G.R. No.

150731 September 14, 2007

CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioner,
vs. PHILBANKING CORPORATION, respondent.

On appeal to this Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the March 29, 2001 Decision1 and
November 7, 2001 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63979
entitled Philbanking Corporation v. Casent Realty Development Corporation. The CA reversed the May
12, 1999 Order3 of the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 93-2612,
which granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint filed by respondent.

The Facts
The facts according to the appellate court are as follows:
In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor
of Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) involving the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No. 84-04) and
PhP 681,500 (PN No. 84-05). It was agreed in PN No. 84-04 that the loan it covered would earn an
interest of 36% per annum and a penalty of 12% in case of non-payment by June 27, 1985, while the
loan covered by PN No. 84-05 would earn an interest of 18% per annum and 12% penalty if not paid
by June 25, 1985.4 On August 8, 1986, these promissory notes were assigned to respondent
Philbanking Corporation through a Deed of Assignment.
Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes upon
maturity such that its obligation already amounted to PhP 5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993.
Respondent filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the collection of said
amount. In its Answer, petitioner raised the following as special/affirmative defenses:
1. The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same was barred by estoppel,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, laches, prescription, payment, and/or release;
2. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago (Dacion) which ceded and conveyed
petitioner’s property in Iloilo City to respondent, with the intention of totally extinguishing
petitioner’s outstanding accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a Confirmation
Statement dated April 3, 1989 issued by respondent stating that petitioner had no loans with
the bank as of December 31, 1988.
3. Petitioner complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the property
since the obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation statements in the latter
months of 1989, which showed that petitioner had no more outstanding loan; and
4. Assuming that petitioner still owed respondent, the latter was already estopped since in
October 1988, it reduced its authorized capital stock by 50% to wipe out a deficit of PhP
41,265,325.12.

Thus, petitioner, by way of compulsory counterclaim, alleged that it made an overpayment of

approximately PhP 4 million inclusive of interest based on Central Bank Reference Lending Rates on
dates of overpayment. Petitioner further claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fee,
amounting to PhP 4.5 million plus the costs of suit as a consequence of respondent’s insistence on
collecting.

The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference. Thereafter,
respondent presented its evidence and formally offered its exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence,11 pointing out that the plaintiff’s failure to file a Reply to the
Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the
genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated petitioner’s
obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.
Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition12 which alleged that: (1) the grounds relied upon by
petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered in evidence and evaluated; and (3) since respondent
failed to file a Reply, then all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint through the May 12, 1999
Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] finding defendant’s Motion For Judgment On
Demurrer To The Evidence to be meritorious[,] the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently,
considering that the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff having been extinguish[ed] by
a Dacion en Pago duly executed by said parties, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED,
with prejudice. Without Cost.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, respondent alleged that the trial court gravely erred because the promissory notes were
not covered by the Dacion, and that respondent was able to prove its causes of action and right to
relief by overwhelming preponderance of evidence. It explained that at the time of execution of
the Dacion, the subject of the promissory notes was the indebtedness of petitioner to Rare Realty and
not to the "Bank"––the party to the Dacion. It was only in 1989 after Rare Realty defaulted in its
obligation to respondent when the latter enforced the security provided under the Deed of
Assignment by trying to collect from petitioner, because it was only then that petitioner became
directly liable to respondent. It was also for this reason that the April 3, 1989 Confirmation Statement
stated that petitioner had no obligations to repondent as of December 31, 1988. On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that the Deed of Assignment provided that Rare Realty lost its rights, title, and
interest to directly proceed against petitioner on the promissory notes since these were transferred
to respondent. Petitioner reiterated that the Dacion covered all conceivable amounts including the
promissory notes.

The appellate court ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be resolved in a
demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the law.
Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which alleged the Dacion, and
that its genuineness and due execution were not at issue. It added that the court a quo should have
resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioner’s
demurrer was granted, it had already lost its right to present its evidence.
The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, respondent clearly had the right to proceed against
the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty. Thus, the CA ruled, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated May 12, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 145, Makati City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Judgment is hereby entered ORDERING [petitioner] Casent Realty [Development] Corporation to:
1. pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation the amount of P300,000.00 with an interest of
36% per annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay the same on its maturity date, June
27, 1985 as stipulated in Promissory Note No. 84-04;
2. pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation the amount of P681,500.00 with an interest of
18% per annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay the same on its maturity date, June
25, 1985 as stipulated in Promissory Note No. 84-05; and
3. pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation, the amount representing 25% of total amount
due as attorney’s fee as stipulated in the promissory notes.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied by the CA in its November 7, 2001
Resolution.

The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE PETITIONER’S
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ITS ANSWER IN RESOLVING A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; AND
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY THE RESPONDENT
In other words, the questions posed by this case are:
1. Does respondent’s failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation Statement
under oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of these
documents?
2. Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence? If yes, are the
judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the complaint?

Petitioner asserts that its obligation to pay under the promissory notes was already extinguished as
evidenced by the Dacion and Confirmation Statement. Petitioner submits that when it presented
these documents in its Answer, respondent should have denied the same under oath. Since
respondent failed to file a Reply, the genuineness and due execution of said documents were deemed
admitted, thus also admitting that the loan was already paid. On the other hand, respondent states
that while it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters were deemed controverted pursuant to Section
10, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. Also, the loan which was covered by the Dacion refers to another loan
of petitioner amounting to PhP 3,921,750 which was obtained directly from the respondent as of
August 1986.20 Furthermore, petitioner argued that assuming respondent admitted the genuineness
and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement, said admission was not all-
encompassing as to include the allegations and defenses pleaded in petitioner’s Answer.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.
Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.––After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we defined a demurrer to evidence as "an objection by one of the parties
in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue."

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the
rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as
capacity to sue. However, the plaintiff’s evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a demurrer
to evidence. The "facts" referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the Rules
of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of
judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the
only exclusion being the defendant’s evidence.
Petitioner points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were submitted
in the Answer, should have been specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with
Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
Section 8. How to contest such documents.––When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless
the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth, what he claims to be the
facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to
be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused.

Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due
execution of said documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the appellate
court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.––An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceeding in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

On appeal to the CA, respondent claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters
alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.––A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts
in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or
make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged
in the answer are deemed controverted.

We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a
written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section
10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer
is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made;
otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since
respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in
resolving the demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Sweet Lines, Inc. that "[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed
admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the
instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact."24
In any case, the CA found that:
From the facts of the case, the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion en Pago were
never put to issue. Genuineness merely refers to the fact that the signatures were not falsified
and/or whether there was no substantial alteration to the document. While due execution
refers to whether the document was signed by one with authority.

The more important issue now is whether the Dacion and Confirmation Statement sufficiently prove
that petitioner’s liability was extinguished. Respondent asserts that the admission of the genuineness
and due execution of the documents in question is not all encompassing as to include admission of
the allegations and defenses pleaded in petitioner’s Answer. In executing the Dacion, the intention of
the parties was to settle only the loans of petitioner with respondent, not the obligation of petitioner
arising from the promissory notes that were assigned by Rare Realty to respondent.

We AGREE.
Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not
prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes.
Petitioner, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the
promissory notes.

The promissory notes matured in June 1985, and Rare Realty assigned these promissory notes to
respondent through a Deed of Assignment dated August 8, 1986. The Deed of Assignment provides,
thus:
Rare Realty Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with law, with
office at 8th Floor Philbanking Building, Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila (herein called Assignor)
in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND & 00/100
pesos [PhP 3,790,000.00] and as security fee or in the payment of the sum, obtained or to be
obtained as loan or credit accommodation of whatever form or nature from the [PHILBANKING]
CORPORATION, with office at Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila (herein called Assignee), including
renewals or extensions of such loan or credit accommodation, now existing or hereinafter
incurred, due or to become due, whether absolute or contingent, direct or indirect, and whether
incurred by the Assignor as principal, guarantor, surety, co-maker, or in any other capacity,
including interest, charges, penalties, fees, liquidated damage, collection expenses and attorney’s
fee, the Assignor hereby assigns, transfers and conveys to Assignee all its rights, title and interest
in and to: (a) contracts under which monies are or will be due to Assignor, (b) moneys due or to
be due thereunder, or (c) letters of credit and/or proceeds or moneys arising from negotiations
under such credits, all which are herein called moneys or receivables assigned or assigned moneys
or receivables, and are attached, or listed and described in the Attached Annex A (for contracts)
or Annex B (for letters of credit).

It is clear from the foregoing deed that the promissory notes were given as security for the loan
granted by respondent to Rare Realty. Through the Deed of Assignment, respondent stepped into the
shoes of Rare Realty as petitioner’s creditor.
Respondent alleged that petitioner obtained a separate loan of PhP 3,921,750. Thus, when petitioner
and respondent executed the Dacion on August 27, 1986, what was then covered was petitioner’s
loan from the bank. The Dacion provides, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the DEBTOR hereby transfers and
conveys in favor of the BANK by way of Dacion en Pago, the above-described property in full
satisfaction of its outstanding indebtedness in the amount of P3,921,750.00 to the BANK, subject
to x x x terms and conditions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The language of the Dacion is unequivocal––the property serves in full satisfaction of petitioner’s
own indebtedness to respondent, referring to the loan of PhP 3,921,750. For this reason, the bank
issued a Confirmation Statement saying that petitioner has no unpaid obligations with the bank as of
December 31, 1988.

In 1989, however, Rare Realty defaulted in its payment to respondent. Thus, respondent proceeded
against the security assigned to it, that is, the promissory notes issued by the petitioner. Under these
promissory notes, petitioner is liable for the amount of PhP 300,000 with an interest of 36% per
annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the maturity date, June 27, 1985; and for the amount
of PhP 681,500 with an interest of 18% per annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the
maturity date, June 25, 1985.

WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001 Resolution of the CA
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016
FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondent.

The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the
defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are
considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because
the defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

The Case
The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on July 2, 2013, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the order issued on November 23, 2011 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, in
Manila, denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 09-122116
entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines.

Antecedents
From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with
medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the
respondent's hospital under the following contracts:
a. Memorandum of Agreement dated January 9, 2006 for the supply ol' medical equipment in
the total amount of P18,625,000.00
b. Deed of Undertaking dated July 5, 2006 for the installation of medical gas pipeline system
valued at P8,500,000.00
c. Deed of Undertaking dated July 27, 2006 for the supply of one unit of Diamond Select Slice CT
and one unit of Diamond Select CV-P costing P65,000,000.00; and
d. Deed of Undertaking dated February 2, 2007 for the supply of furnishings and equipment
worth P32,926,650.00.

According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 57,683.23 of its total obligation of
P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54. However, on February 11, 2009, the
petitioner and the respondent, respectively represented by Rafael P. Fernando and Guillermo T.
Maglaya, Sr., entered into an agreement,8 whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only
P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36
months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009,10 the respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration
had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic
prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the February 11, 2009
agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having been signed by
Maglaya whose term of office had expired.

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent.

Due to the respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of
money in the RTC, averring as follows:
xxxx

2. On January 9, 2006, plaintiff supplied defendant with hospital medical equipment for an in
consideration of P18,625,000.00 payable in the following manner: (2.1) For nos. 1 to 9 of items to be
sourced from Fernando Medical Equipment, Inc. (FMEI) - 30% down payment of P17,475,000 or
P5,242,500 with the balance of PI2,232,500 or 70% payable in 24 equal monthly instalments of
P509,687.50 and (2.2.) cash transaction amounting to P1,150,000.00 (2.3) or an initial cash payment
of P6,392,500.00 with the remaining balance payable in 24 equal monthly installments every 20th day
of each month until paid, as stated in the Memorandum of Agreement, copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "A";

3. On July 5, 2006, plaintiff installed defendants medical gas pipeline system in the latter's hospital
building complex for and in consideration of P8,500,000.00 payable upon installation thereof under
a Deed of Undertaking, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B";

4. On July 27, 2006, plaintiff supplied defendant one (1) unit Diamond Select Slice CT and one (1) unit
Diamond Select CV-9 for and in consideration of P65,000,000.00 thirty percent (30%) of which shall
be paid as down payment and the balance in 30 equal monthly instalments as provided in that Deed
of Undertaking, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C";

5. On February 2, 2007, plaintiff supplied defendants hospital furnishings and equipment for an in
consideration of P32,926,650.00 twenty percent (20%) of which was to be paid as downpayment and
the balance in 30 months under a Deed of Undertaking, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
"D";

6. Defendant's total obligation to plaintiff was P123,901,650.00 as of February 15, 2009, but
defendant was able to pay plaintiff the sum of P67,357,683.23 thus leaving a balance P54,654,195.54
which has become overdue and demandable;

7. On February 11, 2009, plaintiff agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00 and extended its
payment for 36 months provided defendants shall pay the same within 36 months and to issue 36
postdated checks therefor in the amount of P1,400,000.00 each to which defendant agreed under an
Agreement, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "E";

8. Accordingly, defendant issued in favor of plaintiff 36 postdated checks each in the [a]mount of
P1,400,000.00 but after four (4) of the said checks in the sum of P5,600,000.00 were honored
defendant stopped their payment thus making the entire obligation of defendant due and
demandable under the February 11, 2009 agreement;

9. In a letter dated May 27, 2009, defendant claimed that all of the first four (4) agreements may be
rescissible and one of them is unenforceable while the Agreement dated February 11, 2009 was
without the requisite board approval as it was signed by an agent whose term of office already
expired, copy of which letter is hereto attached as Annex "F";

10. Consequently, plaintiff told defendant that if it does not want to honor the February 11, 2009
contract then plaintiff will insists [sic] on its original claim which is P54,654,195.54 and made a
demand for the payment thereof within 10 days from receipt of its letter copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "G";

11. Defendant received the aforesaid letter on July 6, 2009 but to date it has not paid plaintiff any
amount, either in the first four contracts nor in the February 11, 2009 agreement, hence, the latter
was constrained to institute the instant suit and thus incurred attorney's fee equivalent to 10% of the
overdue account but only after endeavouring to resolve the dispute amicable and in a spirit of
friendship[;]
12. Under the February 11, 2009 agreement the parties agreed to bring all actions or proceedings
thereunder or characterized therewith in the City of Manila to the exclusion of other courts and for
defendant to pay plaintiff 3% per months of delay without need of demand;
xxxx

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, 14 namely: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum
shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint for
the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan
City; and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for
collection.

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009,16 the respondent filed its answer (ad
cautelam), averring thusly:
xxxx

2. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint are ADMITTED subject to the
special and affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;

3. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged
transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan
University-Philippines. At any rate, these allegations are subject to the special and affirmative
defenses hereafter pleaded;

4. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 9 and 10 of the complaint are ADMITTED subject to the special
and affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;

5. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 11 and 12 of the complaint are DENIED for being conclusions
of law.
xxxx

The petitioner filed its reply to the answer.

On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating
that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender
any issue as to such allegations.

The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had
specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint, particularly paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 11 and
12.

On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings of the petitioner, to wit:
At the hearing of the "Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings" filed by the plaintiff thru counsel,
Atty. Jose Mañacop on September 28, 2011, the court issued an Order dated October 27, 2011 which
read in part as follows:
xxxx
Considering that the allegations stated on the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, are
evidentiary in nature, the Court, instead of acting on the same, hereby sets this case for pre-trial,
considering that with the Answer and the Reply, issues have been joined.
xxxx

In view therefore of the Order of the Court dated October 27, 2011. let the Motion for Judgment Based
on the Pleadings be hereby ordered DENIED on reasons as abovestated and hereto reiterated.
xxxx

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on December 29, 2011.

The petitioner assailed the denial in the CA on certiorari.

Judgment of the CA

On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent had
admitted the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, viz.:
It must be remembered that Private Respondent admitted the existence of the subject contracts,
including Petitioner's fulfilment of its obligations under the same, but subjected the said admission
to the "special and affirmative defenses" earlier raised in its Motion to Dismiss.
xxxx

Obviously, Private Respondent's special and affirmative defenses are not of such character as to avoid
Petitioner's claim. The same special and affirmative defenses have been passed upon by the RTC in
its Order dated July 19, 2010 when it denied Private Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. As correctly
found by the RTC, Private Respondent's special and affirmative defences of lack of jurisdiction over
its person, improper venue, litis pendentia and wilful and deliberate forum shopping are not
meritorious and cannot operate to dismiss Petitioner's Complaint. Hence, when Private Respondent
subjected its admission to the said defenses, it is as though it raised no defense at all.

Not even is Private Respondent's contention that the rescission case must take precedence over
Petitioner's Complaint for Sum of Money tenable. To begin with. Private Respondent had not yet
proven that the subject contracts are rescissible. And even if the subject contracts are indeed
rescissible, it is well-settled that rescissible contracts are valid contracts until they are rescinded.
Since the subject contracts have not yet been rescinded, they are deemed valid contracts which may
be enforced in legal contemplation.

In effect, Private Respondent admitted that it entered into the subject contracts and that Petitioner
had performed its obligations under the same.

As regards Private Respondent's denial by disavowal of knowledge of the Agreement dated February
11, 2009, We agree with Petitioner that such denial was made in bad faith because such allegations
are plainly and necessarily within its knowledge.

In its letter dated May 27, 2009, Private Respondent made reference to the Agreement dated
February 11, 2009, viz.:
"The Agreement dated 11 February 2009, in particular, was entered into by an Agent of the University
without the requisite authority from the Board of Trustees, and executed when said agent's term of
office had already expired. Consequently, such contract is, being an unenforceable contract."
Also, Private Respondent averred in page 5 of its Complaint for Rescission, which it attached to its
Motion to Dismiss, that:
"13. On 6 February 2009, when the terms of office of plaintiffs Board of Trustess chaired by
Dominador Cabasal, as well as of Atty. Guillermo C. Maglaya as President, had already expired,
thereby rendering them on a hold-over capacity, the said Board once again authorized Atty. Maglaya
to enter into another contract with defendant FMEI, whereby the plaintiff was obligated to pay and
deliver to defendant FMEI the amount of Fifty Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php50,400,000.00) in thirty five (35) monthly instalments of One Million Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Phpl,400,000.00), representing the balance of the payment for the medical equipment
supplied under the afore-cited rescissible contracts. This side agreement, executed five (5) days later,
or on 11 February 2009, and denominated as "AGREEMENT", had no object as a contract, but was
entered into solely for the purpose of getting the plaintiff locked-in to the payment of the balance
price under the rescissible contracts; x x x"

From the above averments, Private Respondent cannot deny knowledge of the Agreement dated
February 11, 2009. In one case, it was held that when a respondent makes a "specific denial" of a
material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon to
support its general denial, when such matters where plainly within its knowledge and the defendant
could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, said defendant fails to properly tender an issue."

the CA ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance
due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its
complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City, to wit:
However, Private Respondent's disavowal of knowledge of its outstanding balance is well-taken.
Paragraph 6 of Petitioner's Complaint states that Private Respondent was able to pay only the
amount of P67,357,683.23. Taken together with paragraph 8, which states that Private Respondent
was only able to make good four (4) check payments worth P1,400,000.00 or a total of P5,600,000.00,
Private Respondent's total payments would be, in Petitioner's view, P72,957,683.23. However, in
its Complaint for Rescission, attached to its Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Complaint for Sum of
Money, Private Respondent alleged that:
"16. To date, plaintiff had already paid defendant the amount of Seventy Eight Million Four Hundred
One Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P78,401,650.00)"

It is apparent that Private Respondent's computation and Petitioner's computation of the total
payments made by Private Respondent are different. Thus, Private Respondent tendered an issue as
to the amount of the balance due to Petitioner under the subject contracts.27chanrobleslaw

Hence, this appeal.

Issue

The petitioner posits that the CA erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the
allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission; and insists that the CA should have
confined itself to the respondent's answer in the action in order to resolve the petitioner's motion for
judgment based on the pleadings.

In contrast, the respondent contends that it had specifically denied the material allegations of the
petitioner's complaint, including the amount claimed; and that the CA only affirmed the previous
ruling of the RTC that the pleadings submitted by the parties tendered an issue as to the balance
owing to the petitioner.
Did the CA commit reversible error in affirming the RTC's denial of the petitioner's motion for
judgment on the pleadings?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

The rule on judgment based on the pleadings is Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, which
provides thus:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading, x x x

The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are
issues of fact generated by the pleadings.28 Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not depends on
how the defending party's answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The
defending party's answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit, being undisputed, will
not require evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the
answer properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence.

The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party's pleadings not only
when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it omits to deal with them at
all.29 The controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of
fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which
he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon which
he relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a
part of an averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material
allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only the remainder. The third is done
by the defending party who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material
averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the
amount of unliquidated damages.

In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or defense is based, which is
also known as the actionable document, the pleader of such document is required either to set forth
the substance of such instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach the original or a copy
thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall then be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or to
set forth a copy in the pleading.31 The adverse party is deemed to admit the genuineness and due
execution of the actionable document unless he specifically denies them under oath, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection
of the original instrument is refused.

In Civil Case No. 09-122116, the respondent expressly admitted paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of
the complaint. The admission related to the petitioner's allegations on: (a) the four transactions for
the delivery and installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the respondent;
(c) the payments made by the respondents; (d) the balance still due to the petitioner; and (e) the
execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement. The admission of the various agreements, especially
the February 11, 2009 agreement, significantly admitted the petitioner's complaint. To recall, the
petitioner's cause of action was based on the February 1 1, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable
document in the case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of the February 11, 2009
agreement, and contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of the genuineness
and due execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement, judgment on the pleadings became proper. As
held in Santos v. Alcazar:

There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness
and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party. With the consequent admission
engendered by petitioners' failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled
with its proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to mention petitioners'
admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the
Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the document, and there is no need to present
receipts and other documents to prove the claimed indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an
ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a
document evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into. The absence of rebutting evidence
occasioned by petitioners' waiver of their right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as
the best evidence of the transactions between the parties and the consequential indebtedness
incurred. Indeed, the effect of the admission is such that a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff
which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitled him to a judgment on the
pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the
defendant. (citations omitted)

The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint "for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged
transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan
University-Philippines." Was the manner of denial effective as a specific denial?

We answer the query in the negative. Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the respondent's total obligation
as of February 15, 2009 was P123,901,650.00, but its balance thereafter became only P54,654,195.54
because it had since then paid P67,357,683.23 to the petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that the
petitioner had agreed with the respondent on February 11, 2009 to reduce the balance to only
P50,400,000.00, which the respondent would pay in 36 months through 36 postdated checks of
P1,400,000.00 each, which the respondent then issued for the purpose. Paragraph no. 8 averred that
after four of the checks totalling P5,600,000.00 were paid the respondent stopped payment of the
rest, rendering the entire obligation due and demandable pursuant to the February 11, 2009
agreement. Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the
respondent ought to know or could have easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such
material averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters
clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been known by it are
insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.

That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special and
affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis pendentia and forum
shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved matters
extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner's claim, and thus did not negate the material averments of the
complaint.

Lastly, we should emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on
the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No.
09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for
ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such,
the respondent's averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its
complaint for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent
remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the
respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the
P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability.
The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2, 2013;
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its proceedings in Civil Case No. 09-
122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines, and to
forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings by rendering the proper
judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202597 February 8, 2017
SPS SERGIO C. PASCUAL, Petitioners
vs. FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL), INC., Respondents

On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of
Appeals (CA) in order to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case No.
4577 by the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC) ordering the cancellation of their notice of lis
pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-42190 of the Register of Deeds of Butuan
City.
After the responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the CA scheduled the preliminary
conference on October 4, 2011, and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs. Instead
of filing their pre-trial brief, the petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold
Pre-Trial in Abeyance. At the scheduled preliminary conference, the petitioners and their counsel did
not appear.
On November 16, 2011, the CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment, stating:
Section 4 through 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provide, viz:
Sec. 4. Appearance of parties. - It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the
pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if
a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admission of facts and of documents.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.- The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to
the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall
be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on
the basis thereof.
Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief - x x x
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Petitioners, instead of complying with our order, filed the twin motions, averring that it behooves us
to rule first on their motions before pre-trial could be conducted, "especially with the incompatibility
of a pending Motion for Summary Judgment vis-a-vis the conduct of pre-trial conference."

Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original action before the Court of
Appeals, pre-trial is mandatory, per Section 6 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, whereby the failure of
the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief
has the same import.
In fact, contrary to petitioners' assertion, it is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to
render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section 2 (g) of Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:
x x xx
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing
the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist.

Moreover, in an Order dated October 20, 2011, we noted petitioners and counsel's special
appearance via a new counsel, but failed to accept the same as the latter was not armed with the
appropriate documents to appear as such. Therefore, it was as if petitioners did not appear during
the Preliminary Conference.
It is not for the petitioners to arrogate whether or not pre-trial may be suspended or dispensed with,
or that their motions be resolved first, as the same are discretionary upon the court taking cognizance
of the petition. Furthermore, their failure to furnish private respondent Robinsons Land Corporation
a copy of their Motion for Reconsideration of our denial of their TRO and/or WPI, and to submit proof
of service thereof to this court is tantamount to failure to obey lawful orders of the court.

This we cannot countenance. Strict compliance with the Rules is indispensable for the prevention of
needless delays and the promotion of orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Hence,
petitioners' failure to comply with our directives merits dismissal of their petition. We find support
in the provision of Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.
x x xx
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule 48, or to comply with
orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable cause ...
The Supreme Court has invariably ruled that while "litigation is not a game of technicalities," it is
equally important that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16
November 2011), which the CA denied on January 9, 2012 for being filed out of time. Unrelenting, they
presented a Respectful Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 9 January 2012), which the
CA also denied on June 20, 2012.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

We deny the petition for review for its lack of merit.
1.
Motions and other papers sent to the CA by private messengerial services arc deemed
filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt

The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November 24, 2011. Under
Section l, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, they had 15 days from receipt (or until December 9, 2011)
within which to move for its reconsideration or to appeal to the Supreme Court. They dispatched
the Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16 November 2011) on December 9, 2011
through private courier (LBC). The CA actually received the motion on December 12,
2011. Considering that Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals provided that motions sent through private messengerial services are deemed filed on the
date of the CA's actual receipt of the same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12,
2011.

Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution promulgated on
November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed resolution final and executory by
operation of law.
2.
Although motions for summary judgment can be filed before the pre-trial, their non-
resolution prior to the pre-trial should not prevent the holding of the pre-trial
The petitioners contend that their Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in
Abeyance needed to be first resolved before the pre-trial could proceed; that the CA erred in declaring
that "it is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court;" and that the CA
overlooked their submission in their Opposition with Explanation to the effect that Section 2(g), Rule
18 of the Rules of Court was superseded by Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999
and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC dated August 16, 2004.

The petitioners' contentions have no merit.

We consider it erroneous on the part of the CA to declare that "it is only at the pre-trial that the rules
allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section
2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court." The filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done
prior to the pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 3 5 of the Rules of Court permits a party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or seeking declaratory relief to file the motion for a summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof in his favor (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions) "at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served;" while Section 2 of Rule
35 instructs that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may file the motion for summary judgment (and its supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions) upon all or any part thereof "at any time." As such, the petitioners
properly filed their motion for summary judgment prior to the pre-trial (assuming that they thereby
complied with the requirement of supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions).

We remind that the summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper under Section 3, Rule
35 of the Rules of Court only if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It is a method intended to expedite or
promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record. The term genuine issue is defined as an issue of fact
that calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious,
contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits,
and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a
trial. The party moving for the summary judgment has the burden of clearly demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of fact. Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to prove the cause of action,
and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the plaintiffs burden
has been discharged, the defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.
The CA could have misconceived the text of Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:
x x xx

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing
the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
x x xx

To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been filed
the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment
on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may
then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary
motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule
35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment,
the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion.
Even so, the petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should have first resolved their Motion for
Summary Judgment before holding the pretrial. They could not use the inaction on their motion to
justify their nonappearance with their counsel at the pre-trial, as well as their inability to file their
pre-trial brief. In that regard, their appearance at the pre-trial with their counsel was mandatory.
The petitioners argue that their non-appearance was not mandatory, positing that Section 2(g), Rule
18 of the Rules of Court had been amended by Administrative Circular No. 3-99 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-
SC issued on July 13, 2004 but effective on August 16, 2004.
The petitioners' argument was unwarranted.

Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 still affirmed the mandatory character of
the pre-trial, to wit:
x x xx
V. The mandatory continuous trial system in civil cases contemplated in Administrative Circular No.
4, dated 22 September 1988, and the guidelines provided for in Circular No. 1-89, dated 19 January
1989, must be effectively implemented. For expediency, these guidelines in civil cases are hereunder
restated with modifications, taking into account the relevant provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
A. Pre-Trial
x x xx
6. Failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be a cause for dismissal of the action. A similar
failure of the defendant shall be a cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte and the
court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Underlining supplied for emphasis)
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct
of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) - adopted for the purpose of abbreviating court
proceedings, ensuring the prompt disposition of cases, decongesting court dockets, and further
implementing the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 - similarly
underscored the mandatory character of the pre-trial, and reiterated under its heading Pre-Trial in
civil cases that, among others, the trial court could then determine "the propriety of rendering a
summary judgment dismissing the case based on the disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment
based on the pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during pre-trial." As such, they
could have urged the trial court to resolve their pending Motion for Summary Judgment during the
pre-trial..

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals promulgated in
CA-G.R. SP No. 04020-MIN; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159695 September 15, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.RAMON G. ASUNCION et al, respondents.

This petition for review seeks to set aside the Decision dated April 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 70607 and its Resolution dated August 15, 2003, denying the motion for
reconsideration. Before the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, sought to
annul: (1) the Order dated February 26, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
21, insofar as it declared petitioner's motion for reconsideration pro forma; and (2) said trial court's
subsequent Order dated April 26, 2002, dismissing petitioner's notice of appeal on the ground that it
was filed out of time.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On December 29, 1976, Paciencia Gonzales Asuncion and the Heirs of Felipe F. Asuncion applied for
the registration of the titles of nine (9) parcels of land, all located at Bambang, Bulacan, Bulacan, with
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan. The application was docketed
as LRC Case No. 3681-M. The applicants alleged that they have registerable titles over the subject
lands which they acquired by inheritance, accretion and through open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under color of title for at least thirty (30) years.
Petitioner, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the ground that the
subject lands are inalienable forest lands of the public domain, within the unclassified area of
Bulacan, Bulacan. Other persons also opposed the application.
On November 7, 1986, the applicants' motion to admit an amended application for eleven (11)
parcels of land was granted by the trial court. On August 30, 1996, the applicants and the other
oppositors entered into a compromise agreement.

Despite the Solicitor General's opposition that the State was not bound by the compromise agreement
since the subject lands were not susceptible of private appropriation, the trial court on March 22,
1999, approved the compromise agreement and excluded four (4) parcels of land from the
application. The trial court also dismissed the application over two (2) other parcels, Psu-133934 &
Psu-138316.

Due to the applicants' voluminous formal offer of evidence, the Solicitor General asked for additional
time, until July 30, 2001, to file his comment on the applicants' formal offer of evidence.

Meanwhile, on June 29, 2001, the trial court had considered the case submitted for decision and on
July 10, 2001, rendered its decision ordering the registration of five (5) parcels of land, denominated
as Psu-115369, Psu-115615, Psu-115616, Psu-118984, and Psu-121255 (amended).

On July 27, 2001, the Solicitor General received his copy of the decision. Five days later, on August 2,
2001, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision dated July
10, 2001, but it was denied on February 26, 2002. The trial court ruled that the Solicitor General was
in effect seeking a new trial and that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an
affidavit of merit required by the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
The Solicitor General received the Order of denial on March 13, 2002, and filed a notice of appeal on
March 20, 2002. On April 26, 2002, the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal for being filed out of
time.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment
of the Orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 26, 2002. The appellate court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.

The appellate court considered the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration as a motion for new
trial and held that the case cannot be re-opened because the motion was filed after judgment. The
appellate court also held that the motion for reconsideration was fatally defective without an affidavit
of merit. Further, the motion was pro forma since it merely reiterated the Solicitor General's previous
arguments. Thus, the motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. The
appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Solicitor
General's prayer to present evidence and to file an appeal.

The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision stated, as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no showing that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by
respondents Judge D. Roy A. Masadao, Jr. and Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales in denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Appeal, respectively, whose findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is correspondingly denied for
lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED.

After the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General filed the
instant petition assigning the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF FACT IN
MISAPPREHENDING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001 IN
LRC CASE NO. 3681-M AS A PRO FORMA MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001 IN LRC
CASE NO. 3681-M WAS A PRO FORMA MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT AN ERRONEOUS CHARACTERIZATION OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AS PRO FORMA IS A MERE ERROR OF JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOT CORRECTIBLE BY THE
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY SUSPEND ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE IN THIS
CASE IN VIEW OF THE SPECIAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN ORDER TO
REVIEW THE LEGAL MERITS OF THE DECISION DATED JULY 10, 2001 IN LRC CASE NO. 3681-M.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION IS PRIVATE LAND UNDER
ARTICLE 457 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
IN ALTERNATIVELY CONCLUDING THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION IS PRIVATE
LAND UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE SPANISH LAW OF WATERS OF 1866.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION BELONGS TO THE STATE.

The basic issues for resolution are: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the dismissal of the
Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the motion was in effect one for a
new trial and was pro forma? May this Court now review, as if also on appeal, the trial court's July 10,
2001 decision in LRC Case No. 3681-M?

On the first issue, a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new trial if based on a
ground for new trial. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial must
be based on the following causes: (a) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably
been impaired in his rights; or (b) newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the
result.

Here, the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration did not aver grounds for new trial. The
motion was not based on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that would need affidavits
of merit, nor is the motion based on newly discovered evidence as to require affidavits of witnesses.
The two main arguments raised by the Solicitor General in the motion for reconsideration were: (1)
that the trial court deprived petitioner of its right to present evidence; and, (2) that the decision was
tainted with serious errors of law and fact. Both are not the valid causes for new trial per Section 1,
Rule 37. Hence, we are unable to agree with the trial and appellate courts that the motion for
reconsideration was actually a motion for new trial.

Is the motion for reconsideration pro forma because of alleged reiteration of previous arguments?
Mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion
for reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules.
In his motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that:
xxxx

11. Applicants failed to rebut the presumption that the land subject of their application belongs to
the State. Applicants' Exhibits "L" and "L-1" show, on their faces, that they requested in 1977 for
release of areas subject of their application and falling within the unclassified region of Bulacan,
Bulacan, per LC Map No. 637 dated March 1, 1927. And that field personnel of the Bureau of Forest
Development gave favorable recommendations in support of the applicants' requests. However,
these documents do not prove that the Director of the then Bureau of Forest Development, or the
Secretary of the DENR, or the President, had approved the recommendations contained therein and
had certified the forest areas concerned as alienable and disposable.

12. This Honorable Court, with due respect, misapplied the concept of accretion as a mode of
acquiring ownership in this case. Said mode was mistakenly applied to the boundary of applicants'
estate which was roughly perpendicular (instead of parallel) to the bank of the Wawang-Dapdap
River.

13. The 1953 CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 766, that applicants are the owners of the land by virtue
of accretion and a superior right to possess the same, does not amount to res judicata as against the
Republic because the then CFI was not a court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable
forest land of the public domain in favor of private persons. Such power is vested exclusively, by
delegated legislation, to the President or his alter ego, the DENR Secretary.
These allegations stress that the findings or conclusions of the trial court were allegedly not
supported by the evidence or were contrary to law. Particular reference is made to documentary
evidence in paragraph 11. In paragraph 12, the error alleged was misapplication of the concept of
accretion. In paragraph 13, the Solicitor General alleged that the trial court had erred in considering
the 1953 decision of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 766 as res judicata relative to LRC
Case No. 3681-M. Patently, herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration was not pro forma.

However, our ruling that the motion for reconsideration was not pro forma does not in any way mean
that it is meritorious. As this Court held in Marikina Valley Dev't. Corp. v. Hon. Flojo, public policy
would be better served by according the appellate court an effective opportunity to review the
decision of the trial court on the merits, rather than by aborting the right to appeal by a literal
application of the procedural rule relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration.

Since the Solicitor General filed his notice of appeal on March 20, 2002 or seven days after he received
the denial of the motion, the notice of appeal was filed within the "fresh period" of 15 days to file the
notice of appeal. Thus, the notice of appeal deserves to be given due course.

Lastly, we find now that the Solicitor General improperly appeals before this Court the trial court's
decision in LRC Case No. 3681-M. We note that he had already appealed said decision, by way of an
ordinary appeal, when he filed the notice of appeal with the trial court. In Marikina Valley Dev't. Corp.
v. Hon. Flojo, it should be pointed out, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to the
notice of appeal.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE (a) the trial court's Orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 26, 2002;
and (b) the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution dated April 30, 2003 and August 15, 2003,
respectively, and we REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21.
The trial court is DIRECTED to GIVE DUE COURSE to the Solicitor General's notice of appeal with
deliberate dispatch. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170618 November 20, 2013
FAR EASTERN SURETY AND INSURANCE CO. INC., Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (petitioner) assails in this Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari the Order dated October 4, 2005, the Judgment of Forfeiture dated October 6, 2005, and
the Orders dated October 25, 2005, November 14, 2005 and November 22, 2005, all issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Tarlac City in Criminal Case No. 12408, entitled "The People
of the Philippines v. Celo Tuazon."

The petitioner claims that it should not be held liable for a bail bond that it did not issue.

The Factual Antecedents

The petition traces its roots to the personal bail bond, with serial no. JCR (2) 1807, for the provisional
release of Celo Tuazon (accused) which was filed before the RTC in Criminal Case No. 12408. The
personal bail bond was under the signatures of Paul J. Malvar and Teodorico S. Evangelista as the
petitioner’s authorized signatories. On January 23, 2004, the RTC approved the bail bond.

On August 16, 2004, the Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC requiring all bonding companies
to accredit all their authorized agents with the courts. The petitioner applied for its Certification of
Accreditation and Authority to transact surety business with the courts and accordingly designated
Samuel A. Baui as its authorized representative in Tarlac Province.

Subsequently, the accused failed to appear in the scheduled hearing for Criminal Case No. 12408,
prompting the RTC to issue an order requiring the petitioner to produce the body of the accused and
to explain why no judgment shall be rendered against the bond.

Samuel, who was then the petitioner’s designated representative, filed a Motion for Extension of
Time7 to comply with the RTC’s order. He likewise sought the petitioner’s assistance for the use of its
resources and agents outside Tarlac City because of the difficulty of arresting the accused.

Sometime thereafter, the petitioner allegedly verified from its register that it neither authorized nor
sanctioned the issuance of a bail bond, with serial no. JCR (2) 1807, and on this basis, it filed with the
RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Cancel Fake/Falsified Bail Bond. The petitioner alleged that the
signature of Teodorico in the bail bond had been forged; it also alleged that Paul was not an
authorized signatory; his name was not listed in the Secretary’s Certificate submitted to the Court. In
support of its motion, it attached copies of the Personal Bail Bond, its Corporate Secretary’s
Certificate, and the Special Power of Attorney in favor of Medy S. Patricio, and prayed to be relieved
from any liability under the bail bond.

The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion on the ground that the petitioner had indirectly
acknowledged the bond’s validity when it filed a motion for extension of time with the trial court. The
RTC subsequently issued a Judgment of Forfeiture for ₱200,000.00 against the petitioner. The
petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment, but the RTC denied the motion.

On October 25, 2005, the RTC issued another order, this time directing the issuance of a writ of
execution. The petitioner responded by filing an omnibus motion to hold in abeyance or quash the
writ, but the RTC similarly denied this motion. The petitioner thereafter filed this Rule 45 petition to
assail the Orders dated October 4, 2005, October 25, 2005, November 14, 2005 and November 22,
2005, and the Judgment of Forfeiture dated October 6, 2005, all of them issued by the RTC.
 The Petition
The petitioner principally argues that the RTC erred in ruling that the petitioner indirectly
acknowledged the falsified bond’s validity when it filed a motion for extension of time to respond to
the lower court’s order of August 2, 2005. It also disclaims liability under the bond based on the
absence of the name of Paul in the Secretary’s Certificate of authorized signatories, and based on the
alleged forgery of Teodorico’s signature. It lastly argues that the RTC failed to observe the mandate
of A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC when it did not verify the signatures’ authenticity and confirm the petitioner’s
authorized signatories in the Secretary’s Certificate before approving the bond.

The Case for the Respondent

The respondent People of the Philippines, for its part, maintains that the petitioner is already
estopped from questioning the bail bond’s authenticity. It likewise contends that the petitioner used
the wrong mode of review; the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It lastly argues that the case involves factual
issues that are beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition.

The Issues
In its petition, the petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:
i. Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the alleged falsified bond’s validity can be indirectly
acknowledged.
ii. Whether the RTC erred in holding the petitioner liable under the alleged falsified bond.
iii. Whether the RTC erred in failing to observe and apply A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC.
iv. Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the alleged falsified bond is binding upon the petitioner.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition as we cannot rule on it without the established or undisputed facts on which to
base our rulings of law on the presented issues. In short, the petitioner used the wrong mode of
appeal, rendering us unable to proceed even if we would want to.

We note that the petitioner directly comes to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, in relation with Rule
41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), on alleged pure questions of law.

Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken in three (3) ways,
depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1) an ordinary appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CA) in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction;
(2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only
questions of law are raised or involved.

The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought
to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on questions of law. It is only where
pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be brought to the Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given
set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the
question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the
party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.

An examination of the present petition shows that the facts are disputed. The issues of the
authenticity and of the validity of the bail bond’s signatures and the authority of its signatories had
never been resolved. When the petitioner questioned the RTC’s ruling, it was, in fact, raising the
issues of falsity and of forgery of the signatures in the bail bond, which questions are purely of fact.

To quote the pertinent portion of the RTC’s order:

When the case was called, a representative of the bonding company by the person of a certain Samuel
Baui appeared. However, there is already a motion by said bonding company thru Samuel Baui to
give the bonding company 60 days extension but which the Court granted shortened to 30 days. The
expiration of the 30-day period is supposed to be today but, however, the Court was confronted with
the motion by the bonding company alleging that the bond posted by the bonding company was
falsified. The Court is of the opinion that by the motion for extension of time within which to produce
the body of the accused, the bonding company indirectly acknowledged the validity of the bond
posted by the said bonding company. Wherefore, the motion of the bonding company dated October
3, 2005 that it be relieved from liability is hereby DENIED. (emphasis ours)

This ruling, by its clear terms, did not pass upon the falsity or forgery of the bail bond’s signatures.
Nothing in the order resolved the question of whether Teodorico’s signature had been forged. Neither
was there any finding on the validity of the bail bond, nor any definitive ruling on the effects of the
unauthorized signature of Paul. Missing as well was any mention of the circumstances that led to the
RTC’s approval of the bond. We need all these factual bases to make a ruling on what and how the
law should be applied.

We additionally note that a bail bond is required to be in a public document, i.e., a duly notarized
document. As a notarized document, it has the presumption of regularity in its favor, which
presumption can only be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant; otherwise, the regularity of the document should be upheld.

Likewise notable is the settled rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies in the party alleging forgery.

All these legal realities tell us that we can rule only on the issue of liability, even assuming this to be
a purely legal issue, if the matter of forgery and falsification has already been settled. In other words,
a finding of forgery (or absence of forgery) is necessary. At the moment, the questions of whether the
petitioner’s evidence is sufficient and convincing to prove the forgery of Teodorico’s signature and
whether the evidence is more than merely preponderant to overcome the presumption of validity
and the regularity of the notarized bail bond are unsettled factual matters that the assailed ruling did
not squarely rule upon, and which this Court cannot now resolve via a Rule 45 petition. Simply put,
the resolution of these matters is outside this Court’s authority to act upon.

Similarly, in the absence of factual circumstances relating to the RTC’s approval of the bail bond, a
finding on whether it erred (and should be blamed for the approval of a falsified bail bond) is a matter
we cannot touch. A glaring lapse on the petitioner’s part is its failure to consider that while it has
been citing A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC, the submission of the bail bond and its alleged approval by the RTC
all took place previous to this cited issuance. Thus, even if we are inclined to take equitable
considerations into account in light of the alleged previous court approval of the bail bond, we cannot
do so for lack of sufficient factual and evidentiary basis. To be fair, we must know what we must be
fair about and cannot simply rely on general allegations of overall unfairness.

We stress that in reviews on certiorari the Court addresses only the questions of law. It is not our
function to analyze or weigh the evidence (which tasks belong to the trial court as the trier of facts
and to the appellate court as the reviewer of facts). We are confined to the review of errors of law
that may have been committed in the judgment under review.

In Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to stress this rule in these words:
The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed
by the lower court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It leaves these matters to the lower court,
which [has] more opportunity and facilities to examine these matters. This same Court has declared
that it is the policy of the Court to defer to the factual findings of the trial judge, who has the advantage
of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and to determine their demeanor whether they are
telling or distorting the truth.

And again in Remalante v. Tibe (158 SCRA 138 [1988]):

The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive." [Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
737, reiterating a long line of decisions]. This Court has emphatically declared that "it is not the
function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court" [Tiongco v.
De la Merced, G.R. No. L-24426, July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 89;
Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62482, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 865; Banigued v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-47531, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 596]. [italics supplied]

We repeated this ruling in Suarez v. Judge Villarama, Jr., this time giving the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts as our additional reason.

It is axiomatic that a question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.

In the instant case, petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari raising mixed questions
of fact and law. She impugns the decision of the RTC dismissing her complaint for failure to prosecute.
The In the instant case, petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari raising mixed
questions of fact and law. She impugns the decision of the RTC dismissing her complaint for failure
to prosecute. The resolution of the propriety of dismissal entails a review of the factual circumstances
that led the trial court to decide in such manner. On the other hand, petitioner also questions the
lower court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time.
There is indeed a question as to what and how the law should be applied. Therefore, petitioner should
have brought this case to the Court of Appeals via the first mode of appeal under the aegis of Rule 41.
Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides that an appeal taken
to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall
be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not
be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court
is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the decision involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of
Appeals. [italics supplied, emphases ours; citations omitted]

As a final point, while we note the irregular procedure adopted by the RTC when it rendered a
decision based on implications, we nevertheless hold that the proper remedy to question this
irregularity is not through a Rule 45 petition. If indeed there is merit to the claim that the signatures
had been forged or that the signatory was unauthorized, or that the R TC failed to observe the
mandate of A.M. No. 04-7 -02-SC, the proper recourse to question the RTC s ruling on the motion to
cancel the bond should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not through the process and
medium the petitioner took.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition. Costs against Far Eastern Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154284 October 27, 2006
BIBIANA FARMS & MILLS, INC., petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th Division) et al, respondents.

Assailed in the herein Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the Resolution
dated June 11, 2002, rendered by the Court of Appeals1 (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69403, which denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 19, 2001 denying the
petition of private respondent for failure to pay docket fees, and directing private respondent to file
his reply to petitioner’s Comment.

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in hog and cattle raising, and corn milling, while Rogelio Majasol
(private respondent) was employed therein as assistant to the head of the feeds mixing department.
On June 5, 1998, petitioner’s security guards caught private respondent, as he was about to go out,
with a tupperware-full of feeds. When confronted about it, he told the guards that he was going to
feed it to his chicks. The matter was reported to the management and an inquiry was conducted.
Private respondent was not allowed to report for work anymore in the afternoon of June 5.

On June 15, 1998, a conference was held before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
where attempts at an amicable settlement were made. However, before the case could be settled, a
show-cause memorandum was issued to private respondent on June 17, 1998. In a reply dated June
19, 1998, private respondent denied the incident. Private respondent also stated that even if it was
true, given the length of his service with petitioner, he does not deserve to be terminated.

On June 22, 1998, petitioner wrote private respondent informing him of their decision to separate
him from employment. The notice of termination stated that petitioner was constrained to evaluate
his case based on the affidavits of the security guards since he failed to submit his explanation within
three days from service of the show-cause memo.

On June 23, 1998, private respondent lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
allowance and service incentive leave pay. The complaint was later amended to include vacation
leave, unpaid wages, damages and attorney’s fees.

In a Decision dated May 31, 1999, Labor Arbiter (LA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua dismissed the
complaint for illegal dismissal and ordered the payment of unpaid wages and proportionate 13th
month pay in favor of private respondent.

The LA’s decision was initially reversed and set aside by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in its Decision dated April 28, 2000. It was the NLRC’s finding that petitioner’s evidence does
not support their claim that private respondent violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by
virtue of his position. The NLRC also found that private respondent was not accorded due process,
and his termination was not commensurate to his violation.

On motion for reconsideration, the NLRC, in its Resolution dated July 31, 2000, revised its decision
and ruled that private respondent’s dismissal is legal and with regard to due process. The NLRC set
aside its order to reinstate private respondent, deleted all awards for money claims and reinstated
the LA’s award for unpaid wages and proportionate 13th month pay.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC’s Resolution, but this was denied
per Resolution dated May 31, 2001.
Private respondent then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA, which, in a Resolution
dated September 19, 2001, dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to pay docket fees. On
private respondent’s motion for reconsideration, the CA granted the same per Resolution dated
February 4, 2002. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution but the CA
denied this in the assailed Resolution dated June 11, 2002.

Hence, the present petition based on the sole ground that:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE RESOLUTION DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2001
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE NECESSARY DOCKET FEES.

The thrust of petitioner’s argument is that private respondent’s failure to pay the docket fees is a case
of negligence. According to petitioner, respondent had until September 4, 2001, within which to pay
the docket fees; instead, he waited until October 15, 2001, or until after the CA first dismissed his
petition that he paid the same. Petitioner also argues that private respondent’s claim that payment
of docket fees in the form of cash was originally enclosed in the petition should not be accepted; and
given the mandatory nature of the payment of docket fees within the reglementary period, the CA
should not have reconsidered its previous dismissal of the petition.

The Court denies the petition, as the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in admitting
private respondent’s belated payment of docket fees and reinstating his petition.

Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon
for the relief prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
xxxx

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and
deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing rule, non-compliance with any of the requirements shall be a sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition. Corollarily, the rule is that a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case, unless the docket fees are paid. And where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fees, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

In several cases, however, the Court entertained certain exceptions due to the peculiar circumstances
attendant in these cases, which warrant a relaxation of the rules on payment of docket fees. It was
held in La Salette College v. Pilotin, that the strict application of the rule may be qualified by the
following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in
conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

Thus, in Villamor v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the decision of the CA to reinstate the private
respondents’ appeal despite having paid the docket fees almost one year after the notice of appeal
was filed, finding that there is no showing that the private respondents deliberately refused to pay
the requisite fee within the reglementary period and abandon their appeal. The Court also found that
it was imperative for the CA to review the ruling of the trial court to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Thus, the Court concluded, "Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we see no cogent
reason to reverse the resolutions of the respondent court. It is the policy of the court to encourage
hearing of appeals on their merits. To resort to technicalities which the petitioner capitalizes on in
the instant petition would only tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice."

In the present case, the CA, in the exercise of its discretionary power, accepted private respondent’s
explanation that the money for the payment of docket fees was originally enclosed in the petition for
certiorari but was misplaced, and reinstated the petition. The CA may have abused its discretion
when it ignored the rule on payment of docket fees, but the Court finds that such abuse was not
tainted with any capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment.

The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such
degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and
hostility. The word "capricious", usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary", conveys the notion
of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.

It should be noted that it was only after the CA dismissed his petition that private respondent learned
that the payment for the docket fees did not reach the CA. Consequently, he filed a motion for
reconsideration and enclosed postal money orders as payment. While private respondent may have
taken the unnecessary risk in initially enclosing cash in his petition, nevertheless, it was clearly not a
dilatory tactic nor intended to circumvent the Rules of Court. In fact, private respondent
subsequently paid the docket fees even before the CA had passed upon their motion for
reconsideration, which is indicative of his good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.

More importantly, the Court notes that there are two divergent rulings with regard to the propriety
of private respondent’s dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, in its Decision dated May 31, 1999, held that
private respondent’s dismissal was valid. On the other hand, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 28,
2000, made its own factual finding that private respondent’s dismissal was tainted with illegality.
The NLRC may have reconsidered its ruling per its Resolution dated July 31, 2000, still, the Court
finds it more judicious to have this issue fully threshed out and properly resolved on appeal to the
CA.

Clearly, the CA’s exercise of its discretionary power was not made with any grave abuse, but in
recognition of the need to ensure that every party litigant is given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities.

Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that, while the Rules are
liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been
relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to
an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but
only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The underlying consideration in this petition is that the act of dismissing the notice of appeal, if done
in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction, amounts to an undue denial of the petitioners’ right to
appeal. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v.
Court of Appeals where this Court ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and
trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and
instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.

The Court could have resolved this case on its merits considering that the records have already been
elevated. It appears, however, that the present petition involved only the issue of whether or not the
CA gravely abused its discretion in accepting private respondent’s belated payment of docket fees. It
was on this issue that the parties focused their arguments, and it would be a deprivation of their
respective rights to due process if the Court were to resolve the merits of this case, without giving
them the opportunity to present their respective stances. Consequently, the Court remands this case
to the CA for the continuation of the proceedings before it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149227 : December 11, 2003
LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR. ROMEO GONZALES, MS; and JESUS T.
BAYAUA, Dean of Student Services, petitioners, vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent.

An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice of Appeal that has been served on the adverse
party. The docket fees must likewise be paid within the reglementary period. Petitioners have failed
to show why they merit an exception to these stringent rules.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
November 16, 2000 and the June 22, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV UDK
No. 0236C. The November 16, 2000 Resolution disposed as follows:
In view of the foregoing, Appellees Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution,
dated March 14, 2000, is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.4
The June 22, 2001 Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court as follows:
[Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner] College dating back [to] the school year 1988-1989
taking up the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce. In the enrollment period for the second
semester held on October 22 to November 5, 1993, [respondent] was denied re-enrollment, despite
repeated pleas by x x x himself and by other interested parties and his lawyer.

On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to compel [petitioner college to] re-admit him. On December 28, 1993, an order
was issued directing [petitioner college] to admit [respondent] for the second semester but still
[petitioner college] refused to re-admit [respondent], despite implementation of said order and the
pleas of [respondent] thru his counsel so that he could catch up with the bulk of the school days of
the semester and could graduate.

Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school in re-admitting him and his defiance to the
order and because the period of the second semester [was] already about to close, [respondent]
amended his complaint and concentrate[d] on damages, hence, this case.

On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it opened its enrollment period for the second
semester of school year 1993-1994 on 11 October 1993 up to 22 October, 1993 to 05 November,
1993. However, classes for the second semester of that school year commenced on 25 October, 1993.
During these periods for enrolment, [respondent] never enrolled with the x x x College and neither
did he accomplish the basic requirements for enrolment. However, on 05 November, 1993, the x x x
College was in receipt of a letter from Atty. Quirino L. Pilotin dated on that same date requesting for
a reconsideration of an alleged decision denying enrolment to the [respondent]. Upon receipt of the
said letter, it was endorsed to [Respondent] Bayaua who in turn wrote Atty. Pilotin explaining among
others that was not denied enrolment but rather [the] latter did not enroll with the said College.
Considering, however, that the x x x College started its regular classes on 25 October, 1993, in the
event [respondent] was able to enroll on 6 November, 1993, he would have then exceeded the
required absences for his supposed enrolled subjects.

Since plaintiff failed to enrol on the last day for enrolment, there is no reason why the x x x College
should relax its rules to accommodate [respondent]. The x x x College merely imposed its disciplining
authority when it sets dates for the period to enrol and the matter of admission of students is within
the ambit of academic freedom and beyond the province of the Courts to decide.

On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Petitioners
received the Decision on November 26, 1998. On the same date, they filed a Notice of Appeal, which
the RTC approved on December 2, 1998.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the ground of petitioners failure to pay the
docket fees within the reglementary period. The trial court, however, denied the Motion in its April
23, 1999 Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure to
pay the required docketing fee within the period for filing an appeal. But, upon their motion, the CA
granted, in a Resolution dated March 14, 2000, reconsideration of their appeal, which it reinstated in
the interest of substantial justice and considering that [petitioners] already paid the docket fees.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration on March 29, 2000.

After reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the challenged November 16, 2000 Resolution,
dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners, because the docket fees were only paid after one (1) year
and eleven (11) months from the filing of the notice of appeal. It deemed it imperative to reverse
the March 14, 2000 Resolution to conform with the law and long settled jurisprudence on the matter.
Thus, in the June 22, 2001 Resolution, it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed;
2. With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did not have the authority to dismiss the appeal.
In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:
Timeliness of Payment of
Appellate Court Docket Fees

The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees are necessary to defray court expenses
in the handling of cases. For this reason, and to secure a just and speedy disposition of every action
and proceeding, the Rules on Civil Procedure mandates the payment of docket and other lawful fees
within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the jurisdiction of the proper court to handle a case is
adversely affected.

The above rule applies squarely to this case, in which the judgment issued by the RTC, in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, was elevated to the CA for review. Rule 41 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
provides the essential requirements for making such an appeal, as follows:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. x x x.
 xxx
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. x x x.
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from,
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as
to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
xxx.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
xxx.
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be complied with. First, within 15 days, a
notice of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to be
appealed; second, such notice must be served on the adverse party; and third, within the same 15-day
period, the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the
court that rendered the judgment or final order.

It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would
not be able to act on the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought to be
appealed from would become final and executory.

In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid the docket fees. After resolving thrice
the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees, the CA finally found that these had been paid one
(1) year and 11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.

To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision.
Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice of Appeal. They did so on November 26, 1998, but
failed to pay the docket fees. A review of the records shows that they paid these only on July 8,
1999, or after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last day for payment, which
was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to
appeal, had long become final and executory.

Relaxation of the Rule on

Nonpayment of Docket Fees

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we
also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such
power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration
of all attendant circumstances.

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the payment of the docket fees was
delayed by six (6) days, but the late payment was accepted, because the party showed willingness to
abide by the Rules by immediately paying those fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals saw us again
relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that the appellate court may extend the time for the
payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the
failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the
appellant.

In the present case, petitioners have not shown any satisfactory reason to warrant the relaxation of
the Rules. In fact, the manner in which they presented their case before us leaves too much to be
desired. Indeed, we are almost tempted to say that they tried to mislead -- nay, deceive -- this Court
as well as the appellate court.

The present case calls for the adjudication of whether petitioners paid the docket fees on time. Hence,
it is essential that they specify the exact dates when they filed their notice of appeal and paid the
corresponding docket fees. But nowhere in their pleadings did they do so. All they said was that the
appeal had been seasonably filed.

In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an appeal as enumerated earlier, petitioners
should have (1) filed a notice of appeal with the RTC of Santiago, Isabela, within 15 days from the
issuance of the trial court Decision being appealed; (2) paid the docket fees within the same period;
and (3) served the notice to the adverse party.

True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period, but they paid the docket
fees only seven (7) months thereafter. They adamantly insisted on page 6 of their Petition that the
appeal was seasonably filed, but later said that the the appeal fee was paid immediately after 23 April
1999 when the court a quo denied the respondents motion for reconsideration and approved the
appeal. x x x. With the foregoing therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the payment
of docket fees on time.

They admitted, though, that because of the excusable negligence or mistake of their counsel, the
official receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not been attached. They reasoned that they had failed to
transmit the proof of payment of the docket fees to the CA, because such provision of civil procedure
was relatively new x x x at that time. At any event, respondent denies being served such notice.

Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted by respondents motion for
reconsideration of the RTCs approval of petitioners notice of appeal, the required docket fees for the
latter were still not paid on time. From November 23, 1998, when petitioners filed their Notice of
Appeal, until April 23, 1999, when the trial court approved it with finality, they made no effort to pay
those fees. It took them more than two (2) months to immediately pay the docket fees after being
informed of the April 23, 1999 Order denying respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTC
Order approving petitioners Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected sincere willingness
to abide by the Rules, especially when respondent had raised the very issue of nonpayment of docket
fees as early as December 28, 1998.

On this point, petitioners counsel is reminded of the role that lawyers play in the dispensation of
justice. Bayas v. Sandiganbayan held thus:
Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As
such, one of their duties -- assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice -- is more
significant than that of [the cause of] their client, rightly or wrongly. x x x. We stress that candor in
all dealings is the very essence of membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe
rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an
essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does
not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought
to be appealed from becomes final and executory. As laid down in Barangay 24 of Legazpi City v.
Imperial:

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is purely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Well-rooted
is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to
entertain the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
February 22, 2017
G.R. No. 208506
MAHARLIKA A. CUEVAS, Petitioner vs. ATTY. MYRNA v. MACATANGAY, in her capacity as
Director IV of the Civil Service Commission and MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL
MUSEUM, et al, Respondents

For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 With Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated September
18, 2013 of petitioner Maharlika A. Cuevas that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
August 7, 2013 of the Court Appeals (CA), affirming Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No.
10-1438 invalidating petitioner's appointment as Director III of the National Museum.
The facts follow.

Petitioner Maharlika Cuevas was one of the employees of the National Museum vying for the vacant
position of Director III, and on October 23, 2008, Board Resolution No. 03-2008 was issued by the
National Museum Board of Trustees, recommending for appointment Mr. Cecilio Salcedo and
petitioner for the said position.

The then National Museum Board of Trustees Chairman, Antonio O. Cojuangco, appointed petitioner
as Director III under a temporary status on November 24, 2008.

Unsatisfied, Elenita D.V. Alba, another applicant for the same position, filed a protest with the CSC,
the latter referring the matter to the National Museum for resolution. In a letter to the CSC, dated
August 14, 2009 by Director IV Corazon S. Alvina, the National Museum dismissed the protest and
informed the CSC that the decision on petitioner's appointment is final.
Thereafter, on November 24, 2009, the then National Museum Board of Trustees Chairman, Antonio
O. Cojuangco, appointed petitioner as Director III on a permanent status.

Still aggrieved, Elenita D.V. Alba appealed the dismissal of her protest to the CSC insisting that she is
the most qualified for the contested position, and on July 27, 2010, the CSC issued Resolution No. 10-
1438 finding no merit on Alba's claim. The CSC, however, found that the issuance of petitioner's
appointment was not in accordance with Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8492, or the National
Museum Act of 1998, which states that it is the Board of Trustees that shall appoint the Assistant
Director or Director III and not the Chairman of the National Museum, thus:
Sec. 11. Director of the National Museum; duties, programs and studies; annual report to Congress. -
The Board of Trustees shall appoint the Director of the Museum and two (2) Assistant Directors. The
Director shall be in charge of the over-all operations of the Museum and implement the policies set
by the Board of Trustees and programs approved by it. The Director shall have a proven track record
of competent administration and shall be knowledgeable about museum management. The Director,
assisted by two (2) Assistant Directors, shall be in charge of the expanded archeological sites and the
Regional Museum Division of the Museum.

The CSC further stated that there is nothing under the National Museum Act of 1998 that expressly
authorizes the Board of Trustees to delegate any of its powers to the Chairman of the National
Museum or to any official of the National Museum, thus:
In the case at hand, the Board of Trustees (BOT), which is the policy-making body and appointing
authority of the National Museum under R.A. No. 8492, was relegated to function as the Personnel
Selection Board (PSB) which subsequently recommended to then Chairman Cojuangco the
appointment of Cuevas for the position of Director III. As such, the BOT abdicated to then Chairman
Cojuangco its discretionary power to appoint the Director position. x x x
 xxxx
Unlike the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8292) which expressly allows
Boards of State Universities and Colleges (SUCS) to delegate its powers, there is nothing under the
National Museum Act of 1998 that expressly authorizes the BOT to delegate any of its powers to the
Chairman of the National museum or to any official of the National Museum. Thus, in absence of
statutory authority, the National Museum Board of Trustees may not alienate or surrender its
discretional power. In short, the exercise by then Chairman Cojuangco of the appointing power is not
valid and the approval of Cuevas' temporary appointment should be recalled.

xxxx
In fine, considering that the exercise by then Chairman Cojuangco of the appointing power is not
valid, the approval of Cuevas' temporary appointment should be recalled.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Elenita D.V. Alba, Curator II, National Museum (NM)
is GRANTED. Accordingly, the dismissal of her protest by NM Chairman Antonio O. Cojuangco against
the promotional appointment of Maharlika A. Cuevas as Director III under temporary status
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The approval of Cuevas' temporary appointment as Director III by
the Civil Service Commission, National Capital Region is RECALLED.

Due to the above Resolution, Director Jocelyn Patrice L. Deco, Director II of the CSC Field Office-
National Museum, sent a letter dated October 14, 2010 to Director Jeremy Barns, Director IV of the
National Museum, forwarding the invalidated permanent appointment of petitioner as Director III
contained in CSC Resolution No. 10-1438 dated July 27, 2010.

On October 21, 2010, Director Jeremy Barns wrote the CSC asking for a clarification and
reconsideration of the October 14, 2010 letter. The CSC replied in a letter dated June 27, 2011
declaring that its resolution is final and executory because the proper party - the appointing authority
or the appointee, the petitioner, in this case, failed to appeal the resolution as provided by the CSC
Rules. According to the CSC, the records showed that the National Museum duly received the October
14, 2010 letter, copy of which was furnished the petitioner and the appeal from CSC Resolution No.
10-1438 should have been made on or before October 29, 2010.

On August 2, 2011, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the June 27, 2010 letter. He claimed
that he received the letter dated June 27, 2010 on July 18, 2011, and it was the first time that he
learned of the matter regarding his appointment. He also argued that his appointment was
procedurally sound.

The National Museum then posted a bulletin of vacant posit10ns, including that of petitioner's, on
August 12, 2011. Petitioner, thereafter, wrote a letter to the National Museum clarifying that a motion
for reconsideration had been filed before the CSC and it was pending resolution and as such, his
position cannot be considered as vacant.

On October 12, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the CSC's letter dated September 26, 2011 denying
his motion, thus:
Please be informed that said letter to Director Barns is not the main action recalling and invalidating
your appointment as Director III but a mere clarification on the effects thereof, hence, it is not the
proper subject of a motion for reconsideration or appeal.

xxxx
Moreover, records of this Office clearly show that the invalidation of said appointments was duly
received by the National Museum on October 14, 2010 and you were furnished a copy thereof. x x x
Thus, your claim that you did not receive any information relative to the recall and invalidation of
your appointments has no basis.

Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court alleging that the CSC gravely abused its discretion when it sent its letter-responses dated
June 27, 2011 and September 26, 2011 to the National Museum. On August 7, 2013, the CA denied
the petition and ruled that CSC Resolution No. 10-1438 invalidating petitioner's appointment stands,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. CSC Resolution No. 10- 1438 invalidating petitioner's
appointment STANDS.
SO ORDERED.

The CA ruled that the assailed orders of the CSC are only letter-responses and not the orders
contemplated by the Rules which can be assailed in a petition for certiorari. According to the CA,
petitioner should have sought reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 10-1438 which invalidated his
appointment and which was communicated to the National Museum, copy furnished the petitioner,
on October 14, 2010; and an appeal should have been filed instead of a letter of clarification and
reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition with the following issues presented:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR IN
DECLARING THAT THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 WAS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND GRAVE
ERROR IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Citing National Development Company v. The Collector of Customs, petitioner argues that even letter-
responses can be subjects of a petition for certiorari if acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner
further asserts that he was appointed by the proper appointing authority or the National Museum
Board of Trustees, based on the Minutes of the special meeting of the same Board held on October
21, 2008.

In their Comment dated February 11, 2014, the respondents, as represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), insist that the CA correctly ruled that the communications between the
National Museum and the CSC are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. The OSG also
argues that petitioner's appointment was not issued by the proper appointing authority because the
resolution of the National Museum Board of Trustees takes precedence over the minutes of the board
meeting.

On January 21, 2015, this Court dismissed the present petition for failure of petitioner to obey a
lawful order of the Court pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, upon Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, this Court set aside its earlier resolution
and reinstated the petition on June 22, 2015.

After a careful review of the arguments presented, this Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are reviewable by this Court.15 Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,
including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to rule on
matters falling within their jurisdiction especially when these are supported by substantial
evidence. However, a relaxation of this rule is made permissible by this Court whenever any of the
following circumstances is present:
1. [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7. when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
9. when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,]
are not disputed by the respondent;
10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; [and]
11. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The question as to whether the assailed orders of the CSC are mere letter-responses or the orders
contemplated by the Rules that can be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is factual and
is not within the ambit of a petition under Rule 45. Nevertheless, even if this Court relaxes such
procedural infirmity, the present petition must still fail.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
According to petitioner, a letter-response can be the subject of a petition for certiorari as already
ruled by this Court in National Development Company v. Collector of Customs wherein a letter-
response for the Collector of Customs was struck down for having been committed with grave abuse
of discretion. However, as correctly observed by the OSG, the case cited by petitioner is misapplied.
In National Development Company v. Collector of Customs, the subject letter was, in fact, a resolution
or decision that found therein petitioners guilty of a violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, while
in the present petition, the letter-responses of the CSC did not decide the issue on the validity or
invalidity of petitioner's appointment. Thus, as aptly observed by the OSG:
35. In the NDC case, the letter issued by the Collector of Customs, in fact, constituted a resolution or
decision finding a violation apparently committed by the petitioner therein under Section 2521 of
the Tariff and Customs Code, thereby imposing a fine of ₱5,000.00. Said resolution was issued
without giving the owner or operator a chance to controvert the alleged violation. Hence, the
resolution was deemed to have been issued in deprivation of therein petitioner's right to due process.
36. In the instant case, the June 27, 2011 communication of the CSC addressed to NM merely
answered the clarifications requested by NM Director IV Jeremy Barns in a letter dated
October 21, 2011, regarding the invalidation of petitioner's appointment. The same can also be
said of the September 26, 2011 letter of the CSC to petitioner, addressing the latter's Motion for
Reconsideration in a letter dated August 1, 2011. The June 27, 2011 and September 26, 2011 CSC
letters did not decide the issue pertaining to the validity or the invalidity of petitioner's
appointment which, precisely, was the subject of CSC Resolution No. 10-1438. The letter
merely stated the procedural rules ought to be followed by parties who wish to appeal
decisions of the CSC, which procedure, both the appointing authority, the NM BOT, and
petitioner, failed to avail of within the reglementary period.

It is, therefore, CSC Resolution No. 10-1438 that should have been the subject of an appeal as it
contained the decision of the said Commission as to the invalidity of petitioner's appointment as
Director III of the National Museum. On point is the finding of the CA, thus:
We perused the assailed orders and find that they are only letter-responses of the CSC and not the
orders contemplated by the Rules which can be assailed in a petition on certiorari. As aptly explained
by the CSC, petitioner should have sought reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 10- 1438 which
invalidated his appointment and which was communicated to the National Museum, copy furnished
the petitioner, on October 14, 2010; and an appeal should have been filed instead of a letter seeking
clarification and reconsideration as was done by Director Barns on October 21, 2010. Since what was
filed is a letter of clarification and reconsideration, it was acted upon in the same manner by the CSC
in its letter-reply dated June 27, 2011, explaining that the recall and invalidation of petitioner's
appointment can only be reconsidered through an appeal to the CSC, by the appointing authority or
the appointee, within fifteen days from receipt of the decision, pursuant to CSC Memorandum
Circular 20, s. 1998 as held in Francisco Abella, Jr. v. CSC; the CSC claimed that per records, the notice
was properly served and received by the addressees such that the period to appeal had already
prescribed. It is this letter-reply that petitioner filed a reconsideration on, claiming that he did not
receive notice of the invalidation of his appointment. However, petitioner's denial is belied by the
statement in his Petition, properly pointed out by the CSC, that:
On 21 October 2010, Dir. Barns wrote Dir. Deco of the CSC Field Office requesting clarification and
reconsideration of the invalidation by the CSC of the said appointment. It is stressed that Dir. Barns
did not officially inform herein petitioner of said invalidation, and seemingly Dir. Barns took it upon
himself to "handle" the said matter of invalidation. In fact, Director Barns verbally explained to
petitioner that he (Barns) will take care of the whole thing and will not let anything happen to
petitioner's position as long as he was the NM director.

Thus, this is a classic case of resorting to the filing of a petition for certiorari when the remedy of an
ordinary appeal can no longer be availed of. Jurisprudence is replete with the pronouncement that
where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be
entertained - remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal.
This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of
the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter
remedy is the unavailability of appeal. Clearly, petitioner should have moved for the reconsideration
of CSC Resolution No. 10-1438 containing the Commission's resolution as to the invalidity of his
appointment and, thereafter, should have filed an appeal. Sadly, failing to do so, petitioner utilized
the special civil action of certiorari. And to make matters worse, petitioner questioned, not the proper
resolution of the CSC, but the mere letter-responses of the same Commission.

Notwithstanding the above disquisitions, petitioner's claim that his appointment is valid because he
was in fact appointed by the Board and not the Chairman as shown in the Minutes of the meeting still
does not gain him any merit. In order for the Court to refer to the minutes of a meeting or a
proceeding, the subject Board resolution must at least be ambiguous or obscure; otherwise, if it is
clear on its face, there is no need to resort to such action because a Board resolution takes precedence
over the minutes of a meeting. As correctly ruled by the CA:
Petitioner argues that the CSC erred when it held that his appointment was invalid because it was
made by the wrong appointing authority; although it would appear that the Resolution on his
appointment of the National Museum shows that he was appointed by the Chairman and not the
Board, the Minutes of the meeting regarding the matter shows otherwise; and, because of the
ambiguity of the resolutions, resort to the Minutes is indispensable. We reviewed the pe1iinent
resolutions and find no ambiguity or obscurity on its face; hence, there is no need to resort to the
Minutes, for a board resolution takes precedence over the minutes of the meeting.
The same reasoning is also aptly asserted by the OSG, thus:
xxxx
75. Petitioner argues that resort to the Minutes of the meeting is necessary in the presence of
vagueness and confusion regarding the provisions of the Resolutions. If such is the case, then no
res01i to the minutes is necessary because Board Resolution Nos. 02-2008 and 03-2008
issued by the BOT are from being ambiguous.

76. In both resolutions, the Chairman was categorically deemed as the appointing authority and not
the BOT. This grant of authority is in violation of the clear provisions of R.A. No. 8492, particularly
Section 11 thereof, which states:
Section 11. Director of the National Museum; duties; programs and studies; annual report to Congress. -
The Board of Trustees shall appoint the Director of the Museum and two (2) Assistant Directors. The
Director shall be in charge of the over-all operations of the Museum and implement the policies set
by the Board of Trustees and programs approved by it. The Director shall have a proven track record
of competent administration and shall be knowledgeable about Museum management.
Anent petitioner's Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, such is no longer necessary due to the above resolution and discussion of this
Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 With Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated September 18, 2013 of
petitioner Maharlika A. Cuevas is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision dated August
7, 2013 of the Court Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, et al, Petitioners, vs. CA and
HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO et al, , Respondent.

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and
Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land
Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador
and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions
with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent
heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to
dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N.
Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could
be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo,
based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined
only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss
on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal
on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well
within the reglementary period for appeal.

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was
the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance
with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the
Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors
allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N.
ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE
PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF
THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID
THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL
ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE
[FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998
INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED
BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE
CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY
IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed
their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by
both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment
appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice
of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed
when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the
July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-
suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an
omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to
appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out
of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial
court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of
a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where we
again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order
which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the
decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners
did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the
trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1)
day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the
"final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial
court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the
notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases, premised on the long-settled
doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law.

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing
with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal,
an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment
or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided,
the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received
notice of the denial of said motion. (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129,
however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment was to shorten the
period of appeal and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict
observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of
appeal, and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however,
we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should
not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not
depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain
acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may
be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing
party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been
oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules.
In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare
cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that
every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the
use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal
(in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The
fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error
of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become
final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of
"final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period
may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within
the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC since the Court
of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148739 November 19, 2004
FAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. RENATO MAGDALUYO, et al, respondents.

In an appeal from a Decision or final order of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals, will
the payment of the appellate docket fees made one hundred and thirty-two (132) days after the lapse
of the reglementary period to take an appeal, justify its dismissal?
This is the question to be resolved in this case.
The relevant and undisputed facts are as follows:
On 25 November 1997, a complaint was filed by respondents herein against petitioner Far
Corporation, Rosa O. Caram, and Fermin Manuel Caram III for Specific Performance with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 137,
Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2745. A Decision was rendered by the said court on 21
December 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering defendant FAR Corporation to pay plaintiffs
RENATO T. MAGDALUYO, ANTONIO L. VALDEZ and ROLANDO E. CHUA, Seven Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P750,000.00) Pesos as broker’s commission with legal interest at the rate of six (6%)
[percent] per annum from 2 May 1990 until fully paid; however said commissions, inclusive of
interest, should be divided equally in four parts, and ¼ given to each plaintiff, and ¼ to defendant
Fermin Manuel Caram III; attorney’s fees equivalent to twenty percent of the amounts due; and costs
of the suit.

The complaint, insofar as defendants Rosa O. Caram and Fermin Manuel Caram III (sic), is dismissed
for lack of sufficient evidence.

The Decision of the trial court was received by petitioner on 18 February 1999.
Not fully satisfied with the trial court’s Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 02
March 1999, to which respondents filed a Comment dated 18 March 1999.

In an Order dated 02 February 2000, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit. This Order was received by petitioner on 17 February 2000.

On 21 February 2000, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court. An Order was issued by
the trial court judge on 28 March 2000, directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit immediately
the entire records of the case, with the transcript of stenographic notes, to the Court of Appeals. The
same were transmitted to the Court of Appeals on 22 June 2000.

On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission
dated 17 July 2000. In said pleading, petitioner manifested that it has paid the required appeal docket
fees with the trial court, whose Decision and order were being appealed, and prayed that the receipts
for payment be included as part of the records of the case. Attached therewith were the originals of
the Clerk of Court, RTC-Makati Official Receipts, with numbers 12856671 (for P300) and 12857288
(for P200), both dated 13 July 2000.
On 28 July 2000, respondents filed a Comment with Motion to Dismiss before the Court of Appeals.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to pay the
docket fees within the period for taking an appeal.

On 31 August 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, quoted as follows:

From the records it appear(s) that appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 21, 2000. Yet based
on the "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" filed by counsel for defendant-appellant it appears
that the appeal docket fees were paid only on July 13, 2000, obviously way beyond the period for
perfecting an appeal. In view thereof, the present appeal is DISMISSED for non-payment of docket
fees within the period for perfecting an appeal.

The said Resolution was received by petitioner on 18 September 2000, and on 21 September 2000,
it filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 21 November 2000, respondents filed a Comment on the
Motion For Reconsideration, to which petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Comment dated 27
December 2000. The Court of Appeals, in another Resolution promulgated on 27 June 2001,
dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The same is quoted hereunder:
After a reading of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant-appellant Far Corporation, we
find no reason to disturb our previous ruling dismissing the appeal for non-payment of docket fee
within the period of perfecting an appeal.
The contention of defendant appellant that under Sec. 1(c), Rule 50, the ground to dismiss an appeal
is failure to pay the docket fee but not failure to pay the docket fee on time, is untenable. On this
respect, it is worth stressing that based on the records, it took defendant-appellant almost five (5)
months before paying the required docket fee. Such unreasonable delay would be tantamount to
failure to pay the docket fee which is a ground for dismissal of an appeal pursuant to Sec. 1(c) of the
Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner assigned the following errors:

1. That the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error of law when it peremptorily
and precipitously dismissed its formative appeal, and refused to reconsider said dismissal,
based on the procedural technicality of late payment of appeal docket fees, rather than on the
substantial merits of the case, thereby unduly depriving it of its right to appeal; and
2. That by its unjustifiable actions which constitute unwarranted deviation from, and disregard
of, the prevailing doctrines laid down by this Court, the Court of Appeals unjustly denied due
process to petitioner, who by paying the appeal docket fees at its own initiative showed
complete good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.

In support of the assignment of errors, petitioner submits the arguments that the nonpayment on
time of the appeal docket fees is a non-fatal lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect which the Court of
Appeals should have overlooked in order to attain substantial justice. This argument, according to
petitioner, was based on our rulings in the earlier cases of Rosario Yambao v. Court of Appeals, Ayala
Land, Inc. v. Sps. Morris and Socorro Carpo, and Santos v. Court of Appeals. Further, petitioner argues
that the Court of Appeals hastily and wrongly dismissed its appeal considering that there was good
faith and willingness on its part to comply with the Rules by voluntarily paying the docket fees.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The reliance of petitioner in the three aforementioned cases is misplaced.

In Yambao v. Court of Appeals, the failure of the petitioners to pay the correct amount of docket fees
was due to the erroneous assessment by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela
City (the assessment was short by P20), as evidenced by the 10 December 1999 Certification issued
by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The fault was not upon the petitioners themselves, but upon a civil
servant. In this case, we even reiterated the ruling that the payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
In the case of Ayala Land, Inc. v. Sps. Morris and Socorro Carpo, the appellant was likewise unable to
pay the correct amount of docket fees due to an error of an officer of the Court in computing the
correct amount (the assessment was short by P5). Therefore, there was no fault on its part.

The case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, wherein we laid down the rule that the payment of the appeal
fee is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal, is not totally applicable in the case at bar. The
Santos case was decided at a time when the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure was not yet in effect. It
was also a case involving an appeal, not from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, but from the Municipal
Trial Court to the RTC. The applicable rules at that time were the Interim Rules and Guidelines
relative to the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 which did not provide that
the payment of the appeal fee is a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal, and Section 8, Rule 141
of the Revised Rules of Court which imposes an appeal fee in cases of appeal from the municipal trial
courts and specifies the person/s to whom the appeal fee shall be paid, without specifying when said
payment shall be made.

The rules with respect to the payment of the appellate docket fees have substantially changed with
the advent of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said
fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on
appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforecited rule is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a
right, but a mere statutory privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a Decision or final order of the RTC to the Court of Appeals must be made
within fifteen (15) days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from.

The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period
is not a mere technicality of law or procedure.

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that the "payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is
not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory."
The nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided
under Section 4 of Rule 41 is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal, as provided for under Section
1(c) Rule 50, to wit:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
...
c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41;
....
Rules of Procedure must be faithfully followed. But the rules may be relaxed, for persuasive and
weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. In the case of La Salette College v. Victor Pilotin, we held:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we
also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such
power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration
of all attendant circumstances.

In petitioner’s Memorandum, our ruling in the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) v. Mangubat, where we held that "[l]ate payment of docket fees may be admitted when the
party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying the required fees," was cited.
This doctrine cannot be applied in the case at bar because, in the MCIAA case, the Solicitor General,
as counsel for the petitioner, paid the appellate docket fees six (6) days after the timely filing of the
notice of appeal. In the instant case, the payment of the appellate docket fees was made 132 days
after the lapse of the reglementary period to take an appeal. It is also worthy to note that when the
Solicitor General filed the notice of appeal, the 1997 Rules had been in effect only for fourteen (14)
days, and that is why we ruled that "the omission of the Solicitor General to pay docket fees together
with the filing of the notice of appeal fourteen (14) days after the effectivity of the new rules may be
excused."

The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees. Inasmuch as the payment of the appellate docket fees in
this case was made 132 days after the expiration of the period for the perfection of an appeal, the
Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, except to order its dismissal. Thus, the
Decision rendered by the RTC, Branch 137, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 97-2745, dated 21 December
1998, became final and executory by operation of law.

The term "substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to
suspend procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed."

Considering the circumstances present here, we are not exactly convinced that a relaxation of the
Rules is in order. Petitioner miserably failed to provide this Court with persuasive and weighty
reasons that would allow us to exercise our discretion on whether or not to adhere to the strict
requirement of the law. Thus, as propitiously pointed out by respondents, we must yield to the time-
honored principle "Justice is for all. Litigants to an action have equal footing in a court of law. Rules
are laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time and
own bidding."

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200727 March 4, 2013
IRENE VILLAMAR-SANDOVAL, Petitioner, vs. JOSE CAILIPAN, et al, Respondents.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the September 30, 2011 Decision and February 1,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) of Cagayan de Oro City -in CA-G.R. SP No. 03976-MIN
which set aside the October 20, 201 0 and November 10, 201 0 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Koronadal City, Branch 24 declaring respondents in default.

The Facts
Petitioner Irene Villamar-Sandoval (petitioner) instituted a complaint for damages before the RTC,
claiming that she was prejudiced by the false, baseless and malicious libel case filed against her by
respondent Jose Cailipan (Cailipan) which was supported by affidavits executed by the other
respondents herein. The said libel case circled around certain declarations purportedly made by
petitioner during a homeowner’s association meeting about Cailipan’s criminal records for murder,
slight physical injuries and estafa. These allegations were supposedly made by petitioner in order to
tarnish Cailipan’s reputation and facilitate his ouster as President of the said homeowner’s
association.

During the course of the proceedings, respondents belatedly filed their answer (albeit by one day),
prompting petitioner to move to declare respondents in default. Consequently, the RTC issued an
Order dated September 27, 2010 denying the said motion and admitting the answer of respondents.6
Subsequently, the case was set for pre-trial, during which respondents’ counsel, Atty. Sardido, failed
to appear as well as file a pre-trial brief despite due notice, while petitioner and her counsel appeared
and made such submission. In view of these lapses, petitioner prayed that respondents be declared
in default which was granted by the RTC in its October 20, 2010 Order.

Aggrieved, Atty. Sardido filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration on October
29, 2010, seeking the reversal of the October 20, 2010 Order. He proffered the excuse that on the day
of the pre-trial conference, he had to attend an urgent hearing in Cotabato City involving an election
protest but that he immediately went back to Koronadal City to attend the mediation proceeding for
the main case scheduled at 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. Petitioner opposed the motion.

Ruling of the RTC

On November 10, 2010, the RTC issued an Order denying respondents’ motion for reconsideration,
sustaining the declaration of default due to their counsel’s failure to: (1) attend the scheduled pre-
trial conference on October 20, 2010 and; (2) file a pre-trial brief despite due notice. Notably, it
observed that respondents were already accorded consideration when their answer was admitted
despite its belated filing. It also found that "their newly retained counsel miserably failed to attach a
pre-trial brief or submit/attach an affidavit of merit" in the said motion for reconsideration. Pursuant
thereto, petitioner proceeded with the presentation of her evidence ex parte. Upon submission of her
formal offer of evidence, the case was submitted for resolution.

On January 11, 2011, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, asserting that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the October 20, 2010
and November 10, 2010 Orders and in not dismissing the case for improper venue.

On even date, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, a copy of which was received by
respondents on January 24, 2011.
On January 22, 2011, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, while its initially filed
certiorari petition was still pending resolution before the same appellate court. In this relation, they
subsequently filed on February 2, 2011 an Amended Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam and a Joint Notice
of Appeal Ad Cautelam (Amended Notices of Appeal), clarifying therein that they were not
abandoning their petition for certiorari.

Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated September 30, 2011, the CA, through its Twenty-First Division, denied
respondents’ contention that the venue was improperly laid but nevertheless, granted their petition
grounded on the impropriety of the order of default. It applied the principle of substantial justice and
deemed that "it would be most unfair" to declare respondents in default for their lawyer’s failure to
attend the pre-trial conference. With respect to the failure of respondents’ counsel to file a pre-trial
brief on time, the CA held that the RTC’s Order "barring respondents from presenting evidence had
been too precipitate and was not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by [respondents’]
counsel with the said order." Thus, for these reasons, the CA set aside the RTC’s October 20, 2010 and
November 10, 2010 Orders and directed the remand of the case to the RTC to allow the respondents
to present their evidence.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that: (1) since the main
case had already been decided by the RTC through its January 11, 2011 Decision and respondents
have availed of the remedy of appeal, the latter’s petition for certiorari filed with the CA on January
11, 2011 was already moot and academic; and (2) the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it declared respondents in default.

The foregoing motion was denied by the CA in its February 1, 2012 Resolution, holding that petitioner
"failed to raise substantial issues that would warrant reconsideration." In sustaining the invalidity of
the RTC’s October 20, 2010 and November 10, 2010 Orders, it ratiocinated that "it is a far better and
more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse" and afford the respondents
the right to be heard.

Separately, the CA noted that, per the January 27, 2012 Verification issued by its Judicial Records
Division, the case records have yet to be forwarded to it, despite petitioner’s allegations that the RTC
had already promulgated a decision and that the respondents filed a Notice of Appeal. In this regard,
it modified its initial September 30, 2011 Decision and thus deleted the portion which directed that
the records of the case be remanded to the court a quo.

Issues Before The Court

Essentially, the following issues are presented for the Court’s resolution: (1) whether respondents’
petition for certiorari was an improper remedy and/or had been rendered moot and academic by
virtue of the RTC’s January 11, 2011 Decision; and (2) whether the CA erred in setting aside the
October 20, 2010 and November 10, 2010 RTC Orders.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious

It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy
would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there
should be no appeal.

Corollary thereto, an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari superfluous and mandates its
dismissal. As held in Enriquez v. Rivera:
The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief through a special
action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies. The exception to this
rule is conceded only "where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, and the
broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders complained of were found to be
completely null and void, or that appeal was not considered the appropriate remedy, such as in
appeals from orders of preliminary attachment or appointments of receiver." (Fernando v. Vasquez,
L- 26417, 30 January 1970; 31 SCRA 288). For example, certiorari maybe available where appeal is
inadequate and ineffectual (Romero Sr. v. Court of Appeals, L-29659, 30 July 1971; 40 SCRA 172).

None of the exceptional circumstances have been shown to be present in this case; hence the general
rule applies in its entirety. Appeal renders superfluous a pending petition for certiorari, and
mandates its dismissal. In the light of the clear language of Rule 65 (1), this is the only reasonable
reconciliation that can be effected between the two concurrent actions: the appeal has to be
prosecuted, but at the cost of the petition for certiorari, for the petition has lost its raison d'etre. To
persevere in the pursuit of the writ would be to engage in an enterprise which is unnecessary,
tautological and frowned upon by the law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, it is clear that respondents’ January 11, 2011
petition for certiorari was rendered superfluous by their January 22, 2011 appeal.

Although respondents did not err in filing the certiorari petition with the CA on January 11, 2011 –
as they only received the RTC’s Decision three days after the said date and therefore could not have
availed of the remedy of an appeal at that time – the Court observes that respondents should have
(a) withdrawn their certiorari petition and instead raised the jurisdictional errors stated therein in
their appeal or (b) at the very least, informed the CA’s Twenty-First Division of the Decision rendered
on the main case and the filing of their Notice of Appeal on January 22, 2011. Prudence should have
guided them to pursue either course of action considering the well-entrenched conflict between the
remedies of an appeal and a petition for certiorari, of which they should have been well aware of.

Unfortunately, their omission resulted in the CA’s issuance of the September 30, 2011 Decision and
February 1, 2012 Resolution in the certiorari case which set aside the assailed interlocutory orders,
notwithstanding the supervening rendition of a decision on the main case, thus creating an evident
procedural impasse.

It should be noted that respondents’ petition for certiorari had long become moot by the RTC’s
January 11, 2011 Decision. In particular, the grant of the petition for certiorari on mere incidental
matters of the proceedings would not accord any practical relief to respondents because a decision
had already been rendered on the main case and therefore, may be elevated on appeal. Lest it be
misunderstood, a case becomes moot when no useful purpose can be served in passing upon its
merits. As a rule, courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can
be granted.

In view of the above-discussed considerations and considering the fact that respondents’ petition for
certiorari cannot anymore be dismissed, the Court is constrained to set aside the September 30, 2011
Decision and February 1, 2012 Resolution of the CA. Consequently, this course of action will allow
the CA Division where the appeal of the main case is pending to appropriately pass upon the merits
of the RTC’s January 11, 2011 Decision including all assailed irregularities in the proceedings such as
the validity of the default orders. To rule otherwise would only serve to perpetuate the procedural
errors already committed in this case.

Given the foregoing pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the issue
regarding the RTC’s grave abuse of discretion in issuing the October 20, 2010 and November 10, 2010
default orders. As earlier mentioned, that matter may be properly ventilated on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2011 Decision and February 1, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03976-MIN are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179492 June 5, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al, Petitioner, vs. ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, in their own
behalf and in behalf of the other officials and employees of DA-RFU XII, Respondents.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45. This Petition prays for the reversal
and setting aside of the Court of Appeals’ (1) Resolution dated March 21, 2007 that dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner for failure to resort to a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 and (2) Resolution dated
August 16, 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII (DARFU XII) is a government office
mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the Department
of Agriculture in its regional area, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII.

On March 30, 2004, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the
regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all departments, bureaus, and
offices of the national government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of
operations to Koronadal City.

In an April 1, 2005 Memorandum, the Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for Operations
Edmund J. Sana directed Officer-inCharge (OIC) and Regional Executive Director of DA-RFU XII
Abusama M. Alid as follows:
In compliance with Executive Order No. 304 of which Section 2 states "Transfer of Regional Offices.
All departments, bureaus and offices of the National Government on the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall
transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City," you are hereby directed to immediately
effect the transfer of the administrative, finance and operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City
to Koronadal City. On the interim, part of the staff can temporarily hold office at either or both the
ATI building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm, but the main office shall be within Koronadal City.
The action plan for transfer should be submitted to my office not later than 6 April 2005 so that
appropriate funding can be processed soonest. Further, execution of the plan should commence by
16 April 2005 or earlier so that concerned personnel can benefit from the summer break to make
personal arrangements for the transfer of their work base.
For strict compliance.

In a Memorandum dated April 22, 2005 addressed to DA Secretary Arthur Yap, private respondents
opposed the implementation of the April 1, 2005 Memorandum.

They alleged that in 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during
one of her visits in Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. Only
three departments were not covered by the suspension of E.O. No. 304, namely, the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Tourism (DOT), and Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE).

Respondents alleged further in their Memorandum to the DA Secretary that on March 7, 2005, they
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture that the implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance.
A copy of the Petition was attached to the Memorandum. It cited reasons such as the huge costs the
physical transfer will entail and the plight of employees who have already settled and established
their homes in Cotabato City.
On March 8, 2005, their Petition was endorsed by Department of Agriculture Employees Association-
12 (DAEAS-12) President Osmeña I. Motañer to then President Macapagal-Arroyo, and on April 12,
2005, this was referred to DA Secretary Yap for his information and appropriate action. Respondents
justified their appeal saying that a building was constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate
the whole staff of DARFU XII. On the other hand, there is no building yet in Koronadal City where rent
is very expensive. Moreover, if the regional office remains in Cotabato City, the government need not
spend over ₱7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipment hauling and
construction. Finally, respondents alleged that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in
Tantangan has a sub-standard foundation and will not be issued a certificate of occupancy by the City
Engineering Office of Koronadal City as per information from an auditor.

On May 17, 2005, OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the regional office
to ATI Building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South Cotabato and Uptown,
Koronadal City, to be carried out on May 21, 2005.

This prompted respondents to file on May 18, 2005 a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14 of Cotabato City.

By Order dated October 9, 2006, the trial court granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

In a petition dated December 17, 2006, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 on the
ground that the assailed Order of the trial court is contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in
DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees.
Through the March 21, 2007 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
for failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order.
Hence, the present Petition under Rule 45.
Petitioner argues that (1) this case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for Reconsideration
prior to filing a Petition under Rule 65; (2) the trial court Order enjoining the transfer is contrary to
DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees that upheld the separation of powers between the executive
and judiciary on the wisdom of transfer of regional offices; (3) the trial court interfered into this
wisdom of the executive in the management of its affairs; and (4) the trial court disregarded basic
rules on amendment and revocation of administrative issuances and the propriety of injunction as a
remedy.

In their Comment, respondents counter that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail
the disputed Resolutions. They allege that the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari for failure of the petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final
order or resolution" contemplated by Rule 45. It is not an adjudication on the merits. In fact, the Court
of Appeals did not even attempt to resolve the propriety of the issuance of the assailed trial court
Order. In any case, respondents argue that petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration is
fatal. They contend that this is a condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule 65, and none of the
exceptions are present in this case.

Based on both parties’ contentions, the issues involved in this case may be summarized as follows:
i. Whether a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions
ii. Whether the present case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for filing a Motion for
Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
iii. Whether petitioner can raise other issues not addressed in the assailed Resolutions
 iv. Whether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the DA
Regional Office to Koronadal City violates the separation of powers between the executive
department and the judiciary as to the wisdom behind the transfer

First, we discuss the procedural issues.

Respondents contend that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail the disputed
Resolutions. They allege that the assailedCourt of Appeals Resolution dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari for failure of the petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or
resolution" contemplated by Rule 45.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that if the assailed Resolutions are not elevated via Rule 45, they
would attain finality and consequently, the trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 would become
unassailable as well.

A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration may be assailed via Rule 45.

Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case, a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. Consequently,
the March 21, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition via Rule 65 as well as
its August 16, 2007 Resolution denying reconsideration are the final Resolutions contemplated under
Rule 45. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, these Resolutions would attain finality if these are not
elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 would also
become unassailable.

Respondents also argue that petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed
Regional Trial Court Order dated October 9, 2006 is fatal. They contend that the reasons raised by
petitioner do not justify dispensing with the prerequisite of filing a Motion for Reconsideration.

For its part, petitioner argues that its Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals falls
under the exceptions to the necessity of filing a Motion for Reconsideration. In its Petition with the
Court of Appeals, petitioners explained its reasons for no longer filing a Motion for Reconsideration
of the assailed order in that (a) the questions to be raised in the motion have already been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court and (b) there is urgent necessity for the resolution of the
questions or issues raised. Petitioners allege that the trial court presiding judge was not acting on the
disposition of the case with dispatch and that any further delay would unduly prejudice the interests
of the government in pursuing its economic development strategies in the region.
The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
This rule admits well-defined exceptions as follows:
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for certiorari.

Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed
to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however,
circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
 any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved. (Emphasis provided)

The second exception is present in this case.

In Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., this Court found that the non-filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration in the case was not fatal since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, viz:
Respondent explained their omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a
petition for certiorari based on exceptions (b), (c) and (i). The CA brushed aside the filing of the
motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court. We agree.

Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction prayed for
by petitioner should not be granted. However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA and presented the same arguments which were already passed
upon by the RTC. The RTC already had the opportunity to consider and rule on the question of the
propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the injunction. We found no reversible error committed
by the CA for relaxing the rule since respondent's case falls within the exceptions.

Similarly, the various issues raised in the Petition with the Court of Appeals have already been raised
by petitioner on several occasions through its pleadings with the trial court. The lower court,
therefore, passed upon them prior to its issuance of its Order dated October 9, 2006. Specifically, the
table below summarizes the issues and arguments raised by petitioner before the trial court vis a vis
those raised in the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals:
COURT OF
TRIAL COURT
APPEALS

Motion to Dismiss Memorandum Manifestation and Petition for Certiorari

dated June 27, 2005 dated September 1, Reply dated December 17,
2006 dated September 5, 2006 2006

The Honorable The instant complaint To reiterate, the Respondent judge

Supreme Court had filed by plaintiffs for Supreme Court has held committed grave abuse
already ruled that the injunction is an indirect in the applicable case of of discretion to lack or
propriety or wisdom way of preventing the DENR v. DENR Region 12 excess of jurisdiction
of the transfer of transfer of the regional Employees (409 SCRA when he enjoined
government agencies seat of DARFU XII which 359 [2003]) that petitioner from
or offices from has been upheld by the respondent DENR transferring DA-RFU XII
Cotabato City to Supreme Court in DENR employees "cannot, by from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South v. DENR Region 12 means of an injunction, South Cotabato and
Cotabato is beyond Employees (409 SCRA force the DENR XII Koronadal City. The
judicial inquiry. 359 [2003]). If this Regional Offices to assailed order of the
 Honorable Court cannot remain in Cotabato City, lower court enjoining
countermand the as the exercise of the petitioner from
Supreme Court’s ruling authority to transfer the transferring the seat of
directly, it cannot do so same is executive in the DA-RFU XII office to
indirectly. nature." The Supreme Koronadal City in South
Court further stated in Cotabato is contrary to
said case that "the the pronouncement of
judiciary cannot inquire the Supreme Court in
into the wisdom or DENR v. DENR Region
expediency of the acts of 12 Employees (409
the executive or the SCRA 359 [2003]).
legislative department."

Corollary to the above,

the Order dated May 31,
2005 of this Honorable
Court enjoining
defendants from
transferring the seat of
the DA-RFU XII office to
Koronadal City in South
Cotabato is contrary to
the above
pronouncement of the
Supreme Court.
Perforce, the Order
must be set aside
accordingly.

The allegation under Executive orders are Respondent judge acted

Paragraph 4 of the amended, modified or arbitrarily, whimsically
Complaint that her revoked by subsequent and in a very biased
Excellency, President ones. The alleged public manner when he
Gloria Macapagal- pronouncement of the concluded that the
Arroyo only made a President suspending President of the
public pronouncement the implementation of Republic has suspended
that the effect of E.O. Executive Order No. the implementation of
No. 304 is suspended 304 is contrary to the Executive Order No.
is hearsay and ordinance power of the 304.
contrary to the President as provided
procedure on the under the
repeal, amendment or Administrative Code of
modification of rules 1987.
and regulations.

By the nature of their Respondent judge

appointment as committed grave abuse
Regional Officials and of discretion when he
Employees, plaintiffs concluded that the
can be reassigned transfer of DA-RFU XII
anywhere within to Koronadal City will
Region XII in the affect seriously the
exigency of the service. studies of respondents’
children and that there
will be no buildings to
house respondents.

The allegation of If the plight and

possible injury to conditions of the families
plaintiffs and their of the DENR employees
families as a are worth considering,
consequence of the like the dislocation of
planned transfer of the schooling of their
regional seat of DA-RFU children, which without
XII to Koronadal City doubt has more adverse
had been ruled upon by impact than the
the Supreme Court in supposed absence of
DENR v. DENR Region allowances for the
12 Employees (409 transfer, the Supreme
SCRA 359 [2003]) to be Court should have
beyond judicial inquiry granted the injunction
because it involves prayed for by said DENR
concerns that are more employees. Apparently,
on the propriety or the Supreme Court did
wisdom of the transfer not find it compelling to
rather than on its grant the injunction over
legality. and above the wisdom of
the transfer.

The families of the

employees can still stay
in Cotabato City in as
much as they have
established residences
in the area. It must be
emphasized that the
employees derive
salaries and benefits
from their government
work, from which they
support their families.
The movement of
employees thus would
not cause much
financial dislocation as
long as the employees
received their salaries
and benefits.
 The Honorable Court Respondent judge
must further realize that committed grave abuse
the employees are being of discretion when he
paid their salaries. In the concluded that the
given order of things, transfer of DA-RFU XII
such salaries are enough would stretch out the
to provide for their basic meager salaries of
necessities. The Regional respondents and that it
Office can simply would cause them
provide for economic
transportation to strangulation.
effectuate the minimum
required for the transfer
to Koronadal City and
expect the employees to
live on their salaries. Any
allowances due and
owing the employees
connected with the
transfer can be given to
them later as back
payments. This is not to
forget that the Regional
Office has provided
temporary housing for
said employees to
alleviate any
inconvenience that they
may suffer.

There is absolutely no The issues on the Respondent judge

technical malversation alleged illegal committed grave abuse
in the realignment of realignment of funds, of discretion when he
budgetary allocation unauthorized ssuance ordered the issuance of
for the intended of memorandum and a writ of preliminary
transfer of DA-RFU XII the alleged unjust injunction based on the
to Koronadal City. transfer of employees absence of
of DA-RFU XII are acts appropriation for the
that are executive in transfer to Koronadal
nature x x x. City in the amount of
₱9,250,000.00.

x x x the funds needed

for the transfer can be
sourced and met by the
DA from sources such
as the discretionary
administrative fund of
the Office of the
 Secretary.
Respondent’s
computation of the
amount required for the
transfer in the amount
of ₱9,222,000.00 is
bloated or exaggerated.

Respondents who are Respondent judge

accountable officers committed grave abuse
cannot be coerced to of discretion when he
transfer funds that are concluded that
deemed illegal or respondents would
improper. Hence, no suffer irreparable
personal liability or damage if the transfer
irreparable injury of DARFU XII from
would be caused upon Cotabato City to
them. On the other Koronadal City is not
hand, the rest of enjoined.
respondents who are
ordinary employees
would not suffer any
irreparable injury. This
is due to the fact that
they have no privity to
the alleged illegal
transfer of funds.
Thus, the present case falls under the second exception in that a Motion for Reconsideration need not
be filed where questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court.

In any case, this Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is necessity to address
the issues because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public
service and the serious implications the case may cause on the effective administration of the
executive department.

The instant Petition involves the effective administration of the executive department and would
similarly warrant relaxation of procedural rules if need be. Specifically, the fourth clause of E.O. No.
304 states as follows: "WHEREAS, the political and socio-economic conditions in SOCCSKSARGEN
Region point to the need for designating the regional center and seat of the region to improve
government operations and services."

Respondents’ final contention is that the disputed Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals dwell
solely on the indispensability of the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court before
filing a Petition via Rule 65; thus, the other grounds in the present Petition need not be addressed.
Considering that the Petition has overcome the procedural issues as discussed above, we can now
proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised by petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the assailed Order of the trial court enjoining it from transferring the seat of
the DA-RFU XII Regional Office to Koronadal City is contrary to this Court’s pronouncement in DENR
v. DENR Region 12 Employees upholding the separation of powers of the executive department and
the judiciary when it comes to the wisdom of transfer of regional offices.

This Court has held that while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for
expressly in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. This power of
supervision is found in the Constitution as well as in the Local Government Code of 1991, as follows:
Section 25 – National Supervision over Local Government Units –
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general
supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities,
and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and
municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.

In Chiongbian v. Orbos, we held further that the power of the President to reorganize administrative
regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.

The case of DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees is in point. This Court held that the DENR Secretary
can reorganize validly the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. We also found as follows:
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no
buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of
Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City,
(4) the Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsod,
through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these
concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our
form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of
the executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the
others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or
wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments. (Emphasis provided)

The transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN region to Koronadal City is an executive
function.

Similar to DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees, the issues in the present case are addressed to the
wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. Some of these concerns are the lack of a proper and
suitable building in Koronadal to house the DA regional office, the inconvenience of the transfer
considering that the children of respondent-employees are already enrolled in Cotabato City schools,
and other similar reasons.
The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive. When the
trial court issued its October 9, 2006 Order granting preliminary injunction on the transfer of the
regional center to Koronadal City when such transfer was mandated by E.O. No. 304, the lower court
did precisely that.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great government branches has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain
executive or legislative action x x x. "

Finally, a verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not have been
given weight. An executive order is valid when it is not contrary to the law or Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated March 21,
2007 and August 16, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 0 1457-MIN, as well as the Decision dated October 9,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Cotabato City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017
BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO C. NIEVA AND MAMERTO
SIBULO, JR., Respondents.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the August 26, 20092 and October 9, 20093 Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108033. The CA denied due course and dismissed
Baclaran Marketing Corporation's (BMC) Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground that it is
not a remedy available to BMC.

Petitioner BMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of distribution, marketing and
delivery of cement.4 It is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1218-A, entitled "Mamerto Sibulo, Jr.
v. Ricardo Mendoza and Baclaran Marketing, Inc." pending with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Branch 74 (Antipolo Court).5 The case is one for damages arising from a vehicular collision in Taytay,
Rizal between a 10-wheeler truck owned by BMC and driven by its employee Ricardo Mendoza
(Mendoza), and a car owned and driven by Mamerto Sibulo, Jr. (Sibulo). The Antipolo Court, in its
Decision6 dated November 21, 1990 (1990 Decision), ruled in favor of BMC and Mendoza and
dismissed Sibulo's complaint.7 It found that the damages suffered by Sibulo were the result of his own
reckless and imprudent driving.

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision9 dated May 9, 2005 reversed the Antipolo Court and held that
Mendoza's negligence caused the collision. It awarded Sibulo damages in the total amount of
P765,159.55.10 In the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the Decision became final and
executory on June 12, 2005.11 The Antipolo Court subsequently issued a Writ of Execution12 on
January 16, 2006. Then, in an Order13 dated February 23, 2006, it directed the Deputy Sheriff, upon
motion of Sibulo, to implement the Writ of Execution against the real properties owned by BMC, as it
appears that BMC has no personal properties. The sheriff of the Antipolo Court levied upon BMC's
real property in Parañaque City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34587 (property).
He sold the property and its improvements through public auction on April 17, 2006. Respondent
Fernando C. Nieva (Nieva) emerged as the highest bidder paying the total price of P800,000.00.

For BMC's failure to redeem the property within one year from the sale, Nieva consolidated
ownership over it. He filed a Petition for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate Title No. 34587 and
Issuance of New [Title] in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257 (Parañaque Court)
pursuant to Section 107 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.15 The case was docketed as LRC Case No.
07-0119.16 The Parañaque Court granted the petition in its Decision17 dated March 26, 2008 and
ordered BMC to surrender to Nieva, within 15 days from receipt of the Decision, its owner's duplicate
certificate of title over the property. Failing such, the Parañaque Court ordered the Register of Deeds
to annul TCT No. 34587 and issue a new title in Nieva's name. The Decision of the Parañaque Court
became final on May 8, 2008.

Consequently, Nieva filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the property in the
Parañaque Court. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 08-0077. The Parañaque Court granted the
petition in its Decision19 dated January 26, 2009 and issued a Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate
against BMC dated March 12, 2009 and March 22, 2009, respectively.

In view of the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued against it, BMC filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment21 before the CA. BMC prayed for the annulment of the following orders and
decisions:
 (a) Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2006 issued by the Antipolo Court in Civil Case No.
1218-A;

(b) Order dated February 23, 2006 of the Antipolo Court in Civil Case No. 1218-A ordering the
implementation of the writ of execution over the real properties of BMC;

(c) Auction Sale dated April 17, 2006;

(d) Decision dated March 26, 2008 of the Parañaque Court in LRC Case No. 07-0119 canceling
TCT No. 34587; and

(e) Decision dated January 26, 2009 of the Parañaque Court in LRC Case No. 08-0077, ordering
the issuance of a Writ of Possession.

BMC alleged that its counsel, Atty. Isagani B. Rizon (Atty. Rizon), committed acts of gross and
inexcusable negligence constituting "extrinsic fraud," which deprived it of due process and an
opportunity to present its side.23 It discovered the fraud only in December 2008 when its
representatives tried to pay the real estate tax on the property, only to learn that the title to it had
already been transferred to Nieva.24 BMC averred that it did not know that Sibulo appealed the 1990
Decision of the Antipolo Court to the CA. It claimed that Atty. Rizon assured BMC that the 1990
Decision ended the controversy.25 Had BMC known of the appeal, it could have opposed the
proceedings or engaged the services of new counsel.

BMC claimed that it immediately called Atty. Rizon in his office upon discovering that the property
was levied upon and sold at public auction. However, BMC was informed that Atty. Rizon died on
January 30, 2009. It also learned that Atty. Rizon ran for public office and won as Mayor of Baroy,
Lanao Del Norte in the 1995, 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections. BMC alleged that based on court
records, notices relative to the case against BMC were sent to Atty. Rizon but, for some reason
unknown to BMC, Atty. Rizon never informed it of the court documents/processes.

BMC emphasized that the Antipolo Court ruled in its favor in Civil Case No. 1218-A and that it was
only when BMC failed to participate in the appeal that an adverse decision was rendered against
it.28 It maintains that if the orders of the Antipolo and Parañaque Courts were allowed to stand, BMC
will be deprived of its substantial property rights over the property: when the property was sold to
Nieva at the public auction for a bid price of P800,000.00, its market value 29 was already
P19,890,000.00.

The CA, in its Resolution dated August 26, 2009, denied BMC's petition. It ruled that the remedy of
annulment of judgment is not available to BMC because:

(a) Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the
unsuccessful party's own counsel.31

(b) BMC is bound by the negligence of Atty. Rizon because it was negligent for not checking on
the status of the case. It did not also inform the Antipolo Court of its change of address.
Thus, BMC cannot claim that it was denied due process.32
 (c) A writ of execution or auction sale are not in the nature of a final judgment, order, or
resolution, hence, they cannot be the subject of an action to annul judgment.

BMC moved for reconsideration; this, however, was denied. Hence, this petition, which raises the sole
issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing BMC's petition for annulment of judgment.

We deny the petition.

I
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court governs actions for the annulment of final judgments, orders, or
resolutions of regional trial courts in civil actions. It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only
in exceptional cases where there is no available or other adequate remedy.35 Its objective is to set
aside a final and executory judgment, which is not void upon its face, but is entirely regular in form,
and whose alleged defect is not apparent upon its face or from the recitals contained in the
judgment.36 Since it disregards the time-honored rule of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, the Rules of Court impose stringent requirements before a litigant may avail of it.
In Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank & Trust Company,37 we held that "[g]iven the
extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order,"38 a
petitioner must comply with the statutory requirements as set forth under Rule 47. These are:

(1) The remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no
fault of the petitioner;

(2) The grounds for the action of annulment of judgment are limited to either extrinsic fraud
or lack of jurisdiction;

(3) The action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel; and

(4) The petition must be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.39

BMC's petition for annulment of judgment fails to meet the first and second requisites.

II
Rule 47, Section 1 limits the applicability of the remedy of annulment of judgment to final judgments,
orders or resolutions.40 A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do in respect thereto. This may be an adjudication on the merits which, on the
basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground of res judicata or prescription. In contrast, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case
completely but leaves something to be done upon its merits.

We find that the CA correctly denied BMC's petition.

In Guiang v. Co,43 we declared that an auction sale and a writ of execution are not final orders. Thus,
they cannot be nullified through an action for annulment of judgment, to wit:
It bears stressing that Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to a petition to annul a
judgment or final order and resolution in civil actions, on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction or due process. A final order or resolution is one which is issued by a court which
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. The rule
does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public auction of petitioner's
properties or the certificate of sale executed by the deputy sheriff over said properties.
Neither does it apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because a writ of execution is
not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the
enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order
or judgment against the losing party. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)

Corollarily, an order implementing a writ of execution issued over certain real properties is also not
a final order as it merely enforces a judicial process over an identified object. It does not involve an
adjudication on the merits or determination of the rights of the parties.

Closely related to a writ of execution is a writ of possession. In LZK Holdings and Development Corp.
v. Planters Development Bank,45 we explained that a writ of possession is a writ of execution employed
to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land
and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.46 Thus, similar to a writ of
execution, a writ of possession is not a final order which may be annulled under Rule 47. It is merely
a judicial process to enforce a final order against the losing party. For this reason the Decision of the
Antipolo Court ordering the issuance of writ of possession is also not amenable to an action for
annulment of judgment.

In fine, only the Decision of the Parañaque Court ordering the cancellation of BMC's title over the
property qualifies as a final judgment. It is a judgment on the merits declaring who between Nieva
and BMC has the right over the title to the property. Therefore, it may be the subject of an action for
annulment of judgment. Be that as it may, BMC failed to prove that any of the grounds for annulment
are present in this case.

III
Rule 47, Section 2 provides extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction as the exclusive grounds for the
remedy of annulment of judgment.47 Case law, however, recognizes a third ground—denial of due
process of law. Arcelona v. Court of Appeals48 teaches that a decision which is patently void may be
set aside on grounds of want of jurisdiction or "non-compliance with due process of law."49

Here, BMC invokes extrinsic fraud and lack of due process as grounds for its petition for annulment
of judgment. It claims that Atty. Rizon's gross negligence in handling the case constitutes extrinsic
fraud and deprived it of due process of law.

We are not persuaded. Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful party by his
opponent preventing him from fully exhibiting his case by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives
at his defeat.

In Pinausukan, we held that a lawyer's neglect in keeping track of the case and his failure to apprise
his client of the developments of the case do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Fraud is not extrinsic if
the alleged fraudulent act was committed by petitioner's own counsel. The fraud must emanate from
the act of the adverse party and must be of such nature as to deprive petitioner of its day in
court. Thus, in many cases, we have held that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence does not amount
to extrinsic fraud that would grant a petition for annulment of judgment.

In this case, the CA correctly found that BMC neither alleged nor proved that the gross negligence of
its former counsel was done in connivance with Nieva or Sibulo.54 Therefore, it is not the extrinsic
fraud contemplated under Rule 47, Section 2.

IV
BMC maintains that it was denied due process of law because it was not able to participate in the
proceedings subsequent to the 1990 Decision of the Antipolo Court. It alleges that Atty. Rizon did not
inform it of Sibulo's appeal and of the orders and processes issued by the courts. BMC pleads that
Atty. Rizon's gross negligence in handling the case is tantamount to abandonment of the same. Thus,
it should not be bound by the negligence of its counsel.

Nieva and Sibulo, on the other hand, assert that BMC was not deprived of due process. They aver that
the records of the CA show that BMC was furnished with a copy of the decision of the CA and a copy
of the entry of judgment.

BMC's contentions have no leg to stand on. It is well-settled that the negligence of the counsel binds
the client, except in cases where the gross negligence of the lawyer deprived his client of due process
of law. However, mere allegation of gross negligence does not suffice. In the recent case of Ong Lay
Hin v. Court of Appeals,58 we held that for the exception to apply, the client must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was maliciously deprived of information that he could not have acted to
protect his interests. The error of his counsel must have been both palpable and maliciously exercised
that it could viably be the basis for a disciplinary action.59 Pertinently, malice is never presumed but
must be proved as a fact. The record is bereft of showing that BMC alleged and proved that Atty. Rizon
was motivated by malice in failing to inform it of Sibulo's appeal.

Moreover, the gross negligence of the counsel must not be accompanied by the client's own
negligence. In Bejarasco, Jr. v. People,60 we ruled that for his failure to keep himself up-to-date on the
status of his case, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him. A
litigant bears the responsibility of monitoring the developments of his case for no prudent party
leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer.

In this light, BMC ca1mot pass all the blame to Atty. Rizon. It admitted in its petition before us that
after obtaining a favorable decision from the Antipolo Court, it did not bother to check the status of
the case.62 While it might be true that Atty. Rizon assured it that the case has already ended with the
1990 Decision, the prudent thing would have been for BMC to ask for evidence or proof that the
decision was already final. This, BMC failed to do.

Since Sibulo's claim for damages involves a considerable amount of money, BMC is expected to
protect its own interest and not merely to rely on its counsel. It is the duty of. BMC to be in touch with
its counsel regarding the progress of the case. It cannot just sit back, relax, and wait for the outcome
of the case.63 Since the alleged negligent act of its counsel was accompanied by BMC's own negligence,
the latter shall be bound by the former's negligence.

We commiserate with the plight of BMC, assuming that it was indeed unaware of the proceedings
subsequent to the 1990 Decision. Nevertheless, we cannot simply disregard the statutory
requirements of an action for a1mulment of judgment, lest we open the gates for possible abuse of
litigants who seek to delay the enforcement of final and executory judgments of the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The August 26,2009 and October 9, 2009
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108033 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, et al, Petitioners, vs. CA and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, Respondent.

This is a petition for review of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
69221, dismissing petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment.

On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, docketed as SP

Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado ("decedent"), who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. Respondent alleged that
he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate
of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings.7 Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will
of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are
the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice
to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the
signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is,
the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her
signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will
properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued
to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.

On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing
by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright
dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the deficiency. Moreover, the
RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen.

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA,
seeking the annulment of the RTC’s Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002.
They claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several
conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to
a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to
implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign
and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in participating in the
compromise agreement so that they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will.
They claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which
they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the
will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on
the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.

In its Resolution promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that there
was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their
own. Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners’ claim that the proceedings in the RTC was
attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. Petitioners sought
reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.

Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to show that
they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied
their day in court during the proceedings before the RTC. In addition, they assert that this Court has
yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant petition should
be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar.

For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies provided
in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new trial. Moreover, they could
have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment since they learned of the RTC’s judgment only
three and a half months after its promulgation. Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud
exists to warrant the annulment of the RTC’s Decision, since there was no showing that they were
denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the probate proceedings because the
decedent did not institute them as her heirs. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs
of the decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a
matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. Finally, respondent charges
petitioners of forum–shopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving the same issues as those
in SP No. 00-135, that is SP No. 1181 filed before Branch 23, RTC of General Santos City and
subsequently pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R. No.74924.

It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores ("Flores"), who is a niece of the
decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General Santos City, claiming
that the decedent died intestate without any issue, survived by five groups of collateral heirs. Flores,
armed with a Special Power of Attorney from most of the other petitioners, prayed for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since
the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the decedent
died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue
hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC added. On 9 January 2002, Flores filed
a Notice of Appeal and on 28 January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA.

Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be
annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of
the CA. They aver that respondent’s offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the
probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s judgment.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground
of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify
the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should
be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the
same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry
thereof.

A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies
available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has
been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein,
cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment.

However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become
parties to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be
published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as
well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus,
it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in
said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It
is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in
the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication
of the notice of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of
motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed
a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the
reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for
having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.

Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have
still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners
claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the
time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them,
petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would
benefit from their own inaction or negligence.

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for
failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds:
extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the
judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court.

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondent’s
deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the
decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus
they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent’s offer of a false
compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the
petition for probate.

The Court is not convinced.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of
the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no
legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the
same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is
cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of
procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.

The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify
them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in
court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case
before the probate court.

One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping consists of
filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, involving the same
parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed case before the CA,
are the same. Both cases deal with the existence and validity of the alleged will of the decedent, with
petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy. In the probate proceedings, petitioners’
position has always been that the decedent left no will and if she did, the will does not comply with
the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of course,
respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for letters of
administration, petitioner Flores prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate on the
theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the subject of review in CA-G.R. No. 74924.
Clearly, therefore, there is forum-shopping.

Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their certification against
forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any time thereafter. The Court notes that even in the
petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their
appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for
annulment of judgment was instituted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118328. October 8, 1998
MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, Petitioner, v. SPS FIDEL and EVELYN BENOLIRAO, MELITON
CARISIMA, and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14, 1994 in CA G.R. CV
No. 39251 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in Civil
Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992 directing herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal
structures which she constructed in front of the subject lots, to vacate the said property and right of
way, and return possession thereof to the Respondents.

The antecedent facts:

The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising of 1,806 square
meters, more or less, located at the corner of Pilapil and N. Domingo Streets, Pasay City. The legal
heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation (UCRTC) which
subdivided the property into fourteen (14) lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The subdivided lots were then
offered for sale with first priority to each of the tenants, including the private respondents and
petitioner. Lot 666-H has an area of 248 square meters, consisting of two (2) parts. One part is the
residential portion with an area of 112 square meters purchased by private respondents-spouses
Benolirao while the second part is the right of way for Lot 666-I and the aforesaid residential portion.
Private respondent Carisima purchased Lot 666-I. Petitioner, who was occupying the western end
and front portions of the aforesaid lots declined the offer to purchase any of the lots offered for sale
by UCRTC.
Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiakos wife, Mrs. Rosario de Jesus. Thereafter, the
collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file on June 30, 1987, Civil Case No. 5456
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario
de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The consignation was granted by the trial court and was
eventually affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October 25,
1989.
On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondents-spouses
Benolirao for Lot 666-H. This sale was annotated at the back of UCRTCs title on Lot 666-H .
On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made upon petitioner, UCRTC
instituted an action against her for recovery of possession of the subject premises before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 docketed as Civil Case No 6652. On July 15, 1990, the trial court
rendered its decision dismissing the complaint of UCRTC, stating in part, to wit:
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff, not having been authorized in writing for the purpose, may not
validly bring an action to enforce a perceived easement of right of way pertaining to the owners of
Lots 666-H and 666-I or the Benolirao and Carisima families. while Benjamin Ongsiako possessed the
authority to institute the case (Exhibit G), plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Furthermore, the
situation obtaining does not call for the enforcement of an easement of right of way. Defendant
Serdoncillo is not the owner of and has never claimed ownership over the portion of Lot 666-H on
which her house is erected. A servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner (Article 613, New Civil Code). In the
present case, the ejectment of defendant Serdoncillo from the portion of Lot 666-H occupied by the
house at the instance of the proper party (Renato Bolinaraos family ) would remove the obstruction.
xxx
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the complaint against the defendant
Marciana Serdoncillo, as well as defendants counterclaim, is dismissed for lack of merit. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court, hence, the same became
final.
On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the Exercise of Preferential
Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao
praying for the annulment of sale of a portion of lot 666-H sold to the Benolirao spouses on the
ground that said transfer or conveyance is illegal. She claimed that she has the preferred right to buy
the said property and that the same was not offered to her under the same terms and conditions,
hence, it is null and void. UCRTC and private respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the same was dismissed on July 9, 1992.
On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on petitioner reiterating their
previous demands to vacate the property. On December 13, 1990, private respondents filed their
complaint for recovery of possession of the subject premises against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, docketed as Civil Case No. 7785, which complaint alleges these
material facts:
5. That plaintiffs, being then registered owners of the properties designated as lot 666-H and 666-I,
are likewise the owners/grantees of the right of way granted by United Complex Realty and Trading
Corporation which was correspondingly annotated in its title (Annex B-3) under Entry No.
205154/T-172291 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City;
6. That since 1982 the defendant has built and constructed a residence and pig pen on the plaintiffs
right of way as well as on the front portions of the latters properties leaving them virtually obstructed
with no ingress or egress from the main road;
7. That verbal and written demands made upon the defendant by the plaintiffs to remove and
demolish her structures had been ignored, the last of which was on November 20, 1990, xerox copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof, but despite such demands,
the defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to remove and vacate her illegal structures
on the portion of the properties as well as on the right of way of plaintiffs;
8. That plaintiffs in compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law lodged a complaint before
the Barangay Captain, Barangay 84, Zone 10 of Pasay City, which certified filing of the same in court,
xerox copy of said certification is hereto attached as Annex D and taken as integral part hereof;
9. That due to the unjustified refusal of the defendant, the plaintiffs are suffering the unnecessary
inconvenience of the absence of decent and sufficient ingress and egress on their properties, and will
continue to suffer the same unless the illegal structures are finally demolished and/or removed by
the defendants;
Petitioner, in her Answer, put up the defense that she is the legitimate tenant of said lots in question
since 1956, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder, thus:
13. That Lot 666-H and Lot 666-I mentioned in the complaint are formerly portions of a big track(sic)
of land consisting of 1,806 square meters then owned by H.V. Ongsiako;
14. That since 1956 and before the 1,806 square meters of lot owned by H.V. Ongsiako was
subdivided into fourteen (14) lots in 1982, defendant is (sic) already a legitimate tenant and occupant
family of around 400 square meters of the 1,806 square meters of the said land then owned by H.V.
Ongsiako by erecting her residential house thereon at the agreed monthly rental of P15.00 and
increased to P100.00;
"15. That upon the death of H. V. Ongsiako his heirs continued collecting the monthly rental of the
premises from the defendants;
"16. That the heirs of H. V. Ongsiako formed a corporation known as UNITED COMPLEX REALTY AND
TRADING CORPORATION and the big parcel of land consisting of 1,806 square meters was
transferred to the said corporation and subdivided in 1982 into fourteen (14) lots, two (2) of which
lots are the very same lots leased by the defendant from H.V. Ongsiako and later from his heirs and
then from United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation as alleged in the preceding pars. 13, 14,
and 15;
The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992, the trial court rendered
its decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of the foregoing, and finding preponderance of evidence in plaintiffs favor,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) "Ordering the defendant to demolish and remove all illegal structures she constructed on the
front portions of the subject lots and on the right of way of the plaintiffs;
2) "Ordering the defendant to vacate the property and right of way and return possession
thereof to the plaintiffs;
3) "Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.

As to the damages (actual and moral) no award is given. In the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
by defendants, the latter are(sic) not liable for damages (Escritor Jr. v. IAC, 155 SCRA 577).
"Actual and compensatory damages require substantial proof. In the absence of malice and bad faith,
moral damages cannot be awarded (Capco v. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561).
"As to the attorneys fees, each party should shoulder his/her expenses.
SO ORDERED."

Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that: 1)
the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of private respondents considering that based
on the letter of demand dated November 20, 1990, the action filed should have been unlawful
detainer and not an action for recovery of possession; 2) the action filed by private respondents is
barred by res judicata considering that the present action is identical with that of Civil Case No.
6652; 3) the lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action with respect
to enforcement of right of way vis a vis defendant; and 4) the lower court erred in ordering that
defendants vacate the properties in question since the lease of defendants thereon was still in
existence and had not yet been terminated.

On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the findings of the
trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner, stating in part as follows:
The issue as to the proper action has been resolved by the respondent court, to wit:
`The defense that what should have been filed is an ejectment case and not recovery of possession, is
not also correct. The filing of this case for recovery of possession, instead of an ejectment case, is not
altogether unjustified. The Benoliraos and Carisima became the owners as early as May, 1989. Verbal
and written demands had been ignored. There is an immediate need for plaintiffs to use the right of
way, which up to the present time is obstructed,. At most, what surfaced is a technicality which should
be abandoned.'
"A plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff-appellees cause of action is for recovery of
possession of their property which was encroached upon by defendant-appellant.
A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by petitioner on August 8, 1994 was
denied by the respondent on September 23, 1994.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner ascribes one single error committed by the respondent court, to wit:
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (Sp. Fifteenth Division)
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING AS AN ACCION PUBLICIANA AN
EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE (THE JURISDICTION OF WHICH CLEARLY PERTAINS
TO THE INFERIOR COURT), A CASE BASICALLY INVOLVING AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY.
Petitioner asserts that the respondent court erred in sustaining the trial courts finding that the
complaint filed by private respondents for recovery of possession of the subject premises is
an accion publiciana notwithstanding the fact that the action was filed within one (1) year from
demand. Petitioner contends that private respondents should have filed an action for unlawful
detainer and not an action for recovery of possession against petitioner. Consequently, the trial court
is without jurisdiction to hear and determine Civil Case No. 7785. In support of her contention,
petitioner cited the cases of Bernabe vs. Luna and Medina vs. Court of Appeals, which she states is
strikingly similar to the facts of this case. Consequently, the rulings of this Court in these two cases
are squarely applicable and controlling in the case at bar.

Private respondents, however, aver that they were merely successors-in-interest of UCRTC and
therefore step into the shoes of the latter. They claim that the demand to vacate required by law
should at the very least be reckoned from June 2, 1989, the date of the filing of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 6652 considering that their demands are simply a reiteration of UCRTCs demands against
petitioner. Private respondents further contend that the allegations in the complaint determine the
jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 specifically alleged that private
respondents are the owners of lots 666-I and 666-H as evidenced by transfer certificates of title and
prayed for recovery of possession of a portion thereof including its right of way illegally and
unlawfully possessed by petitioner.

Petitioners position is without merit.

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted. Accordingly, the issues in the instant case can only be properly
resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785.

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on
the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to
parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria.

In the case of Javier vs. Veridiano II this Court held that the doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, decided more
than twenty-five years ago, is still good law. It preserved the age-old remedies available under
existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely: (1) accion
interdictal, which is the summary action for either forcible entry or detentacion, where the
defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio; or for unlawful detainer
or desahucio, where the defendants possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the
expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of
actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan court; (2) accion publiciana which is a
plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional
trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, (3) accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes
the jus possidendi brought in the proper regional trial court.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges

ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion
interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess
without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc., this Court held that:
We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as distinguished from that of unlawful
detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiffs prior physical
possession of the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of such possession by any of the means
provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and
stealth, for if the dispossession did not take place by any of these means, the courts of first instance, not
the municipal courts, have jurisdiction.

xxx
The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands. Thus,
whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he may maintain his
action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the expiration of
twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed or declared to be owner of the land.
Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property illegally
detained, together with rents due and damages, even though one (1) year has not expired from the
beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of ownership of such property
is also involved. In other words, if the party illegally dispossessed desires to raise the question of
illegal dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the property, he may commence such
action in the Court of First Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal dispossession. If he
decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only, and the action is filed more than one (1)
year after such deprivation or withholding of possession, then the Court of First Instance will have
original jurisdiction over the case. The former is an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery
of ownership as well as possession, while the latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First
Instance.

A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 undisputably show that plaintiffs
(private respondents herein) clearly set up title to themselves as being the absolute owner of the
disputed premises by virtue of their transfer certificates of title and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo
be ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of the
means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, nor is there any assertion of defendants possession which was originally lawful but ceased to
be so upon the expiration of the right to possess. It does not characterize petitioners alleged entry
into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was
able to construct the house and the pig pens thereon. The complaint merely avers that a portion of
the lot owned by private respondents and its right of way have been occupied by petitioner and that
she should vacate. The action therefore is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but
essentially involves a dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land allegedly
encroached upon by petitioner and its adjoining right of way. Indeed, the Ocular Inspection Report
of the Branch Clerk of Court, states that:
"xxx (T)he right of way hit directly the defendant Serdoncillos property consisting of a two-storey
residential house made of wood and GI sheets and occupying the entire width of the rear portion of the
right of way. A coconut tree stands on the middle of the road, at the back of which is a shanty made of
rotten G.I. sheets around it which is used as pigpens and place of washing clothes extended from
defendants house. To gain access to plaintiffs property, the group turned right and passed between an
aratiris tree and cemented firewall owned by Mr. Belarmino making only one person at a time to pass.
This passageway has only a width of 0.5 meter which is being used by the defendant and her members
of the family aside from the plaintiffs.

xxx Two (2) monuments of the lot boundary of the plaintiffs property are existing, but the rest are
nowhere to be found. According to Mrs. Benolirao, they are located within the premises of the
defendants house. At the back of Benolirao is a private property gutted by fire.

xxx Upon request, the group was granted permission by the relatives of the defendant to inspect the
place. The group further noticed that defendants improvements were even encroaching on the
plaintiffs lot by approximately 4.1 meters, more or less. The house of the defendant is facing the
plaintiffs property; there is a small chicken house and there is also a dog house standing near it.

It is noted that at the time of the filing of said complaint, Civil Case No. 7749, an action for annulment
of the sale between UCRTC and private respondents Benolirao of Lot 666-H initiated by petitioner
was likewise pending in another court. This case puts in issue the validity of private respondents
acquisition of the subject lots and ultimately their ownership of Lot 666-H.

Thus, what is noticeable in the complaint is that private respondents definitely gave petitioner notice
of their claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including their right to possess which is an
elemental attribute of ownership. It is immaterial whether or not private respondents instituted their
complaint one month from date of last demand or a year thereafter. What is of paramount importance
is that the allegations in the complaint are of the nature of either an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria.

Petitioners reliance on the Bernabe and Medina cases, which she claims to be squarely applicable
under the circumstances herein, is entirely misplaced. While it is true that in these two cases the
complaints were filed before the one-year period had expired from date of last demand, the
allegations in the complaint failed to state material facts which are indicative of a case of either
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Thus, the Court in Bernabe stated that:
"In their complaint, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) allege that they are the owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 199.4 square meters more or less, located in Tondo, Manila, that defendant (private
respondent herein) constructed a house on said lot without plaintiffs permission; that on November 14,
1980, plaintiffs thru counsel made a written demand for the removal of said house as well as for the
recovery of damages for the reasonable use and occupation thereof; and that defendant refused and
failed to comply despite repeated demands.

xxx
We have noted that while petitioners allege in their complaint that they are the owners of the lot on
which the house of the private respondent is constructed, their attached TCT shows that the lot is
still in the name of Fejosera Investment Incorporated. Private respondent and said company entered
into a contract of lease in l950 for the use and occupation of said lot. Petitioners allegedly bought the
lot in question in 1973, and they must have been fully aware of the occupancy of the private
respondent of the premises in question. Yet, they did not take any action to remove the house of the
private respondent or to inform the respondent that they had become the new owners of the lot in
question. It is clear therefore that the lease was allowed to continue.
 xxx
"Consequently, the possession of private respondent over the lot in question became illegal only on
November 14, 1980, when the formal demand to pay and vacate the premises was sent to him.

The allegations in the complaint clearly show that plaintiffs were already the owners of the property
when defendant constructed a house on the disputed lot without their permission. That despite
formal demand defendant failed to vacate and surrender possession of the property to them. Indeed,
the averments in plaintiffs complaint present jurisdictional facts which do not illustrate plaintiffs
action as either an action publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs complaint, pertinent portion of which is
quoted hereunder:
It is clear on the face of the complaint that at the time of the filing of this case on February 19, 1981, the
defendant was in possession, as tenant, of the premises. When plaintiffs counsel, therefore sent a written
notice on November 4, 1980 requiring defendant to vacate the premises when this action was brought,
the one (1) year period after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession has not yet set in. It
is clear that this is an ejectment case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.
SO ORDERED.

We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by petitioner, to be inappropriate. The facts distinctly
show that the complaint filed by the owners of the property before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 47, was for unlawful detainer. It was the action resorted to by the plaintiffs after
advising the defendant (the lessee of the premises in question) that a member of the family, Dr. Igama,
urgently needed the house and after repeated demands to vacate made on the lessee proved to be
unsuccessful. All these incidents, from notification to the filing of the complaint dated May 16, 1985,
transpired within a period of six (6) months. Indeed, the factual background of this case is a classic
illustration of an action for unlawful detainer. Verily, the facts are therefore diametrically opposite
to the facts of the case at bar.

Petitioner has therefore no legal basis to insist that the present case is similar to the Bernabe and
Medina cases and from which this Court should base its findings and conclusions. The doctrine laid
down in Tenorio vs. Gomba is still controlling. In that case the Court ruled that courts of first instance
have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land except forcible entry and illegal
detainer, and therefore the lower court has jurisdiction over the action alleged in the appellants
complaint because it is neither of illegal detainer nor of forcible entry.

Petitioner maintains that her leasehold right as a tenant of the subject premises had been settled in
Civil Case No. 5456, an action for consignation, which she won before the Metropolitan Trial Court
and affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109. Said court ruled that
the latter is a tenant of the site or premises in question and that she cannot be ejected therefrom,
even on the assumption that her house and pig pen are allegedly standing on a right of way. She
claims that pursuant to Section 49 (b) (now Section 47) Rule 39, Rules of Court, the issue of tenancy
in said case is now conclusive between her and private respondents with respect to the subject
premises in question.

Petitioners contention is devoid of merit.

Section 49 (now Section 47), provides that:

Section 49. Effects of Judgments .- the effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge
of the Philippines having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when the right or fact has been judicially
determined, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

Thus, for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must
concur: (l) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and, (4)
there must be between the first and second actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of subject
matter; and (c) identity of cause of action.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three (3) requirements and the identity of the
subject matter. The only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 5456 and Civil Case
No. 7785, there is identity of parties and of causes of action in Civil Case No. 5456 to bar the institution
of Civil Case No. 7785.

There is identity of parties. The record shows that the parties in Civil Case No. 5456 are petitioner as
plaintiff while the defendants were UCRTC, the spouses Meliton and Efremia Carisima and Rosario
de Jesus. Private respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao acquired lot 666-H from UCRTC
and are therefore the successors-in-interest of UCRTC by title subsequent to the commencement and
termination of the first action. As such, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of UCRTC
and acquired whatever capacity and title the former had over the same property or subject matter of
the action. Indeed, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of parties between the two actions.

There is however, no identity of causes of action in both cases. In the case of Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action
but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action. Petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 5456 is an action for consignation of rentals while Civil
Case No. 7785 is an action for recovery of possession.

In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is whether or not consignation of rentals is proper
under the circumstances obtaining in that case. Private respondents action for recovery of possession
requires them to present evidence of their claim or title to the subject premises and their right to
possess the same from petitioner. Stated conversely, the evidence in Civil Case No. 5456 is entirely
different to that in Civil Case No. 7785. Thus, the decision in Civil Case No. 5456 does not in any way
affect nor bar Civil Case No. 7785.

Indeed, the Court noted that the parties had been at odds since 1987 when petitioner initiated Civil
Case No. 5456, and then Civil Case No. 7749. Private respondents predecessor UCRTC likewise
initiated Civil Case No. 6652 and the present case under appeal, Civil Case No. 7785, all because of
the use of a right of way and an encroachment of only 4.1 meters of the subject premises. At some
point in time, all these squabbles must end. Thus, the respondent court stated that:
It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should decide all questions submitted
to them as truth and justice require, and that it is greatly to be desired that all judgments should be so
decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts
demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of the courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law.

In passing, We reiterate the time-honored doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and the Court will not normally disturb such factual
findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the evidence or unless the
judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. In this case, We find the said decision to be
totally supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the foregoing premises, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV NO. 39251 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.