THE HON. EXPEDITO B.

PILAR, in his capacity as ViceMayor and concurrently presiding

officer protempore of the Sanguniang Bayan of Dasol, Pangasinan, petitioner, vs. THE
SANGUNIANG BAYAN OF DASOL, PANGASINAN, composed of the HON. LODOVICO
ESPINOSA, Municipal Mayor and presiding officer of said body and the following members of
that body: HON. AVELINO N. NACAR, HON. LUZ B. JIMENEZ, HON. GERARDO B. RIVERA,
HON. JUAN M. BONUS, HON. APOLONIO G. ABELLA, HON. ABRAHAM BALAOING, HON. JAIME
ABELLA, HON. LAURENTINO BALAOING, HON. MA. LINDA BUSTRIA, HON. CEFERINO
QUINITIO, HON. ELIFAS VIDAL, and MR. VICTORIANO BUAGA, Municipal Treasurer of Dasol,
Pangasinan, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. Elected with him
were Lodovico Espinosa as the municipal mayor and the following members of the Sanguniang
Bayan, to wit: Avelino Nacar, Luz Jimenez, Gerardo Rivera, Juan Bonus, Apolonio G. Abella,
Jaime Abella, Laurentino Balaoing and Elifas Vidal. All of them assumed office on March 1,
1980. Later on, the following also became members of the Sanguniang Bayan: Linda Bustria,
Abraham Balaoing and Ceferino Quinitio.

On March 4, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the
mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per annum respectively. It did not
provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such position is entitled to an
annual salary of P16,044.001 (Circular No. 9-A).

Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of
his salary. The proper provincial2 and national officials3 endorsed compliance with Circular 9-A of the
Joint Commission on Local Government and Personnel Administration in giving the revised rate of salary
for petitioner. The mayor was sent a letter by the Executive Secretary of the Commission advising him
that the Municipality should pay the ViceMayor the salary due him equivalent to that of the Municipal
Treasurer per Circular No. 15.

On October 26, 1982, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of
P15,144.00 as payment of the unpaid salaries of the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to December 31,
1982. The resolution was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the petitioner of this
petition for a writ of mandamus on February 16, 1983.

Respondents Allegation:

Filing of the petition is premature because the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies
contending that petitioner should have lodged his complaint first with the Ministry of Local Government
and Community Development.

This Court does not have jurisdiction over the case because the right of the petitioner to receive a salary
depends on the availability of municipal funds and “the availability or nonavailability of municipal funds is
a factual issue which is not cognizable by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner admitted that at the time he submitted his memorandum, he has been fully paid of his salaries
as provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg 51 and implemented by Circular No. 9-A of the Joint Commission
for Local Government and Personnel Administration

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent mayor shall be personally liable to damages incurred by the petitioner

RULING:

We find and rule that petitioner is entitled to damages and attorney’s fees because the facts show that
petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which was unduly denied him for three
(3) years and that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner’s plainly
valid, just demandable claim

That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the
miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26,
1982 the Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner.

While “to veto or not to veto involves the exercise of discretion” as contended by
respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner
when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the
salary of the petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in
complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau
of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed
salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public
good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective
damages.

The petition is hereby considered moot and academic but respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to pay
petitioner from his private and personal funds actual damages and costs of litigation the amount of
P5,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00; exemplary or corrective damages in the amount
of P5,000.00; and attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
 OSMUNDO G. RAMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE ABALA, MELCHOR ABANGAN,
EUTIQUIO ALEGRADO, EMIGDIO BLANCO, ISABELO CABUENAS et al.,

Facts:

During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of Cebu, Osmundo G. Rama as vice-
governor and Pablo P. Garcia, Reynaldo M. Mendiola and Valeriano S. Carillo as members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, said officials adopted Resolution No. 990 which appropriated funds "for
the maintenance and repair of provincial roads and bridges and for the operation and
maintenance of the office of the provincial engineer and for other purposes.

In the said resolution it declared the policy, "to mechanize the maintenance and repair of all roads and
bridges of the province (including provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid 'JJ'), and to adopt a
more comprehensive, systematic, efficient, progressive and orderly operation and maintenance of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer."

To implement said policy, the provincial board resolved to abolish around thirty positions** the salaries of
which were paid from the 'JJ' Road and Bridge Fund thus doing away with the caminero (pick-shovel-
wheelbarrow) system. Consequently, around 200 employees of the province were eased out of their
respective jobs and the provincial government purchased heavy equipment worth P4,000,000.00.

Contrary to its declared policy to economize, the provincial administration later on hired around one
thousand new employees, renovated the office of the provincial engineer and provided the latter with a
Mercedes-Benz car.

Aggrieved by these turn of events, the employees whose positions were abolished filed separate petitions
for mandamus, damages and attorneys fees aimed at the annulment of Resolution No. 990, their
reinstatement and the recovery of damages

The Court of First Instance of Cebu declared Resolution No. 990 null and void and ordered the
respondent officials to re-create the positions abolished, to provide funds therefore, to reinstate the 56
petitioners headed by Jose Abala, and to pay them back salaries and no damages were awarded to
petitioners and no pronouncement as to attorney's fees were made.

All the parties appealed to the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision with the modification
that respondents were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their "individual and personal capacity"

ISSUE:

Whether or not Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo are personally liable for damages for adopting
a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants thereto

RULING:

We hold that the petitioners in the instant three cases are personally liable for damages
because of their precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly legal
means.

A public officer by virtue of his office alone is not immune from damages in his personal
capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith. A public officer who commits a tort or
other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his
office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual.

This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes
another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason
of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the
officials were acting outside of their official authority.

The provincial employees concerned were "eased out because of their party affiliation." i.e., they
belonged to the Liberal Party whose presidential candidate then was Sergio Osmeña, Jr. Such act of the
petitioners reflected their malicious intent to do away with the followers of the rival political party so as to
accommodate their own proteges who, it turned out, even outnumbered the dismissed employees.

municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or wantonly, and if the work which they
perform is done rather to injure an individual than to discharge a public duty. a public officer is civilly
liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public officers or
for wilfully or negligently causing damage to another (Article 20, Civil Code) or for wilfully causing loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and/or public policy (Article
21, New Civil Code).

Neither can petitioners shield themselves from liability by invoking the ruling in the cases of Carino vs.
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration, L-23966, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 268. In
those cases, the erring public officials were sued in their official capacities whereas in the instant cases,
petitioners were specifically sued in their personal capacities.

Suffice it to state that considering the positions they were holding, the dismissed employees concerned
belong to a low-salaried group, who, if deprived of wages would generally incur considerable economic
hardships. Justice demands that they be recompensed for the predicament they were placed in, apart
from the back salaries which they are entitled to as a matter of right.

Petitioner Rama's protestations that when he eventually became the governor of Cebu, he reinstated
most of the dismissed employees through provincial board Resolution No. 392 (L-44484 Rollo, p. 16)
cannot erase the fact that he had a hand in the adoption of Resolution No. 990. His subsequent
benevolent act cannot sufficiently make up for the damage suffered by the dismissed employees during
their period of unemployment.
 SOLANO LAGANAPAN, petitioner, vs. Mayor ELPIDIO ASEDILLO, MUNICIPALITY OF
KALAYAAN, LAGUNA, and EPIFANIO RAGOTERO, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan,
Laguna on 4 January 1960, with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor
Asedillo. On 1 July 1960, his salary was increased to P720.00 per annum extended an appointment
which was approved as provisional under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner
of Civil Service.

The petitioner was given another increase in salary and a corresponding appointment was made
which the Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No.
2260, to continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of
certification of eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. He was again given salary increases, and
new appointments were extended to him, which appointments were also approved.

On 16 February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by respondent
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no
civil service eligibility. Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan,
Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner.

The Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of
police of Kalayaan, Laguna. In view thereof, the petitioner complained to the Police Commission which
advised him to file an injunction suit against Mayor Asedillo. The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus,
quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction against herein respondents seeking his
reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages.

Respondent’s contention:

The appointment of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character and the petitioner having no civil
service eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the
appointing power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its part, alleged that the petitioner has no
cause of action against it; and that, if the acts of the respondent mayor are patently irregular, the
said mayor should be held solely liable therefor.

Judgement was rendered in favor of the petitioner, Ordering the respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and
the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan to forthwith reinstate the petitioner to his former position of
Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, restore the appropriation for his salary and pay him his back salaries.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent mayor shall be personally liable for the damages sustained by the petitioner
through his illegal acts

RULING:

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

While there are precedents which hold that before a litigant can bring a matter to court, it is necessary
that he first exhaust all the remedies in the administrative branch of the government, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. The principle requiring
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one; where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the services of the appellee, the appellant
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily without any semblance of compliance or even an attempt to
comply with the elementary rules of due process.

No charges were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in order to give the appellee an opportunity to
defend himself, despite the provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the
Police Act of 1966:

"Members of the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint
filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or incompetence,
dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and
violation of law."

Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies before appellee could
come to court for the protection of his rights. While it may be true that the appellee was holding a
provisional appointment at the time of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official who could be
dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days after receipt
by the appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission

SOLE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT MAYOR

The records show that the action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo, not personally, but in his capacity
as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, and he appeared and defended the action in such capacity.
After the summary dismissal of the petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo on 16 February 1967, the
Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least protesting the petitioner's summary
dismissal from his position, even abolished the appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of
Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider this act of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or
confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner.

A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back
salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not
applicable in this instance.

Such being the case, the petitioner-appellee is entitled only to back salaries which, however, should be
limited to a period of five (5) years. In addition, respondent Mayor Asedillo who was sued in his official
capacity as municipal mayor, having passed away, the liability to pay petitioner his back salaries must
now devolve upon the respondent municipality alone.
 MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, SENIFORO PERIDO, and VICTOR MADERAZO, JR., petitioners, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

On October 22, 1997, an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), charging the
following with grave coercion: Municipal Mayor Melchor G. Maderazo; his nephew, Victor Maderazo, Jr.,
who is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan; and Seniforo Perido, Caibiran Police Station Chief, together
with Rodolfo Rico, Orlando Mocorro, Rodolfo Azur, Reynaldo Oledan, Jordan Gervacio and Jose Cesora.

It was alleged in the information that they eject one Medaria Verutiao from the market stall she was
occupying and leasing from the Municipality of Caibiran, thereby compelling her to give up her possession
and occupation to said market stall against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said Medaria
Verutiao and detriment of public service.

The prosecution presented Verutiao as sole witness. She testified that Municipal Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the development of the public market, in the absence of
adequate government finance, construction by private parties of buildings and other structures for
commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by
applying 50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for business.

She was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. After the construction, she then
opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the rentals in
1993. On January 13, 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract,13
renewable every year with a monthly rental of P400.00. In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her
P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall.14 However, considering that she
had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent.

On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo,
directing her to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for
the stall. The Mayor declared in his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled. They admitted that
Verutiao had not paid any rent since 1993 but maintained that, under Section 38 of Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1984,22 she did not have to pay rental until her expenses were reimbursed, as the rentals due
would be debited from 50% of the amount she advanced for the construction of the market stall, and
that she will vacate the stall only after the municipality shall have reimbursed her expenses in the
construction.

The locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on January 27, 1997. The contents of the market
stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for safekeeping. She considered
the act of the Mayor as a political harassment, given that her husband, was then a candidate for
councilor under the ticket of the opposition; and that she was a leader of the opposing party.

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment28 convicting the accused Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido,
and Victor Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of unjust vexation, but acquitted the other accused. As Mayor, he
could not eject the lessee by padlocking the market stall and order the hauling and seizure of the goods
contained therein. the accused cannot, however, be convicted of grave coercion because they did not use
violence, threats or intimidation.
ISSUE: whether or not the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners’ guilt for unjust
vexation.

RULING:

The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the guilt of petitioners Mayor Melchor
Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation.

in unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a
good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice. The main purpose of
the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may
take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any
person to take into his own hands the administration of justice.

Based on the evidence on record, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor
Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was
petitioner Melchor Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to
conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of the goods to the police
station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member, obeyed the order of the
Mayor.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the
stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the
crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by
said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or
disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners.

Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr., had no right,
without judicial intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the
police station, thereby preventing her from doing business therein and selling her merchandize. Petitioner
Mayor Maderazo had no right to take the law into his own hands and deprive Verutiao of her possession
of the stall and her means of livelihood.

Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the Municipality and to implement all approved programs, projects, services and activities of the
Municipality40 and to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the Municipality are collected.41 He is
obliged to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the recovery of
funds and property.42 However, in the performance of his duties, petitioner Mayor should act within the
confines of the law and not resort to the commission of a felony. A public officer is proscribed from
resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and ordinances. He must exercise his power and
perform his duties in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the people, and never
whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically.

petitioner had to file an action for unlawful detainer against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall
and cause her eviction from said premises.35 Verutiao insisted on her right to remain as lessee of her
stall and to do business thereat. Such action is designed to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
disorder and prevent those believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property resort to force
to gain possession rather than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert their claims.
It was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot be
permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee who is entitled to the actual possession and to place
the burden upon the latter of instituting an action to try the property right.

Petitioner Seniforo Perido deserving of an acquittal. The Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired
with the other petitioners. He was at the situs of the stall merely to witness the inventory and ensure
peace and order. He agreed to have the contents of the stall of Verutiao stored in the police station
presumably to protect the property from the elements and asportation by thieves until after Verutiao shall
have claimed the same or the disposition thereof determined by the authorities concerned.

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners, vs. RODRIGO APOSTOL,
FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF
KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO

FACTS:

February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up
truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck
was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto
Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at
General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some
fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
speed at the time of the accident.

He was initially treated at the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital. Due to the seriousness of his
injuries, he was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more intensive
treatment.9 despite medical attention; Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.

Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for
damages with the RTC against respondents.

The petitioners pray that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. They pointed out that that
proximate cause of Marvin’s death was Lozano’s negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle.

All respondents denied liability for Marvin’s death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the
pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin’s sudden sprint
across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the
vehicle when it hit Marvin.

RTC Disposition

On January 25, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme. The defendant Municipality
of Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other defendant (sic) being an agency of
the State performing a (sic) governmental functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes Simbulan,
not being the owner of the subject vehicle, he is absolved of any liability. Defendants Fidel Lozano,
Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly
and severally to pay the plaintiff.

CA Disposition

The CA granted the appeal. Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of Marvin
Jayme. paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of both
Mayor Miguel and Lozano. Not being the employer of Lozano, Mayor Miguel could not thus be held liable
for the damages caused by the former. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the
time of the accident.” it is the registered owner of a vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the
driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of the vehicle.

ISSUE:

Whether MAYOR FERNANDO MIGUEL may be held liable for the death of Marvin Jayme

RULING:

The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one’s own quasi-delictual
acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability.

To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be
established:

(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;

(2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to
give at all times; and

(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to
him. To make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that
the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.

It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence.

it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the
negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, we rely on the
four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer’s power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other
remuneration; (3) the employer’s right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the
employer’s right of suspension or dismissal.

the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano
at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality.
That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment.

An employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the
employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists. The
Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to
Mayor Miguel.

Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he
still can not be held liable. mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger
has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.

no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to
control the manner of the vehicle’s operation.26 In the absence of an employer-employee relationship
establishing vicarious liability, the driver’s negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who
only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.

the rule is well-settled both in this state and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or
subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only to the master or principal.
Supreme Court adhered to the general rule that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his
subordinates on a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation. The court
went on to rule that the only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or
encourage it.

In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There
existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him
accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him
warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter’s negligent acts.35
The driver’s duty is not one that may be delegated to others. The true and lawful employer of Lozano is
the Municipality of Koronadal.

Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State
engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.

“Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue
and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown
that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.”

Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the
rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the
vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the
public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences incident to its operation.
The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver’s employer, and the registered owner
of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the
vehicle.