BPI v.

BPI Employees Union - Metro Manila

FACTS.

BPIEU-MM, a LLO and SEBA of all the regular rank-and-file employees of BPI in Metro Manila, and BPI have an existing CBA. The CBA provides for loan
benefits and relatively low interest rates. (Consisted of Fringe benefits including Multi-Purpose loans, Real Estate loans, all of whose interests may be reduced
to 6% subject to certain conditions; said CBA also included Emergency loans)

Thereafter, petitioner issued a "no negative data bank policy" (see notes for this policy) for the implementation/availment of the manpower loans which the Union
objected to, thus, resulting into labor-management dialogues. Unsatisfied with the result of those dialogues, Union brought the matter to the grievance machinery
and afterwards, the issue, not having been resolved, the parties raised it to the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA).

VA ruled for respondent The imposition of the NO NEGATIVE DATA BANK as a new condition for the implementation and availment of the manpower loan
benefits by the employees evidently violates the CBA (also awarded 10% atty’s fees)

CA affirmed the decision of VA with the modification that the award of atty’s fees be deleted. Petitioner’s MR denied.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON the No Negative Data Bank conforms to the CBA. – NO.

BPI: The rationale behind the use of the "no NDB policy" aims to encourage employees of a banking institution to exercise the highest standards of conduct,
considering the bank's fiduciary relationship with its depositors and clients.

A scrutiny of the CBA reveals an express conformity to petitioner's prerogative to issue policies that would guide the parties in the availment of manpower loans
under the CBA.

The subject policy does not only conform to the provisions of the parties' CBA, but it is also in harmony with the circulars and regulations of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas

CBA: Law between the parties

A CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries. As in all other contracts, there must be
clear indications that the parties reached a meeting of the minds. Therefore, the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties.

“No NDB Policy” NOT in CBA

 The CBA in this case contains no provision on the "no negative data bank policy" as a prerequisite in the entitlement of the benefits it set forth for the employees.
In fact, a close reading of the CBA would show that the terms and conditions contained therein relative to the availment of the loans are plain and clear, thus, all
they need is the proper implementation in order to reach their objective.

Although it can be said that petitioner is authorized to issue rules and regulations pertinent to the availment and administration of the loans under the CBA, the
additional rules and regulations, however, must not impose new conditions which are not contemplated in the CBA and should be within the realm of
reasonableness. The "no negative data bank policy" is a new condition which is never contemplated in the CBA and at some points, unreasonable to the
employees because it provides that before an employee or his/her spouse can avail of the loan benefits under the CBA, the said employee or his/her spouse must
not be listed in the negative data bank, or if previously listed therein, must obtain a clearance at least one year or six months as the case may be, prior to a loan
application.

Remedies of ER if it wants to include “No NDB Policy”

It must be remembered that negotiations between an employer and a union transpire before they agree on the terms and conditions contained in the CBA. If the
petitioner, indeed, intended to include a "no negative data bank policy" in the CBA, it should have presented such proposal to the union during the negotiations. To
include such policy after the effectivity of the CBA is deceptive and goes beyond the original agreement between the contracting parties.

This Court also notes petitioner's argument that the "no negative data bank policy" is intended to exact a high standard of conduct from its employees. However,
the terms and conditions of the CBA must prevail. Petitioner can propose the inclusion of the said policy upon the expiration of the CBA, during the negotiations for
a new CBA, but in the meantime, it has to honor the provisions of the existing CBA.

In Favor of Labor

NCC 1702 provides that, in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.
Thus, this Court has ruled that any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and the union members should be resolved in favor of the latter.

DECISION.

Petition Denied

NOTES
No Data Bank Policy: As bank employees, one is expected to practice the highest standards of financial prudence and sensitivity to basic rules of credit and
management of his/her financial resources and needs, it is for this reason that Management deemed fit that reference to the Negative Data Bank (NDB) and other
sources of financial data handling shall be made for purposes of evaluation of manpower loans.

xxx These procedures apply to all employees, whether officer or staff, regardless of loan type (multi-purpose, emergency, car, housing).

NDB (whether record is in his own name or spouse's)

1. Outstanding obligation should be fully paid at least one year prior to loan application.

- even if cleared/fully paid, but within the one-year penalty box, the application wili not be considered.

2. Clearance certification should be obtained from the card company/lending company/bank/court:

- if card or lending company, the date of full payment should be clearly indicated in the certification.

- if closed account due to mishandling, date of account closure.

- f court case, date of dismissal of case.

3. Employees will be asked to explain in writing the reason/circumstances for being in the NDB.

4. Final approval of the loan will be with the HR Head, SVP Jess Razon.

- if provincial Business Center account, the employee to submit 2 and 3 to BC with his/her loan application; BC to send to HR for evaluation and approval prior to
implementation of the loan.

Suspended/Past Due (not vet in NDB) Accounts within the Unibank.

1. Outstanding obligation should be fully paid at least six months prior to the loan application.

- even if cleared/fully paid, but within the 6-month penalty box.

2. Clearance certification from BCC or other Unibank unit where the obligation occurred.
Other Past Due Obligation

Management reserves the right to evaluate an employee's credit-worthiness based on his handling of other obligations, outside of NDB or Unibank units, as basis
for granting manpower loans. This is particularly considered in the case of housing ioan take-out, if the employee-applicant has been grossly delinquent in his
payments to the previous financing company. (Id. at 49-50).

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF), PHILIPPINE PLAZA CHAPTER v.
PHILIPPINE PLAZA HOLDINGS, INC., G.R. No. 177524, July 23, 2014

Facts:The Union is the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. (PPHI). The PPHI and the Union
executed the “Third Rank-and-File Collective Bargaining Agreement as Amended” (CBA). The CBA provided, among others, for the collection, by the PPHI, of a
ten percent (10%) service charge on the sale of food, beverage, transportation, laundry and rooms. The CBA provisions merely reiterated similar provisions found
in the PPHI-Union’s earlier collective bargaining agreement executed.

The Union’s Service Charge Committee informed the Union President, through an audit report (1st audit report), of uncollected service charges for the last quarter
of 1998 amounting to P2,952,467.61. Specifically, the audit report referred to the service charges from the following items: (1) “Journal Vouchers;” (2) “Banquet
Other Revenue;” and (3) “Staff and Promo.” The Union presented this audit report to the PPHI’s management during the Labor Management Cooperation Meeting
(LMCM). The PPHI’s management responded that the Hotel Financial Controller would need to verify the audit report.

Through a letter, the PPHI admitted liability for P80,063.88 out of the P2,952,467.61 that the Union claimed as uncollected service charges. The PPHI denied the
rest of the Union’s claims because: (1) they were exempted from the service charge being revenues from “special promotions” (revenue from the Westin Gold
Card sales) or “negotiated contracts” (alleged revenue from the Maxi-Media contract); (2) the revenues did not belong to the PPHI but to third-party suppliers; and
(3) no revenue was realized from these transactions as they were actually expenses incurred for the benefit of executives or by way of good-will to clients and
government officials.

During the LMCM, the Union maintained its position on uncollected service charges so that a deadlock on the issue ensued. The parties agreed to refer the matter
to a third party for the solution. They considered two options – voluntary arbitration or court action – and promised to get back to each other on their chosen option.
In its formal reply (to the PPHI’s letter) (2nd audit report), the Union modified its claims. It claimed uncollected service charges from: (1) “Journal Vouchers -
Westin Gold Revenue and Maxi-Media” (F&B and Rooms Barter); (2) “Banquet and Other Revenue;” and (3) “Staff and Promo.”

The Union’s Service Charge Committee made another service charge audit report for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (3rd audit report). This 3rd audit report
reflected total uncollected service charges of P5,566,007.62 from the following entries: (1) “Journal Vouchers;” (2) “Guaranteed No Show;” (3) “Promotions;” and
(4) “F & B Revenue.” The Union President presented the 3rd audit report to the PPHI.

When the parties failed to reach an agreement, the Union, filed before the LA (Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC) a complaint for non-payment of specified
service charges and unfair labor practice. LA dismissed the Union’s complaint for lack of merit. NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and considered the specified
entries/transactions as “service chargeable.” The PHHI went to the CA on a petition for certiorari after the NLRC denied its motion for reconsideration. The CA
granted the PPHI’s petition. It affirmed the LA’s decision. The Union filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in the CA’s
resolution.

Issue: Whether or not service charges should have been collected (and distributed to the covered employees) for the specified entries/transactions.
Ruling: No.

No service charges were due from the specified entries/transactions; they either fall within the CBA-excepted “Negotiated Contracts” and “Special Rates” or did not
involve “a sale of food, beverage, etc.”

The Union anchors its claim for services charges on Sections 68 and 69 of the CBA, in relation with Article 96 of the Labor Code. Section 68 states that the sale of
food, beverage, transportation, laundry and rooms are subject to service charge at the rate of ten percent (10%).Excepted from the coverage of the 10% service
charge are the so-called “negotiated contracts” and “special rates.”

Following the wordings of Section 68 of the CBA, three requisites must be present for the provisions on service charges to operate: (1) the transaction from which
service charge is sought to be collected is a sale; (2) the sale transaction covers food, beverage, transportation, laundry and rooms;and (3) the sale does not result
from negotiated contracts and/or at special rates.

In plain terms, all transactions involving a “sale of food, beverage, transportation, laundry and rooms” are generally covered. Excepted from the coverage are, first,
non-sale transactions or transactions that do not involve any sale even though they involve “food, beverage, etc.” Second, transactions that involve a sale but do
not involve “food, beverage, etc.” And third, transactions involving “negotiated contracts” and “special rates” i.e., a “sale of food, beverage, etc.” resulting from
“negotiated contracts” or at “special rates;” non-sale transactions involving “food, beverage, etc.” resulting from “negotiated contracts” and/or “special rates;” and
sale transactions, but not involving “food, beverage, etc.,” resulting from “negotiated contracts” and “special rates.”

Notably, the CBA does not specifically define the terms “negotiated contracts” and “special rates.” Nonetheless, the CBA likewise does not explicitly limit the use
of these terms to specified transactions. With particular reference to “negotiated contracts,” the CBA does not confine its application to “airline contracts” as
argued by the Union. Thus, as correctly declared by the CA, the term “negotiated contracts” should be read as applying to all types of negotiated contracts and not
to “airlines contracts” only. This is in line with the basic rule of construction that when the terms are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail. A constricted interpretation of this term, i.e., as applicable to “airlines contracts” only, must be positively
shown either by the wordings of the CBA or by sufficient evidence of the parties’ intention to limit its application. The Union completely failed to provide support for
its constricted reading of the term “negotiated contracts,” either from the wordings of the CBA or from the evidence.

In reversing the NLRC’s ruling and denying the Union’s claim, the CA found the specified entries/transactions as either falling under the excepted negotiated
contracts and/or special rates or not involving a sale of food, beverage, etc. Specifically, it considered the entries “Westin Gold Cards Revenue” and “Maxi Media
Barter” to be negotiated contracts or contracts under special rates, and the entries “Business Promotions” and “Gift Certificates” as contracts that did not involve a
sale of food, beverage, etc. The CA also found no factual and evidentiary basis to support the Union’s claim for service charges on the entries “Guaranteed No
show” and “F & B Revenue.”

Toyota Motors v. NLRC

G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007

Topic: Requisites for a valid strike

Doctrine: Prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code : (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or
15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.
FACTS:

Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (Union) and its dismissed officers and members seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC), declaring illegal the strikes staged by the Union and upholding
the dismissal of the 227 Union officers and members.

On the other hand, in the related cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 158798-99, Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation (Toyota) prays for the recall of the award of
severance compensation to the 227 dismissed employees, which was granted.

In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota
eventually appealed the order before the DOLE Secretary.

Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the
DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a
preventive mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyota’s appeal.
In relation to Toyota’s appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the
Union. But despite this, many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00.
The union members went to the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly abandoned their work.

This resulted to another rally within Toyota’s premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work.

In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month.
However, in May and June 2001, union members still conducted rallies and pickets.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the mass actions committed by the union on different occasions are illegal strikes;
(2) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the union members who participated in the illegal strikes.
HELD: #1 YES.

We rule that the protest actions undertaken by the Union officials and members on February 21 to 23, 2001 are not valid and proper exercises of their right to
assemble and ask government for redress of their complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code. The Union’s position is weakened by the lack of
permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies.” Shrouded as demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the concerted
action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros,
Manila, on February 21 to 23, 2001.

The purported reason for these protest actions was to safeguard their rights against any abuse which the med-arbiter may commit against their cause. However,
the Union failed to advance convincing proof that the med-arbiter was biased against them. The acts of the med-arbiter in the performance of his duties are
presumed regular. Sans ample evidence to the contrary, the Union was unable to justify the February 2001 mass actions. What comes to the fore is that the
decision not to work for two days was designed and calculated to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota. It becomes obvious that the real and ultimate goal of
the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of
assembly and to demand redress of grievance.

It is obvious that the February 21 to 23, 2001 concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor
Code. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.

These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike
notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the
law. As they failed to conform to the law, the strikes on February 21, 22, and 23,2001 were illegal

The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:
1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art.
264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art.
263 of the Labor Code]; or
6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.

#2 NO.

The Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissalrecognized under Art. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and
attended by willful or wrongful intent or they
reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees.

We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, indismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of
duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed
employee. Based on existing jurisprudence, the award of separation pay to the Union officials and members in the instant petitions cannot be sustained.

REYNALDO HAYAN MOYA VS FIRST SOLID RUBBER INDUSTRIES INC.

GR NO. 184011, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013

FACTS:

Reynaldo Moya was hired by respondent First Solid, a business engaged in manufacturing of tires and rubbers, as a machine operator. He was promoted as
head of the Tire Curing Department of the company. He reported an incident about under curing of tires within his department which led to the damage of five tires.
The incident was investigated by the company which he was later required to explain. Upon explanation he stated that the damage was caused by machine failure
and the incident was without any fault of the operator. His employment was then terminated by the company. As a result, he filed a complaint before the NLRC for
illegal dismissal against First Solid Rubber Industries, Inc. And its President Edward Lee Sumulong. The company insisted on its right to validly dismiss an
employee in good faith if it has a reasonable ground to believe that its employee is responsible of misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders
him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
ISSUE:

Does the termination from employment of Moya was valid on the ground of loss of trust and confidence?

LAW APPLICABLE:

ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

XXX

RULING: Yes. The termination from employment of Moya was valid.

Moya was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He was holding a supervisory rank being an Officer-in-Charge of the Tire Curing Department. The
position, naturally one of trust, required of him abiding honesty as compared to ordinary rank-and-file employees. When he made a false report attributing the
damage of five tires to machine failure, he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by the company.

It is a general principle of labor law to discourage interference with an employer’s judgment in the conduct of his business. As already noted, even as the
law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it also recognizes employer’s exercise of management prerogatives. As long as the company’s exercise of
judgment is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements,
such exercise will be upheld.

CASE HISTORY:

LA – Dismissal was valid. However, LA ruled that dismissal was too harsh as a penalty.

NLRC – Affirmed

CA – Deleted the award on separation pay.

OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. The law is clear in providing for the valid grounds of termination of employment of the employer. Article
282 of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment if there is a serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. Moya, was holding a supervisory rank being an OIC of the Tire Curing Department.
When he made the false report regarding the incident, it was indeed a loss of trust and confidence of the employer. As to the award of the separation pay of Moya,
I agree with the Supreme Court in holding that he is not entitled for such separation pay. Although the State upholds the principle of social justice, it cannot be
used as a defense by the party at fault which is Moya as the principle is not intended to condone the wrongdoing of the employee.

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 San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) sponsored an Innovation Program which grants cash rewards to all “SMC employees who submit to the corporation
ideas and suggestions found to beneficial to the corporation.

Private Respondent Rustico Vega, who is a mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC submitted an innovation proposal which supposed to eliminate certain
defects in the quality and taste of the product “San Miguel Beer Grande.”

Petitioner Corporation did not accept the said proposal and refused Mr. Vega’s subsequentdemands for cash award under the innovation program. Hence, Vega
filed a complaint with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment in Cebu. He argued that his proposal had been accepted by the methods analyst and was
implemented by the SMC and it finally solved the problem of the Corporation in the production of Beer Grande.

Petitioner denied of having approved Vega’s proposal. It stated that said proposal was turned down for “lack of originality” and the same, even if implemented,
could not achieve the desire result.Further, petitioner Corporation alleged that theLabor Arbiter had no jurisdiction.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the claim of Vega is “not a necessary incident of his employment” and does not fall under
Article 217 of the Labor Code. However, in a gesture of compassion and to show the government’s concern for the working man, the Labor Arbiter ordered
petitioner to pay Vega P2, 000 as “financial assistance.” Both parties assailed said decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and ordered SMC to pay complainant the amount of P60, 000

Issue:

Whether the Labor Arbiter and the Commission has jurisdiction over the money claim filed by private respondent

HELD:

NO

The Labor Arbiter and the Commission has no jurisdiction over the money claim of Vega. The court ruled that the money claim of private respondent Vega arose
out of or in connection with his employment with petitioner. However, it is not enough to bring Vega’s money claim within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters. In the CAB, the undertaking of petitioner SMC to grantcash awards to employees could ripen into anenforceable contractual obligation on the part
of petitioner SMC under certain circumstances. Hence, the issue whether an enforceable contract had arisen between SMC and Vega, and whether it has been
breached, are legal questions that labor legislations cannot resolved because it’s recourse is the law on contracts. Where the claim is to be resolved not by
reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement BUT by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute
belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and NLRC.

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Sanyo Phils. Workers Union v. Canizares

Topic : arbitrable issues; jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrator

Facts:

 PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo. It provides that “all members of the union covered by this agreement must retain their membership as condition
of his/her continued employment with the company. The union shall have the right to demand from the company the dismissal of the members of the union
by reason of their voluntary resignation from membership or willful refusal to pay the Union Dues or by reasons of their having formed, organized, joined,
affiliated, supported and/or aided directly or indirectly another labor organization, and the union thus hereby guarantees and holds the company free and
harmless from any liability.”
 PSSLU, through its national president, informed Sanyo that the respondent employees were notified that their membership with PSSLU were cancelled for
anti-union, activities, economic sabotage, threats, coercion and intimidation, disloyalty and for joining another union. On February 14, 1990,respondent
executed a pledged of cooperation with PSSLU promising cooperation with the latter union and among others, respecting, accepting and honoring the
CBA between Sanyo and specifically
 On March 4, 1991, PSSLU through its national and local presidents, wrote another letter to Sanyo recommending the dismissal of the respondent. Tthey
were engaged and were still engaging in anti-union activities; 2) they willfully violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU which they signed and
executed on February 14, 1990; and 3) they threatened and were still threatening with bodily harm and even death the officers of the union
 The company received no information on whether or not said employees appealed to PSSLU. Hence, it considered them dismissed as of March 23, 1991
 The dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal.
 PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case. the cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration.

Issue: Whether the labor arbiter has jurisdiction or case is subject to grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.

We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private
respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause
provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their)
Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the
Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitrator states that "(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and
conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies." It is further provided in said article that the parties
to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall automatically
be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are
the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. No grievance
between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the
one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance
machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands
that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

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 SMCEU-PTGWO v. Bersamira

Facts:

SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite, independent contractors duly licensed by DOLE, to maintain its competitive
position and in keeping with the imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of its operation. In said contracts, it was expressly understood and
agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig.
There was to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with
whom the latter executed a CBA which provides that "temporary, probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and,
therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement.

The Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with
SMC because some employees have been continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years and that their work is neither casual
nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it was contended that there exists a
"labor-only" contracting situation and wanted to be regularized.

The Union filed a notices of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting. The two (2) notices of strike were consolidated and several
conciliation conferences were held to settle the dispute before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of DOLE.

Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices.

SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before respondent Court to enjoin the Union from their acts. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order and set the application for Injunction for hearing. The Union filed a Motion to Dismiss which was then opposed by SanMig. The Motion was denied by the
respondent Judge. The Court then issued the Order granting the application and enjoining the union from the acts thereof. Court issued the corresponding Writ of
Preliminary Injunction after SanMig had posted the required bond of P100,000.00 to answer for whatever damages petitioners may sustain by reason thereof.
Petitioners then sought for the nullification of the Writ before the SC while it also went to strike as some of the contractual workers were laid off. NCMB called the
parties for conciliation.

Issue:

Did the respondent Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the present controversy and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction to the resolution of that
question, is the matter of whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute.

Held:

While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite
on the other, a labor dispute can

nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee” provided the controversy concerns, among
others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof. The existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the
plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Molave Motor Sales vs. Judge Laron

Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles.Private respondent is the sales manager of PLAINTIFF. At the pre-trial conference, the
DEFENDANT raised the question of jurisdiction of the Court stating that PLAINTIFF's complaint arose out of employer-employee relationship, and he subsequently
moved for dismissal. Such complaint was dismissed by the judge because it must be the juris of the LA and NLRC to decide cases on ER-EE relationship.
However, although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. In this case,
PLAINTIFF had sued for monies loaned to DEFENDANT, the cost of repair jobs made on his personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold
to him. Those accounts have no relevance to the Labor Code. hence, the civil has the juris over the matter.

Issue
Whether or not there was still a relationship of employer and employee between the parties.

Held
The dismissal of the case below on the ground that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-employee relationship was erroneous.
Claims arising from employer-employee relations are now limited to those mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 217. There is no difficulty in stating that those
in the case below should not be faulted for not being aware of the last amendment to the frequently changing Labor Code.

The claim of DEFENDANT that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF, because the latter has not sought clearance for his separation from the
service, will not affect the jurisdiction of respondent Judge to resolve the complaint of PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT could still be liable to PLAINTIFF for payment of
the accounts sued for even if he remains an employee of PLAINTIFF.

ERNESTO MEDINA v. FLORELIANA CASTRO--BARTOLOME IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, GR
No. 59825, 1982-09-11

Facts:

Civil Case... was filed in May, 1979, by Ernesto Medina and Jose G. Ong against Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc... the
defendant corporation, acting through its President, Cosme de Aboitiz, dismissed and slandered the plaintiffs in the presence of their subordinate employees
although this could have been done in... private;

That because of the anti-social manner by which the plaintiffs were dismissed from their employment and the embarrassment and degradation they experience in
the hands of the defendants, the plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer wounded feelings,... sleepless nights, mental torture, besmirched reputation and
other similar injuries... for which the sum of P150,000.00 for each plaintiff, or the total amount of P300,000.00 should be awarded as moral damages;... a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the defendants. The trial court denied the motion... the defendants filed a second motion to
dismiss the complaint dated January 23, 1981, because of amendments to the Labor Code immediately prior thereto.

the trial court issued on May 23, 1981, the following order:

"The Court agrees with defendants that the complaint alleges unfair labor practices which under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1691, has vested
original and exclusive jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters, and Art. 248, thereof . . . 'which may include claims for... damages and other affirmative reliefs.'... the alleged
defamatory remarks made by defendant Cosme de Aboitiz were said to plaintiffs in the course of their employment, and the latter... were dismissed from such
employment. Hence, the case arose from such employer-employee relationship which under the new Presidential Decree 1691 are under the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.

Issues:

whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs.

Ruling:

It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly
committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the

Labor Code.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SOLIMAN SECURITY SERVICES, INC. and/or TERESITA L. SOLIMAN, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO VALENZUELA,
Respondents.

DECISION

Respondent Eduardo Valenzuela, a security guard, was a regular employee of petitioner Soliman Security Services assigned at the BPI-Family Bank, Pasay City.
On 09 March 1995, he received a memorandum from petitioners relieving him from his post at the bank, said to be upon the latter’s request, and requiring him to
report to the security agency for reassignment. The following month, or on 07 April 1995, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground that his
services were terminated without a valid cause and that, during his tenure at the bank, he was not paid his overtime pay, 13th month pay, and premium pay for
services rendered during holidays and rest days. He averred that, after receiving the memorandum of 09 March 1995, he kept on reporting to the office of
petitioners for reassignment but, except for a brief stint in another post lasting for no more than a week, he was put on a "floating" status.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

Petitioners contended that the relief of respondent from his post, made upon request of the client, was merely temporary and that respondent had been offered a
new post but the latter refused to accept it. Petitioners argued that respondent’s floating status for barely 29 days did not constitute constructive
dismissal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On 31 July 1995, the Labor Arbiter, Ariel Cadiente Santos, arrived at a decision holding petitioners guilty of constructive dismissal and ordering the reinstatement
of the complainant to his former position with full backwages from the date of his "dismissal" until his actual reinstatement; directing the Research and Information
Unit to compute the various monetary benefits awarded to the complainant; and adjudging the payment, by way of attorney’s fees, of ten percent (10%) of all sums
owing to the complainant.

On 16 October 1998, petitioners filed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

On 11 November 1998, the NLRC issued an order directing petitioners to submit an affidavit to the effect that their appeal bond was genuine and that it would be in
force and effect until the final disposition of the case. In his reply memorandum, dated 28 November 1998, respondent, asseverating that petitioners failed to
deposit the required bond for the appeal, sought the appeal to be declared as not having been validly perfected. On 19 January 1999, petitioners submitted a
manifestation and affidavit in compliance with the 11th November 1998 order of the NLRC. 1 Apparently satisfied, the NLRC, on 30 April 1999, gave due course to
the appeal and rendered the presently assailed decision, reversing that of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. However, respondent [before the NLRC] is hereby ordered to pay complainant separation pay
computed at one-half (½) month for every year of service, reckoned from date of employment on October 9, 1990 up to September 9, 1995, the date the
complainant should have been redeployed." 2

A motion for reconsideration, filed by herein private respondent Valenzuela, was denied by the NLRC.

Valenzuela forthwith brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals. On the thesis that the only issue interposed was whether or not the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of the appeal and reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter despite the failure of herein petitioners to validly post the
appeal bond, the appellate court responded in the affirmative, set aside the assailed decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. A motion to
reconsider the decision was denied.

In the instant recourse before this Court, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals (Eleventh Division) has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have failed in perfecting their appeal with the NLRC.

This Court finds merit in the petition.

Private respondent would posit that the appeal of petitioners to the NLRC should be considered to have been made on 19 January 1999 (when petitioner
submitted, pursuant to the NLRC order, a statement under oath to the effect that the surety bond it had posted was genuine and confirmed it to be in effect until the
final termination of the case) which was beyond the ten-day period for perfecting an appeal. The records before the Court would show, however, that an appeal
bond was posted with the NLRC at the same time that the appeal memorandum of petitioners was filed on 16 October 1998. A certified true copy of the appeal
bond 3 would indicate that it was received by the Commission on 16 October 1998, the date reflected by the stamp-mark thereon. The surety bond issued by the
Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation bore the date of 14 October 1998 or two days before the appeal memorandum was seasonably filed on 16 October 1998.
The Order, 4 dated 11 November 1998, of the NLRC categorically stated that "records [would] disclose that the instant appeal [was] accompanied by a surety
bond, as the Decision sought to be appealed involved a monetary award." The NLRC, in fact, ordered petitioner to submit an affidavit to confirm that its appeal
bond was genuine and would be in force and effect until the final disposition of the case. The Commission’s declaration that the appeal was accompanied by a
surety bond indicated that there had been compliance with Article 223 5 of the Labor Code.

An appeal to the NLRC is perfected once an appellant files the memorandum of appeal, pays the required appeal fee and, where an employer appeals and a
monetary award is involved, the latter posts an appeal bond or submits a surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company. 6 In line with the desired objective
of labor laws to have controversies promptly resolved on their merits, the requirements for perfecting appeals are given liberal interpretation and construction. 7

The only issue on the merits of the case is whether or not private respondent should be deemed constructively dismissed by petitioner for having been placed on
"floating status," i.e., with no reassignment, for a period of 29 days. The question posed is not new. In the case of Superstar Security Agency, Inc., v. NLRC, 8 this
Court, addressing a similar issue, has said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The records show that a month after Hermosa was placed on a temporary ‘off-detail,’ she readily filed a
complaint against the petitioners on the presumption that her services were already terminated. Temporary ‘off-detail’ is not equivalent to dismissal. In security
parlance, it means waiting to be posted. It is a recognized fact that security guards employed in a security agency may be temporarily sidelined as their
assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties (Agro Commercial Security Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, Et Al., G.R. Nos.
82823-24, 31 July 1989). However, it must be emphasized that such temporary inactivity should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency
concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal." 9
Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain, on the part of an employer has become so unbearable as to leave an
employee with no choice but to forego continued employment. 10 The temporary "off-detail" of respondent Valenzuela is not such a case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NCR CN. 04-02620-95 is REINSTATED. No costs.cralaw : red

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

FACTS: Petitioners were jeepney driver of private respondent Comejo on the boundary system. Due to a change in schedule, they did not report to work as
protest. They were then replaced. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal asking for separation pay and other benefits. On November 26, 1991, the labor
arbiter rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents were served a cop of the decision on April 3, 1992. They filed their memorandum on appeal
on April 13, 1992; however the appeal bond was only filed on April 30, 1992. Also, such bond was found to be spurious. It was only on July 20, 1993 that a
substitute bond was issued by another company.

ISSUE: W/N the NLRC has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

HELD: No. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Perfection of an appealincludes the filing, within the prescribed period of the
memorandum ofappeal and posting of the appeal bond. In cases where the judgment involves a monetary award, as in this case, the appeal may be perfected
only upon posting of a cash or surety bond to the NLRC. Since the private respondents received the LA’s decision on April 3, they had only until April 13 to file their
appeal. The bond was posted only on April 30; beyond the reglementary period. The requirement of posting the bond has only been relaxed on grounds of
substantial justice and special circumstances which are not attendant in this case. Furthermore, the bond posted was not genuine. The decision can no longer be
amended nor altered by the labor tribunal.

MINDANAO TIMES V. CONFESOR (G.R. NO. 183417; FEBRUARY 5, 2010)

CASE DIGEST: MINDANAO TIMES CORPORATION v. MITCHEL R. CONFESOR. (G.R. No. 183417; February 5, 2010).

FACTS: Mitchel Confesor (respondent) was employed on May 1998 by petitioner, publisher of a newspaper of general circulation in Mindanao and Davao City. He
became petitioners Associate Editor in six months.

Respondent resigned from petitioner on June 17, 2003.On August 28, 2003, he filed a verified complaint before the Labor Arbiter for payment of separation pay
and pro-rated 13th month pay for 2003.He later amended his complaint from one of money claims to illegal dismissal, averring that petitioners President and Chief
Operating Officer forced him to resign after he and Anthony Allada, a columnist, published separate articles which appeared in the June 14, 2003 issue of
petitioner's newspaper accusing then Presidential Assistant Dominador Boy Zu, Jr., Cong. Prospero Nograles and Cong. Corazon Malanyaon of being involved in
some anomalies; and that he did resign as he was told that he would be entitled to separation pay and other benefits, but that the promised benefits were not
forthcoming, hence, his filing of the complaint.
The Labor Arbiter, finding that respondent was constructively dismissed, ordered petitioner to pay him P71,909.77 representing backwages, as well as separation
pay and 10% of the total award as attorney's fees.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City, respondent contending that, in addition to the award granted by the Labor Arbiter, he was entitled to
service incentive leave pay and moral and exemplary damages.Petitioner, on the other hand, questioned the Labor Arbiters finding of constructive dismissal.

In compliance with the appeal bond requirement, petitioner deposited the amount ofP71,909.77 with the United Coconut Planters Bank and surrendered to the
NLRC the passbook covering the deposit, along with a Deed of Assignment it executed assigning the proceeds of the deposit in favor of respondent and
authorizing the NLRC to release the same in the event that the Labor Arbiters Decision becomes final and executory.

By Resolution of November 30, 2004, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondents complaint, holding that there was no
constructive dismissal since respondent effectively resigned from his employment.

The Court of Appeals, to which respondent assailed the NLRC resolution via petition for certiorari, dismissed said petition by Decision of November 13, 2006.

On respondents Motion for Reconsideration, however, the appellate court, by the assailed Amended Decision of November 29, 2007, set aside the NLRC
February 28, 2005 Resolution and reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision which it declared to have become final and executory.

Petitioners motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the present petition.

ISSUE: Did the bank deposit and Deed of Assignment which it transmitted to the NLRC, along with the passbook, constitute substantial compliance with the rule
on perfection of appeals?

HELD: Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that an appeal by the employer to the NLRC from a judgment of a labor arbiter which involves a monetary award
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC,in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.Section 4 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC echoes the provision,viz.:

SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL.[1] The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall
be verified by appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal in three (3) legibly typewritten copies which shall state
the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for, and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed
decision, resolution or order and a certificate of non-forum shopping with proof of service on the other party of such appeal.A mere notice of appeal without
complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

[2] The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office where the appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant's memorandum of
appeal, not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.Failure on the part of the appellee who was properly furnished with a copy of the appeal to file his
answer or reply within the said period may be construed as a waiver on his part to file the same.

[3] Subject to the provisions of Article 218, once the appeal is perfected in accordance with these Rules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding
specific issues that were elevated on appeal.
Further, Sec. 6 of the same Rules provides:

SECTION 6.BOND. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award,an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.The appeal bond shall either be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages
and attorney's fees.

In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court, and shall be
accompanied by:

1. A joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final
disposition of the case.

2. A copy of the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and bonding company; and
3. A copy of security deposit or collateral securing the bond.

A certified true copy of the bond shall be furnished by the appellant to the appellee who shall verify the regularity and genuineness thereof and immediately report
to the Commission any irregularity.

Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the Commission shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal.

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award.

The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, an appeal from a judgment as that involved in the present case is perfected only upon the posting of acash or surety bond. Accessories Specialist, Inc. v.
Alabanza enlightens:

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA. The intention of the
lawmakers to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the provision that an appeal by the
employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond."The word"only"makes it perfectly plain that the lawmakers intended the posting of a
cash or surety bond by the employer to be the essential and exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected.The word"may"refers to the
perfection of an appeal as optional on the part of the defeated party, but not to the compulsory posting of an appeal bond, if he desires to appeal. The meaning
and the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute must be determined from the language employed; and where there is no ambiguity in the words used, then
there is no room for construction.

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-
compliance therewith renders the decision of the LA final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will
receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal.It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or
evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

Cash, means a sum of money;cash bail (the sense in which the term cash bond is used) is a sum of money posted by a criminal defendant to ensure his presence
in court, used in place of a surety bond and real estate.

In the present case, the Deed of Assignment, as well as the passbook, which petitioner submitted to the NLRC is neither a cash nor surety bond. Petitioners
appeal to the NLRC was thus not duly perfected, thereby rendering the Labor Arbiters Decision final and executory. DENIED.

ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, Petitioner, v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, INC. and E. GANZON, INC., Respondents.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

On October 4, 2002, Andrew James McBurnie (McBurnie), an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against
Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc., and E. Ganzon, Inc., (respondents). McBurnie claimed that on May 11, 1999, he signed a 5-year employment agreement with
the company EGI as an Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the management of the company hotels and resorts within the Philippines. He performed work
for the company until sometime in November 1999, when he figured in an accident that compelled him to go back to Australia while recuperating from his injuries.
While in Australia, he was informed by respondent Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because their intended project would no longer push through.

The respondents contend that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish a company for the management of the hotels. They did not
intend to create an employer-employee relationship, and the execution of the employment contract that was being invoked by McBurnie was solely for the purpose
of allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in the Philippines, and that McBurnie had not obtained a work permit.

On September 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed from employment. The respondents filed their Memorandum
of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted an appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00. They claimed that an award of more than P60 Million Pesos to a
single foreigner who had no work permit and who left the country for good one month after the purported commencement of his employment was a patent nullity.

On March 31, 2005, the NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond explaining that in cases involving monetary award, an employer seeking to appeal the LA
decision to the Commission is unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond equivalent to the monetary award.

The motion for reconsideration was denied, the respondents appealed to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with extremely urgent prayer for the
issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90845.

The NLRC dismissed their appeal due to respondent's failure to post the required additional bond. The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied on
June 30, 2006. This prompted respondents to filed with the CA the Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R SP No. 95916, which was later consolidated with
CA-G.R. SP No. 90845
The CA granted the respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction on February 16, 2007. It directed the NLRC, McBurnie, and all persons acting for
and under their authority to refrain from causing the execution and enforcement of the LA decision in favor of McBurnie, conditioned upon the respondents posting
of a bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The reconsideration of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by McBurnie was denied by the CA.

McBurnie filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 178034 and 178117) assailing the CA resolutions that granted the
respondent's; application for the injunctive writ. On July 4, 2007, the Court denied the petition. A motion for reconsideration was denied with a finality on October 7,
2007.

McBurnie filed a Motion for Leave (1) To File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and (2) to Admit the Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the motion for leave was denied by the Court and the July 4, 2007 became final and
executor on November 13, 2007.

On October 27, 2008, the CA ruled on the merits of CA-G.R. SP No. 90845 and CA-G.R. SP No. 95916 and rendered a decision allowing the respondent's motion
to reduce appeal bond and directing the NLRC to give due course to their appeal. The CA also ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
immediately denying the motion without fixing an appeal bond in an amount that was reasonable, as it denied the respondents of their right to appeal from the
decision of the LA.

McBurnie filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondents moved that the appeal be resolved on the merits by the CA. The CA denied both motions. McBurnie
then filed with the Supreme Court the Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 186984-85)

The NLRC, acting on the CA order of remand, accepted the appeal from the LA decision and reversed and set aside the decision of the LA, and entered a new on
dismissing McBurnie complaint.

On September 18, 2009, the third division of this court rendered its decision granting respondents motion to reduce appeal bond. This Court also reinstated and
affirmed the NLRC decision dismissing respondent's appeal for failure to perfect an appeal and denying their motion for reconsideration. The aforementioned
decision became final and executor on March 14, 2012.

The respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Third Motion for Reconsideration, with an attached Motion for Reco

nsideration with Motion to Refer These Cases to the Honorable Court En Banc. The Court En Banc accepted the case from the third division and issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of the LA Decision. McBurnie filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he invoked that the Court
September 18, 2009 decision had become final and executor.

ISSUE: Whether or not McBurnie was illegally dismissed?

LABOR LAW: rule on appeal bonds

The crucial issue in this case concerns the sufficiency of the appeal bond that was posted by the respondents. The present rule on the matter is Section 6, Rule VI
of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was substantially the same provision in effect at the time of the respondents appeal to the NLRC, and which reads:
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award. The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect
an appeal.
While the CA, in this case, allowed an appeal bond in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 and then ordered the case remand to the NLRC, this Court Decision
dated September 18, 2009 provides otherwise, as it reads in part: While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions
that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the
appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.The qualification effectively requires that
unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond
securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the
correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day period.

To begin with, the Court rectifies its prior pronouncement the unqualified statement that even an appellant who seeks a reduction of an appeal bond before the
NLRC is expected to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the judgment award within the 10-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal.

LABOR LAW: suspension of the period to perfect the appeal upon the filing of a motion to reduce bond

To clarify, the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter provides that the filing of a motion to reduce bond, coupled with compliance with the two conditions
emphasized in Garcia v. KJ Commercial for the grant of such motion, namely, (1) a meritorious ground, and (2) posting of a bond in a reasonable amount, shall
suffice to suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter decision to the NLRC. To require the full amount of the bond within the 10-
day reglementary period would only render nugatory the legal provisions which allow an appellant to seek a reduction of the bond.

The rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule. In
Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista, the Court held: Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an appeal from a decision involving a monetary award may
be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond.The Court, however, has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to
resolve controversies on their merits.These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or
of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved.

A serious error of the NLRC was its outright denial of the motion to reduce the bond, without even considering the respondent's arguments and totally unmindful of
the rules and jurisprudence that allow the bond reduction.Instead of resolving the motion to reduce the bond on its merits, the NLRC insisted on an amount that
was equivalent to the monetary award.

When the respondents sought to reconsider, the NLRC still refused to fully decide on the motion.It refused to at least make a preliminary determination of the
merits of the appeal.

LABOR LAW: allowance of the reduction of appeal bonds

Time and again, the Court has cautioned the NLRC to give Article 223 of the Labor Code, particularly the provisions requiring bonds in appeals involving monetary
awards, a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.

Although the general rule provides that an appeal in labor cases from a decision involving a monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond, the Court has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies on their merits.These circumstances
include: (1) the fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) the prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances
of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved. Guidelines that are applicable in the reduction of appeal bonds were also
explained in Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corporation. The bond requirement in appeals involving monetary awards has been and may be relaxed in meritorious
cases, including instances in which (1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to
reduce the bond, (3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4)
the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.

It is in this light that the Court finds it necessary to set a parameter for the litigantsand the NLRC guidance on the amount of bond that shall hereafter be filed with a
motion for a bond reduction.To ensure that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that give parties the chance to seek a reduction of
the appeal bond are effectively carried out, without however defeating the benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions to reduce bond
that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that is subject of the
appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable amount of the bond in the meantime that an appellant motion is pending resolution by the
Commission.In conformity with the NLRC Rules, the monetary award, for the purpose of computing the necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages and
attorney fees. Only after the posting of a bond in the required percentage shall an appellant period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC Rules be deemed
suspended.

The foregoing shall not be misconstrued to unduly hinder the NLRC exercise of its discretion, given that the percentage of bond that is set by this guideline shall be
merely provisional. The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion and determine the final amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still
in accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount Should the NLRC, after considering the motion merit, determine that a greater
amount or the full amount of the bond needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly.The appellant shall be given a period of 10
days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.

LABOR LAW: employment permit for non-resident aliens; illegal dismissal

Considering that McBurnie, an Australian, alleged illegal dismissal and sought to claim under our labor laws, it was necessary for him to establish, first and
foremost, that he was qualified and duly authorized to obtain employment within our jurisdiction.A requirement for foreigners who intend to work within the country
is an employment permit, as provided under Article 40, Title II of the Labor Code.

In WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. v. Galera, we held that a foreign national failure to seek an employment permit prior to employment poses a serious
problem in seeking relief from the Court.

Clearly, this circumstance on the failure of McBurnie to obtain an employment permit, by itself, necessitates the dismissal of his labor complaint.

McBurnie failed to present any employment permit which would have authorized him to obtain employment in the Philippines.This circumstance negates McBurnie
claim that he had been performing work for the respondents by virtue of an employer-employee relationship.The absence of the employment permit instead
bolsters the claim that the supposed employment of McBurnie was merely simulated, or did not ensue due to the non-fulfillment of the conditions that were set
forth in the letter of May 11, 1999.

McBurnie failed to present other competent evidence to prove his claim of an employer-employee relationship. iven the partiesconflicting claims on their true
intention in executing the agreement, it was necessary to resort to the established criteria for the determination of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (1)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee conduct. The rule
of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on the claimant to establish or substantiate the claim by the requisite quantum of evidence.Whoever claims entitlement
to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto. McBurnie failed in this regard.As previously observed by the NLRC, McBurnie even failed
to show through any document such as payslips or vouchers that his salaries during the time that he allegedly worked for the respondents were paid by the
company. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between McBurnie and the respondents, McBurnie could not successfully claim that he was
dismissed, much less illegally dismissed, by the latter.Even granting that there was such an employer-employee relationship, the records are barren of any
document showing that its termination was by the respondents dismissal of McBurnie.

Grand Asian Shipping Lines v. Galvez

G.R. No. 178184; January 29, 2014

Facts:

 Petitioner Grand Asian Shipping Lines, Inc (GASLI) is a domestic corporation engaged in transporting liquified petroleum gas (LPG) from Petron’s refinery
in Bataan to Pasig and Cavite.
 Respondents are crewmembers of one of GASLI’s vessels, M/T Dorothy Uno.
 On January 2000, Richard Abis (vessel’s oiler) reported to GASLI an alleged illegal activity being committed by respondent who would misdeclare the
consume fuel in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports and the save fuel oil were sold to other vessel out at sea (at nighttime). Profits would be divided amongst
themselves.
 After investigation, from the period of June 30, 1999 to Feb 15, 2000 the fuel it consumption was overrate by 6,954.3 liters amounting to 74,737.86.
 Acting upon the anomaly, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension and after conducting administrative hearings decided to terminate them
for breach of trust, commission of crime against employer.
 Respondents filed with the NLRC separate complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal, underpayment/nonpayment of salaries/wages, overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive pay, tax refunds and indemnities for damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner.
 On August 30, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered decision finding the dismissal of 21 complainants to be illegal.
 Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Bond before the NLRC citing economic depression, legality of termination, and compliance
with labor standards. NLRC denied petitioner’s motion to reduce bond and directed an additional bond.
 Despite petitioner’s failure the pay the bond, NLRC found the appeal meritorious and ruled for petitioners. Stating that the dismissal was valid with the
exception of Sales.
 NLRC struck down the monetary awards given by the Labor Arbiter as they were based on computations made by respondents.
 On appeal to the CA, the court ruled in favor of respondent stating that the NLRC’s decision had jurisdictional error since petitioner did not comply with the
additional bond.

LABOR LAW

Issue:

I. WON the CA erred in holding that respondents were illegally dismissed

II. WON the CA erred when it concluded petitioner were not able to perfect the appeal of the Labor Arbitrer’s decision
Held/Ratio:

I. No, the CA did not commit any error in finding that respondent’s were illegally dismissed. According to the termination notice, respondents were dismissed based
on the grounds of (a) serious misconduct (b) engaging in pilferage wile navigating at sea (c) willful breach of the trust reposed by the company (d) commission of a
crime against their employer. After examination of the evidence, the court finds that petitioners failed to substantiate the charges of pilferage against respondents.
The quantum of proof that should be presented is substantial evidence. Mere filing of formal charge does not automatically make dismissal valid. The affidavit
executed simply contained accusations while allegations remained uncorroborated. Also there is no sufficient evidence to show respondents participation in the
commission of the crime.

Respondent’s termination due to loss of trust and confidence should have a distinction between managerial and rank and file employees. Rank-and-file
employees require proof of involvement while managerial employees mere existence of a basis for belief is sufficient. Given that Galvez and Gruta have
managerial positions there is some basis for the loss of employer’s confidence—regarding the overstatement of fuel consumption without any evidence to the
contrary. While the others, who are ordinary rank and file employees, were not proven to have any involvement in the loss of the vessel’s fuel. Rendering their
dismissals illegal. The employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases thus the employer must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
dismissal.

With regard to the contention of the Labor Arbiter’s Authority to impose the penalty of double indemnity for violations of the Minimum Wage Law. Petitioner’s
contention is untenable since there is no provision in RA 6727 or RA 8188 that precludes that labor from imposing the penalty of double indemnity against
employers. Article 217 of the Labor Code gives the labor arbiter jurisdiction over cases of termination disputes and those cases accompanied with a claim of
reinstatement.

The Labor arbiter erred in awarding damages by lumping, moral, actual, and exemplary damages. These should rest on different jural foundations and must
independently identified and justified.

Glaze and Gruta, as managerial employees, are not entitled to claims for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and premium pay for holiday and
restday—according to Art. 82 of the Labor Code. The same way the other rank-and-file employees cannot be classified as field personnel under Article 82 of the
Labor Code. According to Article 82, “non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of
the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.” Here, respondents remain inside a vessel and were
constantly supervised under effective control of a ship captain. Also they cannot claim to be entitled of these because they have already been paid all the days of
the month, which include benefits. As for the overtime pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day, no evidence was presented to prove that they worked in
excess of the regular working hours. For their claim of service incentive leave pay, respondents did not specify what year they were not paid—in accordance with
Art. 95.
II. Yes, the CA erred in holding that there was no compliance on the part of petitioner regarding the appeal bonds. According to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, the
posting of a bond, either in cash or surety, must be in the amount equivalent to them entry award.

Nonetheless, the court held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense—the same in labor cases were substantial merits serve the interest of
justice. In this case, the petitioner appeals from the awarding of 7,104,483.84 to respondents and only complied with the posting of 500,000 PHP. We find this to
be in substantial compliance with the Labor Code.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BIENVENIDO ARCAYOS
G.R. NO. 130866
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

Facts: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be
taxes paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee due to the lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition,
respondent is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no
illegal dismissal in such a situation.

The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court.

Held: No.

Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the
new rules do not anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC.

However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance
system and the perceived intention of the legislative body who enacted the new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and
that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”
The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with
the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP VS LAGUESMA

Topic: Managerial Employees

FACTS:

Petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines is engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber products

PICOP-Bislig instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of
PICOP for collective bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes.

Initial hearing was set. Paper Industries Corp failed to file any comment or position paper. Meanwhile, private respondents Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and
Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed their respective petitions for intervention.

An Order was issued granting the petitions for interventions of the FFW and ALU. Another Order issued on the same day set the holding of a certification election
among PICOP's supervisory and technical staff employees in with four choices, namely: (1) PICOP Bislig Union; (2) FFW; (3) ALU; and (4) no union.

Paper Industries Corp appealed the Order which set the holding of the certification election contending that the Med-Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in
deciding the case without giving the corporation the opportunity to file its comments/answer, and that PICOP-Bislig Union had no personality to file the petition for
certification election.

PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were reclassified as
managerial employees in the light of the reorganization effected by it.

PICOP’s contention: the company was divided into four (4) main business groups, namely: Paper Products Business, Timber Products Business, Forest Resource
Business and Support Services Business. A vice- president or assistant vice-president heads each of these business groups. A division manager heads the
divisions comprising each business group. A department manager heads the departments comprising each division. Section heads and supervisors, now called
section managers and unit managers, head the sections and independent units, respectively, comprising each department. PICOP advanced the view that
considering the alleged present authority of these section managers and unit managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial employees, and hence,
ineligible to form or join any labor organization.

Med-Arbiter ruling: supervisors and section heads of the petitioner are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters for purposes of
certification election.
DOLE Under Sec Laguesma: issued an order declaring that the subject supervisors and section heads are supervisory employees eligible to vote in the
certification election.

ISSUE: W/N the positions Section Heads and Supervisors, who have been designated as Section Managers and Unit Managers, were converted to managerial
employees under the decentralization and reorganization program

RULING: No, they are not managerial employees

RATIO: A thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section heads indisputably show that they are not actually
managerial but only supervisory employees since they do not lay down company policies. PICOP's contention that the subject section heads and unit managers
exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not supreme but merely advisory in
character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer,
suspension and termination of employees is still subject to confirmation and approval by their respective superior. Thus, where such power, which is in effect
recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same,
although present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.

DISPOSITIVE: Under Sec. Laguesma was correct. The members of the labor unions won.

DOCTRINE: Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to
devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the
rank-and- file employees of an organization. Under this distinction, "managerial employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the "managers" per se
composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the "supervisors" composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated manager"
does not ipso facto make him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description that determines the
nature of employment.

G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND ERNESTO L. PONCE, President V. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS MED-ARBITER
AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
FACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification election among the abovementioned employees of the different plants as one
bargaining unit.

San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in grouping together all three (3)
separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.

The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent company’s Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for
determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification elections
among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a
union.

2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.

RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a union.

They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in
the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor
relations.

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a
principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ”confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a
position involving a potential conflict of interests. “Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented
by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the company’s
position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.”

The Court held that “if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view
of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.”

An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of
certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employee’s necessary access to confidential labor relations information.

(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando,
Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.

An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.”
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of
collective bargaining.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED VS SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION G.R. No. 146206

Topic: Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Unit; Factors – Unit Determination

QUICKIE FACTS: San Miguel Foods has factory/branches in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis. The employees from these three branches wanted to form a
single bargaining unit. This was opposed by the company as being against the “one company, one union” policy. SC ruled that applying the mutuality of interest
test, there should only be one bargaining unit.

FACTS:

In the case of San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma, the Court held that even if they handle confidential data regarding technical
and internal business operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc. are not to be considered
confidential employees, because the same do not pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances. Consequently, they were
allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The Court also declared that the employees belonging to the three different
plants of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having community or mutuality of interests, constitute a
single bargaining unit.

A certification election was conducted. On the date of the election, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters, questioning the eligibility to
vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no
existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner.

Based on the results of the election, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order stating that since the Yes vote received 97% of the valid votes cast, respondent is certified
to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and
Otis.

On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolution, affirmed the Order of the Med-Arbiter.

CA affirmed the Resolution of DOLE Undersecretary with modification stating that those holding the positions of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel
Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.

Hence, this petition by the San Miguel Foods

ISSUE: W/N CA departed from jurisprudence when it expanded the scope of the bargaining unit.

RULING: No. In San Miguel vs Laguesma, the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company, one-union policy. An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a
group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law.
It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive
or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same
way that the company needs them both. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant
the formation of a separate bargaining unit.

The Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for the employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of Magnolia Poultry
Products Plant involved in dressed chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in live chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of
work, working conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest. Although
they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants
the formation of a single bargaining unit.

DISPOSITIVE: Respondent won

DOCTRINE: An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive
or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same
way that the company needs them both. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant
the formation of a separate bargaining unit.

Standard chartered bank employees v. Sec. of Labor and Employment, and the Standard Chartered Bank

Facts

Standard chartered bank is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. Standard chartered.Standard chartered bank employees union is the
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees.The bank and the Union signed a 5 year collective bargaining agreement with a provision covering
renegotiation of the terms on the 3rd year.Prior to the expiration of the 3rd year period but within the 60day period,the Union initiated the negotiations.Before the
commencement of the negotiation,the Union through Divinagracia suggested to the Banks Human resources manager and head of the negotiating panel that the
bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team.Meanwhile, the head of the negotiating panel suggested to Divinagracia that the President of the
National Union of Bank employees be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel.However,he was retained as a member thereof.During thenegotiation the head
of the negotiating panel suggested that the negotiation be kept a familiy fair.The proposed non economic provisions of the CBA discussed even during the final
reading,there were still provisions on which the Union and

the bank could noit agree.Temporarily, the negotiation "deferred" was placed therein.But towards the end of the meeting,the Union manifested that the same
should be changed to "deadlock" to indicate that such items remained unresolved.Both parties agreed to place the notation "deferred/deadlock".When the
negotiation for economic provisions commenced the president of the NUBE requested the Bank to validate the unions "questimates" especially the figures for the
rank and file staff.And he revoked the bank for the insufficiency of its counter-proposal on the provisions on salary increase,group hospitalization,death assistance
and dental bebefits.Upon the bank insistence,the parties agreed to tackle the economic package item by item.Upon disagreement the union declared a deadlock
and filed a notice of strike before the national conciliation and mediation board NCMB.On the otherhand,the Bank filed a complaint for ULP and damages before
the NLRC.The bank allege that the union violated its duty to bargain,as it did not bargain in good faith.It contended that the demanded "sky high economic
demands" indicative of "blue sky bargaining".Further, the union violated its no strike-no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB.The secretary of
labor and employment ordered that NUBE to execute a collective bargaining agreement incorporating the dispositions contained herein.The banks charge for ULP
is dismissed for lack of merit.The SOLE dismissed the charges of ULP of both Union and the explaining that both parties failed to substantiate their claims.Stated
that ULP charges would prosp[er only if shown to have directly prejudiced the public interest.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of ULP against the bank arising from the latters alleged "interference" with its choice of
negotiator,surface bargaining,making bad faith non-economic proposals,and refusal to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data.

2.Whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of juridiction when she issued the assailed order and
resolutions.

3.Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from filing the instant action.

COURTS RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

''Interference" under art.248(a) of the labor code.The court held that in order to show that the employer committed ULP under the labor code,substantial evidence
is required to support as conclusion.In the case at bar,the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the
Unions negotiating panel.

"Duty to bargain collectively".The suggestions made by Diokno to Divinagracia should be construed as part of the normal relations and innocent
communications,which are all part of the friendly relations between the Union and Bank.

"NO grave abuse of discretion".While it is true that a showing of prejudice to public interest is not a requisite for ULP charges to prosper,it cannot be said that the
public respondent acted in capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof.Neither was it shown the public
respondent exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.

"Estoppel not Applicable".In the case,the approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that the Union waived its ULP claim
against the bank during the past negotiations.Afterall,the conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE,while the signing bonus was included in the
CBA itself.

''Union did not engage in the blue sky bargaining?"The Union is guilty olf ULP for engaging the blue-sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonble
proposals.The bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exagerated or unreasonable.The minutes of the meeting show that the
Union based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits in the Philippines.

Petition dismissed.
 TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA BREWERY VS. ASIA BREWERY, INC G.R. No. 162025

Topic: Right to Self-Organization; Excluded Employees/ Workers; Confidential Employees

FACTS:

1) Respondent ABI entered into a CBA with Bisig at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-Independent (BLMA-INDEPENDENT), the exclusive bargaining
representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees.

2) Article I of the CBA defined the scope of the bargaining unit, as follows: The UNION shall not represent or accept for membership employees outside the
scope of the bargaining unit herein defined.

Section 2. Bargaining Unit. The bargaining unit shall be comprised of all regular rank-and-file daily-paid employees of the COMPANY. However, the following
jobs/positions as herein defined shall be excluded from the bargaining unit, to wit:

xxx

Confidential and Executive Secretaries

xxx

Purchasing and Quality Control Staff.

3) The CBA expressly excluded Confidential and Executive Secretaries from the rank-and-file bargaining unit, for which reason ABI seeks their disaffiliation from
petitioner. ABI’s management stopped deducting union dues from 81 employees, believing that their membership in BLMA-INDEPENDENT violated the CBA. 18
of these affected employees are QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technician (checkers) who formed part of the Quality Control Staff.
The rest are secretaries/clerks directly under their respective division managers.

4) Petitioner, however, maintains that except for those who had been promoted to monthly paid positions, the other secretaries/clerks are deemed included
among the rank-and-file employees of ABI. BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABI’s actions restrained the employees’ right to self-organization.

5) VA ruled that the subject employees qualify under the rank-and-file category because their functions are merely routinary and clerical. He noted that the
positions occupied by the checkers and secretaries/clerks in the different divisions are not managerial or supervisory, as evident from the duties and
responsibilities assigned to them. With respect to QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technician, he ruled that ABI failed to establish with
sufficient clarity their basic functions as to consider them Quality Control Staff who were excluded from the coverage of the CBA. Accordingly, the subject
employees were declared eligible for inclusion within the bargaining unit represented by BLMA-INDEPENDENT.

6) CA reversed the VA, ruling that the 81 employees are excluded from and are not eligible for inclusion in the bargaining unit as defined in Section 2, Article I of
the CBA.

ISSUE: WON the checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent company are rank-and-file employees who are eligible to join the Union of the rank-and-file
employees.
RULING: YES. The checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent company are rank-and-file employees who are eligible to join the Union of the rank-and-file
employees.

Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended
this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to
managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file
bargaining unit. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees
because if allowed to be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can also become
company-denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the Union membership. Having access to confidential information, confidential employees
may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.

Confidential employees are defined as those who:

1) assist or act in a confidential capacity,

2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.

The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining
units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be
accomplished by the confidential employee rule.

A perusal of the job descriptions of these secretaries/clerks reveals that their assigned duties and responsibilities involve routine activities of recording and
monitoring, and other paper works for their respective departments while secretarial tasks such as receiving telephone calls and filing of office correspondence
appear to have been commonly imposed as additional duties. Respondent failed to indicate who among these numerous secretaries/clerks have access to
confidential data relating to management policies that could give rise to potential conflict of interest with their Union membership. It is not even farfetched that the
job category may exist only on paper since they are all daily-paid workers. With respect to the Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and the Gauge Machine
Technician, the job descriptions of these checkers showed that they perform routine and mechanical tasks preparatory to the delivery of the finished products. No
evidence was presented by the respondent to prove that these daily-paid checkers actually form part of the company’s Quality Control Staff who as such were
exposed to sensitive, vital and confidential information about [company’s] products or have knowledge of mixtures of the products, their defects, and even their
formulas which are considered trade secrets.

DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner won.

DOCTRINE: Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence
has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary
manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Confidential employees are thus excluded from the
rank-and-file bargaining unit.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING

333 SCRA 13
 G.R. No. 128845
June 1, 2000

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel
allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-
hires.

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee
less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-
hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to
be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL vs. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
and PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG ANAKPAWIS – HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-
PIGLAS) G.R. No. 179146, 23 July 2013

FACTS:

A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees
Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS). Holy Child Parochial School raised that members of private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is not only a
mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees – as three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are
coordinators – but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven (27) are non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being in
accord with Article 24510 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election
The Med-Arbiter denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor organization’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-
and-file employees.

RULING:

No. Before, when the 1989 Rules was still in application, mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor organization from exercising its
right to file a petition for certification election. But then, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997
Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate
that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees – was removed.

Petitioner argued that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel in private respondent due to the absence of mutuality of interest
among its members, the petition for certification election should have been dismissed on the ground that private respondent is not qualified to file such petition for
its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of which is the representation of an appropriate bargaining unit. The Supreme Court
disagreed and said that the concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of
the union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as
amended. To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality
which may not be attacked collaterally.

STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, GR No. 162355, 2009-08-14

Facts:

Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file
employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates
Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit.

[CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association
(herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation.

, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. It alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-
and-file category are its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that no certification election has been held among... them within the last 12 months prior to the filing
of the petition

SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular
rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced... between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for
violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

[CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to [SLECC'S] Motion to Dismiss. It assailed the validity of the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC]
and their consequent negotiations and execution of a CBA. According to

[CLUP-SLECCWA], the same were tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy involving some officials of the Regional Office.

it violated one of the major requirements for voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of another labor organization in the same bargaining unit.

The Med-Arbiter's Ruling

CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule.

The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWA's... petition for direct certification.
The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor and Employment... the Secretary found merit in CLUP-SLECCWA's appeal. The Secretary held that the subsequent
negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA's petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates

Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary and quoted extensively from the Secretary's decision.

MSLEC's voluntary recognition was void and could not bar

CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for certification election.

Issues:

SLECC asserted that the appellate court commited a reversible error when it affirmed the Secretary's finding that SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was
done while a legitimate labor organization was in existence in the... bargaining unit.

Ruling:

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit. We see no reason to overturn the rulings of the Secretary and of the appellate court.

CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its... members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC
cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.

The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor

Code.[10] Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired
juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is... to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration[11] of
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition proceedings with SMSLEC.

Employer's Participation in a Petition for Certification Election

We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for certification election. In petitions for certification
election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter's decision. The... exception to this rule, which happens when
the employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us.[13]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition

Principles:

Bargaining Unit

The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. We explained the concept of a
bargaining unit in San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma,[8] where we stated that:

A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties... under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."

The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working... conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the
determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.

However, employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are related.