because this is a matter which a court
RULE 129 - WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVEN
1. Judicial Notice
 Basis:
It is based on the maxim, “what is known need not
be proved.” Hence, the Court will take such fact
even without need for evidence ïf such knowledge
is already known by well-informed persons.
 Definition:
It is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them. (Tan Ferdinand, Evidence:
A Compendium for the Bench and the Bar [Rex
Publishing, 2019 Ed, 2019])8.
 Purposes:
Its purposes are (1) to take such knowledge as a
proof & (2) to abbreviate the proceedings.
 Requisites:
1. The matter must be one of common
and general knowledge;
2. It must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and
3. It must be one which is not subject to
a reasonable dispute in that it is
either:
a. Generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or
b. Capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
 Rationale:
The principle of Judicial Notice is first for
Convenience (parties will be relieved to present
such proof) and second is for Expediency (trial
will be more speedy).
 Limitations of Judicial Notice:
1. Limited to facts evidenced by public
records
2. Limited to facts of general notoriety
Doctrine of Judicial Notice
The doctrine provides that the exercise of Judicial Notice
rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts and must
be exercised with caution.
Two Kinds of Judicial Notice:
 Mandatory
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides
for the definition of a Mandatory Judicial Notice.
- No motion or hearing is necessary for the
court to take judicial notice of a fact
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
ought to take judicial notice of.
The following SHALL be taken by court even
without the introduction of evidence:
1. Existence and Territorial Extent of States
2. Their Political History
3. Forms of Government and Symbols of
Nationality
4. Law of Nations
5. Admiralty and Maritime Courts of the world
and their seals
6. Political Constitution and History of the
Philippines
7. Official Acts of Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Department of the Philippines
8. Laws of Nature
9. Measures of Time
10. Geographical Divisions
 Discretionary
Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides
for the definition of Discretionary Judicial Notice.
Judicial Notice, When Discretionary:
1. Matters which are of public knowledge
2. Matters capable of unquestionable
demonstration; or
3. Matters ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.
The court may take Judical Notice of foreign laws
provided that the following requirements are met:
1. The issue involved is one of fact and not of law
2. The foreign law must be proved like any other
fact.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. In the
absence of proof, the foreign law will be presumed to
be the same as the laws of the jurisdiction hearing the
case.
Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary:
 Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides
that Hearing is necessary for the Court to take
Judicial Notice in the following instances:
1. During trial
- The Court, during the trial, on its own
initiative or on request of a party may
announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.
- This hearing is only for the purpose of
determining the propriety of taking
judicial notice of a certain matter and not
for the purpose of proving the issues in the
case.

2. After the trial and before judgment
- The proper court, on its own initiative or
on request of a party, may take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.
- It may also be taken on appeal.
Taking Judicial Notice of the Contents of Other Cases:
 General Rule: Courts are not authorized to take
Judicial Notice of the Contents of the Records of
Other cases even when said cases have been tried or
pending in the same court or before the same judge.
 Exceptions:
1. When in the absence of any objection, and
with the knowledge of the opposing party, the
contents of said other case are clearly referred
to by title and number in a pending action and
adopted or read into the record of the latter; or
2. When the original record of the other case or
any part of it is actually withdrawn from the
archives at the court’s discretion upon the
request, or with the consent, of the parties, and
admitted as part of the record of the pending
case.
2. Judicial Admissions
 Definition:
Section 4 of Rule 129 provides that an admission,
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made.
 Elements of Judicial Admission:
1. Must be made by a party to the case
2. Admission must be made in the course of the
proceeding in the same case
3. No particular form required (verbal or written)
Examples of Judicial Admissions:
 Admissions in pleadings and motions
Judicial Admission Not Judicial Admission
 Complaint  Pleadings not yet
 Answer to filed
complaint  Failure to make a
 Motions specific denial of
 Failure to immaterial
specifically deny the allegations
material allegations  Superseded
pleadings after
in the other party’s
pleadings amendment (deemed
extrajudicial
admissions)
 Sworn statement
of a proposed state
witness (after being
denied) –
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
inadmissible in
evidence
 Implied admissions of allegations of Usury
o Sec 11 of Rule 8 – if the complaint makes an
allegation of usury to recover usurious
interest, the defendant must specifically
deny the same under oath. Failure to do so
amounts to implied admission.
 Implied admissions of actionable documents
o Sec 8 of Rule 8 – When an action or
defense is founded upon a written
instrument, the genuineness and due
execution of the same instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
under oath, specifically denies them.
 Admissions in the pre-trial of civil cases
o Pre-trial in civil cases is mandatory to
obtain stipulations or admissions of facts
(Sec 2[d], Rule 18)
o Admissions during pre-trial, including
depositions, interrogatories or requests for
admission are all deemed judicial
admissions
 Admissions in the pre-trial of criminal cases
o Sec 2, Rule 118- all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused.
o Note: Stipulation of facts entered into by
the prosecution and defense counsel during
trial in open court is automatically reduced
in writing and contained in the official
transcript of proceedings had in court. The
accused need not sign the same to be
considered as a judicial admission.
 Implied admissions in the modes of discovery
o Depositions
o Written Interrogatories
o Requests for admissions – of the genuineness
of any material and relevant documents; truth
of any material and relevant matter. The party
to whom the request is directed must file and
serve a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission
is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny
those matters. Otherwise, each matter of
which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted.
 Admissions by counsel are generally conclusive
upon a client
 Effects and Characteristics of Judicial
Admissions:
1. A judicial admission requires no proof;
production of evidence is dispensed with.
 2. They are legally binding to the party making
the admission
3. They cannot be contradicted by the admitter

 Rationale:
Distinctions between Judicial Admission and
Extrajudicial Admission
Doctrine of Estoppel
An admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or Judicial Admission Extrajudicial Admission
disproved as against the person relying thereon.

An admission made in An admission made in

Note: Despite presence of judicial admissions, trial court is the same case. another case or out of
still given leeway to consider other evidence presented court admission.
because such admissions may not necessarily prevail over
It need not be proven It needs to be alleged
documentary evidence.
by the party being and proved like any
How Judicial Admissions May Be Contradicted: conclusive on the part other fact.
of the admitter, unless
 Sec 4 of Rule 29 – Two ways to contradict a judicial it was made through
admission: palpable mistake or
when there is no
1. by showing that the admission was made admission made.
through a palpable mistake
o Mistake should be clear to the mind or
plain to see; readily perceived by the senses LBP v. Banal, 434 SCRA 543
or the mind
2. by showing that no such admission was made DOCTRINE:
o invoked when the statement of the party is Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
taken out of context contents of the records of other cases even when said
o denies the meaning attached to his cases have been tried or are pending in the same court
statement or before the same judge. They may only do so in the
absence of objection and with the knowledge of the
Distinctions between Judicial Admission and Judicial opposing party.
Confession
FACTS:
Judicial Admission Judicial Confession Spouses Banal are the registered owners of 19.3 hectares of
agricultural land in Camarines Norte – a portion of which
An admission, verbal or An acknowledgment of was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian
written, made by a one’s guilt in the same Reform (DAR) pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian
party in the course of case. Reform Law. In determining the valuation of said property,
the proceedings in the the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte merely took judicial
same case. notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez
Does not result in Connotes admission of case pending before it and applied the same to the present
liability. one’s liability. case without conducting a hearing and without the
May be express or Always express or tacit. knowledge or consent of the parties.
implied.
More of a broader scope Only limited to the ISSUE:
which includes judicial confession of a person WON the RTC may validly take judicial notice of a matter
confession. pending before it in another case.
May be made by any Can only be made by the
RULING:
party. accused in a criminal
No. Well settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to
proceeding.
take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge. They may only do
so “in the absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of
the opposing party.

People v Kulais, 292 SCRA 551

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice
of the evidence presented in other proceedings even if
these have been tried or pending in the same court, or
have been heard and are actually pending before the
same judge. To do so especially in criminal cases will
violate the right of the accused to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.

FACTS:
This criminal case is one of many cases docketed in the same
court (RTC Zamboanga City) rooted in the kidnapping of a
group of public officials in Zamboanga City.
Five informations for kidnapping for ransom and three
informations for kidnapping were filed inn the RTC of
Zamboanga against herein accused. He was found guilty of
five counts of kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of
kidnapping, which was also affirmed by the Supreme Court.
All the other appellants in other casees withdrew their
appeal in their application for amnesty, except for Kulais.
Kulais argued that he was denied due process in the trial
court, when it took judicial notice of the testimony of one
Lt. Feliciano, who was a witness in another case being tried
in the same court. He argued that he was denied of his right
to cross-examine a material witness.
ISSUE:
WON Kulais was denied due process due to the error by the
Court of taking judicial notice of a testimony of a witness in
another case.
RULING:
Appeal denied. Though the general rule is that the courts
should not take judicial notice of evidence presented in
other proceedings even if these are tried or pending in the
same court or handled by the same judge, the Court a quo
did take judicial notice of such but did not use it in deciding
the case against Kulais. He was not denied due process.
Laureano v. CA, 324 SCRA 414
DOCTRINE:
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. He who claims applicability of such foreign law has
the burden of proof to establish its applicability in a case.
FACTS:
In 1978, plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano, then Director of
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied
for employment with defendant company through its Area
Manager in Manila. Plaintiff’s appointment was confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. On the said date, the defendant also
offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five
(5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20,1984 subject
to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract
of employment, which the latter accepted.
Sometime in 1982, defendant initiated cost-cutting
measures due to recession. Seventeen (17)
expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found
in excess of the defendant’s requirements. Defendant
informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance leaves. It did not
however immediately terminate A-300 pilots. It reviewed
their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet.
Among the 17 Airbus pilots reviewed, 12 were found
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the 12. On
October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his
termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be
paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice
but defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1)
month salary.
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant on
February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds since the plaintiff was employed in Singapore and
all other aspects of his employment contract were executed
in Singapore, therefore, Singapore laws should apply.
ISSUE:
WON Singapore Law governs in the case at bar
RULING:
NO. Philippine Law governs in the case. Philippine courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The one claiming
applicability of such law must prove such law by evidence.
Here, petitioner Laureano failed to prove the said
Singaporean Law, and without such proof, the Court cannot
determine whether termination of Laureano is legal under
the laws of Singapore. Thus, Philippine Law shall apply.
Maquiling v. COMELEC, 700 SCRA 367
DOCTRINE:
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,
which must be presented as public documents and thus
must be proven by clear evidence. Mere reference to a
foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be
considered in deciding a case.
FACTS:
Arnado was the proclaimed Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del
Norte, and this case is rooted in a challenge for his
qualifications as mayor of the city, alleging that Arnado is a
dual citizen who is disqualified to be in a public office in
accordance to the Local Government Code.
Arnado reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance
not only twice, but six times. But the problem is, he
continued to use his US Passport even after his alleged
renunciation. He cites that Sec. 349 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of the United States must be applied in
his case; that under such law, he is already deemed divested
of his American Citizenship.
ISSUE:
WON Arnado effectively renounced his foreign citizenship
and thus not disqualified to run for publi office
RULING:
Arnado is disqualified. Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws, and thus must be proven by evidence before
the Courts can apply such. Since Arnado failed to prove the
said foreign law and merely cited it in his pleading,
Philippine Law will govern. Under Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225, the
law required those who have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce
any and all foreign citizenship. Further, under Sec. 40(d) of
the LGC, those with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running any elective local position.

In this case, Arnado failed to effectively renounce his
American citizenship, since he continued to use his US
passport even after reacquiring Filipino citizenship. The use
of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of
the country which issued the passport. Arnado’s
renunciation of his US citizenship is not complete and
unequivocal. Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
People v. Baharan, 639 SCRA 157
DOCTRINE:
Rule 130, Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy
is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
(Rules of Court)
FACTS:
Herein accused were charged of multiple murder in relation
to the Valentine’s Day bombing. The prosecution presented
documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the
spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group - Abu Solaiman –
announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on
radio and warned of more bomb attacks. As stipulated
during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News
Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident,
confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing
incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the
14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the
accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they
were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the
evening of 14 February. Accused were convicted largely due
to the testimony of Asali who turned state witness and the
testimony of the conductor who identified the two accused
to be those who alighted from his bus shortly before the
bomb exploded. Accused contend that the testimony of
Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
WON testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised
interview and repeated during trial may be admissible as
evidence against a co- conspirator.
RULING:
The answer is in the affirmative. Section 30. Admission by
conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of
declaration. While Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rule of Court
provides that statements made by a conspirator against a
coconspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the
statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to
both conspirators. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Distinction
must be made between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in
evidence against the confessant but not against his co-
accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the
declarant's co- accused since the latter are afforded
opportunity to cross-examine the former.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 662 SCRA 152
DOCTRINE:
Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge.
FACTS:
In 1993, SB ordered the consolidation cases related to the
recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos Family and
cronies. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner
filed a Motion stating that petitioner wishes to adopt in Civil
Case No. 0009 testimonies and the documentary exhibits
presented and identified by them in another related case.
This motion partly denied insofar as the adoption of
testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and
Rolando Gapud for the reason that said deponents are not
available for cross-examination in this Court by the
respondents.
Petitioner then filed another motion asking SB to take
judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane
deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended
thereto.
This was again denied by the SB, to wit: Judicial notice is
found under Rule 129. This provision refers to the Court’s
duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings
in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is
mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the
initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court
finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
as something which need not be acted upon as the same is
considered redundant. Petitioner’s 3rd motion was again
denied by SB. Hence, petitioner filed the instant motion
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of SB’s refusal
to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as
part of its evidence. Petitioner asserts that the case where
the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and
admitted in evidence is but a "child" of the "parent" case,
Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence
offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should
be considered as evidence in the "parent" case.
ISSUE:
WON courts in trying consolidated cases may take judicial
notice of testimony and evidence presented in one of the
cases consolidated.
RULING:
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
 records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that
both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
before the same judge.
This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of
convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all
or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into the record of a case pending before it, when,
with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the
adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the
former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the
archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending. Courts must also take judicial
notice of the records of another case or cases, where
sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it,
warranting the dismissal of the latter case.
The petitioner itself admits that the present case has
generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve
issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the
petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial
confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of
evidence in one case, which was presumably found
competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the
supposed lineage of the cases.
Ligtas v. People, 767 SCRA 1
DOCTRINE:
Courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt
and in favor of innocence.” Equally settled is that
“where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one
of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with
innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of
doubt and should be acquitted.”
trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was
considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and
without any objection on the part of the People of the
Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the
Regional Trial Court held that “the prosecution was able to
prove the elements of theft” Ligtas’ “defense of tenancy was
not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was
his claim of harvest sharing between him and Anecita Pacate
duly corroborated by any witness.”
ISSUE:
WON the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the
conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal
case for theft?
RULING:
YES. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the
issue of tenancy between petitioner and private complainant
negates the existence of the element that the taking was
done without the owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision
implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest
the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all
the elements of theft. No less than the Constitution provides
that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime
until proven guilty. “It is better to acquit ten guilty
individuals than to convict one innocent person.”
Thus, courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt
and in favor of innocence.” Equally settled is that “where the
evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is
consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the
accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be
acquitted.” In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not
authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding that
both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
before the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions. (Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 662 SCRA 152 [2011])

FACTS:
Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the
harvest of Abaca in the plantation of belonging to Anecita
Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca
fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without
the consent of said owner. Where Ligtas pleaded not guilty,
alleging himself as the owner of the said property as he is
the one who cultivated such, he further alleged the following
defenses; setting an alibi that the alleged taking did not
happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres
attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan,
Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting
happened but later on when confronted he admitted
harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner, being
a tenant of 1.5 to two hectares of land that he just prevented
the men to harvest from the land which he himself
cultivated.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department

of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod,
Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on
November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB
rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide
tenant of the land. While records are bereft as to when the
DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020

RULE 130 – RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
1. Object/Real Evidence
 Object as evidence:
Objects as evidence are those addressed to the
senses of the court. When an object is relevant to
the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined
or viewed by the court.
 Definition:
It is the real thing itself consists of tangible things
like gun, a broken glass, a piece of bloody clothing
or the defective ladder that caused the fall of the
plaintiff. It does not refer to the perception of the
witness and recollection of that perception. It is not
a reconstruction of past events as related by a
witness on the stand. It is not a verbal description
of something. It is not a replica or a mere
representation of something.
 Purpose
To afford the court a 1st hand impression of the
matter in litigation, because object evidence is the
evidence of the highest order.
Requisites for Admissibility of Object Evidence:
1. The evidence must be relevant.
The admissibility of object or real evidence like any
other evidence requires that the object be both
relevant and competent. To be relevant, the
evidence must have a relationship to the fact in
issue. To be competent, it must not be excluded by
the rules or by law.
2. The evidence must be authenticated.
For the object not to be excluded by the Rules, the
same must pass the test of authentication. The
threshold foundation for real evidence is its being
authenticated. To authenticate the object, it must
be shown that the object is the very thing that is
either the subject matter of the lawsuit or the very
one involved to prove an issue in the case. Also,
there must be someone who should identify the
object to be the actual thing involved in the
litigation. This someone is the witness.
3. The authentication must be made by a competent
witness.
It must be emphasized that every evidence,
whether it be a document or an object, needs a
witness. Even object evidence requires statements
from witness to make its way into the realm of
admissible evidence. In short, testimonial evidence
provides the foundation for all types of evidence.
The witness should have actual and personal
knowledge of the exhibit he is presenting for
admission.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
4. The object must be formally offered in evidence
Salas v. Matusalem, G.R. No. 180284
DOCTRINE:
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate.
As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and
respondent showing their exchange of affectionate
words and romantic trysts, these are not sufficient to
establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they
were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the
father of said child
FACTS:
Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas and claimed that
petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas
In his answer, Petitioner denied paternity of the child
At the trial, respondent and her witness Murillo testified.
Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the
payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits
and financial support to her, his presence during and after
delivery of respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted
suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization
for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police
authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife at the
headquarters
Respondent also presented the following evidence: (1)
certificate of live birth of Christian Paulo which she allegedly
filled up with entries supposedly dictated by the Petitioner;
and (2) baptismal certificate
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision in favor
of respondent. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court
Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari on
the ground that CA erred in holding that the filiation of
Christian Paulo was duly established pursuant to article 175
in relation to article 172 of the Family Code and existing
jurisprudence and therefore entitled to support
ISSUE:
Whether illegitimate filiation may be proved by mere
testimonial evidence that the alleged father provided
financial support and unsigned birth certificate and love
letters.
RULING:
NO. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of
the Family Code states... The filiation of legitimate children
is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of
 birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate.
Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can
such birth certificate be taken as recognition in a public
instrument and it has no probative value to establish
filiation to the alleged father.
Furthermore, while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity
of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of
handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs
taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented
apartment unit are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by
petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child.
Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify
under Article 172 (2) vis- à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation
an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
Classification of Object Evidence
A. Real Object
Are those object evidence imparted to the
senses of the court without the aid of a
testimony of a witness; admissible in evidence
and has a probative value.
B. Substitute / Demonstrative
Are those evidence imparted to the senses of
the court with the aid of a testimony of a
witness; admissible in evidence but has NO
probative value.
C. Scientific Evidence
The evidence that is the product of the witness’
train, expertise, and education.
Categories of Object Evidence:
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
a. Objects that have readily identifiable
marks (unique objects)
If the object has a unique characteristic, it becomes
readily identifiable (a serial number of a caliber 45
pistol). So long as the witness testifies that the
object has a unique characteristic, he saw the object
on the relevant date, remembers its characteristics,
asserts that the object shown to him in court is the
same or substantially in the same condition as when
he first saw it and alleges that those characteristics
are those of the object he is identifying in court, the
authentication requirement is satisfied.
b. Objects that are made readily
identifiable (objects made unique)
(E.g. like a typical kitchen knife without a serial
number), the witness may be able to testify the
same if he claims that he made the thing acquire a
unique characteristic like placing identifying marks
on it. All he has to do is to testify as to what he did
to make the object identifiable and that the object
presented to him for identification in court has the
characteristics he made on the object.
c. Objects with no identifying marks and
cannot be marked (non-unique
marks).
The third category includes drop of blood or oil,
drugs in powder form, fiber, grains of sand and
similar objects. In this case, the proponent of the
evidence must establish a chain of custody. The
purpose is to guaranty the integrity of the physical
evidence and to prevent the introduction of
evidence which is not authentic but where the
exhibit is positively identified the chain of custody
of physical evidence is irrelevant. Since it is called a
chain, there must be links to the chain. The links
are the people who actually handled or had custody
of the object. Each link must show how he received
the object, how he handled it to prevent
substitution and how it was transferred to another.
Each must testify to make the foundation complete.
This is the ideal way (though this is not absolutely
required. There is a view that the prosecution is not
required to elicit testimony from every custodian or
from every person who had an opportunity to come
in contact with the evidence sought to be admitted.
As long as one of the chains testifies and his
testimony negates the possibility of tampering and
that the integrity of the evidence is preserved, his
testimony alone is adequate to prove the chain of
custody.
Chain of custody in drug cases (Sec. 21 of the
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002)
 People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 230228
DOCTRINE:
Chain of Custody: In prosecuting both illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if
doubt persists on the identity of said drugs. The identity
of the dangerous drug must be established with moral
certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of sale
are present, the fact that the dangerous drug illegally
sold is the same drug offered in court as exhibit must
likewise be established with the same degree of certitude
as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict
In illegal drugs cases, as a rule, strict compliance with
the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA No.
9165 is required because of the illegal drug’s unique
characteristic
The exception found in the IRR of R.A. 9165 comes into
play when strict compliance with the proscribed
procedures is not observed. This saving clause, however,
applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the
procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited
justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution
established that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the evidence seized had been preserved
FACTS:
Manuel dela Rosa was charged and found guilty by the trial
court with the violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165
Aggrieved, Manuel dela Rosa appealed before the CA
arguing, among others, that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated item was not secured because it was
merely wrapped in a banana leaf and it was not placed in an
envelope or evidence bag; that there was an inconsistency as
to who received the confiscated drug at the crime laboratory;
and that the crime laboratory was not secured at the time of
the examination because any personnel and policemen
could enter the premises and even sleep there
The CA highlighted that the prosecution was able to prove
that there was substantial compliance with the chain of
custody rule considering that there was no compromise in
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug
It stated that the drug was properly marked and inventories
and that the marked item was delivered to the crime
laboratory where it tested positive for marijuana; and that
the same marked item was presented in court
ISSUE:
Whether there was no compliance with the chain if custody
rule
RULING:
NONE. Aside from the inconsistent dates of the conduct of
the buy-bust operation, the Court finds that the prosecution
failed to sufficiently comply with the chain of custody rule
In prosecuting both illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
conviction cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the
identity of said drugs. The identity of the dangerous drug
must be established with moral certainty
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Apart from showing that the elements of sale are present,
the fact that the dangerous drug illegally sold is the same
drug offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition
As the means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of
custody, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the
apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to
immediately conduct a physically inventory; and photograph
the same in the presence of
(1) the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,
(2) a representative from the media and
(3) the DOJ, and
(4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In addition, Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures.
It further states that noncompliance with these
requirements shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over the confiscated items provided that such
noncompliance were under justifiable grounds and the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer
The records of the case show that the physical inventory of
the confiscated drug and the photographs of the same where
only done in the presence of the accused-appellant, a Brgy.
Captain and a media representative
Clearly, a representative of the DOJ, as required by Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165, was not present during the inventory of the
seized item
More importantly, the apprehending team did not
immediately conduct the physical inventory and the taking
of the photographs at the time the suspected drug was
confiscated or at the nearest police station.
Instead, they travelled 54km from Puerto Galera, the place
of the seizure, to Calapan before they conducted the
inventory of the drugs
 Also, the prosecution failed to provide a justifiable ground
for the noncompliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and to
establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item was preserved
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 231383
DOCTRINE:
RA 9165 requires the presence of an elected public
official, as well as representatives from the DOJ and the
media during the actual conduct of inventory and
photography to ensure that the chain of custody rule is
observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering,
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence
which could considerably affect a case
However, minor deviations may be excused in situations
where a justifiable reason for noncompliance is
explained.
FACTS:
Sanchez was charged with illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs (shabu) and was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by the RTC after a buy-bust operation
The buy-bust team conducted the markings, inventory, and
photography on site before proceeding to their office for
documentation purposes
Thereat, the team was met with representatives from the
DOJ and the media, both of whom signed the Certificate of
Inventory
The seized plastic sachets were then taken to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where it was confirmed that their contents are
indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
The RTC found that the buy-bust team validly arrested
Sanchez who was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to
the poseur-buyer; and that after his arrest, the arresting
officers discovered 2 more sachets, containing shabu, from
his pocket
Further, the RTC found that the arresting officers followed
the procedures in conducting buy-bust operation, and that
the evidence were preserved as the chain of custody thereof
was not broken
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence were preserved as the chain of
custody thereof was not broken
RULING:
NO. RA 9165 requires the presence of an elected public
official, as well as representatives from the DOJ and the
media during the actual conduct of inventory and
photography to ensure that the chain of custody rule is
observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering,
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which
could considerably affect a case
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the
arresting officers committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Sanchez
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
While it appears that representatives from the DOJ and the
media were present during the conduct of the inventory as
evidenced by their signatures on the Certificate of Inventory,
a more careful scrutiny of the records shows that the buy-
bust team conducted the marking, inventory, and
photography where the arrest was made, and merely made
the aforesaid representatives sign the Certificate of
Inventory upon the buy-bust team’s arrival at their office
Moreover, the said procedures were not done in the presence
of any elected public official.
In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution
must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting
the representatives enumerated under the law for “a sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable without so
much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse.”
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual
serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for noncompliance
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 212171
DOCTRINE:
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody
Rule; To be admissible in evidence, the prosecution
must be able to present through records or testimony,
the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time
these were seized from the accused by the arresting
officers; turned over to the investigating officer;
forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their
composition; and up to the time these are offered in
evidence.
FACTS:
At around 7:15 in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3
Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and their civilian asset
proceeded to Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon
When the team went inside the interior portion of Sitio
Cogon, PO1 Reales together with the civilian asset
approached the house of Dela Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos
and PO1 Bullido were strategically hidden more or less 10
meters away
The civilian asset called Dela Cruz and told her that they will
buy shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed
PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline
substance and in exchange he handed to the former the
P200.00 bills
Upon getting hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1
Bullido, who saw the consummation of the transaction
rushed to the scene
Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased her,
however, her neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega blocked them
The team introduced themselves as policemen but Ortega
did not listen, so PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning shot
 Meanwhile, Dela Cruz was able to evade arrest. The team
then arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice
On their way to the police station aboard their patrol car,
PO1 Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the small plastic
containing white crystalline substance which he purchased
from Dela Cruz. Thereafter, upon arrival at the police
station, PO3 Batobalonos marked the seized item with
"DDM 11/10/06."
Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the
seized item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos
The Request and the seized item were delivered to the
Regional Crime Laboratory Office-7, Camp Sotero Cabahug,
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu by PO1 Reales at around 1:10 in the
morning of November 11, 2006
Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry
Report No. D-1771-2006," with the finding that the specimen
gave positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine
hydrochloride
RTC, Branch 58, Cebu found the accused-appellant guilty of
illegal sale of shabu
ISSUE:
Whether appellant’s case should be dismissed due to failure
of the police officers to comply with the procedure in the
custody and disposition of seized drugs (chain of custody)
RULING:
NO. We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of
any intent or ill motive on the part of the police officers to
falsely impute commission of a crime against the accused-
appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to
prevail over the bare, uncorroborated denial and self-
serving claim of the accused of frame-up
Also, we reject the appellant’s contention that the police
officers failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21,
paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, which provides for the
procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs.
Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain
of custody in the handling of evidence, “substantial
compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of
the seized item” is sufficient
This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting
officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal
and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused
In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution
must be able to present through records or testimony, the
whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these
were seized from the accused by the arresting officers;
turned over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to
the time these are offered in evidence.
For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in
this case, even though the procedural requirements
provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully
observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been
preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with.
Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to
overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of
exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public
officers properly discharged their duties. Accused-appellant
in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute
ill motive on the part of the arresting officers
Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve
full faith and credit.
People v. Oliva, G.R. No. 234156
DOCTRINE:
In People v. Gatlabayan, the Court held that it is of
paramount importance that the identity of the
dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude that
the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is
exactly the same substance offered in evidence before
the court.
In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the
court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be
the very same substance recovered from the suspect.
Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed."
FACTS:
In a buy-bust operation, sachets of shabu were seized and
Oliva (seller), Barangot (buyer) and Manalastas (buyer) were
arrested and brought to the barangay hall where an
inventory was conducted and an inventory report was
prepared
During the inventory the only one present to witness the
inventory and the marking was an elected official, Barangay
Captain Evelyn Villamor
When the case reached the SC, Oliva et. al. argue, among
others, that the arresting officers failed to immediately
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused, their
representative or counsel, a representative of the media and
the DOJ, and any elected public official who are required to
sign the copies of the inventory
Thus, according to Oliva et. al., the prosecution failed to
establish every link in the chain of custody of the seized
items
ISSUE:
 Whether there is compliance with the chain of custody rule
in this case
RULING:
NONE. In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal
possession, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused
comprise the corpus delicti of the charges
In People v. Gatlabayan, the Court held that it is of
paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous
drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it
must be proven with certitude that the substance bought
during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance
offered in evidence before the court
In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as
exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same
substance recovered from the suspect. Thus, the chain of
custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed."
Under the original provision of Sec 21, after seizure and
confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was
required to immediately conduct a physically inventory and
photograph of the same in the presence of
(1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,
(2) a representative from the media and
(3) the DOJ, and
(4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof
It is assumed that the presence of these three persons will
guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up," i.e.,
they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and
incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or
irregularity."
Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must
be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official,
and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service
or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof
In this case, the absence of a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media during the inventory of the
seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution
A review of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes does not
yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the
reason why there was no representative from the DOJ or the
media
The only one present to witness the inventory and the
marking was an elected official, Barangay Captain Evelyn
Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to show that any
attempt was made to secure the presence of the required
witness
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show
valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid
down in Sec 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended
It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in
such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial
court, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any
perceived deviations from the requirements of the law.
Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be
adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in
accordance with the rules on evidence. The rules require that
the apprehending officers do not simply mention a
justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their
sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they
took to preserve the integrity of the seized item
A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required where the
quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it is highly
susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration.
Summary of Chain of Custody (Section 21):
 STEP 1: MARKING - done at the place of seizure.
Note: This step is only found in jurisprudence.
 STEP 2: PHYSICAL INVENTORY
1. If WITH search warrant: at the place of seizure.
2. If WITHOUT search warrant: (1) at the place of seizure (as
much as possible) or, (2) nearest police station or, (3) office
of seizing officer.
3. WITNESS
i. Accused OR representative.
ii. Elected government official.
iii. Representative of DOJ or Media.
4. Witness and accused SIGN the inventory receipt.
5. Witness and accused must be GIVEN COPY of Inventory
Receipt.
6. PHOTOGRAPH of the seized drugs.
Substantial Compliance
 SC held that non-compliance with Section 21 will
not render the case dead. The following conditions
have to be met:
1. The police should admit noncompliance.
2. Offer justifiable explanation for the noncompliance.
3. The prosecution should be able to establish that despite
noncompliance, the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized illegal drugs are duly preserved.
DNA Test (A.M. No.06-11-5- SC Rule on DNA Evidence)
 Evidentiary value: DNA result is ADMISSIBLE.
 Three instances when DNA can be resorted:
- Before the filing of the case.
 - During the pendency of an action.
- Post-conviction DNA test.
1. Before the filing of the case.
Any interested party, including appropriate
government agency, may resort to DNA testing. No
need for a court order because there is no case yet.
2. During the pendency of an action.
Section 4. Application for DNA Testing
Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following:
A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;
The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation
for good reasons;
The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
The existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest
of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
Requirements for DNA testing to be allowed by court:
1. There must be a DNA sample that exist, which are
relevant, that can be subject to the test.
2. The DNA test will usr a valid scientific procedure.
3. DNA test should have a potential of using information
that may be considered by the court for the resolution
of the issue of the case.
4. Such other factors or facts that the court should
consider as maybe necessary for the accuracy and
reliability or integrity of the DNA test to be conducted.
Lucas v Lucas (Additional requirement)
 In case of paternity, other than the four
conditions, the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie or
reasonable possibility of paternity. Evidence of
sexual relation should be established first, that the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
defendant is likely to be the father. This is to protect
the putative father from mere harassment suits.
3. Post-conviction DNA test.
Section 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. – Post-
conviction DNA testing may be available, without
need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any
person convicted by final and executory judgment
provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b)
such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the
testing would probably result in the reversal or
modification of the judgment of conviction.
Note: If the decision is not yet final, it is not the remedy.
Preservation of DNA Evidence (Sec. 12)
 Criminal case - time of trial up to full service, to afford
opportunity for DNA tests.
 Civil case and all other cases - time of trial up to the
time judgment is final and executory.
2. Documentray Evidence
 Section 2. Documentary evidence.
Documents as evidence consist of writing or any
material containing letters, words, numbers,
figures, symbols or other modes of written
expression offered as proof of their contents.
 Documents
Any deed, instrument or any duly authorized paper
by which something is proved, evidenced or set
forth.
St. Martin Polyclinic vs. LWV Const. Corporation
G.R. No. 217426
DOCTRINE:
Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker
c. Any other private document need only be identified as
that which it is claimed to be
FACTS:
Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino
workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. On the other hand,
petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative
Council Approved Medical Centers Association (GAMCA)
and as such, authorized to conduct medical examinations of
prospective applicants for overseas employment.
On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective
applicant Raguindin to petitioner for a pre-deployment
medical exam in accordance with the instructions from
GAMCA
 After undergoing the required examinations, petitioner
cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as
evidenced by a Medical Report dated January 11, 2008
Respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly
incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41
Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent another medical
examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi
Arabia on March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive for
HCV or the hepatitis C virus
The Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia required a re-
examination of Raguindin. However, the results remained
the same. An undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report
likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such
finding, thereby leading to repatriation to the Philippines
Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical
Report stating that Raguindin is "fit for employment" when a
subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he was
positive for HCV, respondent filed a Complaint for sum of
money and damages against petitioner before the MeTC
Respondent essentially averred that it relied on petitioner's
declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus,
respondent prayed for the award of damages in the amount
of P84,373.41 representing the expenses it incurred
In its Answer with compulsory counterclaim, petitioner
denied liability and claimed that: first, respondent was not a
proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract
between them... third, the action is premature as Raguindin
has yet to undergo a post-employment medical examination
following his repatriation; and fourth, the complaint failed
to state a cause of action as the Medical Report issued by
petitioner had already expired on April 11, 2008, or three (3)
months after its issuance on January 11, 2008
MeTC rendered in favor of respondent, it rejected
petitioner's contention that Raguindin may have contracted
the disease after his med examination in the PH up to his
deployment, there being no evidence offered to corroborate
the same
Petitioner appealed to the RTC, contending, among others,
that respondent failed to comply with the requirements on
the authentication and proof of documents under Section
24, Rule 132, considering that respondent's evidence,
particularly the April 28, 2008 Certification issued by the
General Care Dispensary and the HCV Confirmatory Test
Report issued by the Ministry of Health, are foreign
documents
RTC affirmed MeTC, CA affirmed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical
Report declaring Raguindin "fit for employment" and hence,
should be held liable for damages
RULING:
Petition granted. The records of this case show that the
pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to
establish petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
dated April 28, 2008; and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test
Report
However, these issuances only indicate the results of the
General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own
medical examination of Raguindin finding him to be
positive for HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the
General Care Dispensary, which was later affirmed by the
Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008,
or at least two (2) months after petitioner issued its Medical
Report. Hence, even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for
HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive for the
same does not convincingly prove that he was already under
the same medical state at the time petitioner issued the
Medical Report on January 11, 2008.
In this regard, it was therefore incumbent upon respondent
to show that there was already negligence at the time the
Medical Report was issued, may it be through evidence that
show that standard medical procedures were not carefully
observed or that there were already palpable signs that
exhibited Raguindin's unfitness
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin
became exposed
Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi Arabia
immediately after petitioner's medical examination and
hence, could have possibly contracted the same only when
he arrived thereat
While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an expiration of
April 11, 2008, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that the
same could not be construed as a certified guarantee coming
from petitioner that Raguindin's medical status at the time
the report was issued on January 11, 2008 (i.e., that he was fit
for employment) would remain the same up until that date
(i.e., April 11, 2008)
If at all, the expiration date only means that the Medical
Report is valid - and could be submitted - as a formal
requirement for overseas employment up until April 11,
2008; it does not, by any means, create legal basis to hold
the issuer accountable for any intervening change of
condition from the time of issuance up until expiration
At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV
could not have been properly established since the courts a
quo, in the first place, erred in admitting and giving
probative weight to the Certification, which was written in
an unofficial language. Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court states that:
Section 33.Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.
- Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino
To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial
A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal
that while it contains English words, the majority of it is in
an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or
Filipino provided by respondent, the same should not have
 been admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not be
given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the
facts stated therein

Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said

certification were not proven in accordance with Section 20,
Rule 132:

Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
(c) Any other private document need only be identified as
that which it is claimed to be.
Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the
Certification does not fall within the classes of public
documents under Section 19, Rule 132 - and hence, must be
considered as private. It has been settled that an unverified
and unidentified private document cannot be accorded
probative value
In addition, case law states that "since a medical certificate
involves an opinion of one who must first be established as
an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit unless
the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications. It is precluded because the party against
whom it is presented is deprived of the right and
opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author
should be presented as a witness to provide the other party
to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents.
Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of
the medical certificate renders its contents suspect and of no
probative value,"
FACTS:
In an Information dated 23 December 2004, Vibar was
charged with the Crime of Rape
On 4 August 2002, at around 11:00 A.M., while AAA was
cooking lunch outside their nipa hut in Camarines Norte,
Vibar came and asked her to get his gloves from inside the
house. When AAA refused to do so, he carried her inside
and laid her on the floor and raped her.
AAA reported the same to the police. After executing an
affidavit, she appeared before the judge of the MCTC of San
Lorenzo Ruiz for preliminary investigation.
AAA's first complaint for rape, however, was dismissed
because she refused to speak during that time. She did not
cooperate with the preliminary investigation because she
was afraid of the threats.
She left Camarines and went back on 2004 to study, where
Vibar constantly harassed her still.
Vibar’s testimony is that he went home after attending
Sunday worship. Once home, he asked AAA why she did not
prepare lunch, and the latter retorted in a disrespectful
manner. Because he was hungry and had an earlier
misunderstanding with his wife BBB, Vibar scolded her and
uttered other unsavory remarks.

Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the After the verbal confrontation, AAA went to the police
Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia should have also been station and accused him of attempted rape.
excluded as evidence. Although the same may be considered
a public document, being an alleged written official act of a In 2004, AAA re-filed the case against Vibar with the
foreign country, the same was not duly authenticated in prodding of BBB, and conspired against him.
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132.
While in detention, Vibar received a letter from AAA in 2006
While respondent provided a translation thereof from the wherein she alleged that she was merely coerced to re-file
National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, Bureau of the complaint for rape and that she regretted her decision to
External Relations, Office of the President, the same was not do so.
accompanied by a certificate of the secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul-general, consul, vice- consul, or consular RTC found Vibar guilty. TC ruled that prosecution was able
agent or any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines to prove that AAA was indeed sexually abused. CA affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
stationed in Saudi Arabia, authenticated by the seal.
Section cannot
Petitioner 20, Rule 132 provides
be held liable for that in order
damages underfor
Artany
2178
private
of the Civildocument
Code offered as authentic to be admitted as ISSUE:
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be Whether or not the letter, as evidence, is authenticated and
proved either:
People vs. Vibar, G.R. No. 215790 admissible
(1) by anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or RULING:
(2) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or NO. In People v Amarela, the Court cautioned against the
handwriting of the maker over-reliance on the presumption that no woman would spin
a tale of sexual abuse if it were untrue because it would
The authentication of private document before it is tarnish her honor… However, this misconception,
received in evidence is vital because during such particularly in this day and age, not only puts the accused at
process, a witness positively identifies that the an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice... It is
document is genuine and has been duly executed or that
the document
EVIDENCE is neither
| TH 5:30-9:30 spurious
| Judge norPedro
Byron San counterfeit nor
executed
Arellano by mistake
University Schoolorof
under
Law,duress.
First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 important to weed out these unnecessary notions because
an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things.
AAA was straightforward and categorical in narrating how
Vibar had forcibly taken her and raped her.
Vibar also laments that there was no physical evidence of
penetration to support AAA's claims of defilement, noting
that there were no medical reports that indicated even the
slightest of penetration
It must be remembered, however, that medical reports are
merely corroborative in character and are not essential for a
conviction because the credible testimony of a victim would
suffice
It is clear that AAA's medical report did not discount the fact
that intercourse occurred even if her hymen was intact.
Lastly, Vibar claimed that while it was not AAA herself who
gave the letter, he was sure that it was AAA who wrote it
because no one else by AAA's name would call herand that
he was familiar with her handwriting.
Section 20, Rule 132 provides that in order for any private
document offered as authentic to be admitted as evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(1) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(2) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker
The authentication of private document before it is received
in evidence is vital because during such process, a witness
positively identifies that the document is genuine and has
been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious
nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress
A plain reading of Vibar's testimony immediately reveals
that he miserably failed to comply with the authentication
requirement set forth under the Rules. Neither was there any
witness who could testify that the alleged letter was
voluntarily and personally made by AAA nor was there any
document from which her handwriting could have been
compared. Curiously, the person who purportedly handed to
Vibar AAA's letter was not presented in court to testify as to
the genuineness of the document.
2.a. Best Evidence Rule
 Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides...
Original document must be produced; exceptions.
— When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. (2a)
 Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides... Original of document. —
(a) The original of the document is one the
contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course
of business, one being copied from another at or
near the time of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals
Best Evidence Rule
 RULE: In resolving an issue on the contents of a
document, the only document admissible is the
ORIGINAL document itself, any other substitute is
inadmissible.
 Only applies:
- To documentary evidence
- When the subject of inquiry are the
contents of the document
 “Original Document” in BER:
1. The original of the document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.
2. When the documents are produced into two or
more copies with identical contents executed at or
about the same time, all copies are original.
3. Entry repeated in the course of business, copied
from one another at or about the same time.
 Purposes of BER:
1. Avoid the evil of inaccuracy and
inconsistencies. Recognizes the inherent risk of
inaccuracy, imprecision of the process of copying
where there is inherent danger of mis-transmission.
2. Recognition of frailty of human memory. If no
BER, the contents of the documents would just be
 established by testimony of witness out of their
memory.
 Exceptions to BER
Falls within the purview of BER but is expressly
exempted by law. Thus, secondary evidence maybe
offered.
1. If the original is lost, destroyed or cannot be
found without bad faith on the part of the offeror.
2. When the original is in the possession of the
adverse party, who fails or refuses to present the
copy in court despite reasonable notice.
3. When the copy consists of numerous accounts or
records that cannot be examined in the court
without great loss of time and what is sought to be
established is the general.
4. When the original document happens to be a
public document, in the possession of a public
officer or recorded in some public office.
2.b. Secondary Evidence
 Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides...
When original document is unavailable. — When
the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of
its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
 Section 6, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides... When original document is in adverse
party's custody or control. — If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party,
he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case
of its loss. (5a)
 Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides...
Evidence admissible when original document is a
public record. — When the original of document is
in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. (2a)
 Section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides... Party who calls for document not bound
to offer it. — A party who calls for the production of
a document and inspects the same is not obliged to
offer it as evidence
DOCTRINE:
Before
MCMP a party
Const. is Corp.
allowed to adduce secondary
v MONARK, evidence
G.R. No. 201001
to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must
prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason
for its non- production in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.The
EVIDENCE correct
| TH 5:30-9:30 orderByron
| Judge of proof is as follows:
San Pedro
existence,
Arellano execution,
University Schoolloss, and contents.
of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
FACTS:
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy
equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark)
covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract).
The delivery of 5 heavy equipment were evidenced by
invoices and Documents Acknowledgment Receipts received
and signed by representatives of MCMP.
For failure of MCMP to pay its obligation upon demand,
Monark filed a suit for a sum of Money with RTC Quezon
City.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses its
Senior Account Manager. The latter testified that there were
two original copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark,
while the other was given to MCMP. That Monark’s copy had
been lost and diligent efforts to recover the copy proved
futile.
Instead, he presented a photocopy of the Contract which he
personally had on file.
MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary evidence
to prove the contents of the Contract following Best
Evidence.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Monark. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court should have disallowed the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of
the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the
production of the original document whenever its contents
are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Sec 3 of Rule 130
which provides:
“Section 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control
of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
 Relative thereto, Secs 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the
relevant rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to
prove the contents of a lost document:
“Section 5. When original document is unavailable. —
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party’s
custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or
under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of its loss.”
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the
Court set down the requirements before a party may present
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original
document whenever the original copy has been lost:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the
following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for
its non- production in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, and contents.
In the instant case, CA correctly ruled that the above
requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original
Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that
diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail.
Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been
repeatedly held by this Court, “findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to
the trial court.”
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by
Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it has
failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the
request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of the
Contract.
Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have
asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus,
MCMP’s failure to present the same and even explain its
failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of
secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130,
but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse
to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 that “evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”
DOCTRINE:Loon vs. Power Master Inc., 712 SCRA
While courts generally admit in evidence and give
probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabrication
EVIDENCE | THshould prompt
5:30-9:30 | Judgethe adverse
Byron San party
Pedroto present
the original
Arellano documents
University Schoolfor inspection.
of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
FACTS:
Respondents employed and assigned the petitioners as
janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT offices in Metro
Manila area.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money
claims and illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter (LA) partially ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the NLRC.
6 months after filing their notice of appeal, Respondents
filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached
photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees
with ATM cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also
showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’
ATM cards.
On the other hand, petitioners filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion
of the supplemental appeal from the records because it
allegedly suffered from infirmities.
First, the supplemental appeal was not verified.
Second, it was belatedly filed 6 months from the filing of the
respondents’ notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal.
The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the
respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading until December
18, 2002.
Third the attached documentary evidence on the
supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged signatures.
NLRC giving weight to the photocopy of computerized
payroll records ruled in favor of respondent. It maintained
that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls
was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. The
CA affirmed
ISSUE:
Whether or not mere photocopies as documentary evidence
filed 6 months from notice of appeal are admissible in
evidence where there is an allegation of forgery by the
adverse party
RULING:
INADMISSIBLE. While courts generally admit in evidence
and give probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the
original documents for inspection.
It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the
originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had
submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the
respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the
opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious
evidence by not adducing the originals.

Failure to present the originals raises the presumption that
evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Dimaguila vs. Monteiro, 714 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except when the original is
a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
FACTS:
Spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint against Petitioner
for Partition and damages, of a residential house and lot,
anchored their claim on a deed of sale (Bilihan ng Lahat
Naming Karapatan) executed in their favor by the heirs of
Pedro Dimaguila (co-heirs of petitioner).
Later on, the complaint was amended to an action for
recovery.
In their original answer, petitioner admitted that the subject
property had already been extrajudicially partitioned.
They subsequently changed their position when Spouses
Monteiro amended their complaint.
During the trial, Spouses presented the Deed of Exrajudicial
partition, certified true copy of the cadastral map and the
Municipal assessor’s records as evidence to prove their claim
of partition.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a certified true copy of cadastral map is
inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it violates the
best evidence rule and hearsay rule
RULING:
ADMISSIBLE. Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule,
Section 3(d) of Rule 130 provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except
when the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of
a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody or the record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the
map were presented by two public officers.
The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true
copies of original public records, fall under the exception to
the BE rule.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Republic vs. Mupas, 769 SCRA 384
DOCTRINE:
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of
inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. In proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be
produced in court.
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC)
submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Govt - through the
Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) and the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) for the construction and development of the NAIA-
IPT III under a build- operate-and-transfer (BOT)
arrangement.
The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit
competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC's
unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law.
Paircargo consortium also submitted their competitive
proposal to build the NAIA-IPT III. Both AEDC and
Paircargo offered to build, however, Paircargo submitted a
bid superior to AEDC’s unsolicited proposal, thus DOTC
awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO).
PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as,
Asahikosan, both foreign corporations organized in Japan,
for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO
defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the problem
Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s
payments until June 2003.
Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to the attendant
costs of the construction, PIATCO was required to submit
the original documents to the court.
PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified under
Sec. 3 Rule 130, referring to the submission of numerous
accounts.
ISSUE:
Whether the non-submission of original documents is
justified
RULING:
NO. As a condition precedent to the admission of a summary
of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper
foundation for the admission of the original documents on
which the summary is based. The proponent must prove
that the source documents being summarized are also
admissible if presented in court.
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best
evidence rule pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130, he asks
permission from the trial court to produce a summary of
numerous documents, whose originals are available to the
adverse party for inspection. He does not ask permission
from the trial court to present in evidence the numerous
non-original documents
 Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court would be defeated.
In that case, every exhibit of non-original documents would
be identified, authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to
a tedious and protracted litigation. Thus, if a party desires to
present photocopies of the original documents, he must first
establish that the presentation of photocopies is justified
under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
He must establish the presence of all the elements under
these provisions. To conclude otherwise is to allow the party
to circumvent the best evidence rule and the requirements
under Section 3 (a), (b), and (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court by merely invoking Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
In this case, PIATCO having failed to establish that the
photocopied documents he presented in courts are
authentic, theses photocopied documents are deemed as
hearsay, and shall not be admissible as evidence, or reference
to the claimed attendant costs of the project.
Robinol vs. Atty. Bassig, A.C. No. 11836
DOCTRINE:
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty.Bassig for
violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and
Lawyer's Oath.
Complainant Robiñol and respondent entered into a
contract of lease for a period of 2 years without any written
contract. When respondent defaulted in his obligation,
complainant hired a counsel to protect her interest.
Robiñol submitted as evidence photocopies of the receipts
showing payment of Atty. Bassig and the promissory note
executed by the latter, in support of her claim.
IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for the suspension of the
Atty. Bassig from the practice of law for a period of 2 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mere photocopies of the official receipts and
promissory note are admissible in evidence
RULING:
INADMISSIBLE. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant and the proper evidentiary
threshold is substantial evidence. Here, Robiñol failed to
discharge the burden of proof.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable.
Sec. 5 When original document is unavailable. – When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v.
Antonio Lagman, the Court held that: Before a party is
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents
of the original, the offeror must prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for
its non- production in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed
In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid
down the predicate for the admission of said photocopies.
Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her complaint,
Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that
Atty. Bassig failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact
leased a house from Robiñol.
2.c. Parol Evidence
 Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides... Evidence of written agreements. —
When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection
in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
 The term "agreement" includes wills.
 “Parol” evidence means something oral or verbal,
but with reference to contracts, it means
extraneous evidence or evidence allude
Note: As used in the rules of court, the term refers not only
to oral but also written evidence which are outside of or
extraneous to the written contract be
Parol Evidence Rule:
Once parties reduced their agreement in writing, it is
considered to be the final repository of everything
agreed upon by them.
 Everything not included are deemed abandoned by the
parties. If dispute arise to what really was agreed upon
by the parties, the only acceptable evidence is the
written document itself.
As a general rule, neither party can present other
evidence to establish that they agreed something else.
 Purposes
1. To preserve the integrity and protect the
reliability of documents.
2. To prevent fraud.
Instances when Parol Evidence Rule does not apply:
1. When the document does NOT amount to a
written contract or agreement.
2. When at least one of the parties in the suit is
NOT a party to the written agreement or contract
subject of the suit, neither party may invoke Parol
Evidence Rule.
Parole Evidence Rule presupposes a dispute
between parties.
A stranger is NOT bound by a contract to which he
is not a party.
Thus, this rule cannot be invoked by or against a
stranger or non-party to the contract.
The prohibition goes both ways:
a. Party to the contract cannot invoke Parol Evidence
Rule against a non-party or a stranger to the
contract, or
b. A non-party to the contract cannot invoke Parol
Evidence Rule against a party to the contract.
 Who are deemed parties to the contract?
1) Signatories to the contract
2) Successors in interest
3) Beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui
3. If the prior or contemporaneous agreement does
NOT contradict or alter the written agreement,
also known as Collateral Agreement Rule.
Parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of
extraneous evidence that would establish the
existence of other prior or contemporaneous
agreement that would tend to vary, alter or
contradict the terms of the written agreement.
Thus, the rule does NOT apply in the following:
a. When such other terms or agreement does
NOT vary the terms of the written agreement,
even if executed prior to or contemporaneous with
the written agreement.
b. When such other terms or agreement was
executed after the written agreement.
4. Waiver
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Parol evidence rule is NOT self-executing. It has to
be seasonably invoked by the parties. Failure to do
so results to waiver. Parol evidence then becomes
admissible.
Note: Parol evidence rule does not apply in these 4
instances because these situations are not the ones
contemplated by law. Differentiate these with the exceptions
as provided by Section 9, Rule 130.
Exceptions to Parol Evidence Rule:
IMPORTANT: These must be raised in the pleadings before
it can be considered by the court.
1. Intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection of the
written agreement
Ambiguous terms that cannot be ascertained by
just examining the four corners of the written
contract.
Latent or Intrinsic Patent or Extrinsic
Ambiguity Ambiguity
Uncertainty is that which Uncertainty appears on
does not appear on the face the face of the contract
of the contract such as itself.
imperfect description or no
person or property exactly
answers the description.
The ambiguity or Extrinsic evidence, as well
uncertainty can be as the contract itself, may be
ascertained by looking at examined to ascertain
extrinsic or extraneous the true meaning.
evidence.
MISTAKE or IMPERFECTION
o If there is a meeting of the minds, but their true
intention is not expressed in the instrument by any
of the causes mentioned, one of the parties may
ask for the reformation of the instrument
o If there is no meeting of the minds because of
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, the
proper remedy is not a reformation of the
instrument but an annulment of the contract.
o Reformation of the instrument cannot be brought
to reform any of the following:
(a) Simple donations inter vivos wherein no
condition is imposed;
(b) Wills;or
(c) Void contracts.
Note: That even if the parol evidence applies to wills, an
express trust concerning an immovable or interest therein
may not be proved by parol evidence. The Rule however IS
NOT ABSOLUTE; it is a mere general rule, but only subject
to four exemptions mentioned in Sec 9, of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. The list is just an exclusive list; if the grounds
in issue does not fall in the list, parol evidence will not apply.
 2. Failure of the written agreement to express the true
intention of the parties. SUMMARY

o General Rule: No parole evidence BEST EVIDENCE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

RULE
o Exception: Failure of agreement to Presentation of the An agreement in writing
express INTENT. ORIGINAL document cannot be disproved by
extraneous evidence
o Exception to the exception: Statute of INSTANCES OF NON-APPLICABILITY
Frauds 1. If the document is only a 1. When document does
collateral fact. NOT amount to contract or
Statute of Frauds is also a rule relating to Parol 2. If the purpose of agreement
Evidence. This rule under the New Civil Code presenting of a document 2. When at least one of the
prohibits a party from proving by oral evidence the is to establish a fact, which parties in the suit is NOT a
existence of specific types of contracts. it has an existence party to the written
independent from a agreement or contract
According to Paras, the Civil Code is a substantive document. 3. Prior contemporaneous
law while the Rules of Evidence is procedural law, 3. If the purpose of agreement does NOT
hence, the New Civil Code prevails. presenting the document, contradict or alter the
is to prove extraneous written agreement
Thus, parol evidence may be allowed when the matters, or matters that 4. Waiver
contract is alleged to have failed to express the true are extraneous to the
intention of the parties EXCEPT when the contract contents of the document.
is covered by the Statute of Frauds. 4. When the party against
whom the document is
o Exception to the exception to the offered, admits expressly
exception: Executed contracts the genuineness and
authenticity
Limitation under SOF finds no application in EXCEPTIONS
contracts partially or fully executed. 1. If the original is lost, 1. Intrinsic ambiguity,
destroyed or cannot be mistake or imperfection of
3. Invalidity of the written agreement found without bad faith on the written agreement
the part of the offeror. 2. Failure to express true
Operation of Parol Evidence Rule presupposes that 2. When the original is in Intentions
the written agreement is valid or legal. the possession of the 3. Invalidity of written
adverse party, who fails or agreement
If the written agreement subject to the dispute is refuses to present the copy 4. Existence of other terms
alleged in the pleading as invalid or illegal, the rule in court entered by parties or
is inapplicable. despite reasonable notice. successors in interest
3. When the copy consists of subsequent
4. Existence of such other terms entered by parties or numerous accounts or
successors in interest subsequent to the written records
agreement 4. When the original
document happens to be a
WAIVER OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE --- it can be public document, in the
waived by failure to invoke the benefits of the rule possession of a public
on time. It can be rendered as admissible for failure officer or recorded in some
to object. public office.

Best Evidence Rule
Section 1, Rule 130
Establishes a rule of
preference which requires
that the original document
must be presented when
available before secondary
evidence is allowed.
Covers all forms of
documents
Covers all parties in a suit
Asks the question: “What
does the document contain
or say?”
Parol Evidence Rule
Section 9, Rule 130
Does not establish a rule of
preference but merely
presupposes compliance
with the Best Evidence Rule.
Only covers written
contractual agreements
Can only be invoked by or
used against a party to the
contractual agreement
Asks the question: “What
really was agreed upon by
the parties?”
Leoveras vs. Valdez, 652 SCRA
FACTS:
Respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement,
allotting their portions of the subject property, to wit:
Petitioner Modesto Leoveras – 3,020 sqm and Respondent
Casimero Valdez – 7,544.27 sqm.
In 1996, the respondent learned that the petitioner had
already obtained in his name two TCTs: one – covering an
area of 3,020 sqm; and two - covering an area of 1,004 sqm.
Thus, respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title,
Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking
the reconveyance of the 1,004 sqm portion on the ground

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 sqm
identified in the parties' Agreement.
In his defense, the petitioner claimed: (1) that the parties has
agreed that the extent of their ownership would be based on
their actual possession; (2) that he actually possessed and
subsequently acquired has a total area of 4,024 sqm, which
he subdivided into two portions and caused to be covered by
the two TCTs in question; and (3) that respondent
participated in executing an Affidavit of confirmation of
subdivision, which corrected the mistake in the previously
executed Agreement and confirmed the petitioner's
ownership over the disputed property.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the RTC.
CA noted the discrepancy between the respondent's
signatures as appearing in the Affidavit, on one hand, and
the documents on record, on the other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an allegation of ownership that is contrary
to those expressly stated in an agreement may be used as
evidence.
RULING:
NO. The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and
the authenticity the Agreement entered into between him
and the respondent. However, he claims that since the
Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties,
the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect
the parties' true intention.
Factual findings of the CA holding that such affidavit is
spurious due to discrepancy of respondent’s signature
therein leads us to rely only on the agreement as the basis for
the claim of ownership of both parties.
The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of the
Parol evidence rule: when the terms of an agreement are
reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to
contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these
terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the
written agreement.
Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have
been waived and abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules
of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying,
explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties.
The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud,
inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not
prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
Spouses Paras vs. KIMWA Const. & Devt., 755 SCRA
FACTS:
Lucia was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit and
Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete aggregates
to contractors and haulers.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a
contract where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were
"allotted" by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa.
Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s
permitted area in Toledo City at ₱240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic
meters of aggregates.
Sometime after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling
aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the
Agreement, Lucia filed the Complaint for breach of contract
with damages.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to
obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates from Lucia. It
argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic
meters represented only an upper limit or the maximum
quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the
Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000
cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995
was never set as a deadline.
Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses
Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would
show that the parties had agreed differently.
ISSUE:
Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa
was obliged to haul a total of 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
RULING:
YES. Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the
quantity which it was obliged to acquire from Paras.
Rule 130, Section 9 provides for the Parol Evidence Rule:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement. However, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally
imperative that the parol evidence sought to be introduced
points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it.
That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief in [the]
existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous
terms averred by the party seeking to introduce parol
evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol
evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of
 the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party;
and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented
serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the
presenting party.
Contrary to the CA’s conclusion, Spouses Paras pleaded in
the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or
imperfection inmthe Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s
failure to express the true intent of the parties.
Further, Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to
petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is,
thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence.
It is true that petitioners’ Complaint does not specifically
state words and phrases such as "mistake," "imperfection," or
"failure to express the true intent of the parties."
Nevertheless, it is evident that the crux of petitioners
Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that the
Agreement "entered into . . . on 6 December 1994 or
thereabouts" was founded on the parties’ supposed
understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in
favor of Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such
hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of
petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area.
The Special Permit’s condition (issued to Paras) that a total
of only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be
extracted by petitioner Lucia Paras from the permitted area
lends credence to the position that the aggregates "allotted"
to respondent Kimwa was in consideration of its
corresponding commitment to haul all 40,000 cubic meters.
By allotting the entire 40,000 cubic meters, petitioner Lucia
Paras bound her entire business to respondent Kimwa.
Rational human behavior dictates that she must have done
so with the corresponding assurances from it. It would have
been irrational, if not ridiculous, of her to oblige herself to
make this allotment.
Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid
for only 6 months from November 14,1994 lends credence to
petitioners Spouses Paras’ assertion that, in entering into
the Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia
Paras did so because of respondent Kimwa's promise that
hauling can be completed by May 15, 1995.
Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner Lucia
Paras needed to make it eminently clear to any party she was
transacting with that she could supply aggregates only up to
May 15, 1995 and that the other party's hauling must be
completed by May 15, 1995.
She was merely acting with due diligence, for otherwise, any
contract she would enter into would be negated; any
commitment she would make beyond May 15, 1995 would
make her guilty of misrepresentation, and any prospective
income for her would be rendered illusory.
PNV vs. Pasimio, 769 SCRA 70
FACTS:
Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages, she alleged having a peso and dollar
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of
P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that both
investment placements have matured; and when she sought
to withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB
refused to oblige.
PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement but it claimed
that Pasimio is without right to insist on their withdrawal,
the deposited amount having already been used in payment
of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank.
PNB narrated how the set off of sort came about: Pasimio
and her husband took out three "loans against deposit hold-
out" from the PNB Sucat, as follows: Three Million One
Hundred Thousand Peso; and a Thirty-One Thousand One
Hundred US Dollar (US$31,100) loan on December 7, 2001.
During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio
denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the
corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing
certain documents which turned out to be the Peso Loans
Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan Applications, the Promissory
Notes and Hold-out on Savings Deposit/ Peso/FX Time
Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute and the
Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction, she
professed not understanding what they really meant.
She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in
blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the
PNB Sucat branch manager and Customer Relations Officer
led her to believe that what she was signing were related to
new high-yielding PNB products.
Pasimio would also deny re-lending the loan proceeds to
Paolo Sun.
The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is
predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had proven by
convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan
accommodation from PNB.
As a corollary, the TC held that there was no evidence
showing the release by PNB of the loan proceeds to Pasimio.
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
granting Pasimio's complaint for a sum of money.
RULING:
YES. In upholding the RTC's finding respecting Pasimio's
never having received any loan proceeds, the CA doubtless
disregarded the rule holding that a promissory note is the
best evidence of the transaction embodied therein; also, to
prove the existence of the loan, there is no need to submit a
separate receipt to prove that the borrower received the loan
proceeds.
Indeed, a promissory note represents a solemn
acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to
repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon
by the borrower and the lender.
As has been held, a person who signs such an instrument is
bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by
 him through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his
good faith.
If he reneges on his promise without cause, he forfeits the
sympathy and assistance of this Court and deserves instead
its sharp repudiation.
The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt
of the loan, which is stated in a clear and unequivocal
manner in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its
validity.
To overthrow the recitals of such instrument, convincing
and more than merely preponderant evidence is necessary.
A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud.
Following this doctrine, Pasimio's notarized promissory
notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be
upheld, absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive
proof of their nullity.
The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for
themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has not questioned the
genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the
promissory notes, she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of
the corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot
plausibly set up the defense that she did not apply for any
loan, and receive the value of the notes or any consideration
therefor in order to escape her liabilities under these
promissory notes.
PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on
the existence of the loan. Here, each promissory note was
supported by a corresponding loan application form and
disclosure statement, all of which carried Pasimio's
signatures. Isolated from each other, these documents might
not prove the existence of the loan, but when taken together,
collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary steps
to contract loans from PNB and was aware of their terms and
conditions.
Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore,
there can be, between the parties and their successors-in
interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other
than the contents of the writing.
Under this rule, Parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be
given to contradict, change or vary a written document,
except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add
to the terms of a written agreement and puts in issue in his
pleadings:
(a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties;
(c) the validity of the written agreement; and
(d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written
agreement
Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and
of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written
agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Court, the documents embodying the loan agreement of the
parties should be upheld.
Moncol vs. DBP
FACTS:
DBP scheduled an invitation to bid for Negotiated Sale of a
residential lot with a 2-storey building located at Calbayog
with a purchase price of 1,326,000.00.
In line with this Fernando Mancol Jr. executed an SPA
appointing his father, Fernando Mancol Sr., to represent and
negotiate on his behalf, the sale of the subject property.
Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol Sr., signed the negotiated offer
to purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and
procedures/disposition of assets on a first come first served
basis.
DBP then issued an OR dated October 14, 2004 in the name
of Mancol Jr., paid by Mancol Sr., in the amount of
265,200.00 as initial payment for the purchase price.
During the negotiations, DBP allegedly agreed, in some
agreements other than those stated in the written agreement
signed by the latter.
In 2006, petitioner sent a letter to DBP to comply with the
verbal undertaking. DBP disregarded the oral agreements
and averred that DBP is under no obligation to transfer the
title.
Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for damages for breach of
contract. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies are based on personal
knowledge and not hearsay evidence and that they
sufficiently established the existence and validity of the
subsequent oral agreement and that they can be admitted.
RULING:
NO. “The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or
contradiction of the terms and conditions of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to
show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
varying that purport the written contract.”
This, however is merely a general rule.
Provided, however, that a party puts in issue in its pleadings
any of the exceptions in the second paragraph of rule 130
Section 9, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the agreement. Moreover, as with all the
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party’s
failure to timely object is deemed as a waiver, and parol
evidence may then be entertained.
In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc, Inc. v CA, the
court held that: “The rule is that objections to evidence must
be made as soon as the grounds therefore become
reasonably apparent. In the case of the testimonial evidence,
the objection must be made when the objectionable features
become apparent only by reason of such answer, otherwise
the objection is waived and such evidence will form part of
the records of the case as competent and complete evidence
 and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or
unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.”
Here, they invoked the 4th exception by offering oral
testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol Sr. The bank however
failed to timely object against the said testimonies during
the trial. As a consequence, the oral testimonies were
admitted. We stress that admissibility is different from the
weight of the testimony.
2.d. Electronic Evidence
 Electronic documents as functional equivalent
of paper-based documents.
Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term of
writing, document, record, instrument,
memorandum or any other form of writing, such
term shall be deemed to include an electronic
document as defined in these Rules.
NOTE: The rules of court including the statutes containing
rules of evidence are suppletory to the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.
 Electronic evidence
It refers to information, or the representation, data,
figures, symbols, or other modes of written
expressions, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation is
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved or
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved, or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any print-out or output, readable
by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message, or electronic
document. The term “electronic document” may be
used interchangeably with “electronic data
message.”
 Common Forms:
1. Digital images
2. E-mails
3. Text Messages
4. Voice Messages
 Common Denominator of Electronic Evidence
o All the process involved MUST be
Electronic.
o It must be free from manual intervention
such as “manually signing”
Note: It is the purpose of its offer that determines the
nature. If contents of electronic document is subjected to
inquiry, BER also applies – present the original.
 Ephemeral electronic communications.
Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
witnesses, other competent evidence may be
admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or
ephemeral electronic communication shall be
covered by the immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or
embodied in an electronic document, then the
provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
The following are the SPECIFIC EPHEMERAL
Communications mentioned in the rules:
i. Telephone Conversations
ii. Text Messages
iii. Streaming video/audio
iv. Chat sessions
v. Other similar electronic communications
evidence of which is NOT retained or
recorded.
Distinguish:
- If not recorded/stored (no evidence is retained) =
ephemeral rules
- If it is already recorded/stored = either object or
documentary rules
 Burden of proving authenticity
The person seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden
of proving its authenticity in the manner provided
in this Rule.
Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa, 408 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The facsimile signature in this case, which is defined as
a signature produced by mechanical means is but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business
transactions. Thus, even generally pleadings filed via fax
machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies and not admissible in evidence, as there is
no way of determining whether they are genuine or
authentic will not apply to this case.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer against
respondents and alleged that the disputed property was
owned by Marcos Saez, predecessor of petitioners.
That Marcos’ son Adolfo, for humanitarian reasons, allowed
respondents to occupy a portion of Marcos Saez’ land
without paying any rental.
 Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was
succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise
did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises
through petitioners' tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the
respondents to vacate the premises.
Respondents in their Answer, denied the material
allegations of the complaint and alleged that they entered
and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid
and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot
way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have
acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the
premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription.
MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal,
RTC reversed the said decision. Affirming the RTC, the CA
upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors.
The CA lend credence to the Certification issued by the
DENR’s community environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet
allocated to any person.
Therefore, respondents after sufficiently proving their
actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960 have better
right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Hence, petitioners avers that CA gravely abuse its discretion
in giving weight to the CENR Officer’s Certification, which
only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain
Tagorda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a certification issued by a public officer
bearing a facsimile signature is inadmissible in evidence
RULING:
NO. While the issue as to who among the parties are entitled
to a piece of public land remains pending with the DENR,
the question of recovery of possession of the disputed
property is a matter that may be addressed to the courts
The rule stated in Garvida v. Sales Jr that – “A facsimile or fax
transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an
original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing
the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of
electric current. x x x
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals
and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible
in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they
are genuine or authentic” is not applicable to the instant
case.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for
bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F.
Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that
which is alluded to in Garvida.The one mentioned here
refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in
banking, financial, and business transactions
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the
Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated
April 2, 1998
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then
the regional director would not have used it as reference in
his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or
directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as
the latter was under the former’s direct control and
supervision
Torres vs. PAGCOR, 661 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It
is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading
is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by
the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading. Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not
considered as electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor
(SMOS) of respondent PAGCOR who was terminated due to
his alleged participation in padding of Credit Meter
Readings (CMR) or slot machines at Casino Filipino-Hyatt.
Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR
for illegal dismissal. CSC held that petitioner's appeal had
already prescribed.
The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent
a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within
the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers
where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration
disclosed that such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's
Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should
have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at
the first instance when he filed his complaint and not only
when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription
in its Comment.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of
his dismissal on August 13, 2007, which was within the 15-
day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means
of a facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of
the Board of Directors.
He claims that the sending of documents thru electronic
data message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned under
Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000.
Petitioner further contends that since his letter
reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then
filed his complaint before the CSC

ISSUE:
Whether or not a letter reconsideration filed through
facsimile is allowed
RULING:
NO. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed
submitted a letter reconsideration, which he claims was sent
through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration
did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by
petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be
filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., it was held inadmissible in evidence
the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
“x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It
is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party
and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x”
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an
electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act
Ang vs. Republic, 618 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Electronic Evidence Rule does not apply to criminal
actions. The said Rules applies only to civil actions,
quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings
FACTS:
Rustan Ang was charged of violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act for purposeful
sending Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile
phone.
A pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his
former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached
to a completely naked body of another woman making it to
appear that it was Irish who is depicted in the said obscene
and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation
to her
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through
a text constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC)
ISSUE:
Whether or not text messages to be admissible as evidence
in a criminal case must be authenticated following the
Electronic Evidence Rule
RULING:
NO. Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to the present
criminal action. The said Rules applies only to civil actions,
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
(A.M. No. 01-7- 01-SC, Rule 1, Sec 2)
However, Rustan is raising the objection to the admissibility
of the obscene picture for the first time before the SC. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was
offered in evidence
He should be deemed to have already waived such ground
for objection
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies
only to civil actions, quasi- judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has
proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
People vs. Enojas
FACTS:
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants with murder
before the Las Piñas RTC
The officers approached the taxi suspiciously parked and
asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his
documents.
The latter complied but, having entertained doubts
regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they
asked him to come with them to the police station in their
mobile car for further questioning.
PO2 Pangilinan came upon two suspected robbers and shot
it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and
hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired
at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored
the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing
as Enojas, communicated with the other accused.
The police then conducted an entrapment operation that
resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni.
Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused
Enojas and Gomez
The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile
phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-
accused.
The accused filed a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008
for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to
an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since
the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not
having been properly identified.
RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether the text messages are admissible as evidence
RULING:
 As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC
admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions.
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them.
Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged
text messages with the other accused in order to identify and
entrap them.
As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.
Syhunliong vs. Rivera
FACTS:
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private
complainant and defendant in the instant case.
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and
Development Corporation (BANFF) while Rivera, citing
personal and family matters, tendered her resignation as
Accounting Manager of BANFF, on February 3, 2006 and
continued working for BANFF until March of the same year
to complete the turn- over of papers under her custody to
Jennifer Lumapas.
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request
for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and
incentives.
Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid,
but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned,
and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.
Hence, on April 6, 2006, Rivera sent libelous text message to
one of BANFF's official cellular phones held by Lumapas.
Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the
NLRC a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid
salaries, 13th-16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and
tax refund.
On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution of the aforecited
labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint
for libel, and the public prosecutor finds probable cause to
indict Rivera the crime of libel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in
ordering the outright dismissal of the complaint of
Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly
libelous text messages were privileged communication
RULING:
There is no merit in the instant petition. Prescription had
set in. Well settled rule in statutory construction that the
liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes
emanates from the liberality of the State, any doubt on this
matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the
accused.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong
filed his complaint against Rivera more than 1 year after the
allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas.
Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16,
2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter the fact that its
institution was made beyond the prescriptive period
provided for in Article 90 of the RPC.
In relation thereto, Article 89 of the RPC provides that the
prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing
the criminal liability. Prescription of the crime is already a
compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal of
the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the
text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the
purview of a qualified privileged communication.
The rule on privileged communication means that a
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in
which the communicator has an interest, or concerning
which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having
a corresponding duty.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of
a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No.
1, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the person who made the communication had a legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least,
had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board,
or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and
who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
(3) the statements in the communication are made in good
faith and without malice
Presiding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in
the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message falls within
the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she
was speaking in response to duty, to protect her own
interest, and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of
Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of
the message beyond that of conveying it to the party
concerned
Bartolome vs. Maranan, 740 SCRA 491
FACTS:
This administrative matter started through the sworn
affidavit- complaint in the vernacular, dated December 16,
2009, that Ella Bartolome (complainant) filed against
Rosalie Maranan.
RTC Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, charging her with extortion,
graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee.
To put an end to the respondent’s extortion activities, the
complainant decided to report the matter to the police.
During the entrapment operation conducted by police
officers of Imus Police Station, the respondent was
 apprehended inside the premises of the RTC Branch 20,
Imus, Cavite in the act of receiving the money from the
complainant.
In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to
her affidavit-complaint the transcribed electronic
communications (text messages) between her and the
respondent; a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History form
given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing
the petition for annulment of marriage; a copy of the Imus
Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was
apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted
by police officers of Imus Police Station on November 11,
2009 at 2:40 p.m.; and a versatile compact disc (VCD)
containing the video taken during the entrapment operation
conducted against the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ephemeral electronic communications are
now admissible evidence.
RULING:
YES. Ephemeral electronic communications are now
admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions.
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming
audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the communications or has personal
knowledge thereof.
In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in
considering the present case. The complainant, who was the
recipient of the text messages and who therefore has
personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the
respondent as the sender through cell phone number
09175775982.
The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with
the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the
cell phone number reflected in the complainant’s cell phone
from which the text messages originated was hers. She
confirmed that it was her cell phone number during the
entrapment operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted
BBB vs. AAA, 750 SCRA 188
FACTS:
BBB and AAA married in civil rights to legalize their
relationship. Later on, their relationship turn sour and they
decided to live separately.
Citing economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed an
application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order with a request to make the same permanent after due
hearing, before the RTC.
Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or
through text messages.
RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made
permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC. He posits that
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
the text messages offered by AAA as evidence were
unauthenticated; hence doubt exists as to their admissibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or admitted into evidence the unauthenticated text
messages adduced by AAA.
RULING:
In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, it is stated
that any question as to the admissibility of text messages as
evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising
such issue admits authorship of the subject messages.
BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as
evidence the text messages which, were sent by him and FFF
to AAA since they were unauthenticated.
However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the pleadings
filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text
messages attributed to him by AAA.
Astorga and Repol Law Office VS. Villanueva,
751 SCRA 410
FACTS:
This administrative Complaint was filed by Astorga and
Repol Law Offices against Alexander D. Villanueva, Sheriff
IV of Branch 60 of the RTC, Makati City.
Astorga and Repol Law Offices charged Alexander D.
Villanueva (Sheriff Villanueva) with “willful neglect of duty
[and] serious misconduct [in office] due to graft and
corruption [or] extortion with a prayer that a penalty of
dismissal [or] other appropriate sanctions be meted against
him.”
Astorga and Repol Law Offices represented FGU Insurance
Corporation in a Complaint for damages filed against NEC
Cargo Services, Inc.
The decision was rendered against NEC cargo. The Writ of
Execution was issued.
On October 29, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Arnold B.
Lugares started coordinating with each other for the
execution of the Decision. They agreed to meet on
November 24, 2008 allegedly "to discuss the service of the
Notice[s] of Garnishment."
On November 24, 2008 at 8:54 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva
allegedly sent a text message to Atty. Lugares. The message
said, "Nagcoffee break lang sir, antay nio lng muna ako dyan
sir, gd. day."
At around 10:00 a.m., Atty. Lugares met with Sheriff
Villanueva on the 10th floor of the Makati City Hall.
During the meeting, Sheriff Villanueva allegedly demanded
P8,000.00 to execute the Decision.
Atty. Lugares informed Sheriff Villanueva that this was part
of his job, and he should not demand money from him.
Sheriff Villanueva allegedly lowered the price to P5,000.00.
Sheriff Villanueva denied any attempt to extort money from
Atty. Lugares. He alleged that if he had met with Atty.
 Lugares, it would only be out of courtesy due to the latter's
persistence to garnish the stocks  Who may be a witness

Executive Judge Pozon stated that upon his examination of 1. Can perceive;
the purported text messages, he found that these could not 2. Can make known his perceptions to others;
be construed as evidence that Sheriff Villanueva extorted 3. Must take either an oath or an affirmation; and
money. 4. Must not possess any of the disqualifications
imposed by law or the rules.
Since Atty. Lugares' outgoing text messages to Sheriff
Villanueva were not presented as evidence, the text Factors that do not afftect the competency of a witness
messages from Sheriff Villanueva served as the sole
evidentiary basis for Atty. Lugares' allegations. 1. Religious;
2. Political belief;
Atty. Lugares' failure to show and verify the text messages he 3. Interest in the outcome of the case; or
sent meant that the charges were bereft of evidence. Hence, 4. Conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided
Executive Judge Pozon ordered that the Complaint be by law
dismissed for lack of evidence.
Presumption of competency of a witness
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Sheriff Villanueva is guilty of o General Rule: A person who takes the witness
misconduct due to willful neglect of duty and corruption or stand, is presumed to be qualified to testify. A party
extortion. who desires to question the competence of a
witness must do so by making an objection as soon
RULING: as the facts tending to show incompetency are
In previous admin cases involving other court personnel, apparent
text messages were admitted as evidence and given probative
value by this court. o A prospective witness must show that he has the
following abilities:
In those cases, the court considered the content of the text
messages and the identification of the person sending them To observe – The testimonial quality of perception;
as substantial evidence to prove the commission of To remember – The testimonial quality of memory;
administrative offenses. To relate – The testimonial quality of narration;
To recognize a duty to tell the truth –
Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he The testimonial quality of sincerity.
received in his cellular phone. He attached photographs of
the screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as o Exceptions: There is prima facie evidence of
they were received. He submitted respondent’s calling card
incompetency in the following:
that contained the same phone number seen in the text
messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove
1. The fact that a person has been recently found
that respondent was the source of the text messages
of unsound mind by a court of competent
jurisdiction; or
Respondent denied meeting with Atty. Lugares, but he never
denied sending the text messages to him. The content of the
2. That one is an inmate of an asylum
text messages from respondent and the circumstances
within which they were made constitute substantial
 Time when the witness must possess the
evidence that justify the finding of administrative liability
qualifications
The qualifications and disqualifications of
The presentation of text messages that Atty. Lugares sent to
witnesses are determined as of the time said
respondent is not necessary. Respondent’s text messages
witnesses are produced for examination in court or
sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to
at the taking of their depositions
implement the Writ of Execution. The contents of the text
messages sufficiently prove his manifest refusal to properly
 Burden of proof
implement the Writ of Execution.
The burden is upon the party objecting to the
competency of a witness to establish the ground of
3. Testimonial Evidence
incompetency.
 Definition
Competency vs. Credibility of a Witness
Testimonial or oral evidence is an evidence elicited
from the mouth of a witness. It is sometimes called
Competency of a Credibility of a
viva voce evidence which literally means “living
Witness Witness
voice” or by word of mouth. In this kind of
evidence, a human being (witness) is called to the
Refers to the basic Refers to the believability
stand, is asked questions, and answers the question
qualifications of a of a witness
asked of him.
witness
3.a. Qualifications

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020

Is a matter of law or a Refers to the weight and
matter of rule trustworthiness or
reliability of the
It also includes the testimony.
absence of any of the
disqualifications
imposed upon a witness.
o General Rule: Discrepancies between the
statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those
made by him on the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit him because it is a matter of
judicial experience that an affidavit, being taken ex
parte, is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate.
o Exceptions: The credibility of witnesses will be
impaired if:
1. The omission in the affidavit refers to a very
important detail of the incident that one relating
the incident as an eyewitness would not be
expected to fail to mention; or
2. When the narration in the sworn statement
substantially contradicts the testimony in court.
Credibility of a witness
 A testimony must not only come from a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself, tested by
human experience, observation, common
knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved
through the years
Note: Mental unsoundness of the witness which occurred at
the time of taking his testimony, affects only his credibility.
Nevertheless, as long as the witness can convey ideas by
words or signs and give sufficiently intelligent answers to
questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if
she is feeble- minded or is a mental retardate or is a
schizophrenic
Findings on the credibility of a witness
o General Rule: The determination of credibility of
witnesses is properly within the domain of the trial
court as it is in the best position to observe their
demeanor and bodily movements. The findings of
the trial court with respect to the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great
respect, and even finality
o Exceptions:
- The lower court has reached conclusions that
are clearly unsupported by evidence; or
- It has overlooked some facts or circumstances
of weight and influence which, if considered,
would affect the result of the case
Note: It is a jurisprudentially conceded rule that it is against
human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame,
especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime
imprisonment of her own father. "AAA" was without doubt
telling the truth when she declared that her father raped her
on three separate occasions. The attempt to discredit the
testimony of "AAA" by the accused deserves no merit. When
credibility is in issue, the Court generally defers to the
findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment during trial.
Here, there is nothing from the records that would impel
this Court to deviate from the findings and conclusions of
the trial court as affirmed by the CA
3.b. Disqualifications
 Who may NOT be a witness:
The following are then grounds for the
disqualifications of a witness...
1. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity
or immaturity
2. Disqualification by reason of marriage
3. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity
of adverse party, and
4. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication:
- Marital privilege;
- Attorney-client privilege;
- Doctor-patient privilege;
- Minister-penitent privilege; or
- Public office as regards
communications made in official
confidence
Note: The qualifications and disqualifications of witnesses
are determined as of the time they are produced for
examination in court or at the taking of the depositions.
Blood relationship does not disqualify a witness
Marcos vs. Heirs of Andres Navarro, 700 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific
disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are
mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age
or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based
on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21
provides for disqualification based on privileged
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a
rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he was called.
FACTS:
Marcos and her sister discovered that respondents are
claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. The heirs of
Andres Navarro based their claim on the Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr. (common
ascendant of both petitioner and respondent) donated the
subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a
forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting examination of
 the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace
Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit
and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters
sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of
donation. After the pre-trial, The Heirs moved to disqualify
PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not
authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. RTC
granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez
as a witness. Petitioners elevated the case before the CA by
way of petition for certiorari. CA denied the petition.
ISSSUE:
Whether or not an expert, whose examination is not
authorized by the trial court, disqualified from being a
witness.
RULING:
No. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides the
qualifications of a witness, i.e., all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses. The disqualifications are as follows: (1)
Section 19, Rule 130 disqualifies those who are mentally
incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity
renders them incapable of being witnesses; (2) Section 20 of
the same rule provides for disqualification based on conflicts
of interest or on relationship; (3) Section 21 provides for
disqualification based on privileged communications; and
(4) Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a
witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called. The specific enumeration of disqualified
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules.
Absolute Disqualification vs. Relative Disqualification
Absolute disqualification Relative Disqualification
prohibited from being witnesses to a will
- Those who have been convicted of an offense
involving moral turpitude cannot be
discharged to become a State witness, and
- Those who fall under the disqualification
provided under Secs. 21-24, Rule 130.
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MENTAL
INCAPACITY OR IMMATURITY
(Sec. 21, Rule 130)
 The following persons CANNOT be witnesses:
Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others
Note: Neither feeble-mindedness nor mental retardation is
a sufficient ground for a witness to be declared incompetent.
The acceptance of a person’s testimony depends on its
nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his
perceptions and the manner he can make them known to
the court
 Mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’
credibility. Only those whose mental condition, at
the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others are disqualified
 Children whose mental maturity is such as to
render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating
them truthfully
When incompetence of the witness by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity should exist

The proposed witness is The proposed witness is
prohibited to take the prohibited to testify only on
witness stand certain matters specified
under Secs. 23 and 24, Rule
130 due to interest or
relationship, or to privileges
of other parties
1. Disqualification by reason 1. Disqualification by reason
of mental incapacity or of death or insanity of the
immaturity adverse party (Dead Man’s
Statute)
2. Disqualification by reason 2. Disqualification by reason of
of marriage privileged communication
Conviction of a Crime as a Ground for Disqualification
 General Rule: Conviction of a crime is not a
ground for disqualification as a witness
Mental Incapacity Mental Immaturity
The incompetence of the
witness must occur at the
time the witness
The incompetence of perceives the event
the witness must exist, including his incapability
not at the time of his to relate his perceptions
perception of the facts, truthfully
but at the time he is
produced for Children whose mental
examination, and maturity is such as to
consists in his render them incapable
inability to intelligently of perceiving the facts
make known what he respecting which they
has perceived are examined and of
relating them truthfully
(Rule on
Examination of Child
Witness).

 Exceptions: Otherwise provided by law, such as

the following:  Tests considered in determining insanity of a
person
- Those who have been convicted of falsification
of a document, perjury or false testimony are 1. Test of cognition – complete deprivation of

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 intelligence; and
2. Test of volition - total deprivation of freedom
of the will.
Note: The test of cognition is the applicable test in the
Philippines
People vs. Golimlim, 427 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per
se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental
condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is
now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no
matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to
the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still
give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the
matter testified to.
FACTS:
Golimlim was charged and convicted of the crime of rape
committed against Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), a mental
retardate who is the niece of the accused’s wife. The accused,
on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it
is not true "because her mind is not normal," she having
"mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual
intercourse with her." The trial court in convicting the
accused gave credence to the testimony of Evelyn.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mental retardate is not qualified to
become a witness due to her mental state.
RULING:
No. Sections 20 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. On the other hand, Section 21 of the same rule
provides that the following persons cannot be witnesses: (a)
Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b)
Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully. That Evelyn is a
mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor
render her testimony bereft of truth.
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
(MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION)
(Sec. 22, Rule 130)
 During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendant or descendants
 Rationale for the Disqualification
1. There is identity of interests between husband
and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other,
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Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
there is a consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security
and confidences of private life, even at the risk
of an occasional failure of justice, and to
prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility,
there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other
 Requisites for the applicability of Spousal
Immunity
1. That the spouse for or against whom the
testimony of the other is offered is a party to
the case;
2. That the spouses are legally married (valid
until annulled);
3. That the testimony is offered during the
existence of the marriage; and
4. That the case is not by one against the other
 Exceptions to Spousal Immunity
1. Consent is given by the party-spouse;
2. In a civil case filed by one against the other;
3. In a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants
4. Where the testimony was made after the
dissolution of the marriage or
5. Where the spouse-party fails to raise the
disqualification, it is deemed a waiver.
 Waiver of spousal immunity
Objections to the competency of a husband or wife
to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other
may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses
generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her
privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for
him or her. It is also true that objection to the
spouse's competency must be made when he or she
is first offered as witness, and that the
incompetency may be waived by the failure of the
accused to make timely objection to the admission
of the spouse's testimony, although knowing of
such incompetency, and the testimony admitted
 Extent of prohibition
The prohibition extends not only to a testimony
adverse to the spouse but also to a testimony in
favor of the spouse. It also extends to both criminal
and civil cases and not only consists of utterances
but also the production of documents
 Who can claim spousal immunity
The privilege to object may be claimed only by the
spouse-party and not the other spouse who is
offered as a witness
 Testimony where spouse is accused with others
The spouse could testify in a murder case against
the other co-accused, who were jointly tried with
the accused-spouse. This testimony cannot,
however, be used against accused- spouse directly
or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the
 proceedings in the murder case without violating
the marital disqualification rule, if the testimony is
properly objected
 Marrying the witness
An accused can effectively “seal the lips” of a
witness by marrying the witness. As long as a valid
marriage is in existence at the time of the trial, the
witness-spouse cannot be compelled to testify –
even where the crime charged is against the
witness’ person, and even though the marriage was
entered into for the express purpose of suppressing
the testimony
Alvarez vs. Ramirez, 473 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved
nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security
and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
FACTS:
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza
Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no
objection. On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel,
filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying
against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court on marital disqualification.
ISSUE:
Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband
in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
RULING:
Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latters direct descendants or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is
consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification
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Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance,
where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity
of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in
such a situation, the security and confidences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals,
which through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to
petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between
him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the
major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence,
respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship
survives and flourishes.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to
the commission of the offense, the relationship between
petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they
were separated de facto almost six months before the
incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal
that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
People vs. Castañeda, 88 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And
it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife
to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid
criminal case with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is
not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the
other is to advance a conclusion which completely
disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
FACTS:
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife Benjamin
Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of
Public Document. At the trial, the prosecution called the
complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved
to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court The prosecution opposed said
motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls under
the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other."
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted
the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying
for or against her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin
 F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of his
wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, may be considered as a criminal
case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife
and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
RULING:
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to
the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a
crime committed by the accused-husband against the
witness-wife. The act complained of as constituting the
crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by
the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby
making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale
of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that
had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the
wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made
with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been
charged against said husband. Clearly, therefore, it is the
husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to
the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust
which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly,
filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal
case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against
the other is to advance a conclusion which completely
disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF DEATH OR
INSANITY OF ADVERSE PARTY
(DEAD MAN’S STATUTE / SURVIVING PARTY RULE)
(Sec. 23, Rule 130)
 Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons
in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of
a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound
mind
 Purpose of Dead Man’s Statute
It is designed to close the lips of the plaintiff when
death has closed the lips of the defendant, in order
to remove from the surviving party the temptation
to do falsehood and the possibility of fictitious
claims against the deceased
In order to prevent perjury considering that the
other party cannot say anything anymore because
he/she is dead.
If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by reason of death, insanity, or
other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to give his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction.
Note: Inasmuch as the statutes are designed to protect the
interests of a deceased or incompetent person, they do not
operate to exclude testimony which is favorable to the
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Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
representative of such person. This is the conclusion, also,
where the representative is not a party
 Applicability of Dead Man’s Statute
This rule “applies only to a civil case or a special
proceeding over the estate of a deceased or insane
person”
 Requisites for the applicability of Dead Man’s
Statute
1. The defendant in the case is the executor or
administrator or a representative of the
deceased or the person of unsound mind;
2. The suit is upon the claim by the plaintiff
against the estate of said deceased or person of
unsound mind;
3. The witness is the plaintiff, or an assignor of
that party, or a person in whose behalf the case
is prosecuted; and
4. The subject of the testimony is as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became
of unsound mind
 Extent of disqualification by reason of death or
insanity of the adverse party
It constitutes only a partial disqualification as the
witness is not completely disqualified but is only
prohibited from testifying on the matters therein
specified
 Who may invoke the protection of the Dead
Man’s Statute
1. Executor, administrator and any other
representative of a deceased person, when they
are the defendants in a claim against the estate
of the deceased; or
2. Person of unsound mind in a claim filed against
him
The following CANNOT testify as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound
mind:
1. Parties or assignors of parties to a case or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted;
and
2. Against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against
a person of unsound mind.
The subject matter of the action is a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person
or against such person of unsound mind
 Waiver of the protection of the Dead Man’s
Statute
1. Failing to object to the testimony;
2. Cross-examining the witness on the prohibited
testimony; or
3. Offering evidence to rebut the testimony

 Cases not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute
o The rule has no application to mere
witnesses who are neither parties to
the case, their assignors, nor persons
in whose behalf the case is prosecuted
nor to a nominal party, nor to officers
and stockholders of a plaintiff
corporation
Note: The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to
extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons
not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not
included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from
testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the
deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein
o When a counterclaim is set up by the
administrator [or executor or
representatives] of the estate, the case is
removed from the operation of the dead
man’s statute
o The adverse party is competent to testify to
transactions or communications with the
deceased or incompetent person which
were made with an agent of such person in
cases in which the agent is still alive and
competent to testify. But the testimony of
the adverse party must be confined to
those transactions or communications
which were had with the agent
o In land registration cases instituted by the
decedent’s representatives, this prohibition
does not apply as the oppositors are
considered defendants and may, therefore,
testify against the petitioner. This
prohibition does not also apply in
cadastral cases since there is no plaintiff or
defendant therein
o The disqualification under this rule is
waived if the defendant does not timely
object to the admission of such evidence or
testifies on the prohibited matters or
cross-examines thereon
o The rule will not apply where the plaintiff
is the executor or administrator as
representative of the deceased, or if the
plaintiff is the person of unsound mind
o Where the testimony is intended to prove
a fraudulent transaction of the deceased,
provided such fraud is first established by
evidence aliunde
o Negative testimony, that is, testimony that
a fact did not occur during the lifetime of
the deceased
o Testimony on the present possession by
the witness of a written instrument signed
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Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
by the deceased as such fact exists even
after the decedent’s demise
o When the defendants, as heirs of the
deceased, are sued in their personal
capacity, and
o In an action against a partnership, plaintiff
partners may testify against a deceased
partner
Dead Man’s Statute vs. Marital Disqualification Rule
Dead Man’s Statute Marital Disqualification
Rule
Only a partial
disqualification as the A complete and
witness is only prohibited absolute disqualification
from testifying on the
matters therein specified
GR: Applies to a civil or
criminal case
Applies only to a civil case XPN: In a civil case by one
or special proceeding over spouse against the other, or
the estate of a deceased or in a criminal case for a
insane person crime committed by one
spouse against the other or
the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants
It prohibits testimony that
is against the estate of a It prohibits testimony that
deceased person or is for or against the party-
against a person of spouse.
unsound mind
Razon vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving
party.” The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it
contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
administrator or its representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.
FACTS:
Vicente Chuidian filed a complaint for the delivery of the
certificates of stocks representing the 1,500 share holdings of
his deceased father, Juan Chuidian, in the E. Razon, Inc. In
the answer, Razon alleged that he owned the shares and the
same remained in his possession. It was alleged that the late
Juan Chuidan did not pay any amount whatsoever for the
1,500 shares in question.
CHUIDIAN’s EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate
No. 003 for 1,5000 shares of stock of defendant corporation
was issued in the name of Juan Chuidian (Juan). Razon had
not questioned (not until the demand was made) Juan’s
ownership of the shares and had not brought any action to
have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.
RAZON’s EVIDENCE (In the answer and in his oral
 Testimony): After organizing E. Razon,Inc., Razon
distributed shares, previously placed in the names of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators, to some friends
including Juan. The shares of stock were registered in the
name of Juan only as nominal stockholder and with the
agreement that the said shares were owned and held by the
Razon (as he was the one who paid for all the subscription).
Juan was given the option to buy the same but did not do so.
CFI (RTC) declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the
said shares. IAC (CA) reversed and ruled that Juan Chuidian
is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the
dead man’s statute rule (DMS) under Section 20 (a) Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, although such testimony was not
objected to during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition
under DMS Rule.
RULING:
No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the
estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. The
purpose of DMS Rule is that “if persons having a claim
against the estate of the deceased or his properties were
allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by
him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely
impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no
longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their
properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.”
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates
in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or
its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate
of the deceased person. In the instant case, the testimony
excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian,
(the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the
defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the
1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by
the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to
pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by
the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by
the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the
testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of
theDOCTRINE:
rule.
The Dead Man’s Statute provides that if one party to the
alleged transaction
Sunga-Chan is precluded from testifying by
vs. Chua, 363SCRA
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account
of the transaction. But before this rule can be
successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person or a person of
unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against
person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which
occurred
EVIDENCE before
| TH the death
5:30-9:30 | JudgeofByron
such San
deceased
Pedro person or
before
Arellano such person
University became
School of unsound
of Law, mind
First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
FACTS:
Lamberto T. Chua verbally entered into a partnership with
Jacinto L. Sunga in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the
business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS
APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name
of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly
delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to
Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his
counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits
would be equally divided between them.
Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving
wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter,
petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control,
custody, disposition and management of Shellite without
respondent's consent. The trial court and the ca ruled in
favor of the respondent. Both court held that partnership
existed between Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga until the
latter’s death.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership
existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until
Jacintos death. In the absence of any written document to
show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from
hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness,
Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after
Jacintos death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke
the Dead Man’s Statute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Josephine’s testimony is covered by the dead
man’s statute.
RULING:
No. The Dead Man’s Statute provides that if one party to the
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is
not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the
introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound
mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against person
of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred
before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind.
 the various relationships therein have ceased to
Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans exist.
Statute to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim] against  Who may assert the privilege
respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with The holder of the privilege, authorized persons and
the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves persons to whom privileged communication were
effectively removed this case from the ambit of the Dead made may assert the privilege
Mans Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estate HUSBAND AND WIFE [SEC. 24(A), RULE 130]
that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of  Marital privilege
the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.] Moreover, as Requisites for the application of marital privilege
defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring - There must be a valid marriage between the
before the death of the deceased, said action not having husband and wife;
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of - There is a communication received in
the deceased. confidence by one from the other;
- The confidential communication was received
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the during the marriage; and
Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she is not a - The spouse against whom such evidence is
party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose being offered has not given his or her consent to
behalf a case is prosecuted.Records show that respondent such testimony.
offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence
of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto.
 Cases when marital privilege is NOT
Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
applicable
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which
1. In a civil case by one against the other;
has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before
any cause of action has arisen. Plainly then, Josephine is
2. In a criminal case for a crime committed by
merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
one against the other or the latter’s direct
plaintiff.
descendants or ascendants or
We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that
3. Information acquired by a spouse before
Josephines testimony lacks probative value because she was
the marriage even if received confidentially
allegedly coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to
will not fall squarely within the privilege
testify in his favor. Josephine merely declared in court that
she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she
Disqualification By Disqualificati n By Reason
were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We
Reason of Marriage of Marital Privilege
fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission
(Sec. 22) [Sec. 24(a)]
that Josephines testimony is involuntary when she did not in
any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness
Who may invoke
of respondent. Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of
the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her Can be invoked only if Can be claimed whether the
testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not one of the spouses is a other spouse is a party to
affect the credibility of witnesses. party to the action the action
Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to
defeat respondents claim cannot prevail over the factual Coverage
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a Includes facts, Only to confidential
partnership was established between respondent and occurrences or information received during
Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the information even the marriage
documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court prior to the marriage
of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as Duration
sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an Applies only if the Can be claimed even after
informal one. marriage is existing at the the marriage has been
time the testimony is dissolved
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED offered
COMMUNICATIONS Limitations
Constitutes a total Applies only to
 Scope of disqualification by reason of prohibition against any confidential
privileged communication testimony for or against communications between
The disqualification by reason of privileged the spouse of the spouses.
communication applies to both civil and criminal the witness
cases except doctor-patient privilege, which is Can no longer be invoked The spouse affected by the
applicable only in civil cases. Unless waived, the once the marriage is disclosure of the information
disqualification under Sec. 24 remains even after dissolved or testimony may object even

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 after the dissolution of the
marriage
NOTE: It is not affected by
the death of the other
spouse.
In both cases, it is essential that they be legally married to
claim such privilege.
Marital Disqualification vs. Marital Privilege
Only partial
disqualification as the A complete and absolute
witness is only prohibited disqualification
from testifying on the
matters therein specified
GR: Applies to a civil or
criminal case
Applies only to a civil case
or special proceeding over XPN: In a civil case by one
the estate of a deceased or spouse against the other, or
insane 7person in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one
spouse against the other or
the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants
It prohibits testimony It prohibits testimony that
that is against the estate is for or against the party-
of a deceased person or spouse
against a person of
unsound mind
 Other items of communication overheard
or in presence of third parties
General Rule: Third persons who, without the
knowledge of the spouses, overhear the
communication are not disqualified to testify.
Exception: When there is collusion and
voluntary disclosure to a third party, that third
party becomes an agent and cannot testify
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT [SEC. 24(B), RULE 130]
 Requisites for the privilege
1. There must be a communication made by the
client to the attorney, or and advice given by
the attorney to his client;
2. The communication or advice must be given in
confidence; and
3. The communication or advice must be given
either in the course of the professional
employment or with a view of professional
employment
Note: The Rules safeguarding privileged communications
between attorney and client shall apply to similar
communications made to or received by the law student,
acting for the legal clinic. The privilege does not extend to
communications where the client’s purpose is the
furtherance of a future intended crime or fraud, or for the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
purpose of committing a crime or a tort, or those made in
furtherance of an illicit activity.
 Purpose of Attorney-Client Relationship
To encourage full disclosure by client to her
attorney of all pertinent matters, so as to
further the administration of justice (Herrera,
1999).
 Test in applying the attorney-client
privilege
The test is whether the communications are
made to an attorney with a view of obtaining
from him professional assistance or advice
regardless of whether there is a pending or
merely impending litigation or any litigation.
Note: The present rules do not require a perfected attorney-
client relationship for the privilege to exist. It is enough that
the communication or advice be “with a view to”
professional employment.
 Confidential communication
It refers to information transmitted by
voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which,
so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given
 Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
The privilege belongs to the client and if he
waives the privilege, no one else including the
attorney can invoke it
 Cases when the privilege is applicable
1. Privilege is not confined to communications
regarding actual pending cases. It may also
refer to anticipated litigations;
2. Communication may be oral or written but it
is deemed to extend to other forms of
conduct, like physical demonstration;
3. The statement of the client need not be made
to the attorney in person. Those made to the
attorney’s secretary, clerk or stenographer for
purpose of the professional relationship, or
those knowledge acquired by such employees
in such capacity; and
4. In an action filed for payment of attorney’s
fees or for damages against the negligence of
the attorney.
 Cases when the privilege is NOT applicable
If the communication is:
1. Intended to be made public;
2. Intended to be communicated to others;
3. Intended for an unlawful purpose;
4. Received from third persons not acting in
behalf or as agents of the client; or
5. Made in the presence of third parties who are
strangers to the attorney-client relationship

 Applicability of the rule regarding the
identity of the client
General Rule: A lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.
Exceptions:
1. Where a strong possibility exists that
revealing the client’s name would implicate
the client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer’s advice;
2. Where disclosure would open the client to
civil liability; or
3. Where the government’s lawyers have no
case against an attorney’s client unless, by
revealing the client’s name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual for a crime
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT [SEC. 24(C), RULE 130]
 Requisites for the applicability of the
privilege
1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. The person against whom the privilege is
claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. Such person acquired the information while
he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
4. The information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity; and
5. The information is confidential and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation of
the patient.
Note: This privilege cannot be claimed in a criminal case
presumably because the interest of the public in criminal
prosecution should be deemed more important than the
secrecy of the communication
Note: The rule does not require that the relation between
the physician and the patient be a result of a contractual
relationship
 Purpose of the privilege
The privilege is intended to facilitate and make
safe, full and confidential disclosure by patient
to doctor of all facts, circumstances, and
symptoms, unrestricted by apprehension of
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end
that the physician may form a correct opinion,
and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat
his patient
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 Information which CANNOT be disclosed
- Any advice given to the client;
- Any treatment given to the client;
- Any information acquired in attending
such patient provided that the advice,
treatment or information was made or
acquired in a professional capacity and was
necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and
- That the information sought to be
disclosed would tend to blacken the
reputation of the patient
 Waiver of Privilege by the patient; Express
or Implied
1. By a contract, as in medical or life
insurance;
2. Disclosure by the patient of the
information;
3. When the patient answers questions on
matters which are supposedly privileged on
cross-examination or
4. By operation of law
 Cases when the privilege is NOT applicable
1. The communication was not given in
confidence;
2. The communication is irrelevant to the
professional employment;
3. The communication was made for an
unlawful purpose;
5. The information was intended to be made
public; or
6. There was a waiver of the privilege either by
provisions of contract or law (Regalado,
2008); and
7. Dentists, pharmacists or nurses are
disqualified.
Note: It is essential that at the time the communication was
made, the professional relationship is existingwhen the
doctor was attending to the patient for curative, preventive
or palliative treatment. The treatment may have been given
at the behest of another, the patient being in extremis
The rule does not require that the relationship between the
physician and the patient be a result of a contractual
relationship. It could be the result of a quasi-contractual
relationship as when the patient is seriously ill and the
physician treats him even if he is not in a condition to give
his consent.
PRIEST AND PENITENT [SEC. 24(D), RULE 130]
 A minister or priest cannot, without the
consent of the person making the confession,
be examined as to any confession made to or
any advice given by him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by
 the church to which the minister or priest
belongs[Sec. 24(d), Rule 130].
 Purpose of the priest-penitent privilege
To allow and encourage individuals to fulfill
their religious, emotional or other needs by
protecting confidential disclosures to religious
practitioners (Peralta, Jr., 2005, citing Evidence,
Oregon State Bar Committee on Continuing
Legal Education).
 Requisites for the applicability of the
priest- penitent privilege
1. The confession must have been made to
the priest in his professional character
according to the discipline of the church to
which the priest or minister belongs and
2. Communications made must be
confidential and must be penitential in
character, e.g., under the seal of the
confessional.
Note: The privilege also extends not only to a confession
made by the penitent but also to any advice given by the
minister or priest.
 Extent of the priest-penitent privilege
The communication must be made pursuant to
confession of sins. Where the penitent
discussed business arrangements with the
priest, the privilege does not apply
 When privilege is NOT applicable
- Where the penitent discussed business
arrangements with the priest, the privilege
does not apply
- A third person who overheard the
confession is not disqualified
 Who holds the privilege
The person making the confession holds the
privilege and the priest or minister hearing the
confession in his professional capacity is
prohibited from making a disclosure of the
confession without the consent.
PUBLIC OFFICERS [SEC. 24 (E), RULE 130]
 Rationale: General grounds of public policy
The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as maybe provided by law.
 Requisites for its application
1. The holder of the privilege is the government,
acting through a public officer;
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
2. The communication was given to the public
officer in official confidence;
3. The communication was given during the term
of office of the public officer or afterwards; and
4. The public interest would suffer by the
disclosure of the communication.
 Cases when the privilege is inapplicable
and disclosure will be compelled
1. The disclosure is useful to vindicate the
innocence of an accused person;
2. To lessen risk of false testimony;
3. The disclosure is essential to the proper
disposition of the case; or
4. The benefit to be gained by a correct disposition
of the litigation was greater than any injury
which could inure to the relation by a disclosure
of information.
Note: The disclosure or non-disclosure is not dependent on
the will of the officer but on the determination by a
competent court. (Riano, 2016)
 Executive privilege
The power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and
the Congress.
There are types of information which the
government may withhold from the public like
secrets involving military, diplomatic, and
national security matters, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused
before the prosecution of the accused were
exempted from the right to information.
FILIAL PRIVILEGE RULE (SEC.25, RULE 130)
 No person may be compelled to testify against
his parents, other direct ascendants, children or
other direct descendants.
Note: It is a privilege which consist of exempting the
witness, having attended the court where his testimony is
desired, from disclosing a certain part of his knowledge.
 Two privileges
1. Parental privilege rule - a parent cannot be
compelled to testify against his child or other
direct decendants.
Note: A person, however, may testify against his parents or
children voluntarily but if he refuses to do so, the rule
protects him from any compulsion. Said rule applies to both
criminal and civil cases since the rule makes no distinction.
2. Filial privilege rule – a child may not be
compelled to testify against his parents, or
other direct decendants.
Note: The filial privilege rule applies only to “direct”
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a
 common ancestry – a stepdaughter has no common ancestry
by her stepmother.
 Criminal Cases
General Rule: No descendant shall be compelled,
in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents.
Exception: The descendant may be compelled to
give his testimony in the following instances:
1. When such testimony is indispensable in a
crime committed against said descendant; or
2. In a crime committed by one parent against the
other.
 Other privileged matters(GEV-STB-CAP)
o The Guardian ad litem shall not testify in any
proceeding concerning any information, statement,
or opinion received from the child in the course of
serving as guardian ad litem, unless the court finds it
necessary to promote the best interests of the child
[Sec. 5(e), Rule on Examination of a Child Witness];
o Editors may not be compelled to disclose the source
of published news (R.A. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477);
o Voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom
they voted;
o Trade secrets;
o Information contained in tax census returns (Ibid.);
o Bank deposits (Sec. 2, R.A. 1405);
o Information and statements made at conciliation
proceedings (Art. 233, Labor Code);
o Institutions covered by the law and its officers and
employees who communicate a suspicious
transaction to the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(Sec. 6 of R.A. 9194 amending Sec. 9 of R.A. 9160);
and
o The prosecutor may not be compelled to present an
informer to protect his identity and when his
testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative.(Herrera, 1999)
Note: On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not
authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter;
that is, books and papers which, because of their
confidential and privileged character, could not be received
in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite
that the items be specifically described, and must constitute
or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or
control.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Chan vs. Chan, 702 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information
while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil
case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any
facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This
rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to
the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment,
and give him access to his body, enabling the physician
to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide
the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be
compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all
that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own
health at great risk.
FACTS:
Josielene filed before the (RTC) a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage to respondent (Johnny), the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the
award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed
that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that
a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital
confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene
who failed in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he
agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got
to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms
while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations
got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for
an unrelated crime and released her only after the case
against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship
could no longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the
Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as
proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit
of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten
 note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, Josielene filed
with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical
records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in
evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical
records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The
RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly denied the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital
records on the ground that these are covered by the
privileged character of the physician-patient
communication.
RULING:
RTC was justified in denying Josielene her request for the
production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and
AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
Lacurom vs.Jacoba, 484 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may
be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to
its presentation or by any conduct that may be
construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to
Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July
2001 motion.
FACTS:
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff
Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for
unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos
("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but
Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case
was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as
pairing judge. Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution
("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments rendered in
favor of Veneracion. Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) dated 30 July
2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"),
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom
inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance"
and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion
on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm. Judge
Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala
and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court
for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating"
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. Judge Lacurom found
Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with
imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000. Velasco-
Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her
way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na
ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due
today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the
pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind
faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted
her whole life and future." This pleading turned out to be
the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not
sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law.
Judge Lacurom issued another order, this time directing
Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt.
Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the
30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements
implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding
Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P500.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA
VELASCO-JACOBA, committed contempt of court
RULING:
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name
does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the
inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to
him as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his
Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a
denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly
admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he
"trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived
and believed to be gigantic and monumental."
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more
plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was
immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which
was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from
the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been
counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836,
supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she had not
"actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No.
2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the
petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge
against him. This petition for certiorari anchors some of its
arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact,
Jacoba’s handiwork.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be
waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as
implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly
admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Court SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of
law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision.
WeDOCTRINE:
also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the
Canonof21law
practice of for
thetwoCode of Professional
(2) months effective Responsibility
upon finality of
this Decision. STERNLY WARN shall
which states that “a lawyer preserve that
respondents the a
confidences and secrets of his client even
repetition of the same or similar infraction shall meritafter the a
attorney-client relation
more severe sanction. is terminated.” The reason for
the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and
client, which is onevs.ofValencia,
Samala trust and 512confidence
SCRA of the
highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the
facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his
client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care.
.

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant)
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for
Disbarment. One of the following grounds being that the
respondent served on two separate occasions as counsel for
contending parties;
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City,
entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for
nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the
counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the
tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing
an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. One of the
tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. The stern rule against
representation of conflicting interests is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from
the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as
well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an
attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his
client. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the
case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated. The bare
attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an
attorney from accepting professional employment from the
client's adversary either in the same case or in a different but
related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client when the subject
matter of the present controversy is related, directly or
indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client.
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship
with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of
not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-
6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing.
Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an
attorney from representing a new client whose interest is
adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original
client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication
that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez
and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that
the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has
long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client
is required.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by representing contending
parties.
RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano
D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons
21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
At common law a governmental privilege against
disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters.
This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending
the individual interests of a private citizen, even though,
as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce
his legal rights.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by
respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio
Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record
custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents
relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of
EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of
the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's
Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena
duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection
with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that
funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to
have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a
concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such documents are privileged matter.
RULING:
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed,
EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding “illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
 limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, affidavit shall take the place of direct
dollar salting.” Consequently, while in cases which involve testimonies of witnesses.(Sec. 2, Judicial
state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the Affidavit Rule); and
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters o If the witness is incapacitated to speak; and
without compelling production, no similar excuse can be
made for a privilege resting on other considerations. o The question calls for a different mode of
answer.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation
which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293,
which petitioners invoke to support their contention that
there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds,
provides that the “only item of expenditure which should be
treated strictly confidential” is that which refers to the
“purchase of information and payment of rewards.”

The Court ruled that the petition is DISMISSED, but it is Oath vs. Affirmation
directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be
made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all An Oath is an outward
the safeguards outlined in this decision. pledge made under an An affirmation is a
immediate sense of substitute for an oath and
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS responsibility to God or a is solemn and formal
solemn appeal to the declaration that the
 General Rule: The examination of witnesses Supreme Being in witness will tell the truth.
presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open attestation of the truth of
court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the some statement
witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question
calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of NOTE: The object of the
the witness shall be given orally. rule is to affect the
conscience of the witness
 RATIO: Open court examination allows the court to compel him to speak
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the the truth, and to lay him
witness and allows the adverse party to cross- open to punishment for
examine the witness perjury if he testifies
falsely.
 Exceptions: The testimony of the witness may not
be given in open court in the following cases: Note: The option to take either an oath or affirmation is
given to the witness and not to the court.
o In civil cases, by depositions pursuant to and
under the limitations of Rules 23 and 24
(Regalado, 2008);  Waiver of the right to have the witness sworn
The right may be waived. If a party admits proof to
o In criminal cases, by depositions or conditional be taken in a case without an oath, after the
examinations, pursuant to Secs. 12-15, Rule 119, testimony has been acted upon by the court, and
and Sec. 1, Rule 123, or by the records of the made the basis of a judgment, such party can no
preliminary investigation, under the longer object to the admissibility of the testimony.
circumstances of Sec. 1(f) of Rule 115 (Regalado, He will be deemed to have waived the objection.
2008);
 Matters to be recorded during trial
o In criminal cases covered by the Rule on The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing,
Summary Procedure, the affidavits of the parties including:
shall constitute the direct testimonies of the
witnesses who executed the same (Riano, 2016, 1. Questions propounded to a witness and his
citing Sec. 15, Rule on Summary Procedure); answers thereto; and
2. The statements made by the judge or any of the
o In civil cases covered by the Rules on Summary parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to
Procedure, the parties are merely required to the case.
submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other pieces of evidence on the factual issues, Note: These shall be recorded by means of shorthand or
together with their position papers, setting forth stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by
the law and the facts relied upon (Riano, 2016, the court
citing Sec. 9, Rule on Summary Procedure);
 Exclusion and separation of witnesses
o Under the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the judicial

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 General Rule: The judge may exclude from the
court any witness not at the time under
examination, so that he may not hear the testimony
of other witnesses. The judge may also cause
witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented
from conversing with one another until all shall
have been examined.
Exceptions:
1. An accused in a criminal case as it is his
constitutional right to be present at all stages
of the proceedings;
2. Parties to the litigation will generally not be
excluded, their presence usually being
necessary to a proper management of the case;
3. Party in interest though not a party to the
record and an agent of such party, if the
presence of such agent is necessary;
4. Officers and complaining witnesses are
customarily excepted from the rule unless the
circumstances warrant otherwise; and
5. Expert witnesses are not excluded until
production of evidence bearing upon the
question or subject as to which they have been
called or unless liable to be influenced by the
testimony of the other witnesses.
 Recantation of a witness
Courts must not automatically exclude the original
statement based solely on the recantation. It should
determine which statement should be given
credence through a comparison of the original and
the new statements, applying the general rules of
evidence.
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS
(A.M. No. 00-4-08-SC)
 Who is a child witness
1. Any person who at the time of giving testimony
is below the age of 18 years old;
2. Or a person over 18 years of age, if he/she is
found by the court as unable to fully take care of
himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of physical or mental disability or condition.
It shall govern the examination of a child witness in all
criminal and non-criminal proceedings of a child who is:
1. Victims;
2. Accused; and
3. Witnesses to a crime.
 Presumption of competency
General Rule: Every child is presumed qualified to
be a witness. The burden of proof to rebut such
presumption lies in the party challenging his
competence.
Exception: When the court finds that substantial
doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
the truth in court, the judge shall conduct a
competency examination of a child.
 Live-link TV testimony
The court may order by an application may be made
by the prosecutor, counsel or guardian ad litem for
the testimony of the child to be taken in a room
outside the courtroom and be televised to the
courtroom by live-link television, if there is a
likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from
testifying in the presence of the accused, his
counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be.
The kind of trauma is contemplated on is trauma
that would impair the completeness or truthfulness
of the testimony of the child.
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
(A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
 Scope and Where Applicable
1. This Rule shall apply to all actions,
proceedings, and incidents requiring the
reception of evidence before:
2. The MeTC, MTC in Cities, MTC, and the
MCTC, and the Shari‘a Circuit courts;
3. The RTC and the Shari‘a District Courts;
4. The Sandiganbayan, CTA, CA and the Shari‘a
Appellate Courts;
5. The investigating officers and bodies
authorized by the Supreme Court to receive
evidence, including the IBP; and
6. The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies,
whose rules of procedure are subject to
disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar as
their existing rules of procedure contravene the
provisions of this Rule.
Note: In civil cases (with the exception of small claims), the
application of the JAR is mandatory regardless of the
amount of money claimed.
 Effect of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR) in
the Philippine judicial system
It signals a dramatic shift from a dominantly
adversarial system to a mix adversarial and
inquisitorial system.
 Purpose of JAR
To decongest the courts of cases and to reduce
delays in the disposition of cases.
 Significance of the use of a judicial
affidavit
The judicial affidavit shall take the place of
direct testimonies of witnesses.
 Notable changes by the JAR
1. Testimonies are now allowed to be taken
and kept in the dialect of the place
provided they are subsequently translated
into English or Filipino. These will be
quoted in pleadings in their original
 version with the English or Filipino
translation in parenthesis provided by the
party, subject to counter translation by
opposing side.
2. In civil actions, the judicial affidavit rule
requires the parties to lay their cards on
the table before pre-trial by submitting the
judicial affidavits and documents of the
parties and their witnesses and serving
copies on the adverse party at least 5 days
before the pre-trial. No further
stipulations of facts are needed at the pre-
trial since, by comparing the judicial
affidavits of the opposing sides, the court
will already see what matters they agree
and on what matters they dispute.
3. The court will already take active part in
examining the witnesses. The judge will no
longer be limited to asking clarificatory
questions; he can also ask questions that
will determine the credibility of the
witness, ascertain the truth of his
testimony and elicit the answers that the
judge needs for resolving issues.
 Requirements of the JAR which the parties
are bound to follow
The parties shall file with the court and serve
on the adverse party, personally or by licensed
courier service, not later than 5 days before
pre-trial or preliminary conference or the
scheduled hearing with respect to motions and
incidents, the following:
1. The judicial affidavits of their
witnesses, which shall take the place
of such witnesses' direct testimonies;
and
2. The parties' documentary or object
evidence, if any, which shall be
attached to the judicial affidavits and
marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on
in the case of the complainant or the
plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so
on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.
 Attachment of the original document as
documentary evidence
A party or a witness may keep the original
document or object evidence in his possession
after the same has been identified, marked as
exhibit, and authenticated, but he must
warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or
reproduction attached to such affidavit is a
faithful copy or reproduction of that original.
In addition, the party or witness shall bring the
original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference
with the attached copy, reproduction, or
pictures, failing which the latter shall not be
admitted.(Ibid.)
 Contents of a Judicial Affidavit (2016 Bar)
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in a
language known to the witness and, if not in
English or Filipino, accompanied by a
translation in English or Filipino, and shall
contain the following:
1. The name, age, residence or business address,
and occupation of the witness;
2. The name and address of the lawyer who
conducts or supervises the examination of the
witness and the place where the examination is
being held;
3. A statement that the witness is answering the
questions asked of him, fully conscious that he
does so under oath, and that he may face
criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;
4. Questions asked of the witness and his
corresponding answers, consecutively
numbered, that:
- Show the circumstances under which the
witness acquired the facts upon which he
testifies;
- Elicit from him those facts which are
relevant to the issues that the case presents;
and
- Identify the attached documentary and
object evidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the Rules of
Court;
5. The signature of the witness over his printed
name;
6. A jurat with the signature of the notary public
who administers the oath or an officer who is
authorized by law to administer the same.(Sec.
3, JAR); and
7. A sworn attestation by the lawyer who
conducted or supervised the examination of the
witness attesting to the following:
- He faithfully recorded or caused to be
recorded the questions he asked and the
corresponding answers that the witness
gave; and
- Neither he nor any other person present or
assisting him coached the witness regarding
the latter's answers.
 Effect of non-compliance with the
content and attestation requirements
The judicial affidavit shall not be admitted
by the court in evidence.[Sec. 10 (c), JAR]
Note: The above provision, however, does not absolutely bar
the submission of a complaint replacement judicial affidavit
as long as the replacement shall be submitted before the
hearing or trial and provided further that the following
requisites are met:
1. The submission shall be allowed only once;
2. The delay is for a valid cause;
3. The delay would not unduly prejudice the opposing
party; and
4. The public or private counsel responsible for the
preparation and submission of the affidavit pays a
 fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 nor more than
₱5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
 Subpoena
The requesting party may avail himself of the
issuance of a subpoenaad testificandum or duces
tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court if the
(a) government official or employee, or the (b)
requested witness, who is neither the witness of
the adverse party nor a hostile witness:
1. Unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit;
2. Refuses without just cause to make the relevant
books, documents, or other things under his
control available for copying, authentication, and
eventual production in court.
 Submission by the prosecution of the
judicial affidavit
The prosecution shall submit the judicial
affidavits of its witnesses not later than five
days before the pre-trial, serving copies of
the same upon the accused. The
complainant or public prosecutor shall
attach to the affidavits such documentary or
object evidence as he may have, marking
them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No
further judicial affidavit, documentary, or
object evidence shall be admitted at the
trial.
 Trial
After submitting to the court and serving
the adverse party a copy of the judicial
affidavits, trial shall commence as follows:
1. The party presenting the judicial affidavit of his
witness in place of direct testimony shall state the
purpose of such testimony at the start of the
presentation of the witness (Sec. 6, JAR);
2. The adverse party may move to disqualify the
witness or to strike out his affidavit or any of the
answers found in it on ground of inadmissibility;
Note: The court shall promptly rule on the motion and, if
granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by
placing it in brackets under the initials of an authorized
court personnel, without prejudice to the tender of excluded
evidence under Sec. 40, Rule 132.
3. The adverse party shall have the right to cross-
examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and on
the exhibits attached to the same (Sec. 7, JAR);
4. The party who presents the witness may examine
him on re-direct;
Note: In every case, the court shall take active part in
examining the witness to determine his credibility as well as
the truth of his testimony and to elicit the answers that it
needs for resolving the issues.
5. Upon the termination of the testimony of his last
witness, a party shall immediately make an oral
offer of documentary evidence, piece by piece, in
their chronological order, stating the purpose or
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
purposes for which he offers the particular exhibit
(Sec. 8, JAR);
6. .After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse
party shall state the legal ground for his objection,
if any, to its admission, and the court shall
immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
Note: Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of
the judicial affidavits that describe and authenticate them, it
is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their
markings during the offers, the objections, and the rulings,
dispensing with the description of each exhibit.
 Application to Criminal Actions
The judicial affidavit rule shall apply to all
criminal actions:
1. Where the maximum of the imposable penalty
does not exceed six years;
2. Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial
affidavits, irrespective of the penalty involved; or
3. With respect to the civil aspect of the actions,
whatever the penalties involved are.(Sec. 9, JAR)
 Effect of Non-Compliance
General Rule: A party who fails to submit
the required judicial affidavits and exhibits
on time shall be deemed to have waived
their submission.
Exception: The court may, however, allow
only once the late submission of the same
provided, the delay is for a valid reason,
would not unduly prejudice the opposing
party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of
not less than ₱1,000.00 nor more than
₱5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
 Appearance of the witness at the
scheduled hearing
The submission of the judicial affidavit of
the witness does not exempt such witness
from appearing at the scheduled hearing.
His appearance is necessary as the adverse
party has the right to cross-examine him on
his judicial affidavit and the attached
exhibits.
Note: The court shall not consider the affidavit of any
witness who does not appear in the scheduled hearing of the
case as required. As for the counsel, his failure to appear
without a valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to have
waived his client’s right to confront by cross-examination,
the witnesses present.
 Effects on Other Rules
As to Rules of Court and Rules of Procedure
governing investigating officers and bodies
authorized by the Supreme Court to receive
evidence
 They are repealed or modified insofar as
they are inconsistent with the provisions of
the Judicial Affidavit Rule.(Sec. 11, JAR)
 Rights and Obligations of a Witness
1. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or
insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;
2. Not to be detained longer than the interests of
justice require;
3. Not to be examined except only as to matters
pertinent to the issue;
4. Not to give an answer which will tend to subject
him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise
provided by law (right against self-
incrimination);
Note: This refers to immunity statutes wherein the witness
is granted immunity from criminal prosecution for offenses
admitted in his testimony, e.g. under Sec. 8, R.A. 1379, the
law providing for the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
property; and under P.D. 749, in prosecutions for bribery and
graft.(Regalado, 2008)
5. Not to give an answer, which will tend to
degrade his reputation, unless it be to the very
fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in
issue would be presumed. But a witness must
answer to the fact of his previous final
conviction for an offense.(Sec. 3, Rule 132)
 Obligation of a witness in open court
General Rule: A witness must answer
questions, although his answer may tend to
establish a claim against him
Exceptions: A witness may validly refuse to
answer under the following: Right against
self-degradation – If his answer will have a
direct tendency to degrade his character.
Exception to the Exception: A witness
may not invoke the right against self-
degradation if:
a. Such question is directed to the very
fact at issue or to a fact from which the
fact at issue would be presumed; or
b. If it refers to his previous final
conviction for an offense
Note: A witness invited by the Senate who refused to testify
and arrested for contempt, cannot invoke the right against
self- incrimination in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The said right may be invoked only when the
incriminating question is being asked, since he has no way
of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions
to be asked of him. That this right may possibly be violated
or abused is no ground for denying the Senate Committees
their power of inquiry.
 Refusal of a witness to take the witness
stand
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
General Rule: A witness may not refuse to
take the witness stand.
Exceptions:
- An accused in a criminal case; or
- A party who is not an accused in a
criminal case is allowed not to take
the witness stand in administrative
cases/proceedings that partook of
the nature of a criminal proceeding
or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. As long as the suit is
criminal in nature, the party
thereto can altogether decline to
take the witness stand. It is not the
character of the suit involved but
the nature of the proceedings that
controls
 Right against self-incrimination not
available under the Witness Protection
Program
Any witness admitted into the program of
the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act cannot refuse to testify or give
evidence or produce books, documents,
records or writings necessary for the
prosecution of the offense or offenses for
which he has been admitted into the
Program on the ground of the
constitutional right against self-
incrimination but he shall enjoy immunity
from criminal prosecution and cannot be
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for
any transaction, matter or thing concerning
his compelled testimony or books,
documents, records and writings produced.
(Sec. 14, R.A. 6981)
 Persons eligible to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit
Program
Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the
commission of a crime and has testified or
is testifying or about to testify before any
judicial or quasi- judicial body, or before
any investigating authority may be
admitted provided that:
o The offense in which his testimony will
be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code, or its
equivalent under special laws;
o His testimony can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
o He or any member of his family within
the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to
threats to life or bodily injury or there is
a likelihood that he will be killed,
 forced, intimidated, harassed or
corrupted to prevent him from
testifying, or to testify falsely, or
evasively, because or on account of his
testimony; and
o He is not a law enforcement officer,
even if he would be testifying against
the other law enforcement officers. In
such a case, only the immediate
members of his family may avail
themselves of the protection provided
for under the Act. (Sec. 3, R.A. 6981)
3.c. Admissions
 Admission
Any statement of fact made by a party against his
interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which
he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged
by him.
Do not require proof and Regarded as evidence and
may be contradicted only by must be offered as such,
showing that it was made otherwise the court will
through palpable mistake or not consider it in deciding
that no such admission was the case.
made.
Judicial admissions need not Requires formal offer for it
be offered in evidence since to be considered
it is not evidence. It is
superior to evidence and
shall be considered by the
court as established.
Conclusive upon the person Rebuttable
admitting
Admissible even if self- Not admissible if self-
serving serving
Subject to cross- Not subject to cross-
examination examination
Offer of Compromise as Admission of Liability
Civil Case Criminal Case

 Express Admissions It is NOT an admission of GR: It may be received in

Those made in definite, certain and unequivocal any liability and is NOT evidence as an implied
language. admissible against the admission of guilt.(Ibid.)
offeror. (Sec. 27, Rule 130)
 Implied Admissions XPNs:
Those which may be inferred from the acts, In quasi-offenses where
declarations or omission of a party. Therefore, an there is no criminal intent
admission may be implied from conduct, statement (negligence), such as
of silence of a party. reckless imprudence;

 Requisites for admissions to be admissible In criminal cases allowed

by law to be compromised
1. They must involve matters of fact and not of law; such as:
2. They must be categorical and definite;
3. They must be knowingly and voluntarily made; and NIRC (Sec. 7c) – The CIR
4. They must be adverse to the admitter’s interests, has the power to
otherwise it would be self- serving and compromise minor
inadmissible. criminal violations as may
be determined by the
Admissions vs. Confessions Secretary of Finance;

Admission Confession LGC (Sec. 408) – Allowed

A statement of fact which A statement of fact which in minor offenses whose
does not involve an involves an penalties do not exceed
acknowledgment of guilt or acknowledgment of guilt or one year;
liability liability
May be made by third Can be made only by the RPC (Art. 266-C) – In
persons and in certain cases, party himself and, in some cases of marital rape,
are admissible against a instances, are admissible where subsequent
party against his co-accused forgiveness by the wife
Applies to both criminal and Applies only to extinguishes the criminal
civil cases criminal cases action or penalty. (Suarez
May be express or tacit Must be express and De la Banda, 2006)

Judicial Admission vs. Extrajudicial Admission

Those made in the course of
the proceeding in the same
case
Admissibility of Plea or Offer
Those made out of court or
in a judicial proceeding Offer of plea Admissibility
other than the one under
consideration Plea of guilty later Not admissible in evidence
withdrawn by the accused against the accused who
made the plea

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 Offer by the accused to Not admissible in evidence
plead guilty to a lesser against the accused who
offense but unaccepted by made the offer
prosecution
Offer to pay or payment of Not admissible in evidence
medical, hospital or other as proof of civil or criminal
expenses occasioned by liability for the injury
injury (Good Samaritan
Rule)
 Good Samaritan Rule
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital
and other expenses occasioned by an injury is not
admissible in evidence as proof of civil and criminal
liability for the injury.
RATIO: Humanitarian acts or charitable responses should
be encouraged and rewarded instead of being discouraged or
penalized.
 Unaccepted offer
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money
or todeliver a written instrument or specific
personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of
the money, instrument, or property.(
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
 Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet
This principle literally means “things done between
strangers ought not to injure those who are not
parties to them.”
 Reason for the rule on res inter alios acta
On principle of good faith and mutual convenience,
a man’s own acts are binding upon himself and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. It would not only be rightly
inconvenient but also manifestly unjust, that a man
should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by
the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.
 Two branches of res inter alios acta rule
1. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another ;and
2. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
did not do the same or similar thing at another
time.
 Exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule (first
branch)
1. Admission by a co-partner or agent (Sec. 29,
Rule 130);
2. Admission by a co-conspirator (Sec. 30, Rule
130); and
3. Admission by privies (Sec. 31, Rule 130)
Note: The rule has reference to extrajudicial declarations.
Hence, statements made in open court by a witness
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
implicating persons aside from him are admissible as
declarations from one who has personal knowledge of the
facts testified to.
The testimony of the accused against his co- accused in open
court is considered as admissible testimony and not subject
of the res inter alios acta rule since such testimony is subject
to cross examination.
ADMISSION BY A PARTY
 The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
(Sec. 26, Rule 130)
 Requisites for the admissibility of an
admission
1. The act, declaration or omission must have been
made by a party or by one by whom he is legally
bound;
2. The admission must be as to a relevant fact; and
3. The admission may only be given in evidence
against him.
 Self-serving declaration
It is one which has been made extra-judicially by
the party to favor his interest. It is not admissible in
evidence because they are inherently
untrustworthy, and would open the door to fraud
and fabrication of testimony.
ADMISSION BY A THIRD PARTY
 Admissions that is receivable in evidence against
the party who has expressly referred another to him
for information in regard to an uncertain or
disputed matter. But such a reference does not
make a person referred to an agent for the purpose
of making general admissions. The declarations are
not evidence, unless strictly within the subject
matter relation to which reference is made. When
the reference was not made to any particular person
but in general, the rule above-stated is not
applicable.
ADMISSION BY A CO-PARTNER OR AGENT
 Requisites:
1) The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
party must be within the scope of his authority;
2) During the existence of the partnership or agency;
and
3) After the partnership or agency is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration (Sec.
29).
ADMISSION BY A CO-CONSPIRATOR
 Requisites:
1) The declaration or act be made or done during the
existence of the conspiracy;
 2) The declaration or act must relate to the conspiracy;
and
3) The conspiracy must be shown by evidence other
than the declaration or act (evidence aliunde) (Sec.
30)
ADMISSION BY PRIVIES
 Requisites:
1) There must be privity between the party and the
declarant;
2) The declarant as predecessor-in-interest made the
declaration while holding the title to the property;
and
3) The admission relates to the property (Sec. 31).
ADMISSION BY SILENCE
 There is admission by silence when a party does or
says nothing when he hears or observes an act or
declaration made in his presence when such act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible
for him to do so. Such may be given in evidence
against him. (Sec. 32, Rule 130)
 Requisites:
1) He must have heard or observed the act or
declaration of the other person;
2) He must have had the opportunity to deny it;
3) He must have understood the statement;
4) He must have an interest to object, such that he
would naturally have done so, if the statement
was not true;
5) The facts were within his knowledge; and
6) The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn
from his silence is material to the issue (Sec. 32,
Rule 130; People v. Paragsa, G.R. No. L-44060,
July 20, 1978).
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino Jr.,
706 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party
making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases
is one of the instances of judicial admissions
FACTS:
In this case, there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial
settlement involving estate properties of Pedro Constantino,
Sr., i.e., one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm and another in
1992 involving the 240 sqm. The separate Deeds came into
being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both
to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the entire
estate of Pedro Sr.
Respondent, who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. from Pedro
Jr., filed a complaint seeking to annul the 1992 extrajudicial
settlement involving the 240sqm lot on the ground that
they, who are also heirs of Pedro Sr., were excluded thereto.
On the other hand, Petitioners alleged that the respondents
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
have no cause of action against them considering that the
respondents’ already have their lawful share over the estate
of Pedro Sr. by virtue of the 1968 Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver. During the pre-trial, respondents
admitted that they executed the 1968 Deed to partition the
192 sqm which is the share of their predecessor Pedro Jr., in
Pedro Sr.’s Estate.
RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and
defendants in pari delicto. On appeal, CA rule in favor of
respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed covering the
192 sq m lot which actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not
part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Hence, heirs of Pedro Jr.
(herein respondent), did not adjudicate the 192 sqm lot unto
themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr.
Petitioners now assails the erroneous disregard by the CA of
stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference.
ISSUE:
Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are
binding upon the parties.
RULING:
The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are
legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-
trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of
judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the
contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the
issues to be tried. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot
later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.
However, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of
judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is
shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was
in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict
an admission by denying that he made such an admission.
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier
admission/stipulation before and during the trial.
Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 812 SCRA 537
DOCTRINE:
Probable cause simply means "such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and
positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a
finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice."
FACTS:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their
respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public
funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance
Fund of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total
amount of P517,000,000.00.
The charges are contained in two complaints, namely:
 1. A complaint for plunder filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod
2. A complaint for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 filed by the Fieled Investigation Office.
(a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, for authorizing the illegal utilization, diversion,
and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his
endorsement of fraudulent Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles
JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation in relation to "ghost"
PDAF-funded projects and for receiving significant portions
of the diverted PDAF funds as his commission or "kickback;
(b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times
material to this case, for processing the utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF and for
personally receiving his own "commission" or "kickback"
from the diverted funds;
(c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for
facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: 1. the
commencement via "business propositions" with the
legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; 2. the creation and
operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for
"ghost" PDAF-funded projects; 3.the use of spurious receipts
and liquidation documents to make it appear that the
projects were implemented by her NGOs; 4. the falsification
and machinations used in securing funds from the various
implementing agencies and in liquidating disbursements;
and (5) the remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for
misappropriation;
(d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for
assisting in the fraudulent processing and releasing of the
PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs cralawred through,
among others, their designation as Presidents/Incorporators
of JLN-controlled NGOs, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa
Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. and Ginintuang Alay sa
Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. respectively, and for eventually
remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles's control;and
(e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et
al.), as employees of the Department of Budget and
Management, for participating in the misuse or diversion of
Sen. Revilla's PDAF, by acting as contacts of Napoles within
the DBM, and thereby, assisting in the release of the Special
Allotment Release Orders and Notices of Cash Allocation
covering Sen. Revilla's PDAF.
As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles
meeting with a legislator - in this case, Sen. Revilla - with
the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in
exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a
certain percentage of the PDAF.
The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of
Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed through a complex scheme
involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the
DBM, the IAs, and the JLN-controlled NGOs. The
Ombudsman then went on to conclude that through the
said scheme, they were able to siphon out government
funds. Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause
exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and
Lim for Plunder.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
ISSUE:
Whether or not the findings of probable cause against all
petitioners should be upheld.
RULING:
It should be borne in mind that probable cause is
determined during the context of a preliminary
investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it." It "is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution's evidence. Therefore, the validity and merits of
a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
Accordingly, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings. This Court has
ruled that "probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay," and that even an invocation of the rule on res
inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper.
In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to
Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding probable cause
against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported
by the evidence on record and no semblance of
misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court
cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar
testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings;
otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms
followed during preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence
teaches us that in dealing with probable cause at the very
name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly
correlative to what must be proved." Overall, based on the
foregoing disquisitions, the standard of probable cause was
adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such,
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayanin the proceedings a
quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the
crimes they were charged.
3.d. Confessions
 Definition of Confession
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.
Rule 133, section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not
sufficient ground for conviction. — an extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Rule: The declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him

 Effect of Judicial and Extrajudicial Confession
of Guilt
Rule: While a judicial confession may sustain a
conviction, an extrajudicial confession alone is not
sufficient for conviction, to sustain a conviction, it
must be:
1.Corroborated Evidence of the Corpus Delicti
 Corpus delicti is the ‘body of the crime’ or the
offense. Strictly speaking, it means the actual
commission of the Crime and someone criminally
responsible therefor. It is the substance of the
crime; the fact that a crime has actually been
committed
 Two elements:
1. Proof of the occurrence of a certain eventfor
example, that a man has died or a building has been
burned
2. Some person’s criminal responsibility for the act
 Corpus delicti, and all the elements thereof, may be
proved by circumstantial evidence but such proof
must be convincing and compatible with the nature
of the case
 While an extrajudicial confession will not be
sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, a judicial confession will
support conviction without proof of corpus delicti
independent of the judicial confession
2.Competent (made in accordance with the rules on
custodial investigation and other pertinent Laws)
 The rule on extrajudicial confession in the rules of
court must be considered together with applicable
Constitutional and substantive laws which must be
complied with for the confession to be admissible.
 Any extrajudicial confession made by a person
arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter’s absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of
the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse,
the municipal mayor,the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by him; otherwise,such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding (sec. 2(d) of r.a. 7438: act defining
certain rights of persons, arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation)
 Constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to spontaneous
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
statements, not elicited through questioning by
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused orally admitted having
committed the crime. Hence, such confession is
admissible in evidence against him, even when he
did so with- out the assistance of counsel
 Custodial investigation has been described as one
which involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. It is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that
lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
that the rule begins to operate (aquino v.Paiste)
Admission by Silence
 Section 32. Admission by silence. — an act or
declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
and when proper and possible for him to do so, may
be given in evidence against him. (23a)
 Elements
1. He heard and understood the statement
2. He was at liberty to make a denial
3. The statement was about a matter affecting his
rights or in which he was interested and which
naturally calls for a response
4. The facts were within his knowledge; and
5. The fact admitted from his silence is material to the
issue
Admission by silence has been traditionally
received, even in common law, as admissible
evidence.
The usual pattern for its admissibility involves a
statement by a person in the presence of a party to
the action, criminal or civil.The statement
contains assertions against the party which, if
untrue, would be sufficient cause for the party to
deny. His failure to speak against the statement is
admissible as an admission.
Not every silence is an implied admission. For
instance, the silence of a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense
should not be construed as an admission by silence
because of constitutional reasons
Note: Admission by silence are frowned up, before silence
may be construed as an admission, there must be no other
reasonable explanation why the person would be silent
Example: suppose upon seeing a policeman, a
bystander, in the presence of other people, points to
a man and accuses him as the killer of another man
found dead the night before. The man pointed at
 does not respond. He does not deny the accusation.
His failure to respond may be given in evidence
against him. The idea of the rule on admission by
silence is that if an accusation is made, and a
reasonable person would have denied the same if it
were false, the failure to deny the accusation by the
person accused may be construed as an implied
admission of the truth of the accusation and may
be given in evidence against him.
Offer of Compromise
 Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. —
in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by
the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
1. OFFER OF COMPROMISE IN CIVIL CASES
It is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror
2. OFFER OF COMPROMISE IN CRIMINAL CASES
It may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt
Exceptions: there is no implied admission of guilt if
the offer of compromise is in relation to:
1. Quasi-offenses (criminal negligence); or
2. Cases allowed by law to be compromised
Example: although the marriage of the accused in a
rape case extinguishes the penal action, an offer of
marriage is, generally speaking, an admission of
guilt
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
 Section 27. Offer of compromise not
admissible. — A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or
an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser
offense, is not admissible in evidence against the
accused who made the plea or offer.
Rule: In case the accused withdraws his guilty plea,
that plea of guilty later withdrawn is not admissible
in evidence against the accused who made the plea
The rules of criminal procedure (sec. 2 of rule 116)
allows the accused, at arraignment, to plead guilty
to a lesser offense with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor provided that the lesser
offense is necessarily included in the offense
charged.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
He may also plead guilty to a lesser offense even
after arraignment but before trial, after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty.
If the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is not
accepted, the rule does not provide for an adverse
consequence of the unaccepted plea. On the
contrary, the rule provides that an unaccepted plea
of guilty to a lesser offense is not admissible in
evidence against the accused who made the plea or
offer
Offer to Pay for Expenses
 Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible.
—An offer to pay or the payment of medical,
hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury
is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury.
Rule: An offer to pay or the payment of medical,
hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury
is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury
In other jurisdictions, this act of rendering aid is
sometimes called the “good, samaritan rule.” The
phrase is used to refer to the rendering of voluntary
aid to a suffering person.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE IN GENERAL
 The expression if fully expressed reads: res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet which literally
means that “things done between strangers ought
not to injure those who are not parties to them”
 The res inter alios acta rule has two branches:
1. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another (sec.
28, rule 130)
2. Evidence of previous conduct or similar acts at
one time is not admissible to prove that one did
or did not do the same act at another time (sec.
34, rule 130)
Ladiana vs. People, 393 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any
statement extracted by the police from the accused
without the assistance of competent and independent
counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a
counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused
during the preliminary investigation, even if made
without the assistance of counsel, may be used as
evidence against the affiant.
FACTS:
Josue Ladiana, a member of the Integrated National Police
(now PNP), was charged with murder before the
Sandiganbayan for the death of Fancisco San Juan. During
the trial, Cortez, the prosecutor who conducted the
 preliminary investigation, testified that the accused
executed before him a counter-affidavit admitting the
commission of the crime. Before Cortez was presented as
witness, Defense counsel made an admission as to the
authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution
of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. However, Accused
Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense. The same
counteraffidavit became the basis of SB in convicting the
accused. The court a quo held that his CounterAffidavit, in
which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that
caused the victim’s death, may be used as evidence against
him. On appeal with the SC, petitioner argued that the
counteraffidavit cannot be considered an extrajudicial
confession as the same was executed during custodial
investigation with the assistance of a counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of the commission of an
offense while invoking self-defense in a counter-affidavit
executed during preliminary investigation without the
assistance of a counsel may be admitted as an extrajudicial
confession against him.
RULING:
The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission.
Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows: "SEC. 26.
Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him. "SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him." In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment
of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with
which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by
the accused admitting the commission of the act charged
against him but denying that it was done with criminal
intent is an admission, not a confession. Ladiana admits
shooting the victim, which eventually led to the latter’s
death but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In
fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless,
whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is
admissible in evidence against him as the voluntariness of
the execution thereof was admitted by the defense.
People vs. Ulit, 423 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption
that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully
apparent.
FACTS:
The case at hand is an automatic review of the Decision
dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City finding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape. In
the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two counts
of acts of lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
court sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death,
while for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the appellant
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. The appellant was, likewise,
ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano, the
amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000 for
each count of acts of lasciviousness. Upon the sworn
complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four informations
were filed against her uncle, the appellant. The appellant,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment. Joint trial of all the cases ensued and on
December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged. The trial
court ruled that although Lucelle did not testify on the
contents of her sworn statement the same were admissible
in evidence as part of the res gestae. In view of the trial
courts imposition of the death penalty on the appellant, the
said cases were brought to the Supreme Court on automatic
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement of the accused is admissible as
evidence.
RULING:
Yes. Although counsel did not assist the appellant at the
time he gave his statement to the barangay chairman and
when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence
against him because he was neither under arrest nor under
custodial investigation when he gave his statement. The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where
the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological,
is forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police
authorities, which will include investigations conducted by
the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other
police agencies in our government. The barangay chairman
is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
successfully claimed that the appellant’s statement before
the barangay chairman is inadmissible.
People vs. Sayaboc, 419 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary.
The condition for this presumption, is that the
prosecution is able to show that the constitutional
requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during
custodial investigation have been strictly complied with,
especially when the extrajudicial confession has been
denounced.
FACTS:
On November 9, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, found appellant Benjamin
Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. It
also found appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal
 and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso
guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide. On
December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and the accused attacked, and
assaulted Joseph Galam y Antonio, inflicting upon him
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs. The appellants argued that the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant may not be admitted in evidence
against him because the lawyer from the Public Attorney’s
Office, who was his counsel during the custodial
investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant,
and effective counsel for remaining silent during the entire
proceedings, was not independent, as he was formerly a
judge in the National Police Commission, which was holding
court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
the extrajudicial confession of the accused when it was taken
without the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel not by an effective and vigilant counsel.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Sayaboc’s extrajudicial
confession cannot be used in evidence in this case. Section
12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: ”Sec. 12. (1)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
(2) These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.” Jurisprudence
provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be
voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is
that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional
requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during
custodial investigation have been strictly complied with,
especially when the extrajudicial confession has been
denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any
fear that the person being investigated would succumb to
coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating
environment that is inherent in custodial investigations.
Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been
given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges
against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure
to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial
investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible. Apart from the absence of an express waiver of
his rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to
be informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects
and consequences of any waiver he might make of these
rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who
has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in
Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of
the police officers for two days previous to the investigation,
albeit for another offense.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Tanenggee vs. People, 699 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The proscription against the admissibility of admission
or confession of guilt is applicable only in custodial
interrogation, which means any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant manner.
FACTS:
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations for Estafa
were filed against the petitioner. The RTC then entered a
plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a
plea and the cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions,
appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes and
cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan. Appellant
approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager
of Metrobank Commercio Branch located at New Divisoria
market building, Divisoria, Manila. Appellant affixed, forged
or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and
payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same
to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for
payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria
Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents
were forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained
from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and
misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the
discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was
conducted and an administrative investigation was held in
the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant
signed a written statement in the form of questions and
answers. Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs
Department of Metrobank, testified that he conducted and
interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said
interview, appellant admitted having committed the
allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the
promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured
or personally received by the appellant although it should be
the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that
all the answers of the appellant were contained in a
typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked,
and signed by him (Exhibit "N"). After the joint trial, the
RTC found petitioner guilty of the crimes charged.
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA.
The CA promulgated its Decision affirming with
modification the RTC Decision. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in
evidence of the petitioner’s written statement based on its
finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial
interrogation when the same was taken.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s written
statement is admissible in evidence. The constitutional
proscription against the admissibility of admission or
confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article
III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and
the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation, which
means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed
certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, “(1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to
be informed of the two other rights above.” In the present
case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an
uncounseled written statement regarding an anomaly
discovered in the branch he managed, the following are
clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs
manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither
arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot
be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking
of his written statement as it was given during an
administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in
connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly
committed in the course of his employment. No error can
therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in
evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s
written statement as there is no constitutional impediment
to its admissibility.
Fronteras vs. People, 776 SCRA 152
DOCTRINE:
A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if
voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence of a
high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind
will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be
the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth
and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a
confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness.
FACTS:
The petitioner was the Vault Custodian of the 685 Old
Balara, Tandang Sora, Quezon City branch (Old Balara
branch) of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop (Cebuana). She was
tasked to safe keep all the pawned items and jewelry inside
the branch vault. Likewise employed in the same branch
were Teresita Salazar (Salazar) and Jeannelyn Carpon
(Carpon) who served as Branch Manager and District
Manager, respectively. Salazar was responsible for the overall
operation of the Old Balara branch and was also tasked to
handle the appraisal of pawned items and the recording of
such transactions. Carpon, on the other hand, supervised
the overall operations of the branches within her district
ensuring that they are operating within the objectives,
procedures, and policies of Cebuana; she also monitored the
district bank account and handled the appraisal of pawned
items and the recording of cash. On October 27, 1998, a
surprise audit was conducted at the Old Balara branch by
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Cebuana’s internal auditors, Mila Escartin (Escartin) and
Cynthia Talampas (Talampas). The audit revealed that 156
pieces of jewelry, with an aggregate value of ₱1,250,800.00
were missing. A cash shortage of ₱848.60 was likewise
discovered. When the petitioner was asked to explain the
discrepancy, she told Escartin that she would reduce her
explanation into writing. The next day, an audit report was
sent to Marcelino Finolan (Finolan), Area Manager of
Cebuana. Upon receipt of the audit report on October 28,
1998, Finolan immediately proceeded to the Old Balara
branch to conduct an investigation. He called Escartin and
the petitioner for a meeting during which the petitioner
handed over several pawn tickets while Escartin gave him a
handwritten letter made by the petitioner On May 10, 1999,
an Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC
against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon. Salazar and
Carpon entered a “Not Guilty” plea upon arraignment on
July 13, 1999. The petitioner likewise pleaded “Not Guilty”
during her arraignment on August 9, 1999. Trial thereafter
ensued the RTC found sufficient circumstantial evidence
establishing that the petitioner perpetrated the offense. The
petitioner’s co-accused Salazar and Carpon were acquitted
on the ground of reasonable doubt. The petitioner moved
for reconsideration which the RTC denied but it reduced the
penalty it had earlier imposed to four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. Undeterred, the petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and upheld the
RTC’s findings and conclusions. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but her motion was denied. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a serious error in not finding that
the trial court gravely erred in rendering judgment upon
conjecture and surmises vis-à-vis the absence of
circumstancial evidence.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court stated that intent to gain can be
deduced from the petitioner’s possession of the foregoing
pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the
redemption payment by their respective pledgors. She
submitted them during the spot audit along with a
confession letterstating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00
missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed. The
tenor of the foregoing declaration and the circumstances of
the petitioner at the time she wrote and signed it, all militate
against her bare allegation that she was threatened with an
administrative case unless she admits her transgression. The
petitioner wrote and signed the confession letter
spontaneously. When Escartin asked her if there are any
problems in the Old Balara branch, the petitioner answered
that she will write down her explanation and will submit it
to Escartin. The petitioner also told Talampas that if she will
escape, she will just be afraid that someone will go after her
and that she will just face the consequences. Talampas then
saw the petitioner make and sign the confession letter.
When Finolan went to the Old Balara branch for further
investigation, Escartin handed her the confession letter from
the petitioner. The language of the confession letter was
straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it
was replete with details which could only be known to the
petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an
 administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one’s
liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It
is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a
wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The
petitioner’s declarations to Talampas show that she fully
understood the consequences of her confession. She also
executed the letter even before Finolan came to the Old
Balara branch, thus, negating her claim that the latter
threatened her with an administrative sanction. Under the
law, it is stated that a confession, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will
deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession,
thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present
in this case. The petitioner’s extrajudicial written confession
coupled with the following circumstantial evidence all point
to her as the perpetrator of the unlawful taking.
3.e. Conduct and Character
 Conduct as Evidence
applicable to both civil and criminal cases
General Rule: Evidence that one did or did not do
a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or similar
thing at another time
Exception:
1. INTENT- If it can be established that the
accused had a truthful intent against the crime
charged.
2. KNOWLEDGE- If it can be established that the
accused know where the stolen item is located.
3. IDENTITY – If it can be established that the
previous actions of the accused shows interest
that might compel him in committing the
crime
4. PLAN, DESIGN, OR SCHEME – if it can be
established that he had committed preparatory
crimes in the commission of the crime charged.
5. HABIT OR CUSTOM – if it can be established
that the accused always do acts that is being
charged to him.
-The offering party must allege and prove
specific, repetitive conduct that might
constitute evidence of habit. The examples
offered in evidence to prove habit, or
pattern of evidence must be numerous
enough to base on inference of systematic
conduct.
6. NEGLIGENCE – If it can be established that
damages due to the same negligence was
committed and that such negligent act
continue.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
7. USAGE; and
8. THE LIKE
People vs. Santos, 221 SCRA 715
DOCTRINE:
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor
the veracity of the weight of their testimonies.
FACTS:
That on or about October 22, 1989, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, with intent to kill, and by
means of treachery and with the aid of armed men, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault, and use personal violence upon the person of
VALENTINO A. GUEVARRA by then and there hacking and
stabbing him with jungle bolos and samurais on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said
Valentino A. Guevarra multiple hack and stab wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death. At the
trial, the accused invoked alibi, claiming that when tragedy
struck on October 22, 1989, he was in Balut, Tondo, where
he worked as a plumber, far from the place of the killing. He
admitted, however, that he started work only on October 24,
1989, and returned to their house in Pepin Street, Sampaloc,
Manila on October 29.26 He claimed that prosecution
witness Rodelio Dipana pointed to him because they once
had a quarrel during a drinking spree. After trial, Dionisio
was found guilty of murder and sentenced to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Dionisio appealed to Supreme
Court and cites an inconsistency between the testimonies of
Lucita and the other prosecution witnesses. When asked
what time the incident happened, Lucita mentioned
noontime. The two other witnesses, however, testified that
the incident occurred late in the afternoon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged inconsistencies affect the
credibility of the witnesses no the veracity of the weight of
their testimonies.
RULING:
No. Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity
of the weight of their testimonies. The fact that,
immediately after the hacking, Ernesto del Rosario went to
the victim’s house and informed Lucita of the incident, does
not lead to the conclusion that she was not present at the
scene of the crime. It is entirely possible that a well-meaning
person may inform another of an incident not knowing that
the latter already had prior knowledge of the same. Indeed,
there is no reason why the victim’s mother would fabricate a
story to accuse an innocent person of such grave a crime.
The natural interest of the witness, who is a relative of the
victim in securing the convictions of the guilty would deter
her from implicating a person other than the true culprit. It
is therefore highly unlikely for her to lie as to the identity of
one of her son’s assailants. Moreover, the defense did not
present any evidence of ill motive on the part of the victim’s
mother. In the absence of any evidence tending to question
 her motive and integrity, her testimony should be given fall
credit. The absence of improper or evil motive for a
prosecution witness to make false imputations against the
accused strengthens her credibility.
People vs. Nardo, 353 SCRA 339
DOCTRINE:
Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and
credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
FACTS:
Lorielyn Nardo, the Plaintiff, filed a case of rape against her
father which happened on 24 February 1996 that at 1:30
o’clock in the afternoon, after they had lunch, Vicente
(Plaintiff’s grandfather) left for work. Alfredo (Defendant)
told his sons, Leonel and Louie, to go out. He then ordered
Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his bedroom. When Lorielyn
went inside the bedroom, her father followed her. He
embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her
breasts. Lorielyn pleaded, “Papa, please stop it Have mercy.”
Her father ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and
pushed her to the bed. Lorielyn started to cry, while Alfredo
took off his clothes. Then, he lay on top of her and had
sexual intercourse with her. He kissed her from the neck
down. She tried to free herself but Alfredo took hold of a
knife from a nearby cabinet and pointed it at her right ear.
He threatened to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told
anyone what he did. Alfredo again asked Lorielyn for
another sexual intercourse but Lorielyn went to her aunt,
Carol until she filed the case of rape against her father. In
the trial, after the prosecution and defense presented their
witnesses, Lorielyn was recalled to the witness stand by way
of rebuttal evidence with regard to the allegation on the
unremitted salary. Then on clarificatory questioning,
Lorielyn reiterated that her father, Alfredo, had sexual
intercourse with her. The RTC ordered the Defendant of
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the Plaintiff is
credible.
RULING:
Yes. Jurisprudence provides that courts usually give credence
to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault,
particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because,
normally, no person would be willing to undergo the
humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of
her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. Needless to
say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child
victims are given full weight and credit, since when a
woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. In this case, the defense
endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar.
Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in
order to obtain money or her parents’ permission to leave
the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Court provides that: “Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like.” While lying may constitute a habit, we
believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming
them for the moment to be true, are petty and
inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one’s
own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious
repercussions.
RP vs. Heirs of Alejaga, 393 SCRA 361
DOCTRINE:
A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person—the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad
faith and the former’s statements may then be regarded
as independently relevant without violating the hearsay
rule. The doctrine on independently relevant statements
holds that conversations communicated to a witness by
a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless
of their truth or falsity, they were actually made.
Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a
fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the
existence of such fact.
FACTS:
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor
General instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
Patent and Title and Reversion against respondents, the
PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas
City covering Free Patent Application (VI2) 8442 of the
parcel of land with an area of .3899 hectares more or less
located at Dumolog, Roxas City. The RTC rendered
judgment declaring the approval of Free Patent Application
and issuance of Original Certificate of Title in the name of
Felipa Alejaga is by means of fraud, hence null and void ab
initio. The CA reversed the RTC decision and ruled that
petitioner failed to prove its allegation that respondents had
obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through
fraud and misrepresentation. Further, the CA brushed aside
as hearsay the Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that Land
Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation
on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Isagani Cartegena that
Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an
investigation on the Free Patent Application is not
admissible on the grounds of hearsay
RULING:
No. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person—the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith
and the former’s statements may then be regarded as
independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened
himself to cross-examination, the Investigation Report he
had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands
constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the
report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions
and conclusions are not hearsay. In addition, the doctrine on
independently relevant statements holds that conversations
 communicated to a witness by a third person may be
admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity,
they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant
to the existence of such fact. Since Cartagena’s testimony
was based on the report of the investigation he had
conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence,
properly admitted by the trial court.
Rape Shield
 In prosecution for rape, evidence of complainant’s
past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of his/her
reputation SHALL NOT be admitted UNLESS, and
only to the extent that the court finds, that such
evidence is material and relevant to the case ,
Sexual Abuse Shield Rule
 Evidence is NOT ADMISSIBLE in any criminal
proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
1. Evidence offered to prove that the alleged
victim engaged in other sexual behavior;
and
2. Evidence offered to prove the sexual
predisposition of the alleged victim.
 Exception: Evidence of specific instance of sexual
behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a
person other than the accused was the source of the
semen, injury, or other physical evidence.
Unaccepted Offer
 An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money
or to deliver a written instrument or specific
personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of
the money, instrument, or property.
The effect of tender without consignation is to
exempt the debtor from payment of interest and/or
damages.
Character Evidence
 Character
The possession by a person of certain qualities of
mind and morals, distinguishing him from others.
It is the opinion generally entertained of a person
derived from the common report of the people who
are acquainted with him.
 Good Moral Character
includes all the elements essential to make up such
a character; among these are common honesty and
veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a
character that measures up as good among people
of the community in which the person lives, or that
is up to the standard of the average citizen; that
status which attaches to a man of good behavior
and upright conduct.
 General Rule: Character evidence is not
admissible in evidence.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 Exceptions:
CRIMINAL CASES:
1. Accused may prove his good moral character which
is applicable to the moral trait involved in the
offense charge.
When the accused presents proof of his
good moral character, this strengthens the
presumption of innocence.
2. Prosecution may not prove bad moral character of
the accused unless in rebuttal when the accused
opens the issue by introducing evidence of his good
moral character.
3. Offended Party may prove his good or bad moral
character as long as it tends to establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
 Exception to the Exception
1. Proof of bad character of the victim in a
murder case is not admissible if the crime was
committed through treachery and
premeditation.
2. In prosecution for rape, evidence of
complainant’s past sexual conduct, opinion
thereof or of his/her reputation shall not be
admitted unless, and only to the extent that the
court finds that such evidence is material and
relevant to the case.
CIVIL CASE:
The moral character of either party cannot be
proved unless it is applicable to the issue of
character involved in the case
 Person’s character may be proved by:
1. Evidence of reputation;
2. Witness who know him personally; and
3. In some instances, by evidence of particular
acts of said person from whom his character
may be inferred.
AS TO WITNESS:
The bad moral character of a witness may always be
proved by either party but not evidence of his good
moral character, unless such character has been
impeached.
3.f. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

Patula vs. People, 669 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the
ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant. The testimony may have been given under
oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered
against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC of
Dumaguete City by Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.
(Footlucker’s). At the trial, Karen Guivencan, only other
witness for the Prosecution declared that Go, a former
branch manager of Footlucker, had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had
already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still
reflected outstanding balances for them. She discovered in
the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the
original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50
customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate
copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that
upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written
report denominated as “List of Customers Covered by
Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as
per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997” marked as
Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had
misappropriated the total amount of P131,286.92. In the
course of Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioner’s
counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground
that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who
had made the entries were not themselves presented in
court. With that, petitioner’s counsel did not anymore cross-
examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to
be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove
falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and
receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to
prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion was
inadmissible for being hearsay.
RULING:
Yes.The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of
the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness
is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom
the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is
not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-
examined. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be
denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
administration of justice. In this case, Guivencan’s testimony
as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive,
must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioner’s
misappropriation or conversion, on the ground of hearsay.
DYING DECLARATION
 Section 37. Dying declaration.
The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject
of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death. (31a)
 What are the elements of a dying declaration?
1. That the declaration is one made by a dying
person;
2. That the declaration was made by said dying
person under the consciousness of
impending death;
3. That the declaration refers to the cause and
circumstances surrounding the death of the
declarant and not of anyone else;
4. That the declaration is offered in a case where
the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry;
5. The declarant is competent as a witness had he
survived;
6. The declarant should have died. (Note: must
refer to the death of the declarant, not merely
injuries.) (*If the declarant survives HIS
DECLARATION MAY BE ADMISSIBLE AS
PART OF THE RES GESTAE.)
People vs. Calinawan, 817 SCRA 424
DOCTRINE:
For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the
hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur: (a)
the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b)
that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant
was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or
Parricide where the declarant is the victim.
FACTS:
At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan
(Marigor), Janice’s seven (7)-year-old daughter, saw
Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen. Thereafter,
Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan
Nevado (Jonathan), Janice’s brother and neighbor, was
awakened by shouts coming from his sister’s house. He
rushed to her house and saw her children crying. After
bringing her children to his house, he went looking for
Janice whom he saw outside a neighbor’s house pleading for
help. Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who
stabbed her, and she answered it was Calinawan who did it.
Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When
Darwin Silan, Janice’s husband, arrived at the hospital, he
also asked her who stabbed her and she reiterated that it was
Calinawan. After three (3) days, Janice died in spite of the
medical treatment at the hospital. The RTC convicted
 Calinawan for murder. The trial court noted that Marigor
positively and categorically identified him as the one who
stabbed her mother. It noted that she was able to identify
him because of his amputated fingers. In addition, the trial
court pointed out that the dying declaration of Janice to
Jonathan corroborated Marigor’s statement that Calinawan
killed her mother. The RTC stated that his positive
identification trumped his denial and alibi, which were
considered as inherently weak defenses
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration of Janice is admissible
evidence.
RULING:
Yes. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to
the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur: (a)
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time
the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is
the victim. In this case, first, the stabbing incident
constituted the startling occurrence. Second, Janice never
had the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating
Calinawan because she immediately identified him as her
attacker when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took
place. Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the
circumstances surrounding her stabbing. Hence the dying
declaration is admissible evidence.
People vs. Gatarin, GR No. 198022
DOCTRINE:
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent
death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief
in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has
abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending.
FACTS:
Sonny Gatarin, the accused, armed with a bladed weapon,
conspiring and confederating together, acting in common
accord and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain,
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof
and with violence against or intimidation of person, did
then and there will fully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
rob, and carry away cash money amounting to Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias “Ka
Maning,” to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and by
reason of said robbery, the said accused with intent to kill
and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with the said weapon Januario Castillo y Masangcay
alias “Ka Maning,” thereby inflicting upon the latter the stab
wounds to [the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right
axilla, which directly caused his death. RTC indicted the
accused guilty of homicide. The CA affirmed the decision of
RTC however the CA considered Januario’s statement to
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones who stabbed
him and took his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but
also as a dying declaration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration of Januario to SPO3
Mendoza is admissible evidence.
RULING:
No, not as a dying declaration. For a dying declaration to be
deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide,
Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. In the
case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying
declaration are present. From the records, no questions
relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario.
It does not appear that the declarant was under the
consciousness of his impending death when he made the
statements. The rule is that, in order to make adying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the
belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned
all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not
be considered as a dying declaration. However, even if
Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying
declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part
of the res gestae.
People vs. Palanas, 759 SCRA 318
DOCTRINE:
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the
hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must concur:
(a) the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b)
that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant
was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or
Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On the other
hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res
gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the
rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of
the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
FACTS:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was
riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw Januario
being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in
Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he
 stayed in front of the church until such time that the itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation
accused ran away and were chased by policemen who or purpose to manufacture testimony.
alighted from the police patrol vehicle. On the same night,
SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
vehicle performing their routine patrol duty when they met  Section 38. Declaration against interest.
two men, later identified as the accused, who were running
at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the The declaration made by a person deceased, or
accused did not answer prompting the policemen to chase unable to testify, against the interest of the
them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration
catching them and when it became evident that they could was at the time it was made so far contrary to
no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in
There they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s his position would not have made the declaration
studio. As he was severely injured, the policemen unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and evidence against himself or his successors in
brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the interest and against third persons. (32a)
vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He
answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him.
The declaration made by a person deceased, or
The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay-R
unable to testify, against the interest of the
is his co-accused who remains at-large. At the Zigzag
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was
Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found
at the time it was made so far contrary to
him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a
declarant's own interest, that reasonable man in his
bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which
position would not have made the declaration
eventually caused his death. CA affirmed RTC decision
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
hence this appeal.
evidence against himself or his successors in
interest and against third person.
ISSUE:
Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case is
 Requisites for the exception to apply:
admissible evidence.
1. That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
RULING:
2. That it relates to a fact against the interest of the
No. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as
declarant;
evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
3. That at the time he made said declaration the
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a)
declarant was aware that the same was contrary to
the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding
his aforesaid interest; and
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when
4. That the declarant had no motive to falsify and
death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
believed such declaration to be true.
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would
have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
(Ex. A statement by the debtor before he died that he owes
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the
the creditor a sum of money, or an oral acknowledgment by
subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. In the case
the principal that he received the money previously
at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying
entrusted to his agent, are clear declarations against the
declaration are present. From the records, no questions
interest of the person making it. Note that declaration
relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario.
against interest made by the deceased, or by one unable to
It does not appear that the declarant was under the
testify, is admissible even against the declarant’s successors
consciousness of his impending death when he made the
in interest or even against third person.)
statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
People vs. Bernal, 274 SCRA
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the
belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration DOCTRINE:
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned A statement may be admissible when it complies with
all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly the following requisites, to wit: “(1) that the declarant is
impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
be considered as a dying declaration. However, even if against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time
Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying he made said declaration the declarant was aware that
declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4)
of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and such declaration to be true.”
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea
of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the
FACTS:
act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or
Accused was charged with Kidnapping Openda, Jr. During
connected with the principal fact or event that it
trial, the prosecution, in order to prove that accused has a
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
motive in perpetrating the alleged crime, presented

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 Enriquez, a common friend of both the accused and the
victim, as witness. Enriquez testified that Openda, Jr.
confided to him that the latter is having an affair with
accused’s wife. The trial court, giving credence to Enriquez’s
testimony as well as testimony of other witnesses attesting to
the circumstances prior to the alleged abduction, convicted
the accused. Accused assailing the decision of the trial court
and for admitting the testimony of Enriquez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony made by a witness as to a
statement made a deceased person that is against the
interest of the latter may be admissible in evidence as
against a third person.
RULING:
Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit
relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence,
pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, viz.: "Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons." A statement may be admissible when it complies
with the following requisites, to wit:" (1) that the declarant is
dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against
the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made
said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant
had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true. Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction,
cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez,
definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his
affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence
because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood
to his own detriment.
ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
 Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.
The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these fast occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree. (33a)
The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.
Pedigree is the history of family descent which is
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
transmitted from one generation to another by both
oral and written declarations and by traditions.
 Requisites for applicability:
1. Declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2. Necessity that pedigree be in issue;
3. Declarant must be a relative of the person whose
pedigree is in question;
4. Declaration must be made before the controversy
occurred; and
5. The relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Tizon vs. CA, 276 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
A declaration about pedigree is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, is subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante
litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter
of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
FACTS:
Martin Guerrero, the surviving spouse and only heir of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero (TDG), sold the property
originally owned by the latter to herein respondent Teodora
Domingo. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012
was issued in the latter’s name. When Martin Guerrero died,
herein petitioners, alleging to be TDG’s niece and nephew,
filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are
entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by
right of representation from TDG. During the trial, Corazon,
one of the petitioners, testified that she is the niece of TDG
and submitted documentary evidence such as pictures,
baptismal certificate etc. to prove the alleged filiation.
Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence
on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The
trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to
evidence. In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of
Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented
by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates,
family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and
insufficient to prove and establish filiation
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony as to filiation to a deceased
person is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.
RULING:
The answer is in the negative. The court a quo and
respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes
 a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law. The burden of proof rests not on herein
petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their
favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony
of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece.
Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the
person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that
such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante
litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of
the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon. There is no
dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth
elements. What remains for analysis is the third element,
that is, whether or not the other documents offered in
evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the
pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it
is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the
declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by
other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be
supported by evidence aliunde. The general rule, therefore,
is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not
from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may
not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations
of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where
it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and
not merely to establish a right through his declarations to
the property of some other member of the family. We are
sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is
one instance where the general requirement on evidence
aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to
part of the estate of the declarant herself.
FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION
 Section 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree.
The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
 Requisites for the exception to apply:
1. There is a controversy in respect to the pedigree of
any members of a family;
2. The reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the
person concerned existed ante litem motam or
pervious to the controversy; and
3. The witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person concerned
must be a member of the family of said person,
either by consanguinity or affinity.
Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The common reputation in the family, and not the
common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. x x x
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation
in the family, and not by reputation in the
neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in
question is marriage which may be proved by common
reputation in the community.
FACTS:
Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an
illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison. In her
complaint, she alleged that: (1) at the end of 1945 or the start
of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes); (2) MONINA was born
on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo; (3) since childhood, she
had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an
illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his
family; and (4) that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent
for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree,
became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a
Central Bank examiner. At trial on the merits, MONINA
presented as documentary evidence letters written by
Francisco’s relatives as proof of her recognition as
illegitimate daughter of the latter. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the trial
court and held that Monina was able to establish her
filiation as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter not just
preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record.
Francisco elevated the case before the SC and assailed the
admissibility of the letters of his relatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not letter of the relatives of a putative father is
admissible in evidence as part of the family reputation.
RULING:
No. Under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
documents may not be admitted, there being no showing
that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify,
neither was the relationship between the declarants and
MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in
question. Neither may it be admitted under under Rule 130,
Section 40. Rule 130, Section 40, provides: Sec. 40. Family
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The
 reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.
(emphasis supplied) It is evident that this provision may be
divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence,
under which the documents in question may not be
admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness
stand; and the section containing the second underscored
phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether letter
presented in this case as private documents, fall within the
scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the
preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rights and family portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the
second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of
ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly
known as "family possessions," or those articles which
represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as
to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as
objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or
those "which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as
giving a family tradition." Plainly then, letters, as private
documents not constituting "family possessions" as
discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule
130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on
the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation, it having been observed that: the weight of
authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the
general repute, the common reputation in the family, and
not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus,
matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the
family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or
vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage
which may be proved by common reputation in the
community.
COMMON REPUTATION
 Sec. 41. Common Reputation.
Common reputation existing previous to the
controversy, respecting facts of public or general
interest more than thirty years old, or respecting
marriage or moral character, may be given in
evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public
places may be received as evidence of common
reputation
 What is the rule on common reputation?
It is admissible in evidence where the reputation
refers to a matter of public or general interest, or
respecting marriage or moral character and said
matter is more than thirty (30) years old. The
common reputation must likewise be one existing
before the controversy. This common reputation
may, on the other hand, be established by
monuments and inscriptions.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 How to prove common reputation?
1.) By testimonial evidence of a competent witness;
2.) Monuments and inscriptions in public places; and
3.) By documents containing statements of reputation
 What are the requisites for common reputation
to be applied as an exception to hearsay
evidence rule?
1. The matter to which the reputation referred to is of
public or general interest more than 30 years old
2. That the reputation is ancient;
3. That the reputation is one formed in the
community interested;
4. That it existed before any controversy has arisen in
the matter sought to be proved thereby; and
5. That common reputation is with respect to the
marriage or moral character.
RES GESTAE
 Section. 42. Part of res gestae.
Statements made by a person while a starting
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as
part of res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.
 What is Res Gestae?
Statements, otherwise inadmissible in evidence
because they are hearsay, which are sufficiently
contemporaneous with the act they accompany and
explain, admissible in evidence as part of res gestae.
 Two (2) classes of res gestae
1.) Spontaneous statements; and
2.) Verbal Acts
 Requisites of declaration deemed part of res
gestae:
1.) The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence;
2.) The statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and
3.) The statements concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.
 Factors to be considered to determine
spontaneity of the declaration:
1. The time that has lapsed between the occurrence of
the act or transaction and the making of the
statements;
2. The place where the statement is made;
3. The condition of the declarant when the utterance
is given;
 4. The presence or absence of intervening events
between the occurrence and the statement relative
thereto; and
5. The nature and the circumstances of the statement
itself.
 To be admissible in evidence, verbal acts must
have the following requisites:
1. The principal act to be characterized must be
equivocal (ambiguous; one which, in itself, does
not signify anything when taken separately);
2. The equivocal act must be material to the issue;
3. The statement must accompany the equivocal act;
and
4. The statement gives a legal significance to the
equivocal act.
 Test for the admissibility of res gestae
FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the
afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity
were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the
Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained
injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries. An information for
murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla
Juris fraternity, with the Regional Trial Court. A separate
information were also filed against them for the attempted
murder and another for frustrated murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence as part of the res gestae may be
admissible.

The test of admissibility of evidence as part of the RULING:

res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal little persuasive value in this case. According to the
fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at
the principal fact or even itself, and also whether it clearly the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture that they could not recognize the attackers since they were
testimony. all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could
be given as part of the res gestae. As a general rule, "a witness
 Doctrine of Independent Relevant Statement can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
Under the doctrine of independent relevant knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony are hearsay
fact that such statement have been made is and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court,
relevant. however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and
one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Res Gestae vs Dying Declaration Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person
while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
Res Gestae Dying Declaration circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
a.) Res gestae may be that of a.) a dying declaration can res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal
the killer himself after ir only be made by a dying act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance,
during the killing victim may be received as part of the res gestae. In People v.
Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the
b.) the statement may b.) dying declaration is admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating
precede, accompany or be made only after the that: A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the
made after the homicidal homicidal attack has been res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to
act was committed committed the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
c.) Res gestae has its basis c.) dying declaration is (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to
on sponteinty of the being given based upon the contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
statement awareness of impending occurrence in question and its immediately attending
death circumstances. x x x x The term res gestae has been defined
as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to
the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
People vs.Feliciano, GR No. 196735 spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on
res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
DOCTRINE:
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group
crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
bystanders were made immediately after the startling
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and
given in res gestae.
to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the
act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. There
is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating
lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence.
Considering that the statements of the bystanders were
made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in
fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae. In People v.
Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to
ordinary human experience:" x x x persons who witness an
event perceive the same from their respective points of
reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different
accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect
the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all
aspects because different persons have different impressions
and recollections of the same incident. x x x The statements
made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little
persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen the
events transpiring at different vantage points and at different
points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at
the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their
masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and
some were unmasked. When the bystanders' testimonies are
weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the
entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close
range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact
that an attack occurred. Their account.
People vs.Villarico, GR No. 158362
DOCTRINE:
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and
also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an
utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b)
the statements were made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
FACTS:
Accused were charged of murder for the death of Haide
Cagatan. During the trial, prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (1) Remedios, sister-in-law of the
victim, who testified that she saw accused pointing their gun
at the victim; (2) Lolita Cagatan, mother of the victim, who
testified that she was at the sala when she heard gunshots
followed by seeing the victim wounded and asking for help
stating that he was shot by Berting (accused); (3) Francisco,
father of the victim; who testified that he also heard
gunshots and saw accused aiming their guns upward and
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
were about to leave. RTC convicted the four accused of
homicide aggravated by dwelling. The RTC accorded faith to
the positive identification of the accused by the
Prosecution's witnesses. On intermediate review, the CA
modified the RTC's decision and convicted the accused with
murder. The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses
did not actually see who had shot Haide and that Lolita’s
testimony is a hearsay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony relating the last statement of the
victim immediately after the shooting incident is admissible
in evidence.
RULING:
The answer is in the affirmative. The statement was
admissible against the accused as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which provides: “Statements made by a person while
a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.” The term res gestae refers
to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestaeincludes
the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact
or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the
principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as
part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. We find that the
requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act - the
shooting of Haide - was a startling occurrence. Secondly, his
statement to his mother about being shot by the group of
Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or to
devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the
shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the
startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance
(that is, the identities of the assailants). Verily, the statement
was reliable as part of theres gestae for being uttered in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
People vs.Palmones, GR No. 136303

DOCTRINE:
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res
gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The
following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as
part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1)
the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act
or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the
place where the statement was made; (3) the condition
of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the
presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5)
the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
FACTS:
The prosecution presented Sonny Boy Redovan who was the
nephew of the victim. According to him, he asked the victim
what happened of which the latter answered that he had
been waylaid. When asked who was the assailant, the victim
answered that it was Juany andTony Palmones which were
the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. He also claim
that there were nurses and bystanders who were present in
the room when the victim made such statement. Another
witness was Dr. Aguyao who said that the victim told him
that he did not know the assailant because it was dark. On
cross-examination he stated that it was Sonny Redovan who
was with the victim at the time he interviewed the victim.
The third witness was Police Inspector Tagum, he testified
that while chasing a suspected motor vehicle PO3 Aniceta
called him on the radio and told him that the accused-
appellants were the assailants. It was confirmed when he
went to the house of the two whom he met Triny Palmones
and asked the latter if her brother owned a Kawasaki motor
vehicle of which it affirms. OSG ordered of the acquittal of
the accused-appellants on the ground that the Trial Court
erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration of the
victim as an exception to the hearsay rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission by the victim be considered as
dying declaration?
RULING:
In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution
that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause
and surrounding circumstances of his death were made
under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to
this effect was ever presented by the prosecution. It was not
shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or Inspector Alexander
Tagum ever asked the victim whether he believed that he
was going to die out of his injuries or any other similar
question. Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he was able to
talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing he
revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification
of the victim of his two assailants. For his part, Inspector
Tagum admitted that the only question he asked of the
victim was if the victim knew who had shot him. While it is
true that the law does not require that the declarant
explicitly state his perception that he has given up the hope
of life, the circumstances surrounding his declaration must
justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his
impending death. In the instant case, it was not proven that
the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his condition.
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these
statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When
Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to
him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed
from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at
around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements
attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later.
Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the
scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought
for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime
to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could
have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These
circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the
statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite
spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the
res gestae.
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
 Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business.
Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to
which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as a prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.
 Requisites for the application of the entries in
the course of business:
1. The person made the entry in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty;
2. That the entry was made in the ordinary course of
business or duty;
3. That the entry was made at or near the time of the
transaction to which it relates; and
4. That the person who made the entry is dead,
outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify
Philippine Airlines vs.Ramos, 207 SCRA 461
DOCTRINE:
A writing or document made contemporaneously with a
transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an
issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is
ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater
probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to
such facts based upon memory and recollection. The
hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements,
acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected
with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and
which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the
act, are admissible as part of the res gestae

FACTS:
Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner
alleging the following: (1) they are passengers of PAL Flight
No. 264 on September 24, 1985; (2) they check-in at least one
(1) hour before the published departure time; (3) no one was
at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before departure;
(4) upon checking-in, they were informed that their tickets
were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers;
(5) they have to take the bus instead; and (6) they suffered
damages due to the cancellation. Petitioner disclaims any
liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of
Respondent on said flight was due to their having check-in
late for their flight. During the trial, defendant presented the
check-in counter clerk at their Naga Branch on the date of
respondent’s scheduled flight. The clerk testified that: (1)
the respondents were late and that he noted the time of
check-in on their tickets; and (2) there were other
passengers who came late before the respondents. In
relation to the testimony, two documentary evidence were
offered, namely: (1) the ticket bearing the notation “late
4:02” of the clerk; and (2) the passenger manifest showing
the other names of other passengers who were also late.
Respondent objected to the documentary evidence
submitted and argued that those are self-serving.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries made on a ticket by employees of
a party in the course of their business may not be given
weight on the ground that the same is self-serving.
RULING:
The answer is in the negative. The plane tickets of the
private respondents with the notation "late 4:02" stamped
on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon
the check-in of private respondents and the passenger
Manifest of Flight PR 264 which showed the non-
accommodation of Capati and Go and the private
respondents are entries made in the regular course of
business which the, private respondents failed to overcome
with substantial and convincing evidence other than their
testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and
credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously
with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to
an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily
regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative
force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts
based upon memory and recollection Spoken words could
be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that
speaks a uniform language. Private respondents’ only
objection to these documents is that they are self- serving
cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this
case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so
nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part
of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize
the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae.
ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
 Sec. 44. Entries in official records.
Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or
by a person in the performance of a duty specially
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
 Requisites for the admissibility of the Entries
in the Official Records:
1. That the entries was made by a public officer or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
2. That it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and
3. That the public officer or the person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
 What are the grounds for its admissibility?
1. Neccessity
2. Trustworthiness
Lao vs. Standard Insurance, 409 SCRA 43
DOCTRINE:
Entries in official records. An exception to the hearsay
rule are entries in official records as provided under Sec.
44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Entries in police
records made by a police officer in the performance of
the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative
value may be either substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence. Although police blotters are of
little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted
and considered in the absence of competent evidence to
refute the facts stated therein.
FACTS:
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At
around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro,
Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, with
Plate No. FBS917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter
truck was running ahead of the insured truck and was
bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages
estimated to be around ₱110,692, while the damage to the
other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident,
were placed at ₱35,000 more or less. Petitioner filed a claim
with the insurance company for the proceeds from his
policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance
company on the ground that when its adjuster went to
investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the
insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper
driver’s license at the time of the accident. The restriction in
Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license provided that he can only
drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500
kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more
than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the "authorized driver"
clause of the insurance policy. Respondent cited a police
blotter where it was indicated therein that it was Leonardo
Anit who is driving the insured vehicle. Trial court dismissed
the case for it lacks sufficient cause of action. CA affirmed.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assails the admissibility and
evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis for
the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. He contends that
the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident
 Report and testimony of the investigating policeman
himself, attesting that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo
Anit, who was driving the insured vehicle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not police blotter is admissible and may be given
probative value?
RULING:
Yes. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section
44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the following
are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was
made by a public officer, or by another person, specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that
the police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of
official records. Entries in police records made by a police
officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by
law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and
their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified
by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of
little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute
the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the police
blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy.
Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving
the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike
People v. Mejia, where we said that "entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or probative
value," since the Court there found that "the entries in
question are sadly wanting in material particulars".
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified
and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the
entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and
certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The
information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating
officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the
blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise
given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange
of names.
Sabili vs. COMELEC, 670 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Entries in official records, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, is admissible when the following requisites concur:
a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was
made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer
or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information.
FACTS:
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Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
COMELEC denied due course to and canceled the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) Sabili for the position of Mayor of Lipa
City for the May 2010 elections for allegedly not complying
with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had
been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8)
months. One of the pieces of evidence presented by the
petitioner is the Certification from the Barangay Captain of
Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC did not consider in the first
instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade that petitioner had
been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this
oversight was raised as an issue in petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the
ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a
notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on."
Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially
identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been
sworn to before a notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Certification from the Barangay Captain
shall be admissible in evidence
RULING:
Yes . The SC disagrees with the COMELEC’s treatment of the
Barangay Captain’s Certification and find the same tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to
before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not
only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to
due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court
provides: SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The following three
(3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be
admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance
of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by
him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information. As to the first requisite, the
Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government
OCode to "keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the
barangay." Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly
that "it is the business of a punong barangay to know who
the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third
requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and
duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy
to DOCTRINE:
these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. Accordingly,
It has
there is been
basissettled in thethe
in faulting caseCOMELEC
of U.S. v. Evangelista thatto
for its failure
church registries of births, marriages, and deaths
consider Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it made
wassubsequent tonotarized.
initially not the promulgation of General Orders No.
68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public
writings, nor are they
Cercado-Siga vs. kept by duly
Cercado authorized
Jr., 752 SCRA 514public
officials. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,
before a private document is admitted in evidence, it
must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the
parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof.

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr.
(Vicente) and Leonora Ditablan (Leonora) among the
respondents. They claim that they are the legitimate
children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who
were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners
claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente and by
virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject
land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of
Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of
law. To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita,
petitioners presented the following documents: 1) Contrato
Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 2) Certification dated
19 November 2000 issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente
of its acceptance of original marriage contract; 3)
Certification of non-production of record of birth of
Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of
Simplicia; 5) Certification of non-production of record of
birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint Affidavit of two
disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of
Vicente and Benita. Respondents alleged that they are the
legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married
on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan,
Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties-
interest to institute the case because they failed to present
their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that
the marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid; that
the document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is
not a certified true copy; and that they are now estopped by
laches. The trial court first upheld the validity of the
marriage between Vicente and Benita and it concluded that
the subject property was part of the conjugal property of
Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that
the Deed is null and void because it deprived Benita of her
share of the property as surviving spouse and impaired the
shares and legitimes of petitioners. The appellate court
found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita,
being a private document, was not properly authenticated,
hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate
court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by
petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint
Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas
Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and
Benita was not given credence by the appellate court for
being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove
their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the RTC. Petitioners insist that the Contrato
Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by
law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in
their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato
Matrimonial which should be regarded as original.
Petitioners emphasize that the certification issued by the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of
two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate
presented by petitioners, and the open and public
cohabitation of petitioners’ parents are sufficient proof of
their marriage. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a
private document, petitioners maintain that said document
should be considered an ancient document which should be
excluded from the requirement of authentication.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is
sufficient to prove the fact of marriage between Vicente and
Benita.
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private
document. As early as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista, it has
been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and
deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General
Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer
public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials. They are private writings and their authenticity
must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence. Under Section 20,
Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is
admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the
person who executed it, the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, any person who was present
and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties
to the instruments had previously confessed execution
thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners
failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only
Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage
contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during
its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting
because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate. Petitioners
insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the
ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the original
need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously
ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals that " a signed carbon
copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time
as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe
introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-
production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified
document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent
evidence. It is because there is no public officer
acknowledging the accuracy of the copy." Next, while
petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private
document, they now argue that it is an ancient document
which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still
has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient
document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is
produced from custody in which it would naturally be found
if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was
executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-
years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of
alteration. The marriage contract however does not meet the
second requirement. In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, the Court ruled that the requirement of proper
custody was met when the ancient document in question
 was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who
is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this
case however, we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her
filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a
baptismal certificate which has long been held "as evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the
dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk.
COMMERCIAL LIST
 Section 45. Commercial lists and the like.
Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a
list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein. (39)
 When is a document considered a commercial
list?
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document
is a commercial list if:
a) The commercial list is a statement of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation;
b) Such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation;
c) Said compilation is published for the use of
persons engaged in that occupation; and
d) It is generally used and relied upon by persons in
the same occupation. (PNOC Shipping and
Transport Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 402).
MERALCO vs. Quisimbing, 336 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Certain commercial lists and reports of matters of
interest to persons engaged in a particular occupation
are admissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay
rule, provided, they are made by persons engaged in
that occupation and are generally used and relied upon
by them and those lists and reports are published.
FACTS:
There was a labor dispute between Meralco and Union due
to an alleged unfair labor practice. The Union insisted their
economic and political demands. The Union relies on the
estimate that All Asia financial analyst had published that
Meralco's net operating income for the same year was about
P5.7 billion to support its claim on the wage increase.
Meralco alleged that its actual total net income for 1996 was
only P5.1 billion, The Secretary of Labor directed the parties
to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
the 2,200 increase in wages and increase in other benefits,
such increases were based on the P5.7 billion Meralco’s net
income as published by All Asia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor’s reliance on the
published report of All Asia regarding Meralco’s net income
in granting the increase in wages and benefits is misplaced
RULING:
Yes. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies
to support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an
accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of
wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence
provides: Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
is generally used and relied upon by them therein. Under the
afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a
periodical, may be admitted only "if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
is generally used and relied upon by them therein." The
report is a mere newspaper account and not even a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion
which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case
as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither
did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in
their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that
the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch
with the market and that it is generally regarded as
trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their
accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same
manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not
admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is
available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of
such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of
the report in this case can be easily made available
considering that the same is necessary for compliance with
certain governmental requirements. The Secretary gravely
abused his discretion in making this wage award by
disregarding evidence on record. He misappreciated the
evidence in favor of claims that do not have evidentiary
support. The MERALCO projection had every reason to be
reliable because it was based on actual and undisputed
figures. On the other hand, the union projection was based
on a speculation that the union failed to substantiate. The
All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more than a newspaper
report that did not show any specific breakdown or
computations.
LEARNED TREATISES
 Section 46. Learned treatises.
A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a
subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible
as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
 pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling
as expert in the subject. (40a)
 Requisites for admissibility:
1. Published treatise, periodical or pamphlet is on a
subject of history, law, science, or art; and
2. Court takes judicial notice of it, or
3. Witness expert in the subject testifies that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling
as expert in the subject
Learned treatises are now properly included in this
exception to the hearsay rule.
TESTIMONY OR DEPOSTION AT A FORMER
PROCEEDING
 Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding.
The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased
or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)’
 Requisites for admissibility
In order to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay evidence rule, this section requires that:
1. The witness is dead or unable to testify.
2. His testimony or deposition was given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the
same interest.
3. The former case involved the same subject as that
in the present case, although on different causes of
action.
4. The issue testified to by the witness in the former
trial is the same issue involved in the present case
5. The adverse party had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case.
 Why is the testimony or deposition taken at a
former trial or proceeding admissible?
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or
deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are
the necessity for the testimony and its
trustworthiness. Inasmuch as the former witness
could no longer testify, his former testimony is
admitted to prevent failure of justice.
People vs. Ortiz-Miyako, 279 SCRA
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
DOCTRINE:
For Sec. 47 of Rule 130 (testimony or deposition at a
former proceeding) to apply, the following requisites
must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to
testify; (b) his testimony or desposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the
same interests; (c) the former case involved the same
subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness
in the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former
case.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with
illegal recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan,
Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she
was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the
same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan
alone. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large
scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch
78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis
for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for
estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, rendered in Criminal
Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same circumstances in
the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del
Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This
decision was not appealed and had become final and
executory. In thus convicting appellant in the illegal
recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional Trial
Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were
the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It,
therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in
the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its
retionale for the conviction in the case before it. The
position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of
appellant should be merely for the lesser offense of simple
illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court
of Makati erred in convicting appellant of illegal
recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based
on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Parañaque where appellant was found guilty of estafa
committed against Generillo and Del Rosario. It is argued
that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts
embodied in the decision of the Parañaque court to show
that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo
and Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly
proven to have been committed against only one person,
particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may
only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of
such offense in large scale. He further submits that the
adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision of
the Parañaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the
subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as
it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the
witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario,
during trial before it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court may admit decision in the
 previous proceeding to prove guilt of the accused in
subsequent proceeding
RULING:
No. Rule 130 Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same
parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine
him. Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal
case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has
two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-
examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it
is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who
has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event
his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece
of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The
previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious. Under
these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the
facts stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court does
not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as
the exception contemplated by law covers only the
utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in
previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of
previous decisions or judgments. In the instant case, the
prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by
complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous
estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence,
and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for
illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in
the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment, while
admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove
that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent
case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the
commission of the crime, as said previous decision is
hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction
in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right
of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
DOCTRINE:
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding – The
procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases
recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve
testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the
unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give
license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly
involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from
Go vs. People, 677 SCRA
trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the
accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. As provided under Section 15,
Rule 119, the examination of witnesses must be done
orally before a judge in open court. This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution
secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to
meet the witnessess against him face to face. To take the
deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending
would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of
the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is
especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is
crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
FACTS:
Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged
for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) because of defrauding Highdone Company Ltd.
Represented by Li Luen Ping by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations to the effect
that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts,
equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the
premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in
the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in which they
executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the
amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
P20,892,010.50 in favor of ML Resources and Highdone
Company Ltd. They represented that the said deed is a
FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused
well knew that the same had been previously encumbered,
mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
CORPORATION. Li Luen Ping is a frail old businessman
from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back
to the Philippines in order to attend the case hearings.
Subsequently, trial dates were subsequently postponed due
to his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to
Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was
being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia and that
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to
the Philippines by reason of ill health in which the MeTC
granted. RTC declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The
RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of
depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply
suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in
the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions
of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is
primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of
the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. CA
held that MeTC did not committed grave abuse of discretion
for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining
witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of the prosecution’s motion to
take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in Laos,
Cambodia must be upheld.
RULING:
No. The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases
recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial
evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial
indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution
witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would
effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be
 confronted with the witnesses against him. The Procedure
for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution
Witness is Covered under Section 15, Rule 119. The
examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge
in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where
the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The
requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules
of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. Even in criminal
proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of
conditional examination of witnesses – both for the benefit
of the defense, as well as the prosecution. As exceptions,
Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an
action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the
testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of
both the defense and prosecution witnesses." The procedure
under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or
written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place
within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular
official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no
additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing
to the other party. But for purposes of taking the deposition
in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending as
required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus: SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness
for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with
no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused,
or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be conducted in
the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice
shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused. The condition
of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age
falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he
should be conditionally examined before the court where
the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the
language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing
through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can
be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather
than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule
permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines
whether the deponent is sick or not. Certainly, to take the
deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
before the very same court where the case is pending would
not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment
and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused. While the SC
recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony
of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard
the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony
during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination
of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as
such, calls for a strict construction of the rules. It is argued
that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly
applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as
special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a
Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed
allowable also under the circumstances. However, the
suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution
witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court. It is
true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that
the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the
rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to
criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately
and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find
no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise."
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness
Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and
Confrontation of Witnesses The CA took a simplistic view
on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked
fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution
secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the
right to confrontation of witnesses. In this case, where it is
the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under
Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
CHILD WITNESS RULE
 The Supreme Court, in an en banc Resolution
adopted the so called-Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness which became effective on
December 15, 2000. The rule applies to child
witnesses who are victims of crimes, accused of a
crime, and witnesses to a crime. It shall apply to
criminal proceedings and non-criminal
proceedings involving child witnesses.
“child witness” is any person who at the time of
giving testimony is below the age of eighteen (18)
years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over
eighteen (18) years but is found by the court as
unable to fully take care of himself or protect
himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.

Salient Features:
I. Creates a Presumption of Competency in favor of a
child-witness subject to a Competency Test.
o “Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness.
However the court shall conduct a competency
examination o a child moto proprio or on motion of
a party, when it finds that substantial doubt exist
regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court”. ( Sec. 6).
o A party seeking a competency examination must
present proof of necessity of competency
examination. The age of a child shall not by itself is
not a sufficient basis for a competency
examination.
II. Allows the Court to, motu proprio or on motion,
appoint certain persons to help in the testimony of the
child-witness:
o Guardian Ad Litem- a person to protect the best
interest of the child whose appointment took into
consideration his familiarity with the judicial
process, social service programs, and child
development. The parent if preferred, if qualified.
Has the right to be present in all proceedings, to
obtain copies of documents, interview witnesses,
make recommendations to the court, and to do all
to protect the child.
o Interpreter- one, other than the regular court
interpreter, whom the child can understands and
who understands the child.
o Facilitator- one who poses the questions to the
child who may be a child psychologist, psychiatrist,
social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious
leader, parent or relative. Counsels shall pose
questions only through the facilitator.
o Support Person- person chosen by the child to
accompany him to testify at or attend a judicial
proceeding or deposition to provide emotional
support to the child
III. Contains Child Centered Provisions during the
actual testimony such as :
o A separate waiting area furnished to make the child
comfortable
o To create a more comfortable courtroom
environment, the court may direct and supervise
the location, movement, deportment of all person
in the court room;
o The child may testify from a place other than the
witness chair; child is not required to look at the
accused
o To testify during the time of day that the child is
well rested
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
o Reasonable periods of relief is allowed as often as is
necessary
o The child is allowed to use testimonial aids, such as
dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins or any other
appropriate devise to assist in the testimony of the
child.
o Child is allowed to have an Emotional Security Item
of his own choosing as a blanket, toy, doll.
IV. Manner of Questioning and Objections
o Leading Questions are allowed specially des for
Child-Directs
People vs. Ibanez, 706 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Child Witness Rule. Under Sec. 28 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15
December 2000), a statement of a child may be allowed
in evidence in any criminal or noncriminal proceeding.
To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on
the party challenging the child's competence. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of
the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty
to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or
on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child.
FACTS:
The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to further
discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a
mere child who had studied only until the first grade of
elementary school and could barely read, and did not know
how to tell time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rachel’s testimony may be admitted
RULING:
Yes. We cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly simply
because she was a mere child when she witnessed the
incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is
no showing that her mental maturity rendered her
incapable of testifying and of relating the incident
truthfully. With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is
even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness which specifies that every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's
competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding
the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to
tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a
child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of
education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight
and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of
Rachel as to who killed her father. We likewise note that the
line of questioning of the defense during cross-examination
on the competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not
distract her in recollecting how her father was attacked by
 accused-appellants. From her position underneath the
house of her "Kuya Unyo," she saw her father, Wilfredo,
attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was
astonished as the happening unfolded, her ability to
perceive, remember, and make known her perception was
not diminished.
People vs.Esugon, 759 SCRA 666
DOCTRINE:
Child Witness Rule. That the witness is a child cannot
be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child
witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased.
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
(A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is
now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child’s competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child
to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a
party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
FACTS:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that
on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche,
and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground
floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls
"Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife,
while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was
no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After
his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl
saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father
then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified
the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as
the one who stabbed his mother. On crossexamination, he
related that the assailant took money from his father’s
pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well
the perpetrator because there was no light. Upon being
asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was
no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what
he saw since there was light at their second floor, which
illumined the ground floor through the stairway. Sharon,
sister-in-law of the victim, testified that after the incident
she took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said,
"Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she
did not see who it was since there were many people passing
by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw somebody
enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated
how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person
who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then
pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumasok sa
bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to
the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the
house of the victim. PO1 Fabela also testified that when he
went to the hospital and interviewed the persons thereat.
Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the
one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their
money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police
station. PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was
questioning people in the area, Carl pointed to them the
suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was
appellant who entered their house and stabbed his mother.
They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter
denied having committed the crime. RTC pronounced the
appellant guilty of the crime charged. The appellant posits
that the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled
with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that
unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of
the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to
Carl’s recollection, the place was not even dark when the
stabbing attack on the victim occurred because his father
said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody
shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then
gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was credible and
competent considering that the identifying witness was
Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively
pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who
had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his
mother.
RULING:
Yes. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the
ability to relate to others the acts and events witnessed.
Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear
who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings,
to wit: Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief,
interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification. Section 21. Disqualification by reason of
mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons
cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at
the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is
such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully. (19a) That the witness is a child cannot be the sole
reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which
the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past
has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000),
every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To
rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial
doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive
,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood,
or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court,
motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child. The appellant did not object to Carl’s
competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the
child was incapable of perceiving events and of
communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess
the basic qualifications of a competent witness. After the
Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the
appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-
examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to
discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the
Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from
 wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to
the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the
appellant. It seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the
child incurred in his testimony did not concern the principal
occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged
but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such,
their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil,
because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Carl
positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the
investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the
child could not have been mistaken about his identification
of him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant
as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the
child’s family.
3.g. Opinion Rule
 What is an opinion?
Opinion is an informal expression one what the
witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to fact in
dispute
EXPERT WITNESS
A.Rule on Questioned Document
General Rule: The opinion of witness is not
admissible, except as indicated in
the following sections
Exceptions:
1. Opinion of an expert witness
2. Opinion of an ordinary witness with respect to:
a. The identity of a person about whom
he has adequate knowledge
b. A handwriting with which he has
sufficient familiarity
c. The mental sanity of a person with
whom he is sufficiently acquainted;
and
d. The witness may also testify on his
impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person.
B.Rule on Medical Negligence/Malpractice
 Rule on Opinion of Expert Witness
Sec.49. Opinion of expert witness.- The opinion of a
witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he shown to
possess, may be received in evidence
Who is an expert witness?
C.Rule on Psychological incapacity
A person who by study or experience has acquired
particular knowledge or experience upon matters of
technical knowledge and skill relating to a specific
business or employment (Dilag & Co vs Merced, 45
OG 5542).
 Factors required of an expert witness:
1. Training and education
2. Particular, first hand familiarity with
the facts of the case
3. Presentation if authorities or standard
on which his opinion is based
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 Rule in case of an opinion of an expert witness
The opinion of a witness in a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
 Factors to be considered in giving weight and
sufficiency on expert testimony
The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the
trial court to decide, considering the ability and
character of the witness, his actions upon the
witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion,
his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the
relative opportunities for study or observation of
the matters about which he testifies, and any other
natter which serve to illuminate hi statements.
Function of the expert witness
The expert’s function being to place before the
court data upon which the court can form its own
opinion.
 The factors to consider are his statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer.
 The testimony of a handwriting expert is not
indispensable in examining or comparing the
handwriting or signature.
 It is the court which has the discretion and
authority on whether to give probative value to the
results of the examination.
 Medical negligence are best proved by opinions of
expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon can be
proved by expert witness.
 Psychological incapacity may be proven by
independent evidence adduced by the person
alleging said disorder.
 The presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert.
 Psychological incapacity covers most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to marriage.

 The acts to be proven are gravity, judicial
antecedence, and incurability.
 In Dimayuga-Laurena vs CA, the Court explained:
- Gravity- it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
- Judicial Antecedence- it must be rooted in the
history of the [arty antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and
- Incurability- it must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure be beyond the means of
the party involved.
People vs. Abriol, 367 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
An expert witness is one who belongs to the profession
or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry
relates and who possess special knowledge on questions
on which he proposes to express an opinion. There is no
definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify
as an expert. The question of whether a witness is
properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics
rest with the discretion of the trial court.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged of murder and illegal
possession of firearms at RTC of Cebu City for killing
Alexander Flores. Among the witnesses presented by the
prosecution were Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter
then aboard his jeep who heard a couple of gunshots; Po3
Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station
No.3 who found four(4) .45 caliber shells some four(4) feet
away from the victim’s body., and two(2) deformed slugs
where the victim had lain; Dr. Ladislao Diola Jr., Chief of the
PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory who had autopsied the
victim’s body; and SPO4 Lemuel Caser, a ballistician of the
PNP Crime Laboratory. Accused-appellant Abriol also
testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC
Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of
arrest for murder in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843.
However, the handgun was defective and it was returned to
him for repair by Armscor. He presented a Memorandum
Receipt authorizing him to carry the government-issued .38
revolver. The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna,
medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP Command, to
testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have
caused the gunshot of the victim. The trial court found
appellant’s version of the incident neither convincing and
credible and, as earlier stated, it believed the prosecution’s
version. Petitioners were convicted of the offenses
charged.Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expert opinion of both the medical
doctor and ballistic expert should be stricken down.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
RULING:
No. The office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr.
Diola’s testimony is supported by Dr.Pedro P. Solis, a
medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The
factors which could make the wound of entrance bigger than
the caliber include : (1) shooting in a contact or near fire; (2)
deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which
might have entered the skin sidewise; and (4) an acute
angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound
of entrance is smaller than the firearms caliber, the same
may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet before
entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of
the skin. Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol could
have caused the grazing wounds on the victim’s head and
extremities. Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diola’s findings in
this regard. Such expert opinions disprove appellants theory
that the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could
not have been used in killing the victim. An expert witness is
“one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the
subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possess special
knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an
opinion. There is no definite standard of determining the
degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in
order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following
factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular,
first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3)
presentation of authorities or standards upon which his
opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is
properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistic rests
with the discretion of the trial court. In giving credence to
Caser’s expert testimony the trial court explained. The
defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics
ballistics and identifying firearms. Much stress is given to
the absence of photographs of his examination.
Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied Caser’s examination,
findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope.
Caser’s conclusion based on his examination deserves credit.
He found the impressions on the primer of the fired
cartridges that were test-fired to have the same
characteristics with those recovered at the scene of the
crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet into the body
of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence that
binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply
imprints on every bullet its characteristics marking peculiar
to that gun a d that gun alone. These markings might be
microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their
origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of
identification, as the print left by the human finger. An
expert
DOCTRINE:witness need not present comparative
microphotographs
The opinion of an of test bullets
expert, and special
having cartridges to support
knowledge,
hisskill,
findings. Examination
experience under amay
or training comparison microscope
be admitted in
showing
evidencethat the test
as stated bullet
under Sec.and
49, the
Ruleevidence
130 of thebullet
Rulesboth
of
came from
Court. thecourt,
The same however,
gun is sufficient.
is not bound by the opinion
of an expert witness. Expert opinions are not ordinarily
conclusive. WhenBautista
facedvs. CA,conflicting
with 436 SCRA expert opions,
courts give weight and credence to that which is more
complete, thorough and scientific (Bacalso v. Padigos,
552 SCRA 185). A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts.
Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still
exercises independent judgment on the issue of
authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot
rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.
As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of
a witness who was physically present at the signing of
the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof,
the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect
or circumstantial evidence at best.

FACTS:
The dispute involves a parcel of land which was previously
owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos.
Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista,
being the brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos. Cesar,
who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any
children. Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest.
During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the parcel of
land in favor of Laura as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute
Sale" notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued in the name of petitioner
Laura Bautista. Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the
illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue,
instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale.
Petitioner asserts the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
and invoke the testimony of Carmelita Marcelino, the
instrumental witness to the signing of the document, who
confirmed that it was the decedent Cesar Morelos who
affixed his signature to the document. On the other hand,
respondent contends that the decedent's signature on the
Deed was forged. He presented the testimony of Francisco
Cruz, Jr., Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory
Service, that the signature of decedent on the questioned
instrument, when compared to other documents bearing the
authentic signature of Cesar Morelos, did not match and
appeared to have been authored by a different person. Cruz,
Jr. declared that the latest document bearing the genuine
signature of the decedent is dated March 31, 1982, while the
alleged forged signature was made on April 5, 1982, or a mere
lapse of five days. According to him, it is not possible to have
significant variation between the two signatures,
considering the proximity of time when the signatures
where affixed. Another witness, Major Braulio Monge, Chief
of the Fingerprint Division of the PC-INP, testified that the
thumbmark of Cesar Morelos appearing on the residence
certificate indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, when
compared to those affixed on previous residence certificates
issued to the decedent, did not match and appears to be the
thumbmark of another person. RTC rendered judgment
declaring the Deed of Sale valid while the CA reversed and
set aside the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are
conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed and
notarized deed of absolute sale.
RULING:
No. Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the
genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following
manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom
the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. It is well-settled that a duly
notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and
credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this
legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant to establish that there was
forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract. As a general
rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof
lies on the party alleging forgery. Due to the technicality of
the procedure involved in the examination of the forged
documents, the expertise of questioned document
examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to questioned
document examiners is not mandatory and while probably
useful, they are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting. Hence, a finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts.
Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still
exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity
of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere
testimony of the handwriting expert. The authenticity of
signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense
that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or
topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a
highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert
on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly
much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion
rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. In the
case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity
prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against
direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who
was physically present at the signing of the contract and who
had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert
witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at
best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of
Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and
due execution thereof. Having been physically present to see
the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista
affix their signatures on the document, the weight of
evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners. Witness
Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was not that of Cesar
Morelos. He merely concluded that the document was a
forgery without citing any factual basis for arriving at that
conclusion. Cruz did not point out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily
escape detection by an ordinary lay person. Authenticity of a
questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the
genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity,
rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of
stops, shades, that may be found between the questioned
signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the
question of the former's authenticity. The result of
examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the
benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at
best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be
taken into consideration, such as the position of the writer,
the condition of the surface on which the paper where the
questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings
and nerves, and the kind of pen and paper used. These play
 an important role on the general appearance of the
signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case,
absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or
circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a
questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given
to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a
questioned handwriting and an authentic one. Besides, a
notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear
unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor
the presumption of regularity. The authenticity and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be
upheld.
Avelino vs. People, 701 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to
be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the
witness has been qualified as an expert. Minor
inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the
probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding
the very act of the accused.
FACTS:
On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o’clock in the evening,
Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a tricycle going to
Baseco Compound, Tondo Manila. Since Manalangsang was
the last passenger to board the tricycle, he sat behind the
driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del
Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which
Manalangsang was riding on passed at the left lane instead
of the right lane of the road to give way to the owner-type
jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its Chairman,
Generoso Hispano, herein victim. While Chairman Hispano
was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man
suddenly emerged and blocked Chairman Hispano’s vehicle.
Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts of gunshot
which prompted him to jump from the tricycle.
Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the center island of
the road. Manalangsang positively identified the third
assailant as appellant Bobby “Abel” Avelino, whom he saw
stooping down at the Chairman’s body and pulling the
opening of his bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the
Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was safe for him to
leave the scene, Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and
went home. When the police arrived at the crime scene,
Chairman Hispano was already dead. Denying tge
accusation, the defense presented as evidence the
testimonies of petitioner, PO2 Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T.
Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito
D. Cabamongan. Petitioner advanced the defense of denial
and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he and his
wife went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to
renew his license as they planned to go to Baguio that day.
But as he was issued a temporary license late in the
afternoon, instead of going home, he and his wife checked
in at the Pharaoh hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to spend the
night. He parked his car along Dasmariñas Bridge and slept.
Later, he woke up to transfer his car but his car was gone.
Thus, he and his wife went to the Anticarnapping Unit along
U. N. Avenue to report the incident. After the trial, the RTC,
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder. As aforesaid, the CA, in its assailed
decision, denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the RTC
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
decision with modification by increasing the award of actual
damages. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and
disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of
Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and
SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman.
RULING:
No. The Court have carefully studied the records of this case
and find no cogent reason to overturn the ruling of the CA
which is accord with law and jurisprudence. The CA was also
correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI
Cabamongan as regards the position of the gunman when
the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the
gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano
was shot, which is opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony.
However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was
presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion
regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place
where the empty shells were found is immaterial. Expert
evidence is admissible only if : (a) the matter to be testified
to is one that required expertise, and (b) the witness has
been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the
petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon
presenting Cabamongan during trial. Jurisprudence further
provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do
jot destroy the probative value of the testimony of a witness
regarding the very act of the accused. Thus, the positive
identification of the petitioner as the gunman by
Manalangsang, as corroborated by Cañada, must stand.
ORDINARY WITNESS
 Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses.
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding----
1. The identity of a person about whom he has
DOCTRINE:
adequate knowledge
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given
2. A handwriting with which he has sufficient
may be received in evidence regarding – (a) the identify
familiarity; and
of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b)
3. The mental sanity of a person with whom he is
a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;
sufficiently acquainted.
and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted (Rule 130, Section 50 of the
The witness may also testify on his impression of the
Revised Rules on Evidence). It is competent for the
emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has
People vs. Duranan, 349 SCRA
had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech,
manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the
factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion
before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme
Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give
his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when
based upon conversations or dealings which he has had
with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any
fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the
witness' own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or
other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.”

FACTS:
Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the
time of the incidents in question, is considered to be
retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is
unemployed and simply does household chores for her
family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainant's
family in the same apartment where he rented a room that
he shared with several other people. The first rape took place
in the afternoon of March 7, 1994. Nympha was standing by
the door of her grandfather's house when accused-appellant
suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside
the common bathroom. Complainant said that accused-
appellant kissed her and then removed her shorts and
underwear as he held her hands with his other hand. She did
not cry for help because accused-appellant threatened her
that he would get angry if she did she claimed that accused-
appellant was able to rape her while standing up despite her
resistance. After the incident, complainant was sent out of
the bathroom and went directly home. The second incident
occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994, according to
complainant. She said she was cleaning the premises of her
family residence when accused-appellant pulled her from
her house and took her to his room. According to
complainant, accused-appellant asked his brother, who was
then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his brother had
left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped her.
Complainant said she was forced to submit to
accusedappellant's lust because of his threats. After the
incident, accused-appellant sent her letters professing love
her and telling her how beautiful she was. Complainant said
she tore up the letters after reading them. In another
incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked
complainant to let him use their bathroom. However, after
being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the
hand, pulled her inside the bathroom, and started kissing
her on the lips and neck after closing the door behind them.
He only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody
coming. The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely,
complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara, complainant's
mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the attending medico-
legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Virginia Lozada testified that she saw her daughter leave the
bathroom, quickly followed by accused-appellant. Virginia
noticed that her daughter's lower lip was bruised. When she
confronted her daughter about it, the latter revealed for the
first time what had happened to her. They then filed
affidavits and two informations for the crime committed and
then they took complainant to Camp Crame for
examination. Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined
complainant, submitted a report which contained findings
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
of some inflammation that could have been caused by
friction due to intercourse indicating the possibility of
intercourse that caused complainant's loss of virginity
within the last five days. The defense thereafter presented its
witnesses, namely accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan,
accused-appellant's alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and
Carlito Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan. With respect
to the first incident of rape it is contended that accused-
appellant could not have committed such because he was
not at home at that time. As to the second incident of rape,
accused-appellant contends that it was impossible for him to
commit rape in his room because there were at least six
other people there at the time of the alleged rape. Rico
Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellant's
schedule. Bariquit claimed that he was always with
accusedappellant and knew where he was all the time. Both
witnesses said rape could not have been committed in a
room where at least five other people were sleeping. RTC
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal two (2) counts of rape On appeal, accused-
appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since
the victim's mental age was not proven. He argues that
under Art. 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential
element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is
a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant's mental age to
determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further
claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent
due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of
mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the opinion of the ordinary witness (mother
of the victim) regarding the mental condition or sanity of
the victim be received in evidence
RULING:
Yes. Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides: Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a
witness for which proper basis is given may be received in
evidence regarding --- a. the identify of a person about
whom he has adequate knowledge; b. a handwriting with
which he has sufficient familiarity; and c. the mental sanity
of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The
mother of an offended party in case of rate, though not a
psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition
of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from,
and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the
matter. It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his
opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person,
provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to
observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the
person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness
details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his
opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme
Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his
opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based
upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such
person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing
upon his mental condition, with the witness' own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts,
as the basis for his opinion. In the case at bar, Virginia
Lozada testified on the mental condition of her daughter
that at the age of 25 she still thinks like a child but from her
narration or statement it can be seen that her declaration are
true or believable.
 termination was for lawful cause
and in the manner required by
law.
Benefits Whoever claims entitlement to
the benefits provided by law
should establish his right thereto
by substantial evidence.
Disbarment The burden of proof rests on the
Proceedings complainant to establish
respondent attorney’s liability by
clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.
Constitutionality of He, who attacks the
a Law constitutionality of a law, has the
onus probandi to show why the
law is repugnant to the
Constitution.
Small Claims Cases He who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.
Eminent Domain The local government that seeks
Cases to expropriate private property
has the burden of proving that
the elements for the valid
exercise of the right of eminent
domain have been complied
with.
Accident Insurance The insured’s beneficiary has the
Cases burden of proof in
demonstrating that the cause of
death is due to covered peril.
International Law The party who wants to have a
Cases foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.

RULE 131 – BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

1. Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence
 Burden of Proof
“onus probandi”, traditionally refers to the
obligation of a party to a litigation to persuade the
court that he is entitled to relief. One has to prove
what he alleges. He who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving the same.
A mere allegation is not evidence.
 RULE 131, SECTION 1. Burden of Proof.
The burden of proof, under the terms of law, is the
duty of a party to present evidence not only to
establish a claim but also a defense.
Jurisprudential Pronouncements on Burden of Proof
Civil Cases The party making allegations has
the burden of proving them by
preponderance of evidence.
Administrative Complainant bears the onus in
Cases proving the averments of his
complaint by substantial
evidence.
Labor Cases The burden of proof places upon
the employer to show by
substantial evidence that the
 The test for determining where the burden of
proof lies
To ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he
offers no evidence competent to show the facts
averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain.
The burden of proof rests with the party who wants
to establish a legal right in his favor.
 Where burden of proof is fixed
The burden of proof is fixed by the pleadings.
 Burden of Evidence
also called as “burden of coming forward with the
evidence”, it is the duty of the party to go forward
with the evidence to overthrow the prima facie
evidence against him.
Note: Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. If
the accused, however, admits killing the victim, but pleads
self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to
prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on
his part.
 Equipoise Rule or Equiponderance Doctrine
No one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020

The doctrine refers to a situation where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, or there
is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates.
In this case, the decision should be against the
party with the burden of proof.
Civil Cases Where the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff and the evidence does
not suggest that the scale of justice
should weigh in his favor, the court
should render a verdict for the
defendant.
Criminal Cases Where the evidence is evenly
balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence tilts the
scales in favor of the accused.
FEBTC vs. Chante, 707 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden
of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not
evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove. Burden of proof is a term that refers
to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a)
the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion,
or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of
producing evidence, or the burden of going forward
with the evidence, or simply the production burden or
the burden of evidence.
FACTS:
Instant complaint was filed by FEBTC against Chante to
recover from Chan the principal sum of P770,488.30
representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently
withdrawn from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that Chan had
withdrawn funds totaling P967,000.00 from the PNB-
MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in
Manila; that the withdrawals were done in a series of 242
transactions with the use of the same machine, at
P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that the transactions were
processed and recorded by the respective computer systems
of PNB and MEGALINK despite the following
circumstances, namely: (a)the offline status of the branch of
account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch); (b) Chan’s account
balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c) the maximum
withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day;
and (d) his withdrawal transactions not being reflected in
his account, and no debits or deductions from his current
account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded.
FEBTC asserted further that defendant took advantage of a
system bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals.
Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been
actually home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a
possible “inside job” as the cause of the supposed
withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an
employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts
of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well
as information available to him. Chan claimed that it would
be physically impossible for any human being like him to
stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to
withdraw funds.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil action be decided in favor of the
plaintiff where the defendant relies on bare and
uncorroborated denial of the former’s allegation.
RULING:
No. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden
of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not
evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would
be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This is
because our system frees the trier of facts from the
responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and
arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the
respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be
on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the
defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in
the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the
defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses,
that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and
quite different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of non-
persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply
persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence,
or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply
the production burden or the burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a
given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as
the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its
other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the
beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to
make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden
of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as
the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests
throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the
issue.
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its
own evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s
evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to
preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been
used to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the
ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make
the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover
from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from
the ATM account.
2. Presumptions
 What is a Presumption?
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting
from a rule of law which requires such fact to be
assumed from another fact or group of facts found
or otherwise established in the action.
A presumption is not evidence. They merely affect
the burden of offering evidence.
A presumption is an inference which is mandatory
unless rebutted.
 Inference distinguished from a presumption
An inference is a factual conclusion that can
rationally be drawn from other facts. It is one that is
 a result of the reasoning process. It need not have a
legal effect because it is not mandated by law.
A presumption is the rule of law directing that if a
party proves certain facts at a trial or hearing, the
fact finder must also accept an additional fact as
proven, unless sufficient evidence is introduced
rending to rebut the presumed fact.
A presumption is an inference which is mandatory
unless rebutted.
 Kinds of Presumptions
1. Presumptions of Law
2. Presumptions of Fact
 Effect of Presumptions
A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists
may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue. One need not introduce
evidence to prove the fact for a presumption is
prima facie proof of the fact presumed.
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
(Presumptions juris et de jure)
 It is conclusive when the presumption becomes
irrebuttable upon the presentation of the evidence
and any evidence tending to rebut the presumption
is not admissible.
 The Supreme Court taught that conclusive
presumptions are “inferences which the law makes
so peremptory that it will not allow them to
overturned by any contrary proof however strong.”
 RULE 131, SECTION 2. Conclusive Presumptions.
a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration,
act, or omission, intentionally or deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing is true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it.
b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of
his landlord t the time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them.
Note: Conclusive presumptions under the Rules of Court are
based on doctrine of estoppel. The first conclusive
presumption is often referred to as estoppels in pais or
estoppels by conduct.
 Estoppel
The doctrine of estoppel is an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Under the Civil Code, through estoppels, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying on it.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Ibaan Rural Bank vs. CA, GR No. 123817
DOCTRINE:
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through
culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
FACTS:
Spouses Tarnate entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question from its
original owner Spouses Reyes. The Tarnates failed to pay the
loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the
mortgaged lots. At the public auction, the bank was the sole
bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was issued. The
said certificate stated that redemption period expires two (2)
years from the registration of the sale.
Certificate of sale was registered on October 16, 1979. Within
the two (2) year period, private respondents offered to
redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption
amount. However, petitioner Bank refused and argued that
the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year
had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale.
Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to
allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They argued
that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because
they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price
before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to previously contest the redemption
period stated on the certificate of sale precludes the bank
from asserting it as a defense to oppose the exercise of right
of redemption.
RULING:
Yes. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private
respondents to believe that they had two years within which
to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years,
petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for
redemption was only one year and that the period had
already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he
ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist
and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so
that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
the existence of such facts.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City,
it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate
and its contents. For two years, it did not object to the two-
year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it
could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year
redemption period specially since it had time to object and
did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the
part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his
silence can be construed as consent.
Spouses Alcaraz vs. Tangga-an, GR No. 128568
 DOCTRINE:
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
FACTS:
Reynaldo leased a building from Esmeralda’s predecessor
(Virginia). At the time of the perfection of the contract, the
Reynaldo, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not
Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented
house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to
comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed
their obligations as lessees for two years. After two years
from the effectivity of the lease contract, Esmeralda filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages against
Reynaldo for failure to pay rent. On the other hand, the
latter alleged that they paid the rent to the new owners
(Virgilio and Angelita) of the lot where the building stood
and not to respondents since the latter supposedly no longer
had the legal right to collect rentals. They further claimed
that the lease contract ceased to be effective because
Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the land stripped the
respondents of ownership of the building. MTC rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiffs. MTC ruled that petitioner
failed to show that the subject house belonged to Virgilio.
On the other hand, the respondents proved that the
property in question is registered in their name. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC based on the
petitioner’s failure to present any documentary evidence
modifying or amending the contract of lease to justify the
transfer of payment of the monthly rental to Virgilio Tanga-
an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on
which the leased house is located.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a defendant in a suit to which the cause of
action arises from a contract assail the operation of such
contract by disputing a previously affirmed fact.
RULING:
No. Reynaldo was aware that the lot in question was not
owned by the lessors at the time the lease contract was
entered into. After recognizing the validity of the lease
contract for two years, the Reyanldo is barred from alleging
the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground
that the Esmeralda lost ownership of the house after Virgilio
acquired title over the lot. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are
instances of conclusive presumptions:Whenever a party has,
by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it;
Univ. Of Mindanao vs. BSP, GR No. 194964
DOCTRINE:
Presumptions are not allegations, nor do they supply
their absence. Presumptions are conclusions. They do
not apply when there are no facts or allegations to
support them. If the facts exist to set in motion the
operation of a disputable presumption, courts may
accept |the
EVIDENCE TH presumption.
5:30-9:30 | JudgeHowever,
Byron San contrary
Pedro evidence
Arellano University
may be School
presented of Law,
to rebut First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
the presumption.
FACTS:
Guillermo B. Torres and Dolores P. Torres incorporated and
operated two (2) thrift banks: (1) First Iligan Savings & Loan
Association, Inc. (FISLAI); and (2) Davao Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (DSLAI). Guillermo B. Torres chaired both
thrift banks. He acted as FISLAI's President, while his wife,
Dolores P. Torres, acted as DSLAI's President and FISLAI's
Treasurer. Upon Guillermo B. Torres' request, Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas issued a P1.9 million standby emergency
credit to FISLAI. On May 25, 1982, University of Mindanao's
Vice President for Finance, Saturnino Petalcorin, executed a
deed of real estate mortgage over University of Mindanao's
property in Cagayan de Oro City in favor of Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas. "The mortgage served as security for FISLAI's
PI.9 Million loan" It was allegedly executed on University of
Mindanao's behalf. As proof of his authority to execute a real
estate mortgage for University of Mindanao, Saturnino
Petalcorin showed a Secretary's Certificate signed by
University of Mindanao's Corporate Secretary, Aurora de
Leon.
The Secretary’s certificate states among others the
authorizing of the chairman to appoint Satunino Pactolerin
to represent the University of Mindanao to transact, transfer,
convey, lease, mortgage, or otherwise hypothecate the
subject properties. Saturnino Petalcorin executed another
deed of real estate mortgage, allegedly on behalf of
University of Mindanao, over its two properties in Iligan
City. This mortgage served as additional security for FISLAI's
loans. FISLAI and DSLAI eventually merged with DSLAI as
the surviving corporation in an effort to rehabilitate the
thrift banks due to the heavy withdrawals of depositors.
DSLAI later became known as Mindanao Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (MSLAI). MSLAI failed to recover from its
losses. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas later on foreclosed the
mortgaged properties. University of Mindanao filed two
complaints for nullification and cancellation of mortgage.
One Complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, and the other Complaint was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. University of
Mindanao alleged that it did not obtain any loan from
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and that Aurora De Leon’s
certification was anomalous. That it never authorized
Saturnino Petalcorin to execute real estate mortgage
contracts involving its properties to secure FISLAI's debts
and it never ratified the execution of the mortgage contracts.
The Regional Trial Courts ruled in favor of University of
Mindanao. The Court of Appeals however ruled that
"although BSP failed to prove that the UM Board of Trustees
actually passed a Board Resolution authorizing Petalcorin to
mortgage the subject real properties, Aurora de Leon's
Secretary's Certificate" clothed Petalcorin with apparent and
ostensible authority to execute the mortgage deed on its
behalf. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas merely relied in good
faith on the Secretary's Certificate. University of Mindanao
is estopped from denying Saturnino Petalcorin's authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not University of Mindanao bound by the real
estate mortgage contracts executed by Saturnino Petalcorin.
 RULING:
No. Petitioner argues that the execution of the mortgage
contract was ultra vires. As an educational institution, it may
not secure the loans of third persons Securing loans of third
persons is not among the purposes for which petitioner was
established.
In ruling in favor of the contract’s validity, this court
considered the incidental powers of the hotel to include the
execution of employment contracts with entertainers for the
purpose of providing its guests entertainment and
increasing patronage. This court ruled that a contract
executed by a corporation shall be presumed valid if on its
face its execution was not beyond the powers of the
corporation to do. Thus:When a contract is not on its face
necessarily beyond the scope of the power of the corporation
by which it was made, it will, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be presumed to be valid. Corporations are
presumed to contract within their powers. The doctrine of
ultra vires, when invoked for or against a corporation, should
not be allowed to prevail where it would defeat the ends of
justice or work a legal wrong.
Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned
by evidence, however strong the evidence is. They are made
conclusive not because there is an established uniformity in
behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. They are
conclusive because they are declared as such under the law
or the rules. Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
identifies two (2) conclusive presumptions:SEC. 2.
Conclusive presumptions.— The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,
he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; (b) The tenant is
not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
On the other hand, disputable presumptions are
presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence.
They are disputable in recognition of the variability of
human behavior. Presumptions are not always true. They
may be wrong under certain circumstances, and courts are
expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of
every experience that may render the expectations wrong.
Thus, the application of disputable presumptions on a given
circumstance must be based on the existence of certain facts
on which they are meant to operate. "[P]resumptions are not
allegations, nor do they supply their absence." Presumptions
are conclusions. They do not apply when there are no facts
or allegations to support them. If the facts exist to set in
motion the operation of a disputable presumption, courts
may accept the presumption. However, contrary evidence
may be presented to rebut the presumption.
Hospicio Rosaroso vs. Soria, GR No. 194846
DOCTRINE:
The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved
for the time being from introducing evidence in support
of the averment, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence unless rebutted.
. more than merely preponderant.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
FACTS:
Rosaroso filed a complaint for nullity of the SPA authorizing
Soria to sell the subject disputed lots to Meridian, as well as
the deed of sale entered into pursuant to the said SPA.
Petitioner alleged that the said lot had already sold to them
by their predecessor Luis Rosaroso.
During trial the second wife of Luis, Lourdes testified deed
of sale in favor of petitioners, was obtained through fraud,
deceit and trickery. She explained that they signed the
prepared deed out of pity because petitioners told them that
it was necessary for a loan application. RTC ruled in favor of
Rosaroso. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision. The CA ruled that the first deed of sale in favor of
petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they
indeed tendered a consideration for the four (4) parcels of
land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners
did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the
sale was simulated to make it appear that payment had been
tendered when in fact no payment was made at all.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the validity of a contract be assailed on a
mere testimony that it has no consideration.
RULING:
No. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the
following are disputable presumptions: (1) private
transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary
course of business has been followed; and (3) there was
sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions
operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof
to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting
evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and
which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered,
will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by
the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for
the time being from introducing evidence in support of the
averment, because the presumption stands in the place of
evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said
presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale
was made without a consideration, they failed to supply
clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is
elementary in procedural law that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under the Rules of Court. The CA decision ran counter to
this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It
relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that
the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to
sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a
loan application, but they did not pay the purchase price for
the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self-
serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing
evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption.
As such, the presumption that there was sufficient
consideration will not be disturbed.
Heirs of Trazona vs. Heirs of Canada,
GR No. 175874
DOCTRINE:
While notarized documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be
contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and

FACTS:
Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. 5053–H. Sometime in 1997,
when the heirs of Cipriano, herein petitioners, tried to
secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, they were
informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959 was
issued in the name of Dionisio, the owner of the property
adjacent to Cipriano’s lot. Apparently, respondents had
caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 23959 by
submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by
Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. The deed of sale covers a
portion of Cipriano’s property which was encroached upon
by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime, but the new tax
declaration issued covers the whole property of Cipriano.
Consequently, petitioners filed a Complaint against
respondents for cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959.
Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery. During the trial, petitioners
presented an expert witness testifying to the forgery of
Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed. RTC ruled in favor
of petitioners. On appeal, CA ruled that petitioners had
failed to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the
assailed deed was a forgery. The deed, being a notarized
document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due
execution and that the deed was an ancient document that
remained unaltered after so many years, bodes well for its
authenticity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of regularity of a notarized
ancient document may be assailed by the testimony of an
expert witness and independent observation of the trial
court
RULING:
Yes. It is true that notarized documents are accorded
evidentiary weight as regards their due execution.
Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable.
They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant. In this
case, clear and convincing evidence that is enough to
overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed
was presented. First, the document examiner determined
that the signature of Cipriano in theassailed deed had been
forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. Second,
the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that
the signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding
that the signature was forged through independent
observation. Lastly, when the record management analyst
from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed, the
paper was noted to be white, while its supposed
contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had
turned yellow with age.
Uy vs. Lacsamana, GR No. 206220
DOCTRINE:
Semper Praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage. However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
FACTS:
Luis Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents
Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and
Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he
was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived
together as husband and wife from the time they were
married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends
that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of
their marital property regime is not valid for being
simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent.
Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she
lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her
paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited
and attempted to formalize their marital union with a
marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not
consummated because of the bombings which occurred on
the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to
secure a marriage contract. Spouses Lacsamana also filed
their Answer with Counterclaim dated claiming that they
were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied
on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of
the subject property. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone,
without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana is
valid.
RULING:
YES. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the
sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether
Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption
established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage." Semper Praesumitur pro matrimonio
— Always presume marriage. However, this presumption
may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other
evidence. Marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence.
In Pugeda v. Trias, it was held that testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the
solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage
certificate which he could have sourced from his own
personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal
office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the
findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single
relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On
the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he
and Rosca were not legally married to each other. While it is
true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as
husband and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed
that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their
marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, the
Court held that persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
Consequently, with thepresumption of marriage sufficiently
 overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to
plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to
prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It
became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit
additional proof to show that they were legally married. He,
however, dismally failed to do so.
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally
married to Rosca,their property relations would be governed
by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a
couple living together were not incapacitated from getting
married. The provision states that properties acquired
during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is
proof to the contrary. Both the trial and appellate courts is
correct in that Rosca was able to prove that the subject
property is not co-owned but is paraphernal. Based on the
evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently
overcome the presumption that any property acquired while
living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares.
The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal
properties and she had every right to sell the same even
without Uy's consent.
Diaz vs. People, GR No. 208113
DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence. the legal presumption is that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates
that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a
document without first informing himself of its
contents and consequences.
FACTS:
Leticia S. Arcilla filed against Dolores Diaz before the RTC a
information for estafa for her alleged failure to return or
remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at
P32,000.00 received by her in trust. Leticia alleged that she
is a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling
goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is
petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over
the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after
they were entrusted. She averred that she entrusted
merchandise worth P35,300.00 to Dolores as evidenced by
an acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter.
However, petitioner was only able to remit the amount of
P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances
and ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or
return the goods. Petitioner admitted having previous
business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She
clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase
order cards and gift checks from respondent on installment
basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a
blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs and GCs.
She further claimed that their last transaction was
conducted in 1995, which had long been settled.
However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of
merchandise from respondent. RTC acquitted petitioner of
the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay
respondent the amount of P32,000.00. CA upheld
petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that respondent was able to
establish by preponderance of evidence her transaction with
petitioner, as well as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to
return the same to respondent in case the items were not
sold, the fact of which having been substantiated by the
acknowledgment receipt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held civilly liable for
the value of the merchandise.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2)
one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in blank during
her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed
to retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation
that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled that he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.
On the contrary, respondent was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as
well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of
the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to
respondent in case such merchandise were not sold. This
was established through the presentation of the
acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, which, as
the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner
acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items
with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation
to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.
In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section
3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is
that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this,
case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one
does not sign a document without first informing himself of
its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p)
of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private
transactions have been fair and regular.
This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the
contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The
effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create
the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie
case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered,
will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any
evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also,
respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the
obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has
not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only
requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than
the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence
in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
 Section 3. Disputable presumptions: The
following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful
intent;
c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary act;
d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
 Example: One does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences
e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced;
 Does not apply if:
1. the evidence is at the disposal of both parties
2. the suppression was not willful
3. it is merely corroborative or cumulative
4. the suppression is covered by the privileged
communication between physician and patient
People vs. Padrigone, GR No. 137664
DOCTRINE:
The rule that "evidence wilfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is
at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was
not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative;
and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
FACTS:
Roberto Padrigone, Jocel Ibanita, Michael San Antonio and
Abel Triumpante broke into the house of Rowena Contridas
at 3:00 a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint successively
raped Rowena, then 16 year old. They threatened to kill
Rowena and her 14 year old sister, Nimfa that they will be
killed if they reported the incident to others. The victim
became insane after the incident and was not able to testify
in Court thus it was Nimfa who testified. The trial court,
disregarding the Accused’s defense of denial and alibi,
convicted the accused. On appeal, Accused-appellant claims
that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting
Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her
sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived
appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she
allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it
was only appellant who raped her which declaration became
the basis for the latter’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to present as witness the victim of a
crime who became insane by reason of such offense
amounts to suppression of evidence.
RULING:
No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand
cannot be considered as suppression of evidence. Under
Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
"evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced"
does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both
parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely
corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case.
First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena
even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness.
Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand.
Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute
Psychotic Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand
judicial proceedings yet." The non- presentation, therefore,
of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena
was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed
the violation committed on her sister.
Metrobank vs. CA and GTP, GR No. 122899
DOCTRINE:
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to
prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party,
and he has it in his power to produce evidence which
from its very nature must overthrow the case made
against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to
produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the
evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice,
and support the case of his adversary.
FACTS:
Chia and Respondent GTP entered into a contract of sale
with assumption of mortgage wherein the latter assumes the
former’s indebtedness with Metrobank. Respondent,
pursuant to the balance declared by Metrobank prior to the
execution of the sale, paid Chia’s loan balance with
Metrobank in the amount of P116,416.71. This
notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release
the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite
repeated requests, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an
action for specific performance against petitioner
METROBANK and Mr. Chia. Metrobank refused to
discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the
subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due
loans” as there exist a stipulation in subject Deeds of
Mortgage that mortgagors’ debts subsequently obtained
would be covered by the same security. Hence, the payment
made by GPT does not extinguish the mortgage. The trial
court ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal, CA
reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure of the mortgagee to present the proof
of loan secured by the mortgage estopped him from further
asserting the existence of such liability
RULING:
Yes. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to
prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party,
and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from
its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if
 it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such
evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if
produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the
case of his adversary. The scheduled oral arguments before
the CA was supposed to be Metrobank’s golden opportunity
to prove the existence the "other unliquidated past due
loans" which is the basis of its refusal to release the
mortgage property. But Metrobank failed to appear thereon.
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in
his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would
benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as
conclusive that the fact does not exist."
f) That money paid by one to another was due to the
latter;
g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged
to the latter;
h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has
been paid;
i) That prior rents or installments had been paid
when a receipt for the later ones is produced;
j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken
in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
things which a person possess, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him;
k) That a person in possession of an order on himself
for the payment of the money, or the delivery of
anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing
accordingly;
l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly
appointed or elected to it;
m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
 Application:
The presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty obtains only when there is no
deviation from the regular performance of duty. It is
rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
of a failure to perform a duty.
 Does not Apply to:
1. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF AMPARO:
Under Sec.17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the
“respondent public official or employee cannot
invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed to evade responsibility or
liability.”
2. DURING IN-CUSTODY INVESTIGATIONS:
Even if the confession of the accused is gospel
truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of
the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove during the trial that prior to
questioning, the confessant was warned of his
constitutionally- protected rights.
EXAMPLES:
1. In buy bust operations, the Court has usually
presumed the regularity of performance of their
official duties in favor of members of the buy-bust
team (People vs Mendoza, 2014)
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
2. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses, who are police officers, for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the
police officers or deviation from the regular
performance of their duties (People vs Alejandro,
2014)
3. The presumption of regularity of court proceedings
includes presumptions of regularity of service of
summons. It is incumbent upon the party
questioning the validity of the service to rebut these
presumptions with competent evidence. The return
is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein
People vs. Barte, GR No. 179749
DOCTRINE:
The conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the shabu confiscated were consequently not
preserved became unavoidable. The failure to prove the
chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was
the very same one delivered by the accused-appellant to
the poseur buyer.
.
FACTS:
The accused-appellant was charged in the RTC with a
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu
worth ₱l00.00 to a police officer-poseur buyer in the evening
of August 10, 2002 during a buy-bust operation conducted in
Consuelo Village, Mandaue City. The RTC convicted Barte as
charged giving credence to the arresting officers’ testimonies
although no evidence has been produced compliance of the
procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
No. Although non-compliance with the prescribed
procedural requirements (Section 21 of RA 9165) would not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the
contraband invalid, that is true only when there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. Any departure from the prescribed
procedure must then still be reasonably justified, and must
further be shown not to have affected the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband.
Otherwise, the non-compliance constitutes an irregularity, a
red flag, so to speak, that cast reasonable doubt on the
identity of the corpus delicti. The State's agents who
entrapped the accused-appellant and confiscated the
dangerous drug from him did not tender any justifiable
ground for the non-compliance with the requirement of
establishing each link in the chain of custody from the time
of seizure to the time of presentation. The conclusion that
 the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu confiscated
were consequently not preserved became unavoidable. The
failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore,
that the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial
was the very same one delivered by the accused-appellant to
the poseur buyer.
Delos Santos vs. COA, GR No. 198457
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad
faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties. However, this
presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule
that was violated.
FACTS:
Congressman Cuenco entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center
(VSMMC) appropriating to the hospital the amount of
P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent
patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program.
It was agreed that Cuenco shall identify and recommend the
patients who may availed of the program.
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations
of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for
the availment of medicines under the TNT Program
surfaced. Consequently, an audit thereof was conducted and
rampant violations of bidding and audit procedure were
revealed. Thereafter, Special Audit Team Supervisor, Boado
disallowed the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of
drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified
prescription and documents, and holding petitioners,
together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable
therefor.
By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that
VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of
funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith
in the performance of their respective duties,capitalizing on
the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that
their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were
attended by malice or bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not assertion of good faith in the performance of
a public function prevails over factual findings revealing
violations of rules and regulations in the performance of
such function.
RULING:
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith
and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. However, this presumption
must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.
Petitioners failed to make a case justifying their non-
observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of
their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect
to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF
facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133
falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy,
despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral
slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an
internal control system installed by petitioners, the
irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital
would have been prevented from processing falsified claims
and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF.
People vs. Candidia, GR No. 191263
DOCTRINE:
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are
police officers for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence
to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the
police officers.
FACTS:
Accused was charged with violation of RA 9165. The
prosecution presented Trayvilla, a Non-Uniformed
Personnel of the PNP, who testified that on 31 July 2002 at
around 6:30 in the morning, while performing her duty as a
female frisker assigned at the NAIA Terminal I, she frisked
the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area
and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of
Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it
was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual
thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation,
Trayvilla and her female co-employee Bagsican brought the
accused to the comfort room inside the domestic airport to
check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her
underwear, they discovered that inside were two sachets of
shabu. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their
supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang).
Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia denied that the two sachets of
shabu were hers and said that she was only asked by an
unidentified person to bring the same.
During trial, accused interposed the defense of frame-up.
Both the trial court and the CA, on appeal, conviced the
accused. The accused also assails the application of
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of
the witnesses. She claimed that the self- serving testimonies
of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties of a public officer may be assailed by
bare allegations of frame-up.
RULING:
The answer is in the affirmative. In cases involving violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting
ill-motive on the part of the police officers.”
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show
ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against Cadidia.
Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker
 when she handled the accused who entered the x-ray
machine of the departure area. There was no pre-
determined notice to particularly search the accused
especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the
buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to
notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The
subsequent search of the accused would only show that the
two female friskers were just doing their usual task when
they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This
is bolstered by the fact that the accused on the one hand and
the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other.
Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other.
The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution
witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding
the apprehension.
n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;
 Application:
A judgment or final order against a person,
rendered by a tribunal of a foreign country with
jurisdiction to render said judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors-in-interest
o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case
were laid before the court and passed upon by it;
and in like manner that all matters within an issue
raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were
laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by
them;
p) That private transactions have been fair and
regular;
q) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed;
r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a
contract;
s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed
for a sufficient consideration;
t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument
was made before the instrument was overdue and at
the place where the instrument is dated;
u) That a writing is truly dated;
v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received
in the regular course of the mail;
w) That after an absence of 7 years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he is
considered dead for ALL purposes, EXCEPT for
those of succession.
Note: The absentee shall NOT be considered dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of 10
years. If he disappeared after the age of 75 years, an absence
of 5 years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
 The following shall be considered dead for ALL
purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
DOCTRINE:
A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim provided the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent
with human nature and the course of things.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
1. A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been
heard of for 4 years since the loss of the vessel or
aircraft;
2. A member of the armed forces who has taken part
in armed hostilities, and has been missing for 4
years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and whose existence has NOT
been known for 4 years;
4. If a married person has been absent for 4
consecutive years, the spouse present may contract
a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead.
 In case of disappearance, where there is danger of
death under the circumstances hereinabove
provided, an absence of only 2 years shall be
sufficient for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage.
However, in any case, BEFORE marrying again, the
spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in
the rules for declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the
thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or
fact;
y) That things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life;
z) That persons acting as co-partners have entered
into a contract of co-partneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other and who
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a
woman who are NOT capacitated to marry each
other and who have acquire property through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry, such contributions and their
corresponding shares including joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit are equal.
People vs. Edualino, GR No. 119072

FACTS:
Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with consummated
rape of a pregnant woman. Prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (1) Rowena Nantiza – even though it be born within the
victim/complainant; Aileen Yayen – eyewitness; and Dr.
Rogelio Divinagracia – medico-legal. On the other hand,
accused-appellant relies on alternative defenses of alibi and
consent on the part of complainant. While accused-
appellant's defense before the trial court alleges that he had
left the scene of the incident together with defense witness
Calixto Flora, he alternatively raises before this Court the
contention that the elements of the crime of rape have not
been established.
Accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of
complainant Rowena Nantiza. It is argued that a responsible
and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months
pregnant, would not be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning
getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man
to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that
complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her
marriage since her husband had found out that she was
using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle
of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11
May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and
alcohol.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused may question his conviction by
assailing the character of the victim.
RULING:
It should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape
victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of
the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the
victims of rape.
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations
that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs
and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and
responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances
will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped. The
Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the
victim is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape. A
person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible,
natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human
nature and the course of things.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the
mother contracted another marriage within 300
days after such termination of the former marriage,
these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
1. A child born before 180 days after
the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is
considered to have been
conceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born
within 300 days after the
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
termination of the former
marriage
2. A child born after 180 days
following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is
considered to have been
conceived during such marriage,
300 days after the termination of
the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as
long as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting
to be printed or published by public authority, was
so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting
contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the
country where the book is published, contains
correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was
to convey real property to a particular person has
actually conveyed it to him when such presumption
is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his
successor in interest;
(jj) That EXCEPT for purposes of succession, when
two persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is NOT shown
who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is determined from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes,
according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of 15 years,
the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age 60, the
younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under 15 and the other above
60, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty,
and the sex be different, the male is
deemed to have survived, if the sex be the
same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and
the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or
more persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall prove the
 same; in the absence of proof, they shall be diligence of a good father of a family to
considered to have died at the same time prevent damage.

OTHER DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS 4. Article 2184 of the Civil Code:

UNDER THE LAW
1. Notarized Document:
Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledges before a
notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity which may only be rebuttized ed by clear and
convincing evidence
2. Forgery:
In the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and thus, guilty of falsification
3. Article 2180 of the Civil Code:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
o The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
5. Article 2188 of the Civil Code:
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on
the part of the defendant if the death or injury
results from his possession of dangerous weapons
or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable
in his occupation or business
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur establishes a
presumption of negligence against the defendant
and furnishes a substitute for a specific proof of
negligence.
Effect of disputable presumptions

o Guardians are liable for damages caused by  The effect of a presumption upon the burden of
the minors or incapacitated persons who proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
are under their authority and live in their overcome the prima facie case created by the
company. presumption. If no contrary proof is offered, the
presumption will prevail.
o The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

o Employers shall be liable for the damages

caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.

o The State is responsible in like manner

when it acts through a special agent; but
not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.

o Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments

of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.

o The responsibility treated of in this article

shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party
complaints;
(c) The third-party
defendant if any, shall
adduce evidence of his
defense, counterclaim,
cross-claim and fourth-
party complaint;
(d) The fourth-party, and
so forth, if any, shall
adduce evidence of the
material facts pleaded by
them;
(e) The parties against
whom any counterclaim
or cross-claim has been
RULE 132 – PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE pleaded, shall adduce
evidence in support of
1. Order of Presentation of Evidence their defense, in the order
to be prescribed by the
I. Pre-Trial court;(f) The parties may
 No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and then respectively adduce
offered during the trial in support of a party’s rebutting evidence only,
evidence-in-chief other than those that had been unless the court, for good
earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre- reasons and in the
trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause furtherance of justice,
shown. permits them to adduce
evidence upon their
 One-Day Examination of Witness Rule, that is, a original case; and
witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day only,
shall be strictly adhered to subject to the courts’ g) Upon admission of the
discretion during trial on whether or not to extend evidence, the case shall
the direct and/or cross-examination for justifiable be deemed submitted for
reasons. decision, unless the court
directs the parties to
 Most Important Witness Rule, determine the most argue or to submit their
important witnesses to be heard and limit the respective memoranda or
number of witnesses. any further pleadings.
(c) The prosecution and
the defense may, in that
order, present rebuttal
and sur-rebuttal evidence
unless the court, in
furtherance of justice,
permits them to present
additional evidence
bearing upon the main
issue.
(d) Upon admission of
the evidence of the
parties, the case shall be
deemed submitted for
decision unless the court
directs them to argue
orally or to submit
written memoranda.
(e) When the accused
admits the act or
omission charged in the
complaint or information
but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial
may be modified.

 The reception of evidence may be delegated to the
Branch Clerk of Court (COC).
II. Trial
Civil Procedure
Section 5. Order of trial. —
Subject to the provisions of
section 2 of Rule 31, and
unless the court for special
reasons otherwise directs,
the trial shall be limited to
the issues stated in the pre-
trial order and shall
proceed as follows:
(a) The plaintiff shall
adduce evidence in
support of his complaint;
(b) The defendant shall
then adduce evidence in
support of his defense,
Criminal Procedure
Section 11. Order of trial.
— The trial shall proceed
in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall
present evidence to prove
the charge and, in the
proper case, the civil
liability.
(b) The accused may
present evidence to prove
his defense, and
damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of a
provisional remedy in the
case.
If several defendants or
third-party defendants, and
so forth, having separate
defenses appear by different
counsel, the court shall
determine the relative order
of presentation of their
evidence.
III. Presentation of Evidence
 Examination of Witness
The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in OPEN COURT, and
UNDER OATH or AFFIRMATION. Unless the
witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question
calls for a different mode of answer, the ANSWERS
OF THE WITNESS SHALL BE GIVEN ORALLY.
 Open Court
This method allows the court the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness and also
allows the adverse party to cross-examine the
witness.

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020

 Orally
Except when the questions calls for another mode
(persons with disabilities), Testimonies which need
not to be given orally in open court
Summary Procedure
o In criminal cases, the affidavits of the parties shall
constitute direct testimonies of the witnesses who
executed the same (Section 15, Rule on Summary
Procedure)
o In civil cases, the parties are merely required to
submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other
pieces of evidence in the factual issues together
with their position papers, setting forth the law and
the facts relied upon (Section 9, Rule on Summary
Procedure)
 Depositions
Need not to be taken in open court, may be taken
before the notary public (Section 10, Rule 23) or
before any person authorized to administer oaths
(Section 14, Rule 23)
 Section 1, Rule 115
To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as
part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who
is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence can
be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and the same subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-
examine him
 Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
The Judicial Affidavits of the witnesses shall take
the place of such witness’ direct testimonies.
 Child Witness Rule
The court upon application may order that the
testimony of the child be taken by live-link
television if there is substantial likelihood that the
child would suffer trauma from testifying in the
presence of the accused, his counsel, or the
prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma should
be of a kind which would impair the completeness
or truthfulness of the testimony.
 Oath or Affirmation
Oath is an outward pledge made under an
immediate responsibility to God or a solemn appeal
to the Supreme Being in attestation of the truth of
some statement.
Affirmation is a substitute for an oath and is a
formal declaration that the witness will tell the
truth.
Note: Option is given to the witness and not the court.
A witness who refuses to take an oath or affirmation may be
barred.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 Proceedings to be recorded
The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing,
including the questions propounded to a witness
and his answers thereto, the statements made by
the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses
with reference to the case, shall be recorded by
means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means
of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made
by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder
and certified as correct by him shall be deemed
prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.
 Rights and obligations of a witness
A witness must answer questions, although his
answer may tend to establish a claim against him.
However, it is the right of the witness:
1. To be protected from irrelevant, improper
or insulting questions, and from harsh or
insulting demeanor;
2. Not to be detained longer that the
interests of justice require;
3. Not to be examined except only as to
matters pertinent to the issue;
4. Not to give an answer which will tend to
subject him to penalty for an offense
unless otherwise provided by law; or
5. Not to give an answer which will tend to
degrade his reputation, unless it be to the
very fact at issue or to a fact from which
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a
witness must answer to the fact of his
previous conviction for an offense.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to
penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by law – This
provision gives meaning to the right of the person against
self-incrimination.
WHEN THE WITNESS IS THE ACCUSED
He may totally refuse to take the stand.
ORDINARY WITNESS
A mere/ordinary witness cannot altogether refuse to take the
stand. Before he refuses to answer, he must wait for the
incriminating question.
ROLE OF COUNSELS
Counsels must always come to the aid of his witness being
subjected to intimidation, harassment, and embarrassment.
Such acts are objectionable and a timely objection should be
raised.
Section 4. Order in the examination of an individual
witness – The order in which an individual witness may
be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross examination by the opponent.
Section 5. Direct examination. — Direct examination is
the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.
 It is a procedure for obtaining information from one’s own
witness in an orderly fashion. It is information which the
counsel wants the court to hear. The purpose is to elicit facts
about the client’s cause of action or defense.
Subject to the Judicial Affidavit Rule
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in
lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the
court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by
licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-
trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing
with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall
take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies;
and
(2) The parties' documentary or object evidence, if any,
which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and
marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of
the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3,
and so on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original
document or object evidence in his possession, he
may, after the same has been identified, marked as
exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to
such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that
original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring
the original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference with
the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing
which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary
evidence in place of the original when allowed by existing
rules.
Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit
shall be prepared in the language known to the witness and,
if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in
English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address,
and occupation of the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who
conducts or supervises the examination of the
witness and the place where the examination is
being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the
questions asked of him, fully conscious that he does
so under oath, and that he may face criminal
liability for false testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his
corresponding answers, consecutively numbered,
that:
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
(1) Show the circumstances under which
the witness acquired the facts upon which
he testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are
relevant to the issues that the case
presents; and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and
object evidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the Rules
of Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed
name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public
who administers the oath or an officer who is
authorized by law to administer the same.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial
affidavit. - The party presenting the judicial affidavit of his
witness in place of direct testimony shall state the purpose
of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the
witness. The adverse party may move to disqualify the
witness or to strike out his affidavit or any of the answers
found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall
promptly rule on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the
marking of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets
under the initials of an authorized court personnel, without
prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence under Section 40
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial
affidavit. - The adverse party shall have the right to cross-
examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and on the
exhibits attached to the same. The party who presents the
witness may also examine him as on re-direct. In every case,
the court shall take active part in examining the witness to
determine his credibility as well as the truth of his testimony
and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the
issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon
the termination of the testimony of his last witness, a party
shall immediately make an oral offer of evidence of his
documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in their
chronological order, stating the purpose or purposes for
which he offers the particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse
party shall state the legal ground for his objection,
if any, to its admission, and the court shall
immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form
part of the judicial affidavits that describe and
authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits
are simply cited by their markings during the offers,
the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the
description of each exhibit.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This
rule shall apply to all criminal actions:
 (1) Where the maximum of the imposable
penalty does not exceed six years;
(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of
judicial affidavits, irrespective of the
penalty involved; or
(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the
actions, whatever the penalties involved
are.
(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial
affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days
before the pre-trial, serving copies if the same upon
the accused. The complainant or public prosecutor
shall attach to the affidavits such documentary or
object evidence as he may have, marking them as
Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial
affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be
admitted at the trial.
(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense
after receipt of the judicial affidavits of the
prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his
judicial affidavit as well as those of his witnesses to
the court within ten days from receipt of such
affidavits and serve a copy of each on the public and
private prosecutor, including his documentary and
object evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2,
3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct
testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when
they appear before the court to testify.
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial
Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who fails to submit the required
judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to
have waived their submission. The court may, however, allow
only once the late submission of the same provided, the
delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the
opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not
less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the
discretion of the court.
(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any
witness who fails to appear at the scheduled
hearing of the case as required. Counsel who fails to
appear without valid cause despite notice shall be
deemed to have waived his client's right to confront
by cross-examination the witnesses there present.
(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits
that do not conform to the content requirements of Section
3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The
court may, however, allow only once the subsequent
submission of the compliant replacement affidavits before
the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason
and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and
provided further, that public or private counsel responsible
for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less
than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion
of the court.
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.
— Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
to many matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
The scope of the cross-examination is not confined to the
matters stated by the witness in the direct examination.
The above mentioned is only a general rule, where the
witness is unwilling or a hostile witness as so declared by the
court, he may be cross-examined only as to the subject
matter of his examination-in-chief (Section 12, Rule 132).
The same limited scope of a cross-examination is imposed
upon the cross-examiner where the witness examined is an
accused because he is subject to cross-examination on
matters covered by direct examination (Section 1(d), Rule
115)
The purposes of the cross-examination are:
(1) To bring out facts favorable to counsel’s client not
established by direct testimony, and
(2) To enable counsel to impeach or impair the credibility of
the witness.
DEATH OR ABSENCE OF A WITNESS
● If the witness dies before his cross-examination is over,
his testimony on the direct may be stricken out only
with respect to the testimony not covered by the cross-
examination. The absence of a witness is not enough to
warrant the striking out of his testimony for failure to
appear for further cross-examination where the
witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined
and the matter on which the cross-examination is
sought us not in controversy. (People v Seneris, 99
SCRA 92)
● If the witness was not cross-examined because of
causes attributable to the cross-examining party and
the witness had always made himself available for
cross-examination, the direct testimony if the witness
shall remain in the record and cannot be ordered
stricken out because the cross-examiner is deemed to
have waived the right to cross examine the witness (De
la Paz Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 65)
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESS PREROGATIVE
OF THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE WITNESS IS
CALLED
CASE:
People v Fabre (385 SCRA 185)
DOCTRINE:
The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the
party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of
cross-examination is to test the truth and accuracy of the
statements of a witness made on a direct examination. The
party against whom the witness testifies may deem any
further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any
other evidence therefore adduced of thereafter to the
adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of
the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to
give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct
examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the
other party.
FACTS:
Leonardo Fabre was accused of rape by his daughter,
Marilou Fabre. During the trial, the prosecution presented
Marilou Fabre, Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the
accused and Dr. Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou
Fabre. The defense presented Leonardo Fabre and also called
 Adela Fabre to the witness stand. The trial court gave
credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution
particularly the narration of the young complainant thus
Leonardo Fabre was convicted of rape and sentenced to
death. Upon automatic review, the accused argues that the
testimony of the Fabre, should acquire more strength for the
failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on
him and to present any rebuttal evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Fabre should acquire more
strength because of failure o f the prosecution to cross-
examine him.
HELD:
The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the
party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of
cross-examination is to test the truth and accuracy of the
statements of a witness made on a direct examination. The
party against whom the witness testifies may deem any
further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any
other evidence therefore adduced of thereafter to the
adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of
the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to
give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct
examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the
other party.
Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and
extent. — After the cross-examination of the witness
has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the
party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers
given during the cross-examination. On re-direct-
examination, questions on matters not dealt with
during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the
court in its discretion.
It may be an opportunity to rehabilitate a witness whose
credibility has been damaged.
Section 8. Re-cross-examination. — Upon the
conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse
party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters
stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such
other matters as may be allowed by the court in its
discretion
Section 9. Recalling witness. — After the examination
of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court.
The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion,
as the interests of justice may require.
2. Leading and Misleading Questions
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A
question which suggests to the witness the answer
which the examining party desires is a leading
question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross-examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and
intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of
feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party.
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a
fact not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to
that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed.
Leading questions
Those which suggest to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires.
GENERAL RULE: It is not allowed.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. On cross-examination
2. On preliminary matters
3. When there is difficulty in getting direct and
intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant,
or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind
4. Unwilling or hostile witness
5. Witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation
or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party
Additional exception:
1. In all stages of examination of a child if the same
will further the interests of justice (Sec. 20, Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-
SC.)
Sec. 20. Leading Questions. — The court may
allow leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child if the same will further the
interests of justice.
Misleading questions
One which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the
witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It
is not allowed in any type of examination (Riano, supra at
373).
Note:
Only one counsel should be allowed to examine a witness in
a single stage. However, the other counsel may make
objection to the testimony.
Reasons:
1. To protect the witness from undue and confusing
interrogation
2. To secure system and brevity by giving the control
of the interrogation to a single hand
CASE:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y
SEBUNG
G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003
DOCTRINE:
Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are
 allowed if the same will further the interest of justice. The the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has
revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused been convicted of an offense. (15)
deserves full credit, as the willingness of complainant to face
police investigation and to undergo the trouble and A party can impeach the adverse party’s witness by:
humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of her
complaint.
1. Contradictory evidence
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
FACTS: 3. Evidence of bad character
4. Evidence of bias, interest, prejudice, or
For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial incompetence
Court finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty of raping Mayia
P. Ponseca and imposing on appellant the death penalty.
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. —
Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
On appeal, Appellant contends that his identification in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party
open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his
out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the
credibility.
man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile
Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that
only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing
when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to
of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify,
him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give any
or his having misled the party into calling him to the
description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant
witness stand.
claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the
after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the
witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by
identification was not done with the usual police line-up.
the party presenting him in all respects as if he had
been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of
ISSUE:
his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-
examined by the adverse party, but such cross-
Whether or not the testimony of the minor-victim should be
examination must only be on the subject matter of his
expunged on the ground that leading questions were asked
examination-in-chief. (6a, 7a)
during her testimony in court.
*(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or (e) Of a witness
who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
HELD:
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party.
No. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However,
the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child
GENERAL RULE: A party who voluntarily offers the
of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state
testimony of a witness in the case is bound by the testimony
facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions
of said witness.
are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In
the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing
leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and EXCEPTIONS:
unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not
uncertain. 1. Hostile witness;
2. Where the witness is the adverse party or the
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the representative of a juridical person which is the
courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child adverse party; and
witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on 3. When the witness is not voluntarily offered but is
Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on required by law to be presented by the proponent,
December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the as in the case of subscribing witnesses to a will.
ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of (Fernandez v. Tantoco)
the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading A party can impeach his own witness only by:
questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed
if the same will further the interests of justice."
1. Evidence contradictory to his testimony
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
3. Impeachment

Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful
acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of
In the case of hostile witnesses, adverse party witnesses or
involuntary witnesses, they can also be impeached by other
modes of impeachment, aside from contradictory
statements and prior inconsistent statements made by them.
Contradictory evidence- Other testimony of the same
witness, or other evidence presented by him in the same
case, but not the testimony of another witness.

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 Prior inconsistent statements- Oral or documentary
statements made by the witness sought to be impeached on
occasions other than the trial in which he is testifying.
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of
inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning
them. (16)
How to impeach a witness by prior inconsistent
statements: By “laying the predicate”
1. Confront him with such statements, with the
circumstances under which they were made;
2. Ask him whether he made such statements; and
3. Give him a chance to explain the inconsistency.
Unless the witness is given the opportunity to explain the
discrepancies, the impeachment is incomplete. (US v.
Baluyot)
However, such defect in the impeachment of the witness is
deemed waived if no objection on that ground is raised
when the document involved is offered for admission.
(People v. Molo)
CASE:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CASTILLANO,
SR. et al.
G.R. No. 139412, April 2, 2003
DOCTRINE:
SEC 13- Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that
he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him,
with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made
such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness
before any question is put to him concerning them.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31 convicting appellants
Ronald Castillano alias "Nono" and Jaime Castillano, Jr. of
murder of the Diosdado Volante.
Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He
asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of
Diosdado, was inconsistent with her testimony during the
preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her
sworn statement before the police investigators as well as the
testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and
the physical evidence on record.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts
that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the prosecution’s
principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
during the preliminary examination before the municipal
trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police
investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn
statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by
the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court.
Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her
testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not,
therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported
inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence
ISSUE:
Whether or not a testimony made in open court may be
impeached by asserting that the said testimony is
inconsistent with those made by the witness in the
preliminary examination.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Before the credibility of a
witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be
impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements
which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-
examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for
impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the
witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a
chance to recollect and to explain the apparent
inconsistency between his two statements and state the
circumstances under which they were made.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her
testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain
any discrepancies between her present testimony and her
testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and
offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for
the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her
present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence
and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn
statement cannot be considered by the court.
4. Reference to a Memorandum by the Witness
Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides for the
rule on reference to a memorandum by the witness. It states
that:
Section 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. —
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by
himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other
time when the fact was fresh in his memory and knew
that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and
may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and may
read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from
such writing or record, though he retain no recollection
of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the
writing or record correctly stated the transaction when
made; but such evidence must be received with
caution.
 In American jurisprudence, the first sentence of Sec. 16 is
known as the rule on “revival of present memory,” and the
second sentence is known as “revival of past recollection.”
The first rule applies if the witness remembers the facts
regarding his entries and is entitled to greater weight; the
second rule applies where the witness does not recall the
facts involved, and is entitled to lesser weight. (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium)
The provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that
there is a need to refresh the memory of the witness.
Furthermore, the memorandum used to refresh the memory
of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be
admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has
just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In
other words, where the witness has testified independently
of or after his memory has been refreshed by a
memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum
is not admissible as corroborative evidence, since a
witness may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just
because he supports his open-court declaration with written
statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them
during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate
of his failing memory is priorly laid down (Borromeo vs.
CA, et al., L-31342, April 7, 1976).When can a witness
refresh his memory by memorandum? What is the rule
on Revival of Present Memory?
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a
fact, by:
1. Anything written or recorded by himself or under
his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or
immediately thereafter , or at any other time when
the fact was fresh in his memory and knew that the
same was correctly written or recorded;
2. In such case that writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse
party, who may, if he chooses, cross examine the
witness upon it, and may read in in evidence.
What is the Rule on Revival of Past Recollection?
A witness may testify from such writing or record, though he
retain no recollection of particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the
transaction when made, but such evidence must be received
by caution.
CASES:
ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 96202, April 13, 1999
DOCTRINE:
Where the witness has testified independently of or after his
testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the
events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence.
FACTS:
Petitioner entered into two contracts with private
respondent Socor Construction Corporation. Due to
Petitioner’s refusal to pay the amount billed by the
Respondent, the latter brought a suit to recover from the
former the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3%
a month.
To prove the unpaid bills of the petitioner, private
respondent presented its Book of Collectible Accounts and
their bookkeeper, Dolores Aday to testify on the entries of
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
the said book. During the trial, Aday admitted that she had
no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry.
She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her.
But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts
stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in
the bills were supervised by "an engineer for such functions.
The trial court, giving due weight to the plaintiff’s Book of
Collectible Accounts, as well as Aday’s testimony, ruled in
favor of respondent. On appeal, said decision was affirmed
by the CA. Petitioner contends that Aday’s testimony is
considered a hearsay for lack of personal knowledge of the
entries made as the information entered was merely
provided to her by the engineers of the respondent.
It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although
the entries cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay
rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner contends that
evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it
was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not testimony of a witness as to entries made
by her based on bills provided to her is inadmissible on the
ground of hearsay evidence rule.
(2) Whether or not the testimony of a witness as to entries
made by her based on information provided to her may be
admissible as memorandum used to refresh the memory of
the witness
HELD:
(1) The answer is in the affirmative. When the witness had
no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the
person who gave him the information is individually known
and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is
not part of a system of entries where scores of employees
have intervened, such entry is not admissible without the
testimony of the informer.
(2) The answer is in the negative. Assuming that the book of
collectible accounts presented by the respondent would
qualify as a memorandum, the memorandum used to refresh
the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and
may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the
witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed
memory. In other words, where the witness has testified
independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed
by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such
memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It
is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any
written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be
more credible just because he supports his open-court
declaration with written statements of the same facts even if
he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless
the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid
down. What is more, even where this requirement has been
satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such
evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is
not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this
nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain
materially or otherwise from the admission of such
evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO
PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO
G.R. No. 90198, November 7, 1995
DOCTRINE:
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness
is not altogether proscribed based on Section 16, Rule 132, of
the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
 Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito)
Descartin were accused of robbery with homicide. The
Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of
alibi. It convicted the three accused of murder.
The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted
appellants. Appellants attack the credibility of the
prosecution's lone eyewitness. It is asserted that the
testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth
since, while testifying, she would at times be seen reading
some notes written on her left palm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony of a witness, who during her
testimony was seen looking at some notes written on her
palm, should not be given credence
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The use of memory aids
during an examination of a witness is not altogether
proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a
fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his
direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who
may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and
may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from
such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of
the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or
record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of that
discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has
explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates
and like details.
5. Classes of Documents
Rule 132, Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For the
purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary
public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to the
entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Classes of Documents
1. Public – by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because ih has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a
notarial will) or a competent public official
with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and
requires no further authentication in order to
be presented as evidence in court (G.R.no.
164457, April 11 ,2012)
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
2. Private – is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person
without the intervention of anotary or other
person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
(Tan)
Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document.
– A document electronically notarized in accordance
with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall
be considered as a public document and proved as a
notarial document under the Rules of Court.
CASES:
Iwasawa vs. Gangan
DOCTRINE:
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Japanese national married Private respondent
in 2002. Private respondent confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband passed away. This
prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of
his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the
ground that their marriage is a bigamous one During trial,
aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the
following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the
NSO: (1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and
private respondent to prove the fact of marriage between the
parties on November 28, 2002; (2) Certificate of Marriage
between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo to prove the fact of marriage between the parties
on June 20, 1994 Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo; (3) Certification from the NSO to the effect that
there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office
pertaining to private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian
certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public
documents issued by said office was necessary before they
could be accorded evidentiary weight.
HELD:
The answer in the negative. There is no question that the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents. Art. 410 of the Civil Code provides that “the
books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.”
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness
Asian Terminals vs. Philam Insurance
DOCTRINE:
A private document requires authentication in the manner
prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
FACTS:
Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219
packages containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup
Truck on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to
Manila. The shipment was insured with Philam against all
risks. When the package arrived and was unloaded by ATI, it
was found that the package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in
bad order. The shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla
Customs Brokerage, Inc., the authorized broker of Universal
Motors, and delivered to the latter’s warehouse. Owing to
the extent of the damage to said cargoes, Universal Motors
 declared them a total loss. Universal Motors filed a formal
claim for damages against Westwind, ATI10 and R.F. Revilla
Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands
remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was
compensated by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors
issued a Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam. When the
case was elevated to the SC, petitioners objected to the
admission of Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt
for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by the
persons who executed them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certificates and/or receipts offered as
evidence required authentication.
HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Public documents, as
enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
are self-authenticating and require no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.
A private document is any other writing, deed or
instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized
by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set
forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private
document requires authentication in the manner prescribed
under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that
which it is claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances,specifically:
(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context
of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable
document have not been specifically denied under oath by
the adverse party;
(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted; or
(d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the
Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam
and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their
business. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of
authentication of a private document obtains in these cases,
said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam
without being properly authenticated.
Private Document
- Unverified and unidentified private document
cannot be accorded probative value.
- A Defective Notarization will strip the document
of its public character and reduce it to a private
instrument and would not invalidate the
transaction evidence therein.
- In determining the genuineness of a signature,
the testimony of the very person whose siganture is
disuputed is a competent proof on the genuineness
of such signature, otherwise(if the testimony of the
writer is not available) the testimony of a witness
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
who has seen the writer sign his name or actually
make the writing.
- The requirment of authentication only pertains
to private documents and does not apply to public
documents, these being admissible without further
proof of their execution or genuineness, it is already
presumed. Two reasons in support of this rule :
1. Said documents have been executed in the
proper registry and are presumed to be valid
and genuine until the contrary is shown by
clear and convincing proof; and,
2. Public documents are authenticated by th
official signature and seals which the bear and
of which seals, courts may take judicial notice.
(G.R. No. 170125, July 16,2012)
“Ancient Document Rule” – Sec.21, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court
Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private
document not necessary. — Where a private document
is more than thirty years old, is produced from the
custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
authenticity need be given.
- Ancient documents are considered from proper
custody if they come from a place from which they
might reasonably be expected to be found.
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. —
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given
by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Section 23. Public documents as
evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.
- Public document cannot be given probative weight
in view of the fact that the public officers who
issued the same did not testify in court to prove the
facts stated therin, at best, they may be considered
only as prima facie evidence of their due execution
and date of issuance.(G.R.No. 215009, January 23,
2017)
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate
 may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
- Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof.The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
- Certification is not required in case of Special
Power of Attorney notarized abroad in order to
institute a petition before the court, what is
importantn is that it was certified before a
commissioned officer clothed with powers to
administer an oath that he is authorizing the
persons to institute the petition before the court a
quo on his behalf.
- Private International law , a foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact.(Doctrine of
Processual Presumption)
- Foreign law may be proven by the following:
1. Publication of the said foreign laws;
2. By a copy duly attested by the officer in custody
thereof.
Section 25. What attestation of copy must
state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Section 26. Irremovability of public record. — Any
public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which
it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just
determination of a pending case.
Section 27. Public record of a private document. — An
authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof,
attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
Section 28. Proof of lack of record. — A written
statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
Section 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any
judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a)
want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b)
collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party
offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.
- Extrinsic fraud refersto any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in litigation committed outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is
prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case
by fraud or deception practicedon him by his
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court,
by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or
where the defendant never had the knowledge of
the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat. (G.R. No.
180819, July 5, 2010)
- The remedy is an action to annul judgment under
Rule 47 or petition from relie judgment under Rule
38 of Rule of Civil Procedure.
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every
instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified
as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved.
- A notarized documents is merely an evidence of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
- Notarized documents enjoys presumption of
regularity, but not to its validity.
- Improperly notarized document is not public
document and will not enjoy the presumption of its
due execution and authenticity.
Section 31. Alteration in document, how to
explain. — The party producing a document as genuine
which has been altered and appears to have been
altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, must account for the alteration.
He may show that the alteration was made by another,
without his concurrence, or was made with the consent
of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly
or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change
the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails
to do that, the document shall not be admissible in
evidence.
Section 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between
sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as their
admissibility as evidence is concerned.
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial
language. — Documents written in an unofficial
language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties
or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
prepared before trial.
6. Offer of Evidence
“Offer of evidence” as used in Section 35 of the Rules of
Court must be understood to mean presentation or
introduction of evidence. Hence, a document or article is
not evidence when it is simply marked for identification, it
must be formally offered for evidence.
Objection is an argument or reasons presented against an
act of the adverse party or his counsel, or against the
determination by the court in the course of the trial.
Section 34 – Offer of Evidence - The court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Purpose why offer must be specified: To determine
whether that piece of evidence should be admitted or not
 because such evidence may be admissible for several inadmissible. It does not specify the grounds for objection.
purposes under the doctrine of multiple admissibility. “Broadside Objection”
2. Specific Objection – It states why or how the evidence is
You follow what is stated in the offer: It must be rejected irrelevant or incompetent.
if it is inadmissible for the purpose stated even if it is
admissible for another purpose. When to make objection:

Exception to the formal offer rule: Offer Time to Object

When the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly Offered orally Made immediately
recorded, r the evidence was incorporated in the records of after the offer is made
the case where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative
facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, o Question propounded in Made as soon as the
when there is judicial admission, or giving credibility on the the course of the oral grounds thereof shall
demeanor of the witness. examination of a witness become reasonably
apparent
Section 35 – When to make offer - As regards the
testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the Offer of evidence in Within 3 days after
time the witness is called to testify. writing notice of the offer
unless a different
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after period is allowed by
the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence. Such the court.
offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to
be done in writing. Section 37 – When repetition of objection unnecessary.
- When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course
Testimonial/Oral Documentary and of the examination of a witness that the question being
Evidence Object Evidence propounded are of the same class as those to which
objection has been made, whether such objection was
At the time the witness is After the party has sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to
called to testify presented his repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse
testimonial evidence, party to record his continuing objection to such class of
before he rests questions.

Oral Evidence is Always
Offered 2x:
1. Before the witness
testified
2. Every time a question is
asked of him (implied
offer)
Offered only once Section 38 – Ruling. - The ruling of the court must be
given immediately after the objection is made, unless
the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform
itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall
always be made during the trial and at such time as will
give the party against whom it is made an opportunity
to meet the situation presented by the ruling.

The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection

Section 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered
orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of
the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon
as the grounds there for shall become reasonably
apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to
within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be
specified.
need not be stated. However, if the objection is based
on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the
objection on one or some of them must specify the
ground or grounds relied upon.
Section 39 – Striking out answer. - Should a witness
answer the question before the adverse party had the
opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and
such objection is found to be meritorious, the court
shall sustain the objection and order the answer given
to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the
striking out of answers which are incompetent,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
CASES:

Classification of Objection: Lomides Aludos, Deceased, Substituted by Flora

Aludos vs. Johnny M. Suerte
1. General Objection – It does not go beyond declaring the GR. No. 165285, June 18, 2012
evidence as immaterial, incompetent, irrelevant or DOCTRINE:

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
 The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May
1, 1985 lease contract between the Baguio City Government
and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence
before the RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer,
Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was part of the
records of the case.
Under Sec. 34, Rule 134 of the Rules of Court, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
“The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of
the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless
and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose
or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.
FACTS:
In this case, the respondent Johnny M. Suerte filed an action
for specific performance and damages against the petitioner
Lomides Aludos; Johnny seeks the execution of the contract
of sale between him and the petitioner. Johnny alleges that
the petitioner and him executed a contract whereby the
petitioner agreed to sell his Market Stall (with
improvements) and lot in the Baguio Public Market.
However, the petitioner contends that the contract was
actually for a loan, with the market stall and lot used as a
security for the loan; in fact, the petitioner already paid the
alleged loan amounting to Php 68,000.00 to the respondent.
The petitioner argues further that there can never be a valid
contract of sale over the market stall/lot as well as the
improvements therein, because the petitioner does not own
such market lot and he is just a lessee, with the Baguio
Government as owner of the lot. As evidence, the petitioner
presented Exhibit “A” (lease contract between the petitioner
and the Baguio City Government) which shows the
agreement of lease between petitioner and the Baguio City
Government, and also provides that “all improvements
introduced shall ipso facto become properties of the City of
Baguio.”.
However, the CA found that the said “Exhibit A” was not
actually the governing lease contract between the petitioner
and the Baguio City Government. In fact, the said exhibit
was merely a permit issued by the City Treasurer in favor of
the Lomises. The actual contract of lease dated May 1, 1985
was never formally offered in evidence before the RTC and
could thus not be considered pursuant to the rules of
evidence. Thus, the CA ruled that while the sale of the
market lot can not be valid as this is the government’s
property, the market stall and its improvements can be a
valid subject of the contract of sale as this is the personal
property of the petitioner. The petitioner now questions the
said resolution demanding him to sell his market stall and
improvements to the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid contract of sale regarding the
Market Stall and its improvements?
HELD:
The Court ruled that there is indeed a valid contract of sale
regarding the Market Stall and its improvements, because
these were personal properties of the petitioner. The actual
contract of lease (dated May 1, 1985) was never formally
offered in evidence. Allegedly, the contract could have
supported petitioner’s claim that the market stall and
improvements cannot be a valid subject of sale due to the
provision in the contract saying “all improvements
introduced shall ipso facto become properties of the City of
Baguio.”. However, since it was not formally offered in
evidence, it cannot be considered by the Court. Therefore
EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro
Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020
the Court affirms the ruling of the CA and remands the case
to the RTC for the determination of the value of the
improvements on the market stall of the petitioner and for
the parties to proceed with the contract of sale therein.
WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION
(WINCORP) vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR. et al. (G.R. No.
194128, December 7, 2011)
DOCTRINE:
Section 34. Offer of evidence —The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
"The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of
the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless
and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose
or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight."
FACTS:
The Francias invested their money in Wincorp for 11%
interest for 43 days. They failed to collect upon maturity and
their investment were rolled over for another 34 days for
which Confirmation Advices were issued by Wincorp
indicating Pearlbank as the actual borrower of the funds
invested. Failing again to collect, the Francias filed a
collection suit against Wincorp and respondent Pearlbank
before the RTC. Wincorp did not object or comment to the
evidence offered by the Francias and filed a motion to
postpone hearing 3 days before the scheduled hearing for
presentation of Wincorp’s defense evidence which was
denied. RTC considered Wincorp to have waive its right to
present evidence. It held Wincorp solely liable to the
Francias and dismissed the case against Pearlbank. CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in not admitting the documents
attached to Wincorp’s pleadings?
HELD:
Yes. It appears that Wincorp was given ample opportunity to
file its Comment/Objection to the formal offer of evidence
of the Francias but it chose not to file any. All the documents
attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA cannot
be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason
that, as correctly observed by the CA, these documents were
not formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To
consider them now would deny the other parties the right to
examine and rebut them. This is in accordance with Section
34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
7. Tender of Excluded Evidence
Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence – If documents
or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court,
the offeror may have the same attached to or made part
of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony.
PURPOSE
1. To allow the court to know the nature of testimony or the
documentary evidence and convince the trial judge to
permit the evidence or testimony, and
2. To create and preserve a record for appeal, if the trial
judge is not convince to reverse his earlier ruling.
HOW IS THE TENDER DONE?
Documentary or object evidence
 1. The offering counsel produces, describes and identifies the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc and before this Court
object or document, and in the case of the latter to state the has petitioner offered any plausible explanation as to why it
contents of the document that is sought to be admitted failed to properly make an offer of proof or tender of
where the substance of the same is not apparent on its face. excluded evidence . Instead, petitioner harps on the fact that
Reading the substance of the document is an accepted way respondent CIR simply refused its claim for refund on the
of stating the contents for the record in states which ground that Revenue Regulation 17-99 was a valid issuance.
recognize a tender. A disclosure of the contents of the Thus, for its failure to seasonably avail of the proper remedy
documents is necessary to aid the court in determining its under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
competence and relevance. is precluded from doing so at this late stage of the case.
2. State the purpose for which the object or document is Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in.
sought to be attached is offered, and ask that it be marked Testimonial evidence
for identification and have it attached to the record. 1. The counsel tells the court what the proposed testimony
EXCLUDED EVIDENCE REJECTED BY LOWER COURT will be. This the method prescribed by the Rules. After
NOT ATTACHED TO THE RECORD CANNOT BE stating for the record, the name and other personal
CONSIDERED IN DISPOSING THE CASE circumstances of the witness.
CASE: 2. Question and answer format.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation v CIR (761 SCRA 174) The method used depends on the discretion of the court.
DOCTRINE: The tender is not meant to be a mere manifestation to the
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary court in mere general terms. It must be in the form of
evidence was rejected by the lower court and the offeror did conclusions of facts. The offer must make reference to the
not move that the same be attached to the record, the same details of the excluded testimony or excluded document.
cannot be considered in disposing the case. For the appellate GENERAL OFFER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
court to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one An erroneous way of making an offer of excluded testimony
party at all during the proceedings below, would infringe the is to make a general offer of proof (tender of excluded
constitutional right of the adverse party – in this case the evidence) without producing the witness or stating the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) , to due process of evidence whereby the fact in issue is to be proved (Douillard
law. It also bears pointing out during the proceedings of the v Wood [1942].
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc and before this Court FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE V FORMAL OFFER OF
has petitioner offered any plausible explanation as to why it PROOF
failed to properly make an offer of proof or tender of FORMAL OFFER OF FORMAL OFFER OF
excluded evidence . Instead, petitioner harps on the fact that EVIDENCE PROOF
respondent CIR simply refused its claim for refund on the ● Offer of the Process by which a
ground that Revenue Regulation 17-99 was a valid issuance. testimony of the proponent of an
Thus, for its failure to seasonably avail of the proper remedy witness prior to excluded evidence
under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, petitioner the latter’s tenders the same
is precluded from doing so at this late stage of the case. testimony
Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in. ● Offer of the
FACTS: documentary
Fortune Tobacco filed a claim for tax credit or refund under and object
Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) evidence
of 1997 for erroneously or illegally collected specific taxes
covering the period June to December 31, 2004 in the total
amount of Php219,566,450. It then filed a Petition for Review ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AFTER THE CASE IS RESTED
which was raffled to the Former First Division of this CTA. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting
After trial on the merits, the Former First Division, rendered the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after
the decision that RR 17-99 is contrary to law and that there is it has rested its case (Republic v Sandiganbayan [Fourth
insufficient of evidence on the claim for refund. Petitioner Division], 662 SCRA 184, December 13, 2011).
filed for a motion for reconsideration which was denied. It
elevated its claim to CTA En Banc, but was rebuffed after the
tax tribunal found no cause to reverse the findings of and GROUP 6:
conclusions of the CTA Division. Hence this petition. 1. Anenias, Frances Cathy
ISSUE: 2. Angeles, Alynna
Whether or not the court may take into consideration 3. Bayabao, April Z.
petitioner’s evidence which were refused admission by the 4. Enriquez, Mark Angelo
CTA Division and CTA En Banc for being merely 5. Guevarra, Ivan
photocopies. 6. Tus, Ma. Ella Concepcion D.
HELD:
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary
evidence was rejected by the lower court and the offeror did
not move that the same be attached to the record, the same
cannot be considered in disposing the case. For the appellate
court to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one
party at all during the proceedings below, would infringe the
constitutional right of the adverse party – in this case the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) , to due process of
law. It also bears pointing out during the proceedings of the

EVIDENCE | TH 5:30-9:30 | Judge Byron San Pedro

Arellano University School of Law, First Sem, A.Y. 2019-2020