A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC
For
EFFICIENT USE OF PAPER RULE
Whereas, to produce 500 reams of paper, twenty trees are
cut and 100,000 liters of water are used, water that is no
longer reusable because it is laden with chemicals and is just
released to the environment to poison our rivers and seas;
Whereas, there is a need to cut the judicial system’s use
excessive quantities of costly paper, save our forests, avoid
landslides, and mitigate the worsening effects of climate
change that the world is experiencing;
Whereas, the judiciary can play a big part in saving our trees,
conserving precious water and helping mother earth;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby
issues and promulgates the following:
Sec. 1. Title of the Rule– This rule shall be known and cited
as the Efficient Use of Paper Rule.
Sec. 2. Applicability. – This rule shall apply to all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies under the administrative supervision of
the Supreme Court.
Sec. 3. Format and Style. – a) All pleadings, motions and
similar papers intended for the court and quasi-judicial
body’s consideration and action (court-bound papers) shall
written in single space with one-and-a –half space between
paragraphs, using an easily readable font style of the party’s
choice, of 14-size font, and on a 13 –inch by 8.5- inch white
bond paper; and
b) All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and
quasi-judicial bodies under the administrative supervision of
the Supreme Court shall comply with these requirements.
Similarly covered are the reports submitted to the courts and
transcripts of stenographic notes.
Sec. 4. Margins and Prints .— The parties shall maintain the
following margins on all court-bound papers: a left hand
margin of 1.5 inches from the edge; an upper margin of 1.2
inches from the edge; a right hand margin of 1.0 inch from
the edge; and a lower margin of 1.0 inch from the edge.
Every page must be consecutively numbered.
Sec. 5. Copies to be filed. – Unless otherwise directed by
the court, the number of court- bound papers that a party is
required or desires to file shall be as follows:
a. In the Supreme Court, one original (properly marked) and
four copies, unless the case is referred to the Court En Banc,
in which event, the parties shall file ten additional copies. For
the En Banc, the parties need to submit only two sets of
1
Ex officio notary public.
Can notarize documents in relation to their public functions.
annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy.
the Division, the parties need to submit also two sets of
annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy. All
members of the Court shall share the extra copies of
annexes in the interest of economy of paper.
Parties to cases before the Supreme Court are further
required, on voluntary basis for the first six months following
the effectivity of this Rule and compulsorily afterwards unless
the period is extended, to submit, simultaneously with their
court-bound papers, soft copies of the same and their
annexes (the latter in PDF format) either by email to the
Court’s e-mail address or by compact disc (CD). This
requirement is in preparation for the eventual establishment
of an e-filing paperless system in the judiciary.
b. In the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, one
original (properly marked) and two copies with their annexes;
c. In the Court of Tax Appeals, one original (properly marked)
and two copies with annexes. On appeal to the En Banc, one
Original (properly marked) and eight copies with annexes;
and
d. In other courts, one original (properly marked) with the
stated annexes attached to it.
Sec. 6. Annexes Served on Adverse Party. – A party
required by the rules to serve a copy of his court-bound on
the adverse party need not enclose copies of those annexes
that based on the record of the court such party already has
in his possession. In the event a party requests a set of the
annexes actually filed with the court, the part who filed the
paper shall comply with the request within five days from
receipt.
Sec. 7. Date of Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect on
January 1, 2013 after publication in two newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines.
CIRCULAR NO. 1-90 February 26, 1990
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS (METC), MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES (MTCC), MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS (MTC),
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS (MCTC) SHARI'A
COURTS, AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP)
SUBJECT: POWER OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT JUDGES AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT JUDGES TO ACT AS NOTARIES PUBLIC EX
OFFICIO1
But if there is no lawyer, then a certification showing that
there are no notaries public.
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted
hereunder, is the Resolution of the Court En Banc, dated
December 19, 1989, in Administrative Matter No. 89-11-
1303 MTC, "Re: Request for clarification on the power of
municipal trial court judges and municipal circuit trial court
judges to act as Notaries Public Ex Officio":
Acting on a query regarding the power of municipal
trial court judges and municipal circuit trial court
judges to act in the capacity of notaries public ex
officio in the light of the 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct, the Court Resolved to issue a clarification
on the matter.
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial
court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the
function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76
of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242
of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court
hereby lays down the following qualifications on the
scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public
ex officio in the notarization of documents connected
only with the exercise of their official functions and
duties [Borne v. Mayo, Adm. Matter No. 1765-CFI,
October 17, 1980. 100 SCRA 314; Penera v.
Dalocanog, Adm. Matter No. 2113-MJ, April 22,
1981, 104 SCRA 193.] They may not, as notaries
public ex officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts
and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct
relation to the performance of their functions as
judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only
enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial
activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with
their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and
Rule 5.07).
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact
that there are still municipalities which have neither
lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and
MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits
with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the
capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act
within the competency of a regular notary public,
provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the
account of the Government and turned over to the
municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm.
Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572);
and, (2) certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or
notary public in such municipality or circuit.
ARNEL S. CRUZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUNINGNING Y. CENTRON, Acting Clerk of Court, RTC-OCC,
Calapan City, respondent.
Before us is an administrative matter which stemmed from a letter-
complaint dated January 2, 2001, originally filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, by Arnel S. Cruz against Atty. Luningning Y. Centron,
Clerk of Court VI, Regional Trial Court, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro,
for acts constitutive of gross misconduct.
In a letter dated January 26, 2001, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon referred the instant matter to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of this Court.1
Complainant alleges: Atty. Centron assisted a certain Gloria Logdat and
Conchita de la Cruz in consummating the sale of a parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2186, in the name of
one Joaquina Jabat. Respondent’s assistance consisted in preparing
and notarizing the documents of sale. The said sale is illegal because
the property covered by the sale is still the subject of "reconstitution
and Extra-Judicial Settlement among the heirs." As a result of the illegal
sale, Logdat and de la Cruz are charged with estafa through falsification
of public documents. Respondent took advantage of her being a
lawyer to solicit the trust and confidence of the buyers of the subject
parcel of land. Respondent is involved in the disappearance of OCT No.
2186, and she refuses to surrender the title which is in the possession
of one of her relatives.2 Complainant prays that respondent be
disbarred and removed from office.
In compliance with an Indorsement dated September 24, 2001 of the
OCA, respondent filed her Comment dated October 29, 2001, denying
involvement in the preparation of the documents and in the
consummation of the sale of the parcel of land covered by OCT No.
2186. Respondent claims that her only participation in the said sale is
that she was the one who notarized the deed of sale on account that
she was requested by the parties to notarize the same because they
cannot afford the notarial fee being charged by the notary public they
earlier approached. Respondent also denies any involvement in the
alleged loss of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 2186. She claims
that Conchita Acyatan de la Cruz and Gloria Acyatan Salamat-Logdat
gave the said certificate of title to their lawyer, Atty. Apolonia A.
Comia-Soguilon.3
On July 26, 2002, the OCA submitted a report finding the complaint to
be without basis. However, the OCA observed that respondent
violated the provisions of Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code as well as Section G, Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court
when she notarized a deed of conveyance, a document which is not
connected with the exercise of her official functions and duties as Ex-
Officio Notary Public. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that
respondent be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 and sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act(s) in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
In a resolution dated February 17, 2003, we resolved to require the
parties to manifest within ten days from notice if they are willing to
submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. In
compliance therewith, complainant filed a manifestation dated March
28, 2003, indicating his desire to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings filed. Respondent failed to file the required
manifestation within the period allowed by the Court.
In a Resolution dated March 8, 2004, we required respondent to show
cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for her failure to file the required manifestation.
In a Compliance dated May 3, 2004, respondent explained that her
failure to timely file her manifestation was brought about by her heavy
volume of work and enormous responsibility as Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan City. She manifested her desire to
submit the instant case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
filed.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers,
the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.4
In the present case, we find that complainant failed to present clear
and preponderant evidence to show that respondent had direct and
instrumental participation in the preparation of documents and the
subsequent sale of the subject parcel of land covered by OCT No. 2186.
Aside from the deed of sale covering the subject parcel of land which
was notarized by respondent, no competent evidence was shown that
would directly link her to the said sale. While it may be logical to
assume that respondent was the one who prepared the deed of sale
since she was the one who notarized it, we cannot give evidentiary
weight to such a supposition in the absence of any evidence to support
it. Moreover, complainant’s allegation that respondent influenced the
buyers of the subject parcel of land is contradicted by the sworn
affidavit of Adelfa Manes, who is one of the buyers of the disputed
piece of land. Manes attested to the fact that respondent did not
convince nor influence them in buying the subject property. Likewise,
we find no competent evidence to prove that respondent is
responsible for the alleged loss of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT
No. 2186.
Nonetheless, we find that respondent is guilty of violating Section 41
(as amended by Section 2 of R. A. No. 6733)5 and Section 2426 of the
Revised Administrative Code, in relation to Sections G,7 M8 and
N,9 Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court.
Under these provisions, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio,
and may thus notarize documents or administer oaths but only when
the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. As we
held in Astorga vs. Solas,10 clerks of court should not, in their ex-officio
capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no
relation at all to their official functions.11 In the present case, it is not
within respondent’s competence, as it is not part of her official
function and duty, to notarize the subject deed of sale. Respondent is
guilty of abuse of authority.
In Astorga,12 we imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on a clerk of court who
was found guilty of notarizing various documents and administering
oaths on matters which are alien to his official duties. In the present
case, it appearing that this is respondent’s first offense of this nature
and that she has only notarized one document, we find the OCA’s
recommended penalty of a fine of P2,000.00 commensurate to the
offense committed.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Luningning Y. Centron, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, is found guilty of abuse of
authority and is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of P2,000.00. She is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Footnotes
5 SEC. 41. Officers Authorized to Administer Oath. – The
following officers have general authority to administer
oaths: President; Vice-President; Members and Secretaries
of both Houses of the Congress; Members of the Judiciary;
Secretaries of Departments; provincial governors and
lieutenant governors; city mayors; municipal mayors;
bureau directors; regional directors; clerks of courts;
registrars of deeds; other civilian officers in the public
service of the government of the Philippines whose
appointments are vested in the President and are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; all other
constitutional officers; and notaries public.
6 Sec. 242. Officers Acting as Notaries Public Ex-Officio. – The
following are ex-officio notaries public: Chief of the Division
of the Archives, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks; Clerks
of Court of the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts;
and Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission
(Now Land Registration Authority) within the limits of their
territorial jurisdiction.
7 The provisions of Section G, Chapter VIII of the Manual for
Clerks of Court are essentially the same as the provisions of
Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.
8 Theprovisions of Section M, Chapter VIII of the Manual for
Clerks of Court are lifted from Section 41 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended.
9 SECTION N. DUTY TO ADMINISTER OATH. – Officers
authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of
notaries public, municipal judges and clerks of court, are not
obliged to administer oaths or execute certificates save in
matters of official business; and with the exception of
notaries public, the officer performing the service in those
matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically authorized by
law.
ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of
a single document, a deed of sale involving interest over real property,
notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of
the Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the
Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of regularity
attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution.
We conclude instead that the document has not been duly notarized
and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina
Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for enforcement of contract
and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria).1 The complaint sought to
enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred
twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located in Dasci,
Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land
Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though
registrable under Act No. 3344.2 The conveyance was covered by a
Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise
agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the
sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to
repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII,
approved and incorporated the compromise agreement in a Decision
which it rendered on 7 September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.3 On 1 December 1989, petitioner
Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution of her deceased father Isidro
Bustria,4 attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for
Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December
1989, the Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to
repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make
a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10 October 1999, the RTC
denied the Motion for Consignation.5
In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was
likewise opposed by the Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6
September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of
Judgment,6 seeking the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257,
so that it could be executed accordingly.7 The Aquinos filed an answer,
wherein they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the
property to them in a deed of sale dated 17 October 1985.8
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus
De Francia (De Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed of sale,
and former Judge Franklin Cariño (Judge Cariño), who notarized the
same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution
and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as
their Exhibit No. "8," the deed of sale (Deed of Sale) 9 purportedly
executed by Bustria. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected
to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document
which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its
existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously
unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed
Tigno's previous Motion for Consignation.10
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of
Sale in evidence.11 A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the
admission of said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994.12
Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor
of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of
the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and
Cariño as conflicting.13 The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the
alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged
by Bustria;14 that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or
represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and
execution of the deed of sale15 or that Aquino had raised the matter of
the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for
Consignation.16 The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for
Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5)
years had elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257
had become final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by
action such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the
revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-
1257.17
The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.18 In the
meantime, the RTC allowed the execution pending appeal of its
Decision.19 On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division
promulgated a Decision20 reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision.
The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or
substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cariño and De
Francia that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that
the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat
did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or
representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null
and ineffective.21 It was noted that a notarized document carried in its
favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution,
and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of
Sale, and that the document extinguished the right of Bustria's heirs to
repurchase the property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tigno's Motion for
Reconsideration,22 the present petition was filed before this Court.
Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts
to the Court of Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He also
argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale
as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any
consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually
based. As such, they could normally lead to the dismissal of this
Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier
of facts,23 factual review may be warranted in instances when the
findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are
contrary to each other.24 Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial
argument regarding the capacity of the notary public, Judge Cariño, to
notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent
on that matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of
October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties known
to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing
instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIÑO
Ex-Officio Notary Public

Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan
There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the
document is certified by way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment.
A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act
or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer
certifies that the same was sworn before him.25 Under Section 127 of
the Land Registration Act,26 which has been replicated in Section 112
of Presidential Decree No. 1529,27 the Deed of Sale should have been
acknowledged before a notary public.28
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one
which is determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority
of Judge Franklin Cariño to notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cariño at the time of the notarization of
the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Alaminos.29 Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,30 that municipal
judges may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of
private documents, contracts, and other acts of conveyance which
bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges.31 In
response, respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on
municipal court judges from notarizing documents took effect only in
December of 1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was notarized
by Cariño.32
Respondent's contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code.33 However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,34 the Court
explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as Cariño may
notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official
duties.35 The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties
of Judge Cariño, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our
observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case,
considering that Judge Cariño identified himself in the Deed of Sale as
"Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:"
[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law
practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize
documents involving private transactions and sign the document in
this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge"
(p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the
distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.36
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter,
as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to
perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public
provided that certification be made in the notarized documents
attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality
or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries
public that the exception applies.37 The facts of this case do not
warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cariño's improper notarial
activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one
was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its
contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,38 was
even then not an isolated backwater town and had its fair share of
practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cariño, who
ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper notarial activity.
Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate
considering Judge Cariño's advanced age, assuming he is still
alive.39 However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation of
the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not
connected with the exercise of their official duties, subject to the
exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not
having been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification
necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the
notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but
does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized.
The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be
prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of
the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit
otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process
devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial
commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a
duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one
accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a
public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity.40 Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the
contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the
protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not
qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon
the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.41
On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was
not notarized? True enough, from a civil law perspective, the absence
of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires
that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights
over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also
an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not
render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that
the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or
enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for
convenience.42 We have even affirmed that a sale of real property
though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is
nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-
honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate
produces legal effects between the parties.43
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid
notarization of the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on
evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of
Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of
Appeals no longer holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a notarized
document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of
Court. Section 19, Rule 132 states:
 Section 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the
enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered a
private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization
performed by Judge Cariño is sufficient to exclude the document in
question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the
Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a
private document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but merely
subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the
requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is
claimed to be.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos,
who likewise insist that its enforceability militates against Tigno's
claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its
authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in
not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and in
applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly
notarized documents, as distinguished from private documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold
that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on the
trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in
evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking
great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity. The RTC
was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the
exercise of its sound discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants
due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the
very first time respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale
when they filed their answer to petitioner's current action to revive
judgment.44 Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried
to operationalize and implement the Compromise Agreement through
two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The
Aquinos duly opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to
exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise then the claim
that such right to repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of
Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few
years after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents
themselves were signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos
did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they opposed in court
petitioner's successive attempts at consignation and execution of
judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in existence and valid, would have
already precluded Tigno's causes of action for either consignation or
execution of judgment. The only believable conclusion, as drawn by
the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be created when
petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of
judgment—an existential anomaly if we were to agree with the
respondents that such document had been signed and notarized back
in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the
other observations of the RTC. It also pointed to certain incredible
aspects in the Aquinos' tale of events. It noted that no receipts were
ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual payment of
consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the
respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts.45 The
Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the receipts, an assertion which
the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for
receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the same.46 In itself,
the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be
conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the
totality of the circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of
such proof further militates against the claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of
Appeals that Bustria did not bother to seek his lawyer's assistance as
regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject
property had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of
Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not be
rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel,
the implausibility of the scenario strikes as odd and therefore
reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm
the doubts raised by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would
die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly
signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the
RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his home in Dasol,
Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the
Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the accomplishments of
nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should be
acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of
Bustria's age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist
on traveling significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the
alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise
appears on the judicial record. Bustria's signature in the 1981
Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising,
considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89)
years old. However, Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale, which if
genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-three (93) years old,
is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other evident
differences between Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale and on
other documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an
appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These have to be weighed
against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria
signed the Deed of Sale was established by the respective testimonies
of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cariño. In its own appreciation of
these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their
testimonies. As a final measure of analysis, the Court shall now
examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the
conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that
Judge Cariño himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in his office,
where the document was signed,47 while Judge Cariño testified that he
did not type the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the
parties arrived at his office for the signing.48 On this point, the Court of
Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record
revealed no material or substantial inconsistencies between the
testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the
inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who prepared the Deed of
Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the
Deed of Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly come
out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no contradictions
in the testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia on the question of
whether or not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private
document. Thus, not only the due execution of the document must be
proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by
the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia
now become material not only to establish due execution, but also the
authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies
pointed out by the RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the
identity of the progenitor of this all-important document is a material
evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the
respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each
other on the basis of their own personal and sensory knowledge.
Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having
drafted the document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony
grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale
would not ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the
transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the
document itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on
that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about
the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not
possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the
competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cariño
was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then
doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia.
It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse
deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and with
particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his
presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity
of the notary public, Judge Cariño, would be obviously compromised.
Assuming that Judge Cariño had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it
would indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the
document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his
testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious,
then there is all the reason to make a similar assumption as to his
testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need
to indubitably establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are
important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those
witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due
execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals
was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the
RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute
conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cariño. The
totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the
Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court
deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale, since
its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence
pointing to the non-existence of such a transaction is so clear and
convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut the typical presumption of
regularity arising from the due execution of notarial documents.
However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably
an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than
sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed,
Tigno's right to repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the
filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by
the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded
otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23
December 1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision dated
18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against
respondents.
Footnotes
28 The provision reads:
Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases
and discharges affecting lands, whether registered
under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in
law when made substantially in accordance with
the following forms, and shall be as effective to
convey, encumber, lease, release, discharge or
bind the lands as though made in accordance with
the more prolix forms heretofore in use: Provided,
That every such instrument shall be signed by the
person or persons executing the same, in the
presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the
instrument as witnesses to the execution thereof,
and shall be acknowledged to be his or their free
 act and deed by the person or persons executing
the same, before the judge of a court of record, or
clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or a
justice of the peace, who shall certify to such
acknowledgment substantially in the form next
hereinafter stated. (Emphasis supplied.)
Fuentes v. Buno 560 SCRA 22 (2008)
FACTS:
1. Geronimo Fuentes filed a complaint wherein he alleged that he is
one of the nine heirs of Bernardo Fuentes, their father, who owned
an agricultural land located at San Jose, Talibon, Bohol.
2. He also alleged that respondent judge prepared and notarized an
"Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" of
the said agricultural land, executed by complainant’s mother Eulalia
Credo Vda. de Fuentes, widow of Bernardo Fuentes, and Alejandro
Fuentes, on his own behalf and on behalf of his brothers and sisters,
including Geronimo Fuentes, as heirs/vendors and one Ma. Indira A.
Auxtero, as vendee.
3. In the aforesaid document, the aforementioned agricultural land
was sold, transferred and conveyed by the heirs/vendors to the
vendee despite the fact that in his Special Power of Attorney (SPA), he
merely appointed his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage said
agricultural land but not to partition, much more to sell the same.
4. According to complainant Geronimo Fuentes respondent judge
notarized said document as ex-officio Notary Public, thereby abusing
his discretion and authority as well as committing graft and corruption.
5. In defense, respondent judge contended that he could not be
charged of graft and corruption, since in a municipality where a notary
public is unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize
documents or deeds as ex-officio notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge has authority to notarize
the documents
RULING: No. While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code authorize MTC
and MCTC judges to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio,
the Court laid down the scope of said authority.
SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other
deeds of conveyances which have no direct relation to the discharge
of their official functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that
he prepared both the document itself, entitled "Extra-judicial Partition
with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" and the acknowledgment of
the said document, which had no relation at all to the performance of
his function as a judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly
proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing
within respondent judge’s territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the
certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor
of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a
certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the
said municipality or circuit be made in the notarized document. Here,
no such certification was made in the Extra-Judicial Partition with
Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to indicate in
his answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was charged for that
transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge,
who was the sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, failed
to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No.
1-90, even if he could have acted as notary public ex-officio in the
absence of any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit to
which he was assigned.
ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIO G.
RAMOS, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant Rosalinda
Bernardo Vda. de Rosales by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against
respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos for violation of Act No. 2711 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch. 11, otherwise know as the Notarial
Law, particularly Secs. 245 and 246 thereof.
In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda
Bernardo Vda. de Rosales, borrowed from Rosalinda the Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H in her name. The lot
measures 112 square meters and is located at the back of Manuel's house on
Fabie Street, Paco, Metro Manila. On 25 November 1990 Rosalinda sold this lot
to one Alfredo P. Castro. When she asked her brother Manuel to return her title
he refused.
On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title and
presented the affidavit to the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title
to the property was already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in favor of Manuel on 5 September
1990. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1
October 1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No.
718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however denied having signed any
deed of sale over her property in favor of Manuel.
On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a complaint for falsification
of public document against her brother Manuel. The NBI invited respondent
Atty. Ramos for questioning. The complaint alleged among others that on 12
September 1991 Atty. Mario G. Ramos executed an affidavit before the NBI
admitting that when Manuel presented the purported Deed of Absolute Sale to
him for notarization, he (Atty. Ramos) found some defects in the document and
that complainant Rosalinda was not around. The NBI Questioned Documents
Division also compared Rosalinda's signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute
Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and found that the signature in the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale and her genuine signatures were not written
by one and the same person.
On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila with the recommendation that Manuel and Atty. Ramos
be prosecuted for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 172 in relation to
Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and that Atty. Ramos be additionally
charged with violation of the Notarial Law.
The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) photocopies of the NBI investigation report
and its annexes, and a verified complaint[1 for disbarment signed by Rosalinda.
The CBD received the records on 5 October 1992. On the same date, the CBD
through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez directed respondent to submit an
answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Respondent admitted in his Answer[2 that he had affixed his signature on the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale but failed to enter the document in his
Notarial Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the NBI on 12
September 1991 an affidavit regarding the matter. Respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint since according to him he only inadvertently signed
the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his signature was procured
through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence, claiming that
he simply relied on the assurances of Manuel that the document would not be
used for purposes other than a loan between brother and sister, and that he
affixed his signature thereon with utmost good faith and without intending to
obtain personal gain or to cause damage or injury to another.
The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, 28 April 2000, 16 June 2000
and 5 October 2000. Complainant never appeared. The records show that the
notices sent to her address at 1497 Fabie Street, Paco, Manila, were returned
unclaimed.[3
On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD through Commissioner Fernandez that the case
against respondent be dismissed in view of complainant's failure to prosecute
and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate the complaint.[4 The
Investigating Commissioner found that the notices sent to complainant were
returned unclaimed with the annotation "moved out," and that she did not
leave any forwarding address, and neither did she come to the CBD to inquire
about the status of her case. From these actuations, he concluded that
complainant had lost interest in the further prosecution of this case,[5 and so
recommended its dismissal.
We cannot wholly agree with the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. It is clear from the pleadings before us that
respondent violated the Notarial Law in failing to register in his notarial book
the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact respondent readily admitted.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It
requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts
as notary,[6 and specifies what information with regard to the notarized
document should be entered therein.[7 Failure to perform this duty results in
the revocation of his commission as notary public.[8
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public.[9 Notarization converts a private document into a
public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity.[10 A notarial document is by law entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public
at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary
public and appended to a private instrument.[11
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.[12 Otherwise, the confidence
of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.[13 Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.[14 The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.[15
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the
necessary information regarding the document or instrument notarized and
retain a copy of the document presented to him for acknowledgment and
certification especially when it is a contract.[16 The notarial registry is a record
of the notary public's official acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments
recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document or instrument
does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt
is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so
that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on
this document. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized
documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his
notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document
was notarized when in fact it was not.
We take note of respondent's admission in his Answer that he had affixed his
signature in the purported Deed of Absolute Sale but he did not enter it in his
notarial registry. This is clearly in violation of the Notarial Law for which he must
be disciplined.
Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed of Absolute
Sale inadvertently and that his signature was procured through mistake, fraud,
undue influence or excusable negligence as he relied on the assurances of
Manuel A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that the document would
not be used for any illegal purpose.
We cannot honor, much less give credit to this allegation. That respondent
notarized the document out of sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate
excuse. It is appalling that respondent did away with the basics of notarial
procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a friend and client. In
doing so, he displayed a decided lack of respect for the solemnity of an oath in
a notarial document. He also exhibited his clear ignorance of the importance of
the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the Notarial Law, he also
did so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-
observance.
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a
notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under
his hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of
the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary
public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and
delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without
further proof of their execution and delivery.[17 Where the notary public is a
lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath
to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.[18 Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted
actions.
From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G. Ramos failed to exercise the
due diligence required of him in the performance of the duties of notary public.
We do not agree however that his negligence should merit disbarment, which
is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. Disbarment should never be
imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct,
should no longer remain a member of the bar. Removal from the bar should
not really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary
suspension or fine - would accomplish the end desired.[19 Under the
circumstances, imposing sanctions decreed under the Notarial Law and
suspension from the practice of law would suffice.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, the
commission of respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos as Notary Public, if still
existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty. Ramos should be DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment to the office of Notary Public.
Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report
to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when his
suspension shall have taken effect.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately circularize this
Decision for the proper guidance of all concerned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
[6 The Notarial Law, Sec. 245. Notarial Register. - Every notary public shall keep
a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of
all his official acts as notary x x x x
[7 Id; Sec. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in
such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date
of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by
him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and when the instrument
is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and
shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof,
and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one
in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his
register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register
on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries x x x
x"
[8 Id; Sec. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. - The following
derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the
proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission x x x x (b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or
entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required
by law x x x x "
ATTY. MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALEJANDRO P. ZABALA, respondent.
In his Letter-Complaint for Disbarment filed before the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Atty. Miniano
B. Dela Cruz charged respondent, Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala, for violating his
oath as a notary public.
Complainant alleged that respondent notarized with unknown witnesses, a fake
deed of sale allegedly executed by two dead people, in gross violation of his
oath as a Commissioned Notary Public in Quezon City.1
Complainant averred that he was retained by a certain Demetrio C. Marero last
December 21, 1996, to finance and undertake the filing of a Petition for the
Issuance of a Second Duplicate Original of the Owner's copy of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4153, in the names of Sps. Pedro Sumulong and
Cirila Tapales before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72. The
court issued an Order approving the said petition on March 10, 1997.2
On May 20, 1997, complainant purchased the said property from Marero and
had the title transferred to him and his wife. OCT No. 4153 was then cancelled
and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 330000.3
The next day, complainant requested a certain Mrs. Adoracion Losloso and Mr.
Nestor Aguirre to register the title in the former's name at the Assessor's Office
of Antipolo City. However, they were unable to do so because the property was
already registered in the name of Antipolo Properties, Inc., under TCT No. N-
107359.4
On May 27, 1997, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over the land
covered by OCT No. 4153, executed by Cirila Tapales and Pedro Sumulong in
favor of the complainant and his wife.5
On December 9, 1997, Mr. Marero filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title
of the land, subject of the Deed of Sale which was notarized by respondent,
with damages against the complainant and his wife. The Deed of Sale was the
same document Marero used when he filed a complaint for Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document docketed as I.S. No. 98-16357 before the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office and in a disbarment case docketed as Adm.
Case No. 4963 against complainant.6
Purportedly, to clear his name, complainant filed this complaint for disbarment
against respondent. According to complainant, respondent notarized an
irregular document where one of the parties to the transaction was already
dead, grossly violating his oath as a notary public.7
The IBP then required the respondent to file his answer to the said allegations.
Respondent, in his Answer alleged that as a notary, he did not have to go
beyond the documents presented to him for notarization. In notarial law, he
explains, the minimum requirements to notarize a document are the presence
of the parties and their presentation of their community tax certificate. As long
as these requirements are met, the documents may be notarized. Furthermore,
he adds, when he notarized the Deed of Sale, he had no way of knowing
whether the persons who appeared before him were the real owners of the
land or were merely poseurs.8
Thereafter, the parties were ordered to appear before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline on July 31, 2001 and August 21, 2001, and required to submit
their position papers.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in its Report dated September 29, 2003,
recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violating Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.9 The allegations with respect to the prayer
for disbarment were recommended for dismissal for insufficiency of evidence.
The Commissioner held that complainant failed to establish by convincing proof
that respondent had to be disbarred because of his notarial negligence. The
alleged failures of respondent did not indicate a clear intent to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, according to the
Commission's Report.
Noteworthy, however, respondent did not deny that he notarized the cited
Deed of Sale under the circumstances alleged by complainant. It appears that
there was negligence on respondent's part which, in our view, is quite serious.
Thus, we cannot conclude that he did not violate the Notarial Law,10 and our
rules regarding Notarial Practice.11 Nor could we agree that, as recommended
by the IBP, he should only be reprimanded. At least his commission as Notary
Public should be revoked and for two years he should be disqualified from being
commissioned as such.
The IBP noted that on its face, the Deed of Sale was not executed by the
purported vendee and that only Pedro Sumulong appeared and executed the
deed even though the property was co-owned by Pedro Sumulong and Cirila
Tapales. In addition, a copy of the title was not attached to the said Deed of
Sale when it was presented for notarization. The aforementioned
circumstances should have alerted respondent. Given the ease with which
community tax certificates are obtained these days, respondent should have
been more vigilant in ascertaining the identity of the persons who appeared
before him.
We have empathically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.12
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides,
...
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
 acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall
so state. [Emphasis ours.]
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein
are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to.
Otherwise, their representative's names should appear in the said documents
as the ones who executed the same.13
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements.14 By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he
converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public
document. In doing so, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that (1)
all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (2) they are all
personally known to him; (3) they were the same persons who executed the
instruments; (4) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the
instrument; and (5) they acknowledged personally before him that they
voluntarily and freely executed the same.15 As a lawyer commissioned to be a
notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with
faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat.16 Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
him, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale
without ascertaining the identities of the persons executing the same
constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala GUILTY of
gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public. His notarial commission, if
still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is DIRECTED
to report the date of his receipt of this Resolution to the Court within five (5)
days from such receipt. Further, he is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should
not be subject to disciplinary action as a member of the Bar.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land as well as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let
this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL L. LEE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Respondent.
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged
respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the
ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee,
Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained
the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported
witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr.
and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on
June 30, 1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence
certificate2 of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated
January 5, 1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same
as his signature as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing his purported
genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased
father in the will and in the deed of donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and
diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]."5
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their
signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective
voters' affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in
the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the
certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999
stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed
by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office['s]
files.6
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint
against him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the
decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and
spurious. He alleged that complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee,
Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized
by respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee,
Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr.,
namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx."9
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him
because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman "did not prosper."
Respondent did not dispute complainant's contention that no copy of the will
was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the
contested will could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action
against him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of
nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.10
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of
violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised
Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics,
particularly Canon 111 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).13 Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three
months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26,
2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's
failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary
public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law
for one year and Respondent's notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified fromreappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.14
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed
by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect
after his death.15 A will may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution
of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.16
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another.17
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On
this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void.18 This is in
consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses.19 The importance of this
requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other
requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate
provision.20
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It
involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to
the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.21 The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the
testator's wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows
that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied
with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence
certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testator's old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent
invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held
in Santiago v. Rafanan:22
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They
are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before
him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such
certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the
degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized
documents.23 A notary public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe
these elementary requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence
certificate upon notarization of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax.
- Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public
shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their
proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence
tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate
the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as
aforesaid.25
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence
Tax Act26 which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any
document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with
whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the
residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person
xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and
correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of
residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an
expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much
could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates
of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a
copy of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy
of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis
supplied)
Respondent's failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy
of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the
necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial
Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in
chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;
2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
6. give each entry a consecutive number; andcralawlibrary
7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the
instrument.27
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule,
respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered
instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his
notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a
certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of
Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is
shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the
existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,29 otherwise, the
evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondent's
notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution
of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the
admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondent's attempt to controvert the certification dated
September 21, 199930 must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of
the certification dated March 15, 2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove
the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.33
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the
entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the
importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the
witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for
his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of
his breach of duty.35
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. - The following derelictions of duty on
the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first
instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.36
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of
his oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138
of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.40 For
a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.41
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation
imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the
basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should
moreover make himself an example for others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he
is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is
concerned.43
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these
conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary
sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has
engaged in professional misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant
lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in
a number of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution47 and should not be decreed if any punishment less severe - such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine - will accomplish the end desired.48 The rule then
is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the
elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised his
duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of
existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very irresponsibly in
notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient
basis for the revocation of his commission50 and his perpetual disqualification
to be commissioned as a notary public.51
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of
professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer's Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old
Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year and his notarial commission REVOKED.Because he has not lived up to the
trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the
court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as
made part of the personal records of respondent.
Endnotes:
11
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
12
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
13
Annex "A," Report and Recommendation by Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano
III, dated February 27 2006. Rollo, p. 13.
24Under the old Notarial Law, non-lawyers may be commissioned as notaries
public subject to certain conditions. Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
(A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, effective August 1, 2004), however, only lawyers may be
granted a notarial commission.
29
"When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated." RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 5.30
37 "Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines;
(b) Xxx," RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20, par. (a).
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V.
LEGASPI, and JUANITO V. LEGASPI, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR., respondent.
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr.,
Dolores L. Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V. Legaspi,
and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent notarized a
document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver
of Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro.
Complainants further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this document were
forged; (2) they did not appear and acknowledge the document on July 16, 2004
before respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3) their purported community tax
certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the
acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it appear,
among other things, that complainants "personally came and appeared before
him" and that they affixed their signatures on the document in his presence. In
the process, complainants added, respondent effectively enabled their sister,
Navarro, to assume full ownership of their deceased parents’ property in
Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
303936 and sell the same to the Department of Public Works and Highways.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the
document in question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He explained
that "he notarized [the] document in good faith relying on the representation
and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the community tax
certificates appearing in the document were true and correct." Navarro would
not, according to respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors of,
each other for 30 years. Finally, respondent disclaimed liability for any damage
or injury considering that the falsified document had been revoked and
canceled.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), found the following as established: (1) the questioned document bore the
signatures and community tax certificates of, and purports to have been
executed by, complainants and Navarro; (2) respondent indeed notarized the
questioned document on July 16, 2004; (3) complainants did not appear and
acknowledge the document before respondent on July 16, 2004; (4)
respondent notarized the questioned document only on Navarro’s
representation that the signatures appearing and community tax certificates
were true and correct; and (5) respondent did not ascertain if the purported
signatures of each of the complainants appearing in the document belonged to
them.
The Commission concluded that with respondent’s admission of having
notarized the document in question against the factual backdrop as thus
established, a clear case of falsification and violation of the Notarial Law had
been committed when he stated in the Acknowledgment that:
Before me, on this 16th day of July 16, 2004 at Manila, personally
came and appeared the above-named persons with their respective
Community Tax Certificates as follows:
xxxx
who are known to me to be the same persons who executed the
foregoing instrument and they acknowledge to me that the same is
their own free act and deed. x x x
For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended, conformably with the
Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Ramos,1 that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial commission, if still existing, be
revoked; and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two
(2) years. On September 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-147, adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Commission.
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises
holding it together. It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain from
affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who
signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared
before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein, for
under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law, an instrument or
document shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment is made in
accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall
so state.2
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in
question, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party’s free act or deed.3 Furthermore, notaries public are required by the
Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and
presented before the notaries public the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and
date of issue as part of certification.4 Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice5 now requires a party to the instrument to present competent
evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.-The phrase "competent
evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an individual
based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official
agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such
as but not limited to, passport, driver’s license, Professional
Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation
clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID, Barangay
certification, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card,
Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen
card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW
ID, seaman’s book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as
amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to
the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual
and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be remembered that
notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a
private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution.6 A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face
and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic
requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public
on notorized documents will be eroded.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial commission of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., if still existing, is REVOKED. He
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two
(2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same negligent act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
IBP and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it
entered into respondent’s personal record.
SO ORDERED.