
Subsequently, the same parties caused the consolidation and subdivisions of the lands they respectively
inherited from the late Delfin I. Cruz per Deed of Partial Partition. After that, they registered the Deed of
Partial Partition and subdivision plans and titles were issued in their names. In the case of Nerissa Cruz
Tamayo, the following titles were issued to her in her name: TCT No. 502603 (Exhibit A), TCT No.
502604, (Exhibit B), TCT No. 502605 (Exhibit C), TCT No. 502606 (Exhibit D), TCT No. 502608
(Exhibit E), TCT No. 502609 (Exhibit F), TCT No. 502610 (Exhibit G), hereinafter called the lands in
question. Naturally, the annotation pertaining to the Memorandum Agreement was carried in each of
said seven (7) titles and annotated in each of them.
Meanwhile, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos filed Civil Case No. 31231 against the spouses
Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo for a sum of money. The Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVI (Quezon City) rendered a decision of June 1, 1981 in favor of Eliseo and Virginia
condemning the spouses Nerissa and Nelson Tamayo to pay them P126,529.00 with 12% interest per
annum from the filing of the complaint plus P5,000.00 attorneys fee. After the finality of that decision, a
writ of execution (Exhibit J) was issued on November 20, 1981.
Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the lands in question. On June 29, 1983, these
properties were sold in an execution sale to the highest bidders, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia
Malolos. Accordingly, the sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale (Exhibit K) over
all the rights, claims, interests, titles, shares, and participations of defendant spouses Nerissa Tamayo
and Nelson Tamayo..
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption within the statutory period and so the
final deed of sale was executed by the sheriff conveying the lands in question to spouses Eliseo and
Virginia Malolos. The Malolos couple asked Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to give them the owners duplicate
copy of the seven (7) titles of the lands in question but she refused. The couple moved the court to
compel her to surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for cancellation. This was granted
on September 7, 1984. But Nerissa was adamant. She did not comply with the Order of the court and so
the Malolos couple asked the court to declare said titles as null and void.
At this point, Adoracion Cruz, Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Arnel Cruz entered the picture by filing is
said lower court a motion for leave to intervene and oppose [the] Maloloses motion. The Cruzes alleged
that they were co-owners of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo over the lands in question.
On January 18, 1985, said court issued an Order modifying the Order of September 7, 1984 by directing
the surrender of the owners duplicate copies of the titles of the lands in question to the Register of Deeds
not for cancellation but for the annotation of the rights, interest acquired by the Maloloses over said
lands.
On February 17, 1987, Adoracion, Thelma, Gerry and Arnel Cruz filed Civil Case No. 961-A for
Partition of Real Estate against spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos over the lands in question.
As already stated in the first paragraph of this Decision, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of
the plaintiffs from which the defendants appealed to this court, x x x x .
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
For Respondent Court, the central issue was: Did the Memorandum of Agreement [MOA] (Exhibit
H)7 revoke, cancel or supersede the Deed of Partial Partition [DPP] (Exhibit 2)?8 If so, then petitioners
and Spouses Tamayo were co-owners of the land in issue, and partition should ensue upon motion of the
former; if not, then the latter are its absolute owners and to partition should be made.
Respondent Court resolved the above question in the negative for the following reasons:
First, the DPP was not materially and substantially incompatible with the MOA. The DPP conferred
absolute ownership of the parcels of land in issue on Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, while the MOA merely
created an obligation on her part to share with the petitioners the proceeds of the sale of said properties.
Second, the fact that private respondent registered the DPP was inconsistent with the allegation that they
intended to abandon it. Indeed, had they meant to abandon it, they would have simply gathered the
copies of said document and then torn of burned them.
Third, petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership over the disputed properties because, as
absolute owners, they either mortgaged or sold the other properties adjudicated to them by virtue of the
DPP.
Hence, this petition.9
Assignment of Errors
In their Memorandum,10 petitioners submit the following assignment of errors:
A. Respondent Court erred in ruling that the Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit H) does not prevail
over the Deed of Partial Partition (Exhibit 2).
B. Respondent Court erred in ruling that petitioners can only claim their right to the proceeds of [the]
auction sale.
C. Respondent Court erred in ruling that petitioners are in estoppel by deed.
D. Respondent Court erred in ruling that the registration of the deed of partial partition precluded the
petitioners from abrogating it.
E. Respondent Court erred when it completely ignored the finality of the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXVI as embodied in the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71.
In fine, the resolution of this petition hinges of the following issues: (1) whether DPP was cancelled or
novated by the MOA; (2) whether the MOA established, between petitioners and the judgment debtor, a
co-ownership of the lots in question; (3) whether petitioners are barred by estoppel from claiming co-
ownership of the seven parcels of land; and (4) whether res judicata has set in.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. It fails to demonstrate any reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals.
First Issue: No Novation or Cancellation
In their Memorandum, petitioners insist that the MOA categorically and unmistakably named and
covenanted them as co-owners of the parcels in issue and novated their earlier agreement, the Deed of
Partial Partition.
Petitioners claim that the MOA clearly manifested their intention to create a co-ownership. This is
particularly evident in Exhibit 1-B, which provides:
That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and eventual disposal or sale of their
respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves and by these
presents do hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall share and receive equal shares from
the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their individual names by virtue
of this deed of partial partition.
The Court disagrees. The foregoing provision in the MOA does not novate, much less cancel, the earlier
DPP. Novation, one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation, requires the concurrence of the
following: (1) there is a previous valid obligation; (2) the parties concerned agree to a new contract; (3)
the old contract is extinguished; and (4) there is a valid new contract.11 Novation may be express or
implied. Article 1292 of the Code provides: In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another
which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms [express
novation],12 or that the old and new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other [implied
novation].
Tested against the foregoing standards, petitioners stance is shattered to pieces. The stipulation that the
petitioners and Spouses Tamayo were co-owners was merely the introductory part of the MOA, and it
reads:13cräläwvirtualibräry
That the parties are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the following registered real
properties, all situated at Taytay, Rizal, Philippines. xxx
xxx
That sometime in August 22, 1977, a Deed of Partial Partition was executed among us before Atty.
Virgilio J. Tamayo, Notary Public in and for the Province of Rizal, per Doc. No. 1796; Page No. 14; of
his Notarial Register No. XLIX, Series of 1977;
Following the above-quoted stipulation is a statement that the subject parcels of land had in fact been
partitioned, but that the former co-owner intended to share with petitioners the proceeds of any sale of
said land,14 viz:
That [as] a result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually partitioned and the
respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her;
That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their
respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves [and] to one
another that they shall do [sic] hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall share alike and
receive equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their
individual names by virtue of this deed of partial partition;
That this Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the contracting parties herein up
to and until the last lot covered by the deed or partial partition above adverted to shall have been
disposed of or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided and their respective shares received by each
of them.
xxx
The MOA falls short of producing a novation, because it does not express a clear intent to dissolve the
old obligation as a consideration for the emergence of the new one.15 Likewise, petitioners fail to show
that the DPP and the MOA are materially and substantially incompatible with each other. Petitioners
admit that, under the MOA, they and the Tamayo spouses agreed to equally share in the proceeds of the
sale of the lots.16 Indeed, the DPP granted title to the lots in question to the co-owner to whom they were
assigned, and the MOA created an obligation on the part of such co-owner to share with the others the
proceeds of the sale of such parcels. There is no incompatibility between these two contracts.
Verily, the MOA cannot be construed as a repudiation of the earlier DPP. Both documents can exist
together and must be so interpreted as to give life to both. Respondent Court aptly
explained:17cräläwvirtualibräry
The Deed of Partition conferred upon Nerissa Cruz Tamayo absolute ownership over the lands in
question. The Memorandum of Agreement merely created an obligation on the part of absolute owner
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to share [with] the appellees with [sic] the proceeds of the sale of said properties.
The obligation of the owner of a piece of land to share [with] somebody with [sic] its fruits or the
proceeds of its sale does not necessarily impair his dominion over the property much less make the
beneficiary his co-owner thereof.
All in all, the basic principle underlying this ruling is simple: when the text of a contract is explicit and
leaves no doubt as to its intention, the court may not read into it any intention that would contradict its
plain import.18 The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts gives primacy to the intention of the
parties, which is the law among them. Ultimately, their intention is to be deciphered not from the
unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, but from the language used in the contract. And
when the terms of the agreement, as expressed in such language, are clear, they are to be understood
literally, just as they appear on the face of the contract.
Indeed, the legal effects of a contract are determined by extracting the intention of the parties from the
language they used and from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.19 This principle gains more
force when third parties are concerned. To require such persons to go beyond what is clearly written in
the document is unfair and unjust. They cannot possibly delve into the contracting parties minds and
suspect that something is amiss, when the language of the instrument appears clear and unequivocal.
Second Issue: No Co-ownership in the MOA
Petitioners contend that they converted their separate and individual ownership over the lands in dispute
into a co-ownership by their execution of the MOA and the annotation thereof on the separate titles.
The Court is not convinced. The very provisions of the MOA belie the existence of a co-
ownership. First, it retains the partition of the properties, which petitioners supposedly placed in co-
ownership; and, second, it vests in the registered owner the power to dispose of the land adjudicated to
him or her under the DPP. These are antithetical to the petitioners contention. In a co-ownership, an
undivided thing or right belongs to two or more persons.20 Put differently, several persons hold common
dominion over a spiritual (or ideal) part of a thing, which is not physically divided. 21 In the present case,
however, the parcels of land in the MOA have all been partitioned and titled under separate and
individual names. More important, the MOA stipulated that the registered owner could sell the land
without the consent of the other parties to the MOA. Jus disponendi is an attribute of ownership, and
only the owner can dispose of a property.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Contrary to petitioners claim, the annotation of the MOA in the certificate of title did not engender any
co-ownership. Well settled is the doctrine that registration merely confirms, but does not confer,
title.23 It does not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. As earlier observed, the
MOA did not make petitioners co-owners of the disputed parcels of land. Hence, the annotation of this
document in the separate certificates of title did not grant them a greater right over the same property.
Third Issue: Estoppel by Deed
Respondent Court found that several deeds of sale and real estate mortgage, which petitioners executed
when they sold or mortgaged some parcels adjudicated to them under the DPP, contained the statement
that the vendor/mortgagor was the absolute owner of the parcel of residential land and that he or she
represented it as free from liens and encumbrances. On the basis of these pieces of evidence, respondent
Court held that petitioners were estopped from claiming that there was a co-ownership over the disputed
parcels of land which were also covered by the DPP. Petitioners contend that Respondent Court , in so
ruling violated the res inter alios acta rule.
Petitioners contentions is untenable. Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of
evidence that tends to show that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that
he has done a similar as act at another time.24 Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the
dependant to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense,
raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the issues immediately
before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the practical inconvenience of trying collateral
issues and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to
litigants.25cräläwvirtualibräry
The rule, however, is not without exception. While inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be
received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or
resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding
the issue or fact to be proved.26 Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in
actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a persons;
it provides insight into such persons motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals
a mistake.27cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other parcels of land they entered into, in
the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that the parcels in issue are not co-
owned. The court is not persuaded. Evidence of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule on
the res inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and
corroborative of evidence already received.28 The relevancy of such transactions is readily apparent. The
nature of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the lots on question since they are all
subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by petitioners in fee simple, in the
concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should similarly be treated as absolutely owned in
fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably, the evidence in dispute manifests petitioners common
purpose and design to treat all the parcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely owned and not
subject to co-ownership.29cräläwvirtualibräry
Under the principle of estoppel, petitioners are barred from claiming co-ownership of the lands in issue.
In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has introduced another to act in a particular manner, is
barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or
injury to another.30 It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the contemplation
of law, become settled by the acts and proceedings of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the
party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in
pairs.31cräläwvirtualibräry
In their transaction with others, petitioners have declared that the other lands covered by the same MOA
are absolutely owned, without indicating the existence of a co-ownership over such properties. Thus,
they are estopped from claiming otherwise because, by their very own acts and representations as
evidenced by the deeds of mortgage and of sale, they have denied such co-ownership.32
FOURTH ISSUES: No Res Judicata On Co-ownership
Petitioners argue that the Order (Exhibit J)33 dated January 18, 1985, issued by the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 86, which had long become final and executory, confirmed their co-ownership. Thus, they claim
that Respondent Courts reversal of the ruling of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, is a violation of the rule
on res judicata.
This contention is equally untenable. The elements of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment was
final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;(3) the
judgment was on the merits; and (4) the parties, subject matters and causes of action in the first and
second actions are identical.34cräläwvirtualibräry
The RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the present case or to entertain
questions regarding the existence of co-ownership over the parcels in dispute, because the suit pending
before it was only for the collection of a sum of money. Its disquisition on co-ownership was merely for
the levy and the execution of the properties of the Tamayo spouses, in satisfaction of their judgment
debt to the private Respondents.
Perhaps more glaring is the lack of identity between the two actions. The first action before the RTC of
Quezon City was for the collection of money, while the second before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, was
for partition. There being no concurrence of the elements of res judicata in this case, the Court finds no
error in Respondent Courts ruling. No further discussion is needed to show the glaring difference
between the two controversies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is Affirmed. Cost against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 158149 February 9, 2006
BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, (formerly BANK OF COMMERCE), Petitioner,
vs.
PERLA P. MANALO and CARLOS MANALO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 47458 affirming, on appeal, the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 98, in Civil Case No. Q-89-3905.
The Antecedents
The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land in Quezon City, known as the
Xavierville Estate Subdivision, with an area of 42 hectares. XEI caused the subdivision of the property
into residential lots, which was then offered for sale to individual lot buyers. 3
On September 8, 1967, XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos, as vendor, and The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), as vendee, executed a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" over some
residential lots in the subdivision, including Lot 1, Block 2, with an area of 907.5 square meters, and Lot
2, Block 2, with an area of 832.80 square meters. The transaction was subject to the approval of the
Board of Directors of OBM, and was covered by real estate mortgages in favor of the Philippine
National Bank as security for its account amounting to ₱5,187,000.00, and the Central Bank of the
Philippines as security for advances amounting to ₱22,185,193.74. 4 Nevertheless, XEI continued selling
the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM.5
Sometime in 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr. Carlos
Manalo, Jr. who was in business of drilling deep water wells and installing pumps under the business
name Hurricane Commercial, Inc. For ₱34,887.66, Manalo, Jr. installed a water pump at Ramos’
residence at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. Manalo, Jr. then
proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as part of
the downpayment the ₱34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated
February 8, 1972, Ramos requested Manalo, Jr. to choose which lots he wanted to buy so that the price
of the lots and the terms of payment could be fixed and incorporated in the conditional sale. 6 Manalo, Jr.
met with Ramos and informed him that he and his wife Perla had chosen Lots 1 and 2 of Block 2 with a
total area of 1,740.3 square meters.
In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. He also
pegged the price of the lots at ₱200.00 per square meter, or a total of ₱348,060.00, with a 20% down
payment of the purchase price amounting to ₱69,612.00 less the ₱34,887.66 owing from Ramos,
payable on or before December 31, 1972; the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be
signed on or before the same date, but if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, 1972,
the balance of the downpayment would fall due then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract
within five (5) days from receipt of the notice of resumption of such selling operations. It was also stated
in the letter that, in the meantime, the spouses may introduce improvements thereon subject to the rules
and regulations imposed by XEI in the subdivision. Perla Manalo conformed to the letter agreement. 7
The spouses Manalo took possession of the property on September 2, 1972, constructed a house thereon,
and installed a fence around the perimeter of the lots.
In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their monthly installments until they were
assured that they would be issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased. 8 The spouses Manalo
were notified of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI.9 However, they did not pay the balance
of the downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to prepare a contract of conditional sale and
transmit the same to Manalo for their signature. On August 14, 1973, Perla Manalo went to the XEI
office and requested that the payment of the amount representing the balance of the downpayment be
deferred, which, however, XEI rejected. On August 10, 1973, XEI furnished her with a statement of
their account as of July 31, 1973, showing that they had a balance of ₱34,724.34 on the downpayment of
the two lots after deducting the account of Ramos, plus ₱3,819.6810 interest thereon from September 1,
1972 to July 31, 1973, and that the interests on the unpaid balance of the purchase price of ₱278,448.00
from September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973 amounted to ₱30,629.28.11 The spouses were informed that
they were being billed for said unpaid interests.12
On January 25, 1974, the spouses Manalo received another statement of account from XEI, inclusive of
interests on the purchase price of the lots.13 In a letter dated April 6, 1974 to XEI, Manalo, Jr. stated they
had not yet received the notice of resumption of Lei’s selling operations, and that there had been no
arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they should not be charged with interest on the balance
of the downpayment on the property.14 Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional sale over the
two lots be transmitted to them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. Consequently,
the spouses refused to pay the balance of the downpayment of the purchase price. 15
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo, Jr. constructed a business sign in the sidewalk near his house. In a
letter dated June 17, 1976, XEI informed Manalo, Jr. that business signs were not allowed along the
sidewalk. It demanded that he remove the same, on the ground, among others, that the sidewalk was not
part of the land which he had purchased on installment basis from XEI. 16 Manalo, Jr. did not respond.
XEI reiterated its demand on September 15, 1977.17
Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the receivables for lots already
contracted and those yet to be sold.18 On December 8, 1977, OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up
of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their contract of conditional sale" and that his failure to
comply with its demand would impel it to avail of the remedies as provided in their contract of
conditional sale.19
Meanwhile, on December 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-265822 over Lot 1, Block 2, and TCT No. T-265823 over Lot 2, Block 2, in favor of the OBM.20 The
lien in favor of the Central Bank of the Philippines was annotated at the dorsal portion of said title,
which was later cancelled on August 4, 1980.21
Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM.
CBM wrote Edilberto Ng, the president of Xavierville Homeowners Association that, as of January 31,
1983, Manalo, Jr. was one of the lot buyers in the subdivision.22 CBM reiterated in its letter to Ng that,
as of January 24, 1984, Manalo was a homeowner in the subdivision. 23
In a letter dated August 5, 1986, the CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on
the property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such
construction.24 She agreed to have a conference meeting with CBM officers where she informed them
that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the property. When asked to prove
her claim, she promised to send the documents to CBM. However, she failed to do so. 25 On September
5, 1986, CBM reiterated its demand that it be furnished with the documents promised,26 but Perla
Manalo did not respond.
On July 27, 1987, CBM filed a complaint27 for unlawful detainer against the spouses with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 51618. CBM
claimed that the spouses had been unlawfully occupying the property without its consent and that
despite its demands, they refused to vacate the property. The latter alleged that they, as vendors, and
XEI, as vendee, had a contract of sale over the lots which had not yet been rescinded. 28
While the case was pending, the spouses Manalo wrote CBM to offer an amicable settlement, promising
to abide by the purchase price of the property (₱313,172.34), per agreement with XEI, through Ramos.
However, on July 28, 1988, CBM wrote the spouses, through counsel, proposing that the price of
₱1,500.00 per square meter of the property was a reasonable starting point for negotiation of the
settlement.29 The spouses rejected the counter proposal,30 emphasizing that they would abide by their
original agreement with XEI. CBM moved to withdraw its complaint31 because of the issues raised.32
In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. After CBM filed its
complaint against the spouses Manalo, the latter filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against the bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on October 31, 1989.
The plaintiffs alleged therein that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the installments
on the lots sold to them by the defendant’s remote predecessor-in-interest, as might be or stipulated in
the contract of sale, but no contract was forthcoming; they constructed their house worth ₱2,000,000.00
on the property in good faith; Manalo, Jr., informed the defendant, through its counsel, on October 15,
1988 that he would abide by the terms and conditions of his original agreement with the defendant’s
predecessor-in-interest; during the hearing of the ejectment case on October 16, 1988, they offered to
pay ₱313,172.34 representing the balance on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of payment was
rejected, so that the subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to third parties.
Plaintiffs further alleged that upon payment of the ₱313,172.34, they were entitled to the execution and
delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject lots, sufficient in form and substance to
transfer title thereto free and clear of any and all liens and encumbrances of whatever kind and
nature.33 The plaintiffs prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in their favor, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing:
(a) The defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over
subject lots in favor of the plaintiffs after payment of the sum of ₱313,172.34, sufficient in
form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free and clear of any and all liens and
encumbrances of whatever kind or nature;
(b) The defendant should be held liable for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of
₱300,000.00 and ₱30,000.00, respectively, for not promptly executing and delivering to
plaintiff the necessary Contract of Sale, notwithstanding repeated demands therefor and for
having been constrained to engage the services of undersigned counsel for which they agreed
to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱50,000.00 to enforce their rights in the premises and
appearance fee of ₱500.00;
(c) And for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.34
In its Answer to the complaint, the defendant interposed the following affirmative defenses: (a) plaintiffs
had no cause of action against it because the August 22, 1972 letter agreement between XEI and the
plaintiffs was not binding on it; and (b) "it had no record of any contract to sell executed by it or its
predecessor, or of any statement of accounts from its predecessors, or records of payments of the
plaintiffs or of any documents which entitled them to the possession of the lots." 35 The defendant,
likewise, interposed counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees and prayed for the eviction of the
plaintiffs from the property.36
Meanwhile, in a letter dated January 25, 1993, plaintiffs, through counsel, proposed an amicable
settlement of the case by paying ₱942,648.70, representing the balance of the purchase price of the two
lots based on the current market value.37 However, the defendant rejected the same and insisted that for
the smaller lot, they pay ₱4,500,000.00, the current market value of the property. 38 The defendant
insisted that it owned the property since there was no contract or agreement between it and the plaintiffs’
relative thereto.
During the trial, the plaintiffs adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale executed
between XEI and Alberto Soller;39 Alfredo Aguila,40 and Dra. Elena Santos-Roque41 to prove that XEI
continued selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the
said lots.
For its part, defendant presented in evidence the letter dated August 22, 1972, where XEI proposed to
sell the two lots subject to two suspensive conditions: the payment of the balance of the downpayment
of the property, and the execution of the corresponding contract of conditional sale. Since plaintiffs
failed to pay, OBM consequently refused to execute the corresponding contract of conditional sale and
forfeited the ₱34,877.66 downpayment for the two lots, but did not notify them of said forfeiture. 42 It
alleged that OBM considered the lots unsold because the titles thereto bore no annotation that they had
been sold under a contract of conditional sale, and the plaintiffs were not notified of XEI’s resumption
of its selling operations.
On May 2, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant –
(a) Ordering the latter to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 1 and 2,
Block 2 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision after payment of the sum of ₱942,978.70
sufficient in form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free from any and all liens
and encumbrances of whatever kind and nature.
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
₱150,000.00; and
(c) To pay attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.43
The trial court ruled that under the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the plaintiffs, the
parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had already partially consummated
the same. It declared that the failure of the defendant to notify the plaintiffs of the resumption of its
selling operations and to execute a deed of conditional sale did not prevent the defendant’s obligation to
convey titles to the lots from acquiring binding effect. Consequently, the plaintiffs had a cause of action
to compel the defendant to execute a deed of sale over the lots in their favor.
Boston Bank appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the lower court erred in (a) not concluding
that the letter of XEI to the spouses Manalo, was at most a mere contract to sell subject to suspensive
conditions, i.e., the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the property and the execution of a
deed of conditional sale (which were not complied with); and (b) in awarding moral and exemplary
damages to the spouses Manalo despite the absence of testimony providing facts to justify such
awards.44
On September 30, 2002, the CA rendered a decision affirming that of the RTC with modification. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that (a) the figure
"₱942,978.70" appearing [in] par. (a) of the dispositive portion thereof is changed to "₱313,172.34 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from September 1, 1972 until fully paid" and (b) the award
of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.45
The appellate court sustained the ruling of the RTC that the appellant and the appellees had executed a
Contract to Sell over the two lots but declared that the balance of the purchase price of the property
amounting to ₱278,448.00 was payable in fixed amounts, inclusive of pre-computed interests, from
delivery of the possession of the property to the appellees on a monthly basis for 120 months, based on
the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of other lot buyers. 46 The CA also declared that,
while XEI must have resumed its selling operations before the end of 1972 and the downpayment on the
property remained unpaid as of December 31, 1972, absent a written notice of cancellation of the
contract to sell from the bank or notarial demand therefor as required by Republic Act No. 6552, the
spouses had, at the very least, a 60-day grace period from January 1, 1973 within which to pay the same.
Boston Bank filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was no perfected
contract to sell the two lots, as there was no agreement between XEI and the respondents on the manner
of payment as well as the other terms and conditions of the sale. It further averred that its claim for
recovery of possession of the aforesaid lots in its Memorandum dated February 28, 1994 filed before the
trial court constituted a judicial demand for rescission that satisfied the requirements of the New Civil
Code. However, the appellate court denied the motion.
Boston Bank, now petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA rulings.
It maintains that, as held by the CA, the records do not reflect any schedule of payment of the 80%
balance of the purchase price, or ₱278,448.00. Petitioner insists that unless the parties had agreed on the
manner of payment of the principal amount, including the other terms and conditions of the contract,
there would be no existing contract of sale or contract to sell.47 Petitioner avers that the letter agreement
to respondent spouses dated August 22, 1972 merely confirmed their reservation for the purchase of Lot
Nos. 1 and 2, consisting of 1,740.3 square meters, more or less, at the price of ₱200.00 per square meter
(or ₱348,060.00), the amount of the downpayment thereon and the application of the ₱34,887.00 due
from Ramos as part of such downpayment.
Petitioner asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and conditions relating to
the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property (as agreed upon by XEI and other lot
buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the contract entered into between the petitioner
and the Respondents. It insists that such a ruling is contrary to law, as it is tantamount to compelling the
parties to agree to something that was not even discussed, thus, violating their freedom to contract.
Besides, the situation of the respondents cannot be equated with those of the other lot buyers, as, for one
thing, the respondents made a partial payment on the downpayment for the two lots even before the
execution of any contract of conditional sale.
Petitioner posits that, even on the assumption that there was a perfected contract to sell between the
parties, nevertheless, it cannot be compelled to convey the property to the respondents because the latter
failed to pay the balance of the downpayment of the property, as well as the balance of 80% of the
purchase price, thus resulting in the extinction of its obligation to convey title to the lots to the
Respondents.
Another egregious error of the CA, petitioner avers, is the application of Republic Act No. 6552. It
insists that such law applies only to a perfected agreement or perfected contract to sell, not in this case
where the downpayment on the purchase price of the property was not completely paid, and no
installment payments were made by the buyers.
Petitioner also faults the CA for declaring that petitioner failed to serve a notice on the respondents of
cancellation or rescission of the contract to sell, or notarial demand therefor. Petitioner insists that its
August 5, 1986 letter requiring respondents to vacate the property and its complaint for ejectment in
Civil Case No. 51618 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court amounted to the requisite demand for a
rescission of the contract to sell. Moreover, the action of the respondents below was barred by laches
because despite demands, they failed to pay the balance of the purchase price of the lots (let alone the
downpayment) for a considerable number of years.
For their part, respondents assert that as long as there is a meeting of the minds of the parties to a
contract of sale as to the price, the contract is valid despite the parties’ failure to agree on the manner of
payment. In such a situation, the balance of the purchase price would be payable on demand,
conformably to Article 1169 of the New Civil Code. They insist that the law does not require a party to
agree on the manner of payment of the purchase price as a prerequisite to a valid contract to sell. The
respondents cite the ruling of this Court in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals48 to support their
submission.
They argue that even if the manner and timeline for the payment of the balance of the purchase price of
the property is an essential requisite of a contract to sell, nevertheless, as shown by their letter agreement
of August 22, 1972 with the OBM, through XEI and the other letters to them, an agreement was reached
as to the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price. They point out that such letters
referred to the terms of the terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the other
lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments
(excluding the downpayment, but inclusive of pre-computed interests). The respondents assert that XEI
was a real estate broker and knew that the contracts involving residential lots in the subdivision
contained uniform terms as to the manner and timeline of the payment of the purchase price of said lots.
Respondents further posit that the terms and conditions to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract
of conditional sale" to be executed by the parties would be the same as those contained in the contracts
of conditional sale executed by lot buyers in the subdivision. After all, they maintain, the contents of the
corresponding contract of conditional sale referred to in the August 22, 1972 letter agreement envisaged
those contained in the contracts of conditional sale that XEI and other lot buyers executed. Respondents
cite the ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila E.R.R. & L. Co. 49
The respondents aver that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual, inappropriate in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They assert that petitioner adopted a theory in
litigating the case in the trial court, but changed the same on appeal before the CA, and again in this
Court. They argue that the petitioner is estopped from adopting a new theory contrary to those it had
adopted in the trial and appellate courts. Moreover, the existence of a contract of conditional sale was
admitted in the letters of XEI and OBM. They aver that they became owners of the lots upon delivery to
them by XEI.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the factual issues raised by the petitioner are
proper; (2) whether petitioner or its predecessors-in-interest, the XEI or the OBM, as seller, and the
respondents, as buyers, forged a perfect contract to sell over the property; (3) whether petitioner is
estopped from contending that no such contract was forged by the parties; and (4) whether respondents
has a cause of action against the petitioner for specific performance.
The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate the evidence on
record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals,
are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.50
We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the ruling of the appellate court dismissing
petitioner’s appeal is contrary to law and is not supported by evidence. A careful examination of the
factual backdrop of the case, as well as the antecedental proceedings constrains us to hold that petitioner
is not barred from asserting that XEI or OBM, on one hand, and the respondents, on the other, failed to
forge a perfected contract to sell the subject lots.
It must be stressed that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when there is plain
error.51 Although a factual issue was not raised in the trial court, such issue may still be considered and
resolved by the Court in the interest of substantial justice, if it finds that to do so is necessary to arrive at
a just decision,52 or when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the case. 53 When the trial court decides a
case in favor of a party on certain grounds, the Court may base its decision upon some other points,
which the trial court or appellate court ignored or erroneously decided in favor of a party. 54
In this case, the issue of whether XEI had agreed to allow the respondents to pay the purchase price of
the property was raised by the parties. The trial court ruled that the parties had perfected a contract to
sell, as against petitioner’s claim that no such contract existed. However, in resolving the issue of
whether the petitioner was obliged to sell the property to the respondents, while the CA declared that
XEI or OBM and the respondents failed to agree on the schedule of payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the property, it ruled that XEI and the respondents had forged a contract to sell; hence,
petitioner is entitled to ventilate the issue before this Court.
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in
law, there must be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the property sold, but also on the
manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.
the price of the property (₱348,060.00), the 20% downpayment of the purchase price (₱69,612.00), and
credited respondents for the ₱34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% downpayment. The
timeline for the payment of the balance of the downpayment (₱34,724.34) was also agreed upon, that is,
on or before XEI resumed its selling operations, on or before December 31, 1972, or within five (5) days
from written notice of such resumption of selling operations. The parties had also agreed to incorporate
all the terms and conditions relating to the sale, inclusive of the terms of payment of the balance of the
purchase price and the other substantial terms and conditions in the "corresponding contract of
conditional sale," to be later signed by the parties, simultaneously with respondents’ settlement of the
balance of the downpayment.
The February 8, 1972 letter of XEI reads:

Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code, in a contract of sale, whether absolute or conditional, one of Mr. Carlos T. Manalo, Jr.
the contracting parties obliges himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling
the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale is perfected at the Rizal Avenue Ext.,Caloocan City
moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and the price.
From the averment of perfection, the parties are bound, not only to the fulfillment of what has been
Dear Mr. Manalo:
expressly stipulated, but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping
with good faith, usage and law.55 On the other hand, when the contract of sale or to sell is not perfected,
it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation between the We agree with your verbal offer to exchange the proceeds of your contract with us to form as a down
parties.56 payment for a lot in our Xavierville Estate Subdivision.

A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal or Please let us know your choice lot so that we can fix the price and terms of payment in our conditional
real property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties. Price is an essential sale.
element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fixing of the price can never
be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a price fixed by one of the contracting
parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale.57 Sincerely yours,

XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC.

It is not enough for the parties to agree on the price of the property. The parties must also agree on the
manner of payment of the price of the property to give rise to a binding and enforceable contract of sale
or contract to sell. This is so because the agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price, (Signed)
such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. 58 EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR.
President
In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on the price as well
as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the CONFORME:
balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer
makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the
perfection of any purchase and sale between the parties. Indeed, this Court ruled in Velasco v. Court of (Signed)
Appeals59 that: CARLOS T. MANALO, JR.
Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling62

It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners themselves admit that they
and the respondent still had to meet and agree on how and when the down-payment and the installment The August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the respondents reads:
payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a definite and firm
sales agreement between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this Court has Mrs. Perla P. Manalo
already ruled before that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an 1548 Rizal Avenue Extensionbr>Caloocan City
essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that
the petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum of ₱10,000.00 as part of the downpayment that they
had to pay cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement Dear Mrs. Manalo:
between the parties herein under article 1482 of the New Civil Code, as the petitioners themselves admit
that some essential matter – the terms of payment – still had to be mutually covenanted.60 This is to confirm your reservation of Lot Nos. 1 and 2; Block 2 of our consolidation-subdivision plan as
amended, consisting of 1,740.3 square meters more or less, at the price of ₱200.00 per square meter or a
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as held by the CA, there is no showing, in the total price of ₱348,060.00.
records, of the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price on the property amounting to
₱278,448.00. We have meticulously reviewed the records, including Ramos’ February 8, 1972 and
August 22, 1972 letters to respondents,61 and find that said parties confined themselves to agreeing on
It is agreed that as soon as we resume selling operations, you must pay a down payment of 20% of the
purchase price of the said lots and sign the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale, on or before
December 31, 1972, provided, however, that if we resume selling after December 31, 1972, then you
must pay the aforementioned down payment and sign the aforesaid contract within five (5) days from
your receipt of our notice of resumption of selling operations.
In the meanwhile, you may introduce such improvements on the said lots as you may desire, subject to
the rules and regulations of the subdivision.
If the above terms and conditions are acceptable to you, please signify your conformity by signing on
the space herein below provided.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC. CONFORME:
By:
(Signed) (Signed)
EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR. PERLA P. MANALO
President Buyer63
Based on these two letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the ₱278,448.00 had yet to be
agreed upon on or before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the parties sign the
corresponding contract of conditional sale.
Jurisprudence is that if a material element of a contemplated contract is left for future negotiations, the
same is too indefinite to be enforceable.64 And when an essential element of a contract is reserved for
future agreement of the parties, no legal obligation arises until such future agreement is concluded.65
So long as an essential element entering into the proposed obligation of either of the parties remains to
be determined by an agreement which they are to make, the contract is incomplete and
unenforceable.66 The reason is that such a contract is lacking in the necessary qualities of definiteness,
certainty and mutuality.67
There is no evidence on record to prove that XEI or OBM and the respondents had agreed, after
December 31, 1972, on the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property and the
other substantial terms and conditions relative to the sale. Indeed, the parties are in agreement that there
had been no contract of conditional sale ever executed by XEI, OBM or petitioner, as vendor, and the
respondents, as vendees.68
The ruling of this Court in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals has no bearing in this case because the
issue of the manner of payment of the purchase price of the property was not raised therein.
We reject the submission of respondents that they and Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of
payment contained in the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers in the
"corresponding contract of conditional sale," which would later be signed by them. 69 We have
meticulously reviewed the respondents’ complaint and find no such allegation therein. 70 Indeed,
respondents merely alleged in their complaint that they were bound to pay the balance of the purchase
price of the property "in installments." When respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was never asked, on
direct examination or even on cross-examination, whether the terms of payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers
would form part of the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" to be signed by them simultaneously
with the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the purchase price.
We note that, in its letter to the respondents dated June 17, 1976, or almost three years from the
execution by the parties of their August 22, 1972 letter agreement, XEI stated, in part, that respondents
had purchased the property "on installment basis."71 However, in the said letter, XEI failed to state a
specific amount for each installment, and whether such payments were to be made monthly, semi-
annually, or annually. Also, respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a shred of evidence to
prove that they were obliged to pay the ₱278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or annually. The allegation
that the payment of the ₱278,448.00 was to be paid in installments is, thus, vague and indefinite. Case
law is that, for a contract to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and explicit, not vague or
indefinite.72
There is no factual and legal basis for the CA ruling that, based on the terms of payment of the balance
of the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and the other lot
buyers, respondents were obliged to pay the ₱278,448.00 with pre-computed interest of 12% per annum
in 120-month installments. As gleaned from the ruling of the appellate court, it failed to justify its use of
the terms of payment under the three "contracts of conditional sale" as basis for such ruling, to wit:
On the other hand, the records do not disclose the schedule of payment of the purchase price, net of the
downpayment. Considering, however, the Contracts of Conditional Sale (Exhs. "N," "O" and "P")
entered into by XEI with other lot buyers, it would appear that the subdivision lots sold by XEI, under
contracts to sell, were payable in 120 equal monthly installments (exclusive of the downpayment but
including pre-computed interests) commencing on delivery of the lot to the buyer.73
By its ruling, the CA unilaterally supplied an essential element to the letter agreement of XEI and the
Respondents. Courts should not undertake to make a contract for the parties, nor can it enforce one, the
terms of which are in doubt.74 Indeed, the Court emphasized in Chua v. Court of Appeals75 that it is not
the province of a court to alter a contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties; its
duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which they have made for themselves, without regard to
its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot supply material stipulations or read into contract words which it
does not contain.
Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the terms of payment of the
₱278,448.00 to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" were those contained
in the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque. 76 They likewise
failed to prove such allegation in this Court.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed
to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the ₱278,448.00.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties.
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, certain;87 or if it provides some method or criterion by which it can be definitely ascertained.88 As this
and the like. Court held in Villaraza v. Court of Appeals,89 the price is considered certain if, by its terms, the contract
furnishes a basis or measure for ascertaining the amount agreed upon.
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of business usage,
habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price We have carefully reviewed the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of the parties and find no direct or
in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the implied reference to the manner and schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lots
respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. covered by the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI and that of the other lot buyers 90 as basis for
Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and or mode of determination of the schedule of the payment by the respondents of the ₱278,448.00.
other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM
after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all
The ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company91 is
lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It
not applicable in this case because the basic price fixed in the contract was ₱9.45 per long ton, but it was
further failed to prive that the trial court admitted the said deeds 77 as part of the testimony of respondent
stipulated that the price was subject to modification "in proportion to variations in calories and ash
Manalo, Jr.78
content, and not otherwise." In this case, the parties did not fix in their letters-agreement, any method or
mode of determining the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must contend amounting to ₱278,448.00.
with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering
party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than
It bears stressing that the respondents failed and refused to pay the balance of the downpayment and of
a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The
the purchase price of the property amounting to ₱278,448.00 despite notice to them of the resumption by
offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit.
XEI of its selling operations. The respondents enjoyed possession of the property without paying a
The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to
centavo. On the other hand, XEI and OBM failed and refused to transmit a contract of conditional sale
base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of
to the Respondents. The respondents could have at least consigned the balance of the downpayment
sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
after notice of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI and filed an action to compel XEI or
OBM to transmit to them the said contract; however, they failed to do so.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are
adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of behavior of a
As a consequence, respondents and XEI (or OBM for that matter) failed to forge a perfected contract to
person regularly represented in like circumstances.79 It is only when examples offered to establish
sell the two lots; hence, respondents have no cause of action for specific performance against petitioner.
pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that
Republic Act No. 6552 applies only to a perfected contract to sell and not to a contract with no binding
examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio
and enforceable effect.
of reaction to situations.80

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
or market or profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme
Quezon City, Branch 98 is ordered to dismiss the complaint. Costs against the Respondents.
Court: "Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will someday become fixed as law. Law preserves the
moulds which have taken form and shape from life."81 Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement
of many of the rights and acts of men.82 It is also well-settled that parties who contract on a subject SO ORDERED.
matter concerning which known usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their
agreement, if nothing is said to be contrary.83
535 Phil. 384

However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove usage,
habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in the contracts of the other
lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay the ₱278,448.00 in 120 months, presumably
because of respondents’ belief that the manner of payment of the said amount is not an essential element
of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision,
including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of
service, had executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover,
under the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the
subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the purchase price to
two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so.84 There is no evidence on record that XEI granted the
same right to buyers of two or more lots.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and the
Resolution,[3] dated 20 November 2002, of the same court which, although modifying its earlier
Decision, still denied for the most part the Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioners.
Petitioner Citibank, N.A. (formerly known as the First National City Bank) is a banking corporation
duly authorized and existing under the laws of the United States of America and licensed to do
commercial banking activities and perform trust functions in the Philippines.

Irrefragably, under Article 1469 of the New Civil Code, the price of the property sold may be considered
certain if it be so with reference to another thing certain. It is sufficient if it can be determined by the
stipulations of the contract made by the parties thereto85 or by reference to an agreement incorporated in
the contract of sale or contract to sell or if it is capable of being ascertained with certainty in said
contract;86 or if the contract contains express or implied provisions by which it may be rendered
Petitioner Investor's Finance Corporation, which did business under the name and style of FNCB
Finance, was an affiliate company of petitioner Citibank, specifically handling money market
placements for its clients. It is now, by virtue of a merger, doing business as part of its successor-in-
interest, BPI Card Finance Corporation. However, so as to consistently establish its identity in the
Petition at bar, the said petitioner shall still be referred to herein as FNCB Finance. [4]
Respondent Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners Citibank and FNCB Finance. with Citibank-Geneva, in accordance with the Declaration of Pledge she executed in its favor.
Regrettably, the business relations among the parties subsequently went awry. Petitioners also alleged that the RTC erred in not declaring respondent liable for damages and interest.

On 8 August 1985, respondent filed a Complaint[5] against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. On 26 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision [12] affirming with modification the RTC
11336, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Respondent claimed to have substantial Decision in Civil Case No. 11336, dated 24 August 1995, and ruling entirely in favor of respondent in
deposits and money market placements with the petitioners, as well as money market placements with this wise -
the Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the proceeds of which were supposedly
deposited automatically and directly to respondent's accounts with petitioner Citibank. Respondent Wherefore, premises considered, the assailed 24 August 1995 Decision of the court a quo is
alleged that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
despite her repeated demands, thus, compelling respondent to file Civil Case No. 11336 against
petitioners for "Accounting, Sum of Money and Damages." Respondent eventually filed an Amended
Complaint[6] on 9 October 1985 to include additional claims to deposits and money market placements
1. Declaring as illegal, null and void the set-off effected by the defendant-appellant Bank of the
inadvertently left out from her original Complaint.
plaintiff-appellant's dollar deposit with Citibank, Switzerland, in the amount of
US$149,632.99, and ordering defendant-appellant Citibank to refund the said amount to the
In their joint Answer[7] and Answer to Amended Complaint,[8] filed on 12 September 1985 and 6
plaintiff-appellant with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
November 1985, respectively, petitioners admitted that respondent had deposits and money market
compounded yearly, from 31 October 1979 until fully paid, or its peso equivalent at the time
placements with them, incluing dollar accounts in the Citibank branch in Geneva, Switzerland
of payment;
(Citibank-Geneva). Petitioners further alleged that the respondent later obtained several loans from
petitioner Citibank, for which she executed Promissory Notes (PNs), and secured by (a) a Declaration of
2. As defendant-appellant Citibank failed to establish by competent evidence the alleged
Pledge of her dollar accounts in Citibank-Geneva, and (b) Deeds of Assignment of her money market
indebtedness of plaintiff-appellant, the set-off of P1,069,847.40 in the account of Ms.
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. When respondent failed to pay her loans despite repeated
Sabeniano is hereby declared as without legal and factual basis;
demands by petitioner Citibank, the latter exercised its right to off-set or compensate respondent's
outstanding loans with her deposits and money market placements, pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge
3. As defendants-appellants failed to account the following plaintiff-appellant's money market
and the Deeds of Assignment executed by respondent in its favor. Petitioner Citibank supposedly
placements, savings account and current accounts, the former is hereby ordered to return the
informed respondent Sabeniano of the foregoing compensation through letters, dated 28 September 1979
same, in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon by the contending parties as
and 31 October 1979. Petitioners were therefore surprised when six years later, in 1985, respondent and
evidenced by the certificates of investments, to wit:
her counsel made repeated requests for the withdrawal of respondent's deposits and money market
placements with petitioner Citibank, including her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and her money
market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. Thus, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the
Complaint and for the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. (i) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 023356 (Cancels and Supersedes NNPN No. 22526) issued on
17 March 1977, P318,897.34 with 14.50% interest p.a.;
When the parties failed to reach a compromise during the pre-trial hearing,[9] trial proper ensued and the
parties proceeded with the presentation of their respective evidence. Ten years after the filing of the (ii) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 23357 (Cancels and Supersedes NNPN No. 22528) issued on
Complaint on 8 August 1985, a Decision[10] was finally rendered in Civil Case No. 11336 on 24 August 17 March 1977, P203,150.00 with 14.50 interest p.a.;
1995 by the fourth Judge[11] who handled the said case, Judge Manuel D. Victorio, the dispositive
portion of which reads - (iii) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05757 (Cancels and Supersedes NNPN No. 04952), issued on
02 June 1977, P500,000.00 with 17% interest p.a.;
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
(iv) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05758 (Cancels and Supersedes NNPN No. 04962), issued on
(1) Declaring as illegal, null and void the setoff effected by the defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank] of 02 June 1977, P500,000.00 with 17% interest per annum;
plaintiff's [respondent Sabeniano] dollar deposit with Citibank, Switzerland, in the amount of
US$149,632.99, and ordering the said defendant [petitioner Citibank] to refund the said amount to the (v) The Two Million (P2,000,000.00) money market placements of Ms. Sabeniano with the
plaintiff with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded yearly, from 31 Ayala Investment & Development Corporation (AIDC) with legal interest at the rate of
October 1979 until fully paid, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment; twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded yearly, from 30 September 1976 until fully
paid;
(2) Declaring the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano] indebted to the defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank]
in the amount of P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979 and ordering the plaintiff [respondent
Sabeniano] to pay said amount, however, there shall be no interest and penalty charges from the time the 4. Ordering defendants-appellants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) by way of moral damages, FIVE
illegal setoff was effected on 31 October 1979;
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages, and ONE
(3) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims interposed by the parties against each other. HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as attorney's fees.

Costs against the defendant Bank.
All the parties appealed the foregoing Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 51930. Respondent questioned the findings of the RTC that she was still indebted to
petitioner Citibank, as well as the failure of the RTC to order petitioners to render an accounting of
respondent's deposits and money market placements with them. On the other hand, petitioners argued
that petitioner Citibank validly compensated respondent's outstanding loans with her dollar accounts
Apparently, the parties to the case, namely, the respondent, on one hand, and the petitioners, on the
other, made separate attempts to bring the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26
March 2002, before this Court for review.
G.R. No. 152985
Respondent no longer sought a reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and instead, filed immediately with this Court on 3 May 2002 a
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review,[13] which, after payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 152985. In the said Motion, respondent
alleged that she received a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision on 18 April 2002 and, thus,
had 15 days therefrom or until 3 May 2002 within which to file her Petition for Review. Since she
informed her counsel of her desire to pursue an appeal of the Court of Appeals Decision only on 29
April 2002, her counsel neither had enough time to file a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision
with the Court of Appeals, nor a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. Yet, the Motion failed to state
the exact extension period respondent was requesting for.
Since this Court did not act upon respondent's Motion for Extension of Time to file her Petition for
Review, then the period for appeal continued to run and still expired on 3 May 2002. [14] Respondent
failed to file any Petition for Review within the prescribed period for appeal and, hence, this Court
issued a Resolution,[15] dated 13 November 2002, in which it pronounced that -
G.R. No. 152985 (Modesta R. Sabeniano vs. Court of Appeals, et al.). - It appearing that petitioner
failed to file the intended petition for review on certiorari within the period which expired on May 3,
2002, the Court Resolves to DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the Division Clerk
of Court to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and
executory.
The said Resolution was duly recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 3 January 2003.
G.R. No. 156132
Meanwhile, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002. Acting upon the said Motion, the Court of Appeals
issued the Resolution,[16] dated 20 November 2002, modifying its Decision of 26 March 2002, as follows
- the Decision of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory. More precisely,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED as Sub-paragraph (V) paragraph 3 of the assailed Decision's dispositive portion is hereby
ordered DELETED.
The challenged 26 March 2002 Decision of the Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26
March 2002 and 20 November 2002, respectively, petitioners filed the present Petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 156132. The Petition was initially denied[17] by this Court for failure of the petitioners to attach
thereto a Certification against Forum Shopping. However, upon petitioners' Motion and compliance
with the requirements, this Court resolved[18] to reinstate the Petition.
The Petition presented fourteen (14) assignments of errors allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals
in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002, involving both questions of fact and questions of law which this
Court, for the sake of expediency, discusses jointly, whenever possible, in the succeeding paragraphs.
I Petitioners contend that respondent committed forum shopping on the basis of the following facts:
The Resolution of this Court, dated
13 November 2002, in G.R. No.
152985, declaring the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 26 March
2002, final and executory, pertains to
respondent Sabeniano alone.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the merits of the instant Petition, this Court wishes to address first
the argument, persistently advanced by respondent in her pleadings on record, as well as her numerous
personal and unofficial letters to this Court which were no longer made part of the record, that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, had already become
final and executory by virtue of the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 152985, dated 13 November
2002.
G.R. No. 152985 was the docket number assigned by this Court to respondent's Motion for Extension of
Time to File a Petition for Review. Respondent, though, did not file her supposed Petition. Thus, after
the lapse of the prescribed period for the filing of the Petition, this Court issued the Resolution, dated 13
November 2002, declaring the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, final and
executory. It should be pointed out, however, that the Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, referred
only to G.R. No. 152985, respondent's appeal, which she failed to perfect through the filing of a Petition
for Review within the prescribed period. The declaration of this Court in the same Resolution would
bind respondent solely, and not petitioners which filed their own separate appeal before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 156132, the Petition at bar. This would mean that respondent, on her part, should
be bound by the findings of fact and law of the Court of Appeals, including the monetary amounts
consequently awarded to her by the appellate court in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002; and she can no
longer refute or assail any part thereof. [19]
This Court already explained the matter to respondent when it issued a Resolution[20] in G.R. No.
156132, dated 2 February 2004, which addressed her Urgent Motion for the Release of the Decision
with the Implementation of the Entry of Judgment in the following manner -
[A]cting on Citibank's and FNCB Finance's Motion for Reconsideration, we resolved to grant the
motion, reinstate the petition and require Sabeniano to file a comment thereto in our Resolution of June
23, 2003. Sabeniano filed a Comment dated July 17, 2003 to which Citibank and FNCB Finance filed
a Reply dated August 20, 2003.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Sabeniano had knowledge of, and in fact participated in, the
proceedings in G.R. No. 156132. She cannot feign ignorance of the proceedings therein and claim that
the Decision became final and executory only with regard to Sabeniano in view of her failure to file a
petition for review within the extended period granted by the Court, and not to Citibank and FNCB
Finance whose Petition for Review was duly reinstated and is now submitted for decision.
Accordingly, the instant Urgent Motion is hereby DENIED. (Emphasis supplied.)
To sustain the argument of respondent would result in an unjust and incongruous situation wherein one
party may frustrate the efforts of the opposing party to appeal the case by merely filing with this Court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, ahead of the opposing party, then not
actually filing the intended Petition.[21] The party who fails to file its intended Petition within the
reglementary or extended period should solely bear the consequences of such failure.
Respondent Sabeniano did not
commit forum shopping.
Another issue that does not directly involve the merits of the present Petition, but raised by petitioners,
is whether respondent should be held liable for forum shopping.
While petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26
March 2002, was still pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent already filed with this Court on 3
May 2002 her Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review of the same Court of Appeals
Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 152985. Thereafter, respondent continued to participate in the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930 by filing her Comment, dated 17
July 2002, to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration; and a Rejoinder, dated 23 September 2002, to
petitioners' Reply. Thus, petitioners argue that by seeking relief concurrently from this Court and the
Court of Appeals, respondent is undeniably guilty of forum shopping, if not indirect contempt.
This Court, however, finds no sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for forum shopping.

Forum shopping has been defined as the filing of two or more suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.[22] The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is an identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought.[23] To guard against this
deplorable practice, Rule 7, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court imposes the following requirement -
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as cause for administrative
sanctions.
Although it may seem at first glance that respondent was simultaneously seeking recourse from the
Court of Appeals and this Court, a careful and closer scrutiny of the details of the case at bar would
reveal otherwise.
It should be recalled that respondent did nothing more in G.R. No. 152985 than to file with this Court a
Motion for Extension of Time within which to file her Petition for Review. For unexplained reasons,
respondent failed to submit to this Court her intended Petition within the reglementary period.
Consequently, this Court was prompted to issue a Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, declaring G.R.
No. 152985 terminated, and the therein assailed Court of Appeals Decision final and executory. G.R.
No. 152985, therefore, did not progress and respondent's appeal was unperfected.
The Petition for Review would constitute the initiatory pleading before this Court, upon the timely filing
of which, the case before this Court commences; much in the same way a case is initiated by the filing
of a Complaint before the trial court. The Petition for Review establishes the identity of parties, rights
or causes of action, and relief sought from this Court, and without such a Petition, there is technically no
case before this Court. The Motion filed by respondent seeking extension of time within which to file
her Petition for Review does not serve the same purpose as the Petition for Review itself. Such a
Motion merely presents the important dates and the justification for the additional time requested for,
but it does not go into the details of the appealed case.
Without any particular idea as to the assignments of error or the relief respondent intended to seek from
this Court, in light of her failure to file her Petition for Review, there is actually no second case
involving the same parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought, as that in CA-G.R. CV No.
51930.
It should also be noted that the Certification against Forum Shopping is required to be attached to the
initiatory pleading, which, in G.R. No. 152985, should have been respondent's Petition for Review. It is
in that Certification wherein respondent certifies, under oath, that: (a) she has not commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, that she is presenting a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c)
if she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, she
shall report that fact within five days therefrom to this Court. Without her Petition for Review,
respondent had no obligation to execute and submit the foregoing Certification against Forum Shopping.
Thus, respondent did not violate Rule 7, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court; neither did she
mislead this Court as to the pendency of another similar case.
Lastly, the fact alone that the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, essentially ruled
in favor of respondent, does not necessarily preclude her from appealing the same. Granted that such a
move is ostensibly irrational, nonetheless, it does not amount to malice, bad faith or abuse of the court
processes in the absence of further proof. Again, it should be noted that the respondent did not file her
intended Petition for Review. The Petition for Review would have presented before this Court the
grounds for respondent's appeal and her arguments in support thereof. Without said Petition, any reason
attributed to the respondent for appealing the 26 March 2002 Decision would be grounded on mere
speculations, to which this Court cannot give credence.
II
As an exception to the general rule,
this Court takes cognizance of questions of
fact raised in the Petition at bar.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the interference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings,
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.[24]
Several of the enumerated exceptions pertain to the Petition at bar.
It is indubitable that the Court of Appeals made factual findings that are contrary to those of the
RTC,[25] thus, resulting in its substantial modification of the trial court's Decision, and a ruling entirely in
favor of the respondent. In addition, petitioners invoked in the instant Petition for Review several
exceptions that would justify this Court's review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, i.e., the
Court of Appeals made conflicting findings of fact; findings of fact which went beyond the issues raised
on appeal before it; as well as findings of fact premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court shall proceed to reviewing and re-evaluating the evidence on
record in order to settle questions of fact raised in the Petition at bar.
The fact that the trial judge who
rendered the RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 11336, dated 24 August
1995, was not the same judge who
heard and tried the case, does not, by
itself, render the said Decision
erroneous.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 11336 was rendered more than 10 years from the institution of the said
case. In the course of its trial, the case was presided over by four (4) different RTC judges.[26] It was
Judge Victorio, the fourth judge assigned to the case, who wrote the RTC Decision, dated 24 August
1995. In his Decision,[27] Judge Victorio made the following findings -
After carefully evaluating the mass of evidence adduced by the parties, this Court is not inclined to
believe the plaintiff's assertion that the promissory notes as well as the deeds of assignments of her
FNCB Finance money market placements were simulated. The evidence is overwhelming that the
plaintiff received the proceeds of the loans evidenced by the various promissory notes she had signed.
What is more, there was not an iota of proof save the plaintiff's bare testimony that she had indeed
applied for loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines.
More importantly, the two deeds of assignment were notarized, hence they partake the nature of a public
document. It makes more than preponderant proof to overturn the effect of a notarial attestation. Copies
of the deeds of assignments were actually filed with the Records Management and Archives Office.
Finally, there were sufficient evidence wherein the plaintiff had admitted the existence of her loans with
the defendant Bank in the total amount of P1,920,000.00 exclusive of interests and penalty charges
(Exhibits "28", "31", "32", and "33").
In fine, this Court hereby finds that the defendants had established the genuineness and due execution of
the various promissory notes heretofore identified as well as the two deeds of assignments of the
plaintiff's money market placements with defendant FNCB Finance, on the strength of which the said
money market placements were applied to partially pay the plaintiff's past due obligation with the
defendant Bank. Thus, the total sum of P1,053,995.80 of the plaintiff's past due obligation was partially
offset by the said money market placement leaving a balance of P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979
(Exhibit "34").
Disagreeing in the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals stressed, in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
51930, dated 26 March 2002, "that the ponente of the herein assailed Decision is not the Presiding Judge
who heard and tried the case."[28] This brings us to the question of whether the fact alone that the RTC
Decision was rendered by a judge other than the judge who actually heard and tried the case is sufficient
justification for the appellate court to disregard or set aside the findings in the Decision of the court a
quo?
This Court rules in the negative.
What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a disputable presumption that the RTC
Decision was rendered by the judge in the regular performance of his official duties. While the said
presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other evidence.[29]
Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the presumption that the RTC judge, in resolving the
case and drafting his Decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on record. That the
said RTC judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of little
consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete and available
for consideration by the former.
In People v. Gazmen,[30] this Court already elucidated its position on such an issue -
Accused-appellant makes an issue of the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge
who heard and tried the case and concludes therefrom that the findings of the former are erroneous.
Accused-appellant's argument does not merit a lengthy discussion. It is well-settled that the decision of
a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous.
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had not heard the controversy at all, the trial
having been conducted by then Judge Emilio L. Polig, who was indefinitely suspended by this Court.
Nonetheless, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were complete and were
presumably examined and studied by Judge Baguilat before he rendered his decision. It is not unusual
for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record. The fact that he did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the transcript
of their testimonies does not for that reason alone render the judgment erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])
Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify is in a better position to observe the
witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor whether they are telling the truth or mouthing
falsehood, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render
a valid decision since he can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of
his decision.
Accused-appellant's contention that the trial judge did not have the opportunity to observe the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses since he was not the same judge who conducted the hearing is also
untenable. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth and falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a
judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision since the latter can
also rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])
At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony of the witness is whether or not such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind (People vs. Morre, 217
SCRA 219 [1993]). Further, the credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of the
substance of their testimony and the surrounding circumstances (People v. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44
[1992]). A critical evaluation of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses reveals that their testimony
accords with the aforementioned tests, and carries with it the ring of truth end perforce, must be given
full weight and credit.
Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge who penned the RTC Decision was not the same judge who
heard the case and received the evidence therein would not render the findings in the said Decision
erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in
deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for the trial court
judge's decision are the contents and substance of the witnesses' testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs,
as well as the object and documentary evidence submitted and made part of the records of the case.
This Court proceeds to making its
own findings of fact.
Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, has
become final and executory as to the respondent, due to her failure to interpose an appeal therefrom
within the reglementary period, she is already bound by the factual findings in the said Decision.
Likewise, respondent's failure to file, within the reglementary period, a Motion for Reconsideration or
an appeal of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the same case, dated 20 November 2002, which
modified its earlier Decision by deleting paragraph 3(v) of its dispositive portion, ordering petitioners to
return to respondent the proceeds of her money market placement with AIDC, shall already bar her from
questioning such modification before this Court. Thus, what is for review before this Court is the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, as modified by the Resolution of the same
court, dated 20 November 2002.
Respondent alleged that she had several deposits and money market placements with petitioners. These
deposits and money market placements, as determined by the Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated 26
March 2002, and as modified by its Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, are as follows -
Deposit/Placement Amount
Dollar deposit with Citibank-Geneva $ 149,632.99
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by Promissory Note (PN) No.
23356 (which cancels and supersedes PN No. 22526), earning 14.5% interest per P 318,897.34
annum (p.a.)
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by PN No. 23357 (which cancels
P 203,150.00
and supersedes PN No. 22528), earning 14.5% interest p.a.
Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced by PN No. 5757 (which
P 500,000.00
cancels and supersedes PN No. 4952), earning 17% interest p.a.
Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced by PN No. 5758 (which P 500,000.00
cancels and supersedes PN No. 2962), earning 17% interest p.a.
This Court is tasked to determine whether petitioners are indeed liable to return the foregoing amounts,
together with the appropriate interests and penalties, to respondent. It shall trace respondent's
transactions with petitioners, from her money market placements with petitioner Citibank and petitioner
FNCB Finance, to her savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank, and to her dollar accounts
with Citibank-Geneva.
Money market placements with petitioner Citibank
(Papa vs. Martinez, 12 Phil. Rep., 613; Chinese Chamber of Commerce vs. Pua To Ching, 14 Phil. Rep.,
222; Banco Español-Filipino vs. McKay & Zoeller, 27 Phil. Rep., 183). x x x
Since the genuineness and due execution of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are uncontested, respondent was
able to establish prima facie that petitioner Citibank is liable to her for the amounts stated therein. The
assertion of petitioner Citibank of payment of the said PNs is an affirmative allegation of a new matter,
the burden of proof as to such resting on petitioner Citibank. Respondent having proved the existence of
the obligation, the burden of proof was upon petitioner Citibank to show that it had been discharged. [33]
It has already been established by this Court that -

The history of respondent's money market placements with petitioner Citibank began on 6 December As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must
1976, when she made a placement of P500,000.00 as principal amount, which was supposed to earn an allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather
interest of 16% p.a. and for which PN No. 20773 was issued. Respondent did not yet claim the proceeds than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty
of her placement and, instead, rolled-over or re-invested the principal and proceeds several times in the that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
succeeding years for which new PNs were issued by petitioner Citibank to replace the ones which
matured. Petitioner Citibank accounted for respondent's original placement and the subsequent roll- When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of
overs thereof, as follows - proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such defense to
the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going
Date Cancels Maturity Amount forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - shifts to the creditor, who is
PN No.
(mm/dd/yyyy) PN No. Date (mm/dd/yyyy) (P) Interest (p.a.) then under the duty of producing some evidence of non-payment.[34]
12/06/1976 20773 None 01/13/1977 500,000.00 16% Reviewing the evidence on record, this Court finds that petitioner Citibank failed to satisfactorily prove
01/14/1977 21686 20773 02/08/1977 508,444.44 15% that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 had already been paid, and that the amount so paid was actually used to
22526 21686 03/16/1977 313,952.59 15-3/4% open one of respondent's TD accounts with petitioner Citibank.
02/09/1977
22528 21686 03/16/1977 200,000.00 15-3/4%
23356 22526 04/20/1977 318,897.34 14-1/2% Petitioner Citibank presented the testimonies of two witnesses to support its contention of payment: (1)
03/17/1977
23357 22528 04/20/1977 203,150.00 14-1/2% That of Mr. Herminio Pujeda,[35] the officer-in-charge of loans and placements at the time when the
Petitioner Citibank alleged that it had already paid to respondent the principal amounts and proceeds of questioned transactions took place; and (2) that of Mr. Francisco Tan, [36] the former Assistant Vice-
PNs No. 23356 and 23357, upon their maturity. Petitioner Citibank further averred that respondent used President of Citibank, who directly dealt with respondent with regard to her deposits and loans.
the P500,000.00 from the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, plus P600,000.00 sourced from her
other funds, to open two time deposit (TD) accounts with petitioner Citibank, namely, TD Accounts No. The relevant portion[37] of Mr. Pujeda's testimony as to PNs No. 23356 and 23357 (referred to therein as
17783 and 17784. Exhibits No. "47" and "48," respectively) is reproduced below -

Petitioner Citibank did not deny the existence nor questioned the authenticity of PNs No. 23356 and Atty. Mabasa:
23357 it issued in favor of respondent for her money market placements. In fact, it admitted the Okey [sic]. Now Mr. Witness, you were asked to testify in this case and this case is [sic]
genuineness and due execution of the said PNs, but qualified that they were no longer outstanding. [31] consist [sic] of several documents involving transactions between the plaintiff and the
In Hibberd v. Rohde and McMillian,[32] this Court delineated the consequences of such an admission - defendant. Now, were you able to make your own memorandum regarding all these
transactions?
By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an instrument, as provided in this section, is Yes, based on my recollection of these facts, I did come up of [sic] the outline of the
A
meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for chronological sequence of events.
him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the Court:
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites Are you trying to say that you have personal knowledge or participation to these transactions?
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by Yes, your Honor, I was the officer-in charge of the unit that was processing these transactions.
A
him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery (Puritan Mfg. Co. vs. Toti & Gradi, 14 N. Some of the documents bear my signature.
M., 425; Cox vs. Northwestern Stage Co., 1 Idaho, 376; Woollen vs. Whitacre, 73 Ind., 198; Court:
Smith vs. Ehnert, 47 Wis., 479; Faelnar vs. Escaño, 11 Phil. Rep., 92); or that it was unauthorized, as in And this resume or summary that you have prepared is based on purely your recollection or
the case of an agent signing for his principal, or one signing in behalf of a partnership (Country documents?
Bank vs. Greenberg, 127 Cal., 26; Henshaw vs. Root, 60 Inc., 220; Naftzker vs. Lantz, 137 Mich., 441) A Based on documents, your Honor.
or of a corporation (Merchant vs. International Banking Corporation, 6 Phil Rep., 314; Court:
Wanita vs. Rollins, 75 Miss., 253; Barnes vs. Spencer & Barnes Co., 162 Mich., 509); or that, in the case Are these documents still available now?
of the latter, that the corporation was authorized under its charter to sign the instrument A Yes, your honor.
(Merchant vs. International Banking Corporation, supra); or that the party charged signed the instrument Court:
in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out (Payne vs. National Bank, 16 Kan., Better present the documents.
147); or that it was never delivered (Hunt vs. Weir, 29 Ill., 83; Elbring vs. Mullen, 4 Idaho, 199; Atty. Mabasa:
Thorp vs. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N.Y., 253; Fire Association of Philadelphia vs. Ruby, 60 Neb., 216) are Yes, your Honor, that is why your Honor.
cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution. Atty. Mabasa:
Now, basing on the notes that you prepared, Mr. Witness, and according to you basing also on
The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory note a prima facie case is made for your personal recollection about all the transactions involved between Modesta Sabeniano
Q
the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on and defendant City Bank [sic] in this case. Now, would you tell us what happened to the
the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant money market placements of Modesta Sabeniano that you have earlier identified in Exhs.
 "47" and "48"?
A The transactions which I said earlier were terminated and booked to time deposits.
Q And you are saying time deposits with what bank?
A With First National Citibank.
Q Is it the same bank as Citibank, N.A.?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how much was the amount booked as time deposit with defendant Citibank?
A In the amount of P500,000.00.
And outside this P500,000.00 which you said was booked out of the proceeds of Exhs. "47"
Q
and "48", were there other time deposits opened by Mrs. Modesta Sabeniano at that time.
A Yes, she also opened another time deposit for P600,000.00.
So all in all Mr. Witness, sometime in April of 1978 Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano [sic] had time
Q deposit placements with Citibank in the amount of P500,000.00 which is the proceeds of Exh.
"47" and "48" and another P600,000.00, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
And would you know where did the other P600,000 placed by Mrs. Sabeneano [sic] in a time
Q
deposit with Citibank, N.A. came [sic] from?
A She funded it directly.
What are you saying Mr. Witness is that the P600,000 is a [sic] fresh money coming from
Q
Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano [sic]?
A That is right.
In his deposition in Hong Kong, Mr. Tan recounted what happened to PNs No. 23356 and 23357
(referred to therein as Exhibits "E" and "F," respectively), as follows -
Now from the Exhibits that you have identified Mr. Tan from Exhibits "A" to "F", which
Atty. Mabasa : are Exhibits of the plaintiff. Now, do I understand from you that the original amount is
Five Hundred Thousand and thereafter renewed in the succeeding exhibits?
Mr. Tan : Yes, Sir.
Atty. Mabasa : Alright, after these Exhibits "E" and "F" matured, what happened thereafter?
Mr. Tan : Split into two time deposits.
Atty. Mabasa : Exhibits "E" and "F"?
Before anything else, it should be noted that when Mr. Pujeda's testimony before the RTC was made on
12 March 1990 and Mr. Tan's deposition in Hong Kong was conducted on 3 September 1990, more than
a decade had passed from the time the transactions they were testifying on took place. This Court had
previously recognized the frailty and unreliability of human memory with regards to figures after the
lapse of five years.[38] Taking into consideration the substantial length of time between the transactions
and the witnesses' testimonies, as well as the undeniable fact that bank officers deal with multiple clients
and process numerous transactions during their tenure, this Court is reluctant to give much weight to the
testimonies of Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan regarding the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and the use
by respondent of the proceeds thereof for opening TD accounts. This Court finds it implausible that
they should remember, after all these years, this particular transaction with respondent involving her
PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and TD accounts. Both witnesses did not give any reason as to why, from
among all the clients they had dealt with and all the transactions they had processed as officers of
petitioner Citibank, they specially remembered respondent and her PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Their
testimonies likewise lacked details on the circumstances surrounding the payment of the two PNs and
the opening of the time deposit accounts by respondent, such as the date of payment of the two PNs,
mode of payment, and the manner and context by which respondent relayed her instructions to the
officers of petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of her two PNs in opening the TD accounts.
Moreover, while there are documentary evidences to support and trace respondent's money market
placements with petitioner Citibank, from the original PN No. 20773, rolled-over several times to,
finally, PNs No. 23356 and 23357, there is an evident absence of any documentary evidence on the
payment of these last two PNs and the use of the proceeds thereof by respondent for opening TD
accounts. The paper trail seems to have ended with the copies of PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Although
both Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan said that they based their testimonies, not just on their memories but also
on the documents on file, the supposed documents on which they based those portions of their testimony
on the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and the opening of the TD accounts from the proceeds
thereof, were never presented before the courts nor made part of the records of the case.
Respondent's money market placements were of substantial amounts - consisting of the principal
amount of P500,000.00, plus the interest it should have earned during the years of placement - and it is
difficult for this Court to believe that petitioner Citibank would not have had documented the payment
thereof.
When Mr. Pujeda testified before the RTC on 6 February 1990,[39] petitioners' counsel attempted to
present in evidence a document that would supposedly support the claim of petitioner Citibank that the
proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 were used by respondent to open one of her two TD accounts in
the amount of P500,000.00. Respondent's counsel objected to the presentation of the document since it
was a mere "xerox" copy, and was blurred and hardly readable. Petitioners' counsel then asked for a
continuance of the hearing so that they can have time to produce a better document, which was granted
by the court. However, during the next hearing and continuance of Mr. Pujeda's testimony on 12 March
1990, petitioners' counsel no longer referred to the said document.
As respondent had established a prima facie case that petitioner Citibank is obligated to her for the
amounts stated in PNs No. 23356 and 23357, and as petitioner Citibank failed to present sufficient proof
of payment of the said PNs and the use by the respondent of the proceeds thereof to open her TD
accounts, this Court finds that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are still outstanding and petitioner
Citibank is still liable to respondent for the amounts stated therein.
The significance of this Court's declaration that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are still outstanding becomes
apparent in the light of petitioners' next contentions - that respondent used the proceeds of PNs No.
23356 and 23357, together with additional money, to open TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784 with
petitioner Citibank; and, subsequently, respondent pre-terminated these TD accounts and transferred the
proceeds thereof, amounting to P1,100,000.00, to petitioner FNCB Finance for money market
placements. While respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance may be traced
back with definiteness to TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, there is only flimsy and unsubstantiated
connection between the said TD accounts and the supposed proceeds paid from PNs No. 23356 and
23357. With PNs No. 23356 and 23357 still unpaid, then they represent an obligation of petitioner
Citibank separate and distinct from the obligation of petitioner FNCB Finance arising from respondent's
money market placements with the latter.
Money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance
According to petitioners, respondent's TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, in the total amount of
P1,100,000.00, were supposed to mature on 15 March 1978. However, respondent, through a letter dated
28 April 1977,[40] pre-terminated the said TD accounts and transferred all the proceeds thereof to
petitioner FNCB Finance for money market placement. Pursuant to her instructions, TD Accounts No.
17783 and 17784 were pre-terminated and petitioner Citibank (then still named First National City
Bank) issued Manager's Checks (MC) No. 199253[41] and 199251[42] for the amounts of P500,000.00 and
P600,00.00, respectively. Both MCs were payable to Citifinance (which, according to Mr.
Pujeda,[43] was one with and the same as petitioner FNCB Finance), with the additional notation that
"A/C MODESTA R. SABENIANO." Typewritten on MC No. 199253 is the phrase "Ref. Proceeds of
TD 17783," and on MC No. 199251 is a similar phrase, "Ref. Proceeds of TD 17784." These phrases
purportedly established that the MCs were paid from the proceeds of respondent's pre-terminated TD
accounts with petitioner Citibank. Upon receipt of the MCs, petitioner FNCB Finance deposited the
same to its account with Feati Bank and Trust Co., as evidenced by the rubber stamp mark of the latter
found at the back of both MCs. In exchange, petitioner FNCB Finance booked the amounts received as
money market placements, and accordingly issued PNs No. 4952 and 4962, for the amounts of
P500,000.00 and P600,000.00, respectively, payable to respondent's savings account with petitioner
Citibank, S/A No. 25-13703-4, upon their maturity on 1 June 1977. Once again, respondent rolled-over
several times the principal amounts of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, as
follows -
Maturity
Date PN No. Cancels Date Amount Interest
(mm/dd/yyyy) PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (P) (p.a.)
4952 None 06/01/1977 500,000.00 17%
04/29/1977
4962 None 06/01/1977 600,000.00 17%
 5757 4952 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17% made to several of her accounts with petitioner Citibank, particularly, Accounts No. 00484202, 59091,
06/02/1977
5758 4962 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17% and 472-751, which would have amounted to a total of P3,812,712.32, had there been no withdrawals or
8167 5757 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14% debits from the said accounts from the time the said deposits were made.
08/31/1977
8169 5752 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14%
As presented by the petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent rolled-over only the principal amounts of her Although the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not make any definitive findings as to the status of
money market placements as she chose to receive the interest income therefrom. Petitioner FNCB respondent's savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank, the Decisions of both the trial and
Finance also pointed out that when PN No. 4962, with principal amount of P600,000.00, matured on 1 appellate courts effectively recognized only the P31,079.14 coming from respondent's savings account
June 1977, respondent received a partial payment of the principal which, together with the interest, which was used to off-set her alleged outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank.[50]
amounted to P102,633.33;[44] thus, only the amount of P500,000.00 from PN No. 4962 was rolled-over
to PN No. 5758. Since both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had consistently recognized only the P31,079.14 of
respondent's savings account with petitioner Citibank, and that respondent failed to move for
Based on the foregoing records, the principal amounts of PNs No. 5757 and 5758, upon their maturity, reconsideration or to appeal this particular finding of fact by the trial and appellate courts, it is already
were rolled over to PNs No. 8167 and 8169, respectively. PN No. 8167[45] expressly canceled and binding upon this Court. Respondent is already precluded from claiming any greater amount in her
superseded PN No. 5757, while PN No. 8169[46] also explicitly canceled and superseded PN No. 5758. savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank. Thus, this Court shall limit itself to determining
Thus, it is patently erroneous for the Court of Appeals to still award to respondent the principal amounts whether or not respondent is entitled to the return of the amount of P31,079.14 should the off-set thereof
and interests covered by PNs No. 5757 and 5758 when these were already canceled and superseded. It by petitioner Citibank against her supposed loans be found invalid.
is now incumbent upon this Court to determine what subsequently happened to PNs No. 8167 and 8169.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
Petitioner FNCB Finance presented four checks as proof of payment of the principal amounts and
interests of PNs No. 8167 and 8169 upon their maturity. All the checks were payable to respondent's Respondent made an effort of preparing and presenting before the RTC her own computations of her
savings account with petitioner Citibank, with the following details - money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva, purportedly amounting to a total
of United States (US) $343,220.98, as of 23 June 1985.[51] In her Memorandum filed with the RTC, she
Date of claimed a much bigger amount of deposits and money market placements with Citibank-Geneva,
Amount
Issuance Check Notation totaling US$1,336,638.65.[52] However, respondent herself also submitted as part of her formal offer of
(P)
(mm/dd/yyyy) No. evidence the computation of her money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva as
09/01/1978 determined by the latter.[53] Citibank-Geneva accounted for respondent's money market placements and
76962 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08167
dollar accounts as follows -
09/01/1978
76961 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08169
MODESTA SABENIANO &/OR
Full payment of principal on PN#08167 which is hereby ==================
09/05/1978 77035 500,000.00
cancelled
Full payment of principal on PN#08169 which is hereby US$ 30'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement
09/05/ 1978 77034 500,000.00
cancelled + US$ 339.06 Interest at 3,875% p.a. from 12.07. - 25.10.79
Then again, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were later returned to petitioner FNCB Finance together with - US$ 95.-- Commission (minimum)
a memo,[47] dated 6 September 1978, from Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, to a Mr. Bobby Mendoza of
petitioner FNCB Finance. According to the memo, the two checks, in the total amount of US$ 30'244.06 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
P1,000,000.00, were to be returned to respondent's account with instructions to book the said amount in
money market placements for one more year. Pursuant to the said memo, Checks No. 77035 and 77034
were invested by petitioner FNCB Finance, on behalf of respondent, in money market placements for US$ 114'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement
which it issued PNs No. 20138 and 20139. The PNs each covered P500,000.00, to earn 11% interest per + US$ 1'358.50 Interest at 4,125% p.a. from 12.07. - 25.10.79
annum, and to mature on 3 September 1979. - US$ 41.17 Commission

On 3 September 1979, petitioner FNCB Finance issued Check No. 100168, pay to the order of "Citibank US$ 115'317.33 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
N.A. A/C Modesta Sabeniano," in the amount of P1,022,916.66, as full payment of the principal
amounts and interests of both PNs No. 20138 and 20139 and, resultantly, canceling the said PNs.[48]
Respondent actually admitted the issuance and existence of Check No. 100168, but with the US$ 145'561.39 Total proceeds of both placements on 25.10.1979
qualification that the proceeds thereof were turned over to petitioner Citibank. [49] Respondent did not + US$ 11'381.31 total of both current accounts
clarify the circumstances attending the supposed turn over, but on the basis of the allegations of
petitioner Citibank itself, the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139, amounting to P1,022,916.66, was US$ 156'942.70 Total funds available
used by it to liquidate respondent's outstanding loans. Therefore, the determination of whether or not
respondent is still entitled to the return of the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 shall be dependent
on the resolution of the issues raised as to the existence of the loans and the authority of petitioner - US$ 149'632.99 Transfer to Citibank Manila on 26.10.1979
Citibank to use the proceeds of the said PNs, together with respondent's other deposits and money (counter value of Pesos 1'102'944.78)
market placements, to pay for the same. US$ 7'309.71 Balance in current accounts
Transfer to Citibank Zuerich - ac no. 121359 on March 13,
- US$ 6'998.84
Savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank 1980

Respondent presented and submitted before the RTC deposit slips and bank statements to prove deposits US$ 310.87 various charges including closing charges
According to the foregoing computation, by 25 October 1979, respondent had a total of US$156,942.70, 2 7
from which, US$149,632.99 was transferred by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Citibank in Manila, and 3440 22820
12/26/1978 02/23/1979 300,000.00 12/26/1978
was used by the latter to off-set respondent's outstanding loans. The balance of respondent's accounts 2 3
with Citibank-Geneva, after the remittance to petitioner Citibank in Manila, amounted to US$7,309.71, 3453 22827
01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00 01/09/1979
which was subsequently expended by a transfer to another account with Citibank-Zuerich, in the amount 4 0
of US$6,998.84, and by payment of various bank charges, including closing charges, in the amount of 3460 22835
01/17/1979 03/19/1979 150,000.00 01/17/1979
US$310.87. Rightly so, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave more credence to the computation 9 7
of Citibank-Geneva as to the status of respondent's accounts with the said bank, rather than the one 3474 22840
01/30/1979 03/30/1979 220,000.00 01/30/1979
prepared by respondent herself, which was evidently self-serving. Once again, this Court shall limit 0 0
itself to determining whether or not respondent is entitled to the return of the amount of US$149,632.99 Total P 1,920,000.00
should the off-set thereof by petitioner Citibank against her alleged outstanding loans be found invalid.
Respondent cannot claim any greater amount since she did not perfect an appeal of the Decision of the When respondent was unable to pay the first set of PNs upon their maturity, these were rolled-over or
Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, which found that she is entitled only to the return of the said renewed several times, necessitating the execution by respondent of new PNs in favor of petitioner
amount, as far as her accounts with Citibank-Geneva is concerned. Citibank. As of 5 April 1979, respondent had the following outstanding PNs (second set),[56] the
principal amount of which remained at P1,920,000.00 -

III Date of Issuance Date of Maturity

PN No. Principal Amount
(mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy)
Petitioner Citibank was able to 34510 01/01/1979 03/02/1979 P 400,000.00
establish by preponderance of 34509 01/02/1979 03/02/1979 100,000.00
evidence the existence of 34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00
respondent's loans. 34612 01/19/1979 03/16/1979 150,000.00
34741 01/26/1979 03/12/1979 100,000.00
Petitioners' version of events 35689 02/23/1979 05/29/1979 300,000.00
35694 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 150,000.00
In sum, the following amounts were used by petitioner Citibank to liquidate respondent's purported 35695 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 100,000.00
outstanding loans - 356946 03/20/1979 05/29/1979 250,000.00
35697 03/30/1979 05/29/1979 220,000.00
Description Amount Total
Principal and interests of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 P1,920,000.00
(money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance) P 1,022,916.66
Savings account with petitioner Citibank 31,079.14 All the PNs stated that the purpose of the loans covered thereby is "To liquidate existing obligation,"
Dollar remittance from Citibank-Geneva (peso equivalent except for PN No. 34534, which stated for its purpose "personal investment."
Of US$149,632.99) 1,102,944.78
Total P 2,156,940.58 Respondent secured her foregoing loans with petitioner Citibank by executing Deeds of Assignment of
According to petitioner Citibank, respondent incurred her loans under the circumstances narrated below. her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. On 2 March 1978, respondent executed in
favor of petitioner Citibank a Deed of Assignment[57] of PN No. 8169, which was issued by petitioner
As early as 9 February 1978, respondent obtained her first loan from petitioner Citibank in the principal FNCB Finance, to secure payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her by petitioner
amount of P200,000.00, for which she executed PN No. 31504.[54] Petitioner Citibank extended to her Citibank, in the aggregate principal amount of P500,000.00. On 9 March 1978, respondent executed in
several other loans in the succeeding months. Some of these loans were paid, while others were rolled- favor of petitioner Citibank another Deed of Assignment,[58] this time, of PN No. 8167, also issued by
over or renewed. Significant to the Petition at bar are the loans which respondent obtained from July petitioner FNCB Finance, to secure payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her by
1978 to January 1979, appropriately covered by PNs (first set).[55] The aggregate principal amount of petitioner Citibank, in the aggregate amount of P500,000.00. When PNs No. 8167 and 8169,
these loans was P1,920,000.00, which could be broken down as follows - representing respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, matured and were
rolled-over to PNs No. 20138 and 20139, respondent executed new Deeds of Assignment, [59] in favor of
Date of Date of Date of petitioner Citibank, on 25 August 1978. According to the more recent Deeds, respondent assigned PNs
PN Principal Amoun MC
Issuance (mm/dd/yyyy Maturity (mm/dd/yyyy Release (mm/dd/yyyy No. 20138 and 20139, representing her rolled-over money market placements with petitioner FNCB
No. t No.
) ) ) Finance, to petitioner Citibank as security for the banking and credit facilities it extended to her, in the
3293 22070 aggregate principal amount of P500,000.00 per Deed.
07/20/1978 09/18/1978 P 400,000.00 07/20/1978
5 1
3375 In addition to the Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance,
10/13/1978 12/12/1978 100,000.00 Unrecovered
1 respondent also executed a Declaration of Pledge,[60] in which she supposedly pledged "[a]ll present and
3379 22628 future fiduciary placements held in my personal and/or joint name with Citibank, Switzerland," to
10/19/1978 11/03/1978 100,000.00 10/19/1978
8 5 secure all claims the petitioner Citibank may have or, in the future, acquire against respondent. The
3402 22643 petitioners' copy of the Declaration of Pledge is undated, while that of the respondent, a copy certified
11/15/1978 01/15/1979 150,000.00 11/16/1978
5 9 by a Citibank-Geneva officer, bore the date 24 September 1979.[61]
3407 22646
11/21/1978 01/19/1979 250,000.00 11/21/1978
9 7 When respondent failed to pay the second set of PNs upon their maturity, an exchange of letters ensued
3419 12/04/1978 01/18/1979 100,000.00 12/05/1978 22805 between respondent and/or her representatives, on one hand, and the representatives of petitioners, on
the other.
The first letter[62] was dated 5 April 1979, addressed to respondent and signed by Mr. Tan, as the
manager of petitioner Citibank, which stated, in part, that -
Despite our repeated requests and follow-up, we regret you have not granted us with any response or
payment.
We, therefore, have no alternative but to call your loan of P1,920,000.00 plus interests and other charges
due and demandable. If you still fail to settle this obligation by 4/27/79, we shall have no other
alternative but to refer your account to our lawyers for legal action to protect the interest of the bank.
Respondent sent a reply letter[63] dated 26 April 1979, printed on paper bearing the letterhead of
respondent's company, MC Adore International Palace, the body of which reads -
This is in reply to your letter dated April 5, 1979 inviting my attention to my loan which has become
due. Pursuant to our representation with you over the telephone through Mr. F. A. Tan, you allow us to
pay the interests due for the meantime.
Please accept our Comtrust Check in the amount of P62,683.33.
Please bear with us for a little while, at most ninety days. As you know, we have a pending loan with
the Development Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P11-M. This loan has already been
recommended for approval and would be submitted to the Board of Governors. In fact, to further
facilitate the early release of this loan, we have presented and furnished Gov. J. Tengco a xerox copy of
your letter.
You will be doing our corporation a very viable service, should you grant us our request for a little more
time.
A week later or on 3 May 1979, a certain C. N. Pugeda, designated as "Executive Secretary," sent a
letter[64] to petitioner Citibank, on behalf of respondent. The letter was again printed on paper bearing
the letterhead of MC Adore International Palace. The pertinent paragraphs of the said letter are
reproduced below -
Per instructions of Mrs. Modesta R. Sabeniano, we would like to request for a re-computation of the
interest and penalty charges on her loan in the aggregate amount of P1,920,000.00 with maturity date of
all promissory notes at June 30, 1979. As she has personally discussed with you yesterday, this date will
more or less assure you of early settlement.
In this regard, please entrust to bearer, our Comtrust check for P62,683.33 to be replaced by another
check with amount resulting from the new computation. Also, to facilitate the processing of the same,
may we request for another set of promissory notes for the signature of Mrs. Sabeniano and to cancel the
previous ones she has signed and forwarded to you.
This was followed by a telegram,[65] dated 5 June 1979, and received by petitioner Citibank the
following day. The telegram was sent by a Dewey G. Soriano, Legal Counsel. The telegram
acknowledged receipt of the telegram sent by petitioner Citibank regarding the "re-past due obligation"
of McAdore International Palace. However, it reported that respondent, the President and Chairman of
MC Adore International Palace, was presently abroad negotiating for a big loan. Thus, he was
requesting for an extension of the due date of the obligation until respondent's arrival on or before 31
July 1979.
The next letter,[66] dated 21 June 1979, was signed by respondent herself and addressed to Mr. Bobby
Mendoza, a Manager of petitioner FNCB Finance. Respondent wrote therein -
Re: PN No. 20138 for P500,000.00 & PN No.
20139 for P500,000.00 totalling P1 Million,
both PNs will mature on 9/3/1979.
This is to authorize you to release the accrued quarterly interests payment from my captioned
placements and forward directly to Citibank, Manila Attention: Mr. F. A. Tan, Manager, to apply to my
interest payable on my outstanding loan with Citibank.
Please note that the captioned two placements are continuously pledged/hypothecated to Citibank,
Manila to support my personal outstanding loan. Therefore, please do not release the captioned
placements upon maturity until you have received the instruction from Citibank, Manila.
On even date, respondent sent another letter[67] to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, stating that -
Re: S/A No. 25-225928
and C/A No. 484-946
This letter serves as an authority to debit whatever the outstanding balance from my captioned accounts
and credit the amount to my loan outstanding account with you.
Unlike respondent's earlier letters, both letters, dated 21 June 1979, are printed on plain paper, without
the letterhead of her company, MC Adore International Palace.
By 5 September 1979, respondent's outstanding and past due obligations to petitioner Citibank totaled
P2,123,843.20, representing the principal amounts plus interests. Relying on respondent's Deeds of
Assignment, petitioner Citibank applied the proceeds of respondent's money market placements with
petitioner FNCB Finance, as well as her deposit account with petitioner Citibank, to partly liquidate
respondent's outstanding loan balance,[68] as follows -
Respondent's outstanding obligation (principal and interest) P 2,123,843.20
Less: Proceeds from respondent's money market placements
with petitioner FNCB Finance (principal and interest) (1,022,916.66)
Deposits in respondent's bank accounts with petitioner
Citibank (31,079.14)
Balance of respondent's obligation P 1,069,847.40
Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank subsequently sent a letter,[69] dated 28 September 1979, notifying
respondent of the status of her loans and the foregoing compensation which petitioner Citibank
effected. In the letter, Mr. Tan informed respondent that she still had a remaining past-due obligation in
the amount of P1,069,847.40, as of 5 September 1979, and should respondent fail to pay the amount by
15 October 1979, then petitioner Citibank shall proceed to off-set the unpaid amount with respondent's
other collateral, particularly, a money market placement in Citibank-Hongkong.
On 5 October 1979, respondent wrote Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, on paper bearing the letterhead of
MC Adore International Palace, as regards the P1,920,000.00 loan account supposedly of MC Adore
Finance & Investment, Inc., and requested for a statement of account covering the principal and interest
of the loan as of 31 October 1979. She stated therein that the loan obligation shall be paid within 60
days from receipt of the statement of account.
Almost three weeks later, or on 25 October 1979, a certain Atty. Moises Tolentino dropped by the office
of petitioner Citibank, with a letter, dated 9 October 1979, and printed on paper with the letterhead of
MC Adore International Palace, which authorized the bearer thereof to represent the respondent in
settling the overdue account, this time, purportedly, of MC Adore International Palace Hotel. The letter
was signed by respondent as the President and Chairman of the Board.
Eventually, Atty. Antonio Agcaoili of Agcaoili & Associates, as counsel of petitioner Citibank, sent a
letter to respondent, dated 31 October 1979, informing her that petitioner Citibank had effected an off-
set using her account with Citibank-Geneva, in the amount of US$149,632.99, against her "outstanding,
overdue, demandable and unpaid obligation" to petitioner Citibank. Atty. Agcaoili claimed therein that
the compensation or off-set was made pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Articles
1278 through 1290 of the Civil Code. He further declared that respondent's obligation to petitioner
Citibank was now fully paid and liquidated.
Unfortunately, on 7 October 1987, a fire gutted the 7th floor of petitioner Citibank's building at Paseo de
Roxas St., Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioners submitted a Certification[70] to this effect, dated 17
January 1991, issued by the Chief of the Arson Investigation Section, Fire District III, Makati Fire
Station, Metropolitan Police Force. The 7th floor of petitioner Citibank's building housed its Control
Division, which was in charge of keeping the necessary documents for cases in which it was involved.
After compiling the documentary evidence for the present case, Atty. Renato J. Fernandez, internal legal
counsel of petitioner Citibank, forwarded them to the Control Division. The original copies of the MCs,
which supposedly represent the proceeds of the first set of PNs, as well as that of other documentary
evidence related to the case, were among those burned in the said fire. [71]
Respondent's version of events
Respondent disputed petitioners' narration of the circumstances surrounding her loans with petitioner
Citibank and the alleged authority she gave for the off-set or compensation of her money market
placements and deposit accounts with petitioners against her loan obligation.
Respondent denied outright executing the first set of PNs, except for one (PN No. 34534 in particular).
Although she admitted that she obtained several loans from petitioner Citibank, these only amounted to
P1,150,000.00, and she had already paid them. She secured from petitioner Citibank two loans of
P500,000.00 each. She executed in favor of petitioner Citibank the corresponding PNs for the loans and
the Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance as security. [72]
To prove payment of these loans, respondent presented two provisional receipts of petitioner Citibank -
No. 19471,[73] dated 11 August 1978, and No. 12723,[74] dated 10 November 1978 - both signed by Mr.
Tan, and acknowledging receipt from respondent of several checks in the total amount of P500,744.00
and P500,000.00, respectively, for "liquidation of loan."
She borrowed another P150,000.00 from petitioner Citibank for personal investment, and for which she
executed PN No. 34534, on 9 January 1979. Thus, she admitted to receiving the proceeds of this loan
via MC No. 228270. She invested the loan amount in another money market placement with petitioner
FNCB Finance. In turn, she used the very same money market placement with petitioner FNCB Finance
as security for her P150,000.00 loan from petitioner Citibank. When she failed to pay the loan when it
became due, petitioner Citibank allegedly forfeited her money market placement with petitioner FNCB
Finance and, thus, the loan was already paid.[75]
Respondent likewise questioned the MCs presented by petitioners, except for one (MC No. 228270 in
particular), as proof that she received the proceeds of the loans covered by the first set of PNs. As
recounted in the preceding paragraph, respondent admitted to obtaining a loan of P150,000.00, covered
by PN No. 34534, and receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds thereof, but claimed that she
already paid the same. She denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701 (for the loan of P400,000.00, covered
by PN No. 33935) and No. 226467 (for the loan of P250,000.00, covered by PN No. 34079), and
pointed out that the checks did not bear her indorsements. She did not deny receiving all other checks
but she interposed that she received these checks, not as proceeds of loans, but as payment of the
principal amounts and/or interests from her money market placements with petitioner Citibank. She also
raised doubts as to the notation on each of the checks that reads "RE: Proceeds of PN#[corresponding
PN No.]," saying that such notation did not appear on the MCs when she originally received them and
that the notation appears to have been written by a typewriter different from that used in writing all other
information on the checks (i.e., date, payee, and amount).[76] She even testified that MCs were not
supposed to bear notations indicating the purpose for which they were issued.
As to the second set of PNs, respondent acknowledged having signed them all. However, she asserted
that she only executed these PNs as part of the simulated loans she and Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
concocted. Respondent explained that she had a pending loan application for a big amount with the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and when Mr. Tan found out about this, he suggested that
they could make it appear that the respondent had outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank and the
latter was already demanding payment thereof; this might persuade DBP to approve respondent's loan
application. Mr. Tan made the respondent sign the second set of PNs, so that he may have something to
show the DBP investigator who might inquire with petitioner Citibank as to respondent's loans with the
latter. On her own copies of the said PNs, respondent wrote by hand the notation, "This isa (sic)
simulated non-negotiable note, signed copy given to Mr. Tan., (sic) per agreement to be shown to DBP
representative. itwill (sic) be returned to me if the P11=M (sic) loan for MC Adore Palace Hotel is
approved by DBP."[77]
Findings of this Court as to the existence of the loans
After going through the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by both sides to this case, it is
this Court's assessment that respondent did indeed have outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank at the
time it effected the off-set or compensation on 25 July 1979 (using respondent's savings deposit with
petitioner Citibank), 5 September 1979 (using the proceeds of respondent's money market placements
with petitioner FNCB Finance) and 26 October 1979 (using respondent's dollar accounts remitted from
Citibank-Geneva). The totality of petitioners' evidence as to the existence of the said loans
preponderates over respondent's. Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced
by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.[78]
Respondent's outstanding obligation for P1,920,000.00 had been sufficiently documented by petitioner
Citibank.
The second set of PNs is a mere renewal of the prior loans originally covered by the first set of PNs,
except for PN No. 34534. The first set of PNs is supported, in turn, by the existence of the MCs that
represent the proceeds thereof received by the respondent.
It bears to emphasize that the proceeds of the loans were paid to respondent in MCs, with the respondent
specifically named as payee. MCs checks are drawn by the bank's manager upon the bank itself and
regarded to be as good as the money it represents.[79] Moreover, the MCs were crossed checks, with the
words "Payee's Account Only."
In general, a crossed check cannot be presented to the drawee bank for payment in cash. Instead, the
check can only be deposited with the payee's bank which, in turn, must present it for payment against
the drawee bank in the course of normal banking hours. The crossed check cannot be presented for
payment, but it can only be deposited and the drawee bank may only pay to another bank in the payee's
or indorser's account.[80] The effect of crossing a check was described by this Court in Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals[81] -
[T]he crossing of a check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only" is a warning that the check should be
deposited in the account of the payee. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCI Bank to ascertain
that the check be deposited in payee's account only. It is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its
depositors before it can make the clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of
indorsement guaranteed."
The crossed MCs presented by petitioner Bank were indeed deposited in several different bank accounts
and cleared by the Clearing Office of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as evidenced by the stamp
marks and notations on the said checks. The crossed MCs are already in the possession of petitioner
Citibank, the drawee bank, which was ultimately responsible for the payment of the amount stated in the
checks. Given that a check is more than just an instrument of credit used in commercial transactions for
it also serves as a receipt or evidence for the drawee bank of the cancellation of the said check due to
payment,[82] then, the possession by petitioner Citibank of the said MCs, duly stamped "Paid" gives rise
to the presumption that the said MCs were already paid out to the intended payee, who was in this case,
the respondent.
This Court finds applicable herein the presumptions that private transactions have been fair and
regular,[83] and that the ordinary course of business has been followed. [84] There is no question that the
loan transaction between petitioner Citibank and the respondent is a private transaction. The
transactions revolving around the crossed MCs - from their issuance by petitioner Citibank to
respondent as payment of the proceeds of her loans; to its deposit in respondent's accounts with several
different banks; to the clearing of the MCs by an independent clearing house; and finally, to the payment
of the MCs by petitioner Citibank as the drawee bank of the said checks - are all private transactions
which shall be presumed to have been fair and regular to all the parties concerned. In addition, the
banks involved in the foregoing transactions are also presumed to have followed the ordinary course of
business in the acceptance of the crossed MCs for deposit in respondent's accounts, submitting them for
clearing, and their eventual payment and cancellation.
The afore-stated presumptions are disputable, meaning, they are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.[85] Respondent, however, was unable to present
sufficient and credible evidence to dispute these presumptions.
It should be recalled that out of the nine MCs presented by petitioner Citibank, respondent admitted to
receiving one as proceeds of a loan (MC No. 228270), denied receiving two (MCs No. 220701 and
226467), and admitted to receiving all the rest, but not as proceeds of her loans, but as return on the
principal amounts and interests from her money market placements.
Respondent admitted receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds of her loan covered by PN
No. 34534. Although the principal amount of the loan is P150,000.00, respondent only received
P146,312.50, because the interest and handling fee on the loan transaction were already deducted
therefrom.[86] Stamps and notations at the back of MC No. 228270 reveal that it was deposited at the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Cubao Branch, in Account No. 0123-0572-28.[87] The check also
bore the signature of respondent at the back.[88] And, although respondent would later admit that she did
sign PN No. 34534 and received MC No. 228270 as proceeds of the loan extended to her by petitioner
Citibank, she contradicted herself when, in an earlier testimony, she claimed that PN No. 34534 was
among the PNs she executed as simulated loans with petitioner Citibank.[89]
Respondent denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701 and 226467. However, considering that the said
checks were crossed for payee's account only, and that they were actually deposited, cleared, and paid,
then the presumption would be that the said checks were properly deposited to the account of
respondent, who was clearly named the payee in the checks. Respondent's bare allegations that she did
not receive the two checks fail to convince this Court, for to sustain her, would be for this Court to
conclude that an irregularity had occurred somewhere from the time of the issuance of the said checks,
to their deposit, clearance, and payment, and which would have involved not only petitioner Citibank,
but also BPI, which accepted the checks for deposit, and the Central Bank of the Philippines, which
cleared the checks. It falls upon the respondent to overcome or dispute the presumption that the crossed
checks were issued, accepted for deposit, cleared, and paid for by the banks involved following the
ordinary course of their business.
The mere fact that MCs No. 220701 and 226467 do not bear respondent's signature at the back does not
negate deposit thereof in her account. The liability for the lack of indorsement on the MCs no longer
fall on petitioner Citibank, but on the bank who received the same for deposit, in this case, BPI Cubao
Branch. Once again, it must be noted that the MCs were crossed, for payee's account only, and the
payee named in both checks was none other than respondent. The crossing of the MCs was already a
warning to BPI to receive said checks for deposit only in respondent's account. It was up to BPI to
verify whether it was receiving the crossed MCs in accordance with the instructions on the face thereof.
If, indeed, the MCs were deposited in accounts other than respondent's, then the respondent would have
a cause of action against BPI.[90]
BPI further stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks to the effect that, "All prior endorsement
and/or Lack of endorsement guaranteed." Thus, BPI became the indorser of the MCs, and assumed all
the warranties of an indorser,[91] specifically, that the checks were genuine and in all respects what they
purported to be; that it had a good title to the checks; that all prior parties had capacity to contract; and
that the checks were, at the time of their indorsement, valid and subsisting. [92] So even if the MCs
deposited by BPI's client, whether it be by respondent herself or some other person, lacked the necessary
indorsement, BPI, as the collecting bank, is bound by its warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the
defense of lack of indorsement as against petitioner Citibank, the drawee bank. [93]
Furthermore, respondent's bare and unsubstantiated denial of receipt of the MCs in question and their
deposit in her account is rendered suspect when MC No. 220701 was actually deposited in Account No.
0123-0572-28 of BPI Cubao Branch, the very same account in which MC No. 228270 (which
respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds of her loan from petitioner Citibank), and MCs No.
228203, 228357, and 228400 (which respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds from her money
market placements) were deposited. Likewise, MC No. 226467 was deposited in Account No. 0121-
002-43 of BPI Cubao Branch, to which MCs No. 226285 and 226439 (which respondent admitted to
receiving as proceeds from her money market placements) were deposited. It is an apparent
contradiction for respondent to claim having received the proceeds of checks deposited in an account,
and then deny receiving the proceeds of another check deposited in the very same account.
Another inconsistency in respondent's denial of receipt of MC No. 226467 and her deposit of the same
in her account, is her presentation of Exhibit "HHH," a provisional receipt which was supposed to prove
that respondent turned over P500,000.00 to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, that the said amount was
split into three money market placements, and that MC No. 226467 represented the return on her
investment from one of these placements.[94] Because of her Exhibit "HHH," respondent effectively
admitted receipt of MC No. 226467, although for reasons other than as proceeds of a loan.
Neither can this Court give credence to respondent's contention that the notations on the MCs, stating
that they were the proceeds of particular PNs, were not there when she received the checks and that the
notations appeared to be written by a typewriter different from that used to write the other information
on the checks. Once more, respondent's allegations were uncorroborated by any other evidence. Her
and her counsel's observation that the notations on the MCs appear to be written by a typewriter
different from that used to write the other information on the checks hardly convinces this Court
considering that it constitutes a mere opinion on the appearance of the notation by a witness who does
not possess the necessary expertise on the matter. In addition, the notations on the MCs were written
using both capital and small letters, while the other information on the checks were written using capital
letters only, such difference could easily confuse an untrained eye and lead to a hasty conclusion that
they were written by different typewriters.
Respondent's testimony, that based on her experience transacting with banks, the MCs were not
supposed to include notations on the purpose for which the checks were issued, also deserves scant
consideration. While respondent may have extensive experience dealing with banks, it still does not
qualify her as a competent witness on banking procedures and practices. Her testimony on this matter is
even belied by the fact that the other MCs issued by petitioner Citibank (when it was still named First
National City Bank) and by petitioner FNCB Finance, the existence and validity of which were not
disputed by respondent, also bear similar notations that state the reason for which they were issued.
Respondent presented several more pieces of evidence to substantiate her claim that she received MCs
No. 226285, 226439, 226467, 226057, 228357, and 228400, not as proceeds of her loans from petitioner
Citibank, but as the return of the principal amounts and payment of interests from her money market
placements with petitioners. Part of respondent's exhibits were personal checks[95] drawn by respondent
on her account with Feati Bank & Trust Co., which she allegedly invested in separate money market
placements with both petitioners, the returns from which were paid to her via MCs No. 226285 and
228400. Yet, to this Court, the personal checks only managed to establish respondent's issuance thereof,
but there was nothing on the face of the checks that would reveal the purpose for which they were issued
and that they were actually invested in money market placements as respondent claimed.
Respondent further submitted handwritten notes that purportedly computed and presented the returns on
her money market placements, corresponding to the amount stated in the MCs she received from
petitioner Citibank. Exhibit "HHH-1"[96] was a handwritten note, which respondent attributed to Mr. Tan
of petitioner Citibank, showing the breakdown of her BPI Check for P500,000.00 into three different
money market placements with petitioner Citibank. This Court, however, noticed several factors which
render the note highly suspect. One, it was written on the reversed side of Provisional Receipt No.
12724 of petitioner Citibank which bore the initials of Mr. Tan acknowledging receipt of respondent's
BPI Check No. 120989 for P500,000.00; but the initials on the handwritten note appeared to be that of
Mr. Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance.[97] Second, according to Provisional Receipt No.
12724, BPI Check No. 120989 for P500,000.00 was supposed to be invested in three money market
placements with petitioner Citibank for the period of 60 days. Since all these money market placements
were made through one check deposited on the same day, 10 November 1978, it made no sense that the
handwritten note at the back of Provisional Receipt No. 12724 provided for different dates of maturity
for each of the money market placements (i.e., 16 November 1978, 17 January 1979, and 21 November
1978), and such dates did not correspond to the 60 day placement period stated on the face of the
provisional receipt. And third, the principal amounts of the money market placements as stated in the
handwritten note - P145,000.00, P145,000.00 and P242,000.00 - totaled P532,000.00, and was
obviously in excess of the P500,000.00 acknowledged on the face of Provisional Receipt No. 12724.

Exhibits "III" and "III-1," the front and bank pages of a handwritten note of Mr. Bobby Mendoza of
petitioner FNCB Finance,[98] also did not deserve much evidentiary weight, and this Court cannot rely on
the truth and accuracy of the computations presented therein. Mr. Mendoza was not presented as a
witness during the trial before the RTC, so that the document was not properly authenticated nor its
contents sufficiently explained. No one was able to competently identify whether the initials as
appearing on the note were actually Mr. Mendoza's.
Also, going by the information on the front page of the note, this Court observes that payment of
respondent's alleged money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance were made using
Citytrust Checks; the MCs in question, including MC No. 228057, were issued by petitioner Citibank.
Although Citytrust (formerly Feati Bank & Trust Co.), petitioner FNCB Finance, and petitioner Citibank
may be affiliates of one another, they each remained separate and distinct corporations, each having its
own financial system and records. Thus, this Court cannot simply assume that one corporation, such as
petitioner Citibank or Citytrust, can issue a check to discharge an obligation of petitioner FNCB
Finance. It should be recalled that when petitioner FNCB Finance paid for respondent's money market
placements, covered by its PNs No. 8167 and 8169, as well as PNs No. 20138 and 20139, petitioner
FNCB Finance issued its own checks.
As a last point on this matter, if respondent truly had money market placements with petitioners, then
these would have been evidenced by PNs issued by either petitioner Citibank or petitioner FNCB
Finance, acknowledging the principal amounts of the investments, and stating the applicable interest
rates, as well as the dates of their of issuance and maturity. After respondent had so meticulously
reconstructed her other money market placements with petitioners and consolidated the documentary
evidence thereon, she came surprisingly short of offering similar details and substantiation for these
particular money market placements.
Since this Court is satisfied that respondent indeed received the proceeds of the first set of PNs, then it
proceeds to analyze her evidence of payment thereof.
In support of respondent's assertion that she had already paid whatever loans she may have had with
petitioner Citibank, she presented as evidence Provisional Receipts No. 19471, dated 11 August 1978,
and No. 12723, dated 10 November 1978, both of petitioner Citibank and signed by Mr. Tan, for the
amounts of P500,744.00 and P500,000.00, respectively. While these provisional receipts did state that
Mr. Tan, on behalf of petitioner Citibank, received respondent's checks as payment for her loans, they
failed to specifically identify which loans were actually paid. Petitioner Citibank was able to present
evidence that respondent had executed several PNs in the years 1978 and 1979 to cover the loans she
secured from the said bank. Petitioner Citibank did admit that respondent was able to pay for some of
these PNs, and what it identified as the first and second sets of PNs were only those which remained
unpaid. It thus became incumbent upon respondent to prove that the checks received by Mr. Tan were
actually applied to the PNs in either the first or second set; a fact that, unfortunately, cannot be
determined from the provisional receipts submitted by respondent since they only generally stated that
the checks received by Mr. Tan were payment for respondent's loans.
Mr. Tan, in his deposition, further explained that provisional receipts were issued when payment to the
bank was made using checks, since the checks would still be subject to clearing. The purpose for the
provisional receipts was merely to acknowledge the delivery of the checks to the possession of the bank,
but not yet of payment.[99] This bank practice finds legitimacy in the pronouncement of this Court that a
check, whether an MC or an ordinary check, is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute valid
tender of payment. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [100] this Court elucidated that:
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an
instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment (Sec. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil
Code; Bryan Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco, v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60,
61). A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check
in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or
creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is
not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized
(Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).
In the case at bar, the issuance of an official receipt by petitioner Citibank would have been dependent
on whether the checks delivered by respondent were actually cleared and paid for by the drawee banks.
As for PN No. 34534, respondent asserted payment thereof at two separate instances by two different
means. In her formal offer of exhibits, respondent submitted a deposit slip of petitioner Citibank, dated
11 August 1978, evidencing the deposit of BPI Check No. 5785 for P150,000.00. [101] In her Formal
Offer of Documentary Exhibits, dated 7 July 1989, respondent stated that the purpose for the
presentation of the said deposit slip was to prove that she already paid her loan covered by PN No.
34534.[102] In her testimony before the RTC three years later, on 28 November 1991, she changed her
story. This time she narrated that the loan covered by PN No. 34534 was secured by her money market
placement with petitioner FNCB Finance, and when she failed to pay the said PN when it became due,
the security was applied to the loan, therefore, the loan was considered paid. [103] Given the foregoing,
respondent's assertion of payment of PN No. 34534 is extremely dubious.
According to petitioner Citibank, the PNs in the second set, except for PN No. 34534, were mere
renewals of the unpaid PNs in the first set, which was why the PNs stated that they were for the purpose
of liquidating existing obligations. PN No. 34534, however, which was part of the first set, was still
valid and subsisting and so it was included in the second set without need for its renewal, and it still
being the original PN for that particular loan, its stated purpose was for personal investment.[104]
Respondent essentially admitted executing the second set of PNs, but they were only meant to cover
simulated loans. Mr. Tan supposedly convinced her that her pending loan application with DBP would
have a greater chance of being approved if they made it appear that respondent urgently needed the
money because petitioner Citibank was already demanding payment for her simulated loans.
Respondent's defense of simulated loans to escape liability for the second set of PNs is truly a novel
one. It is regrettable, however, that she was unable to substantiate the same. Yet again, respondent's
version of events is totally based on her own uncorroborated testimony. The notations on the second set
of PNs, that they were non-negotiable simulated notes, were admittedly made by respondent herself and
were, thus, self-serving. Equally self-serving was respondent's letter, written on 7 October 1985, or
more than six years after the execution of the second set of PNs, in which she demanded return of the
simulated or fictitious PNs, together with the letters relating thereto, which Mr. Tan purportedly asked
her to execute. Respondent further failed to present any proof of her alleged loan application with the
DBP, and of any circumstance or correspondence wherein the simulated or fictitious PNs were indeed
used for their supposed purpose.
In contrast, petitioner Citibank, as supported by the testimonies of its officers and available
documentation, consistently treated the said PNs as regular loans - accepted, approved, and paid in the
ordinary course of its business.
The PNs executed by the respondent in favor of petitioner Citibank to cover her loans were duly-filled
out and signed, including the disclosure statement found at the back of the said PNs, in adherence to the
Central Bank requirement to disclose the full finance charges to a loan granted to borrowers.
Mr. Tan, then an account officer with the Marketing Department of petitioner Citibank, testified that he
dealt directly with respondent; he facilitated the loans; and the PNs, at least in the second set, were
signed by respondent in his presence.[105]
Mr. Pujeda, the officer who was previously in charge of loans and placements, confirmed that the
signatures on the PNs were verified against respondent's specimen signature with the bank.[106]
Ms. Cristina Dondoyano, who worked at petitioner Citibank as a loan processor, was responsible for
booking respondent's loans. Booking the loans means recording it in the General Ledger. She explained
the procedure for booking loans, as follows: The account officer, in the Marketing Department, deals
directly with the clients who wish to borrow money from petitioner Citibank. The Marketing
Department will forward a loan booking checklist, together with the borrowing client's PNs and other
supporting documents, to the loan pre-processor, who will check whether the details in the loan booking
checklist are the same as those in the PNs. The documents are then sent to Signature Control for
verification of the client's signature in the PNs, after which, they are returned to the loan pre-processor,
to be forwarded finally to the loan processor. The loan processor shall book the loan in the General
Ledger, indicating therein the client name, loan amount, interest rate, maturity date, and the
corresponding PN number. Since she booked respondent's loans personally, Ms. Dondoyano testified
that she saw the original PNs. In 1986, Atty. Fernandez of petitioner Citibank requested her to prepare
an accounting of respondent's loans, which she did, and which was presented as Exhibit "120" for the
petitioners. The figures from the said exhibit were culled from the bookings in the General Ledger, a
fact which respondent's counsel was even willing to stipulate.[107]
Ms. Teresita Glorioso was an Investigation and Reconcilement Clerk at the Control Department of
petitioner Citibank. She was presented by petitioner Citibank to expound on the microfilming procedure
at the bank, since most of the copies of the PNs were retrieved from microfilm. Microfilming of the
documents are actually done by people at the Operations Department. At the end of the day or during
the day, the original copies of all bank documents, not just those pertaining to loans, are microfilmed.
She refuted the possibility that insertions could be made in the microfilm because the microfilm is
inserted in a cassette; the cassette is placed in the microfilm machine for use; at the end of the day, the
cassette is taken out of the microfilm machine and put in a safe vault; and the cassette is returned to the
machine only the following day for use, until the spool is full. This is the microfilming procedure
followed everyday. When the microfilm spool is already full, the microfilm is developed, then sent to
the Control Department, which double checks the contents of the microfilms against the entries in the
General Ledger. The Control Department also conducts a random comparison of the contents of the
microfilms with the original documents; a random review of the contents is done on every role of
microfilm.[108]
Ms. Renee Rubio worked for petitioner Citibank for 20 years. She rose from the ranks, initially working
as a secretary in the Personnel Group; then as a secretary to the Personnel Group Head; a Service
Assistant with the Marketing Group, in 1972 to 1974, dealing directly with corporate and individual
clients who, among other things, secured loans from petitioner Citibank; the Head of the Collection
Group of the Foreign Department in 1974 to 1976; the Head of the Money Transfer Unit in 1976 to
1978; the Head of the Loans and Placements Unit up to the early 1980s; and, thereafter, she established
operations training for petitioner Citibank in the Asia-Pacific Region responsible for the training of the
officers of the bank. She testified on the standard loan application process at petitioner Citibank.
According to Ms. Rubio, the account officer or marketing person submits a proposal to grant a loan to
an individual or corporation. Petitioner Citibank has a worldwide policy that requires a credit
committee, composed of a minimum of three people, which would approve the loan and amount thereof.
There can be no instance when only one officer has the power to approve the loan application. When
the loan is approved, the account officer in charge will obtain the corresponding PNs from the client.
The PNs are sent to the signature verifier who would validate the signatures therein against those
appearing in the signature cards previously submitted by the client to the bank. The Operations Unit
will check and review the documents, including the PNs, if it is a clean loan, and securities and deposits,
if it is collateralized. The loan is then recorded in the General Ledger. The Loans and Placements
Department will not book the loans without the PNs. When the PNs are liquidated, whether they are
paid or rolled-over, they are returned to the client.[109] Ms. Rubio further explained that she was familiar
with respondent's accounts since, while she was still the Head of the Loan and Placements Unit, she was
asked by Mr. Tan to prepare a list of respondent's outstanding obligations. [110] She thus calculated
respondent's outstanding loans, which was sent as an attachment to Mr. Tan's letter to respondent, dated
28 September 1979, and presented before the RTC as Exhibits "34-B" and "34-C."[111]
Lastly, the exchange of letters between petitioner Citibank and respondent, as well as the letters sent by
other people working for respondent, had consistently recognized that respondent owed petitioner
Citibank money.
In consideration of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the preponderance of evidence
supports the existence of the respondent's loans, in the principal sum of P1,920,000.00, as of 5
September 1979. While it is well-settled that the term "preponderance of evidence" should not be
wholly dependent on the number of witnesses, there are certain instances when the number of witnesses
become the determining factor -
The preponderance of evidence may be determined, under certain conditions, by the number of
witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts. For instance, one or two witnesses may testify to
a given state of facts, and six or seven witnesses of equal candor, fairness, intelligence, and truthfulness,
and equally well corroborated by all the remaining evidence, who have no greater interest in the result of
the suit, testify against such state of facts. Then the preponderance of evidence is determined by the
number of witnesses. (Wilcox vs. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 66 Am. St. Rep., 761.)[112]
Best evidence rule
This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals summarily dismissing the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners based on its broad and indiscriminate application of the
best evidence rule.
In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of
the document itself,[113] to the exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence. [114]
The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3, which
reads -
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry
is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus -
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of
such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4
Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for
accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary,
but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et
al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil 565). x x x [115]
In Estrada v. Desierto,[116] this Court had occasion to rule that -
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the
best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case in
hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring production.24
"x x x x
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain
documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and
deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used
unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it." (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the
photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish
the existence of respondent's loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never the point of
contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent's position that the PNs in the first set (with the
exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No.
34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the
proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the
other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote personally or
through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she
claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent
questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the
purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the
documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented by
petitioners regarding the existence of respondent's loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits
of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court -
SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents was established through the
testimonies of witnesses, such as Mr. Tan, before whom most of the documents were personally
executed by respondent. The original PNs also went through the whole loan booking system of
petitioner Citibank - from the account officer in its Marketing Department, to the pre-processor, to the
signature verifier, back to the pre-processor, then to the processor for booking.[117] The original PNs
were seen by Ms. Dondoyano, the processor, who recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr. Pujeda
personally saw the original MCs, proving respondent's receipt of the proceeds of her loans from
petitioner Citibank, when he helped Attys. Cleofe and Fernandez, the bank's legal counsels, to
reconstruct the records of respondent's loans. The original MCs were presented to Atty. Cleofe who
used the same during the preliminary investigation of the case, sometime in years 1986-1987. The
original MCs were subsequently turned over to the Control and Investigation Division of petitioner
Citibank.[118]
It was only petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original copies of the PNs when it
moved to a new office. Citibank did not make a similar contention; instead, it explained that the original
copies of the PNs were returned to the borrower upon liquidation of the loan, either through payment or
roll-over. Petitioner Citibank proffered the excuse that they were still looking for the documents in their
storage or warehouse to explain the delay and difficulty in the retrieval thereof, but not their absence or
loss. The original documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and, thus,
unavailable for presentation before the RTC only on 7 October 1987, when a fire broke out on the
7th floor of the office building of petitioner Citibank. There is no showing that the fire was intentionally
set. The fire destroyed relevant documents, not just of the present case, but also of other cases, since the
7th floor housed the Control and Investigation Division, in charge of keeping the necessary documents
for cases in which petitioner Citibank was involved.
The foregoing would have been sufficient to allow the presentation of photocopies or microfilm copies
of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the petitioners as secondary evidence to establish the existence of
respondent's loans, as an exception to the best evidence rule.
The impact of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Dy case
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals made the following pronouncement -
Besides, We find the declaration and conclusions of this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 entitled Sps.
Dr. Ricardo L. Dy and Rosalind O. Dy vs. City Bank, N.A., et al, promulgated on 15 January 1990,
as disturbing taking into consideration the similarities of the fraud, machinations, and deceits employed
by the defendant-appellant Citibank and its Account Manager Francisco Tan.
Worthy of note is the fact that Our declarations and conclusions against Citibank and the person of
Francisco Tan in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 were affirmed in toto by the Highest Magistrate in a Minute
Resolution dated 22 August 1990 entitled Citibank, N.A., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 93350.
As the factual milieu of the present appeal created reasonable doubts as to whether the nine (9)
Promissory Notes were indeed executed with considerations, the doubts, coupled by the findings and
conclusions of this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 93350. should
be construed against herein defendants-appellants Citibank and FNCB Finance.
What this Court truly finds disturbing is the significance given by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
Decision to the Decision[119] of its Third Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 (or the Dy case), when
there is an absolute lack of legal basis for doing such.
Although petitioner Citibank and its officer, Mr. Tan, were also involved in the Dy case, that is about
the only connection between the Dy case and the one at bar. Not only did the Dy case tackle
transactions between parties other than the parties presently before this Court, but the transactions are
absolutely independent and unrelated to those in the instant Petition.
In the Dy case, Severino Chua Caedo managed to obtain loans from herein petitioner Citibank
amounting to P7,000,000.00, secured to the extent of P5,000,000.00 by a Third Party Real Estate
Mortgage of the properties of Caedo's aunt, Rosalind Dy. It turned out that Rosalind Dy and her
husband were unaware of the said loans and the mortgage of their properties. The transactions were
carried out exclusively between Caedo and Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank. The RTC found Mr. Tan
guilty of fraud for his participation in the questionable transactions, essentially because he allowed
Caedo to take out the signature cards, when these should have been signed by the Dy spouses personally
before him. Although the Dy spouses' signatures in the PNs and Third Party Real Estate Mortgage were
forged, they were approved by the signature verifier since the signature cards against which they were
compared to were also forged. Neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, however, categorically
declared Mr. Tan personally responsible for the forgeries, which, in the narration of the facts, were more
likely committed by Caedo.
In the Petition at bar, respondent dealt with Mr. Tan directly, there was no third party involved who
could have perpetrated any fraud or forgery in her loan transactions. Although respondent attempted to
raise suspicion as to the authenticity of her signatures on certain documents, these were nothing more
than naked allegations with no corroborating evidence; worse, even her own allegations were replete
with inconsistencies. She could not even establish in what manner or under what circumstances the
fraud or forgery was committed, or how Mr. Tan could have been directly responsible for the same.
While the Court of Appeals can take judicial notice of the Decision of its Third Division in the Dy case,
it should not have given the said case much weight when it rendered the assailed Decision, since the
former does not constitute a precedent. The Court of Appeals, in the challenged Decision, did not apply
any legal argument or principle established in the Dy case but, rather, adopted the findings therein of
wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of herein petitioner Citibank and Mr. Tan. Any finding of
wrongdoing or misconduct as against herein petitioners should be made based on the factual background
and pieces of evidence submitted in this case, not those in another case.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the Dy case not as a legal precedent for
the present case, but rather as evidence of similar acts committed by petitioner Citibank and Mr. Tan. A
basic rule of evidence, however, states that, "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like."[120] The rationale for the rule is explained thus -
The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial convenience. The fact that a person
has committed the same or similar acts at some prior time affords, as a general rule, no logical guaranty
that he committed the act in question. This is so because, subjectively, a man's mind and even his
modes of life may change; and, objectively, the conditions under which he may find himself at a given
time may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different way. Besides, if evidence of similar
acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to a multiplicity of collateral issues and will subject
the defendant to surprise as well as confuse the court and prolong the trial.[121]
The factual backgrounds of the two cases are so different and unrelated that the Dy case cannot be used
to prove specific intent, knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage on the part of
petitioner Citibank or its officer, Mr. Tan, to defraud respondent in the present case.
IV
The liquidation of respondent's
outstanding loans were valid in so
far as petitioner Citibank used
respondent's savings account with
the bank and her money market
placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance; but illegal and void in so
far as petitioner Citibank used
respondent's dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva.
Savings Account with petitioner Citibank
Compensation is a recognized mode of extinguishing obligations. Relevant provisions of the Civil Code
provides -
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and debtors
of each other.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary;
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal
creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor.
There is little controversy when it comes to the right of petitioner Citibank to compensate respondent's
outstanding loans with her deposit account. As already found by this Court, petitioner Citibank was the
creditor of respondent for her outstanding loans. At the same time, respondent was the creditor of
petitioner Citibank, as far as her deposit account was concerned, since bank deposits, whether fixed,
savings, or current, should be considered as simple loan or mutuum by the depositor to the banking
institution.[122] Both debts consist in sums of money. By June 1979, all of respondent's PNs in the
second set had matured and became demandable, while respondent's savings account was demandable
anytime. Neither was there any retention or controversy over the PNs and the deposit account
commenced by a third person and communicated in due time to the debtor concerned. Compensation
takes place by operation of law,[123] therefore, even in the absence of an expressed authority from
respondent, petitioner Citibank had the right to effect, on 25 June 1979, the partial compensation or off-
set of respondent's outstanding loans with her deposit account, amounting to P31,079.14.
Money market placements with FNCB Finance
Things though are not as simple and as straightforward as regards to the money market placements and
bank account used by petitioner Citibank to complete the compensation or off-set of respondent's
outstanding loans, which came from persons other than petitioner Citibank.
Respondent's money market placements were with petitioner FNCB Finance, and after several roll-
overs, they were ultimately covered by PNs No. 20138 and 20139, which, by 3 September 1979, the
date the check for the proceeds of the said PNs were issued, amounted to P1,022,916.66, inclusive of the
principal amounts and interests. As to these money market placements, respondent was the creditor and
petitioner FNCB Finance the debtor; while, as to the outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the
creditor and respondent the debtor. Consequently, legal compensation, under Article 1278 of the Civil
Code, would not apply since the first requirement for a valid compensation, that each one of the obligors
be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other, was not met.
What petitioner Citibank actually did was to exercise its rights to the proceeds of respondent's money
market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance by virtue of the Deeds of Assignment executed by
respondent in its favor.
The Court of Appeals did not consider these Deeds of Assignment because of petitioners' failure to
produce the original copies thereof in violation of the best evidence rule. This Court again finds itself in
disagreement in the application of the best evidence rule by the appellate court.
To recall, the best evidence rule, in so far as documentary evidence is concerned, requires the
presentation of the original copy of the document only when the context thereof is the subject of inquiry
in the case. Respondent does not question the contents of the Deeds of Assignment. While she admitted
the existence and execution of the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2 March 1978 and 9 March 1978,
covering PNs No. 8169 and 8167 issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, she claimed, as defense, that the
loans for which the said Deeds were executed as security, were already paid. She denied ever executing
both Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978, covering PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These are again
issues collateral to the contents of the documents involved, which could be proven by evidence other
than the original copies of the said documents.
Moreover, the Deeds of Assignment of the money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance
were notarized documents, thus, admissible in evidence. Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court
provides that -
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. - Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.
Significant herein is this Court's elucidation in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,[124] which reads -
On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be recalled that the notarization of a private
document converts it into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so because a public document duly
executed and entered in the proper registry is presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is
shown by clear and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 57 Phil. 652 [1918]; U.S. vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil
241 [1902]; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As such, the party challenging the
recital of the document must prove his claim with clear and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 346 [1986]).
The rule on the evidentiary weight that must be accorded a notarized document is clear and
unambiguous. The certificate of acknowledgement in the notarized Deeds of Assignment
constituted prima facie evidence of the execution thereof. Thus, the burden of refuting this presumption
fell on respondent. She could have presented evidence of any defect or irregularity in the execution of
the said documents[125] or raised questions as to the verity of the notary public's acknowledgment and
certificate in the Deeds.[126] But again, respondent admitted executing the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2
March 1978 and 9 March 1978, although claiming that the loans for which they were executed as
security were already paid. And, she assailed the Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978, with
nothing more than her bare denial of execution thereof, hardly the clear and convincing evidence
required to trounce the presumption of due execution of a notarized document.
Petitioners not only presented the notarized Deeds of Assignment, but even secured certified literal
copies thereof from the National Archives.[127] Mr. Renato Medua, an archivist, working at the Records
Management and Archives Office of the National Library, testified that the copies of the Deeds
presented before the RTC were certified literal copies of those contained in the Notarial Registries of the
notary publics concerned, which were already in the possession of the National Archives. He also
explained that he could not bring to the RTC the Notarial Registries containing the original copies of the
Deeds of Assignment, because the Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 97, dated 8 November
1968, prohibits the bringing of original documents to the courts to prevent the loss of irreplaceable and
priceless documents.[128]
Accordingly, this Court gives the Deeds of Assignment grave importance in establishing the authority
given by the respondent to petitioner Citibank to use as security for her loans her money her market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, represented by PNs No. 8167 and 8169, later to be rolled-
over as PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These Deeds of Assignment constitute the law between the parties,
and the obligations arising therefrom shall have the force of law between the parties and should be
complied with in good faith.[129] Standard clauses in all of the Deeds provide that -
The ASSIGNOR and the ASSIGNEE hereby further agree as follows:
xxxx
2. In the event the OBLIGATIONS are not paid at maturity or upon demand, as the case may
be, the ASSIGNEE is fully authorized and empowered to collect and receive the
PLACEMENT (or so much thereof as may be necessary) and apply the same in payment of
the OBLIGATIONS. Furthermore, the ASSIGNOR agrees that at any time, and from time to
time, upon request by the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR will promptly execute and deliver
any and all such further instruments and documents as may be necessary to effectuate this
Assignment.
xxxx
5. This Assignment shall be considered as sufficient authority to FNCB Finance to pay and
deliver the PLACEMENT or so much thereof as may be necessary to liquidate the
OBLIGATIONS, to the ASSIGNEE in accordance with terms and provisions hereof. [130]
Petitioner Citibank was only acting upon the authority granted to it under the foregoing Deeds when it
finally used the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139, paid by petitioner FNCB Finance, to partly pay
for respondent's outstanding loans. Strictly speaking, it did not effect a legal compensation or off-set
under Article 1278 of the Civil Code, but rather, it partly extinguished respondent's obligations through
the application of the security given by the respondent for her loans. Although the pertinent documents
were entitled Deeds of Assignment, they were, in reality, more of a pledge by respondent to petitioner
Citibank of her credit due from petitioner FNCB Finance by virtue of her money market placements
with the latter. According to Article 2118 of the Civil Code -
ART. 2118. If a credit has been pledged becomes due before it is redeemed, the pledgee may collect
and receive the amount due. He shall apply the same to the payment of his claim, and deliver the
surplus, should there be any, to the pledgor.
PNs No. 20138 and 20139 matured on 3 September 1979, without them being redeemed by respondent,
so that petitioner Citibank collected from petitioner FNCB Finance the proceeds thereof, which included
the principal amounts and interests earned by the money market placements, amounting to
P1,022,916.66, and applied the same against respondent's outstanding loans, leaving no surplus to be
delivered to respondent.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
Despite the legal compensation of respondent's savings account and the total application of the proceeds
of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 to respondent's outstanding loans, there still remained a balance of
P1,069,847.40. Petitioner Citibank then proceeded to applying respondent's dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva against her remaining loan balance, pursuant to a Declaration of Pledge supposedly
executed by respondent in its favor.
Certain principles of private international law should be considered herein because the property pledged
was in the possession of an entity in a foreign country, namely, Citibank-Geneva. In the absence of any
allegation and evidence presented by petitioners of the specific rules and laws governing the constitution
of a pledge in Geneva, Switzerland, they will be presumed to be the same as Philippine local or
domestic laws; this is known as processual presumption.[131]
Upon closer scrutiny of the Declaration of Pledge, this Court finds the same exceedingly suspicious and
irregular.
First of all, it escapes this Court why petitioner Citibank took care to have the Deeds of Assignment of
the PNs notarized, yet left the Declaration of Pledge unnotarized. This Court would think that petitioner
Citibank would take greater cautionary measures with the preparation and execution of the Declaration
of Pledge because it involved respondent's "all present and future fiduciary placements" with a Citibank
branch in another country, specifically, in Geneva, Switzerland. While there is no express legal
requirement that the Declaration of Pledge had to be notarized to be effective, even so, it could not enjoy
the same prima facie presumption of due execution that is extended to notarized documents, and
petitioner Citibank must discharge the burden of proving due execution and authenticity of the
Declaration of Pledge.
Second, petitioner Citibank was unable to establish the date when the Declaration of Pledge was actually
executed. The photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by petitioner Citibank before the RTC
was undated.[132] It presented only a photocopy of the pledge because it already forwarded the original
copy thereof to Citibank-Geneva when it requested for the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts
pursuant thereto. Respondent, on the other hand, was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of Pledge,
certified by an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September 1979.[133] Respondent,
however, presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of the country on the said
date and could not have signed the pledge. Petitioner Citibank insisted that the pledge was signed before
24 September 1979, but could not provide an explanation as to how and why the said date was written
on the pledge. Although Mr. Tan testified that the Declaration of Pledge was signed by respondent
personally before him, he could not give the exact date when the said signing took place. It is important
to note that the copy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by the respondent to the RTC was certified
by an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which had possession of the original copy of the pledge. It is dated 24
September 1979, and this Court shall abide by the presumption that the written document is truly
dated.[134] Since it is undeniable that respondent was out of the country on 24 September 1979, then she
could not have executed the pledge on the said date.
Third, the Declaration of Pledge was irregularly filled-out. The pledge was in a standard printed form.
It was constituted in favor of Citibank, N.A., otherwise referred to therein as the Bank. It should be
noted, however, that in the space which should have named the pledgor, the name of petitioner Citibank
was typewritten, to wit -
The pledge right herewith constituted shall secure all claims which the Bank now has or in the future
acquires against Citibank, N.A., Manila (full name and address of the Debtor), regardless of the legal
cause or the transaction (for example current account, securities transactions, collections, credits,
payments, documentary credits and collections) which gives rise thereto, and including principal, all
contractual and penalty interest, commissions, charges, and costs.
The pledge, therefore, made no sense, the pledgor and pledgee being the same entity. Was a mistake
made by whoever filled-out the form? Yes, it could be a possibility. Nonetheless, considering the value
of such a document, the mistake as to a significant detail in the pledge could only be committed with
gross carelessness on the part of petitioner Citibank, and raised serious doubts as to the authenticity and
due execution of the same. The Declaration of Pledge had passed through the hands of several bank
officers in the country and abroad, yet, surprisingly and implausibly, no one noticed such a glaring
mistake.
Lastly, respondent denied that it was her signature on the Declaration of Pledge. She claimed that the
signature was a forgery. When a document is assailed on the basis of forgery, the best evidence rule
applies -
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best
evidence rule. This is especially true when the issue is that of forgery.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence
and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an
instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be
established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original
document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which
would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document
under controversy cannot produce reliable results.[135]
Respondent made several attempts to have the original copy of the pledge produced before the RTC so
as to have it examined by experts. Yet, despite several Orders by the RTC, [136] petitioner Citibank failed
to comply with the production of the original Declaration of Pledge. It is admitted that Citibank-Geneva
had possession of the original copy of the pledge. While petitioner Citibank in Manila and its branch in
Geneva may be separate and distinct entities, they are still incontestably related, and between petitioner
Citibank and respondent, the former had more influence and resources to convince Citibank-Geneva to
return, albeit temporarily, the original Declaration of Pledge. Petitioner Citibank did not present any
evidence to convince this Court that it had exerted diligent efforts to secure the original copy of the
pledge, nor did it proffer the reason why Citibank-Geneva obstinately refused to give it back, when such
document would have been very vital to the case of petitioner Citibank. There is thus no justification to
allow the presentation of a mere photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge in lieu of the original, and the
photocopy of the pledge presented by petitioner Citibank has nil probative value. [137] In addition, even if
this Court cannot make a categorical finding that respondent's signature on the original copy of the
pledge was forged, it is persuaded that petitioner Citibank willfully suppressed the presentation of the
original document, and takes into consideration the presumption that the evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse to petitioner Citibank if produced.[138]
Without the Declaration of Pledge, petitioner Citibank had no authority to demand the remittance of
respondent's dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and to apply them to her outstanding loans. It cannot
effect legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code since, petitioner Citibank itself admitted
that Citibank-Geneva is a distinct and separate entity. As for the dollar accounts, respondent was the
creditor and Citibank-Geneva is the debtor; and as for the outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the
creditor and respondent was the debtor. The parties in these transactions were evidently not the
principal creditor of each other.
Therefore, this Court declares that the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva
and the application thereof to her outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank was illegal, and null and
void. Resultantly, petitioner Citibank is obligated to return to respondent the amount of US$149,632,99
from her Citibank-Geneva accounts, or its present equivalent value in Philippine currency; and, at the
same time, respondent continues to be obligated to petitioner Citibank for the balance of her outstanding
loans which, as of 5 September 1979, amounted to P1,069,847.40.
V
The parties shall be liable for
interests on their monetary
obligations to each other, as
determined herein.
In summary, petitioner Citibank is ordered by this Court to pay respondent the proceeds of her money
market placements, represented by PNs No. 23356 and 23357, amounting to P318,897.34 and
P203,150.00, respectively, earning an interest of 14.5% per annum as stipulated in the
PNs,[139] beginning 17 March 1977, the date of the placements.
Petitioner Citibank is also ordered to refund to respondent the amount of US$149,632.99, or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, which had been remitted from her Citibank-Geneva accounts. These
dollar accounts, consisting of two fiduciary placements and current accounts with Citibank-Geneva shall
continue earning their respective stipulated interests from 26 October 1979, the date of their remittance
by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Citibank in Manila and applied against respondent's outstanding loans.
As for respondent, she is ordered to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her outstanding loans, which
amounted to P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979. These loans continue to earn interest, as stipulated
in the corresponding PNs, from the time of their respective maturity dates, since the supposed payment
thereof using respondent's dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva is deemed illegal, null and void, and,
thus, ineffective.
VI
Petitioner Citibank shall be liable for
damages to respondent.
Petitioners protest the award by the Court of Appeals of moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees in favor of respondent. They argued that the RTC did not award any damages, and
respondent, in her appeal before the Court of Appeals, did not raise in issue the absence of such.
While it is true that the general rule is that only errors which have been stated in the assignment of errors
and properly argued in the brief shall be considered, this Court has also recognized exceptions to the
general rule, wherein it authorized the review of matters, even those not assigned as errors in the appeal,
if the consideration thereof is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, and there is a close
inter-relation between the omitted assignment of error and those actually assigned and discussed by the
appellant.[140] Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding the damages when it already made
findings that would justify and support the said award.
Although this Court appreciates the right of petitioner Citibank to effect legal compensation of
respondent's local deposits, as well as its right to the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 by virtue of
the notarized Deeds of Assignment, to partly extinguish respondent's outstanding loans, it finds that
petitioner Citibank did commit wrong when it failed to pay and properly account for the proceeds of
respondent's money market placements, evidenced by PNs No. 23356 and 23357, and when it sought the
remittance of respondent's dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva by virtue of a highly-suspect
Declaration of Pledge to be applied to the remaining balance of respondent's outstanding loans. It bears
to emphasize that banking is impressed with public interest and its fiduciary character requires high
standards of integrity and performance.[141] A bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions of pesos.[142] The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last
centavo, and as promptly as possible.[143] Petitioner Citibank evidently failed to exercise the required
degree of care and transparency in its transactions with respondent, thus, resulting in the wrongful
deprivation of her property. respondent, petitioner Citibank should be liable for exemplary damages, in the amount of P250,000.00,
in accordance with Article 2229[146] and 2234[147] of the Civil Code.
Respondent had been deprived of substantial amounts of her investments and deposits for more than two
decades. During this span of years, respondent had found herself in desperate need of the amounts With the award of exemplary damages, then respondent shall also be entitled to an award of attorney's
wrongfully withheld from her. In her testimony[144] before the RTC, respondent narrated - fees.[148] Additionally, attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur
By the way Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell us again, you said before that you are a expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.[149] In this case, an
Q
businesswoman, will you tell us again what are the businesses you are engaged into [sic]? award of P200,000.00 attorney's fees shall be satisfactory.
I am engaged in real estate. I am the owner of the Modesta Village 1 and 2 in San Mateo,
Rizal. I am also the President and Chairman of the Board of Macador [sic] Co. and Business In contrast, this Court finds no sufficient basis to award damages to petitioners. Respondent was
Inc. which operates the Macador [sic] International Palace Hotel. I am also the President of compelled to institute the present case in the exercise of her rights and in the protection of her interests.
the Macador [sic] International Palace Hotel, and also the Treasures Home Industries, Inc. In fact, although her Complaint before the RTC was not sustained in its entirety, it did raise meritorious
A
which I am the Chairman and president of the Board and also operating affiliated company in points and on which this Court rules in her favor. Any injury resulting from the exercise of one's rights
the name of Treasures Motor Sales engaged in car dealers [sic] like Delta Motors, we are the is damnum absque injuria.[150]
dealers of the whole Northern Luzon and I am the president of the Disto Company, Ltd.,
based in Hongkong licensed in Honkong [sic] and now operating in Los Angeles, California. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Q What is the business of that Disto Company Ltd.? Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, as already modified by
A Disto Company, Ltd., is engaged in real estate and construction. its Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, as
Aside from those businesses are you a member of any national or community organization for follows -
Q
social and civil activities?
A Yes sir.
Q What are those?
1. PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are DECLARED subsisting and outstanding. Petitioner Citibank
I am the Vice-President of thes [sic] Subdivision Association of the Philippines in 1976, I am
is ORDERED to return to respondent the principal amounts of the said PNs, amounting to
also an officer of the ... Chamber of Real Estate Business Association; I am also an officer of
A Three Hundred Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and Thirty-Four
the Chatholic [sic] Women's League and I am also a member of the CMLI, I forgot the
Centavos (P318,897.34) and Two Hundred Three Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos
definition.
(P203,150.00), respectively, plus the stipulated interest of Fourteen and a half percent
Q How about any political affiliation or government position held if any?
(14.5%) per annum, beginning 17 March 1977;
A I was also a candidate for Mayo last January 30, 1980.
Q Where?
2. The remittance of One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Two US Dollars
A In Dagupan City, Pangasinan.
and Ninety-Nine Cents (US$149,632.99) from respondent's Citibank-Geneva accounts to
Q What else?
petitioner Citibank in Manila, and the application of the same against respondent's
I also ran as an Assemblywoman last May, 1984, Independent party in Regional I,
A outstanding loans with the latter, is DECLARED illegal, null and void. Petitioner Citibank
Pangasinan.
is ORDERED to refund to respondent the said amount, or its equivalent in Philippine
What happened to your businesses you mentioned as a result of your failure to recover you
Q currency using the exchange rate at the time of payment, plus the stipulated interest for each
[sic] investments and bank deposits from the defendants?
of the fiduciary placements and current accounts involved, beginning 26 October 1979;
They are not all operating, in short, I was hampered to push through the businesses that I
A
have.
3. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to pay respondent moral damages in the amount of Three
Of all the businesses and enterprises that you mentioned what are those that are paralyzed and
A [sic] Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred
what remain inactive?
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00); and attorney's fees in the amount of Two Hundred
Of all the company [sic] that I have, only the Disto Company that is now operating in
A Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
California.
How about your candidacy as Mayor of Dagupan, [sic] City, and later as Assemblywoman of
Q 4. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her outstanding loans,
Region I, what happened to this?
which, from the respective dates of their maturity to 5 September 1979, was computed to be
I won by voting but when election comes on [sic] the counting I lost and I protested this, it is
in the sum of One Million Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Forty
A still pending and because I don't have financial resources I was not able to push through the
Centavos (P1,069,847.40), inclusive of interest. These outstanding loans shall continue to
case. I just have it pending in the Comelec.
earn interest, at the rates stipulated in the corresponding PNs, from 5 September 1979 until
Q Now, do these things also affect your social and civic activities?
payment thereof.
A Yes sir, definitely.
Q How?
I was embarrassed because being a businesswoman I would like to inform the Honorable SO ORDERED.
Court that I was awarded as the most outstanding businesswoman of the year in 1976 but
A
when this money was not given back to me I was not able to comply with the commitments
that I have promised to these associations that I am engaged into [sic], sir.
For the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation
suffered by the respondent, the award of moral damages is but proper. However, this Court reduces the
amount thereof to P300,000.00, for the award of moral damages is meant to compensate for the actual
injury suffered by the respondent, not to enrich her.[145]

Having failed to exercise more care and prudence than a private individual in its dealings with