Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt

Digitale Bibliothek des Sondersammelgebietes Vorderer Orient

Religion between violence and reconciliation

Scheffler, Thomas Scheffler, Thomas

Würzburg, 2002

urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-91336
 The series Beiruter Texte und Studien ( BTS ,
" Texts and Studies from Beirut " ) places its

thematical and regional focus on the Levant . It is

considered as a platform for interdisciplinary
debates pursued by cultural studies and social
sciences with the historical background .

This volume assembles the revised papers of the international

Symposium " Religion between Violence and Reconciliation \ held at
the German Orient Institute Beirut from September 11 to 13 , 1998 ,
and sponsored by the European Union in the framework of the
Beirut - based MEDA program " Vie commune - memoire partagee : le
Liban , laboratoire de la Mediterranee \ jointly organized by the
German Orient Institute and the French Centre d ' Etudes et de
Recherches sur le Moyen - Orient Contemporain ( CERMOC ) .
Thirty - five authors from nine countries and far more scholarly
' schools ' and intellectual " camps ' are discussing the relationship

between religion , conflict , and reconciliation in various cultural ,

spatial , and historical settings . In accordance with the academic
traditions of the German Orient Institute , special emphasis was laid
on the textual and historical dimensions of the topic . At the same
time , however , the contributors were invited to deal with ' religion '
not only as a matter of scriptures and beliefs , but also in a wider
sense , as a field of acts , symbols , and institutions . In order to place
the Lebanese experience in a comparative context , several case
studies on other countries were also included .
 ORIENT - INSTITUT

DER DEUTSCHEN MORGENLÄNDISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT

BEIRUTER TEXTE UND STUDIEN

1 . Michel Jiha : Der arabische Dialekt von Bismizzln . Volkstümliche Texte aus einem libanesi¬
schen Dorf mit Grundzügen der Laut - und Formenlehre . 1964 . XVH , 185 S .

2 . Bernhard Lewin : Arabische Texte im Dialekt von Hama . Mit Einleitung und Glossar . 1966 .
* 48 * , 230 S.

3 . Thomas Philipp : Gurgi Zaidän . His Life and Thought . 1979 . 249 S.

4 . cAbd al - Gani an - NäbulusI : At - tuhfa an - näbuluslya f ! r - rihla at - taräbulusiya . Hrsg . u . eingel .

von Heribert Busse . 1971 . XXIV , 10 S . dt . Text , 133 S . arab . Text .

5 . Baber Johansen : Muhammad Husain Haikai . Europa und der Orient im Weltbild eines ägyp¬
tischen Liberalen . 1967 . XIX , 259 S .

6 . Heribert Busse : Chalif und Großkönig . Die Buyiden im Iraq ( 945 - 1055 ) . 1969 . XTV , 610 S .,
6 Taf ., 2 Kto .

7 . Josef van Ess : Traditionistische Polemik gegen cAmr b . cUbaid . Zu einem Text des cAli b.
cUmar ad - Däraqutni . 1967 . 74 S . dt . Text , 16 S . arab . Text , 2 Taf .

8 . Wolfhart Heinrichs : Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik . Häzim al - Qartägannls

Grundlegung der Poetik mit Hilfe aristotelischer Begriffe . 1969 . 289 S.
9 . S tefan Wild : Libanesische Ortsnamen . Typologie und Deutung . 1973 . xu , 391 S .
10 . Gerhard Endress : Proclus Arabus . Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in
arabischer Übersetzung . 1973 . XVHI , 348 S . dt . Text , 90 S . arab . Text .

11 . Josef van Ess : .Frühe mu ctazilitische Häresiographie . Zwei Werke des NäsP al - Akbar ( gest . 293
H . ) . 1971 . Xn , 185 S . dt . Text , 134 S . arab . Text . ( Vergriffen )

12 . Dorothea Duda : Innenarchitektur syrischer Stadthäuser des 16 .- 18 . Jh . Die Sammlung Henri

Pharaon in Beirut . 1971 . VI , 176 S . , 88 Taf . , 6 Farbtaf . , 2 Faltpläne .

13 . Werner Diem : Skizzen jemenitischer Dialekte . 1973 . XII , 166 S .

14 . Josef van Ess : Anfänge muslimischer Theologie . Zwei antiqadaritische Traktate aus dem ersten
Jahrhundert der Higra . 1977 . XII , 280 S . dt . Text , 57 S . arab . Text .

15 . Gregor Schoeler : Arabische Naturdichtung . Die zahriyät , rabl clyät und raudlyät von ihren
Anfängen bis as - Sanaubari . 1974 . XII , 371 S.

16 . Heinz Gaube : Ein arabischer Palast in Südsyrien . Hirbet el - Baida . 1974 . XHI , 156 S ., 14 Taf .,
3 Faltpläne , 12 Textabb .

17 . Heinz Gaube : Arabische Inschriften aus Syrien . 1978 . XXII , 201 S ., 19 Taf .
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19 . Hans Daiber : Das theologisch - philosophische System des Mu cammar Ibn cAbbäd as - Sulami
( gest . 830 n . Chr . ) . 1975 . XU , 604 S.

20 . .Werner Ende : Arabische Nation und islamische Geschichte . Die Umayyaden im Urteil arabi¬
scher Autoren des 20 . Jahrhunderts . 1977 . XHI , 309 S .

21 . SalähaddIn al - Munaggid , Stefan Wild , Hrsg . und eingel . : Zwei Beschreibungen des Liba¬
non . cAbdalgani an - NäbulusIs Reise durch die Biqä c und al - cUtaifis Reise nach Tripolis . 1979 .
xvn u . XXVH , 144 S . arab . Text , 1 Kte . u . 2 Faltktn .

22 . Ulrich Haarmann , Peter Bachmann , Hrsg . : Die islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter und
Neuzeit . Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer zum 65 . Geburtstag . 1979 . XVI , 702 S ., 11 Taf .
23 . Rotraud Wielandt : Das Bild der Europäer in der modernen arabischen Erzähl - und Theater¬
literatur . 1980 . XW , 652 S.

24 . Reinhard Weipert , Hrsg . : Der Diwan des Rä cI an - Numairi . 1980 . IV dt ., 363 S . arab . Text .

25 . As cAD E . Khairallah : Love , Madness and Poetiy . An Interpretation of the Magnün Legend . 1980 .
163 S .

26 . Rotraud Wielandt : Das erzählerische Frühwerk Mahmud Taymürs . 1983 . XII , 434 S.

27 . Anton Heinen : Islamic Cosmology . A study of as - SuyütJ ' s al - Hay 3a as - sunmya fi l - hay ^a
as - sunniya with critical edition , translation and commentaiy . 1982 . V1E , 289 S . engl . Text , 78 S .
arab . Text .

28 . Wilferd Madelung : Arabic Texts concerning the history of the Zaydi Imäms of Tabaristän ,
Daylamän and Gilän . 1987 . 23 S . engl . Text , 377 S . arab . Text .

29 . Donald P . Little : A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al - Haram as - Sarif in Jerusalem .
1984 . Xm , 480 S . engl . Text , 6 S . arab . Text , 17 Taf .

30 . Katalog der arabischen Handschriften in Mauretanien . Bearbeitet von U . Rebstock , R . Osswald

und A . Wuld cAbdalqädir . 1988 . XII , 164 S .

31 . Ulrich Marzolph : Typologie des persischen Volksmärchens . 1984 . XIII , 312 S ., 5 Tab . u . 3 Ktn .

32 . Stefan Leder : Ibn al - Gauzi und seine Kompilation wider die Leidenschaft . 1984 . XIV , 328 S.
dt . Text , 7 S . arab . Text , 1 Falttaf .

33 . Rainer Osswald : Das Sokoto - Kalifat und seine ethnischen Grundlagen . 1986 . VIII , 177 S .

34 . Zuhair FathalläH , Hrsg . : Der Diwan des cAbd al - Latif Fathalläh . 1984 . 1196 S . arab . Text . In
zwei Teilen .

35 . Irene Fellmann : Das Aqräbädin al - Qalänisi . Quellenkritische und begriffsanalytische Unter¬

suchungen zur arabisch - pharmazeutischen Literatur . 1986 . VI , 304 S.

36 . Helene Sader : Les Etats Arameens de Syrie depuis leur Fondation jusqu ' ä leur Transformation
en Provinces Assyrierines . 1987 . XHI , 306 S . franz . Text .
37 . Bernd Radtke : Adab al - Mulük . 1991 . XII , 34 S . dt . Text , 145 S . arab . Text .

38 . Ulrich Haarmann : Das Pyramidenbuch des Abu Ga cfar al - Idrisi ( st . 649 / 1251 ) . 1991 . XI u .
VI , 94 S . dt . Text , 283 S . arab . Text .

39 . Tilman Nagel , Hrsg . : Göttinger Vorträge - Asien blickt auf Europa , Begegnungen und Irrita¬
tionen . 1990 . 192 S .

40 . Hans R . Roemer : Persien auf dem Weg in die Neuzeit . Iranische Geschichte von 1350 - 1750 .
1989 . X , 525 S.

41 . Birgitta Ryberg : Yüsuf Idris ( 1927 - 1991 ) . Identitätskrise und gesellschaftlicher Umbruch .
1992 . 226 S .

42 . Hartmut Bobzin : Der Koran im Zeitalter der Reformation . Studien zur Frühgeschichte der
Arabistik und Islamkunde in Europa . 1995 . XIV , 590 S . dt . Text .

43 . Beatrix Ossendorf - Conrad : Das „ K . al - Wädilja " des cAbd al - Malik b . Habib . Ed . und
Kommentar zu Ms . Qarawiyyln 809 / 49 ( Abwäb at - tahära ) . 1994 . 574 S . dt . Text mit 71 S . arab .
Edition , 45 S . Faks .

44 . Mathias von Bredow : Der Heilige Krieg ( gihäd ) aus der Sicht der malikitischen Rechtsschule .
1994 . 547 S . arab . Text , 197 S . dt . Text und Indices .

45 . Otfried Weintritt : Formen spätmittelalterlicher islamischer Geschichtsdarstellung . Un¬

tersuchungen zu an - Nuwairi al - Iskandaränis Kitäb al - Ilmäm und verwandten zeitgenössischen
Texten . 1992 . X , 226 S . dt . Text .

46 . Gerhard Conrad : Die qudät Dimasq und der madhab al - Auzä cI . Materialien zur syrischen
Rechtsgeschichte . 1994 . XVIII , 828 S.

47 . Michael Glünz : Die panegyrische qasida bei Kamäl ud - din Ismä cil aus Isfahan . Eine Studie
zur persischen Lobdichtung um den Beginn des 7 ./ 13 . Jahrhunderts . 1993 . 290 S.

48 . Ayman Fu ' äd Sayyid : La Capitale de l ' Egypte jusqu ' ä l ' Epoque Fatimide - Al - Qähira et Al -Fustät
— Essai de Reconstitution Topographique . 1998 . XL , 754 S . franz . Text , 26 S . arab . Text , 109 Abb .
49 . Jean Maurice Fiey : Pour un Oriens Christianus Novus . 1993 . 286 S . franz . Text .

50 . Irmgard Farah : Die deutsche Pressepolitik und Propagandatätigkeit im Osmanischen Reich

von 1908 - 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des „ Osmanischen Lloyd " . 1993 . 347 S.

51 . Bernd Radtke : Weltgeschichte und Weltbeschreibung im mittelalterlichen Islam . 1992 . XII ,

544 S .

52 . Lutz Richter - Bernburg : Der Syrische Blitz - Saladins Sekretär zwischen Selbstdarstellung
und Geschichtsschreibung . 1998 . 452 S . dt ., 99 S . arab . Text .

53 . Fritz - Meier : Bausteine I - m . Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Islamwissenschaft . Hrsg . von Erika
Glassen und Gudrun Schubert . 1992 . 1 und II 1195 S . , EI ( Indices ) 166 S .

54 . Festschrift Ewald Wagner zum 65 . Geburtstag : Hrsg .von Wolfhart Heinrichs und Gregor
Schoeler . Band I und II . 1994 . Bd . 1 : Semitische Studien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der
Südsemitistik . XV , 284 S . Bd . 2 : Studien zur arabischen Dichtung . XVII , 641 S .

55 . Susanne Enderwitz : Liebe als Beruf . Al - cAbbäs Ibn al - Ahnaf und das Gazal . 1995 . IX , 246 S.
dt . Text .

56 . Esther Peskes : Muhammad b . cAbdalwahhäb ( 1703 - 1792 ) im Widerstreit . Untersuchungen

zur Rekonstruktion der Frühgeschichte der Wahhäblya . 1993 . VII , 384 S.

57 . Florian Sobieroj : Ibn ,Hafif as - Siräzi und seine Schrift zur Novizenerziehung . 1998 . IX ,
442 S . dt . Text , 48 S . arab . Text .

58 . Fritz Meier : Zwei Abhandlungen über die Naqsbandiyya . I . Die Herzensbindung an den
Meister . II . Kraftakt und Faustrecht des Heiligen . 1994 . 366 S.

59 . Jürgen Paul : Herrscher , Gemeinwesen , Vermittler : Ostiran und Transoxanien in vormongoli¬

scher Zeit . 1996 . VHI , 310 S . dt . Text .

60 . Johann Christoph Bürgel , Stephan Guth , Hrsg . : Gesellschaftlicher Umbruch und Historie
im zeitgenössischen Drama der islamischen Welt . 1995 . XU , 295 S.

61 . Barbara Finster , Christa Fragner , Herta Hafenrichter , Hrsg .: Rezeption in der islami¬
schen Kunst . 1999 . 332 S . dt . Text , Abbildungen .

62 . Robert B . Campbell , ed . : A cläm al - adab al - carabl al - mu cäsir . Siyar wa - siyar dätiyya .

( Contemporary Arab Writers . Biographies and Autobiographies ) . 2 Bde . 1996 . 1380 S . arab .
Text .

63 . Mona Takieddine Amyuni : La ville source d ' inspiration . Le Caire , Khartoum , Beyrouth ,
Paola Scala chez quelques ecrivains arabes contemporains . 1998 . 230 S . franz . Text .

64 . Angelika Neuwirth , Sebastian Günther , Birgit Embalö , Mäher Jarrar , eds : Myths ,
Historical Archetypes and Symbolic Figures in Arabic Literature . Proceedings of the Sympo¬
sium held at the Orient - Institut Beirut , June 25th - June 30th , 1996 . 1999 . 640 S . engl . Text .

65 . Türkische Welten 1 . Klaus Kreiser , Christoph K . Neumann , Hrsg . : Das Osmanische Reich
in seinen Archivalien und Chroniken . Nejat Göyüng zu Ehren . Istanbul 1997 . XXIII , 328 S.

66 . Türkische Welten 2 . Cabbar , Settar : Kurtulu§ Yolunda : a work on Central Asian literature
in a Turkish - Uzbek mixed language . Ed ., transl . and linguistically revisited by A . Sumru
Özsoy , Claus Schönig , Esra Karabacak , with contribution from Ingeborg Baldauf .
Istanbul 2000 .

67 . Türkische Welten 3 . Günter Seufert : Politischer Islam in der Türkei . Islamismus als symbo¬
lische Repräsentation einer sich modernisierenden muslimischen Gesellschaft . Istanbul 1997 .
600 S .

68 . Edward Badeen : Zwei mystische Schriften des cAmmär al - Bildisi . 1999 . 146 u . 122 S . arab .,
142 S . dt . Text .

69 . Thomas Scheffler , Helene Sader , Angelika Neuwirth , eds : Baalbek : Image and Monu¬
ment , 1898 - 1998 . 1998 . XIV , 348 S . engl . u . franz . Text .

70 . Amidu Sanni : The Arabic Theory of Prosiflcation and Versification . On hall and tiazm in Arabic
Theoretical Discourse . 1988 . XTT1, 186 S .

71 . Angelika Neuwirth , Birgit Embalö , Friederike Pannewick : Kulturelle Selbstbehauptung

der Palästinenser : Survey der modernen palästinensischen Dichtung . 2001 . XV , 549 S.
72 . S . Guth , P . Furrer , J .C . Bürgel , eds : Conscious Voices . Concepts of Writing in the Middle
East . 1999 . XXI , 332 S . engl ., dt ., franz . Text .
73 . Türkische Welten 4. Suraya Faroqhi , Christoph K . Neumann , eds : Glorious Table , Prospe -
rous Home . Studies in Ottoman Food and Housing . In Vorbereitung .
74 . Bernard Heyberger , Carsten Walbiner , eds . : Les Europeens vus par les Libanais ä
l ' epoque ottomane . 2002 . VIII , 244 S.
75 . Türkische Welten 5 . Tobias Heinzelmann : Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikatur . Die
Satirezeitschriften Karagöz , Kalem und Cem 1908 - 1914 . 1999 . 290 S . dt . Text , 77 Abb ., 1
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76 . Thomas Scheffler , ed . : Religion between Violence and Reconciliation . 2002 . XIV , 578 S.
77 . Angelika Neuwirth , Andreas Pflitsch , eds : Crisis and Memory in Islamic Societies . 2001 . XU ,
540 S .
78 . Fritz Steppat : Islam als Partner : Islamkundliche Aufsätze 1944 - 1996 . 2001 . XXX , 424 S ., 8
Abb .
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Islam . 2000 . XV , 620 S ., 23 Abb .
80 . Robert Schick : Islamic Monuments in Jerusalem . Im Druck .
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zialdemokratie von 1850 bis 1950 . In Vorbereitung .

82 . Türkische Welten 6 . Günter Seufert , Jacques Waardenburg , eds : Türkischer Islam and
Europa . 1999 . 352 S . dt . und engl . Text .
83 . Michael GlÜnz : Randlinien mit Herzblut gezogen . Text , Form und Bedeutung in der
persischen Gazal - Dichtung des 15 . Jahrhunderts . Im Druck .
84 . Türkische Welten 7 . Angelika Neuwirth , Judith Pfeiffer , Börte Sagaster , eds : The Ghazal
as a Genre of World Literature . The Ottoman Ghazal in its Historical Context . In Vorbereitung .
85 . Türkische Welten 8. Barbara Pusch , Hrsg . : Die neue muslimische Frau : Standpunkte &
Analysen . 2001 . 326 S.

86 . Türkische Welten 9. Anke von Kügelgen : Inszenierung einer Dynastie -

Geschichtsschreibung unter den frühen Mangiten Bucharas ( 1747 - 1826 ) . 2002 . XII , 518 S .
87 . Olaf Farschid : Islamische Ökonomik und Zakat . In Vorbereitung.
88 . Jens Hanssen , Thomas Philipp , Stefan Weber , eds : The Empire in the City : Arab Provincial
Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire . 2002 . X , 378 S ., 71 Abb .
89 . Angelika Neuwirth , Thomas Bauer , eds : Migration of a Literacy Genre : Studies in Ghazal
Literature . In Vorbereitung .

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Jahrhunderts : Formen und Funktionen des historischen Selbstverständnisses . 2002 . XTV , 341 S.

91 . HANNE SCHÖNIG : Schminken , Düfte und Räucherwerk der Jemenitinnen : Lexikon der
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Religion between Violence and Reconciliation
 BEIRUTER TEXTE UND STUDIEN
HERAUSGEGEBENVOM
ORIENT - INSTITUT
DER DEUTSCHEN MORGENLÄNDISCHENGESELLSCHAFT

BAND 76
RELIGION BETWEEN VIOLENCE
AND RECONCILIATION

edited by

Thomas Scheffler

BEIRUT 2002

ERGON VERLAG WURZBURG

IN {COMMISSION
Cover - design : Wolf - Dieter Lemke . Photographs by Toufie Abdallah ( February 6 , 1984 ,
West Beirut : Insurrection of Amal and the 6 lh brigade of the Lebanese Army against the
regime of President Amin Gemayel ) and Emile Eid ( August 2 , 1993 : Meeting of the
spiritual heads of Lebanon 's religious communities ) , by courtesy of Dar al - Nahar , Beirut .

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements IX

ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH : Preface XI

thomas scheffler : Introduction : Religion between Violence and

Reconciliation 1

PartI
Text and Interpretation

Jan Assmann : Monotheism and Trauma : Reflections on Sigmund

Freud , Moses and Monotheism 31

ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH : Three Religious Feasts between Narratives

of Violence and Liturgies of Reconciliation 49

THOMAS Scheffler : The Radicalism of the Powerless :
Imaginations of Violence in Three Religious Traditions 83
tarif Khalidi : The Poetry of the Khawàrij :
Violence and Salvation 109

RlDWAN al - sayyid : Abode of Peace , Abode of War : Tradition

and Interpretation 123

edgard weber : La codification juridique du jihâd 135

Part II
History and Memory

wajih Kawtharani : Histoire et mémoire entre croisade et jihâd 167

Elias Khoury : On Beirut 175
Us s am a makdisi : Revisiting Sectarianism 179
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

youssef mouawad : Exercice de dhimmitude : Patriarche Ilyâs

al - Huwayyik versus Jamal Pacha 193
samir seikaly : Transcending Sectarian Strife : Nafïr Sùriyyah
as Message and Medium 211
maher jarrar : Displaced Palestinians , Religious Confrontation ,
and the ' Re - production ' of Space in Three Contemporary Novels . . 217
peter van der V eer : The Victims ' Tale : Memory and Forgetting
in the Story of Violence 229

P art III

R eligion and C ivil S trife

mario A postolov : Religion and Nationalism in the Balkans

and in Lebanon 245

habiba djahnine : L ' Algérie , dix ans de guerre fratricide :

quelle réconciliation possible ? 261

H aldun G ulalp : Political Islam and the Culture of Democracy

in Turkey : Confrontation or Accommodation ? 271

samir khalaf : The Radicalization of Communal Loyalties 283
hans G . K ippenber G : Religions and Violent Actions 301
elizabeth P icard : La violence milicienne et sa légitimation
religieuse 319

A ndreas R ieck : A Violent " Peace - Movement " :

Religious World - View and Political Record of Afghanistan 's

Taliban , 1994 - 1998 333

P art IV

R eligion , L aw and C oexistence : T he L ocal D imension

olivier C hristin : Sortir des guerres de religion :

principes juridiques et modèles politiques 353
julia eckert : Reconciling the Mohalla : Politics of
Violence and the Strength and Limits of Mediation in Bombay 365
 TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

THEODOR HANF ( en collaboration avec PETRA BAUERLE ) :

Religiosité et attitudes face aux conflits et à la coexistence :

Quelques perspectives empiriques comparées 391

aïda Kanafani - Zahar : The religion of the
' Other ' as Bond : The Interreligious in Lebanon 401
chibli Mallat : Non - Violence and the Rule of Law 419
ANTOINE Messarra : La contribution des religions à la
culture de paix : le cas du Liban 431
SOFIA Saadeh : Basic Issues Concerning the Personal
Status Laws in Lebanon 449

SAMIZUBAIDA : The Nation - State and Religious Community

in the Middle East 457

Part V
Interreligious Dialogue : Pros and Cons

john Donohue s . .:! The Synod for Lebanon and the

Apostolic Exhortation : a programmed exercise
in self - criticism and reconciliation 471

As cAD E . Khairallah : The Way of the Cross as a

Way of Life : Bishop George Khodr ' s Hope in Times of War 481
Karl - Josef Kuschel : Towards an Abrahamic
Ecumene of Jews , Christians , and Muslims :

Interfaith Dialogue in the Age of Globalization 497

SAOUD El - MA 0 ULA : Le dialogue islamo - chrétien au Liban :
histoire et problèmes 521
muhammad Sammak : Religion and Politics : The Case of Lebanon . . . 535
dieter Senghaas : Some Untimely Reflections on the Dialogue
between Christians and Muslims , or Pleading for a Reorientation

of the Intercultural Dialogue 545

Contributors 561

Index 567
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume assembles the revised papers of the international symposium

" Religion between Violence and Reconciliation " , held at the German Ori¬

ent Institute Beirut from September 11 to 13 , 1998 . Both the symposium

and the publication of its papers were generously funded by the European

Union in the framework of the Beirut - based MEDA program " Vie com¬

mune - memoire partagee : le Liban , laboratoire de la Mediterranee " , joint¬

ly organized by the German Orient Institute and the Centre d ' Etudes et de

Recherches sur le Moyen - Orient Contemporain ( CERMOC ) . Most con¬

tributors revised their papers before September 11 , 2001 .

Many people helped to make this project a success : In Beirut , Bernhard

Hillenkamp , Felix Neugart , Peter Thielmann , and Thomas Ansorg cheerfully

and creatively worked with me to run the conference . Elisabeth Aram

( Bielefeld ) , Katja Burre ( Halle ) , and Christoph Rauch ( Leipzig ) , then stu¬

dent interns at the Orient Institute , proofread many drafts . I also thank Al¬

ison Bailey ( Oxford ), Sebastien Llorca ( London / Paris ) , Ellen Kussman -

Feghali ( Beirut ) , and Thomas Ansorg ( London ) for their help in foreign -

language editing . Stephan Dahne , the Orient Institute 's publications man¬

ager , oversaw the technical production of the book . I have also profited

from the advice of his predecessor , Frank Griffel ( Yale ) . Special thanks go
to Wolf - Dieter Lemke , head librarian of the Orient Institute , who devoted

many an hour to creating the thoughtful and iconographically congenial

cover design of this book .

Throughout the whole project , Angelika Neuwirth , director of the Ori¬

ent Institute from 1994 to 1999 and chair professor of Arabic Studies at the

Free University of Berlin , has been a constant source of encouragement ,

inspiration , and helpful advice . I thankfully acknowledge as well the assis¬

tance of her students and staff members at the Seminar for Semitic and

Arabic Studies , Berlin : Aischa Ahmed helped compile the index , Jan Ott

and Nicolai Sinai helped copy - edit Tarif Khalidi ' s paper on the Khawarij .

I thank professor Manfred Kropp , director of the German Orient Insti¬

tute since 1999 , who kindly took charge of publishing the book in the insti¬

tute 's Beiruter Texte und Studien " series . At the Free University ' s Politi¬

cal Science Department , Friedemann Buttner , chair professor of Middle

X ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Eastern Studies , shielded me from many administrative duties , thus greatly

helping this volume to see the day .
Work on this book and especially the revision of my own contributions
have been completed during the academic year 2001 - 2002 when I was in
residence as a Rockefeller Visiting Fellow at the Joan B . Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame , Indiana , par¬
ticipating in its Program in Religion , Conflict , and Peacebuilding ( PRCP ) .
One can hardly imagine a more convenient place to study problems of
religion , violence , and reconciliation in a congenial and thought - inspiring
ambience . I am grateful for the hospitality and generosity of the Kroc Insti¬
tute , its staff , and its director , R . Scott Appleby . I also wish to thank Tris¬
tan Borer , Patrick Gaffney , Robert Johansen , and Raimo Vayrynen for
many hours of stimulating discussions . Finally , a particular note of grati¬
tude goes to Barbara Lockwood and Abdul Rashied Omar , for their untir¬
ing help , encouragement , and kindness that made my stay at Notre Dame
so pleasant .

T .S .
 PREFACE
Angelika Neuwirth

The symposium " Religion between Violence and Reconciliation " ( Beirut ,

September 11 - 13 , 1998 ) , whose proceedings are presented in this volume ,

was an important part - indeed the climax - of an extensive scientific pro¬

gram carried out jointly by the Orient Institute and its French partner in

Beirut , Centre d ' Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen - Orient Contempo -

rain ( CERMOC ) , under the auspices of the European Union . The title of

the program sounds elusively smooth in both French and German : " Vie

commune , memoire partagee : le Liban - laboratoire de la Mediterran .ee "

and " Gemeinsames Leben — geteiltes Gedachtnis : Der Libanon als

Laboratorium des Mittelmeerraums " . The wording " memoire partagee " is ,

however , not unambiguous at all . On the contrary , it betrays something of

the ambivalence intrinsic to the act of remembering , of commemoration .

A hidden question underlies our project : Is the memory of a jointly ex¬

perienced past primarily a shared good and , thus , a factor contributing to

the coherence of neighboring communities and their reconciliation after

conflict ? Or is it rather a divisive force and , thus , a factor which induces or

justifies violence as an ultima ratiol If we focus on religion , the topic of

this volume , we can ask : is the recollection of universal values , cherished

over ages through observation of particular rituals and recitations of ca¬

nonical texts , expected to inspire openness towards the other , or rather

reinforce seclusion or even encourage confrontation ?

Similar questions have been asked during a second event staged imme¬

diately after the symposium at the Orient Institute , a Summer Academy or¬

ganized by the Working Group " Modernity and Islam " of the Wissen -

schaftskolleg zu Berlin , which focused on the topic of " Crisis and Mem¬

ory " ( Beirut , September 14 - 25 , 1998 ) . 1 Whereas the Summer Academy

concentrated on the manifold relationships feasible between the experience

of crisis and the act of remembering in both the religious and the secular

realms , it was religion - not exclusively Islam , but Christianity as

1 The proceedings of the Summer Academy have been published in : Angelika Neuwirth
and Andreas Pflitsch , eds . , Crisis and Memory in Islamic Societies , Beirut/Wiirzburg :
Orient - Institut / Ergon , 2001 (= Beiruter Texte und Studien ; vol . 77 ) .
XII ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

well - that made up the core of the problems discussed at the symposium .
Religion is perhaps the most crucial and complex figure of remembrance
of which one can think , a Gedachtnisflgur par excellence . By placing re¬
ligion at the center of discourse - not only as a focus of remembrance but
also as a mode of remembering itself - we hoped to come closer to possi¬
ble solutions of the hidden question implied in the title of our project , " Vie
commune - memoire partagee divided or shared memory between the
religious communities in Lebanon .
Approaching social studies as a trained philologist , a student of trans¬
mitted texts , is a venture that sometimes comes close to entering the house
if not through the window , at least through a back door . During the " Relig¬
ion between Violence and Reconciliation " symposium - in which I had the
honored role of official host - my detour lead me through the cellar ,
through basic and elementary matters such as etymology and morphology ,
in order to reach the more elevated levels of discussion .
Philological questions , indeed , already arose with the preparation of
the poster designed for the symposium . Wishing to emphasize the univer¬
sality of the symposium ' s theme through its representation in a number of
languages , we had to look , last but not least , for a proper translation of our
topic into Arabic . A literal translation of the English title , " Religion
Between Violence and Reconciliation " , may have produced " al - dln bayn
al - unf wa - l - musalahah " , musalahah meaning " peace - making " or " recon¬
ciliation " in the sense of a single act lasting until the intended result is
reached .
For our particular context , however , we preferred another term often
used in the limited sense of " tolerance " , which on closer etymological and
morphological examination , proves more flexible : tasamuh . Its rendering
by " tolerance " , in the sense of " patient endurance evinced by one party for
the neighbor ' s otherness " , appears linguistically dubious , since the form
tafa ' ul underlying tasamuh implies a bilateral interaction . It ideally means
that two parties " make it easy for each other " and " accommodate one
another " - not only until a certain result is reached but as a lasting and
mutually - enacted attitude although , of course , the possibility cannot be
excluded that one party dominates and dictates the rules , practicing
tasamuh " on " the other .
, the intended permanence implied in the concept of tasamuh re¬
Yet
lates it directly to our discourse , which - of course - touches upon the
dichotomy established in Western religious thought between " religions of
reconciliation " ( Versdhnungsreligionen ) and " tribal religions " ( Stammes -
religionen ) . It is not astonishing , then , that the closest concept in Islamic
religious thought to the Western Versdhnungsreligion is din al - tasamuh .
 PREFACE XIII

The attitude of tasamuh is claimed as an ideal feature innate in particular

religions , among them Islam . The Qur ' anic motto for the treatment of other

religious groups is certainly the exhortation to peaceful approach : "jadil -

hum bi - llatl hiya ahsan " - " debate with them in the best way " ( Qur ' an

16 : 125 ) . As for Christianity , confronted since the Reformation with multi¬

ple dissident groups , the Parable of Good Grain and the Weed ( Matthew

13 : 24 - 30 ) has emerged as the locus classicus for advisable treatment of

religious opponents . Dissidents , considered unworthy of negotiation , are

compared to the worthless weed . Yet they should be spared until Judgment

Day , if only for the safety of " the good grain " , the true believers . It hardly

needs explication that the convincing force of this ruling has been sadly

insufficient to guarantee a morally binding interpretation of the gospel text .

A new development that was not yet considered in the past - neither in

the source texts of the diverse religions nor in their interpretations con¬

cerned only with religious otherness - conveys particular tension to mod¬

ern discourse . It is the observation that a third party exists - besides those

different and sometimes opposing religious groups - on the scene of con¬

flict and reconciliation : the believers in a res publico ., a common social

cause . In the year our symposium was held , France celebrated the 400th

anniversary of the Edict of Tolerance , the Edit de Nantes , which called

upon Protestants and Catholics of the French Kingdom not to renounce

their faith but simply to live together as brothers , friends and co - citizens ,

" freres , amis et concitoyens " . The res publica , the common cause , be¬

comes the place where confessional differences are effaced , where per¬

sonal convictions , private affections and religious affinities give way to a

universal citizenship in the service of the king . It is true that the subse¬

quent edicts of pacification in the second half of the 16th century prepared

the way for the concept of absolutism , I 'Etat absolu . At the same time ,

however , they contributed to the liberation of the sphere of private con¬

science and responsibility .

Real or imagined potential for conflict , cultural and historical memory ,

means of coping with differences , interreligious dialogue - a glance at the

symposium proceedings ' table of contents mirrors the complex situation in

our host country . Through reflecting Lebanese options of the diverse dis¬

courses that occur in the country and in neighboring societies , our event

intended to contribute modestly to the process of reconciliation , which is

progressing so promisingly in Lebanon .

 INTRODUCTION :
RELIGION BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND
RECONCILIATION

T homas S cheffler

Does religion still matter ?

" God is dead " ( Gott ist tot ) , Friedrich Nietzsche announced in 1883 . How¬

ever , he seemed to be not completely sure that mankind would easily grasp

the full meaning of his message . God ' s shadow , Nietzsche assumed , might

continue to haunt humanity for thousands of years to come . 1 Although de¬

clared dead , God had not yet left the world - and perhaps , somewhere ,

people might even be waiting for the resurrectio mortuorum . As a matter

of fact , throughout the 19th century , even the most anti - clerical minds re¬

mained deeply penetrated by the language and intellectual grammar of the¬

ology :

In the French Revolution , the nationalization of Church properties , the

abolition of the Christian cult and of the Christian calendar was followed

by the cult of Reason ( 1793 ) and the cult of the " Supreme Being " ( 1794 ).

Karl Marx ( 1818 - 83 ) , far from destroying or deconstructing Hegel ' s read¬

ing of world history as an emanation of Divine providence , rather intended

to turn his teachers religious - philosophical system " from top to bottom " -

by keeping its basic structure , but replacing the concept of God by the

concept of Human Labor . 2 " Le Catholicisme et le Socialisme , identiques

pour le fond , ne different pas que par la forme " , Pierre - Joseph Proudhon

1 " Gott ist tot : aber so wie die Art der Menschen ist , wird es vielleicht noch jahrtausen -
delang Hohlen geben , in denen man seinen Schatten zeigt . - Und wir - wir miissen
auch seinen Schatten besiegen ." Fiedrich Nietzsche , Die frohliche Wissenschaft
[ 1883 ] , in : idem , Werke , ed . Karl Schlechta , 2nd ed ., vol . 2 , Darmstadt : Wissenschaft -
liche Buchgesellschaft , 1960 , 115 ( no . 108 ) ; see also ibid ., 127 ( no . 125 ) , idem , Also
sprach Zarathustra [ 1883 / 1891 ] , ibid . , 279 ( no . 2 ) , 280 ( no . 3 ) , 348 , 501 , 523 .

2 Cf . Karl Marx , Das Kapital , vol . i ( epilogue , 2nd ed ., 1873 ) , in : Karl Marx and Fried -
rich Engels , Werke , vol . 23 , Berlin : Dietz , 1962 , 27 ; Friedrich Engels , " Ludwig Feuer -
bach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie " [ 1886 ] , in : ibid ., vol .
21 , Berlin : Dietz , 1972 , 293 .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
2

( 1809 ) said : " Le socialisme est le produit du catholicisme et en meme

- 65

temps son adversaire , tout a la fois fils du Christ et anti - Christ . " 3 The anar¬
chist creed Ni Dieu , ni Maitre did not keep Mikhail Bakunin ( 1814 - 76 )
from describing his movement in theological language : " in our church , . . .
we have a chief, an invisible Christ , science ; and , like the Protestants ,
more logical even than the Protestants , we will suffer neither pope , nor
council , nor conclaves of infallible cardinals , nor bishops , nor even
priests . " 4 All in all , 18th - and 19th - century Enlightenment and revolution¬
ary discourses conquered the stage of history as inner - worldly eschatolo -
gies . 5 Paradise , as Heinrich Heine ( 1797 - 1856 ) put it , should be estab¬
lished " here on earth " , while " heaven " should be left " to the angels and
sparrows " . 6
However , while 19th - century authors had basically stressed the rup¬
tures between modernity and religion , the 20th century was much more in¬
clined to recall the links and continuities between them : Max Weber
( 1864 - 1920 ) , in his essay on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism ( 1904 / 1905 ) , emphasized the role of religion as a motive power
of economic capitalism . 7 Georges Sorel ( 1847 - 1922 ) , in his Reflexions sur
la violence ( 1906 ) , recalled the role of myths in revolutionary mass move¬
ments . Carl Schmitt ( 1888 - 1985 ) , in his Political Theology ( 1922 ) , argued
that " [ a ] ll concise concepts of modern public law are secularized theologi¬
cal concepts " , and that " in jurisprudence , the state of emergency has a
function analogical to that of the miracle in theology " . 8 Schmitt ' s famous
attempt to define the " criterion " of " the political " as the " distinction be -

3 P .- J . Proudhon , Les Confessions d ' un Revolutionnaire pour servir a I 'Histoire de la

Revolution de Fevrier [ 1849 ] , ed . Daniel Halevy ( = Proudhon , CEuvres completes , vol .
9 ) , Paris : Marcel Riviere , 1929 , 60 , 72 .

4 Michael Bakunin , " God and the State " [ 1871 ] , in : idem , Selected Writings , ed . A .
Lehning , New York : Grove Press , 1974 , 111 - 35 ( p . 133 ) ; see also his " The Political
Theology of Mazzini " [ 1871 ] , in : ibid . , 214 - 31 ( pp . 217 - 18 ) .
5 Cf . Karl Lowith , Meaning in History : The Theological Implications of the Philosophy
of History , Chicago : Chicago University Press , 1949 .
6 Heinrich Heine , " Deutschland , ein Wintermarchen " [ 1844 ] , caput I , in : idem , Samtli-
che Werke , vol . 1 , Munchen : Winkler , 1969 , 418 .
7 Max Weber , " Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus " [ 1904 - 05 ] , in :
idem , Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Religionssoziologie [ 1920 ] , vol . I , 9th ed . , Tubingen :
Mohr , 1988 , 17 - 205 .
8 Carl Schmitt , Politische Theologie : Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveranitat
[ 1922 ] , 4th ed ., Berlin : Duncker & Humblot 1985 , 49 . - On the relationship between
Weber and Schmitt , see Gary Ulmen , Politischer Mehrwert : Eine Studie iiber Max
Weber und Carl Schmitt , Weinheim : VCH , 1991 , 176 - 223 .
 INTRODUCTION
3

tween friend and foe " ( 1927 ) 9 was implicitly related to the apocalyptic im¬

age of a final , decisive battle between Good and Evil , Divine and Satanic

powers , Christ and Anti - Christ . 10

Although arguing from different angles , these approaches supported

the paradoxical conclusion that the development of ' religion ' had been

( and still was ) an important element of economic and political seculariza¬

tion . Not surprisingly , other scholars began to discover the religious di¬

mensions of secularist political movements . The Protestant theologian Paul

Tillich ( 1886 - 1965 ) , for instance , refuting the " Judaic - Catholic distinction

between a sacred and a profane sphere " and stressing the religious " sub¬

stance " of " culture " , suggested analyzing Fascism , Communism , and

Nationalism as contemporary religious phenomena . 11 While Schmitt had

expanded the concept of the " political " beyond the confines of the State ,

Tillich expanded the realm of the " religious " beyond the confines of the
Church .

On the one hand , these approaches may be read as reflecting the ero¬

sion of hierarchical institutions , whether sacred or profane , under the as¬

sault of the " rise of the masses " and " technological progress " . On the other

hand , however , they paved the way for new insights into the cultural and

psychological links between religion and politics . Syncretistic and seem¬

ingly paradoxical concepts like " theology of culture " ( Tillich 1919 ) 12 , " po¬

litical theology " ( Schmitt 1922 ) 13 , or " political religion " ( Niebuhr 1935 ,

Voegelin 1938 ) 14 articulated a growing awareness that the appeal of mod -

9 Carl Schmitt , Der Begriff des Politischen [ 1927 , 1932 ] , Berlin : Duncker & Humblot ,
1963 .

10 On the hidden apocalyptic agenda in Schmitt ' s political theology , cf . Heinrich Meier ,
Carl Schmitt , Leo Strauss und » Der Begriff des Politischen « . Zu einem Dialog unter
Abwesenden , Stuttgart : Metzler , 1988 , 35 - 38 , 53 - 57 , 62 - 68 , 90 -92 .
11 Cf . Paul Tillich , " Auf der Grenze " [ 1936 ] , in : idem , Auf der Grenze . Eine Auswahl aus
dem Lebenswerk , Munchen , Zurich : Piper , 1987 , 51 . Cf . ibid . 49 - 51 , 56 - 57 . - On Til -
lich ' s approach see , above all , his anthology Die religiose Substanz der Kultur : Schrif-
ten zur Theologie der Kultur (= Tillich , Gesammelte Werke , vol . 9 ) , Stuttgart : Evange -
lisches Verlagswerk , 1967 .
12 Paul Tillich , " Uber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur " [ 1919 ] , in : idem , Die religiose
Substanz der Kultur [ fh . 11 ] , 13 - 31 .
13 Schmitt , Politische Theologie [ fh . 8 ] , - Schmitt borrowed this term from Mikhail Ba -
kunin ( see Heinrich Meier , Die Lehre Carl Schmitts , Stuttgart , Weimar : Metzler , 1994 ,
22 - 23 ) .

14 Eric Voegelin , Die politischen Religionen [ 1938 ] , ed . Peter J . Opitz , Munchen : Fink ,
1993 . - Reinhold Niebuhr , " Christian Politics and Communist Religion " , in :
Christianity and the Social Revolution , eds . John Lewis et al . , London : Gollancz , 1935 ,
442 - 72 (pp . 460 ff .) , characterized Communism as a " politically oriented religion " .
4 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

ern political mass movements like fascism and communism might be

rooted in their ability to unleash powerful extra - ecclesiastical religious po¬
tentials which , in turn , might be somehow connected to deeper - " archaic " ,
" primitive " or " archetypal " - strata of the human condition . A number of

congenial advances in the fields of comparative ethnology and cultural

psychology accompanied , stimulated and supported this kind of reasoning ,
among them William Robertson Smith ' s ( 1846 - 94 ) and James George Fra -
zer ' s ( 1854 - 1941 ) cross - cultural studies on sacrifice , sacred kingship and
the Dying God ; the exploration of " mass psychology " by Gustave Le Bon
( 1841 - 1931 ) and Sigmund Freud ( 1856 - 1939 ) , or Carl G . Jung ' s ( 1875 -

1961 ) reading of the " collective unconscious " and its " archetypes " as
symbols of divine presence in man . 15

Religion and modernity

From the 1920s to the 1940s , the impulse to understand fascist and com¬
munist mass movements as religious phenomena , 16 had been stimulated by
their charismatic appeal . The breakdown of fascism and the bureaucratiza¬
tion of Soviet state communism after World War II , however , cooled down
that fascination . The Cold War , conceived by many as a contest between
two economic systems , rather promoted the rise of managerial ideologies
of " development " and " social engineering " . With the economic boom pe¬
riod of the 1950s and 1960s , " progress " , once a powerful cipher for inner -
worldly eschatological hopes , seemed to turn into a sober process of
" modernization " , designed by the modern sciences and managed by socio -

15 William Robertson Smith , Lectures on the Religion of the Semites : The Fundamental
Institutions [ 1889 ] , 3rd ed . , London : Black , 1927 ; James George Frazer , The Golden
Bough : A Study in Magic and Religion [ 1890 - 1936 ] , 3rd ed . , 13 vols . , London and Ba¬
singstoke : Macmillan , 1976 ; Gustave Le Bon , Psychologie des foules , Paris : F . Alcan ,
1895 ; Sigmund Freud , Totem und Tabu [ 1912 - 13 ] and Massenpsychologie und Ich -
Analyse [ 1921 ] , both in : idem , Studienausgabe , vol . 9 , Frankfurt /M . : Fischer , 1974 ,
61 - 134 , and 287 - 444 ; Carl G . Jung , Die Archetypen und das kollektive Unbewusste ( =
Jung , Gesammelte Werke , vol . 9 ) , Olten , Freiburg/Br . : Walter , 1976 ; idem , Zivilisation
im Ubergang ( = Gesammelte Werke , vol . 10 ) , Olten , Freiburg /Br . : Walter , 1974 .
16 See Hans Maier , Politische Religionen : Die totalitaren Regime und das Christentum ,
Freiburg / Br . : Herder , 1995 ; Hans Maier and Michael Schiifer , eds . , " Totalitarismus "
und "politische Religionen " : Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs , 2 vols . , Paderborn :
Schoningh , 1996 ; Claus - Eckehard Barsch , Die politische Religion des Nationalsozia -
lismus , Miinchen : Fink , 1998 ; Markus Huttner , Totalitarismus und sakulare Religio¬
nen . Zur Friihgeschichte totalitarismuskritischer Begriffs - und Theoriebildung in
Grofibritannien , Bonn : Bouvier , 1999 .
 INTRODUCTION
5

technological " experts " . Not surprisingly , the decline of religion was

thought to be an inevitable side effect of that disenchanting process . 17

Emphasizing , in such a context , the " religious " dimensions of political

movements primarily served to expose their " irrational " , " backward " , or

even pathological character . Although Western governments continued to

support religion as a weapon against communism , " the prevailing ortho¬

doxy among intellectuals in the West " was , as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it ,

" that religion is a waning , irrational , and dysfunctional aberration . " 18

However , even in the 1950s the victory of the modernization - seculari¬

zation paradigm had been far from complete . In 1957 , as agnostic a soci¬

ologist as Arnold Gehlen ( 1904 - 76 ) suggested that technological progress ,

far from removing religion to the dustbin of history , might rather help to

stabilize it : 19 The " spirit of technology " , Gehlen argued , was driven by man 's

fundamental desire to supersede nature by human control . Its essential dy¬

namics , thus , were inclined toward the creation of an artificial , intellect -

based , anti - natural and a - sensuous world . As a result , its cultural mirrors , the

modem sciences and the modem arts , were becoming too " esoteric " , i . e . , too

abstract , too complex , and too mathematical to create meaning for broader

mass audiences in a simple , comprehensible language . This , however ,

meant that they were increasingly losing their capacity to perform success¬

fully as a surrogate for religion ( Religionsersatz ) . Relieved from the com¬

petition of its former challengers , religion , thus , might be enabled to re¬

store its genuine role in the field of Weltanschauung and to use the neutral¬

ized arts and sciences as well as the television , the radio , or the phone for

its own purposes .

17 For a critical discussion of the modernization - secularization paradigm , see Rodney

Stark , " Secularization , R .I .P ." , Sociology of Religion 60 ( 1999 ) 3 , 249 - 73 ; Philip S.
Gorski , " Historicizing the Secularization Debate : Church , State , and Society in Late
Medieval and Early Modern Europe , ca . 1300 to 1700 " , American Sociological Review
65 ( 2000 ) , 138 - 67 ; Theodor Hanf , " Modernisierung ohne Sakularisierung ? Versuch
iiber religios - politische Ideologien in der Dritten Welt " , in : Die Bedeutung der Ideolo -
gien in der heutigen Welt , ed . Ulrich Matz , Koln : Carl Heymanns , 1986 , 129 - 52 . See
also : Phillip E . Hammond , ed ., The Sacred in a Secular Age : Toward Revision in the
Scientific Study of Religion , Los Angeles : University of California Press , 1985 ; Steve
Bruce , ed . , Religion and Modernization : Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secu¬
larization Thesis , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1992 ; idem , ed . , The Sociology of Relig¬
ion , 2 vols . , Cheltenham : Edward Elgar , 1995 .

18 Zbigniew Brzezinski , " The Illusion of Control " , in : Peacemaking : Moral and Policy
Challenges for a New World , eds . G .F . Powers , D . Christiansen , SJ , and R .T . Henne -
meyer , Washington , DC : United States Catholic Conference , 1994 , 27 - 39 ( p . 31 ) .

19 Arnold Gehlen , Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter : Sozialpsychologische Probleme in

der industriellen Gesellschaft , Reinbekb . Hamburg : Rowohlt , 1957 , 27 - 28 .
6 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

Since then , Gehlen ' s line of thinking has been refined by many discover¬
ies of modern sociology : The most salient features of modernity , the com¬
mercialization of social relations and the acceleration of change , are said to
provoke a compensatory desire for emotional security and stable identities .
Considering the short- term shifts and contingencies of daily life , time -
resistant anchors of identity and orientation may only be found beyond the
horizon of the bewildering Present : in the Past , in the Future , or in the Be¬
yond . Paradoxically , the progress of modernization has thus been accompa¬
nied by an intensified quest for origins , memories , myths , and transcendental
experiences .
Compared to other ideologies and institutions , today ' s world religions
seem surprisingly well equipped to satisfy such needs - first , because their
messages are clustered around atemporal ( ' eternal ' ) values and myths ; sec¬
ond , because they represent some of the oldest and most experienced institu¬
tional traditions of mankind ; third , because they are among the most visible
and widespread stores of collective memory . Today , the " memorial land¬
scapes " in most parts of the world are interspersed with religious monuments
( tombs , temples , churches , mosques , monasteries, shrines , etc . ) - many of

them still functioning as symbols and theaters of ritual group assertion , life
cycle events , individual contemplation, and ( friendly or hostile ) inter - group
encounters . More than other contemporary ideologies or institutions , religions
and churches may take advantage of a rich arsenal of institutional , intellectual
and emotional wisdom enabling them to link the Present to the Past and the
Future , and local human traditions to larger , universal callings .

Religion and power

While many authors attributed the alleged " decline of religion " to the pro¬
gress of science and technology , others stressed a second cause much older
than " modernity " , namely the corruption of religion by mundane power .
Thomas Hobbes ( 1588 - 1679 ) , for instance , attributed even the decline of
ancient pagan cults in the Roman Empire " to the contempt , into which the
Priests of the Gentiles of that time , had brought themselves , by their un -
cleannesse , avarice , and jugling between Princes " , and added sarcastically
that later on , in his own days , " [ a ] lso the Religion of the Church of Rome ,
was partly , for the same cause abolished in England , and many other parts
of Christendome " . 20 In the 19th century , historians like Leopold von Ranke
( 1795 - 1886 ) and Jacob Burckhardt ( 1818 - 97 ) agreed that the moral decline

20 Thomas Hobbes , Leviathan [ 1651 ] , ed . C .B . Macpherson , London : Penguin , 1985 ,

181 .
 INTRODUCTION 7

of the Catholic Church and the rise of proto - secularist discourse in Renais¬

sance Italy had been promoted by the clergy ' s fateful entanglement into

all - too - worldly power politics .21

Comparing the role of religion in the USA to the anti - clericalism of

democratic movements in 19th - century Europe , Alexis de Tocqueville

( 1805 - 59 ) warned against mixing spirituality with daily politics .22 Relig¬

ions , he argued , should avoid trying to expand their dominance beyond the

confines of purely religious matters . Otherwise , they would risk losing

their credibility in all domains . In the age of Enlightemnent and democ¬

racy , only those religions would continue to rule people ' s minds that were

able to restrict themselves to general spiritual and ethical matters . In this

respect , Islam would face much more serious challenges in the future than ,

e . g . , Christianity . 23

In this line of thinking , the decline of religions was attributed to the

" infection " ( Burckhardt ) of their dignitaries and institutions by the tempta¬

tions of profane , inner - worldly power : the greater the entanglement into

everyday politics , the greater the risk of moral exhaustion and waning cha¬

risma . While there was much truth in this line of reasoning , one should not

forget that the rise of religious movements , too , has often been promoted

by links to mundane powers . Ibn Khaldun ( 732 - 808 / 1332 - 1406 ) , for in¬

stance , was completely aware that religious movements in the Middle East

would not succeed if not supported by the community feeling ( fasabiyyah )

and military prowess of a social group . 24 The success of Protestantism in

16th - and 17th - century Europe profited greatly from the desire of territo¬

rial princes to shelter their local power against Papal and imperial ( Habs -

burg ) interference . The successes of many modern Christian sects in Latin

21 Leopold von Ranke , Die romischen Papste in den letzten vier Jahrhunderten [ 1834 -
36 ] , 12th ed . , 2 vols . , Miinchen , Leipzig : Duncker & Humblot . , 1923 , vol . 1 , 24 - 70 ;
Jacob Burckhardt , Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien : Ein Versuch [ 1860 ] , Stutt¬
gart : Reclam , 1960 , 28 - 29 , 45 - 49 , 132 - 59 ; idem , Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen
[ 1905 ] , Miinchen : dtv , 1981 , 101 - 06 .

22 Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville , Democracy in America [ 1835 - 1840 ] , tr . G . Lawrence

[ 1966 ] , New York : Perennial Books , 2000 , vol . 2 , pt . 1 , ch . 5 , 442 - 49 .

23 " Muhammad brought down from heaven and put into the Koran not religious doctrines
only , but political maxims , criminal and civil laws , and scientific theories . The Gos¬
pels , on the other hand , deal only with the general relations between man and God and
between man and man . Beyond that , they teach nothing and do not oblige people to be¬
lieve anything . That alone , among a thousand reasons , is enough to show that Islam
will not be able to hold its power long in ages of enlightenment and democracy , while
Christianity is destined to reign in such ages , as in all others " ( Tocqueville , ibid . , 445 ) .
24 Cf. Ibn Khaldun , The Muqaddimah : An Introduction to History , tr . Franz Rosenthal ,
2nd ed . , Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 1967 , vol . 3 , ch . 6 .
8 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

America , Africa and Asia owe a lot to tacit US support . 25 In the modern
Middle East , the rise of " fundamentalist " movements in the 1970s and
1980s was initially supported by Western and pro - Western governments
who tried to use them against secularist anti - Western governments and op¬
position movements . 26

Religion and peace

In 19th - century Europe , the supposed decline of religion was generally

perceived as unleashing an era of violence and civil unrest . Conservative
writers like Joseph de Maistre ( 1753 - 1821 ) , Louis de Bonald ( 1754 - 1840 ) ,
or Donoso Cortes ( 1809 - 53 ) attributed the horrors of the French Revolu¬
tions to the " progress " of atheism in Europe . On the other hand , Karl
Marx ' s famous denunciation of religion to be the opium of the people
compared religion to a strong sedative that prevented the lower classes
from rising in violent rebellion against their oppressors . 27 Georg Simmel
( 1858 - 1918 ) stressed the " lack of internal struggle and competition " as one

of the main features of the religious unit as such . 28 Max Weber considered
religious " hierocracies " to have been one of the main historical mecha¬
nisms which stabilized large transnational empires , especially by " domes¬
ticating " conquered peoples , by curbing the influence of warrior aristocra¬
cies or by protecting the weak and the poor against ruthless exploitation
and oppression . 29
As it seems , both conservatives and revolutionaries , though arguing
from different standpoints , had conceived of religion as being basically a
means of pacification . This , however , had not always been the case . In
fact , political thought in 17th - century Europe had rather been preoccupied
with curbing the destructive dimensions of religion . Modern political
thinking in Europe has been essentially influenced by a particular interpre¬
tation of the so - called " religious wars " in 16th - and 17th - century Europe .

25 Cf. Jeff Haynes , Religion in Third World Politics , London : Open University Press ,
1994 .

26 Cf. Alexandre del Valle , Islamisme et les Etats - Unis : une alliance contre I 'Europe ,
Lausanne : Editions L ' Age d ' Homme , 1997 ; Fawaz A . Gerges , America and Political
Islam : Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests ? , Cambridge , UK : Cambridge Univer¬
sity Press , 1999 .
27 Karl Marx , " Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie " [ 1844 ] , in : Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels , Werke , vol . 1 , Berlin : Dietz , 1969 , 378 .
28 Georg Simmel , Die Religion , 2nd rev . ed ., Frankfurt /M .: Rutten & Loening , 1912 , 57 .
29 Max Weber , Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft : Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie
[ 1921 ] , 5th ed . ( Tubingen : Mohr [ Siebeck ] , 1972 ) , 689 - 690 , 693 , 701 - 703 .
 INTRODUCTION 9

According to this interpretation , the main motive powers of the traumatic

bloodshed had been religious ones . From Jean Bodin ( ca . 1530 - 96 ) and
Thomas Hobbes to Carl Schmitt , the theory of the sovereign territorial
state has been linked to the assumption that religions , if confronted to other
religions in the framework of a common political unit , turn into dangerous
engines of irreconcilable civil discord and need to be domesticated by a
powerful superior authority , namely the territorial state . The classical for¬
mulas of this line of thinking - e . g . , " cuius regio , eius religio " ( Peace of
Augsburg , 1555 ) , " silete theologi in munere alieno " ( Alberigo Gentili ,
1588 ) , and " auctoritas , non Veritas , facit legem " ( Hobbes , 1668 ) - were
basically advocating a certain separation of politics and religion , linking
the maintenance of peace rather to the realm of the state than to the realm
of the churches . In fact , the idea of imagining religion as being primarily a
domain of private spirituality and public obedience was not least the result
of its political domestication by the absolutist state that had emerged victo¬
riously from Europe ' s confessional wars .
This does not mean that in the 18th and 19th centuries the violent
dimensions of religion had been forgotten in Europe . Rather , they were ex¬
teriorized as a problem of bygone ages or of " backward " , mainly non -
European cultures : The stakes of the Great Inquisition , for instance , were
conjured up time and again by anti - ecclesiastic polemics in order to stig¬
matize the institutional churches as allies of oppressive and unenlightened
regimes . Ethnographic reports about bloody religious rituals in " primitive "
cultures outside Europe served to underline the civilizing mission of the
West , including Christianity ' s role as a religion of peace . Only a few mili¬
tant atheists were using them as a means of theo - political criticism , argu¬
ing that the peaceful discourses of contemporary Christianity were merely
a civilized patina on top of a " barbaric " historical heritage . 30
It was not before the mid - 20th century that the social sciences , on a
massive scale , began to discover religion as an important element of mod¬
ern rebellions and revolutions . Especially in the 1950s and 1960s , " messi -
anism " , " chiliasm " and " nativism " became key categories linking the
comparative , interdisciplinary study of anti - colonial and anti - capitalist
movements with the study of modern totalitarianism and new sectarian
cults in Asia , Africa , America , Europe and the Pacific world . 31 Even then ,

30 Hundred years before Rene Girard published La violence et le sacre ( Paris : Grasset ,
1972 ) , Mikhail Bakunin , for instance , claimed an indissoluble link between the sacri¬
fice and religion as such : " All religions are cruel , all founded on blood ; for all rest
principally on the idea of sacrifice " ( Bakunin , " God and the State " [ fn . 4 ] , 126 ) .
31 Emanuel Sarkisyanz , Russland unci der Messianismus des Orients : Sendungsbewufit-
sein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens , Tubingen : Mohr , 1955 ; Peter Worsley ,
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
10

however , the combination of religion and social movements was often

taken to be mainly a problem of " undeveloped " and " backward " regions .
Even the resurgence of political Islamism in the 1970s and 1980s has fre¬
quently been read ( at least in Western media) as a proof of the persistence
of so - called " medieval " mentalities in the Middle East .

Globalization , the "clash of civilizations and the resurgence of religions

After the end of the Cold War , however , religion is again widely discussed
- not only as one of the main determinants of mankind ' s past , but also as
one of the main determinants of its future . " In the modern world , religion
is a central , perhaps the central , force that motivates and mobilizes peo¬
ple " , says Samuel P . Huntington . 32 Religions , Huntington argues , were the
major normative moulding powers of cultures and civilizations . Religions ,
thus , might be supposed to be at the root of the " fault lines " , " clashes " and
even the future " wars " between the " civilizations " of the modern world . 33
In fact , the 1970s and 1980s have witnessed a worldwide resurgence of
politico - religious movements 34 that seem to render the classic moderniza -

The Trumpet Shall Sound , London : MacGibbon & Kee , 1957 ; Norman Cohn , The Pur¬
suit of the Millenium , London : Seeker & Warburg , 1957 ; Eric J . Hobsbawm , Primitive
Rebels : Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries ,
Manchester : Manchester University Press , 1957 ; Les messianismes dans le monde
(= special issue of Archives de Sociologie des Religions , 4 - 5 , 1957 - 58 ) ; Vittorio
Lanternari , The Religions of the Oppressed [ 1960 ] , London : MacGibbon & Kee , 1963 ;
Wilhelm E . Muhlmann et al . , Chiliasmus und Nativismus : Studien zur Psychologie ,
Soziologie und historischen Kasuistik der Umsturzbewegungen , Berlin : Reimer , 1961 ;
Sylvia L . Thrupp , ed ., Millenial Dreams in Action , The Hague : Mouton , 1962 ; Bryan
Wilson , Magic and the Millenium , London : Heinemann , 1973 ; Guenter Lewy , Religion
and Revolution , New York : Oxford University Press , 1974 ; Janos M . Bak and Gerhard
Benecke , eds . , Religion and Rural Revolt , Manchester : Manchester University Press ,
1984 ; Bruce Lincoln , ed . , Religion , Rebellion , Revolution , Basingstoke and London :
Macmillan , 1985 .
32 Samuel P.Huntington , " If Not Civilizations , What ? Paradigms of the Post - Cold War
World ", Foreign Affairs 72 ( 1993 ) 5 , 186 - 94 ( pp . 191 - 92 ) .
33 Cf . Samuel P . Huntington , " The Clash of Civilizations ? " Foreign Affairs 72 ( 1993 ) 3 ,
22 - 49 ( p . 25 ) ; idem , The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order ,
New York : Simon & Schuster, 1996 , 42 , 47 - 48 , 267 - 272 , and passim . See also : Mark
Juergensmeyer , The New Cold War ? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular
State , Berkeley : University of California Press , 1993 ; idem , Terror in the Mind of
God : The Global Rise of Religious Violence , Berkeley : University of California Press ,
2000 ; Bassam Tibi , Krieg der Zivilisationen : Politik und Religion zwischen Vernunft
und Fundamentalismus , Hamburg : Hoffmann und Campe , 1995 .
34 For an overview , see , above all , Martin E . Marty and R . Scott Appleby , eds . , Funda¬
mentalisms Observed ( 1991 ) , Fundamentalisms and Society ( 1993 ) , Fundamentalisms
 INTRODUCTION 11

tion - secularization paradigm increasingly insufficient . Modernization the¬

ory , in Robert Wuthnow ' s words , has become "a lot like late Ptolemaic

conceptions of the solar system . What was once a simple and elegant ex¬

planatory framework has increasingly become a profusion of ad hoc argu¬

ments about retrograde motion , epicycles , and anomalous stellar observa¬

tions . " 35

As it seems , the end of the Cold War , far from heralding the End of

History ( Fukuyama ) , 36 rather accelerated the multiplication of Histories ,

i .e ., the rise of particularistic ethno - national narratives , many of them

blending ethno - myths with religious symbolism . In many violent conflicts

of the 1990s - Afghanistan , Algeria , Bosnia , Chechnya , Cyprus , Kashmir ,

Kosovo , India , Indonesia , Nagorno - Karabakh , Nigeria , Northern Ireland ,

Palestine , the Philippines , Sri Lanka , Sudan , Tajikistan , Tibet , Turkey - re¬

ligious symbols have been used to articulate a variety of ethnic and / or

socio - political goals .

However , while in those contexts " religion " is often regarded as a

source ( or resource ) of conflict , others see it as a medium of global recon¬

ciliation . This approach is particularly salient in the project of a " Global

Ethic " promoted and developed by theologians like Hans Kiing and Leo¬

nard Swidler . 37 The Declaration Toward a Global Ethic , drafted by Hans

Kiing and solemnly adopted at the centennial celebrations ( Chicago , Au¬

gust 28 - September 4 , 1993 ) of the first Parliament of the World ' s Relig -

and the State ( 1993 ) , Accounting for Fundamentalisms ( 1994 ) , Fundamentalisms

Comprehended ( 1995 ) , all published at Chicago : Chicago University Press . See also
Nikki R . Keddie , " The New Religious Politics : Where , When , and Why Do ' Funda¬
mentalisms ' Appear ? " Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 ( 1998 ) , 696 -
723 .

35 Robert Wuthnow , " Understanding Religion and Politics ", Daedalus 120 ( 1991 ) 3 , 1- 20
(P - 5) .

36 Francis Fukuyama . " The End of History ? " The National Interest , no . 16 ( 1989 ) , 3 - 18 ;
idem , The End of History and the Last Man , London : Penguin , 1992 .
37 See , e .g . , Hans Kting , Global Responsibility : In Search of a New World Ethic , New
York : Crossroad , 1991 ; idem , Yes to a Global Ethic , New York : Continuum, 1996 ;
Hans Kiing and Karl - Josef Kuschel , eds . , Weltfrieden durch Religionsfrieden ,
Miinchen , Zurich : Piper , 1993 ; Paul F . Knitter , One Earth , Many Religions : Multifaith
Dialogue and Global Responsibility , Maryknoll , NY : Orbis Books , 1995 ; David W .
Shenk , Global Gods : Exploring the Role of Religions in Modern Societies , Scottdale ,
PA : Herald Press , 1995 ; Leonard Swidler , ed . , For All Life : Toward a Universal Dec¬
laration of Global Ethic : An lnterreligious Dialogue , Ashland , Or . : White Cloud
Press , 1998 ; idem , ed . , Theoria > Praxis : How Jews , Christians , and Muslims Can
Together Move from Theory to Practice , Leuven : Peeters , 1998 ; Karl - Josef Kuschel ,
ed . , Ein Ethos fur eine Welt ? Globalisierung als ethische Herausforderung , Frank -
furt/M , New York : Campus , 1999 .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
12

ions ( Chicago , September 11 - 18 , 1893 ) emerged as the outstanding mile¬

stone in the ( much older ) history of global interfaith dialogue . 38

Indeed , in a " neo - medieval " world 39 , where the moral and educational

power of the nation state is eroded by globalization , where powerful trans¬

national " players " are defying the welfare state and the might - makes - right

ethic prevails , religion might again become the last resort of moral security
and consolation . Ecclesiastical bodies and their affiliated transnational

networks and relief services are among the world 's biggest non¬

governmental organizations , 40 and a " cosmopolitan ethical tradition rooted

in the common religious principles of different cultures may prove to be

more enduring in a multicultural international society than one rooted in

Enlightenment . " 41

Protagonists of interreligious dialogue sometimes argue that in most of

the violent conflicts mentioned above , religion has been exploited ( i .e .,

misused ) for profane , i . e . , national or ethnic , aims . "A religion in which

people have little or no faith continues to define a community in which

they have much faith . " 42 Should we conclude from this that religion ' as
such ' is not accountable for violent acts committed in its name ? This con¬

clusion , tempting as it is , would leave us with the question why religions

of love and peace could so easily be " exploited " time and again . Instead of

impermeable epistemological walls between " true " and " applied " religion ,

a broader concept of " religion " might be required that transcends the clas¬

sic distinctions between the " sacred " and the " profane " .

As a social fact , the " religious " comprises the totality of acts , ideas ,

symbols and institutions that are linking human beings to one another by

linking them to transcendental powers . Living religions , thus , have always

been much more than merely a canon of theological doctrines or a private ,

personal faith . Even if sacred scriptures as such are conceived of as abso -

38 Cf . Hans Kiing and Karl - Josef Kuschel , eds . , A Global Ethic : The Declaration of the
Parliament of the World 's Religions , New York : Continuum , 1993 . For a broader his¬
torical summary , see Marcus Baybrooke , Pilgrimage of Hope : One Hundred Years of
Global Interfaith Dialogue , New York : Crossroad , 1992 .
39 Cf . Stephen J . Kobrin , " Back to the Future : Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digi¬
tal World Economy " , Journal of International Affairs 51 ( 1998 ) 2 , 361 - 86 .
40 Cf. R . Scott Appleby , The Ambivalence of the Sacred : Religion , Violence , and Re¬
conciliation , Lanham , MD : Rowman & Littlefield , 2000 , 288 - 307 .
41 Scott Thomas , " The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics " ,
Millenium 24 ( 1995 ) 2 , 289 - 99 ( p . 297 ) .

42 Tarek Mitri , " Reflections on Confrontation and Dialogue " , Studies in Interreligious
Dialogue 9 ( 1999 ) 1 , 76 - 86 ( p . 78 ) .
 INTRODUCTION 13

lute truths , their interpretation is " work of man " .43 Considering the diver¬

sity of humankind , living religions may be rather conceptualized as

patterns of dynamic osmotic dialogues ( or better : ' polylogues ' ) between

different types of views and action : between orthodoxy , dissidence and

reform , between purists and syncretists , higher and lower clergies , special¬

ists and laities , mystics and rationalists , charismatics and bureaucrats ,

between urban and rural religiosity , elites and masses , oral and scriptural ,

' great ' and ' little ' traditions , etc .44

As Carl Schmitt once put it : " A conflict is always a dispute between or¬

ganizations and institutions in the sense of concrete orders , a dispute between

instances and not between substances " * 5 Instances , however , do not exist in

a vacuum , but in concrete spatial and temporal configurations 46 David Ni -

renberg , for instance , discussing the regional distribution of anti - Judaic

pogroms in medieval Spain , recently came to the conclusion that violence

was not triggered by the anti - Judaism of Christian theology as such , but by

its combination with specific local configurations of power .47 Olivier

Christin , in his comparative study on efforts to terminate inter - confessional

warfare in 16th - century Europe , provides ample evidence that on the local

level , inter - confessional peace - and toleration - agreements were often much

easier to reach than on the level of imperial or state - politics 48 The

different dynamics of recent Hindu - Muslim riots in different Indian towns

were , as Julia Eckert and Ashutosh Varshney have shown , not least the

result of different strategies of the local security forces and of different

local networks of civic engagement 49

It is for these reasons that our volume on " Religion between Violence

and Reconciliation " is focusing not only on religious texts , their transmis¬

sion , and their interpretations , but also on a variety of comparative case

43 See the contribution of Muhammad Sammak in this volume .

44 For an impressive example of this approach in the historical study of religion , see Rai -
ner Albertz , Religionsgeschichte Israels in alttestamentlicher Zeit , 2 vols . , Gottingen :
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , 1992 .
45 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie II : Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen
Theologie , Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 1970 , 106 .
46 This is the point of Wajih Kawtharani ' s contribution in this volume .
47 David Nirenberg , Communities of Violence : Persecution of Minorities in the Middle
Ages , Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 1996 .
48 Olivier Christin , La paix de religion : L 'autonomisation de la raison politique au XVIe
siecle , Paris : Le Seuil , 1997 . See also his contribution in this volume .
49 Julia Eckert , " Reconciling the Mohalla " ( in this volume ) ; Ashutosh Varshney , " Post¬
modernism , Civic Engagement , and Ethnic Conflict " , Comparative Politics 30 ( 1997 )
1 , 1- 20 .
14 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

studies on the local , institutional , spatial and historical contexts of reli¬

gious expression and interaction , conflict and reconciliation .

Lebanon : model , exception , laboratory ?

For a discussion of " religion " in its manifold contexts , the case of Lebanon
is particularly instructive . With 18 officially recognized sects from three
monotheist religions , living together on only 10 , 452 km2 in a conflict -
ridden region that for centuries has been a frontier as well as a meeting -
place between East and West , Christianity and Islam , Lebanon may be
considered as a " terre exemplaire " 50 , a laboratory of multicultural coexis¬
tence in a global setting and a seismograph for cultural , economic and
political developments in the Eastern Mediterranean .
Lebanon ' s polity is built around one of the richest historical experi¬
ences of inter - sectarian conflict - management , exposing its risks as well as
its opportunities . Its pivotal structure , " political confessionalism " - i . e . , the
proportional distribution of public offices among the country ' s main sects
- may be traced down to the 1840s . From its very inception , this political
system has been the subject of heated debates . Some observers bemoaned
it as an institutionalization of civil war , as an obstacle to nation - building ,
and as a source of immobilism and corruption . Others have hailed it as an
ingenious model for coping with cross - cutting religious and regional
cleavages in a peaceful and democratic way .
By distributing public offices , parliamentary seats , and ministerial
portfolios proportionally among the country ' s main sects , the Lebanese
quota - system may be said to conflict with important provisions laid down
in the Lebanese constitution of May 23 , 1926 , above all with the principles
that all Lebanese shall be equal in the eyes of the law ( Article 7 ) and that
all forms of public employment shall be open to all Lebanese , preference
being given solely to merit and capacity ( Article 12 ) . The system is putting
all those citizens at a disadvantage who do not belong to any of Lebanon ' s
officially acknowledged sects or who wish to leave their sect without con¬
verting to another .
Nevertheless , compared to the forceful expropriation , extermination or
displacement of minorities that accompanied the construction of " nation -
states " in so many other countries of the world , the " Lebanese solution "
was often regarded not only as a lesser evil , but also , and above all , as a

50 Une esperance nouvelle pour le Liban : Exhortation apostolique post -synodale de Sa

Saintete Jean -Paul II aux patriarches , aux eveques, au clerge et a tous les fideles du
Liban , Cite du Vatican : Libreria Editrice Vaticana , 1997 , § 119 .
 INTRODUCTION 15

positive example for others . The model of a tolerant , multiconfessional

Lebanon , as Michel Chiha ( Shiha ) once suggested , would make the Zionist
project in Israel an anachronism . 51 According to Chiha ( 1891 - 1954 ) , Leba¬
non , conceived as a " country of associated confessional minorities " 52 ,
seemed to be obliged by its very nature to develop the mental and political
virtues of tolerance and freedom that fitted best its liberal and cosmopoli¬
tan economy . 53
When , in the late 1960s , political analysts began to lose faith in the
future of the homogeneous " nation - state " and started to turn towards
research on " ethnicity " , the case of Lebanon - together with the cases of
Switzerland , Belgium , and the Netherlands - was one of the most fre¬
quently mentioned examples of " consociational " conflict - management in
culturally segmented societies . 54 Since the mid 1970s , however , the coun¬
try , once celebrated as the " Switzerland of the Near East " , became the
theater of a seemingly unending process of political decay . According to
the 1997 edition of the Petit Larousse dictionary , the neologism "Libanisa -
tion " is said to connote a " Processus de fragmentation d ' un Etat , resultant
de raffrontement entre diverses communautes ou confessions " . 55
For Georges Corm , " Libanisation " is equivalent to a kind of " balkani¬
zation " based not on ethnic but on religious criteria : " La balkanisation
avait represente un processus d ' emergence de mini -Etats batis .. . sur les

51 Cf. Michel Chiha , " Lebanon in the World " [ 1951 ] , in : idem , Lebanon at Home and
Abroad [ 1966 ] , Beirut : Fondation Chiha , 1994 , 130 : "Actually, the clear - cut example
given by Lebanon would have prevented the birth of the State of Israel - an anachro¬
nism in this century , it is the showing forth of the basic qualities of a government in
which religious communities and minorities are well - balanced because they receive
their rights . "
52 Chiha , Liban d 'aujourd 'hui [ 1942 ] , Beirut : Fondation Chiha , 1994 , 59 , 67 .
53 Cf . Chiha , Propos d ' economie libanaise [ 1965 ] , Beirut : Fondation Chiha , 1994 , 9 , 48 -
51 .

54 Cf . Arend Lijphart , " Consociational Democracy " , World Politics 21 ( 1969 ) , 207 - 25 ;
idem , Democracy in Plural Societies : A Comparative Exploration , New Haven and
London : Yale University Press , 1977 ; Elie Adib Salem , Modernization without Revolu¬
tion : Lebanon 's Experience, Bloomington: Indiana University Press , 1973 ; Gerhard
Lehmbruch , " A Non - Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democ¬
racies : The Case of Switzerland , Austria , and Lebanon " , in : Kenneth D . McRae , ed . ,
Consociational Democracy : Political Accomodation in Segmented Societies , Toronto :
McClelland and Stewart , 1974 , 90 - 97 ; Antoine Messarra , ed . , La societe de concor¬
dance : Approche comparative , Beyrouth : Universite Libanaise , Librairie Orientale ,
1986 ; idem , Le Pacte libanais : Le message d ' universalite et ses contraintes , Beyrouth :
Librairie Orientale , 1997 , 19 - 79 .
55 Le Petit Larousse , Paris : Larousse , 1997 , 594 .
16 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

specifies ethniques locales ; la libanisation concerne un processus similaire

mais qui s ' articule sur des particularites de nature religieuse et non plus eth -
nique . " 56 Metaphors , of course , always have to be used cum grano salis :
While " ethnic " fault- lines on the Balkans have often been ( and still are)
strongly related to religious ones , " religion " was not the only , perhaps not
even the most important motive power in the " Lebanonization " of Lebanon .
Neither the outbreak of hostilities in 1975 , nor their escalation may suffi¬
ciently be explained by purely " religious " causes . 57 From a spiritual stand¬
point , many cruelties committed during the " events " may be rather attributed
to a lack of religious ethics . Rephrasing Louis Dumont ' s classic diagnosis of
Indian " communalism " , we may say that the religious element that entered
into the politics of violence in Lebanon , often seemed " to be but the shadow
of religion , i . e . religion taken not as the essence and guide of life in all
spheres , but only as a sign of the distinction of one human , at least virtually
political , group against others . " 58
Nevertheless , the distribution of political power according to religious
criteria was ( and still is ) one of the main issues of public controversy in
Lebanon . The foundational texts of the post - war republic - the Ta ' if
Agreement of October 22 , 1989 , and the constitutional law of September
21 , 1990 - are ambiguous on this issue : On the one hand , the provision to
distribute parliamentary seats and ministerial portfolios at a 1 : 1 ratio be¬
tween Muslims and Christians became part of the constitution requiring ,
thus , a two - thirds majority to be amended . On the other hand , both the
Ta ' if Agreement and the revised constitution stipulate a phased program
for the abolition of confessionalism ( without , however , fixing any sched¬
ule ) . The same ambivalence prevails in public discussion : On the one
hand , it is often argued that a new civil war might be i mmin ent in Lebanon
if the confessional quota system were not swiftly abolished . On the other
hand , however , many discussants are aware that abolishing quotas and
special regulations protecting the country ' s minorities might have similar
consequences .

56 Cf. Georges Corm , L 'Europe et I ' Orient de la balkanisation a la libanisation : histoire

d 'une modernite inaccomplie , Paris : La Decouverte , 1989 , 127 . - For a comparison
between the Balkans and Lebanon , see Mario Apostolov ' s contribution in this volume .
57 Cf . Nawaf Salam , La condition libanaise : Communautes , citoyen , Etat , Beirut : Dar an -
Nahar , 1998 , 19 - 38 ; Thomas Scheffler , " Religion , Violence , and the Civilizing Pro¬
cess : The Case of Lebanon " , in : Jean Hannoyer , ed . , Guerres civiles : Economies de la
violence, dimensions de la civilite , Paris /Beirut : Karthala / CERMOC , 1999 , 163 - 85 (pp .
171 - 82 ) .

58 Louis Dumont , " Nationalism and Communalism " [ 1964 ] , in : idem , Religion/Politics
and History in India , Paris - The Hague : Mouton , 1970 , 89 - 110 ( pp . 90 - 91 )
 INTRODUCTION
17

In January 2000 , violent clashes between the army and armed Sunni

fundamentalists in North Lebanon 59 triggered a new debate in Beirut on

whether political confessionalism should be abolished in order to save

the country from another civil war . It may be useful to recall , in this con¬

text , the methodological advantages of political comparison . Most com¬

parative case studies and overviews presented in this volume - Afghani¬

stan ( Andreas Rieck ), Algeria ( Habiba Djahnine ), the Balkans ( Mario

Apostolov ), India ( Julia Eckert , Peter Vanderveer ), Turkey ( Haldun

Gulalp ) , the Middle East in general ( Sami Zubaida ) - suggest that the

emergence of inter - communal violence is not primarily caused by the ex¬

istence of confessional quota systems . In any state , whatever its constitu¬

tion , some extremists and / or agents provocateurs may be found ready to

provoke violent incidents for almost any purpose at any moment . Such

incidents may occur in societies with or without confessional quota sys¬

tems , and their occurrence cannot be stopped by abolishing such quota

systems , nor by establishing them .

The decisive question rather is whether the state is willing and capable

to intervene by asserting its monopoly of violence and protecting its citi¬

zens and minorities against domestic and foreign law - breakers . As Julia

Eckert shows in her analysis of Muslim - Hindu riots in Bombay , those riots

would probably not have lasted for more than 24 hours if the local security

forces had swiftly counter - acted . In the last instance , the stability and sov¬

ereignty of a political unit is always based on what Thomas Hobbes once

called " the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience ; of which

the condition of Humane Nature , and the Laws Divine ( both Naturall and

Positive ) require an inviolable observation " . 60 " The protego ergo obligo

as Carl Schmitt once put it , " is the cogito ergo sum of the state , and any

political theory that is not systematically cognizant of this proposition re¬

mains an insufficient fragment . " 61

Sure , the monopoly of violence is not sufficient to make a modern

state work . The smooth functioning of political institutions , at least in de -

59 Between December 31 , 1999 and January 6 , 2000 , clashes between the Lebanese army
and Islamist gunmen in the Dinniyah region northeast of Tripoli had claimed the lives
of 9 soldiers , 6 civilians , and 15 Islamists ( Daily Star , May 5 , 2001 ) . The Dinniyah in¬
cidents had been preceded by a series of church bombings in Tripoli ( October and No¬
vember 1999 ) and by the murder of a Maronite nun on January 3 , 2000 , in Beirut . For
an overview , see Jim Quilty , " The Dinniya episode " , Middle East International , Janu¬
ary 14 , 2000 , 7 - 8 . On the links between the Dinniyah gunmen and Usama b . Ladin ' s
al - Qa ' idah network , see Daily Star , October 6 , 2001 .

60 Hobbes , Leviathan [ fn . 20 ] , conclusion , 728 . See also ibid . , 272 , 375 .

61 Schmitt , Der Begriff des Politischen [ fn . 9 ] , 53 .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
18

mocratic societies , depends to a considerable degree on the undivided sup¬

port and cooperation of all of its citizens and societal power groups . Yet ,
although most quota systems have a reputation to fuel civil discord by end¬
less bickering about revised , " fairer " and "just " quotas , they are not neces¬
sarily an obstacle towards achieving that aim . As long as confessional
identities are part and parcel of collective mentality , quota systems , by as¬
suring the public representation of minorities , may help to make those mi¬
norities feel more ' at home ' in their state and induce them to support its
monopoly of violence .
Quota systems , thus , may help to develop a culture of non - violent con¬
flict - management . Left unbalanced by overarching integrationist efforts ,
they might , however , also help to turn a polity into an archipelago of intro¬
verted cultural ghettos headed by self - appointed ethno - political entrepre¬
neurs . One of the best ways to avoid this is to provide incentives for large -
scale trans - confessional interaction and democratization . The development
of a multi - dimensional dialogue between the country ' s citizens and espe¬
cially between its confessional groups is a decisive prerequisite for stabi¬
lizing the state .

Dialogue and coexistence : necessities and obstacles

If we mean by interreligious " dialogue " any form of non - violent interac¬
tion between adherents of different faiths , dialogue may be as old as relig¬
ion itself . On the local level , sharing sacred sites with members of other re¬
ligions , 62 or participating in other religions ' feasts and rituals , 63 has had a
long tradition in the Middle East . Rulers were often inclined to turn a blind
eye on religious heterodoxy as long as their subjects paid their taxes . 64
High - level dialogue between theologians may be more difficult to achieve ,
but even in the case of Islam and Christianity it may be traced back at least
to the theological disputations at the courts of medieval Muslim rulers . 65

62 See , e .g . , Taufik Canaan , Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine , London :

Luzac , 1927 ; Glenn Bowman , "Nationalizing the Sacred : Shrines and Shifting Identi¬
ties in the Israeli - Occupied Territories " , Man , N . S . , 28 ( 1993 ) 3 , 431 - 60 .
63 See the contribution of A'ida Zahar - Kanafani in this volume .
64 For a perceptive discussion of this attitude , see Peter Brown , Authority and the Sacred :
Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World, Cambridge : Cambridge Univer¬
sity Press , 1995 , 38 - 49 ; see also : ilber Ortayli , " Les groupes heterodoxes et
1' administration ottomane " , in : Krisztina Kehl - Bodrogi et al . , eds . , Synergistic Reli¬
gious Communities in the Middle East , Leiden : Brill , 1997 , 205 - 12 .
65 Josef van Ess , " Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie . Eine vorlaufige Skiz -
ze " , Revue des Etudes Islamiques 44 ( 1976 ) , 23 - 60 ; Ute Pietruschka , " Streitgesprache
 INTRODUCTION
19

Today , " dialogue " has become a thriving global business . Frightening vi¬

sions of an upcoming " Clash of Civilizations " , of a " threatened Lebanoni -

zation of national states in which culture is pitted against culture , people

against people , tribe against tribe " 66 provoked increasing efforts to prevent

such scenarios from becoming reality . 67 On the proposal of the Islamic Re¬

public of Iran , the United Nations General Assembly , on November 4 ,

1998 , proclaimed 2001 as the UN Year of Dialogue among Civilizations . 68

In 1999 , the VIII summit of francophone countries ( Moncton , September

3 - 5 , 1999 ) announced that the next summit would be held in Beirut , under

the theme " dialogue of cultures and civilizations " . 69

Preventing clashes of civilizations by intercultural dialogues surely is a

most laudable undertaking . Good intentions notwithstanding , there is ,

however , much reason to reconsider the conceptual prerequisites of such a

project . Are " civilizations " closed semiotic units ? Where are their limits ?

Why and to what extent should they be treated as corporate personalities or

magni homines like , e . g . , states or parties ? Who are the representatives of a

" civilization " and how are they to be selected ? How likely is it that an en¬

counter between different individuals , if staged as a " dialogue " between

" representatives " of different " civilizations " will reinforce precisely the

cultural barriers it claims to overcome ? And , last not least , is a prolifera¬

tion of top - level " dialogue " meetings likely to produce more than still

more lofty resolutions with little effect on " real life " at the " grass root "
level ? 70

Doubts about the usefulness of Muslim - Western " dialogue " projects

have often been voiced . 71 In Lebanon , however , interreligious dialogue is

neither a vague " dialogue of cultures " , nor a ballet of uncomittal encoun¬

ters between cosmopolites of different denominational affiliations . Reli -

zwischen Christen und Muslimen und ihre Widerspiegelung in arabischen und syri -
schen Quellen " , Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes 89 ( 1999 ) , 135 -
62 .

66 Benjamin Barber , " Jihad Vs . McWorld ," The Atlantic Monthly 269 ( 1992 ) 3 , 53 - 65 (p .
53 )

67 See , e . g ., Roman Herzog [ et al .] , Preventing the Clash of Civilizations : A Peace Strat¬

egy for the Twenty -First Century , New York : St . Martin ' s Press , 1999 .
68 UN - Resolution A / RES / 53 / 22 .

69 L ' Orient - Le Jour , September 6 , 1999 , 3 .

70 For a comprehensive discussion of top - level , middle range , and grassroots approaches
to sustained peacebuilding , cf . John Paul Lederach , Building Peace : Sustainable Rec¬
onciliation in Divided Societies , Washington , DC : United States Institute for Peace ,
1997 .

71 See the contribution of Dieter Senghaas in this volume .

20 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

gious leaders and institutions in Lebanon are powerful political actors pro¬
viding guidance not only in spiritual matters but also in political , social ,
and cultural ones . Due to the decline of secularist parties during and after
the war , their visibility in the public square is much stronger today than be¬
fore 1975 . Ecclesiastical bodies and their filiations are a thriving part of
national civil society , and , at the same time , helping to connect the country
to its Diaspora and to religious networks outside Lebanon . Besides , due to
the deficits of Lebanon ' s public welfare system , more and more Lebanese ,
impoverished during and after the war , have become increasingly dependent
on the charity of their respective religious communities . Furthermore , by
providing a sense of spiritual community , safeguarding family values and
teaching civil virtues , religion remains an important bulwark against social
disintegration and , hence , against the increasing rates of " street violence "
eroding the social fabric in other parts of the modern world . 72
All in all , there is little doubt that religion remains an important ele¬
ment of private and public life in Lebanon . According to a survey con¬
ducted in 1989 among 2 , 000 Lebanese adults ( 16 years and over ) , 95 . 6 %
of the respondents believed in God , 60 . 5 % in life after death , 65 . 1 % in
Hell , and 74 . 4 % in Paradise . 88 . 2 % considered themselves to be practicing
believers ; 68 . 8 % claimed to observe one or more religious rituals on a
regular basis ; and 87 . 6 % confirmed to have learned their social virtues
through religious education . 73
Considering the demographic composition of its population and its his¬
torical heritage , Lebanon should be among the best - suited meeting - places
for Muslim - Christian dialogue in the world . In fact , the " First Muslim -
Christian Convocation " ( then organized under the auspices of the " Ameri
can Friends of the Middle East " ) took place in Bhamdun (April 22 - 29 ,
1954 ) . 74 On a more secular level , the " Cenacle libanais " , founded in 1946
by Michel Asmar ( 1914 - 84 ) , provided a fruitful framework for encounters

72 Cf . Ali A . Mazrui , " Islamic and Western Values " , Foreign Affairs 76 ( 1997 ) 5 , 118 - 32
( pp . 130 - 31 ) ; Mayra Buvinic and Andrew R . Morrison , " Living in a More Violent
World " , Foreign Policy , no . 118 ( 2000 ) , 58 - 72 ( pp . 59 - 63 ) .

73 Cf . Ai 'da Boudjikanian , Abdo Kahi , and Joseph Khoury , Orientations culturelles et va -

leurs religieuses au Liban , Beirut : CEROC ( Centre d ' Etudes et de Rech 'erches sur
l ' Orient Chretien ) 1991 , 33 , 57 , 66 , 72 .

74 Cf . Augustin Dupree la Tour s .j . and Hisham Nashabe , eds ., Declarations communes

islamo - chretiennes 1954 - 1995 c . / 1373 - 1415 h . Textes originaux et traductions fran -
gaises , Beyrouth : Dar el - Machreq , 1997 , 11 - 16 . See also : Ataullah Sidddiqi , " Chris¬
tian - Muslim Dialogue : Problems and Challenges " , Encounters 2 ( 1996 ) 2 , 123 - 36 ( pp .
125 , 134 ) ; Juliette Nasri Haddad , " Trente cinq annees de rencontre musulmans -
chretiens " , Travaux et Jours , no . 59 ( 1997 ) , 31 - 47 ( pp . 32 - 33 ) .
 INTRODUCTION 21

between Muslim and Christian politicians and intellectuals . 75 In the years

preceding the civil war , Greek - Orthodox Bishop Georges Khudr ( b . 1923 )

and Shiite Imam Musa al - Sadr ( 1928 - 78 ) had been outstanding protago¬

nists of Muslim - Christian dialogue . 76

At that time , however , interreligious dialogue remained confined to a

few committed and far - sighted individuals . One of the weak points of

Lebanon 's confessionalist system before the war was the fact that trans -

confessional interaction between the country 's secular elites was much

more developed and institutionalized than communication between its re¬

spective clergies . There was at least the Chamber of Deputies and - on the

cultural - intellectual level - the " Cenacle libanais " ( 1946 - 1974 ) as a regular

meeting - place for the secular elites . Comparable national forums on the

side of the clergies did not exist .

It was not before 1993 that a permanent " National Muslim - Christian

Committee for Dialogue " was founded in which the religious heads of the

country ' s main Muslim and Christian sects are represented ( al - lajnah al -

wataniyyah al - islamiyyah al - maslhiyyah li - l - hiwar ) . 11 The Committee

takes position on numerous issues of national interest . Its activities are

broadly reported in the Lebanese press . In postwar Lebanon , problems of

Muslim - Christian dialogue also receive a lot of scholarly and theological

attention in Lebanon , 78 and some of the country ' s academic institutions are

primarily devoted to the promotion of Muslim - Christian mutual under¬

standing , most notably the Institut d 'Etudes Islamo - Chretiennes ( founded

in 1977 at the Universite Saint - Joseph , Beirut ) and the Center for Chris -

75 Jean Corbon , " Le Cenacle libanais et le dialogue islamo - chretien " , Islamochristiana , 7
( 1981 ) , 227 - 40 ; Fares Sassine , " Le Cenacle d ' Asmar ou les paradoxes de la maison
Liban " , L 'Orient - Express , no . 13 ( 1996 ) , 160 - 66 . For a selection of important lectures
presented to the Cenacle , see : cAhd 'al - Nadwah al - Lubnaniyyahhamsiin sanah min
al - muhadarah ' / Les annees ' Cenacle ', Beirut : Daral -Nahar , 1997 .

76 On Khudr and al - Sadr , see the contributions of As ' ad Khairallah and Saoud el - Maoula
in this volume .

77 On the activities of the Committee , see the contributions of Muhammad al - Sammak

and Saoud al - Maoula in this volume . See also the contribution of John Donohue SJ .

78 In 1995 and 1996 , the quarterly al - Ijtihad (Beirut ) , edited by al - Fadl Shalaq and
Ridwan al - Sayyid , devoted 4 issues to Muslim - Christian relations . See al - Ijtihad 7,
nos . 28 and 29 ( 1995 ) ; 8 , nos . 30 and 31 - 32 ( 1996 ) . - See also Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah , FiAfaq al - hiwar al - islamial - maslhl , [ Beirut ] : Dar al - Malak , 1994 ; Sa ' ud al -
Maula , al - Hiwar al - islami al - masihl : darurat al - mughamarah , Beirut : Dar al - Manhal
al - Lubnani , 1996 ; John J . Donohue , Muslim - Christian Relations : Dialogue in Leba¬
non , Washington , DC : Center for Muslim - Christian Understanding , Georgetown Uni¬
versity , 1996 .
22 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

tian Muslim Studies ( markaz al - dirasat al - masihiyya al - isldmiyya ,

-

founded in 1995 at the University of Balamand ) .

Although the problem of " reconciliation " in a postwar society has not
only " religious " dimensions , 79 religious actors are called to play a promi¬
nent role in it . Forgiving - embodied in the idea of the Christ dying at the
Cross for the sins of mankind - is a cornerstone of Christian religiosity ;
and in Islam , mercy and benevolence ( rahmah ) are basic attributes of God
evoked in almost every surah of the Qur ' an . Having remained , by and
large , above the battle lines of the civil war , the top ranks of Lebanon ' s ec¬
clesiastical hierarchies belong to the least discredited powers in the coun¬
try . 80 Educated Christian and Muslim theologians may even agree that the
root cause of Lebanon ' s troubles is not religion as such : In 1997 , former
Greek - Catholic Bishop Gregoire Haddad urged his Christian compatriots
to become Christians , i . e . , to accept the Christ as the savior of mankind and
not just as a kind of " clan chief ' . 81 Addressing an audience in Byblos on
June 16 , 2000 , Shiite Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah voiced
similar thoughts : " People say that the main problem gripping Lebanon is
religion . I say the problem of Lebanon is the lack of religion because most
Lebanese are sectarian , not religious . And it ' s well known that sectarian¬
ism is a product of tribalism and ignorance " . 82
Nevertheless , one can hardly ignore that interreligious dialogue in
Lebanon still faces considerable obstacles : First , although , on the global
level , " Islamic - Christian dialogue has turned from a rivulet into a roaring
river " 83 , major theological differences still remain and are unlikely to be

79 Drawing on the experience of the " Truth and Reconciliation Commission " in post -
Apartheid South Africa , Borer distinguishes between " individual " and " national "
reconciliation , the first type being devoted to the healing of individual traumata , the
second one oriented towards creating political structures of conflict - prevention ( hu¬
man rights culture , transformation of political and social institutions etc .) . " If the
first model is associated with a religious paradigm , the second one is most closely
related to a political one . " ( Tristan Borer , Reconciliation in South Africa : Defining
Success , Notre Dame , in : Kroc Institute , 2001 [ = Kroc Institute Occasional Paper , no .
20 : OP : 1] , 13 ) .

80 Cf . Scheffler , " Religion , Violence , and the Civilizing Process " [ fh . 57 ] , 182 - 85 .
81 Gregoire Haddad , " Changer ? Et pourquoi done ? " L ' Orient - Express , no . 25 ( 1997 ) , 12 -
19 ( p . 19 ) .
82 " Fadlallah denounces sectarianism , seeks ' land of learning , not conflict '", Daily Star ,
June 17 , 2000 , 2 .
83 Seyyed Hossein Nasr , " Islamic - Christian Dialogue : Problems and Obstacles to be pon¬
dered and overcome " , Islam and Christian -Muslim Relations 11 ( 2000 ) 2 , 213 - 27 (p .
213 ) .
 INTRODUCTION
23

solved in the foreseeable future . 84 Second , with the breakdown of commu¬

nism , interreligious dialogue has lost its unifying enemy . The end of the

Cold War reduced the pressing needs to forge a worldwide multifaith coa¬

lition of believers against organized atheism and increased anew the incen¬

tives for interreligious competition . Third , at the grassroots level in

Lebanon , unprejudiced encounters between members of the country ' s de¬

nominations are still impaired by deeply rooted barriers :

(a) Due to the massive demographic displacements during the war ,

many formerly mixed confessional areas in Lebanon have disappeared .

Hundreds of thousands of war - displaced persons have not yet returned to

their homes . The opportunities to live in or get accustomed to inter -

confessional coexistence in local or municipal everyday life , thus , have

been greatly reduced .

(b ) Even in the higher educated strata , sectarian mentalities are still

deeply entrenched . A survey among 2 , 300 students from different Leba¬

nese universities , recently published in the Lebanese press , revealed that

most students chose their " closest friend " among members of their own re¬

ligion : the Druzes leading with 97 . 2 % , closely followed by the Maronites

( 96 . 5 % ) , the Shiites ( 93 . 9 % ) , the Sunnis ( 93 . 7 % ) , the Greek - Catholics

( 91 . 6 % ) , the Armenians ( 81 . 7 % ) , and - although far behind - by the

Greek - Orthodox ( 65 . 7 % ) and the Protestants ( 60 . 0 % ) . 85

( c ) Interreligious marriage still faces many legal and mental obstacles .

In 1998 , an initiative to introduce civil marriage as a voluntary option into

Lebanon ' s legal system was successfully blocked by a united front of reli¬

gious leaders , although the initiative had been launched by the then head of

state , President Elias Hraoui ( Ilyas al - HirawI ) , and had been supported by

a two - thirds - majority in the council of ministers . 86 Even at Lebanon ' s most

secularized university , the American University of Beirut , attitudes to¬

wards interreligious marriage are ambiguous : In a survey conducted in

1993 among AUB students , 59 % of 793 respondents said that civil mar -

84 For an overview , see , e .g . , Nasr , " Islamic - Christian Dialogue " , loc . cit . ; Tim Winter ,
" The Last Trump Card : Islam and the Supersession of Other Faiths " , Studies in Inter¬
religious Dialogue 9 ( 1999 ) 2 , 133 - 55 ; Siddiqi , " Christian - Muslim Dialogue " [ fn . 74 ] ;
Heribert Busse , Die theologischen Beziehungen des Islams zu Judentum und Christen -
tum , Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft , 1988 .
85 Patricia Khoder , " Un sectarisme avive par la guerre " , L ' Orient -Le Jour , April 8 , 1999 ,
5.

86 On the civil marriage debate , see the contribution of Sofia Saadeh in this volume . Cf.
also Georges Assaf , " Systeme communautariste et deconfessionalisation : la problema -
tique de la mutation du systeme politique libanais " , Travaux et Jours , no . 64 ( 1999 ) ,
43 - 73 .
24 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

riage should be instituted in Lebanon . Yet , 66 % declared that they would

prefer to marry a person of their own sect . 87
( d ) Last not least , with 71 , 328 Lebanese killed during the war , 97 , 144

seriously injured , 9 , 627 crippled , 19 , 860 still " missing " , and ca . 825 , 000
displaced , with property worth billions of dollars destroyed and a general
deterioration of the population ' s living conditions , 88 we may safely con¬
clude that antagonistic memories of civil strife are still persisting in nearly
every Lebanese family .

Bridging trenches :

Euro - Mediterranean partnership and Lebanese intellectual life

A former veteran of interreligious dialogue once wrote : " II n ' y a de verita¬

ble dialogue des civilisations que si chacun est penetre de cette certitude
que 1' autre homme est ce qui lui manque pour etre pleinement un
homme . " 89 Few mortals , in Lebanon or elsewhere , will be able to live up to
moral standards that high - but strengthening social interdependence and
complementarity , creating common ground has always been a way to pre¬
vent conflict from becoming violent and disruptive . As the destruction of
Lebanon ' s prewar civil society has been brought about with active ' help '
of external actors , 90 the country ' s reconstruction , too , is in need of interna¬
tional assistance . Investing in the reconstruction of Lebanon is not only ,
not even primarily , an act of charity ; it is an investment in international
peace and in an exemplary experience : " ne pas refaire le Liban , c ' est re -
noncer definitivement au seul lieu geographique ou le dialogue concret en -
tre l ' islam et la chretiente peut encore etre tente dans la politique avant que
nous engloutissent les integrismes religieux de toutes sortes , ou ne nous
enlisent les ghettos ethnique de toutes dimensions " . 91

87 See Muhammad Faour , The Silent Revolution in Lebanon : Changing Values of the
Youth , Beirut : American University of Beirut , 1998 , 130 - 31 .
88 For an evaluation of war damage in Lebanon , see Boutros Labaki and Khalil Abou
Rjeily , Bilan des guerres du Liban 1975 - 1990 , Paris : L ' Harmattan , 1993 , 37 , 80 , 211 .
89 Roger Garaudy , " De la secession de l ' Occident au dialogue des civilisations " , in :
L ' impact de la pensee occidentale rend - il possible un dialogue reel entre les civilisa¬
tions ? Colloque tenu a Teheran du 20 au 29 octobre 1977, ed . Centre Iranien pour
l ' Etude des Civilisations , ed . , Paris : Berg International , 1979 , 106 .

90 Ghassan Tueni , Une guerre pour les autres , Paris : Jean - Claude Lattes , 1985 ; Farid el
Khazen , The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967 - 1976 , Cambridge , MA : Harvard
University Press , 2000 .
91 Ghassan Tueni , " Peut - on refaire le Liban ? " Politique etrangere 55 ( 1990 ) 2, 343 - 56
(p . 356 ) .
 INTRODUCTION
25

The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean being a key external relations

priority for the European Union , the 1995 Barcelona Conference agreed to

establish a comprehensive Euro - Mediterranean partnership " through

strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis , the development of eco¬

nomic and financial cooperation and a greater emphasis on the social , cul¬

tural and human dimension " . Chapter III of the Barcelona Declaration

declared " that dialogue and respect between cultures and religions are a

necessary precondition for bringing the peoples closer . " In order to live up

to that goal , the participants agreed inter alia to " implement a lasting pol¬

icy of educational and cultural programmes " ; they recognized " the essen¬

tial contribution civil society can make . . . as an essential factor for greater

understanding and closeness between peoples " ; and accordingly agreed to

strengthen " decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between ...

leaders of political and civil society , the cultural and religious world , uni¬

versities , the research community , the media , organizations , the trade

unions and public and private enterprises " . 92 Under the 1995 - 2000 Medi¬

terranean Assistance program ( MEDA ) , launched by the Barcelona confer¬

ence , Lebanon became one of the leading per capita beneficiaries of EU

assistance to Mediterranean partners .

This book as well as the conference on " Religion between Violence

and Reconciliation " ( Beirut , September , 1998 ) the papers of which are col¬

lected in it were funded by the European Commission as part of an over¬

arching program , " Vie commune , memoire partagee : le Liban , laboratoire

de la Mediterranee " , jointly organized by the German Orient Institute Bei¬

rut and the Beirut - based Centre d ' Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen -

Orient Contemporain ( CERMOC ) . Launched in 1997 , the program under¬

took to animate scholarly exchange between Lebanese and European

scholars on crucial issues of multicultural coexistence . By considering

Lebanon as a " laboratory of the Mediterranean " , the program inserted the

Lebanese experience in a broader , comparative framework , inviting spe¬

cialists from many countries and disciplines to join the discussion .

The program was designed to support the recovery of intellectual life

in postwar Lebanon . Before the war , Beirut had been the informal cultural

capital of the Arab World .93 Among war ' s many victims was science : the

politicization and communalization of educational institutions , the exodus

of leading scholars , the split - up of the Lebanese University , lack of public

funding , the self - encapsulation of the remaining intellectual mini - ghettos ,

92 " Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro - Mediterranean Conference ( 27 and 28

November 1995 " {http :// www. euromed . net/ key - docs/ barcelona . htm ) .
93 See the contribution of Elias Khoury in this volume .
26 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

political restrictions , mutual fear and the reluctance of scholars to move to

' hostile ' parts of the country have left their traces . By providing ' neutral

space ' , the Orient Institute and the CERMOC were well suited to encour¬
age scholarly encounters across communal trenches . By inviting scholars
from abroad to Lebanon , the two host institutions worked to create an
attractive intellectual environment that might induce young Lebanese
scholars to stay in Lebanon and participate in the reconstruction of their
country . By addressing issues of living together in a multicultural frame¬
work , the program converged with a number of other projects with similar
or related topics . 94
On another level , the program was to combine the different research
traditions embodied in the two host institutes , namely the CERMOC ' s fo¬
cus on social sciences and the study of the contemporary Middle East , and
the Orient Institute ' s concentration in Middle Eastern history and litera¬
ture . The program started with a symposium on the economic and civil
dimension of internal wars , organized by the CERMOC in June 1997 . 95
While this first conference was mainly devoted to processes of contempo¬
rary violence , the second symposium , organized by the Orient Institute in
1998 , focused on problems of religion and reconciliation . 96 In accordance
with the academic traditions of the Orient Institute , special emphasis was
laid on the textual and historical dimensions of the topic . At the same time ,
however , participants were invited to deal with ' religion ' not only as a
matter of scriptures and beliefs , but also in a wider sense , as a field of acts ,
symbols , and institutions relating human behavior to transcendent powers .
In order to place the Lebanese experience in a comparative context , several

94 See , for instance , Louise - Marie Chidiac , Abdo Kahi , and Antoine Messarra , eds ., La
generation de la releve (Une education nouvelle pour la jeunesse libanaise de notre
temps ) , Beirut : Bureau pedagogique des Saints - Cceurs , Librairie Orientale , 4 vols . ,
1990 - 1996 ; George Emile ' Irani and Laurie King - ' Irani , eds . , al -Ttiraf bi - 'l- akhir, al-
ghurfdn wa - 'l- musalahah : durus min Lubnan , Beirut : Lebanese American University ,
1996 ; George Irani , ed ., Reconciliation Processes and the Displaced Communities in
Post - War Lebanon , Beirut : Lebanese American University , 1997 ; Walld Mubarak ,
Antwan Massarrah , and Su ' ad Juzlf, eds . , Bind' al-muwatiniyyah fi Lubnan , Beirut :
Lebanese American University , 1999 .
95 Jean Hannoyer , ed ., Guerres civiles : Economies de la violence , dimensions de la civili -
te , Paris : Karthala , : CERMOC , 1999 .
Beirut
96 For reports on the conference see al -Nahar , September 12 , 1998 , 4 ; September 14 ,
1998 , 5 ; September 22 , 1998 , 15 . See also Andreas Rieck , " Religion zwischen Gewalt
und Versohnung " , Orient 39 ( 1998 ) 3 , 398 - 403 ; Thomas Scheffler , " Internationales
Symposium ' Religion between Violence and Reconciliation ' " , Beiruter Blatter , no . 6 -
7 ( 1998 / 99 ) , 179 - 83 ; Bernhard J . Trautner , " Religion zwischen Gewalt und Versoh¬
nung " , Religion - Staat - Gesellschaft 1 ( 2000 ) 1 , 189 - 97 .
 INTRODUCTION
27

case studies on other countries and regions were included . In order to

avoid biased discussions , participants from different regional , professional ,

confessional and political background were invited : Lebanese , Europeans ,

and Americans ; university professors , independent researchers , journalists ,

and lawyers ; Maronites , Greek - Orthodox , Sunnis , and Shiites ; protagonists

of interreligious dialogue as well as prominent secularists .

Encouraging dialogue on a topic still burdened by many taboos and

sensitivities was the main purpose of this project . Not surprisingly , the het¬

erogeneity of the Lebanese condition is mirrored in this volume , too . But

in all its heterogeneity it bears witness that the country 's intellectual

' camps ' and ' trenches ' are not as impermeable as they are sometimes de¬

picted , and that their members share co mm on ground .

Reversed mirrors : In the 1980s , local politicians in Berlin , Germany -

facing a wave of violent illegal house squatting - , used to invoke the spec¬

ter of an imminent Lebanonization of Berlin . In a speech to the French

Senate in 1997 , Ghassan Tueni , editor of Lebanon ' s respected daily , al -

Nahar , deplored that his country had become " une mosai 'que de multiples

Berlin , aux murs sans cesse demultiplies " . 97 As it seems , in the age of

globalization , metaphors of political fragmentation and heterogeneity have

become mutually convertible currencies . In our case , this gives reason for

hope : As ' Berlin ' miraculously turned from a symbol of global partition

into a symbol of national and regional unification , why shouldn ' t ' Beirut '?

97 Ghassan Tueni , " Le Liban doit encore se refaire " , L 'Orient -Le Jour , June 6 , 1997 , 5
( italics mine , TS ) .
 Parti
Text and Interpretation
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA :
REFLECTIONS ON SIGMUND FREUD ,
MOSES AND MONOTHEISM

Jan Assmann

In his book Moses and Monotheism , Sigmund Freud analyzes the history
of religion as a psycho - historical process of remembering and forgetting . 1
His view of the rise and development of monotheism is centered around
the key - concepts " memory " , " trauma " and " guilt " . He deals with these
problems not as a historian of religion , but as a psycho - analyst , basing his
views on the hypothesis of a close analogy between collective or " cultural "
and individual psycho - dynamics . His starting point is the observation that
no theory of tradition is sufficient to account for the extraordinary dynam¬
ics of religion and especially the compulsory sway it holds over the human
soul . Tradition alone could never achieve this .

"A tradition that was based only on [ direct ] communication could not
lead to the compulsive character that attaches to religious phenomena . It
would be listened to , judged , and perhaps dismissed , like any other piece
of information from outside , but would never attain the privilege of being
liberated from the coercion of logical thinking . It must first have under¬
gone the fate of being repressed , the condition of lingering in the

1 Sigmund Freud , Moses and Monotheism , tr . James Strachey , in : Standard Edition of

the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud , vol . 23 , London : Hogarth , 1959 .
After a long period of " latency " , this work has recently triggered a vivid debate that
may be compared to a " return of the repressed " , cf . , e . g . , Emanuel Rice , Freud and
Moses : The Long Journey Home , New York : New York University Press , 1990 ; Ilse
Gubrich - Simitis , Freuds Moses - Studie als Tagtraum , Weinheim : Verlag Psychoana¬
lyse , 1991 ; Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi , Freud 's Moses : Judaism Terminable and Inter¬
minable , New Haven : Yale University Press , 1991 ; Bluma Goldstein , Reinscribing
Moses : Heine , Kafka , Freud , and Schoenberg in a European Wilderness , Cambridge ,
MA : Harvard University Press , 1992 ; Jacques Derrida , Mai d 'Archive , Paris : Editions
Galilee , 1995 ; Jan Assmann , Moses the Egyptian : The Memory of Egypt in Western
Monotheism , Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press , 1997 ; Richard J . Bernstein ,
Freud and the Legacy of Moses , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1998 ;
" Sechzig Jahre ' Der Mann Moses ' : Zur Religionskritik von Sigmund Freud " , Wege
zum Menschen . Monatsschrift fur Seelsorge und Beratung 51 ( May / June 1999 ) 4 .
 JAN ASSMANN
32

unconscious , before it is able to display such powerful effects on its return

and force the masses under its spell . " 2

The closest analogy to the discontinuities of religious history , according to

Freud , is to be found in the history of neurotic disorders which occurs in
the phases " early trauma - defense reaction and repression - latency -
symptoms of neurotic disorder - return of the repressed " . In the frame of
this analogy , the traditional texts play the role of a patient ' s conscious
memory .
Freud ' s method of analysis requires that these texts be read as pre - texts
that conceal as much as they reveal . For the analyst , the surface - structure
of these messages is only raw material whose full meaning comes to light
only if one obtains access , by means of hidden hints and traces , to a kind
of deep structure semantics corresponding to the patient ' s unconscious
memory . There is a marked distinction between the surface meaning of the
patient ' s utterances resp . a cultural tradition such as the biblical texts , and
the deep structure semantics which only the analyst with his " archaeologi¬
cal " methods is able to bring to light . 3 This distance between surface and
depth is all - decisive for a psychoanalytical theory both of culture and of
individual psychology . It is fundamental for what Ricoeur called the
" Hermeneutics of Suspicion " which consists in reading a text against the

grain and scanning a message for hidden traces of what it wants to conceal
rather than what it wants to convey .
The decisive element in the history both of individual neurosis and of
religion is trauma . Trauma is what sets the whole process into motion .
Without trauma there is no repression , no latency , no return of the re¬
pressed . Freud distinguished between an original " early trauma " that oc¬
curred in the earliest stages of human phylogenesis , and its individual
repetition that occurs in the early infancy of every human being . The origi¬
nal trauma took place in the "primal horde " , when the father reigned in an
unlimitedly tyrannical way over his sons whom he threatened with death
and castration if they dare to rival his claim on the females of the horde .
Eventually his forces weakened with old age and the father was killed and
devoured by his sons . 4 According to Freud , the killing of the primeval

2 Freud , Moses and Monotheism [ fn . 1] , 101 .

3 For the changing meaning of archaeological metaphors in the work of Freud see Karl
Stockreiter , "Am Rand der Aufklarungsmetapher. KoiTespondenzen zwischen Archaolo -
gie und Psychoanalyse " , in : Meine . . . alten und dreckigen Gotten Aus Siginund Freuds
Sammlung, exhibition catalogue , Sigmund - Freud -Museum Vienna , 18 . 11 . 1998 - 17 .2 . 1999 ,
ed . Lydia Marinelli , Basel : Stroemfeld , 1998 , 81 - 93 .

4 Quotes : Freud , Moses and Monotheism [ fh . 1] , 17 .

 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA 33

father was repeated over and over again . Only by this repetition of the

primal crime could the deed leave indissoluble memory - traces in the hu¬

man psyche , forming its " archaic heritage " . 5 In the hidden depth of these

traces , " men have always known that they once possessed a primal father

and that they killed him . " 6 This early trauma accounts both for the oedipal

dispositions of the human soul and for the cultural development of religion

and morality .

Let me briefly summarize Freud ' s view of the history of religion . The

first step of totemism was reached when the slain father was replaced with

a powerful animal and when the sons renounced the position of the om¬

nipotent leader . Killing was now felt to be a sin , reminiscent of the pri¬

mordial sin which led to the origin of culture . The memory of the primeval

patricide was repressed and transformed into a strong feeling of guilt that

informed the nascent religion with all kinds of precautions and anxieties

such as taboos , restrictions , abstinences , self - castigations , cruel sacrifices

and so forth . The females of the horde were separated from the males by

the incest taboo . The next step of polytheism implied the humanization of

divine power . Monotheism , according to Freud , was a kind of return of the

repressed . " When Moses brought to his people the conception of a single

god , it was nothing new , but it signified the resuscitating of an experience

out of the primeval times of the human family that had long ago disap¬

peared from the conscious memory of the people ." Moses ' monotheism

was the return of the father , but the character of repetition was even

stronger , because Freud was convinced that Moses was murdered by his

people unable to stand the exacting demands of abstract monotheism . The

murder of Moses was an even more powerful repetition that revived en¬

crypted memories . By becoming repressed in its turn , the slain Moses and

his religion of undiluted monotheism became encrypted as well . A natural

death would not have been sufficient to work such powerful effects on the

collective psyche . The experience had to be traumatic in order to become

permanent . In Freud ' s words , it had to " undergo the fate of repression " in

order to " force the masses under its spell " . The murder of Moses re -

enacted the fate of the primeval father . The paradoxical point of Freud 's

argumentation is that only by having been murdered and through the sub¬

sequent repression of the deed , Moses became the " creator of the Jewish

nation " , a figure of lasting and interminable memory .

Until recently it seemed easy enough to dismiss Freud ' s construction

of the history of religion as fiction . Everything seemed to depend on the

5 See the excellent summary by Goldstein , Reinserting Mose [ fh . 1] , 117 ff .

6 Freud , Moses and Monotheism [ fh . 1] , 101 .

34 JAN ASSMANN

facts that Moses was indeed an Egyptian and that he was actually mur¬
dered by the Jews . It was easy to refute both these assumptions and to de¬
stroy the whole theory that Freud erected on them . Freud himself was
aware of this situation and complained about being compelled to erect his
" statue of bronze " upon " feet of clay " . In his recent book on Freud and the

Legacy of Moses , Richard Bernstein has , however , adduced new argu¬

ments to support Freud ' s theory . These arguments concern ( a ) the notion
of trauma and ( b ) the notion of tradition .
Trauma does not necessarily mean that an external event was experi¬
enced as traumatic . On the contrary , the traumatic experience normally
comes much later . Quoting Cathy Caruth , Bernstein writes : " since the
traumatic event is not experienced as it occurs , it is fully evident only in
connection with another place , and in another time " . 7 This principle of
" belated experience " becomes even more evident if we distinguish be¬

tween a perpetrator ' s and a victim ' s trauma . In the case of the murder of
Moses we are dealing with a perpetrator ' s trauma , and perpetrators nor¬
mally " don ' t know what they are doing " at the time . Nothing is more apt to
illustrate the truth of this observation than the situation of the holocaust
memory in Germany . Despite the fact that the material truth about Ausch¬
witz was made evident immediately after the war , its " historical truth " has
been very slow in making its way into the German mind . The recent debate
about Martin Walser ' s speech in Frankfurt was still inhibited by defensive
reactions , speechlessness and the desire to repress , if not to forget . The
belated experience of Auschwitz is only slowly beginning to loose its
traumatizing grip and a valid and common language and symbolism of
commemoration is still to be found .
For the Moses experience to become traumatic , Bernstein argues , it is
not necessary that the murder be perpetrated in actual fact . The intention to
kill is fully sufficient . He turns this observation into an argument against
Yerushalmi who had refused Freud ' s idea concerning the violent death of
Moses , pointing out that the biblical texts with their proclivity to dwell on
the misdeeds of the Hebrews would be the least likely sources to conceal
such a fact if it really occurred . Bernstein is able to show that the texts are
quite explicit concerning the murderous intentions against Moses as well
as against his followers , the prophets . Concerning the " violent fate of the
prophets " 8 , Moses is only the first in a long line that culminates with the

7 Bernstein , Freud and the Legacy of Moses [ fn . 1] , 42 , quoting Cathy Caruth , Trauma :
Explorations in Memory , Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press , 1995 , 7 - 8 .
8 See O . H . Steck , Das gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten , Neukirchen - Vluyn : Neu -
kirchener Verlag , 1967 .
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA
35

figure of the ' ebed YHWH in Isaiah 53 and that ends with John the Baptist

and Jesus of Nazareth . This is very convincing indeed and it is only

strange that Freud did not say as much . This was , by the way , also the

opinion of Ernst Sellin , who constructed this line of murderous messian -

ism 9 and who later retracted from his thesis of the murder of Moses as an

unnecessary assumption . Freud , however , who was informed of Sellin 's

retraction , stubbornly stuck to his view . For him , it was necessary that the

murder really occurred . It was the event that counted .

This is easily understandable . Bernstein 's demonstration amounts to

the fact that the patient is saying exactly the same thing as the analyst . The

analyst is able to discover a trauma in the history of monotheism , and the

commentator of the analyst is able to back up this discovery by showing

that the texts speaks of nothing else . This certainly confirms Freud in es¬

tablishing a close relationship of monotheism and trauma . Yet it destroys

Freud ' s methodology which categorically requires the difference and dis¬

tance between surface and depth . It destroys Freud ' s archeology . There is

nothing to be dug out . It ' s all on the surface . There is no need for a herme -

neutics of suspicion . All that is required is to listen attentively to what the

patient has to say . I am not going so far as to believe that the patient is

fully aware of his problems . There is still much room for interpretation .
There is much to be read between the lines of the transmitted texts . But it

is all there . We don ' t need the archaic heritage , the Oedipus complex and

the ambivalence of the father - son - relationship , in short , we don ' t need any

deep psychology in order to learn that the themes of memory , forgetting ,

trauma and guilt are central to biblical tradition .

Freud has the great merit to have discovered the centrality of these top¬

ics , but his explanation cannot be correct . The importance of memory ,

trauma and guilt must reside in the structure and nature of monotheism

itself , and not in the depth of the human psyche . There must be something

in biblical monotheism that relates this religion in the closest possible way

to memory and trauma . In the following paper , I want to establish this

connection . Monotheism is structurally linked to memory . It implies a

certain violence or antagonistic force that produces traumatic experiences

as well as strong sentiments of guilt . Maybe this is or comes close to what

Derrida wanted to show in his text on archive . As far as I am able to follow

him in his convoluted reflections , there is a difference between " archae¬

ology " and " archive " . Freud favored the archaeological approach in dig¬

ging through the various layers of conscious memory or the archives of

9 Ernst Sellin , Mose und seine Bedeutung Jiir die israelitisch -jiidische Religionsge -
schichte , Leipzig : A . Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung , 1922 .
36 JAN ASSMANN

tradition in order to get to the historical truth . I would like to choose the
archival approach , perhaps following Derrida in his concept of " archive "
and certainly Bernstein in his extended notion of tradition and to turn
again , with the Freudian categories of memory , trauma and guilt in mind ,
to the biblical archive .
The following remarks are divided into three sections concentrating in
turn on " memory " , " trauma " and " guilt " .

1 . Memory
Freud rejects the notion of tradition and reconstructs the history of mono¬
theism as a matter of memory , of forgetting and remembering . What he
does not tell us , however , is the fact , that the concept of memory plays a
central role in the biblical texts themselves . The book of Deuteronomy in
particular deals extensively with the problem of memory . One can even
say that Deuteronomy expounds a theory of memory .
The text is staged as a sermon of farewell which Moses addresses to
the people of Israel on the eve of their crossing the Jordan and entering the
Promised Land . Moses will not follow them , because he is bound to stay
behind and to die in Moab . Moses starts with a recapitulation of their
common experiences during their exodus out of Egypt , the revelation of
the Law at Mount Sinai and the following forty years of wandering
through the desert . His main concern is to transform the living memory of
the group into cultural memory that can be transmitted to future genera¬
tions . The whole book is grounded in a deep anxiety of forgetting . The
community is repeatedly and most severely summoned not to forget the
obligations which it had entered into during its wanderings in the desert
now that it is about to enter the Promised Land . Nothing would be more
natural than the loss of a memory that is no longer confirmed and sup¬
ported by any cultural and social frames .

" Only take heed to thyself and keep thy soul diligently , lest thou forget
the things which thine eyes have seen , and lest they depart from thy heart
all the days of thy life : but teach them thy sons and thy sons ' sons " 10
( Deuteronomy 4 : 9 ) .
" And it shall be when the LORD thy God shall have brought thee into the
land he sware unto thy fathers . . . to give thee great and goodly cities

10 Cf . Deuteronomy 6 :6 - 7 : " And these words which I command thee this day shall be in
thy heart : and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children , and shalt talk of them
when thou sittest in thine house , and when thou walkest by the way , and when thou li -
est down , and when thou risest up " .
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA 37

which thou buildest not . . . when thou shalt have eaten and be full ; then

beware lest thou forget the LORD which brought thee forth out of the land
of Egypt , from the house of bondage " ( Deuteronomy 6 : 10 - 12 ) .
" . . . beware that thou forget not the LORD thy God , in not keeping his
commandments . . . lest when thou hast eaten and art full , and hast built
goodly houses . . . then thine heart be lifted up , and thou forget the LORD
thy God which brought thee forth out of the land of Egypt . . . " ( Deuteron¬
omy 8 : 11 - 14 ) .

In view of this imminent danger of forgetting , Moses devises a full - fledged

mnemotechnique of individual and collective remembering . We are deal¬
ing here with a kind of ars memorativa which is worlds apart from what is
understood by this term in greco - roman rhetorics and in the Renaissance .
That kind of ars memorativa relates to the perfection of individual mem¬
ory . It helps a public speaker to remember his speech and was later to help
the Renaissance scholar marshal a universal knowledge and gain insight
into the structure of the universe . The mnemotechnique Moses is devising
is not about strengthening individual memory ( " mind - building " ) but about
strengthening a corpus of highly important memories such as the historical
experience of the Exodus from Egypt and the Laws received at Mount
Sinai in order to save them from falling into oblivion and to transmit them
to future generations . The speech of Moses takes place forty years after
Exodus and Sinai . Forty years means a generation gap . The generation of
eye - witnesses is about to die . In order to save their memories from dying
with them , they have to be recorded , codified and brought into a form that
ensures their transmittability and actual transmission from generation to
generation . Lived memory , memoire vecue in the terminology of Maurice
Halbwachs , or " communicative memory " in the terminology Aleida Ass -
mann and I proposed , had to be transformed into " cultural memory " . 11 We
are now facing the same situation with regard to the holocaust . This sharp¬
ens our awareness of the problem the book of Deuteronomy is dealing
with . The aim of the book of Deuteronomy is to teach both what to re¬
member and how to remember , that is , both the lesson that must never be
forgotten and the mnemotechnique that ensures its continuous transmis¬
sion . This mnemotechnique includes no less than seven different devices :

1 . The inscription in the heart , that is , learning the text of Torah by heart .

11 See Jan Assmann , Das kulturelle Gedachtnis : Schrift , Erinnerung und politische Iden -
titat in friihen Hochkidturen , 3rd ed . , Munchen : Beck , 1999 ; Aleida Assmann , Erinne -
mngsraume : Formen und Funktionen des kulturellen Gedachtnisses , Munchen : Beck ,
1999 .
38 JAN ASSMANN

2 . Conversational remembering : constantly discussing the Torah , at home

and abroad , by day and by night .
3 . Marking the body and boundary by binding the text on the forehead
and by fixing it on the doorpost of the houses .
4 . Celebrating the three commemorative fests , Pessah , Shavuot 12 et Suk -
kot , all of which provide a frame for collective commemoration of the
sojourn in Egypt , the Exodus and the Torah .
5 . The fixation and publication of the text on chalked stelae . 13
6 . Oral poetry : Moses teaches the Israelites a song dealing with the event
of the exodus which they are requested to learn by heart and to trans¬
mit orally to future generations ( Deuteronomy 32 ) .
7 . The canonization of the text of the Law : to add nothing , to subtract
nothing , to change nothing ( Deuteronomy 4 : 2 ) .

This form of cultural and collective mnemotechnique is both a special and

a typical case . We may safely assume that every culture is centered around
a body of indispensable knowledge that is transmitted from generation to
generation . Learning and remembering not only convey useful skills and
knowledge , but also participation , belonging and social identity . Nietzsche ,
in his Genealogy of Morals , has shown how civil society depends on the
" fabrication of memory " , and the mnemotechnique of Deuteronomy may

be interpreted as a very explicit example of such a fabrication of memory

in order to build a society . This example is , however , not only wonderfully
explicit , it is extreme . The stress on forgetting and remembering is much
too strong and much too exceptional as to be explained by pointing to uni¬
versal structures and functions of cultural memory . There must be more to
it , and indeed there is .

The decisive factor is , I think , the extraterritorial character of the kind

of experience which is designed to form the content of the Mosaic mne¬
motechnique . This is a specific element which seems to be related to the
extraterritorial or even extramundane character of monotheism and
revelation . The Bible situates the revealed truth of monotheism , the cove¬
nant and the Law , in the extraterritorial world of the desert . The commu¬
nity had to get out of Egypt in order to receive the revelation and to enter
the new world of Law and monotheism , and it is bound to stick to this new
world even after entering and living in the Promised Land . This means that
it is bound to live as strangers in the land , following not the territorial law
of the land , but the extraterritorial law of the desert , a structure which can

12 Deuteronomy 16 : 12 .
13 Deuteronomy 27 :2 - 3 .
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA 39

easily be generalized to living as strangers in this world because of being

faithful to the Law of another world . " I am a stranger in this land " , we read
in Psalms 119 : 19 , " do not conceal thy commandments from me " . The Bi¬
ble teaches the principle of dual citizenship , of being in this world without
feeling totally at home in it . This can only be achieved by memory , that is ,
by a kind of memory that runs against the evidence of the present circum¬
stances , that keeps an awareness of the desert amidst the amenities of the
cultivated land and that prevents you from feeling totally at home and
identifying with the world you happen to live in . Therefore , the required
memory must be qualified as counter - evidential or counter - factual or
counter - presential . It needs technique for the very reason that it is counter -
presential . It is a memory that cannot survive without strong technical sup¬
port . 14
This relation between the extraterritoriality of what must be remem¬
bered and the need for codification and canonization forms the specificity
of biblical religion which has no parallels in Egypt , Mesopotamia , Greece
and other civilizations of the ancient world , let alone the kind of primitive
societies Nietzsche was thinking of in his Genealogy of Morals . However ,
it is also obvious that there are parallels . The biblical stress on memory
and canonization is typical of all religions based on revelation and it is
especially typical of monotheism . There is no monotheistic religion which
is not based on a canonized body of scriptures serving as a codification of
memory . Belonging to such a religion means having learnt and more or
less interiorized this textualized memory . It is moreover obvious that this
preponderance of memory and codification is a necessary correlative of
revelation . Revealed knowledge is ( or presents itself) always as extraterri¬
torial , or extramundane . It comes from another world , like " air from other
planets blowing " , to quote Stefan George . It is not a knowledge based on
this - worldly experience and accumulated in the course of centuries . Fur¬
ther , it is a knowledge that you are not invited to enlarge by your own
experience . God is invisible , this is the first and foremost teaching of
revealed monotheism . You are not going to see God , you depend on listen¬
ing to his word in order to get close to him . The concept of revelation is
the opposite of what could be called natural evidence . There is no other
access to revealed truth than scripture . "Nobody has ever seen God " we
read in the gospel of John ( John 1 : 18 , cf. 1 John 4 : 12 where this phrase is
quoted ) and St . Paul teaches " that we walk in faith and not in clear sight
( = evidence ) " ( 2 Corinthians 5 : 7 ) . Faith , pistis in Greek and emunah in

14 Cf . Moshe Halbertal , People of the Book: Carton , Meaning , and Authority , Cambridge ,
MA : Harvard University Press , 1997 .
40 JAN ASSMANN

Hebrew , is just another word for " memory " , for it is all about not forget¬
ting what has been said to the ancestors and about trusting the authenticity
of their experience and testimony . The absence of exterior evidence is
compensated by an interior or spiritual representation , that is , memory and
its codification in scripture . This shift from external evidence to memory
and internal trust or certainty has much to do with what Freud called
Fortschritt in der Geistigkeit ( " advance in spirituality/ intellectuality " ) .
The appeal to memory is so decisive that monotheism has , right from
its very beginnings , had to have recourse to techniques of recording , that
is , to writing in order to fight the ever imminent danger of forgetting .
Moreover , it had to invest writing with the highest authority and to develop
a new form of tradition which is canonization . It needs not only writing ,
but this very innovative and special form of written tradition which is can¬
onized scripture , to represent the revealed truth of monotheism that has no
natural basis in evidence and experience . Monotheism , therefore , is first
and foremost a matter of memory . This applies not only to the three west¬
ern monotheistic religions Judaism , Christianity and Islam , but also to
Zoroastrianism , Manichaeism , Buddhism , Jainism , Daoism , Confucianism ,
Mormon religion and other religions , some of which may not be classified
as monotheism , but all of which share the polemic character of biblical
monotheism , opposing and rejecting an older tradition .

2 . Trauma

I hope that the relation between monotheism and memory has become
clear . However , the kind of memory the canonized texts of monotheism
are concerned with is very different from the memory Freud has shown us .
The memory of monotheism has nothing to do with the unconscious , with
repression and the return of the repressed . On the contrary , it is related to
very conscious methods of preserving , learning , repeating , interpreting ,
communicating , transmitting , publicizing and symbolizing . Nevertheless ,
the Bible and especially the book of Deuteronomy is not exclusively con¬
cerned with this kind of cultural memory . There is even a tradition that
associates the book of Deuteronomy with what seems to be an allegory of
repression and the return of the repressed . In 2 Kings 22 - 23 we read that a
book has been discovered in the course of restoration work in the temple .
It was identified as a book written by Moses and containing the conditions
for living in the land under the guidance of God . The discovery of this
book comes as a shock and a catastrophe , throwing the king and the people
in utmost despair . For it is clear that because of the loss of this book the
Law has been broken , the conditions have been forgotten and the punish -
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA 41

ment has become inevitable . No one is able to keep back his tears when the

book is read aloud to the people . In its return , the forgotten memory forced

the masses under its spell . Remorse , repentance and reconversion were

widespread and temporarily appeased God 's wrath for thirty - five years

until in 587 B . C . Jerusalem finally fell into the hands of the Babylonians .

The legend of the discovery of a lost book is an allegory of repression ,

that is , of a kind of forgetting that acts as a means of preserving an original

impression and of not losing it . Repression , according to Freud , is due to

trauma ; there is something so horrible or painful about a certain experi¬

ence that it resists conscious processing and remembering . So , where is the

trauma of monotheism ? Freud answered this question by inventing a psy¬

cho - historical myth about the primal horde and the repeated murder of the

primal father . I shall try a totally different explanation which relates not to

religion in general , but to monotheistic religion alone . This type of religion

is , indeed , built upon a kind of patricide , or , more precisely , " deicide " , the

killing or elimination of gods . I prefer to call this principle " theoclasm " ,

the destruction of gods , in analogy to iconoclasm , the destruction of im¬

ages . Theoclasm is the necessary consequence of a new distinction on

which these religions are based . This is the distinction between true and
false .

The distinction between truth and falsehood is alien to original or

" primary " religions . They are based on distinctions such as pure and im¬

pure , correct and incorrect , sacred and profane . But it never occurred to

any primary religion to denounce any gods as false , fictitious , inefficient or

inexistent . The distinction between Truth and Falsehood in matters of re¬

ligion was a spiritual revolution that changed the world in a way at least as

fundamental as did the other revolutions - political , industrial , economical ,

commercial etc . This distinction created the spiritual space still inhabited

by the greater part of humanity - Jews , Christians , and Moslems .

It is first of all necessary to realize that this distinction is not as old as

religion itself , that it is not just another form of distinguishing between

' us ' and ' them ' , but that it is indeed a revolutionary innovation . This revo¬

lution occurred first in Egypt , in the middle of the 14th century B . C . ( I am

referring to Akhenaten ) , but did not lead to any lasting tradition ( leaving

only , perhaps , some traumatic memories ) . Only its second occurrence , in

Israel 600 to 800 years later , had lasting effects . Tradition fixed it on

Moses , thus dating it back to a time roughly corresponding to its ( long

forgotten ) first occurrence in Egypt . I shall , therefore , refer to it as the

" Mosaic distinction " . It should , however , no longer be forgotten that in

historical reality it was Akhenaten , the Egyptian king , who first dared to

abolish traditional religion , destroy the images of the gods , close the tem -
42 JAN ASSMANN

pies and forbid any worship of the gods declared inexistent . The case of
Egypt shows very clearly the traumatic effects of this new kind of religion
which is based on the distinction between true and false and which rejects
the own tradition , the own gods , as false . Egypt reacted with repression ,
both in the sense of banning all traces and memories of this revolutionary
episode from conscious tradition and in the sense of preserving some dis¬
located and distorted memories of the shock of Amarna which only turn up
in written tradition after many centuries when they will be conflated with
violent reactions against Jewish monotheism . I cannot go into details here
and simply refer to the second chapter of my book Moses the Egyptian ,
where I give a detailed exposition and analysis of this history .
In the Bible , the distinction between true and false gods finds its most
striking expression in the concept of idolatry and in the second command¬
ment , the prohibition of images . The prohibition of images means the pro¬
hibition of worshipping false gods . Every image has the inherent power of
turning into a false god and even the making of images is already an act of
worship . This preoccupation with the fear of false gods and the constant
temptation of worshipping them is the exact inversion of the preoccupation
of primary religions not to miss any divinity and not to omit any required
act of worship . The fear of these religions is not about worshipping wrong
gods but about neglecting any power worth worshipping . In many respects ,
religions based on the distinction between true and false are the inversion
of primary religions . They are " counter - religions " opposing traditional or
primary religions as " paganism " . There is a negative energy and even vio¬
lence, a violent power of negation at the very core of these religions , an
antagonistic force which enables them to draw the distinction between true
and false and to reject what they construct as paganism .
It follows from this analysis that monotheism or secondary religion has
not only much to do with remembering , but equally much with forgetting .
You are requested not only to remember what has been revealed to the
ancestors , but also to forget all about the older tradition . The Mosaic dis¬
tinction does not only set off the true believers from the rest of the world ,
it does not only create an outer boundary , denouncing all other religions as
paganism , but it also directs its antagonistic force against the past which
must be forgotten . The injunction to forget is paradoxical . You can be
asked to remember , but not to intentionally forget . There are mnemo -
techniques of remembering , but no mnemotechniques of forgetting . Yet
this is precisely how the Jewish Law has been explained , not only from the
outside , by Tacitus and other Greek and Latin authors writing on Jews and
Judaism , but also from the inside , by the great medieval philosopher Rabbi
Moshe ben Maimon ( Maimonides ) . The principle of this mnemotechnique
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA 43

of forgetting may be called normative inversion . The uncountable laws

which Moses instituted are explained as the inversion of previous pagan
customs which are meant to be forgotten by superinscription . This concept
of normative inversion as a mnemotechnique of forgetting is just another
allegory of secondary or counter - religion displaying its negative and an¬
tagonistic character . The law is meant not to teach the truth , but to cure the
error of idolatry . The first commandment is not to worship God , but to
have no other gods besides him .
The first author who wrote on normative inversion was an Egyptian
priest called Manetho , whose Egyptian history appeared in several vol¬
umes around 275 B . C . His work is lost , but we owe the preservation of the
fragment that interests us to Josephus Flavius who was interested in pagan
statements about the Jews . Manetho tells a story about a certain Heliopoli -
tan priest named Osarsiph , who was made the leader of a large group of
lepers suffering from persecution and forced labor in the eastern desert . He
was able to obtain a deserted town from the king and turned it into a lepers
colony , organizing some 80 , 000 lepers by giving them laws . The first law
was not to worship any gods , the second not to abstain from eating forbid¬
den food and especially the sacred animals , and third not to mix with out¬
siders . Manetho ' s story gives the opposite , the pagan ' s view of the Mosaic
distinction . The commandment not to worship other gods is turned into the
prohibition of worshipping any gods at all , and the exclusion of other
forms of worship as " paganism " or " idolatry " is turned into the prohibition
to mix with outsiders . The repudiation of idolatry appears here as " theo -
clasm " , because the destruction of images and sacred animals is directed
against the gods who are to be destroyed . Theoclasm is represented in this
text as the extremest form of impurity , viz . leprosy , in much the same way
as idolatry is represented in the biblical texts as madness . On the basis of
the Mosaic distinction between truth and error , idolatry appears as the
worst kind of error , whereas on the basis of the traditional distinction be¬
tween purity and impurity , iconoclasm appears as the worst form of impu¬
rity , which is leprosy .
The trauma of monotheism appears in these stories and theories about
normative inversion in different aspects . Seen from the pagan side , the
trauma consists in negating the gods . For the pagans , it does not make any
difference whether or not the " lepers " worship a god of their own . In their
eyes , monotheism is atheism because it implies the negation of gods . The
prohibition of worshipping " other gods " means the negation of what they
recognize as divine . Seen from the monotheist ' s side , that is , with the eyes
of Maimonides , idolatry appears as an addiction which has to be cured by
the therapy of the Law . The key point here is that it is not only the pagans
44 JAN ASSMANN

who are suffering from this addiction , but the believers as well . The pa¬
gans have long since disappeared and their religion has fallen into com¬
plete oblivion , but the addiction of idolatry still prevails and has to be
fought by all means because the powers of this world continue to exert
their seductive influence on the human heart and because the truth in relig¬
ion is so hard to know .
You find the same language of illness in the writings of Eusebius ,
Theodoretus , Tertullian and other church fathers who are dwelling in
lengthy characterizations of idolatry as a kind of addiction , pestilence ,
leprosy , epidemics . It was once called the " Egyptian disease " by Eusebius .
This same language reappears in the Age of Enlightenment with respect to
religion in general including Christianity , which the French philosopher
Thierry baron d ' Holbach called " the sacred contagion " . With the discovery
of the unconscious in the time of Romanticism , the door is open to Freud ' s
concept of trauma .

3 . Guilt

The construction of paganism that goes with the Mosaic distinction con¬
sists in turning an inner distinction — the distinction between sacred and
profane or pure and impure — into an outer distinction — the distinction
between the sacred people , the " kingdom of priests " ( Exodus 19 : 6 ) and the
outward world . A distinction operative within one and the same culture
and society now became used for setting the whole group off against other
groups or nations . The transformation of an inner into an outer boundary
creates homogeneity , equality and solidarity within the group as it raises
the fence against the exterior world . 15 Internally , with respect to the be¬
lievers , this transformation destroys differences ; we might call this ten¬
dency " de - differentiation " or " totalization " . In the case of biblical religion ,
the most typical expression of this " totalism " is the de - differentiation be¬
tween the spheres of cult and ethics . Moral behavior now becomes even
more relevant for establishing and maintaining a positive relationship bet¬
ween man and God than ritual behavior . What has generally been inter¬
preted as a " spiritualization " or " ethicalization " of cult corresponds to a
sacralization of ethics . The distinction between the two spheres is abol¬
ished . The notions of " law " and " rite " coalesce . 16

15 This transformation corresponds in many ways to what Mary Douglas has described as
" enclave culture " : In the Wilderness : The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of Num¬
bers , Sheffield : Sheffield Academic Press , 1993 .
16 See my booklet Politische Theologie zwischen Agypten und Israel , 2nd ed ., Miinchen :
C .F .von Siemens - Stiftung , 1995 ( = Themen ; 52) .
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA 45

On the other hand , the same distinction which now serves as an outer

boundary , no longer separating priests and specialists from the rest of the

group but the group in its entirety from the outside world of pagans , cuts

right through the community , rejecting its tradition , persecuting what has

been its tradition , and it cuts even through the heart and mind of the indi¬

vidual person with its request to forget , to leave behind , to repudiate the

" pagan within " . This happens everywhere and always where a formerly

inner distinction is made an outer one . Religious totalism and political

totalitarianism share this claim on the heart of man and create similar feel¬

ings of guilt .

Freud sought to explain the coercive power that religion has over the

masses and identified guilt as the most forceful element of this coercive

power . He traced this feeling of guilt ( which according to him is character¬

istic of monotheism ) back to the hostility of the sons against the father .

Ambivalence is a part of the essence of the relation to the father : in the

course of time the hostility , which had once driven the sons into killing

their admired and dreaded father , could not remain latent . There was no

place in the framework of the religion of Moses for a direct expression of

the murderous hatred of the father . All that could come to light was a

mighty reaction against it - a sense of guilt on account of that hostility , a

bad conscience for having sinned against God and for not ceasing to sin . 17

Freud is right in giving this sense of guilt a central place in monothe¬

ism , but he is wrong in believing that there was no room in the religion of

Moses for an expression of hostility against God . On the contrary , there

was ample room , if we recognize in the hostility against the prophets the

expression of a hostility against God . Again , I would prefer a structural

explanation which derives this strong feeling of guilt from the essence of

monotheism . The reason for this sense of guilt , I think , must be sought in

the new concept of sin which is implied in the Mosaic distinction . This has
much to do with the fact that the line the Mosaic distinction draws between

truth and untruth not only separates the community of true believers from

the outward world which it constructs as paganism , but that it cuts through

17 Freud , Moses and Monotheism [ fii . 1] , 134 ( German : " Zum Wesen des Vaterverhalt -
nisses gehort die Ambivalenz : es konnte nicht ausbleiben , daB sich im Laufe der
Zeiten auch jene Feindseligkeit regen wollte , die einst die Sohne angetrieben , den be -
wunderten und gefUrchteten Vater zu toten . Im Rahmen der Moses - Religion war fur
den direkten Ausdruck des morderischen Vaterhasses kein Raum ; nur eine machtige
Reaktion auf ihn konnte zum Vorschein kommen , das SchuldbewuBtsein wegen dieser
Feindseligkeit , das schlechte Gewissen , man habe sich gegen Gott versiindigt und hore
nicht auf , zu sundigen " [ Freud , Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion ,
Frankfurt / M . : Suhrkamp , 1964 , 131 ] ) .
46 JAN ASSMANN

the human heart . The Mosaic distinction addresses first and foremost the
pagan within . Therefore , monotheistic religions are guilt religions involv¬
ing the risk or the temptation of worshipping wrong gods which is ( or be¬
comes ) the most capital sin of all . The inferiority of the conflict they create
causes their inexorable normativity and their antagonistic force .
In the context of primary religions based on the distinction between
pure and impure , guilt is a kind of defilement which must be washed off by
ritual purification . Even in biblical religion , this concept of guilt as defile¬
ment plays still a very central role because the religion of Ancient Israel is
a religion in transition between its primary and secondary stage . Mary
Douglas has dealt extensively with this " primary " concept of guilt in bibli¬
cal texts which she describes as a theory of defilement . There is , however ,
also the new concept of guilt or rather " sin " which belongs in the context
of the distinction between truth and untruth . This kind of sin can no longer
be washed off , because it concerns the inner man . It requires inner proc¬
esses of transformation such as repentance , a new heart , a strong aware¬
ness of having sinned , a broken heart ( Psalms 51 ) .
The Mosaic distinction between true and false produces a new notion
of guilt which consists in the failure of staying faithful to truth and of giv¬
ing in to the temptation of untruth . For untruth has a seductive power over
the human heart . Idolatry is viewed as a constant temptation which seems
very hard to resist . In its ultimate consequences , the prohibition of making
images means the negation of " cosmotheism " , the assimilation of man to
this world , its beauty and power . Staying faithful to the Law means to be¬
come a stranger in this world . Let me again quote Psalms 119 : 19 : " I am a
stranger on this earth . Do not take thy commandments from me " . As this
ideal of world - estrangement can never be totally accomplished because
living in this world requires a certain degree of assimilation and compro¬
mise , a sense of guilt is inevitable .
We must not forget that truth , in religion , is not a matter of experience
and hard thinking , but of revelation . It is something God offers to the
world . The Bible , especially the book of Deuteronomy , casts this way of
God ' s turning towards the world into the political model of the covenant .
The prophets prefer the metaphor of marital love . Truth is a relationship
between God and man . Committing an error means to break away from
God and destroy this relationship . The story of the Golden Calf shows this
personal or political aspect of religious error with great clarity . The people
did not mean to turn away from God to some other god , e . g . , the Egyptian
Apis bull . The Golden Calf was meant as a representation of " Elohim who
brought thee out of Egypt " . Yet " it became a sin " , the most terrible sin
possible which moved God to destroy the whole people , so that Moses had
 MONOTHEISM AND TRAUMA 47

a hard time convincing him to be satisfied with the execution of just 3 , 000
of His people . The error consisted in having recourse to representation
instead of trusting in revelation .
The book of Deuteronomy closes the presentation of the Laws with a
chapter of most terrible curses or punishments against forgetting , negli¬
gence and abolition of the Law . These curses do not concern the transgres¬
sion of any specific laws , for which there are equally specific sanctions ,
but the abandonment of the Law as a whole which means the turning away
from the space of truth which God had opened for men to live in by giving
the Torah , thus , by revelation . The curses of Deuteronomy are a master¬
piece of destructive imagination , an apocalyptic depiction of divine fury , a
real Todesfuge . They make the deadly implications of the Mosaic distinc¬
tion absolutely clear and explicit . It is a text that can only be characterized
as traumatic . It reads like a description of hell on earth , even as a predic¬
tion of Auschwitz . Entering the room that is divided by the Mosaic distinc¬
tion is a matter of death and life . Moses is very explicit in this respect and
warns the people repeatedly before admitting them into the covenant , that
is , into monotheism ( e . g . , Deuteronomy 30 : 15 - 19 ) . Christian imagery is

full of equally horrid images that haunted the memory of Monotheism

during the last millennia . This whole imagery of destruction and torture is
centered around the concept of sin .

Conclusion
To close , I would like to stress once again the deep insight of Freud in
having chosen the motifs of memory , trauma and guilt in order to charac¬
terize and analyze the specificity of monotheism . He was right in this , but
he was wrong in his archaeological approach to what he called the histori¬
cal truth . The traumatic experience of monotheism is not caused by some
external events but , rather , by internal conflicts that are inseparably con¬
nected with the Mosaic distinction . The alternative interpretation which I
explored in this lecture is based on the sources , especially the book of
Deuteronomy , and the concept of revelation . Revelation means to draw a
new distinction in the realm of religion , the distinction between truth and
untruth . From this distinction follow with logical consequence the three
Freudian characteristics , memory , trauma , and guilt . Memory is the only
form in which revealed truth can be preserved and transmitted through
time , trauma is the consequence of the theoclastic impulse and antagonistic
force which this form of religion directs not so much against the other
religions , but rather against the own tradition and the human soul , and
guilt , finally , is the feeling of being unfaithful to God by forgetting and
 JAN ASSMANN
48

negligence , by giving in to the temptations of the world and by never being

enough a stranger in this world . I would not go so far as to declare religion
to be a collective neurosis , but I think indeed that monotheism has brought
into the world a tension between human beings and earthly existence that
can easily turn into destructive crisis .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS BETWEEN
NARRATIVES OF VIOLENCE
AND LITURGIES OF RECONCILIATION
Angelika Neuwirth

" The collective memory is transmitted

more actively through ritual than through
chronicle . "
Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi 1

1 . Diversity of readers ' approaches to the Scriptures

This volume , " Religion between Violence and Reconciliation " , which
inter alia questions the role played by the founding documents of religions
- their canonical Scriptures - in situations of political crisis or conflict
resolution , cannot properly dispense with a reflection on the ways Scrip¬
tures manifest themselves in social life . The following paper attempts to
sketch this complex functionality by uncovering its multiple dimensions
through exemplary cases of Scriptural use in the cultic life of the three
monotheistic religions . 2 It starts from the important thesis presented by
Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi that " meaning in history , memory of the past and
the writing of history are by no means to be equated ( . . . ) , ( that ) historiog¬
raphy is but one expression of the awareness that history is meaningful and
of the need to remember , and ( that) neither meaning nor memory ulti -

1 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi , Zakhor : Jewish Histoiy and Jewish Memoiy , Seattle and
London : University of Washington Press , 1982 , 15 .
2 This essay , meant primarily as a reminder of a neglected dimension of Scriptural
functionality , does not claim to cover any specific historical period . The observations
presented refer to religious practices that are codified in manuals and prayer books still
in use and - what is more - can be found very vividly upheld in religious life in our
own time , at least in the Middle East . In no way a specialist in Jewish or Christian li¬
turgical studies , in my attempt to elucidate the interplay between manifestations of
Scripture and diverse other factors in liturgy , i have drawn on standard liturgical text
editions , as well as a number of previous investigations , particularly the books by Y .H .
Yerushalmi [ fn . 1 ] and William A . Graham , Beyond the Written Word: Oral Aspects of
Scripture in the Histoiy of Religion , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1987 .
50 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

raately depends upon it " 3 . According to his view , a community ' s construc¬
tion of a particular worldview with reference to their Scriptures would not
immediately draw on particular accounts narrated in the canonized texts
but rather rely on their " dramatization " by the community in rituals and
liturgical enactments .
The appearance of Yerushalmi ' s book in 1982 4 is certainly not unre¬
lated to a currently dominant , more simplistic approach to Scripture . At
present , it seems , a great temptation exists to take the Scriptures of the
monotheistic religions as storehouses for visions , ideas and principles
imagined to exercise normative power and inform the life of the believers
for a long span of time or even definitely . Such a presumption , in turn ,
tends to make Scriptures ' responsible ' for any offensive attitude or aggres¬
sive action carried out by ( or merely insinuated against ) their respective
communities .
Islam , for example , was and still is accused , time and again , of an in¬
clination towards violence , in view of the mere observation that jihad , or
Holy War , figures in some Qur ' anic verses 5 as a duty imposed on the col¬
lective of believers , although these impositions are obviously related to
particular historical circumstances . The case of Islam is not unique : Still in
modern history , entire communities have been banned and prosecuted with
reference to allegedly poor moral standards - derived from haphazardly
selected texts - of their Scriptures . Particularly fateful insinuations of this
kind have been brought forward against Jews in Nazi antisemitic propa¬
ganda . But Scriptures are also reclaimed for political service by their own
adherents who use them as their ideological vademecum , as a source of
wisdom expected to entail precise recipes for their individual situations of
crisis . Contemporary fundamentalist groups in the three religions alike use
their Scriptures to distill alleged divinely - granted prerogatives , which enti¬
tle them to discriminate or even disown and annihilate others . Beyond
these two extremes - overt opponents or deriders of Scriptures , as well as
uncritical believers in their literal meaning prepared to implement their
reading of Scripture politically - a vast group of agnostic observers are
also instrumental in degrading Scriptures . Eager to justify their distanced

3 Yerushalmi , Zakhor [ fn . 1] , 15 - 16 .
4 It has been twice reprinted since ( in 1989 and 1996 ) and been translated into six lan¬
guages .
5 The Qur ' anic ' jihad verses " are treated in this volume by Ridwan al - Sayyid and Ed -
gard Weber . A historical evaluation of the early Islamic concept of jihad is given by
Albrecht Noth , " Friiher Islam " , in : Geschichte der arabischen Welt , ed . Ulrich
Haarmann , Miinchen : Beck , 1987 , 11 - 100 ; see also E . Tyan , art . " Diihad " . in : The En¬
cyclopaedia of Islam [EI 2\ , vol . 2 , Leiden/London : Brill/ Luzac , 1965 , 538 - 40 .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS
51

stance towards religion , they point to the lack of credibility of single Scrip¬

tural issues in terms of empirical verisimilitude , again isolating the texts

from their mythopoeic referential frame and linking them directly to mod¬
ern discourses .

Do Scriptures admit this kind of isolated and selective reading , which

- disrespectful for their historical and generic framework - turns them into

reference texts for the most diverse contexts and visions ? Or can they

claim a hermeneutical context of their own , created by the poetics of ex¬

pression proper to their time of origin and by the practice of believers

throughout history that turned them into " vessels and vehicles " of collec¬

tive memory - a hermeneutical context , whose neglect in the debate of the

meaning of Scriptural material would imply an unambiguous misuse of the

texts ?

1.1 Reading Scripture vs . reading profane literature

It may be due to the prevalent approach to Scripture , introduced by Protes¬

tantism and enhanced by the " typographic revolution " , which gave indi¬

vidual readers i mm ediate access to the Bible - be it as an edifying spiritual

guide to be studied in private or be it is a source of ' historical ' information

about one ' s collective cultural roots 6 - that the above question is seldom

raised . Indeed , with the mass production of printed copies in the 19th cen¬

tury which made Bibles widely available , 7 the printed Bible has for broad

circles become the chief medium of contact with Scripture . It seems quite

natural , then , that it should be used like any other piece of literature by

individual readers , i . e . , without being flanked by an historical or literary

commentary to bridge the hermeneutic gap between the reader and the text ,

let alone by a theological assessment of its religious significance . To quote

the words of William Graham , whose 1987 groundbreaking work , Beyond

the Written Word , presents a further answer to the problematic of present

day ' s limited perception of the phenomenon of Scripture :

6 The Bible has been read primarily as a reader in history by Israeli secularists , who
widely dominated public opinion in Israel until 1967 . The recent return to religious
approaches in that country has not resulted in a fundamental revision of that reading .

7 See Graham , Written Word [ fh . 2 ] , 165 - 71 , cf . also Nathan O . Hatch and Mark A .
Noll , eds . , The Bible in America : Essays in Cultural History , New York : Oxford Uni¬
versity Press , 1982 . For the process of promulgation of printed copies in the Middle
East , cf . Dagmar Glass , Malta , Beirut , Leipzig and Beirut again : Eli Smith , the Ameri¬
can Syria Mission and the Spread of Arabic Typography , Beirut : Orient - Institut , 1998
( = Zokak el - Blat ( t ) , no . 16 ) ; Samir Khalaf , " Leavening the Levant : New England Puri¬
tanism as a Cultural Transplant " , in : idem , Cultural Resistance : Global and Local En¬
counters in the Middle East , London : Saqi Books , 2001 , 126 - 50 .
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
52

" Once a generally recognized locus of contact with things transcendent ,

the Bible has undergone a ' leveling ' in which its mythopoeic discourse is
commonly taken by the modern secularist as mere legendarizing and

speculative moralizing or , equally lamentably , by the biblical fundamen¬

talist as a text reporting literal truths analogous to those of modern scien¬

tific inquiry " .8

This is in no way , however , the only approach to Scripture to be imagined .

Over and again , recent scholarship has underscored the complex nature of

texts once elevated to the level of Scriptures . Graham claims that " the

study of a text as a document focuses on the historical background and the

origin and growth of the text , the study of a text as scripture ( . . . ) focuses

upon its contextual meaning , interpretation and use - that is , the ongoing

role the text has played in a tradition , not only in formal exegesis , but in

every sector of life " . 9 Similarly , Moshe Idel distinguishes between reli¬

gious and secular reading , the former being informed by a " vertical rela¬

tionship " between the reader and the object of his faith , the latter relying

on a " horizontal intertextuality - oriented relationship " . 10 Aziz al - Azmeh

succinctly summarizes the peculiar character of Scripture : " It is of course

in the historical nature of the canonical text as a genealogical charter of

rectitude to demand a status beyond history , figuring as a vantage point

from which chronometric time becomes neutralized , and in which the holy

text places itself along a prior continuum of eternity instantiated in the

rhythms of a Heilsgeschichte " . ( . . . ) The necessary condition for this to be

possible is that the actual historical nature of the canon should devolve to

an incontestable assertion of an internal unity and homogeneity ( . . ,) " .n

8 Graham , Written Word [ fn . 2 ] , 167 .

9 See Graham , Written Word, 6 . I would , however , not subscribe to Graham ' s general
conclusion : " To put it succinctly , scripture is not a literary genre but a religio -
historical one , and it must be understood as such " ( ibid .) , a thesis , to which , in my
view , at least the Qur ' an is an exception . Cf . Angelika Neuwirth , " Qur ' an , Crisis and
Memory : The Qur ' anic Path towards Canonization as reflected in the Anthropogonic
Accounts " , in : Crisis and Memory in Islamic Societies : Proceedings of the Third
Summer Academy of the Working Group Modernity and Islam at the Wissenschafts -
kolleg zu Berlin , eds . Angelika Neuwirth and Andreas Pflitsch , Beirut : Orient - Institut ,
2001 (= Beiruter Texte und Studien , vol . 77 ) , 113 - 52 .
10 Moshe Idel ," ' Schwarzes Feuer auf weiBem Feuer ' : Text und Lektiire in der judischen
Tradition " , in : Texte und Lekturen : Perspektiven in der Literaturwissenschaft , ed .
Aleida Assmann , Frankfurt : Fischer , 1996 , 29 - 46 .
11 Aziz al - Azmeh , " Chronophagous Discourse : A Study of the Clerico - Legal Appropria¬
tion of the World in Islamic Tradition " , in : Religion and Practical Reason : New Es¬
says in the Comparative Philosophy of Religions , eds . Frank E . Reynolds and David
Tracy , Albany , NY : State University of New York Press , 1994 , 163 ff.
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 53

This new ' state of matter ' assumed by a canonical text , has , in turn ,
generated a dense network of performative acts that , henceforth , ' accom¬
pany ' the text . Graham has underscored the close relation of Scripture to
performance :

" it is manifest that to understand the phenomenon of scripture in any

fashion that is remotely faithful to historical realities , we must look to its
function as a text that above all has been read and recited aloud , repeated
and memorized , chanted and sung , quoted and alluded to in the oral and
aural round of daily life " . 12

1. 2 Scriptural reading in a liturgical context

This paper is primarily interested in the cognitive aspect of ' scripturality ' .
It focuses on the process through which the actual historical nature of the
texts turns into an incontestable assertion of an internal unity and homoge¬
neity . 13 Let us take a closer look at strategies used to achieve and preserve
this canonicity , particularly at the practices that Aleida and Jan Assmann
have labeled " Sinnpflege " 14 ( " maintenance of meaning " ) , that have served
to reinforce the status of Scripture as living canons .
It is hardly deniable that Scriptures , once acknowledged as canonical ,
have their Sitz im Leben in public performance . The fact is obvious from
their being set to music or cantilena . The sophisticated art of Biblical and
Qur ' anic chant ( Hebrew : hazzanut , Greek : psalmodia , Arabic : tartll ) is
until today based on a complex system of phonetic rules to be meticulously
observed by reciters ( Hebrew : masorah , Greek : ekphonetic accent system ,
Arabic : tajwid ) 15 . In the case of Greek Biblical chant these rules are trans -

12 Graham , Written Word [fn . 2 ] , 156 . - The emphasis on a " strong , indeed almost exclu¬
sive , textual and philological orientation of traditional Islamic studies " has been criti¬
cized by Charles J . Adams . See his foreword in : Approaches to Islam in Religious
Studies , ed . Richard C . Martin , Arizona 1985 , VIII . He is followed by Frederick M .
Denny , " Islamic Ritual : Perspectives and Theories " , in : ibid ., 63 - 77 , who regrets that
" the systematic study of ritual within traditional Islamic studies has been recessive "
( 63 ) .

13 Cf . Aziz Al - Azmeh , " Chronophagous Discourse " [ fn . 11 ] .

14 Jan and Aleida Assmann , " Kanon und Zensur als kultursoziologische Kategorien " , in :
Kanon und Zensur : Beitrage zur Archaologie der literarischen Kommunikation II , eds .
Aleida and Jan Assmann , Miinchen : Fink , 1987 , 7 - 27 .

15 For the development and practice of Hebrew and Greek Biblical chant , see : Reinhard
Flender , Der biblische Sprechgesang und seine mundliche Uberlieferung in Synagoge
und griechischer Kirche , Wilhelmshaven : Florian Noetzel , 1988 . - For the signifi¬
cance of tartil , see : Frederick M . Denny , " Exegesis and Recitation : Their Develop¬
ment as Classical Forms of Qur ' anic Piety " , in : Transitions and Transformations in the
54 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

mitted through oral practice exclusively whereas Hebrew and Arabic read¬
ings follow musical instructions integrated into the orthography of the
texts . Although these detailed rules derive from later developments , in the
case of the Qur ' an , the practice of chant , of the recitation of the text with a
cantilena , appears to have been part of the very emergence of the text . 16
The Islamic practice is perhaps a particularly perspicuous case of liturgical
mnemotechnique . The high rank of ritualized Qur ' an reading 17 in Islamic
social life is attested to on many occasions - ranging from the extensive
use of Qur ' anic texts in the daily prayer ritual , where mostly short single
surahs are recited , to the solemn recitation of large parts of the corpus dur¬
ing diverse rites depassage I8 .

1 .2 . 1 Text divisions and 'liturgicalportions ' : core texts and 'contexts ' in

the three monotheistic religions

The Qur ' an in toto is supposed to be recited during Ramadan . It is for this
very purpose that the corpus has been divided into 30 equally long portions
{juz \ pi . ajza 7) , on the one hand , and seven portions ( manzilah , pi . manazil )
on the other , to be recited as a daily or weekly quantum . This reading is , of
course , never performed outside its proper ritual framework . Thus , ritual
purity , a particular local setting , a spatial orientation toward the central
sanctuary and a particular cosmically - determined timing are preconditions
for proper performance .
Judaism and the Oriental Christian Churches , perhaps including Ca¬
tholicism - at least until lately - widely continue to read Scriptures in a
way different from what modern secularist readers have become accus¬
tomed . Both traditions have cultivated a more collective , ritually informed
approach , setting Bible reading in a multiple ' context ' . Until today , Juda¬
ism and Christian Orthodoxy bind Biblical texts to particular temporal
frames . To quote Yerushalmi :

History of Religions . Essays in Honor of Joseph M. Kitagawa , eds . Frank E. Reynolds

and Theodore M . Ludwig , Leiden : Brill , 1980 , 91 - 123 .
16 See Angelika Neuwirth , " Das islamische Dogma der ' Unnachahmlichkeit des Korans '
in literaturwissenschaftlicher Sicht " , Der Islam 60 ( 1983 ) , 166 - 83 .
17 For details about its performance , see Andreas Kellermann , Koranlesung im Maghreb
( unpublished Doctoral Dissertation , 1993 , Freie Universitat Berlin ) , and idem , " Die
' Miindlichkeit ' des Koran . Ein forschungsgeschichtliches Problem der Arabistik " ,
Beitrage zur Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft 5 ( 1995 ) , 1- 33 .
18 For a mourning ritual , see Ali Qleibo , When the Mountains Disappear : An Ethno¬
graphic Chronicle of the Modern Palestinians , Cairo : Kloreus Books , 1992 , 2 - 34 .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 55

"The Pentateuchal narratives , which brought the historical record up to

the eve of the conquest of Canaan , together with the weekly lesson from
the prophets , were read aloud in the synagogue from beginning to end .
The public reading was completed triennially in Palestine , annually in
Babylonia ( as is the custom today ) , and immediately the reading would
begin again " . 19

In an analogous way , the Gospels in the Orthodox churches - having re¬

placed in Christianity the Torah as the core of Scriptures - are distributed
over the course of the year , 20 ' cut ' into pericopes ( Greek : perikope ) and ,
thus , reflecting the Jewish reading of weekly chapters of the Torah ( He¬
brew : parashah ) 21 . This cycle of readings from the core of Scripture is
accompanied , like that in Judaism , by a second sequence of texts taken
from other parts of the Scriptures . The Pauline letters ( Greek apostolos )
and additional readings from the historical or prophetical books of the Old
Testament ( Greek : propheteia ) are meant to elucidate the pericopes from
the core texts , the Gospels . This , of course , continues the tradition of the
readings from the Prophets in Judaism ( Hebr . haftarah ) 22 , a corpus undis¬
puted in its rank as a vital complement and a necessary exegetical context
for the Torah .

1 .2 . 2 Scriptural reading and its particular notion of time

The cycles of readings in both religions find their culmination points in

festivals . The readings not only form a sequence of accounts , communi¬
cated roughly in the chronological order of the events they relate , but are
bound to particular times held sacred by listeners . Two temporalities are
involved . " The historical events ( . . . ) remain unique and irreversible . Psy¬
chologically , however , those events are experienced cyclically , repeti¬
tively , and to that extent at least , atemporally " . 23 The events ' occur ' each

19 Yerushalmi , Zakhor [ fh . 1 ] , 15 - 16 .
20 Unlike the Jewish practice which has reserved Torah readings for Sabbath services , the
four Gospels are distributed over liturgies celebrated every day .
21 For the genesis of this cycle , see Ismar Elbogen , Der jiidische Gottesdienst in seiner
geschichtlichen Entwicklung , 1913 . English version : Jewish Liturgy . A Comprehensive
History by Ismar Elbogen , tr . Raymond P . Scheindlin , New York/Jerusalem :
Schocken , 5753 / 1993 , 129 - 42 .
22 A complete survey of the liturgical texts in Synagogal services throughout the year is
presented by Moritz Zobel , Das Jahr des Juden in Branch und Liturgie , Berlin :
Schocken , 1936 .
23 See Yerushalmi , Zakhor [ see fh . 1] , 42 .
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
56

time the congregation assembles , history thus becoming ' dramatized ' . In
the words of Andre Lacocque , " there is a synchronic reading and experi¬
encing in the cult which is yielded by a metaphorization or symbolization
of the events of history , so that they never lose their actuality for all gen¬
erations " . 24
Though what has been said seems to apply , first and foremost , to Jew¬
ish and Christian practices , things are not altogether different in Islam . It is
true that the Qur ' an - having emerged as a collection of ' inofficial ' peri -
copes , i . e . , text units recited by the prophet to the early community and
learnt by heart by the receivers as integral single texts 25 - has , after its
canonization by the third caliph cUthman some twenty years after the death
of the prophet , not been submitted to further ' official ' pericopization to
serve the institutionalized worship . There is no division of the text into
weekly pericopes that would figure prominently in the public Friday wor¬
ship . 26 Yet , the Qur ' an has been justly credited with having generated " a
ceremonial of textual repetition with a pronouncedly obsessional charac¬
ter " . 27 This is not surprising . It can be deduced from the literary structure
of the Qur ' an itself , that it was not intended to be enunciated in a ' natural '
way ( i . e . in simple a - melodic reading by an arbitrary performer ) but pre¬
sented in a ' supernatural ' mode , a particularly dramatic style , demanding
the main ' actor ' , the reciter , to change his voice for the performance , i . e . ,
to chant , and requiring certain apotropaeic and ceremonial preparations for
the reading to be respected , which were later codified in special treatises 28

24 Andre Lacocque , " Apocalyptic Symbolism : A Ricoeurian Hermeneutical Approach " ,

Biblical Research 26 ( 1981 ) , 6 - 15 (pp . 8 - 9 ) .
25 See Angelika Neuwirth , " Vom Rezitationstext uber die Liturgie zum Kanon . Zur
Entstehung und Wiederauflosung der Surenkomposition im Verlauf der Entwicklung
eines islamischen Kultus " , in : The Qur'an as Text, ed . Stefan Wild , Leiden : Brill ,
1996 , 69 - 106 ( French translation : " Du texte de Recitation au Canon en passant par la
Liturgie : A propos de la genese de la composition des sourates et de sa resolution au
cours du developpement du culte islamique " , Arabica 47 [ 2000 ] , 194 - 229 ) .
26 For the Friday service , see S .D . Goitein , " The Origin and the Nature of the Muslim
Friday Worship " , in : idem , Studies in Islamic History and Institutions , Leiden : Brill ,
1966 , 111 - 25 .

27 Al - Azmeh , " The Muslim Canon from Late Antiquity to the Era of Modernism " , paper
presented at the occasion of a symposium held by the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin ,
1997 ( unpublished ) , 9 .
28 See Angelika Neuwirth , Studien zur Komposition der mekkanischen Suren , Berlin : de
Gruyter , 1981 . On the literary device of the clausulae in particular which - bearing
less narrative than vocal function - serve to rhythmically punctuate the text , see Ange¬
lika Neuwirth , " Zur Struktur der Yusuf - Sure " , in : Studien aus Arabistik und Semitistik:
Anton Spitaler zum 70 . Geburtstag , eds . , Werner Diem and Stefan Wild , Wiesbaden :
Harrassowitz , 1980 , 123 - 52 . That the peculiar structure of Qur ' anic verses lend them -
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS
57

Graham has underlined the important , often primary , ways in which Scrip¬

ture has been a " significantly vocal as well as visual fact : how individuals

and groups have understood and dealt with their sacred Scriptures not only

as holy books to be calligraphed and illuminated , preserved and revered ,

paraded and displayed , but also as texts to be memorized , sung and

chanted , read aloud , recited , retold , and woven into the texture of their

language , thought and being as auditory fact " . 29

It is true that no annual cycle of scriptural reading exists in Islam ; the

Qur ' anic text has never been distributed into binding weekly or daily por¬

tions to be read out in public service . On the contrary , the choice of

Qur ' anic text passages to be recited in the final prayer of the Friday service

- as usual in collectively performed prayers - is up to the celebrant ( imam )

who leads the liturgy . Similarly , the choice of the Qur ' an quotations figur¬

ing in the sermon ( khutbah ) is left to the preacher ( khatlb ) , who plays the

particularly prominent role in the service of enouncing the most expressive

and highly stereotypical sermon .

This bi - partite sermon of the Muslim Friday service - made up of a

strongly Qur ' an - and Hadith - related first part , followed by a more exhorta¬

tive and commemorative second part - is less an exegetical elucidation of a

particular Qur ' anic text than a Scriptural comment on contemporary

events . Thus , particular Qur ' anic and Prophetic norms akin to the current

situation of the community are reclaimed to throw light on current prob¬

lems . The Qur ' an and the Prophetic tradition , so to speak , are called on to

rectify the community ' s state of affairs . In view of its centrality in the ser¬

vice the bi - partite Islamic sermon has been compared to the double Bibli¬

cal reading in the older monotheist religions . The first part , rich in Qur ' an

quotations , can be viewed as corresponding to the reading of the core of

Scripture ( Pentateuch , Gospels ) , while the second part corresponds to the

elucidating reading from the Prophets or the Apostle . 30 Viewed from this

selves easily to vocal presentation has been acknowledged by Islamic theorists from
classical times onward . See Navid Kermani , Gott ist schon : Das asthetische Erleben
des Koran , Munchen : Beck , 1999 .
29 Graham , Written Word [ fn . 2 ] , 7 .
30 The history of the khutbah remains to be written . See A J . Wensinck , art . " Khutba " ,
in : EI 2, vol . 5 , Leiden : Brill , 1979 , 74 - 75 . Carl Heinrich Becker has presented a com¬
parison between the structure of the Islamic service and that of the Christian mass , in
an attempt to explain the bi - partite structure of the Islamic sermon , see " Zur Geschich -
te des islamischen Kultus " , Der Islam 3 ( 1912 ) , 374 ff . A year later , Eugen Mittwoch
endeavored to draw analogous lines between the synagogal Sabbath service and Is¬
lamic Friday service . See " Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des islamischen Gebets und
Kultus " , in : Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften , no . 2 ,
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
58

perspective , Islamic service is in no way devoid of the phenomenon so

significant to Jewish and Christian services : namely the interrelation be¬
tween a Scriptural core text ( Qur ' an quotations in the sermon and in the
final prayer ) and a ' context ' ( the sermon , entailing ample knowledge from
the prophetical traditions ) . 31
Moreover , the reclaiming of historical time to become present time is
striking in Islamic worship , no less than elsewhere . Though no public
commemoration of single ' historical ' events is repeated on particular occa¬
sions during the year , a strong sense of continuity prevails . The mere fact
that the Qur ' an is recited by the believer himself , 32 who passes God ' s own
words over his lips and reproduces them through his voice - can be taken
in itself as a continuous ' representation ' { Vergegenwartigung ) of the Is¬
lamic Prophet ' s receiving the divine words . What matters less in compari¬
son to the Jewish and Christian services is the regular re - occurrence of
identical texts .

1 .2 . 3 Theatralic aspects of the service

Jan Assmann has stressed that " man is destined to live in two worlds . Life
cannot be limited to everyday - life . Feasts are needed to counterbalance
daily routine . They have to provide spaces where the Other that is ex¬
cluded from the daily routine , can occur . The Other , however , does not
occur by itself , but has to be staged , it has to be enacted " . 33
Indeed , the theatralic quality of a monotheistic service , where Scrip¬
ture plays a main role , cannot be overestimated : not only as the textual
source of the truth revered by the adherents of the particular cult but also
as a present ' agent ' in the service - ' incorporated ' in a touchable scroll or
a lavishly adorned volume beaming with gold to be paraded and displayed

1913 . In our context , it is , of course , less the genetic than the structural relation that
matters .
31 To my knowledge no study on the interrelation of these two sorts of liturgical reading
in either of the three religions exists . Aleida and Jan Assmann , who discuss the rela¬
tion between " primary " and " secondary texts " , limit their attention to written manifes¬
tations , thus referring to the relation between canon and commentary , see Aleida and
Jan Assmann , Kanon und Zensur [ fh . 14 ] , 13 - 15 .
32 In Friday services , the individual believer leaves this part to the prayer leader , the
imam . He may , of course , silently utter the Qur ' anic passage , which he is expected to
know by heart .
33 Jan Assmann , " Der zweidimensionale Mensch : Das Fest als Medium des kollektiven
Gedachtnisses " , in : Das Fest und das Heilige : Religiose Kontrapunkte zur Alltagswelt ,
ed . Jan Assmann , Gtitersloh : Giitersloher Verlagshaus Hans Mohn , 1991 ( = Studien
zum Verstehen fremder Religionen ; 1) , 17 .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 59

during the service , celebrated as enshrining particular blessings , and ' given
life ' through the beauty of the reciter ' s voice . In a way , the presence of the
divine speaker , or the transcendent ' author ' , of the text could hardly be
experienced more closely than during this kind of commemoration . 34
One might duly speak of a re - enactment of the ' first divine communi¬
cation ' , a text perceived as superhuman being recited in a ' super - natural '
performance . It is staged in a site , which functions as the ' house of God ' ,
its structure following a particular cosmic orientation or pointing to the
center of a topographia sacra , its interior hosting diverse symbols of di¬
vine presence . Maurice Halbwachs has further stressed that religious space
as a sanctuary , due to its being shared by believers , enshrines further ele¬
ments of a mystic aura . 35 Add to the staging of the ceremony the fact that
the time frame either refers immediately to empirically perceived cosmic
order - the services taking place at certain cosmically marked phases of the
day or lunar month - or marks the beginning of a new cycle of events .
New Year ' s Day and the Day of Atonement in Judaism " are , at their
core , numinous annual rites of repentance and atonement in which on the
deepest personal and collective levels , the sinful ' history ' of the old year is
abolished to make way for a fresh and new beginning " . 36 Their cosmic di¬
mension is underpinned by particularly suggestive readings ; New Year ' s Day
in Judaism and the beginning of the Lent in Orthodox Christianity , for exam¬
ple , are both distinguished through a pericope about the creation of the world .
Furthermore , in the three religions , some festivals are preferably celebrated in
situ , in the very place where their founding myth is staged . In these cases , text
and ' context ' , time and place , partake of the celebration alike .
Scripture , thus , is involved in complex , multifold interaction - between
text ( i . e . , the parashah / perikope / qira 'ah) and ' context ' , made up of the
haftarah , the apostolos , 37 or the sermon ( khutbah ) . In Judaism and Christian¬
ity , it is set in a particular time frame , the recurring annual cycle culminating
in feasts or festival seasons , when the salvation historical event recorded in
the parashahlperikope - cycle is to be commemorated . Sometimes , particu¬
larly in Islam , it occurs in a historically determined local framework , when
pilgrims assemble at a commemorative place connected with the celebrated

34 For a comprehensive study in the aesthetic dimensions of Qur ' an recitation , see Ker-
mani , Gott ist schon [fn . 28 ] , 212 - 32 .
35 See Maurice Halbwachs , Das kollektive Gedachtnis , Frankfurt /M .: Fischer , 1991 , 156 -
61.
36 Yerushalmi , Zakhor [fn . 1 ] , 42 .
37 Particularly on festivals , there are further readings taken from the Old Testament ,
labeled as propheteia .
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
60

event . A sacred locale may , however , also be claimed when Scriptural

reading takes place in a site reserved for ritual .

Let us now return to our initial question : What is the impact of this

situational context of Scripture on the understanding of the text ? Applied

to the topic of this volume : is the mere presence of ' historical ' records of

violence in a Scripture apt to trigger a particular relation on the side of the

adherents of that religion to violence ? Or is there , thanks to the theatralic

codation of the Scriptural texts , a surplus layer of references that detract

from the particular ' historical ' focus and encode the Scriptural text with a

more complex , universal meaning ?

Manifestations of Scripture
2 .

in three major feasts of the monotheistic religions

To approach an answer , we will look at some Scriptural texts in their festal

embedding , liturgies related to one great feast in each of the three relig¬

ions : Passover in Judaism , Easter in Christianity and Ramadan in Islam .

While no exhaustive study should be expected , this essay will concentrate

on and examine Ramadan from a comparative perspective .

It is obvious that the founding narratives of the three festivals have a close

relation to acts of violence . Each celebrates its community ' s salvation from a

threatening danger of annihilation - a fact that makes them meaningful to our

general topic . It may be less obvious , however , that they are also more or less

closely interrelated , an observation that justifies their synoptic treatment in

our framework . To elucidate their interrelation , a short excursus is required

before we can embark on the question of how they deal with the elements of

violence entailed in their genesis . Let us first look at their interrelation :

2 . 1 Passover- Easter

That Passover and Easter are linked is evident already externally . Both are

close in terms of timing , with Easter commemorating an event that took

place during Passover week 38 . Jesus Christ was crucified a day after Pass¬

over . According to the first three Gospels , he had been taken into custody

immediately after celebrating the feast with his disciples . Insofar as Easter

claims Passover as its temporal backdrop , the Jewish festival confers on

the later feast important traits bearing ritual and symbolic significance : a

38 For details see David Flusser , Jesus : Mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten
dargestellt , Hamburg : Rowohlt , 1968 .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS
61

vicarious sacrifice , a commemorative meal and the remembrance of an

event of deliverance .

Integrating these traits , Easter raises the additional claim to represent

the New Passover . Through a mythic interpretation , it has become Pass¬

over kath ' exochen , 39 understood as a re - enactment of Passover . Deliver¬

ance from servitude in history is replaced by deliverance from the servi¬

tude of the fear of death . The sacrificial lamb to be slaughtered for the

salvation of the community is replaced by the Son of God , who was sacri¬

ficed and died vicariously for the salvation of mankind - a meaning estab¬

lished already by the Gospel of John and manifested in a large corpus of

hymns pertaining to the Easter celebration . The notion of the sacrificial

lamb ' s vicarious suffering of death further merges with the idea of a father

sacrificing his closest beloved - prefigured in Abraham ' s sacrifice 40 -

A cosmically distinguished night as the climax of the feast is also

common to both . The Easter vigil marks the decisive turning point from

fasting to feast , from commemorating the death of Christ to the celebration

of the Eucharist with Christ , a reminder of the first night of Passover ,

which " is different from all other nights " 41 . It is not surprising , then , that

the solemn reading of Biblical texts in the Easter Eve service in the Ortho¬

dox Church makes use of Scriptural chapters that pertain to the Biblical

foundations of Passover : ( a ) a pericope prescribing the preparation of the

Passover meal to the Israelites before their Exodus ( Exodus 12 : 1 - 12 , read

in the church service is very close to Exodus 12 : 21 - 52 read in the Syna¬

gogue service ) and ( b ) a second text describing the celebration of Passover

at Gilgal at the end of the Israelites ' migration through the wilderness

( Joshua 5 : 2 - 6 : 1 ) . The second of these texts is identical to the one pre¬

scribed for Passover in synagogue reading to the present day .

39 The Old Church used to celebrate Easter whose name in most languages still reflects
its origin from the Hebrew Pesah , either on the date of Passover or on the Sunday fol¬
lowing it . See J . Beckmann , art . " Ostern " , in : Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart
[ RGG ] , vol . 3 , Tubingen : Mohr , 1960 , 1735 - 38 .

40 The pericope of the " Binding of Isaac " is among the propheteia - passages recited on
Holy Saturday . See below , ch . 3 .2 . 1 .
41 One of the obligatory questions put forth by the main celebrant to be answered during
the commemorative Passover meal is : " What makes this night different from all other
nights ? " See E .D . Goldschmidt , ed . , Die Pessach - Haggada , Berlin : Schocken , 1937 ,
33 - 38 .
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
62

2 . 2 Passover

Passover has a particularly complex history itself, constituting a merger of

two originally independent feasts . To quote from the Encyclopaedia Ju -
daica 42 : " The feast of Passover consists of two parts : The Passover ceremony
and the Feast of the Unleavened Bread . Originally both parts existed sepa¬
rately ; but at the beginning of the Exile they were combined . Passover was
originally not a pilgrimage feast , but a domestic ceremony consisting of the
slaughtering and eating of the paschal animal , a sheep or a goat . This animal
( . . . ) was slaughtered on the 14th of the first month at the setting of the sun .

The rite of touching the lintel and the doorposts of the house ( formerly the
tent ) with blood from the paschal animal was connected with the slaughter .
Originally the Passover was celebrated by transient breeders of sheep and
goats , later by the Israelites , to secure protection for their flocks prior to
leaving the desert winter pasture for cultivated regions . The rite of the
blood had an apotropaeic significance . The oldest literary record in Exo¬
dus , 12 : 21 , already presupposes the Passover , i . e . the notion of the divine
' overleaping ' ( Hebrew : pesah ) of the houses marked by the apotropaeic

staining with blood . Hence , the old nomadic custom is ' historicized ' by
being connected with the main event in the Israelite salvation history , the
Exodus . Moreover , the rite of the blood made it possible to connect Pass¬
over with the story of the slaying of the Egyptian firstborn , which forms
part of the tradition of the Exodus as the reason why the pharaoh let the
Israelites go . This historicization has determined the character of the Pass¬
over ; it became the feast commemorating the Exodus " . 43
Unlike Passover , " the seven day Feast of Unleavened Bread which was
celebrated in the month of Abib is probably taken over from the Canaan -
ites . The main custom of the feast is the eating of unleavened bread or
mazzot . ( . . . ) It was thus a seasonal festival , the time to consecrate the first¬
lings of the grain . This is clearly suggested by one of its names , hagg ha -
mazzot , the ' festival of the unleavened bread ' " . 44 Unleavened bread has
been identified as a symbol of the interruption between two cycles of har¬
vest 45 It was integrated into the feast of the deliverance from Egyptian

42 Encyclopaedia Judaica [EJ ] , Jerusalem 1972 , vol . 13 , 163 - 73 .

43 EJ , vol . 13 , 169 f. For a more recent historical analysis , see : Rolf Rendtorff , " Die
Entwicklung des altisraelitischen Festkalenders " , in : Das Fest und das Heilige :
Religiose Kontrapunkte zur Alltagswelt , ed . Jan Assmann , Gutersloh : Giitersloher
Verlagshaus Hans Mohn , 1991 , 185 - 205 .
44 EJ , vol . 13, 170 . - Hebrew transcription within quotations reflects the practice of the
source ; it otherwise follows the accepted philological rules .
45 Rendtorff , " Entwicklung " [ fn . 43 ] , 189 f.
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS
63

bondage by re - interpreting the motive for the preparation of unleavened

bread , which is due not to a seasonal ritual tradition but to the circum¬

stances of the hasty Exodus , which left no time to prepare proper bread .

2 .3 Easter

The preparatory week leading up to Easter , particularly the last three days ,

have to be considered as part of the commemorative ensemble . Unlike

Passover , the ceremonies performed in this time period recollect suffer¬

ings , often violent , not inflicted on an enemy but suffered through ene¬

mies . Jesus Christ , after hosting his disciples for the festal meal , goes out

to pray in a lonely grove , left alone by his disciples who fall asleep .

Shortly after , having been betrayed by one of them , he is arrested and

taken into custody . The next day he is condemned to death , flogged and

humiliated by the guards , and finally crucified . All these events figure in

the readings recited during the preparatory days before Easter .

The culmination point of this commemorative period , Easter vigil ,

however , no longer focuses on suffering ; it celebrates the resurrection ,

individual and universal triumph over death . Still , the preceding events

cannot be faded out : a most violent death was suffered and a period of time

among the dead was spent . Even after resurrection , the wounds are still

visible , as is testified to by one of the disciples ( John 20 : 19 - 31 ) . Death , as

an annihilating power , is overcome through sacrificial death . Although the

accounts reflect a strong awareness that the events are a fulfillment of

messianic predictions , entailed or implied in the Scriptures , 46 they rely

primarily on references to a most painfully experienced reality .

Whereas Passover is a commemoration of an event in salvational his¬

tory , one that forms part of the narrative of the ' election ' and certainly is

one of the main acts in the Jewish salvational drama , Easter appears more

complex . It is built on both imagined history - the last and decisive mani¬

festation of God incarnated in humanity - and a reading of received Scrip¬

tural texts . ' Reality ' and textuality thus merge . Easter is grafted upon a

previous feast , in terms of its mythical dimensions ( deliverance from servi¬

tude , vicarious suffering of death ) , as well as its performative aspects : The

Eucharist reassumes a meal , in which a commemorative eating of bread

( see below , ch . 3 . 1 . 2 ) and drinking of wine is essential . But Easter also

draws on a textual tradition that , at the time of the emergence of the new

46 The Nicaean Profession of Faith underlines this " textual referentiality " of the events ,
stating that they took place in accordance with what was said in Scripture : kata tas
graphas {'aid ma fi 'l- kutub ) .
 64 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

community , was perceived to entail the key for understanding the future ,
enshrined in the idea of the return of the redeemer and , thus , the closure of
the circle of salvation history .

2 .4 Passover - Ramadan

The relation between Passover and Ramadan is less obvious . No genetic

relation can be drawn but rather one of analogy . Both feasts share a
number of basic notions , leading the observer back to the earliest his¬
torical layers of the festivals . Ramadan , the Muslim month of fasting , is
grafted upon the jahill ' umrah , a pilgrimage which , before Islam , took
place in the month of Rajab , 47 a festival of spring thanksgiving analo¬
gous in some way to that of Passover in its first stages . Also similar to
pesah , which culminates in a particular night , the climax of the fumrah
was a distinguished night . Laylat al - qadr , the Night of Decision , was
prepared for by a period of abstention and devotion ( rukiij ) . This night
marked the New Year , opening a new cycle of events , similar to the
notion underlying the hagg ha - massot , which opened a new harvest
cycle , as well as to the New Year associated with the pesah lamb ( Exo¬
dus 12 : 3 ) .

2 .5 Ramadan

Scholars widely share consensus about the developments that led to the
institution of Ramadan . An historical experience of the early community ,
the victorious Battle of Badr ( 2 AH ) , classified in the Qur ' an as an event of
furqan ( i . e . , deliverance , analogous to the fiurqan of Moses , the Exodus ),
triggered the process of the sanctification of Ramadan . Fasting , although
ranking prominently among pre - Islamic Rajab rites , was introduced only
shortly after the hijrah as a monotheistic duty , a prescribed task ( " kutiba
' alaykum " , Qur ' an 2 : 185 ).
Tradition has it that the Medinan Jews celebrating the Day of
Atonement ( Hebrew : Yom Kippur , Aramaic : Asora , Arabic : fAshura ^
with their strict observation of the rites , aroused the attention of the
newly arrived Muslims . The Mosaic etiology they adduced for their

47 Julius Wellhausen , Reste arabischen Heidentums , 3rd ed ., Berlin : de Gruyter , 1961 ,

98 - 100 , discusses the Rajab festival in its broader Semitic context ; cf . K . Wagtendonk ,
Fasting in the Koran , Leiden : Brill , 1968 , 41 - 81 , for a thorough revision of the prob¬
lematic . See for Rajab and the ritual practices pertaining to it : M .J . Kister , " Rajab is
the Month of God : A Study in the Persistence of an Early Tradition " , Israel Oriental
Studies 1 ( 1971 ) , 191 - 223 .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 65

celebration - the handing over of the tables of the Law to Moses -

could not but appeal as most significant to the Muslim newcomers , who
perceived themselves as continuing the Mosaic tradition 48 . Thus , the

fasting of cAshura ' was taken over and , through a Qur ' anic verse

( Qur ' an 2 : 185 ) , established as a religious duty .

The first religiously imposed fasting thus was a custom shared with the

Jews . It was later extended for several days ( Qur ' an 2 : 186 ) , maybe due to

increasing interest in the indigenous Arab traditions of piety , stretching

perhaps over the same Rajab period that had been customary in pre - Islamic

practice . Later again , Ramadan was distinguished as the month of deliver¬

ance (furqan , Qur ' an 8 : 29 ) from threatening enemies in the Battle of Badr ,
and , at the same time , of the even more momentous " deliverance " and

guidance that was granted through the revelation of the Qur ' an ( equally

labeled furqan , Qur ' an 8 : 41 ) . After this point , the notion of a time period
when uniquely immediate divine - human communication was possible was

transferred from Rajab onto Ramadan . 49

The most striking reminiscence of the old festival preserved in

Ramadan is , however , the phenomenon of the one night , excelling over

all other nights , even holy months ( Qur ' an 95 : 3 , laylatu l - qadri khayrun

min alfl shahr ) . This night constitutes a kind of cosmic New Year , that
first belonged to Rajab and successively came to mark the culmination

of Ramadan . Thus , not unlike Passover , Ramadan is due to a complex

genesis , entailing both elements of a seasonal feast and a salvation his¬

torical founding myth . 50

48 See S .D . Goitein , "Zur Entstehung des Ramadan " , DerIslam 18 ( 1929 ) , 189 - 96 . A revised
version of the article has been published under the title : " Ramadan , the Muslim Month of
Fasting " , in : idem , Studies in Islamic Histoiy and Institutions , Leiden : Brill , 1966 , 97 - 99 .
49 This picture of the development , which widely relies on reconstructions based on
scarce Qur ' anic text material , has been drawn by K . Wagtendonk , Fasting in the Ko¬
ran , who follows closely the earlier account given by Goitein , " Entstehung des
Ramadan " [ fh . 48 ] . - In spite of the facilitated transcription used in the quotations , for
the sake of consequence philological rules are followed usually .
50 See Goitein , " Entstehung des Ramadan " , 90 - 110 .
66 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

3 . The liturgical enactments

3 .1 Judaism

3 .1 .1 Core text and 'context ' : Reading of a feast pericope and haftarah in

synagogue

The genesis of Passover is presented in Exodus 12 : 21 - 51 , a text read on

the first day of the feast 51 :

" 21 Then Moses called for all the elders of Israel , and said unto them ,

Draw out and take you a lamb according to your families , and kill the
Passover . 2 And ye shall take a bunch of hyssop , and dip it in the blood
that is in the basin , and strike the lintel and the two side posts with the
blood that is in the basin ; and none of you shall go out at the door of his
house until the morning . " 'T or the Lord will pass through to smite the
Egyptians : and when he seeth the blood upon the lintel , and on the two
side posts , the Lord will pass over the door , and will not suffer the de¬
stroyer to come in unto your houses to smite you . 24 And ye shall observe
this thing for an ordinance to thee and to thy sons for ever .
25 And it shall come to pass , when ye be come to the land which the Lord
will give you , according as he hath promised , that ye shall keep this ser¬
vice . " 6And it shall come to pass , when your children shall say unto you ,
' What mean ye by this service ' ? 27 That ye shall say , ' It is the sacrifice of
the Lord ' s Passover , who passed over the houses of the children of Israel
in Egypt when he smote the Egyptians and delivered our houses ' . And
the people bowed the head and worshipped . 28 And the children of Israel
went away , and did as the Lord had commanded Moses and Aaron so did
they .
29 And it came to pass that at midnight the Lord smote all the firstborn in
the land of Egypt , from the firstborn of Pharaoh that sat on his throne
unto the firstborn of the captive that was in the dungeon ; and all the first¬
born of the cattle . 30 And Pharaoh rose up in the night , he , and all his ser¬
vants , and all the Egyptians and there was a great cry in Egypt , for there
was not a house where there was not one dead . 3 ' And he called for Moses
and Aaron by night , and said , ' Rise up , and get you forth from among my

51 The text of the quotation follows The Holy Bible . Containing the Old and New Testa¬
ments . Translated from the original tongues and with the former translations diligently
compared & revised . Set forth in 1611 and commonly known as the King James Ver¬
sion , New York : American Bible Society , s .d . The readings of the second day are Le¬
viticus 22 :26 - 23 :44 ( on the arrangements for the feast ) , complemented again by Num¬
bers 28 :6 - 25 . The haftarah is taken from 2 Kings 23 : 1 - 9 , 21 - 25 , about the celebration
of Passover under King Josiah after the recovering of the Book of the Covenant .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS
67

people , both ye and the children of Israel and go , serve the Lord , as ye
have said .' ( . . .)
34And the people took their dough before it was leavened , their knead -
ing - troughs being bound up in their clothes upon their shoulders . ( . . .)
37And the children of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth , about
six hundred thousand on foot that were men , beside children ( . . .) 39And
they baked unleavened cakes of the dough which they brought forth out
of Egypt for it was not leavened , because they were thrust out of Egypt
and could not tarry , neither had they prepared for themselves any vict¬
uals . ( . . .) 42 ( . . . ) This is that night of the Lord , to be observed of all the
children of Israel in their generations . ( Follows : ordinance of the Pass¬
over ) ."

The text is heavily laden with real and symbolic violence . Symbolic vio¬

lence is represented in the act of slaughtering for the thanksgiving ( Exodus

12 : 3ff , 2If . ) which in the context of the unique historical situation of the

Exodus acquires a momentous function . The blood of the sacrificial ani¬

mals serves to distinguish the blessed community from their doomed ad¬

versaries . Sacrifice , i .e . symbolic violence - which , according to Rene

Girard , is a form of sublimation of otherwise more destructive violence

and in later interpretations is regarded as a vicarious ( bodily ) suffering

inflicted on the sacrificial animal to ensure the ( spiritual ) salvation of those

that offer it - here functions literally for those offering the sacrifice as a

means of salvation from suffering real ( bodily ) violence . Yet , real violence

is present as well , inflicted by the messenger of the Lord on the Egyptians

( Exodus 12 : 23 , 29 ) . Last but not least , there is remembered violence , the

task to turn violence into a verbal text . The narrated events become found¬

ing stories meticulously kept and recalled by the community , their textual

wording even required to be repeated in the future ( Exodus 12 : 24 - 26 ) .

The reading of this text in synagogue is complemented by a reading

from the second Torah scroll , Numbers 28 : 16 - 25 , which deals with the

procedures of sacrifice in the Temple :

" 16And in the fourteenth day of the first month is the Passover of the
Lord . 17And in the fifteenth day of this month is the feast , seven days
shall unleavened bread be eaten . 18And the first day shall be a holy con¬
vocation . Ye shall do no manner of servile work herein . 19But ye shall of¬
fer a sacrifice made by fire for a burnt offering unto the Lord ( . . .) "

This text is followed by a haftarah ( Joshua 5 : 2 - 6 : 1 ) , which recalls one of

the earliest Passover celebrations held by the Israelites at Gilgal , at the end

of their migration through the desert :

 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
68

" 2At that time the Lord said unto Joshua , ' Make thee sharp knives and
circumcise again the children of Israel the second time . 9 And the

Lord said unto Joshua , ' This day have I rolled away the reproach of
Egypt from off you ' . Wherefore the name of the place is called Gilgal
unto this day . I0 And the children of Israel encamped in Gilgal , and kept
the Passover on the fourteenth day of the month at even in the plains of
Jericho . 1' And they did eat of the old corn of the land on the morrow after
the Passover , unleavened cakes , and parched corn in the selfsame day .
12And the manna ceased on the morrow after they had eaten of the old
corn of the land neither had the children of Israel manna any more , but
they did eat of the fruit of the land of Canaan that year ( . .

It appears that the complementary texts , the ' contexts ' of the core reading ,
serve to shift emphasis from the violent circumstances of the deliverance
to a number of complementary discourses . As a result , liberation is incor¬
porated into the universal drama of salvation history . Thus , the connection
between the historical election of the people ( the Exodus ) and the Temple
cult is underlined through the twice - performed reading of the ordinances
of sacrifice (Numbers 28 : 16 - 25 ) . Furthermore , two novelties , the affirma¬
tion of the election through the circumcision of those born in the wilder¬
ness ( Joshua 5 : 2 ) and the beginning of the occupation of the promised land
symbolized in the first consumption of its fruit (Joshua 5 : 11 ) , contribute to
situate the violent deliverance ( the Exodus ) into a more universal drama of
divine - human interaction .

3 .1.2 Further enactments : Orchestration of the core text in the framework

of a family meal (Seder)

Synagogal reading is not the only liturgical performance on Passover .

Yerushalmi 52 has most succinctly summarized the significance of " that
quintessential exercise in Jewish group memory which is the Passover
Seder . Here , in the course of a meal around the family table , ritual , liturgy
and even culinary elements are orchestrated to transmit a vital past from
one generation to the next . The entire Seder is a symbolic enactment of an
historical scenario whose three great acts structure the Haggadah 53 that is
read aloud : slavery - deliverance - ultimate redemption . Significantly , one

52 Yerushalmi , Zakhor [ fn . 1] , 44 .
53 The ' Passover Haggadah whose earliest codification can be traced back into the
Middle Ages , is a kind of guidebook or , more precisely , a ' libretto ' containing all the
texts and acts to be read , sung and performed at the Seder meal . Reading from it is
customary , even in cases when the celebrant knows the texts by heart .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 69

of the first ritual acts to be performed is the lifting of a piece of unleavened

bread ( mazzah ) before those assembled , accompanied by the declaration :

Ha lahma 'anya , ' This is the bread of affliction which our forefathers ate

in the land of Egypt . ' Both language and gesture are geared to spur , not so

much a leap of memory as a fusion of past and present " .

It is worth taking a little closer at the relation between the text of the

core reading in the synagogue and the second enactment of Scripture in

liturgy , the Seder meal at home . According to the focal text of the Torah

( Exodus 12 : 8 ) , it was made a duty to slaughter a lamb (pesah ) on the 14th

of Nisan in memory of the liberation of the Israelites from Egypt . This was

to be consumed on the night of the 15th of Nisan . After the destruction of

the temple and the abolishment of sacrifice , the consumption of meat of

the pesah lamb and unleavened bread - both duties imposed by Scripture

- were integrated into a highly symbolic act of commemoration . The an¬

cient sacrificial meal is evoked through reminiscence : the presence of a

lamb 's foreleg ( " arm " , zero 'a ) among a set of dishes that all allow for

symbolic interpretation . Thus , bitter leaves ( merorlm ) remind of the bitter

sufferings in the land of bondage , and a paste of pickled fruit , called

hardset ( " clay " ) , recalls - not only etymologically ( Hebrew heres : " clay ")

but also through its brownish color - the clay worked on in Egypt by Isra¬

elites in forced labor . The bread , massah , is taken to represent the " bread

of affliction " eaten by the forefathers in the days of the decisive crisis of

the Exodus . The zero ca , finally , not only symbolizes the sacrificial meal in

use until the destruction of the Temple but also reminds of the " de¬

stroyer 's" overleaping of Israelites houses when slaying the first born of

every household . Thus , diverse reminiscences of violent suffering have

become chrystalized to form a new ensemble of signs . They have been

transformed into a meal , distinguishing the table of the Seder ceremony ,

which is meant to be consumed and , thus , ' internalized ' by celebrants .

The culinary performance , however , is only one essential layer of the

ceremony . A further duty - imposed in the Biblical core reading itself - is

to produce a text , to ensure remembrance by telling one ' s children about

the Exodus from Egypt and explaining the meaning of the performances of

the evening ( Exodus 13 : 8 ) . What appears as table talk between the head of

the family ( or person entrusted with this role ) , and his children is the

response to a Biblical command . The questions of Exodus 13 : 8 ( and Deu¬

teronomy 6 : 20 ) are put literally into the mouths of the personae of the

children ; the need to answer the questions provides the occasion for the

celebrant to su mm arize the full story of the Exodus .

Considering the selection of texts prescribed in the Haggadah to be re¬

called on this occasion , we come across further devices for generating

70 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

social coherence , other than the focusing of collectively performed or suf¬

fered violence . The focal text ( Deuteronomy 26 : 5 - 9 ) reads :

A wondering Aramaean was my father , and he went down into Egypt ,

" 5( . . . )
and sojourned there few in number, and he became there a nation , great ,
mighty and populous . 6And the Egyptians dealt ill with us und afflicted us ,
and laid upon us hard bondage . ?And we cried unto the Lord , the God of our
fathers and the Lord heard our voice , and saw our afflictions and our toil and
our oppression . 8And the Lord brought us forth out of Egypt with a mighty
hand and with an outstretched arm and with great terribleness , and with signs
and with wonders . 9And He has brought us into the place and has given us
this land , a land flowing with milk and honey . "

What matters first of all is memory . The core of the ceremony is the in¬
struction of the new generation about the meaning of the commemoration .
In this context , not only the event of deliverance itself but also its history
is recalled , ranging through the stage recorded in the haftarah , the entering
into the land . The ceremony culminates in the message that every genera¬
tion should imagine themselves delivered from Egypt - quote Exodus
13 : 8 : " God has done it ( the work of liberation ) to me when I came down
from Egypt " ( be -seti mim - misrayim ) .
Thus , coherence is generated , not only within the group of celebrants but
also across the generations , pointing to a continuation in the future . This co¬
herence is due less to the extent of violence suffered before the Exodus or
witnessed to be inflicted by God on one ' s own enemies , as is recalled in the
core reading of Scripture , than to the context readings and , particularly , to the
meal , during which instruments and signs of violence are consumed in the
form of food and during which the entire history of the Jewish people is
transmitted to the following generation . Reminiscences of loss and humilia¬
tion turn into food , into nourishment ; memories are ritually made present .
The kairos of liberation is re - experienced as a present event , giving the indi¬
vidual the consciousness of freedom and electness .

3 .2 Christianity ( Eastern Churches ) 54

3 . 2 . 1 Core texts and 'contexts '

In Christian liturgy , unlike Jewish , the core text is not followed but pre¬
ceded by a reading from the ' secondary text ' . We will first examine the

54 The following presentation relies on the rituals performed in the Greek Orthodox Church
as documented in the prayer book Megas kai ieros synekdemos orthodoxon , periechon
pasan ten taxin ton orthodoxon proseuchon kai akolouthion , Athens : Tenos , s .d .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS
71

Easter vigil before turning to Easter Sunday mass . In the case of the

Easter vigil , the Gospel ( Matthew 28 : 1 - 20 ) is preceded by a number of

readings from the Old Testament {propheteiai ) , all of which underline

the symbolic significance of the account of the resurrection .

One must bear in mind that the most dramatic texts , Gospel accounts

on the diverse phases of the Passion , often in more than one version , are

read during the preceding days . 55 They accompany synchronously the pre¬

dicament Christ is imagined to be going through until his final resurrec¬

tion . At the end of the second day of his absence in the world of the dead ,

no further recollection of violence need be presented . It becomes the pe¬

riod of preparation for the experience of deliverance , of renewal , at the

center of the Easter vigil . The ceremony is not an ordinary mass but a

vigil , starting in the late evening of Holy Saturday and lasting into the

early morning of Easter Sunday .

The Gospel that announces the resurrection is , thus , preceded by a

number of propheteiai :

1. Genesis 1 : 1 - 14 . First until third day of Creation ; emergence of light ,

solid earth , vegetation .
2 . Isaiah 60 : 1 - 17 . Prophecy of the revival of Zion , thanks to renewed divine
grace .

3. Exodus 12 : 1 - 12 . Israelites are ordered to prepare for the exodus by

sacrificing and performing the blood ritual ; text very close to the
Passover pericope in Synagogal service , Exodus 12 :21 - 51 ( see above ,
ch . 3 . 1 . 1 ) .
4 . lonas , 1 - 4 . Story of Jonas who , immersed in the darkness of the sea and
swallowed by the fish in whose body he remains for some time , figures
as a prototype of Christ , who descends into Hades to defeat death and
free the dead .

5. Joshua 5 : 10 - 6 : 1 . Narrative of the celebration of Passover at Gilgal after

the migration through the wilderness ; text identical to the haftarah read
in Synagogue on the first day of Passover ( see above 3 . 1 . 1) .
6 . Exodus 13 :20 - 15 : 20 . Passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea
and the drowning of the Egyptians ; the reading culminates in the
hymn on safe passage and the divine power displayed in the miracu¬
lous salvation . Text = part of the Exodus story , focusing on deliver¬
ance .

7. Zephaniah 3 : 8 - 16 . Prophecy of the revival of Zion , re - establishment of

the Divine Kingdom .

55 On Holy Thursday , the so - called Twelve Gospels , 12 readings containing the most
important episodes of the Passion as presented in the four Gospels , are recited . The
readings are continued on the two following days .
72 ANGELUCA NEUWIRTH

8 . 1 Kings 17 : 8 - 18 : 1 . Resurrection from the dead of the son of the widow

from Sarepta , who is revived through the prayer of Elias .
9 . Isaiah 61 : 10 - 62 : 6 . Prophecy of the revival of Zion , perceived as the
bride of her divine King .
10 . Genesis 22 : 1 - 19 . Story of the binding of Isaac , a father sacrificing his
son - prototypical of the sacrifice of Christ .
11 . Isaiah 61 : 1 - 10 . Self- presentation of the Messiah coming to restore order
and justice and initiating a new aeon .
12 . 2 Kings 4 : 8 - 38 . Resurrection from the dead of the son of the woman
from Sunam , who is revived through the prayer of Elisha .
13 . Isaiah 63 : lb - 64 : 5b . Lament of the prophet about the absence of God
from his people ; reminiscences of the divine presence at the Exodus .
14 . Jeremiah 31 : 31 - 34 . Announcement of a new divine - human covenant .
15 . Daniel 3 : 1 - 88 . Story of Daniel and his companions , who were flung into
a burning furnace for worshipping God publicly in a situation of prosecu¬
tion but who miraculously survived . Daniel is a further pre - figuration of
Christ , who went through death but triumphed over death through di¬
vinely granted power . This last reading culminates in the hymn of the
Three Young Men in the furnace .

The first reading from the New Testament (.Apostolos ) is Romans 6 : 3 - 12 ,

which evokes baptism 56 as a metaphor for death and resurrection , the death
of the ' old ego ' leading to life of the ' new ego ' . It is recited shortly before
midnight , when Psalm 81 ( with ample reminiscences of the Exodus ) is
sung 57 :

" 3 Know ye not , that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ
were baptized into his death ? 4 Therefore we are buried with him by bap¬
tism into death ; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the
glory of the Father , even so we also should walk in newness of life . 5For
if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death , we shall be
also in the likeness of his resurrection . 6Knowing this , that our old man is
crucified with him , that his body of sin might be destroyed , that hence¬
forth we should not serve sin . ( . . . ) "

Immediately after midnight follows the core text , the Gospel Matthew
28 : 1 - 20 , with the annunciation of Christ ' s resurrection :

56 Baptism in the Eastern Churches implies the complete immersion of the baptized
person into water .
57 Meanwhile , the celebrants change their liturgical gowns from dark colors symbolizing
penance to light ones expressing joy .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS
73

" ' in the end of the sabbath , as it began to dawn toward the first day of the
week , came Mary Magdalene and the other Mary to see the sepulchre .
2And , behold , there was a great earthquake ; for the angel of the Lord de¬
scended from heaven , and came and rolled back the stone from the door ,

and sat upon it . 3His countenance was like lightning , and his raiment
white as snow . ( . . .) "

The ceremony makes use of the vigil ' s time frame , which extends from

Saturday night to Sunday morning , as a symbolic backdrop , a cosmic

course that is also reflected in the readings ( nos . 1 , 2 ) . The recitations of

Scripture proceed in a sequence of readings from the Old Testament ( on

the eve of the resurrection ) to readings from the New Testament ( on the

early morning of the day of resurrection ) . The sequence entails most ex¬

pressive prophetical annunciations of societal and spiritual renewal ( nos . 2 ,

7 , 9 , 11 ) and accounts about Passover as the paradigm of deliverance in

history ( nos . 3 , 6 ) . They underscore renewal and deliverance achieved

through Christ ' s triumph over death and his resurrection .

The ceremony preludes the climactic announcement of Christ ' s resur¬

rection with accounts about prior occurrences of the resurrection of a dead

person through the belief of a saintly man ( nos . 8, 12 ) , in both cases an

innocent child . Some texts recall prototypes , pre - figurations , of Christ :

those Biblical figures who go through temporary death ( through water : no .

4 ; through fire : no . 15 ) but re - emerge safely and integrally bear a particular

affinity to him who descends to the world of the dead to overcome death .

The reading of the story of the Abrahamian sacrifice , finally , may be un¬

derstood as mirroring the structural paradigm of the divine sacrifice im¬

plied in the incarnation and the final act of redemption through the cross .

The sequence of propheteiai , thus , bears obvious exegetical function , serv¬

ing to frame the account of the resurrection into a complex context of ear¬

lier religious experiences and to throw light on its multiple symbolic im¬

plications .

The service continues with the Sunday mass . The Gospel text is pre¬

ceded by a reading from the Acts ( 1 :1- 8) :

" The former treatise have I made , o Theophilus , of all that Jesus began
both to do and teach . 2Until the day in which he was taken up , after that
he through the Holy Ghost had given commandments unto the apostles
whom he had chosen . 3To whom also he showed himself alive after his

passion by many infallible proofs , being seen of them forty days and
speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God . ( . . . ) 7And he
said unto them : ( . . . ) 8( . . . ) Ye shall receive power , after that the Holy
Ghost is come upon you and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jeru -
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
74

salem and in all Judea , and in Samaria and unto the uttermost part of the
earth ."

The Gospel itself ( John 1 : 1 - 17 ) reads :

" ' in the beginning was the Word , and the Word was with God , and the
Word was God . 2The same was in the beginning with God . 3All things
were made by him ; and without him was not any thing made that was
made . 4In him was life ; and the life was the light of men . 5And the light
shineth in darkness ; and the darkness comprehended it not . 6There as a
man sent from God , whose name was John . 7The same came for a wit¬

ness , to bear witness of the Light , what all men through him might be¬
lieve . 8He was not that Light , but was sent to bear witness of that Light .
9That was the true Light , which lighteth every man that cometh into the
world . 10He was in the world and the world was made by him , and world
knew him not . ( . . . ) 16And of his fullness have all we received and grace
for grace . 17For the law was given by Moses , but grace and truth came by
Jesus Christ ."

Both texts reflect the perception of a new historical beginning . The

apostolos predicts the empowerment of the disciples with the task of

promulgation of the new faith . The notion of its universality , which

projects the new message to powerfully fill space to its extreme limits ,

its ' end ' ( " unto the uttermost part of the earth " , Greek : heos eschatou

tes ges , Acts 1 : 8 ) , is taken up again by the Gospel , which sets it in an

equally universal horizon of time , with its beginning in creation itself

( Greek : en arche , John 1 : 1 ) . It is well known that the prologue to the

Gospel of John presents a christological re - writing of the creation ac¬

count of Genesis 1 . By declaring the new paradigm of Grace successor

of the paradigm of the Law ( John 1 : 17 ) , it announces an essentially new

phase in salvation history . The texts , thus , underscore the notion of the

essential renewal of creation achieved through Easter . At the same time ,

however , they shift the emphasis from commemoration to the laying of

foundations for the future . 58

58 It is not surprising that the Easter Sunday mass is counted already as part of the litur¬
gical period of preparation for Pentecost . The reading of the Gospel of John is contin¬
ued until Pentecost ( 7 weeks ) followed by the Gospel of Matthew ( 16 weeks ) , and
Luke ( 19 weeks ) . During the Lent period and until the Holy Week the Gospel of Marc
is recited .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 75

3 .2 .2 Further enactments

In this place an elaborate presentation of the most theologically significant

hymns 59 occupying most of the service would have been demanded . These

hymns elaborate the experience of the fulfillment of the promise of re¬

newal , Christ appearing as the New Adam , the world after the resurrection

celebrated as the New Jerusalem .60 This being impossible in the present

framework , it should , however , be mentioned that the triumphal affirma¬

tion of the real achievement , the coming true of all those predictions and

prophecies adduced in the numerous Scriptural texts recited in the vigil ,

has been clad into a most suggestive short form . It was abridged into a

two - word motto recited by participants during the Easter vigil and often

repeated in the following days : " Christ has risen " ( Greek : Christos anes -

te ) . It is answered by " He has truly risen " ( Alethos aneste ) . But more than

anything else , it is the Eucharist itself that captures the spirit of Easter .

Those following the invitation to partake in a communal meal claim a

share in the spiritual nourishment accessible in the commemoration of the

sacrifice of the redeemer .

3 .3 Islam

3 . 3 . 1 The Quranic etiological text and its hymnal counterpart

Although there is no particular pericope for Ramadan to be read in the

service of ' id al -fitr , the feast that concludes the month of fasting , there are

relevant texts that document the events that led to the adoption of the

month of Ramadan as a festal month . The Quranic text that recalls the

events of the Battle of Badr as such is preluded by a recapitulation of an

instigation to remember the history preceding the decisive new develop¬

ment . It is a reckoning with the Meccan foes , whose prosecution of the

community - that could have led to their annihilation whose ridiculing

the Qur ' anic revelation and ongoing unjust occupation of the Meccan Holy

59 An English translation of a significant selection of the originally Byzantine Greek

texts is given in The Lenten Triodion : The Service Book of the Orthodox Church , tr .
Mother Mary and Archimandrite Kallistos ( Timothy Ware ) , London : Faber & Faber ,
1977 .

60 A selection of these hymns , chanted in their traditional liturgical musical form by the
celebrated Lebanese singer Fayruz , has been distributed on cassettes and form part of
the repertoire of modern Arab music . See Ines Weinrich , " Tradition and Innovation in
Modern Arab Music : The Lebanese Singer Fayruz " , in : Crisis and Memory [ fn . 9 ] ,
483 - 92 .
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
76

Places are denounced . Against that , the believers are re - assured with refer¬

ence to the long expected " deliverance " (furqan ) , which is finally granted

( Qur ' an 8 : 27 ) . The successful end of the battle is perceived as a divine

punishment of the Meccans ( Qur ' an 8 : 26 - 46 ) : 61

" 26And remember when you were few and abased in the land
and were fearful that the people would snatch you away ;
but He gave you refuge , and confirmed you with His help ,
and provided you with the good things ,
that happily you might be thankful ( . . .) .

29 0 believers , if you fear God , He will assign you a salvation [furqan ]

and acquit you of your evil deeds and forgive you ;
and God is of bounty abounding .
30And when the unbelievers were devising against thee ,
to confine thee , or slay thee , or to expel thee , and were devising ;
and God was devising ; and God is the best of devisers . ( . . .)
34But what have they now , that God should not chastise them ,
when they are barring from the Holy Mosque , not being its protectors ?
Its only protectors are the god - fearing : but most of them know not . ( . . . ) "

The battle , moreover , was a divine trial , an anticipation of the Last Judg¬

ment , which opens new prerogatives for Muslims . They are called to speed

purification of the land from disbelief by fighting unbelievers ( those who

do not surrender ):

" 37That God may distinguish the corrupt from the good ,
and place the corrupt one upon another ( . . .) ,
and put them in Gehenna , those are the losers . ( . . .)
39Fight them till there is no persecution
and the religion is God ' s entirely ;
Then if they give over , surely God sees the things they do ( . . .) "

The experience of " deliverance " , labeled furqan 62 ( Qur ' an 8 : 27 ) , is pre¬

sented as an article of faith , inviting recollection of the events viewed as

miraculous in retrospective . It is noteworthy that the term furqan has

gained new meaning . It was used in the Qur ' an until then to denote divine

revelation - received by Moses and Muhammad alike - as well as affirma¬

tion of divine grace through divine salvation from threatening foes , as

61 The English version of the Qur ' an is that by Arthur J. Arberry , The Koran Interpreted ,
London : Allen & Unwin , 1964 .
62 The loan word furqan in Aramaic ( <purqana ) means " salvation " or " deliverance " ,
corresponding to Greek soteria . In Arabic , where the root FRQ evokes the notion of
" separating " , " distinguishing " , and " deciding " , it has the connotation of " decision " .
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 77

Moses experienced during the Exodus . It has now come to denote deliver¬

ance of the Muslim community in contemporary history . Again , the trial

character of the battle is emphasized ; it is an event governed by divine

decisions : 63

" 41 Know that ( . . . ) if you believe in God and that we sent down upon Our
servant on the day of salvation [furqan ],
the day the two hosts encountered , and God is powerful over everything ,
42 When you were on the nearer bank , and they were on the farther bank
and the cavalcade was below you ,
and had you made tryst together , you would have surely failed the tryst ,
but that God might determine a matter that was done ,
that whosoever perished might perish by a clear sign ,
and by a clear sign he might live who lived ,
and surely God is the All - hearing , All - knowing .
43 When God showed thee them in thy dream as few ,
and had He shown them as many you would have lost heart ,
and quarreled about the matter , but God saved ,
He knows the thoughts in the breast
44When God showed you them in your eyes as few ,
when you encountered ,
and made you few in their eyes ,
that God might determine a matter that was done ,
and unto God all matters are returned ."

Deliverance from fear of overwhelming foes is understood as achieved not

by a victorious army but by divine intervention . The battle has , of course ,

caused violent death on both sides . Still , it is not the coherence - generating

phenomenon of inflicting or suffering violence that constitutes the etiology

of the feast . The historical events , however miraculous imagined , have not

gone through the process of mythicizing . They are not celebrated as " the

decisive turning point , the actual moment of the origination of Islam as an

independent religious community " . 64 This fact may be related to the ab -

63 Although not labeled qadr , but qada ( Qur ' an 8 :42 ) , the divine decision concerning
those who will live and those who will perish is part of the implication of a New
Year ' s Feast , such as laylat al - qadr in later Islamic tradition .
64 Although , viewed in retrospective , that may be their historical dimension , I would not
agree with Wagtendonk , Fasting [ fn . 47 ] , 66 , on the fact of their mythization . There
may have been such a development in later piety , as is reflected occasionally in mythic
poetry , but no particular rank of the Qur ' anic account about Badr as a founding narra¬
tive is perceivable . The account is , on the contrary , inserted in long and heterogeneous
text ; it does not form a clearly definable unit .
78 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

sence of a proper liturgical occasion , there being no pericopes for public

services .
Whatever the reasons , it is not the historical event that is primarily as¬
sociated with Ramadan but the experience of closeness with the divine
protector gained through the event . It is , therefore , not surprising that a
text celebrating the lasting awareness of permeable borderlines between
the heavenly and earthly realms granted in the commemorative month -
and particularly on its focal night , laylat al - qadr - has overlaid the recol¬
lection of the violent event with another vision .
The memory of the violent event has been eclipsed by the image of a cos¬
mic opening , an easily moving communication between God and man at cli¬
max during the festival month of Ramadan . This vision is presented in a text
very frequently enunciated , the short surah 97 . It belongs to the texts custom¬
arily used for the five daily prayers and presumed to be known by believers
by heart . This partial corpus of the Qur ' an , which makes up the last juz ' ( thirti¬
eth part ) of the Qur ' an , may duly be considered the core part of Islamic Scrip¬
ture and , thus , compared to the Torah , to the Gospel or , perhaps more perti¬
nently , to the Psalms . Although not part of a sequence of weekly pericopes ,
the short text on the laylat al - qadr is known by everyone as the Ramadan -
reading . It is entitled Surat al - qadr 65 ( Qur ' an 97 : 1 - 5 ) :

"Behold we sent it down in the night of Power ( better : Decision )

And what shall teach thee what is the Night of Power ?
The night of Power is better than a thousand months ,
In it the angels and the Spirit descend
By the leave of their Lord , upon every command
Peace it is , till the rising of dawn . "

3 .3 . 2 Further enactments

Many testimonies could be adduced to prove the great impact of this text
on popular piety . The imagination of the presence of angels among men
during laylat al - qadr - evoked in the surah - the permeability of the bor¬
derlines between the heavenly and earthly domains and , thus , the expecta¬
tion that prayers will be answered in Ramadan , are clearly reflected - to
quote only one example - in the autobiography of the Palestinian poet
Fadwa Tuqan who portrays her childhood in pre - modern rural Palestine :

"I heard exciting things about Qadr Night , which Muslims believe to
have qualities different from all other nights of the year . For instance ,

65 The surah has a parallel text in Qur ' an 44 : 1- 7 .

 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 79

there was a tree in the heavens with as many green leaves on it as there
were people on the earth . On the night of Lailat al - Qadr the leaves of
those who should die that year would fall and new leaves would grow for
those to be born . One of the privileges of Lailat al - Qadr was that the
heavens were open to hear and grant prayers arising from troubled hearts .
Therefore on Lailat al - Qadr I would seclude myself in a corner of the
open courtyard of the house , or at the foot of a bitter orange tree , to raise
my face to the heavens imploring them to make my cheeks a beautiful
rosy color so I would not be called yellow or green any longer , names
that severely wounded my feelings ." 66

It is not only the divine decision expected on laylat al - qadr that makes
Ramadan a festival of renewal . 67 Similarly , the concluding feast , 'Id al -fi.tr ,
displays a number of traits characteristic of an initial day of a new time
period which at the same time may be taken as a feast of renewal of the
community , such as the autopsy of the new moon ; the obligatory dressing
- at least of children - with new clothes and rites that enhance the coher¬
ence of the community over generations , such as visits to the dead in the
graveyards , the exchange of visits between relatives and friends and , last
but not least , distribution of alms to the poor .
More than anything else , however , the alternation of abstention and the
renouncing of ordinary social life and dedication of one ' s emotional ener¬
gies to God during daytime , with the resumption of social life in an inten¬
sified form during the evenings and nights as a temporary way of life
widely shared by the community as a whole , contributes to the creation
and enhancement of social coherence . It is the joint ceremony of consum¬
ing food , repeated nearly thirty times during the month , that leads to the
extinction of any recollection of violence - be it violence inflicted or suf¬
fered - although from a historical perspective an experience of violence ,
the Battle of Badr was the founding event of the feast .

66 Fadwa Tuqan , Rihlah sa 'bah , rihlah jabaliyyah : sirah dhatiyyah , Amman , 1988 ( Eng¬
lish edition : A Mountainous Journey : The Life of Palestine 's Outstanding Woman
Poet , tr . Olive Kenny , London , 1996 , 17 - 18 ) .
67 On the celebration of Ramadan , see : Gustave E . von Grunebaum , Muhammedan Festi¬
vals , New York : Schuman , 1951 ; Hava Lazarus - Yafeh , " On the Feasts in Islam " ( in
Hebrew ) , in : Studia Orientalia memoriae D . H . Baneth Dedicata , eds . J . Blau , S . Pines ,
M .J . Kister , S . Shaked , Jerusalem : Magnes Press , Hebrew University , 1979 , 17 - 28 ;
Edward W . Lane , An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians
[ 1836 ] , The Hague and London : East - West Publications , 1978 , ch . 25 .
 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
80

4 . Conclusion

A similar intention of overlaying the memory of violence with a ceremony of

social interaction has been observed for the feast of Passover . The affirma¬

tion of the community ' s coherence is expressed through a meal which com¬
memorates deliverance from an existential crisis that threatened the survival

of the community and , at the same time , provides a reminiscence of the tradi¬

tion of sacrifice in the Temple , disrupted after the destruction of the sanctu¬

ary . The Seder ceremony in Judaism , primarily a reminder of the history of

the Exodus , makes ample use of symbols of violence and oppression in its

recall of particular historical circumstances . Yet , it turns remembered

elements of violence into culinary metaphors , into nourishing food ; it

makes them sensually acceptable and , thus , promotes reconciliation .

In Christianity , where on Easter a cluster of commemorations are

brought to conclusion , the phenomenon of a meal is significant as well . In

memory of the meal consumed by Christ and his disciples on the occasion

of the last Passover , a memorial meal is instituted , where the very figure

that suffered violent death symbolically represents the sacrificial victim ,

whose vicarious suffering of death brings about the salvation of the com¬

munity . Here it is not the symbolic representation of the tools of violence ,

but rather the symbolic representation of the body that suffered violence

itself , that is reflected in food and metaphorically turns into spiritual nour¬

ishment . We are confronted with an extremely personal recollection of

suffering violence that , in a deeply mystical way , brings about reconcilia¬

tion .

In Islam , over the period of a whole month , abstention from food and

social life is endured throughout daytime . The fasting community thereby

underpins the cosmic structure of natural time , starting and concluding

their fasting exactly at the borderlines between darkness and light , respect¬

ing the beginning and the end of the lunar month meticulously . Thus , a

cosmically structured symbolic space is created , in which the community

celebrates the feast of the double thanksgiving - for both the deliverance

and the revelation - through daily meals preceded by abstention for a pe¬

riod extending over nearly thirty days . It is the faithfulness and indulgence

of the believers in their mentally reproducing the cosmic structures of di¬

vine creation , by devaluating the usual ' invented ' timing of every day life

and replacing it with a ' genuine ' creation - oriented cosmic timing , that

brings about a renewal , a deliverance of the community . Divine creation

and granting order are gratefully affirmed , rather than divine manifestation
 THREE RELIGIOUS FEASTS 81

in history , or the experience of the redeeming force of divine incarnation . 68

Reviewing the representations of the three monotheist high feasts , all

founded on the experience of the most essential deliverance of the com¬

munity from the threat of annihilation , brought about by events implying

dramatic forms of violence , one cannot but observe a common shift of

focus . What shapes the feasts are not the violent phenomena recorded in

the core Scriptural texts ( in the Christian case , in those numerous texts

read during the preparatory period ) but the reconciliatory visions reflected

in the so - called ' context ' of liturgical reading and , moreover , the ' further

enactments ' of Scripture in domestic rites and liturgies .

While in Judaism the recollection of divinely guided history - imposed

on the believer in the core text but staged in the domestic liturgical re -

enactment - acts as a coherence - generating force , in Christianity it is the

reflection of the salvation historical significance of incarnation and re¬

deeming sacrifice for mankind as a whole . This theologumenon , inherent

in the Scriptural accounts of the Passion , is spelled out most succinctly in

the liturgical formula of the Eucharist , which is celebrated at the end of

mass . In Islam , it is the cosmic order , the ' signs ' of meaningful creation

that are entailed in it , comprehensible for humans as tokens of divine

grace , which plays an essential part in the Qur ' anic rulings of Ramadan

fasting . No less , it is the blessing of a divine - human communication

through the Qur ' anic revelation , which is attested to in the short liturgical

text , Qur ' an 97 , and perceived as a telling proof of divine closeness . Rec¬

onciliation then , between humans and between God and man , has eclipsed

the recollection of violence present in the founding events of the three

feasts , such that they have become exemplary occasions of joyfully experi¬

enced personal and communal renewal .

The life of a religion does not manifest itself exclusively in the Scriptural

texts . Exegetical writing , particularly in those religions strongly oriented

toward law and erudition , has an important role to play as well , as is evident

in Judaism and Islam until modem times and was evident in all three relig¬

ions during the pre - modern epochs . Still , it remains difficult to evaluate the

reception of exegetical literature by society at large , particularly in view of

the fact that exegetical erudition was denied to one half of the believers :

females . Thus , as a catalyst of Scriptural messages , it seems to be rather the

68 The focal interest in creation and cosmic order in Qur ' anic piety , against that in divine
intervention in history , becomes obvious through a comparison between Surat al -
Rahman , on the one hand , and Psalm 136 , on the other . See Angelika Neuwirth ,
" Qur ' anic Literary Structure Revisited : Surat al - Rahman between Mythic Account and
Decodation of Myth " , in : Story - telling in the Framework of Non -Fictional Arabic Lit¬
erature , ed . Stefan Leder , Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz , 1988 , 388 - 420 .
§2 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH

theatralic representation of salvation historical events , the enactment of di¬

vine - human interaction in liturgy ( with Scripture playing a complex and
dramatic role ) , that has been most powerful in exercising lasting influence
on wide circles of believers and , indeed , continues to do so . 69

69 Graham , Written Word [ fn . 2 ] , 160 : " Does it really matter that our modern Western
experience of texts may not be normative ( and even be genuinely aberrant) when seen in
a larger historical perspective ? Does it matter , so long as we doff the appropriate schol¬
arly caps to the oral functions of texts in semi - literature contexts , if we continue to rely
on our standard treatment of texts ( that is as silent repositories of visual ' data ' ) as a
model for understanding texts in other ages and other places ? I believe that it does matter ,
and that it matters considerably for any adequate understanding of scripture as a major re¬
ligious datum . At the most obvious level , the dominance of oral/ aural interaction with sa¬
cred texts has been the rule rather than the exception for the vast majority of persons
and communities throughout history . A treatment of scripture that ignores or slights
this fact is historically anachronistic , culturally biased , or both . It matters also , how¬
ever , because an increased focus upon the oral dimension of scriptural texts encourages
a vivid sense of how important all of the functional aspects of scripture are to an ade¬
quate history of religion and , correlatively , how important it is to approach scripture
and other phenomena in relational rather than objectivist or reductionist terms "
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS :
IMAGINATIONS OF VIOLENCE
IN THREE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

Thomas Scheffler

I - Violent texts - violent authors ?

Do some religions promote more violent patterns of interhuman relations

than others ? There are many ways to tackle that question . One of them ,

and surely the most time - honored one ( at least among theologians and his¬

torians of ideas ) , is to consult the foundational texts of the respective reli¬

gious communities .

Based on a cross - national comparison of religious ideas , the sociologist

Paul Honigsheim ( 1885 - 1963 ) argued that pessimistic religions , i . e . , relig¬

ions conceiving of the world as irremediably evil or corrupted , tend to

refrain from aggressive violence . Optimistic religions , however , i . e . , relig¬

ions considering the world to be essentially good or improvable , would

rather be inclined to support religious warfare in order to spread the bless¬

ings of ' true ' religion . 1 In a similar vein , the Catholic theologian and

psychotherapist Eugen Drewermann draws a line between the peaceful at¬

titude of Buddhism and Taoism , on the one hand , and the aggressive cha¬

racter of " Semitic " religions ( Judaism , Christianity , Islam ) on the other .2

The Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung distinguishes between the

" hard " and the " soft " dimensions of religious " cosmologies " . 3 He , too ,

1 P . Honigsheim , art . " Krieg I . Religionsgeschichtlich " , in : Die Religion in Geschichte

und Gegenwart , 3rd . ed . [i ? GG 3] , vol . 4 , Tubingen : Mohr ( Siebeck ) , 1960 , 362 - 64 ( col .
364 ) .

2 Eugen Drewermann , Die Spirale der Angst : Der Krieg und das Christentum [ 1982 ] ,
Freiburg / Br . : Herder , 1991 , 108 - 22 , 185 - 95 , 198 - 201 , 240 - 42 .

3 Cf . Johan Galtung , " Soziale Kosmologien und das Konzept des Friedens " [ 1982 ] , in :
Den Frieden denken , ed . Dieter Senghaas , Frankfurt / M . : Suhrkamp , 1995 , 276 - 303 ;
idem , Peace by Peaceful Means : Peace and Conflict , Development and Civilization ,
London : Sage , 1996 , 211 - 22 ; idem , " Religionen , hart und sanft : wie die sanfteren As -
pekte zu starken sind " , in : ders ., Die andere Globalisierung : Perspektiven der Weltge -
sellschaft im 21 . Jahrhundert , Miinster : Agenda , 1998 , 207 - 22 .
84 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

tends to find the most promising peace - promoting virtues in Buddhism and
Taoism . 4
There is much to be said against the empirical and predictive value of
such an approach . In a quantitative stocktaking of worldwide domestic
state violence between 1900 and 1987 , Rudolph Rummel found the rate of
lethal violence per regime (measured by the number of killed persons ) not
so much related to specific religious , ethnic , social , or geographical pa¬
rameters , but to opportunities to kill unhindered by institutional restraints :
the more authoritarian or totalitarian a regime , the higher its " democidal "
killing rate . As Rummel put it , " Power kills , and absolute power kills abso¬
lutely . " 5 Modifying RummeFs approach , Matthew Krain asserts that the
actual occurrence of state - sponsored genocides and " politicides " is less re¬
lated to the absolute centralization of power as such , than to the " occur¬
rence of openings in the political opportunity structure " , most notably in
the wake of civil wars , international wars , or decolonization . 6 Following a
similar line of opportunity - oriented reasoning , Paul Collier , director of the
World Bank ' s Development Research Group , holds that " objective meas¬
ures of social grievance , such as inequality , a lack of democracy , and eth¬
nic and religious divisions , have no systematic effect " on the risk of civil
war ; the latter being rather " systematically related to a few economic con¬
ditions , such as dependence upon primary commodity exports and low na¬
tional income . " 7

4 Cf. Peter Lawler , A Question of Values : Johan Galtung 's Peace Research , Boulder ,
CO : Lynne Rienner , 1995 , 191 - 222 ; see also Johan Galtung , " Constructing a Daoist
Social Science Epistemology " , Centre for Peace Studies , University of Tromso , CPS
Working Papers , no . 1 , February 2002 . I am indebted to Raimo Vayrynen (Notre
Dame / Helsinki ) for drawing my attention to these texts .
5 R .J . Rummel , " Democracy , Power , Genocide , and Mass Murder " , Journal of Conflict
Resolution 39 ( 1995 ) 1 , 3 - 26 (p . 25 ) . Cf. idem , Death by Government, New Bruns¬
wick , NJ : Transaction Books , 1994 ; Power Kills : Democracy as a Method of Nonvio¬
lence , New Brunswick , NJ : Transaction , 1997 . See also Rummel ' s website at :
www. hawaii . edu/powerkills / welcome . html .
6 Matthew Krain , " State - Sponsored Mass Murder : The Onset and Severity of Genocides
and Politicides " , Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 ( 1997 ) 3 , 331 - 60 .
7 Paul Collier , Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy ,
World Bank Research Paper, June 15 , 2000 , p . l (www. worldbank. org/research/ con -
flict/papers /civilconflict.pdf ) . Cf. also : idem , "Doing Well out of War : An Economic Per¬
spective " , in : Greed and Grievance : Economic Agendas in Civil Wars , eds . Mats Berdal
and David M . Malone , Boulder, CO : Lynne Rienner, 2000 , 91 - 111 ; Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler , Greed and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Research Paper, October 21 ,
2001 ( www . worldbank . org/research /conflict / papers /greedgrievance _ 23oct .pdf ) .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
85

Nonetheless , at least in a monotheistic framework , religious scriptures

are a crucial symbolic anchor of collective memory and , thus , of group
identity . They are transmitted from generation to generation . They are an

important part of education and public speech , and there is a good chance

that they are more often quoted and referred to in their respective commu¬

nities than any other type of text . This does not mean that all parts of scrip¬

ture are equally important to all adherents of a given scriptural religion .

Passages included in official liturgies and ritual prayers are certainly more

frequently recited than other ones . 8 All sections , however , enjoy that par¬

ticularly prestigious aura that comes with their being part of canonized

Scripture as such : They are instruments of a sanctified ' toolbox ' , ready for

( orthodox or unorthodox ) use by adherents if historical circumstances ,

needs , and opportunities so require or permit .

What is , however , the relation between the justification of aggressive

violence in some sacred texts and the actual behavior of the people who

write , redact , or quote them ? Do violent scriptures correspond to particu¬

larly violent ' authors ' ( redactors , transmitters ) ? The more violent the scrip¬
tures , the more violent their believers ?

The answer is : not necessarily . This paper argues that scriptural imagi¬

nations of aggressive violence may also be read as a compensation for

feelings of powerlessness and despair among the people who recorded ,

compiled , or transmitted them .

II - Territorial conquest and ethno - religious cleansing

The laws of war in ancient Israel , as recorded in the book of Deuteronomy

( Dm ) , chapter 20 , distinguished between two categories of Israel 's ene¬

mies : non - Hebrew peoples who were living outside the Promised Land and

those who happened to live inside its boundaries .

As to the first category , Yahweh asks his people to offer them peace

terms ( Dtn 20 : 10 ) : If they accept and surrender , all of them shall serve Is¬

rael at forced labor ( Dtn 20 : 11 ) . If they do not submit peacefully and are

subsequently defeated , all men shall be put to the sword ( Dtn 20 : 13 )

whereas " the women , children , livestock and whatever the town contains

by way of spoil " may be taken as booty by the victors ( Dm 20 : 14 ) .

See Angelika Neuwirth , " Three Religious Feasts between Narratives of Violence and
Liturgies of Reconciliation " ( in this volume ) . Cf . also Myra Blyth , " Praise , Prayer and
Praxis : Connections between Liturgy and the Decade to Overcome Violence " , The
Ecumenical Review 53 ( 2001 ) 2 , 206 - 215 .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
86

This calibrated use of violence does not apply , however , to non -

Hebrew peoples inside the Promised Land . They are to be put under herem
- a term that has been frequently translated as " ban " , " sacralized destruc¬
tion " ( Vernichtungsweihe ) , or " curse of destruction " . 9 In the context of
Deuteronomic theology , putting a group under herem is tantamount to
complete annihilation of its personal , collective , and spiritual life .

" l6 But as regards the towns of those peoples whom Yahweh your God is
giving you as your heritage , you must not spare the life of any living
thing . l7 Instead , you must lay them under the curse of destruction : Hit-
tites , Amorites , Canaanites , Perizzites , Hivites and Jebusites , as Yahweh
your God has commanded , 18 so that they may not teach you to do all the
detestable things which they do to honour their gods ; in doing these , you
would sin against Yahweh your God " ( Dtn 20 : 16 - 18 ) .

The herem should not only include men , but also women and children ( Dtn
2 : 34 - 35 , 3 : 6 - 7 ; Joshua 8 : 26 - 29 ) , in some cases also their cattle ( Dtn 20 : 16 -

17 ; Joshua 6 : 21 ; 1 Samuel 15 : 3 , 22 : 19 ) . The symbolic traces of their exis¬

tence should not be spared either :

" 2 You must completely destroy all the places where the nations you dis¬
possess have served their gods , on high mountains , on hills , under any
spreading tree ; 3you must tear down their altars , smash their sacred
stones , burn their sacred poles , hack to bits the statues of their gods and
obliterate their name from that place " ( Dtn 12 :2 - 3 ) . 10

Taken at face value , these commandments seem to be one of the first can¬
onized instructions for ethno - religious cleansing . However , at the time the
book of Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic narrative of Israel ' s history
took shape , 11 the Children of Israel were hardly in a position to annihilate

9 On the connotations of " herem " in the Old Testament , see Susan Niditch , War in the
Hebrew Bible : A Study in the Ethics of Violence , New York : Oxford University Press ,
1993 , S . 28 - 77 ; Norbert Lohfmk , art . " haram , herasm " , in : Theologisches Worterbuch
zum Alten Testament [ ThWAT] , vol . 4 , Stuttgart : Kohlhammer , 1982 , 192 - 213 ; Peter
Welten , art . " Bann " , in : Theologische Realenzyklopadie [ TRE] , vol . 5 , Berlin : de Gruy -
ter , 1980 , 159 - 61 ; Moshe Greenberg and Haim Hermann Cohn , art . " Herem " , in : En¬
cyclopaedia Judaica , vol . 8 , Jerusalem : Keter / Macmillan , 1971 , 344 - 50 .
10 See also Dtn 7 :25 - 26 .
11 On the provenance of Deuteronomic Law ( Dtn 12 - 26 ) , see the discussion in : Eckart
Otto , art . " Deuteronomium " , Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart , 4th ed .
[ RGG 4] , vol . 2 , Tubingen : Mohr Siebeck , 1999 , 693 - 96 ; Rainer Albertz , Religions -
geschichte Israels in alttestamentlicher Zeit , vol . 1 , Gottingen : Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht , 1992 , 309 - 12 ; Frank Criisemann , Die Tora : Theologie und Sozialgeschichte
des alttestamentlichen Gesetzes , Miinchen : Chr . Kaiser , 1992 , 242 - 48 ; Norbert
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
87

other nations . Scholars believe that parts of Deuteronomy ' s nucleus , the

Book of the Law ( Dtn chs . 12 - 26 ) , may be traced back to the 8th century

B . C . , when opposition circles in Israel blamed the corruption of their kings

and the latter 's toleration of polytheism for the social erosion , political

demise , and final conquest of the northern Kingdom by Assyria ( 722

B . C . ) . When Assyria evacuated the region ( 626 - 623 B . C . ) , an elaborated

version , solemnly " discovered " in the temple of Jerusalem around 622

B . C . , became the cornerstone of the reforms effected under King Josiah of

Judah ( r . 640 - 609 B . C .) . The reforms limited the King ' s power by con¬

structing a direct link ( covenant ) between God and His People mediated by

Moses , i . e . , a legendary , pre - monarchic authority of the remote past . 12 Af¬

ter the fall of Judah ( 598 / 587 B . C . ) , the Deuteronomic Law , together with

other ancient material , was developed into a comprehensive historical

work - since Martin Noth ( 1902 - 68 ) commonly known as the " Deuter¬

onomic History " - the final redaction of which probably took place during

and after the Babylonian exile ( 598 / 587 - 539 B . C . ) . 13

All in all , the compilation and redaction of Deuteronomic History re¬

flected a period of crises , reemerging hopes , and catastrophes in which the

ancient Israelites were facing ( and finally experiencing ) the loss of two

powerful pillars of their collective identity - namely their state ( s ) and their

territory . Exposed to the dangers of unprecedented powerlessness and

creeping assimilation to neighboring communities , it was not so much the

polytheistic Canaanites as the Children of Israel themselves that had to

face the threat of annihilation .

Lohfink , art . " Deuteronomium " , in : Neues Bibel -Lexikon , vol . 1 , fasc . 3 , Zurich :
Benzinger , 1990 , 414 - 17 ; Richard E . Friedman , Who Wrote the Bible ? New York :
Harper & Row , 1987 ; Moshe Weinfeld , " The Emergence of the Deuteronomic Move¬
ment : The Historical Antecedents " , in : Das Deuteronomium : Entstehung , Gestalt und
Botschaft , ed . Norbert Lohfink , Leuven : University Press , 1985 , 76 - 98 ; idem , Deuter¬
onomy and the Deuteronomic School , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1982 .
12 Cf . Frank Criisemann , " ' Theokratie ' als ' Demokratie ' : Zur politischen Konzeption des
Deuteronomiums " , in : Anjange politischen Denkens in der Antike : Die nalwstlichen
Kulturen und die Griechen , eds . Kurt Raaflaub / Elisabeth Miiller - Luckner , Miinchen :
Oldenbourg , 1993 , 199 - 214 (pp . 207 - 9 ) ; Rainer Albertz , " Die Theologisierung des
Rechts im Alten Israel " , in : Religion und Gesellschaft : Studien zu ihrer Wech -
selbeziehung in den Kulturen des Antiken Vorderen Orients , eds . Rainer Albertz /
Susanne Otto , Miinster : Ugarit , 1997 , 115 - 32 (pp . 119 - 30 ) .
13 The " Deuteronomic History " includes the books of Deuteronomy , Joshua , Judges , 1
and 2 Samuel , 1 and 2 Kings . On the process of its redaction see : Walter Dietrich , art .
" Deuteronomistisches Geschichtswerk " , RGG4 [ fn . 11 ] , vol . 2 ( 1999 ) , 688 - 92 ; Albertz ,
Religionsgeschichte Israels [ fn . 11 ] , vol . 2 , 397 - 413 ; Wolfgang Roth , art . " Deutero¬
nomium II . Deuteronomistisches Geschichtswerk /Deuteronomistische Schule " , TRE
[ fn . 9 ] , vol . 8 ( 1981 ) , 543 - 52 .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
88

Deuteronomy and Deuteronomic History were devoted to explaining

the causes of this crisis and showing a way out . As the Deuteronomists
suggested , the fall of the two kingdoms had been provoked by Israel ' s
deviation from the covenant ( b e rit ) that God had established with Moses at
Horeb ( Dtn 5 ff .) . 14 This covenant obliged Israel to worship no god but
Yahweh and to obey His laws . Israel ' s faithfulness to the covenant would
be rewarded with prosperity and power in the Promised Land . Disobedi¬
ence , however , would be punished by all kinds of catastrophes . Reading
the fall of the two kingdoms and the Babylonian exile as a divine punish¬
ment for Israel ' s deviation from the covenant , meant transforming the dis¬
aster into a sign of God ' s jealous love , i . e . , into an implicit confirmation of
Israel ' s chosenness . This , in turn , gave reason to hope that the Children of
Israel might still have the choice to change their lot by their own efforts :
Renewed , intensified , and complete submission under the covenant would
help regain Yahweh ' s favor and restore the Davidic kingdom in its former
greatness .
At the time the Deuteronomic History took shape , the Canaanite na¬
tions that Yahweh had commanded to annihilate 15 had disappeared long
ago . Targeting them as candidates for the herem had no consequences for
the present - day relations of the Hebrews with their non - Hebrew contempo¬
raries . 16 Yet , telling and re - telling stories about the sacralized destruction
of nations that did not exist any more , had its functions : 17 On the one hand ,

14 On the connotations of " covenant " in the Old Testament , see Steven L . McKenzie ,
Covenant , St . Louis : Chalice Press , 2000 , chs . 1- 5 ; Jan Christian Gertz ; art . " Bund II .
Altes Testament " , RGG4 [ fh . 11 ] , vol . 1 ( 1998 ) , 1862 - 65 ; Robert Davidson , " Covenant
Ideology in Ancient Israel " , in : The World of Ancient Israel , ed . R .E . Clements , Cam¬
bridge : Cambridge University Press , 1989 , 323 - 47 ; Moshe Weinfeld , art . " b erit " ,
ThWAT [ fh . 9 ] , vol . 1 ( 1973 ) , 781 - 808 .
15 Deuteronomy mentions seven nations : the Hittites , Amorites , Canaanites , Perizzites ,
Hivites , Jebusites ( Dtn 7 : 1 , 20 : 17 ) , and Girgashites ( Dtn 7 : 1) . In Exodus 17 : 14 and
Dtn 25 : 19 , Yahweh also commands to wipe out the memory of Amalek under heaven .
16 In medieval Judaism , the Deuteronomic herem sections were even used to emphasize
the rather peaceful nature of Judaism : Since the Seven Nations and Amalek didn ' t exist
anymore , Maimonides ( 1135 - 1204 ) considered the case of the herem - v/ ais historically
closed . Cf . Daniel L . Smith - Christopher , ' " That was then . . . ' : Debating Nonviolence
within the Textual Traditions of Judaism , Christianity , and Islam " , in : Ethics in the
World Religions , eds . Joseph Runzo and Nancy M . Martin , Oxford : Oneworld , 2001 ,
251 - 69 ( p . 262 ) . - For other rabbinical perspectives , see Michael Walzer , " War and
Peace in the Jewish Tradition " , in : Terry Nardin , The Ethics of War and Peace : Reli¬
gious and Secular Perspectives , Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 95 - 114 (pp .
105 , 106 - 7 ) ; Aviezer Ravitzky , " Prohibited Wars in the Jewish Tradition " , ibid . , 115 -
27 (pp . 116 - 8 ) .
17 For the following , see Lohfink , " haram , herasm" [ fh . 9 ] , 211 - 12 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
89

it glorified Israel ' s military past and the power of Yahweh . On the other

hand , it helped convey the message that Israel 's only chance to regain

Yahweh ' s favor was complete extermination of polytheism in Israel . Ob¬

viously , or so it seemed , previous generations , oblivious of their covenan -

tal duties , had failed to destroy all seeds of polytheism in the Promised

Land . As a result , their descendants had remained exposed to the lure of

their neighbors ' fertility cults .

In view of this tension between covenantal duties and polytheist temp¬

tations , the wish to annihilate polytheist women made sense . Ever since the

Serpent seduced Eve , women were suspected of being gateways of disrup¬

tive ' alien ' ideas that might erode the foundations of patriarchal order . The

Deuteronomists did not fail to attribute - at least in part - the spread of

polytheism , crime , and corruption among the Children of Israel to the

negative influence of seductive women , most notably the foreign wives of

King Solomon and the Baal - worshipping Lebanese princess Jezebel , wife

of Israel ' s King Ahab . 18 Under the Mosaic covenant , intermarriage with

polytheist women , hence , was seen as a deadly menace and strictly forbid¬

den ( Dtn 7 : 3 - 4 ) . Even exchange of visits and sexual intercourse seemed to

be an intolerable security risk : In Numbers 25 : 12 , Yahweh rewards Phine -

has , grandson of Aaron the Priest , and his descendants with a covenant of

perpetual priesthood for having followed an Israelite man and a Midianite

woman into their tent and piercing the two of them with his spear through

the belly ( Numbers 25 : 1 - 16 ) .

The real addressees of the / zerem - narrative , thus , were the Children of
Israel themselves . It is no accident that one of the most merciless com¬

mands to apply the herem targeted Israelite towns that seemed infected by

( or too tolerant of ) polytheism :

you hear that in one of the towns which Yahweh your God has given
" 13If
you for a home , 14there are men , scoundrels from your own stock , who
have led their fellow - citizens astray . . . 15it is your duty to look into the
matter , . . . . If it is proved and confirmed that such a hateful thing has
taken place among you , 16you must put the inhabitants of that town to the
sword ; you must lay it under the curse of destruction - the town and eve¬
rything in it . 17You must pile up all its loot in the public square and burn
the town and all its loot , offering it all to Yahweh your God . It is to be a
ruin for all time , and never rebuilt . 18From what is thus put under the
curse of destruction you must keep nothing back , so that Yahweh may
turn from the ferocity of his anger and show you mercy , and have pity on

18 Cf. 1 Kings 11 : 1- 13 , 16 :31 - 33 , 21 :3 - 16 ; 2 Kings 9 :7 - 10 , 30 - 37 .

 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
90

you and increase your numbers , as he swore he would to your ancestors "
( Dtn 13 : 13 - 18 ) .

Although its external target - the Seven Nations and Amalek - were no

longer around , the herein discourse , thus , remained a means to foster in¬

ternal unity and discipline . The readiness to wipe out internal deviators re¬

flected the hope that Israel , by means of uncompromising self - purification

and unwavering loyalty to the covenant , might finally regain Yahweh ' s fa¬
vor .

Postexilic Jewish scriptures indicate that the plausibility of this simple

" do ut des " expectation became less and less evident . Despite all reforms

and ardent prayers , foreign rule continued . The Assyrians were followed

by the Babylonians , the Babylonians by the Medians , the Medians by the

Persians , the Persians by the Greeks , and the Greeks by the Romans . With

one dynasty of foreign oppressors waning only to be replaced by another ,

more powerful , one , hopes for Israel ' s liberation were time and again frus¬

trated , and pessimistic worldviews were on the rise . The disquieting ques¬

tion why the righteous and innocent are unjustly suffering is at the core of

the book of Job ... and finds no intellectually satisfying answer there :

Job ' s case is ' settled ' by a unilateral statement of God ' s absolute and in¬

scrutable power . From a different angle , the book of Ecclesiastes , in its

wisdom - inspired insights into the futility of all human undertakings , deals

with the same situation . For desperate people in search for certainty , the

detached skepticism of intellectual wisdom circles was probably difficult

to sustain . But even among them there was an increasing awareness that
human efforts - be it violent rebellion , meticulous observance of covenan -

tal laws , or lavish sacrifices in the temple - were not sufficient to bring
about Israel ' s liberation .

Ill - Universal love and universal destruction

" Your kingdom come . Your will be

done , on earth as it is in heaven ."

( Matthew 6 : 10 )

In contrast to the Hebrew Bible , the foundational texts of Christianity are

famous for their ethics of universal love and non - violence . In the common

understanding , the ethics of Christianity is epitomized in peaceful sayings ,

 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
91

such as " You must love your neighbor as yourself ' 19 , " Love your enemies ,

do good to those who hate you " ( Luke 6 : 27 - 36 ; Matthew 5 : 43 - 48 ; cf . Ro¬

mans 12 : 20 ) , " Bless those who persecute you " ( Romans 12 : 14 ) , " Offer no

resistance to the wicked " ( Matthew 5 : 39 ) , " To the man who slaps you on

one cheek , present the other cheek too " ( Luke 6 : 29 , Matthew 5 : 39 ) ,

" Never try to get revenge " ( Romans 12 : 19 ) , " all who draw the sword will

die by the sword " ( Matthew 26 : 52 ) , " Everyone is to obey the governing

authorities " ( Romans 13 : 1 - 7 ; cf . Titus 3 : 1 ; 1 Peter 2 : 13 - 14 ) , " Pay Caesar

what belongs to Caesar - and God what belongs to God " ( Matthew 22 : 21 ;

Mark 12 : 17 ; Luke 20 : 25 ) , " Slaves , obey your earthly masters with fear and

trembling , in singleness of heart , as you obey Christ " 20 , " Wives , in the

same way , accept the authority of your husbands " ( 1 Peter 3 : 1 ; cf . Colos -

sians 3 : 18 ) , " Children , obey your parents in the Lord , for this is right "

( Ephesians 6 : 1 ; Colossians 3 : 20 ) , " My kingdom is not of this world " ( John

18 : 36 ) ; " our commonwealth [politeuma ] is in heaven " ( Philippians 3 : 20 ) ,

et cetera .

This image of universal love and non - violence is , however , somehow

relativized by the fact that the last book of the New Testament , namely the

Revelation ( Apocalypse ) to John , indulges in visions of utmost violence

that even surpass the horrors of the Deuteronomic herem . The Apocalypse

is about nothing less than the violent end of the world - or , more precisely ,

the destruction of large parts of the world , visualized as an inferno of hail ,

fire , smoke and sulphur , famine , plagues , monsters , earthquakes , and fal¬

ling stars ( Revelation , chs . 6 - 11 , 16 , 18 , 21 : 1 ) . In contrast to the Deuter¬

onomic herem , the destruction described in the book of Revelation is a

total and universal one , but it is brought about not by humans but by heav¬

enly powers . In the vision of John , the select few who will be saved -

namely the people of God - are rather jubilant bystanders .

At a closer look , the aggressive mindset displayed in the book of Reve¬

lation is no exception in the New Testament . In fact , large parts of early

Christianity expected the End of this world to be imminent 21 and assumed

that it would not be a smooth , but a violent one ( Matthew 24 : 6 - 8 , 29 , 37 - 41 ;

Mark 13 : 7 - 27 ; 2 Peter 3 : 10 ) . Time and again , the spirit of universal love

and unconditional forgiveness was accompanied by imaginations of re¬

venge and punishment :

19 Mark 12 :31 ; Matthew 22 :39 , Luke 10 :27 - 28 , Romans 13 :9 , Galatians 5 : 14 ; see also
Romans 12 : 10 ; James 2 :8 ; 1 Peter 3 : 8 - 12 .
20 Ephesians 6 :5 - 8 ; see also 1 Peter 2 : 18 - 23 , Colossians 3 :22 - 25 ; 1 Timothy 6 : 1- 2 ; Titus
2 :9 - 10 .

21 Matthew 10 :23 , 16 :28 , 24 :34 ; Mark 9 : 1 , 13 :30 ; Luke 9 :27 . See also : Romans 13 : 12 ,
Philippians 4 : 5 ; James 5 :8 , 1 John 2 : 18 ; 1 Peter 4 :7 ; Revelation 1 : 1 - 3 , 22 : 10 - 20 .
92 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

" 16Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved ; whoever does not be¬
lieve will be condemned " ( Mark 16 : 16 ) . " 49 So it will be at the end of the
age . The angels will come out and separate the evil from the righteous
50 and throw them into the furnace of fire , where there will be weeping
and gnashing of teeth " ( Matthew 13 : 49 - 50 ) . " It is easier for a camel to
pass through the eye of a needle than for someone rich to enter the king¬
dom of God " ( Mark 10 :25 ) . " 24 But alas for you who are rich : you are
having your consolation now . 25 Alas for you who have plenty to eat now :
you shall go hungry . Alas for you who are laughing now : you shall
mourn and weep " ( Luke 6 : 24 - 25 ) . " Well now , you rich ! Lament , weep
for the miseries that are coming to you " ( James 5 : 1 ) . " Woe to you , schol¬
ars of the law ! You have taken away the key of knowledge " ( Luke
11 : 52 ) . " [ EJveryone who exalts himself will be humbled , and he who
humbles himself will be exalted " ( Luke 14 : 11 ) . 22

Sometimes the desire to punish the wicked is present in the very passages
that urge non - violent and peaceful conduct in this world :
Romans 12 : 19 - " Vengeance is mine , I will repay , says the Lord " -
may be read as a genuine plea for non - violence . It is , however , also an in -
tertextual reference to Deuteronomy 32 : 35 , 41 , which leaves no doubt that
the Lord ' s vengeance will be an extremely violent one ( Dtn 32 : 21 - 25 , 41 -
43 ) . Romans 12 : 20 - " if your enemy is hungry , feed him ; if he is thirsty ,
give him something to drink " - may be read as a command to love one ' s
enemy . Together with the following clause - " for by so doing you will
heap burning coals upon his head " - it is , however , an allusion to Proverbs
25 : 21 - 22 , which makes it rather an act of shaming the enemy or delivering
him to divine justice . 23
In the apocalyptic framework , thus , the crisis of Deuteronomic cove¬
nant theology was solved in an ambivalent way : Innerworldly conduct was
supposed to follow the Christ ' s example of unconditional , even self-
sacrificial love and forgiveness . In the next world , however , the God of
punishment and reward still reigned supreme . Even in this world , the
command to love one ' s enemies seemed sometimes eclipsed by the glee to
see them , later on , gruesomely punished . Tertullian ( 160 - 220 ) , for in¬
stance , was eagerly longing for :

22 Cf. Matthew 11 :20 - 24 , 13 :49 - 50 , 25 :41 - 46 ; Luke 10 : 10 - 16 , 11 :49 - 52 , 14 : 11 , 13 :3 - 5 ;

James 5 : 1- 6 ; 2 Peter 3 : 7 . See also : Marius Reiser , Jesus and Judgment : The Eschato -
logical Proclamation in Its Jewish Context [ 1990 ] , Minneapolis : Fortress Press , 1997 .
23 Cf . T .R . Hobbs , A Time for War : A Study of Warfare in the Old Testament , Wilming¬
ton , Del . : Michael Glazier , 1989 ( = Old Testament Studies ; 3 ) , 232 . For the image of
burning coals cf. also Psalm 140 : 10 , 11 :6 ; Ezekiel 10 :2 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS 93

. that day of the Last Judgment . . . when the hoary age of the world
" ..
and all its generations will be consumed in one fire . What a panorama of
spectacle that day ! Which sight shall excite my wonder ? Which , my
laughter ? Where shall I rejoice , where exult - as I see so many and so
mighty kings . . . groaning in the depths of darkness ? Governors of prov¬
inces , too , who persecuted the name of the Lord , melting in flames fiercer
than those they themselves kindled in their rage against the Christians
braving them with contempt ? . . . Those wise philosophers blushing before
their followers as they burn together ( . . . ) ? The poets also , trembling , not
before the judgment seat of Rhadamanthus or of Minos , but of Christ
whom they did not expect to meet ? Then will the tragic actors be worth
hearing , more vocal in their own catastrophe ; then the comic actors will
be worth watching , much lither of limb in the fire ( . . . ) . What praetor or
consul or quaestor or priest with all his munificence will ever bestow on
you the favor of beholding and exulting in such sights ? Yet , such scenes
as these are already ours by faith in the vision of the spirit . " 24

In view of the terrible torments to be expected during the End Times , hu¬
mans seemed well advised to make sure they were on the right side already
now . Although the Final Battle between Good and Evil was fought by
cosmic powers , humans were not supposed to remain indifferent or pas¬
sive . On the contrary , the followers of the Christ were expected to partici¬
pate in an innerworldly war for the souls of mankind , and to make the ,
sometimes painful , decisions necessary for successful spiritual warfare :

" 34 Do not think that I have come to bring peace to earth ; I have not come
to bring peace , but a sword . 35 For I have come to set a man against his fa¬
ther , and a daughter against her mother , and a daughter - in - law against her
mother- in ; 36 and one ' s foes will be the members of one ' s own
- law

household " ( Matthew 10 : 34 - 36 ) . " If anyone comes to Me and does not

hate his father and mother , wife and children , brothers and sisters , yes ,
and his own life also , he cannot be My disciple " ( Luke 14 :26 ) . " 36If you
have no sword , sell your cloak and buy one , " because I tell you these
words of scripture are destined to be fulfilled in me : He was counted as
one of the rebellious " ( Luke 22 : 36 - 37 ) . 25

The language of the New Testament is interspersed with military meta¬

phors stylizing the followers of Jesus as spiritual warriors against the de¬
monic powers of Evil :

24 Tertullian , " Spectacles " [De spectaculis ] , ch . 30 :2 - 5 .7 , tr . R . Arbesmann , in : Tertul -

lian , Disciplinary , Moral and Ascetical Works , New York : Church Fathers , 1959
( = The Fathers of the Church . A New Translation , vol . 40 ) , 47 - 107 ( pp . 105 - 07 ) .

25 See also Matthew 10 :35 - 37 , 12 :48 - 50 , Luke 9 : 59 - 62 .

 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
94

" " Put on the full armor of God so as to be able to resist the devil ' s tac¬

tics . l2 For it is not against human enemies that we have to struggle , but
against the principalities and the ruling forces who are masters of the
darkness in this world , the spirits of evil in the heavens . 13That is why you
must take up all God ' s armor , or you will not be able to put up any resis¬
tance on the evil day , or stand your ground even though you exert your¬
selves to the full . I4 So stand your ground , with truth a belt round your
waist , and uprightness a breastplate , ' ^wearing for shoes on your feet the
eagerness to spread the gospel of peace 16and always carrying the shield
of faith so that you can use it to quench the burning arrows of the Evil
One . l7 And then you must take salvation as your helmet and the sword of
the Spirit , that is , the word of God . " ( Ephesians 6 : 11 - 17 ) 26

Origen ( 185 - 254 ) depicted the apostles Paul and Peter as Christian heroes

" who fought so much , who conquered so many barbaric peoples , laid low
so many enemies , won so much spoil , celebrated so many triumphs , who
return with bloody hands from the massacre of the enemy , whose feet are
bathed in blood and whose hands are washed in the blood of sinners ; for

they have defeated and killed whole battalions of the most diverse de¬
mons ; for if they had not defeated them , they could not have captured
prisoners , namely the whole company of those who now believe in
Christ . The one who snatches men away from the domination of the
demons , of him it can be said that he has won a bloody victory over the
demons ." 27

The combination of love and spiritual warfare was to work miracles for the

expansion of early Christianity : It helped mobilize intense friend - foe dis¬

tinctions as powerful resources of community - building without provoking

an all - out clash with the ruling authorities . Preaching love , reconciliation ,

and political quietism as virtues of innerwordly life helped keep out of

many dangerous conflicts , thus greatly facilitating Christianity ' s survival

26 Cf . also Romans 6 : 13 , 13 : 12 ; 2 Corinthians 10 :3 - 6 ; Philippians 2 :25 ; 1 Timothy 1 : 18 ;

2 Timothy 2 : 3 - 4 ; Philemon 2 . - For a discussion of martial metaphors in the New
Testament , see Adolf von Harnack , Militia Christi : The Christian Religion and the
Military in the First Three Centuries [ 1905 ] , tr . David Mclnnes Gracie , Philadelphia :
Fortress Press , 1981 ; Georg Baudler , Toten oder Lieben : Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit
in Religion und Christentum , Miinchen : Kosel , 1994 , 345 - 55 ; Raymond Hobbs , " The
Language of Warfare in the New Testament " , in : Modelling Early Christianity : So¬
cial -Scientific Studies of the New Testament in its Context , ed . Philip F . Esler , London
and New York : Routledge , 1995 , 259 - 73 .
27 Origen , Homiliae in Numeros , homilia 25 t . 10 , 310 ff . , as quoted in Harnack , Militia
Christi [ fh . 26 ] , 50 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
95

and demographic growth in the Roman Empire . 28 Shifting the theater of

warfare to the realm of spiritual warfare against " demonic " and " satanic "
powers was an attractive option for people who shied away from the risks
of violent rebellion against the Roman authorities ; but it also resonated
well with the ' heroic ' pathos of Mediterranean ' honor - shame societies ' in
general and Roman military culture in particular . 29 In contrast to the ago¬
nistic warrior ethos of Greek and Roman culture , however , it supported the
u nh indered build - up and long - term preservation of absolute friend - foe dis¬

tinctions that remained immune to the daily to - and - fro of earthly power
politics and its little , all - too human compromises and friendships across
the line . The spiritualization of aggressive emotions , thus , helped to live in
peace with a reality one wished to destroy ; but it also prepared the poten¬
tial for turning one ' s hostility not only against ' evil ' thoughts and desires ,
but also against the men and women who seemed to embody them . In fact ,
the New Testament refers to several cases in which the sudden death or ill¬
ness of deviant church members was thought to be a divine punishment for
sinful acts and thoughts . 30
In retrospect , apocalyptic thought turned out to be one of the most suc¬
cessful devices to reframe religious and political thinking in world his¬
tory . 31 In postexilic Judaism it reflected the frustration of people who had
lost their political independence to overarching , imperialist power constel¬
lations beyond their control and seemed no longer able to improve their lot
by their own efforts , i . e . , by collective , autonomous , politico - religious ac¬
tion in a given territory . The supersession of telluric , autonomous petty

28 Rodney Stark , The Rise of Christianity : How the Obscure , Marginal Jesus Movement
Became the Dominant Religious Force in the Western World in a Few Centuries
[ 1996 ] , San Francisco : Harper , 1997 , esp . chs . 2 and 4 .

29 Cf . David Mclnnes Gracie , " Translators Introduction " , in : Harnack , Militia Christi , 9 -
22 (pp . 19 - 20 ) . - For some parallels between the Christian Jesus - narrative and classical
Greco - Roman hero - mythology , see Gregory J . Riley , One Jesus , Many Christs : How
Jesus Inspired not One True Christianity But Many [ 1997 ] , Minneapolis : Fortress
Press , 2000 .
30 Cf . Acts 5 : 1 - 11 ( fraud of Ananias and Sapphira ) ; 1 Corinthians 11 :27 - 32 ( weakness ,
illness , and death of Corinthian community members for participating in the Lord ' s
Supper without recognizing the Lord ' s body ) .
31 For a recent general stocktaking of the development and historical ramifications of
apocalyptic thought , see The Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism , eds . John J . Collins ,
Bernard McGinn , Stephen J . Stein , 3 vols . , New York : Continuum , 1998 . See also : art .
" Apokalyptik / Apokalypsen " , pt . I - VII , in : TRE [ fh . 9 ] , vol . 3 , Berlin : de Gruyter ,
1978 , 189 - 289 ; Hans G . Kippenberg , art . " Apokalyptik / Messianismus / Chiliasmus " ,
in : Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe , vol . 2 , Stuttgart : Kohlham-
mer , 1990 , 9 - 26 .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
96

kingdoms and city - states by the swiftly changing , unfathomable , and

sometimes devastating dynamics of superpower rivalries was not only a
propitious ambience for developing concepts of world history , world cri¬
ses , and universal ' solutions ' ; 32 it also gave reason to believe that God had
temporarily detached himself from history , leaving ample space for the ex¬
pansion of evil in this world 33 .
Under Deuteronomic theology , political defeats , plagues , and natural
catastrophes had been read as signs of divine punishment , i . e . , as conse¬
quences of one ' s own misconduct , calling for repentance , atonement , and
renewed faithfulness to the covenant . Continuing calamities only testified
to the enormous weight of one ' s own sins . In apocalyptic thought , how¬
ever , today ' s tribulations were reframed as birth pains of the End Times
and , hence , as harbingers of final and complete salvation .

" [ AJpocalyptic thought provided a way of hoping against hope , of retain¬

ing one s faith in the face of apparently overwhelming events , and of
'
avoiding the perhaps obvious conclusion that one might have drawn from
such events , namely , that God was not on one ' s side after all . Apocalyptic
thought did not permit one to deny the events of history , but it did provide
a means to deny the apparent significance and implications of those
events . " 34

It of course , important to emphasize the difference between authors , lit¬

is ,
erary genres , and social audiences of apocalyptic thought . Many scholars
believe that Jewish apocalyptic literature was mainly authored by scribes
and priests . 35 The numerous apocalyptic works that emerged during the

32 Both Hesiod ' s myth of the world ages ( ca . 700 B .C . ) and the Book of Daniel ' s four-
empires prophecy ( 2nd century B . C .) may be traced back to Aramaic , pre - Iranian ,
prophecies that originated in the 8th century B . C . as a reaction to Assyria ' s military
expansion in Syria , Anatolia , and Mesopotamia . Cf . Walter Burkert , " Apokalyptik im
friihen Griechentum : Impulse und Transformationen " , in : Apocalypticism in the Medi¬
terranean World, ed . D . Hellholm [ fn . 36 ] , 235 - 54 ( pp . 244 - 51 ) .
33 Cf . Jiirgen Lebram , art . " Apokalyptik / Apokalypsen II . Altes Testament " , TRE , vol . 3
[ fn . 31 ] , 192 - 202 (p . 196 ) : " Der Zentralgedanke der Apokalyptik ist die Verkiindigung
einer zum mindesten vorubergehenden Distanzierung Gottes von der Geschichte , die
eine freie Entfaltung des Bosen zulafit . "
34 Fred M . Donner , " The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War " , in : Just War and Ji¬
had , eds . John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson , New York : Greenwood Press , 1991 ,
31 - 69 (p . 45 ) .

35 Cf . Jonathan Z . Smith , " Wisdom and Apocalyptic " , in : Religious Syncretism in Antiq¬
uity : Essays in Conversation with Geo Widengren , ed . Birger A . Pearson , Missoula ,
Mont . : Scholars Press , 1975 , 131 - 56 ; Michael Stone , Scriptures , Sects and Visions : A
Profile of Judaism from Ezra to the Jewish Revolts , Oxford : Blackwell , 1980 ; Philip R .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS 97

Greco - Roman period 36 used widespread elements of oriental and Greek

elite literature , such as Babylonian manticism , the savior propaganda of

Persian kings , and astrological speculations about the cycles of cosmic

world ages . Its social appeal , however , was much broader . As Bruce Lin¬

coln put it , " one can understand apocalypticism as a religious style that

gives voice to the interests and latent consciousness of the dispossessed

and defensive " , such as " sectors of society that have lost power , prestige ,

wealth , confidence , and / or security within their historic memory , or who

feel acutely threatened by such loss in the present . As examples , one could

point to displaced elites , marginal intellectuals , those deprived of patrons ,

peoples in exile , and classes threatened with structural obsolescence . " 37

Lincoln ' s definition is flexible enough to include a broad range of dif¬

ferent apocalypticisms . Visions of a world turned upside down surely had

a special appeal to the ' Wretched of the Earth ' . 38 It would be mistaken ,

however , to assume that socially depraved pariahs were ( or are ) the only

adherents of apocalyptic or millenarian visions . One does not need to be

poor and oppressed in order to feel frustrated , humiliated , alienated , dis¬

criminated , disinherited , persecuted , excluded , or marginalized . The idea

that world history follows a predetermined schedule that cannot be altered

by independent , rebellious , human action is compatible with conservative

and elitist worldviews , too . " Appeal to esoteric knowledge , heavenly reve¬

lation and the use of myth are all equally , if not more , characteristic of the

methods by which ruling cliques justify their status and exercise ideological

control . " 39 And in ideological warfare , the idea of an ongoing final

Davies , " The Social World of Apocalyptic Writings " , in : The World of Ancient Israel ,
ed . R .E . Clements , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1989 , 251 - 71 ; Lester L.
Grabbe , " The Social Setting of Early Jewish Apocalypticism " , Journal for the Study of
the Pseudepigrapha 4 ( 1989 ) , 27 - 47 ; Albertz , Religionsgeschichte Israels [fh . 11 ] , vol .
2 , 636 - 37 ; Stephen L . Cook , Prophecy & Apocalypticism : The Postexilic Social Set¬
ting , Minneapolis : Fortress Press , 1995 .

36 For an overview , see David Hellholm , ed . , Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World

and the Near East : Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Apocalypticism ,
Uppsala , August 12 - 17 , 1979 [ 1983 ] , 2nd . ed . , Tubingen : Mohr ( Siebeck ) 1989 .

37 Bruce Lincoln , " Apocalyptic Temporality and Politics in the Ancient World " , in : The
Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism [ fh . 31 ] , vol . 1 , 457 - 75 ( p . 468 ) .

38 See , for instance , Norman Cohn , The Pursuit of the Millenium , London : Seeker &
Warburg , 1957 ; Vittorio Lanternari , The Religions of the Oppressed : A Study of Mod¬
ern Messianic Cults [ 1960 ] , tr . L . Sergio , London : MacGibbon & Kee , 1963 ; Wilhelm
E . Miihlmann et al . , Chiliasmus und Nativismus : Studien zur Psychologie , Soziologie
und historischen Kasuistik der Umsturzbewegungen , Berlin : Dietrich Reimer , 1961 ,
pp . 335 - 55 , 359 - 71 .

39 Davies , " Social World of Apocalyptic Writings " [ fn . 35 ] , 258 .

98 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

battle between the powers of Good and Evil in which one ' s opponent ap¬
pear in the role of the Evil One , be it the " Antichrist " , the " Great Satan " ,
or the " Evil Empire " , has served both rebels and rulers time and again to
mobilize their followers .

IV — Hegemonic violence and divine law

" So do not lose heart or be grieved ,

for you will surely prevail if you are
believers " ( Qur ' an 3 : 139 ) .

In contrast to Judaism and Christianity , Islam ' s basic theological approach

to interhuman violence originated under conditions of a rising , victorious
and successful political power that - instead of dreaming of violence - had
to use and , hence , to regulate and restrict it in everyday life . Instead of in¬
dulging in frustrated fantasies about the extermination of the wicked or the
destruction of a sinful world , the early Islamic conquerors had to develop a
calibrated , thisworldly approach to dealing with unbelievers .
Sure , images of a cataclysmic end of the world - " when the earth is
pounded to powder " ( Qur ' an 89 : 21 ) and " the sky will be like molten brass "
( 70 : 8 ) , " when the sun is folded up " ( 81 : 1 ) and " the mountains will be like

carded wool " ( 101 : 5 ; cf . 70 : 9 ) - play a prominent role in Qur ' anic escha -
tology , especially in the early surahs revealed during Muhammad ' s Mec -
can period ( ca . 610 - 622 ) . 40 In a situation of political powerlessness and
increasing persecution , vivid descriptions of otherworldly punishments and
rewards were among the few educational means left to the Prophet to make
his skeptical compatriots follow the right path . After his hijrah to
Yathrib /Medina ( 1 / 622 ) , however , the persuasive power of his call was
soon to be strengthened by innerwordly proofs , namely , his astounding
military victories , often scored against enemies far superior in numbers ,
wealth , and experience . In terms of ' normal ' common sense , the most con¬
vincing proof for the truth of a religion is always the most improbable , i . e . ,
miraculous , one : Who would have expected that a small group of Meccan
emigres would succeed in conquering the powerful city - state of Mecca and
large parts of the Arabian peninsula in barely ten years ? But precisely this
had happened . Who would have expected that after the Prophet ' s death , as
faction - ridden and volatile a people as the Arabs would remain united and

40 See , for instance , Qur 'an 52 :9 - 11 ; 56 :4 - 6 ; 69 : 14 ; 70 : 8 - 9 ; 73 : 14 ; 78 :20 ; 81 : 1- 14 ; 82 : 1-

5 ; 84 : 1- 5 ; 89 :21 - 23 ; 101 : 1- 5 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS 99

succeed in overrunning the two superpowers of their time , East Rome and

Persia , conquering in less than hundred years an empire the size of which

surpassed the empires of Alexander the Great and Rome ? But precisely
this had been the course of events .

Blessed with miraculous victories , rapid conquests , and plenty of

booty , the early Muslims had every reason to see this world in a much

more optimistic way than postexilic Judaism and early Christianity had

done . Sure , the Qur ' an leaves no doubt that the rewards for the believers in

the Hereafter will surpass everything that can be expected on earth ( Qur ' an

3 : 157 ; 8 : 28 ; 9 : 21 - 22 , 24 , 38 , 72 , 111 ; 20 : 131 ; 40 : 39 ; 57 : 20 ; 61 : 12 ; 93 :4 ) and

that the believers should , above all , prepare their balance sheet for the Last

Judgment . Nevertheless , the rapid rise of the ummah and the stunning

downfall of its mighty opponents seemed to prove that God wanted His

party to prevail on earth .

No doubt , this world would end one day , but the Qur ' an confirms that

it is unknown to man whether " the Hour " is near or far ( 7 : 187 ; 21 : 109 ;

67 : 25 - 26 ) and that a day in the sight of the Lord is like thousand years

( 32 : 5 ) or even 50 , 000 years ( 70 : 4 ) . Moreover , this world would end be¬

cause God , right from the beginning , had created it only for a limited time

( 46 : 3 ; 30 : 8 ) - and not because of having been essentially evil or out of di¬

vine control . Islam does not subscribe to a doctrine of " original sin " . This

world is a good one : It is created and maintained by God and without any

flaw ( 67 : 3 - 4 ) . God is ceaselessly active in his creation . No slumber can

seize Him nor sleep ( 2 : 255 ) . He is omnipotent , omnipresent , and omnis¬

cient . He is cognizant of all that men do ( 4 : 135 ; 49 : 16 , 58 : 7 ) . Not a leaf is

falling without his knowledge ( 6 : 59 ) . Nothing can happen to man except

what God has decreed ( 3 : 145 ; 9 : 51 , 57 : 22 ; 64 : 11 ) . He grants wisdom and

guidance to whom He pleases ( 2 : 269 , 272 ; 49 : 17 ) . If some individuals or

nations turn out to be faithless and unrepentant sinners , it is them who will

be punished or replaced , not the world as a whole . Time and again the

Qur ' an reiterates the principle that no bearer of burdens shall bear the bur¬

den of another ( 6 : 164 ; 17 : 15 ; 35 : 18 ; 39 : 7 ; 53 : 38 ) , emphasizing that people

will be held accountable only for their own sins , not for the sins of others

( 2 : 286 ; 24 : 11 ) .

Qur ' anic eschatology , thus , is not about destroying an irremediably sin¬

ful and unjust world , but about working to bring humankind in tune with

its divine order . God created men only to worship and serve Him ( Qur ' an

51 : 56 ) . He is reminding them of their duty via prophets , messengers ,

warners , and bringers of glad tidings , sent to the nations of the world to
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
100

explain the signs of God ' s power and reveal His holy Law . 41 Those who
reject His message will be chastised , destroyed , or replaced by other , bet¬
ter , peoples in this world 42 and may expect severe punishment in the next
world as well ( 2 : 217 ; 3 : 56 , 5 : 33 ; 9 : 69 - 70 ; 79 : 25 ) . - Those who obey , how¬
ever , will be rewarded in this world and the Hereafter ( 3 : 148 ; 40 : 51 ;
61 : 12 - 13 ) . God will help those who help His cause ( 22 : 40 ; 47 : 7 ) . He will
grant them victory ( 5 : 56 ; 61 : 14 ) . They shall inherit the earth ( 21 : 105 ) and
will be made rulers on earth ( 24 : 55 ) . They will be made superior until the
Day of Resurrection ( 3 : 55 ) .
With its strong emphasis on earthly punishments and rewards , this was
in many respects a powerful and optimistic restatement of Deuteronomic
covenantal theology in an universalist eschatological framework . In view
of their astounding victories , the early Muslim conquerors had every rea¬
son to believe that it was them who were God ' s Chosen People , destined to
establish , with God ' s help , order on earth . " Of all the communities raised
among men you are the best , enjoining the good , forbidding the wrong ,
and believing in God " ( Qur ' an 3 : 110 ) . Could they be blamed for consider¬
ing their success as God ' s reward for their devotion to the divine cove¬
nant 43 that other people before them , most notably the Jews and Christians ,
had rejected , broken , or distorted ?

"Islam could claim to have outmoded Judaism by the sheer fact of its tri¬
umph : as Freud cynically put it , ' Allah showed himself far more grateful
to his chosen people than Yahweh did to his ' ( . . . ) . And in respect of
Christianity , it was assumed that the absorption of the great patriarchal
cities of Antioch , Alexandria and others could never have been allowed
by a God who did not regard Christianity as obsolete . . . . Most impres¬
sively of all , Islam now presided over Jerusalem itself . . . Muslims could
claim the Dome of the Rock , built on the site of Solomon ' s monumental
sanctuary , as the Third Temple , the ' house of prayer for all nations '
prophesied by Mark . Whereas Mecca demonstrates Islam ' s restoration of

41 See , e .g . , Qur ' an 2 : 213 , 3 : 144 ; 4 :79 ; 6 :42 ,48 ; 10 :47 ; 16 :36 ; 21 : 107 ; 40 :78 , 57 :25 - 27 ;
71 : 1- 28 ; 73 : 15 ; 79 : 15 - 26 ; 87 : 18 - 19 .
42 On the thisworldly punishment of disobedient peoples ( most notably the people of
Noah , ' Ad , Thamud , Abraham , Lot , Madyan , Pharaoh , and Moses ) , see , e . g . , Qur ' an
5 : 54 ; 7 :59 - 186 ; 9 :39 , 69 - 70 ; 13 :34 ; 17 :5 - 8 , 16 - 17 ; 22 :42 - 45 ,48 ; 29 :31 - 40 ; 30 : 9 ; 40 :21 -
22 , 82 - 85 ; 41 : 13 - 18 ; 47 : 8 - 11 ; 50 : 12 - 14 , 36 ; 51 :32 - 46 , 59 ; 53 : 50 - 53 ; 54 :9 - 42 , 51 ; 61 : 14 ;
64 :5 - 6 ; 65 :8 - 9 ; 67 : 16 - 18 ; 69 :4 - 12 ; 71 :25 ; 73 : 16 ; 79 :25 - 26 ; 89 :6 - 14 ; 91 : 11 - 14 .

43 On the concept of " covenant " ( mithaq , 'ahd) in the Qur ' an , see Gerhard Bowering ,
" Covenant " , in : Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an [EQ ] , vol . 1 , Leiden : Brill , 2001 , 464 - 67 ;
C .E . Bosworth , art . " MIthak " [ 1991 ] , in : The Encyclopaedia of Islam . New Edition
[EI 2] , vol . 7 , Leiden : Brill , 1993 , 187 - 88 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
101

the Abrahamic narrative , Jerusalem appears as the sign of Islam ' s

affirmation of the Mosaic subplot within it and its incorporation within its
ambitious claim to embrace the entire world . " 44

Islam ' s universalist approach is most prominently epitomized in the com¬

mand to strive in the path of God until there is no more fltnah ( Qur ' an
2 : 193 ; 8 : 39 ) . Fitnah is a term that has often been used to denote a state of

" disturbance " , " discord " , " sedition " , or " civil war " . 45 Some English trans¬

lations of the Qur ' an have rendered the term in surah 2 : 193 and 8 : 39 as
" persecution " ( Pickthall , Shakir ) , " tumult or oppression " ( Yusuf Ali ) , or

" idolatry " ( Dawood ) . The original meaning of fitnah , however , was " put¬

ting to the proof ' , " temptation " , " trial " , or " test " 46 The term , thus , referred
to anything powerful or seductive enough to make humankind deviate
from the path of God and return to idolatry . The disempowerment of fit¬
nah , hence , had to be a crucial part of the ummah ' s mission .
In contrast to the book of Deuteronomy , the Qur ' anic command to
eliminate polytheism is not confined to a ( vaguely ) delimited Land but to
the world in its entirety . 47 The jihad is supposed to continue until polythe¬
ism has lost all of its power and lure . Violence , however , is but one of
many instruments to achieve that end . Confident of their final victory , the
early Muslim conquerors were ready to recognize in many of their oppo¬
nents the converts and tributaries of tomorrow . Islamic warfare , hence , was
structured and mitigated by its final aim : peace . After all , the Prophet had
been sent as a mercy ( rahmah ) to the inhabitants of the world ( calamln ,
Qur ' an 21 : 107 ) . The formula " In the name of God , the Beneficent , the
Merciful " ( al - rahman al - rahlm ) precedes all but one of the Qur ' an ' s 114
surahs ( the exception being surah 9 , al - Tawbah ) \ and the command to fight

44 Tim Winter , " The Last Trump Card : Islam and the Supersession of Other Faiths ",
Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 9 ( 1999 ) 2 , 133 - 55 (pp . 145 - 46 ) . - For the reference
to Freud , see Sigmund Freud , " Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion :
Drei Abhandlungen " [ 1937 - 39 ] , ch . Ill E , in : idem , Studienausgabe , vol . 9 , Frank -
furt / M . : Fischer , 1974 , 455 - 581 ( p . 540 ) . - On the role of Jerusalem in Muslim escha -
tology see Abdallah al - Khatib , " Jerusalem in the Qur ' an " , British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies 28 ( 2001 ) 1 , 25 - 53 .

45 Cf . Louis Gardet , art . " Fitna " , [ 1964 ] , EI 1 [ fh . 43 ] , vol . 2 , Leiden : Brill / London :
Luzac , 1965 , 930 - 31 ; Amy Ayalon , " From Fitna to Thawra " , Studia Islamica 66
( 1987 ) , 145 - 74 ( pp . 149 - 55 ) .

46 Cf . Gardet , " Fitna " , 930 ; Ayalon , " From Fitna to Thawra " , 150 .

47 Cf . Reuven Firestone , " Conceptions of Holy War in Biblical and Qur ' anic Tradition ",
Journal of Religious Ethics 24 ( 1996 ) 1 , 99 - 123 ( pp . 114 - 18 ) .
102 THOMAS SCHEFFLER

and kill the unbelievers is limited by several conditional and moderating

clauses . 48

Quran 2 : 190 - 93 : " 190Fight [ qatilu ] in the cause of God those who fight
you but do not transgress limits [ wa - la ta 'tadu ] , for God loves not trans¬
gressors . 191And kill them [ wa - 'qtuluhum \ wherever you catch them and
turn them out wherever they have turned you out ; for fitnah is worse than
killing . But fight them not at the sacred mosque , unless they first fight
you there ; but if they fight you , kill them . Such is the reward of those
who reject faith . I92 But if they cease , God is forgiving , merciful . 193And
fight them until there is no more fitnah and the religion becomes God ' s .
But if they cease , let there be no hostility except to the oppressors . "

Qur ' an 8 : 39 : "

So fight them [ the unbelievers ] until there is no more fitnah
and religion becomes God ' s in its entirety . But if they cease , verily God
sees all they do . "

Qur ' an 8 : 60 - 61 : " 60 Against them [ the unbelievers ] make ready your
strength to the utmost of your power , including steeds of war , to strike
terror into the enemy of God and your enemy , and others besides them
whom you may not know but God does know . . . . 6 ' But if they incline to¬
wards peace , do thou ( also ) incline towards it and trust in God : For He is
the one who hears and knows . "

Qur ' an 9 :5 : "

But when the sacred months have passed , then kill the poly -
theists wherever you find them , and seize them , besiege them , and lie in
wait for them in every ambush ; but if they repent and establish regular
prayers and give the alms tax , then leave them their way free , for God is
forgiving , merciful " .

Qur ' an 9 : 29 : " Fight those who do not believe in God or the Last Day , nor
forbid what has been forbidden by God and His messenger , nor acknowl¬
edge the religion of truth , from among the People of the Book , until they
pay the tribute [jizyah ] out of hand [ 'an yadin ] and have been brought low
[ wa - hum saghiruna .] . "

48 Cf . Hans Zirker , Islam : Theologische und gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen , Diis -

seldorf : Patmos , 1993 , 231 . - For a detailed discussion of the Qur ' anic jihad verses , the
historical contexts of their revelation ( asbab al - nuzul ) , and the abrogation (naskh ) of
earlier , more tolerant verses by later , more militant , ones , see Reuven Firestone , Jihad :
The Origin of Holy War in Islam , New York : Oxford University Press , 1999 . Cf . also
' Abdul Hamld Ahmad Abu Sulayman , Towards an Islamic Theory of International Re¬
lations : New Directions for Methodology and Thought [ 1987 ] , Herndon , VA : Interna¬
tional Institute of Islamic Thought , 1993 , 44 - 45 , 89 - 92 , 116 - 20 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
103

Warfare against unbelievers did not need any special justification . 49 The

treatment of enemies during and after military campaigns , however , was

subject to numerous regulations in classical Islamic law . Most medieval

Muslim jurists opined that , in general , those unbelievers who were consid¬

ered unable to fight , such as women , small children , monks , old people ,

the blind , crippled , insane , etc . , should not be killed unless they fought Is¬

lam with words and acts , and that the enemy ' s means of survival , such as

fruit - trees , livestock , and houses , should be spared unless there were mili¬

tary exigencies to destroy them . 50

The command to kill unbelievers was restricted to polytheists ( mush -

rikuri ) and apostates ( murtaddun ) . 51 Both categories , however , had the op¬

portunity to escape execution by converting or ( in the case of apostates ) re¬

turning to Islam . The large majority of vanquished unbelievers with whom

the early Muslim conquerors had to deal , namely the adherents of pre -

Islamic scriptural religions - Jews , Christians , and Sabians ( Qur ' an 2 : 62 ,

5 : 69 ) , later on also Zoroastrians and Hindus - were granted the status of

dhimmis , i . e . , protected but inferior subjects who were allowed to keep

their religious cults and continue their economic activities , but had to pay a

49 Cf. Albrecht Noth , " Der a priori legitime Krieg im Islam : Hauptaspekte des islami -
schen Rechts zum Thema » Krieg und Frieden « " , in : Toten im Krieg , eds . Heinrich von
Stietencron and Jorg Riipke , Freiburg - Miinchen : Alber , 1995 , 277 - 95 .
50 For details and exceptions , see , e .g ., Majid Khadduri , War and Peace in the Law of Is¬
lam , Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press , 1955 ; Abu Sulayman , Islamic Theory
[ fh . 48 ] ; Edgard Weber and Georges Reynaud , Croisade d 'hier , Djihad d ' aujourd 'hui ,
Paris : Cerf, 1989 ; James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay , eds . , Cross, Crescent, and
Sword: The Justification and Limitation of Warfare in Western and Islamic Tradition ,
New York : Greenwood Press , 1990 ; John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson , eds . , Just
War and Jihad : Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western
and Islamic Traditions , New York : Greenwood Press , 1991 ; Alfred Morabia , Le Gihad
dans I 'Islam medieval : Le "combat sacre " des origines au Xlle siecle , Paris : Albin
Michel , 1993 ; Rudolph Peters , Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam : A Reader ,
Princeton , NJ : Markus Wiener , 1996 ; Khaled Abou El Fadl , " The Rules of Killing at
War : An Inquiry into Classical Sources " , The Muslim World 89 ( 1999 ) 2 , 144 - 57 ; So -
hail H . Hashmi , " Saving and Taking Life in War : Three Modern Muslim Views " , The
Muslim World 89 ( 1999 ) 2 , 158 - 80 .
51 The capital punishment for apostates is not explicitly stipulated in the Qur ' an which
emphasizes several times that they will be punished in the next world ( cf . Samir Khalil
Samir , " Le debat autour du delit d ' apostasie dans I ' Islam contemporain " , in : Faith ,
Power , and Violence : Muslims and Christians in a Plural Society, Past and Present ,
eds . John J . Donohue , S .J . , and Christian W . Troll , S .J . , Roma : Pontifico Istituto
Orientale , 1998 , 115 - 40 [pp . 121 - 28 ] ) . However , with reference to Qur ' an 4 : 89 and
several ( disputed ) hadlths , most medieval Muslim jurists were inclined to call for the
execution of unrepentant apostates ( cf. Adel Khoury , Toleranz im Islam , Miinchen :
Kaiser / Mainz : Griinewald , 1980 , 29 - 30 , 110 - 15 ; Samir , op . cit . , 132 - 35 ) .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
104

special protection tax , the jizyah . 51 Converting them by force was not per¬

mitted ( at least in theory ) : " There is no compulsion in religion " ( Qur ' an

2 : 256 ) . 53
Violence was not considered a virtue in itself . Islam was rather devoted

to civilizing Arab tribal violence by subjecting it to the rule of divine law .

As Ignaz Goldziher ( 1850 - 1921 ) has shown , the term jahiliyyah , often

used to denote the " ignorance " of pre - Islamic tribal society , originally had

a much broader meaning , namely , the " barbarian " , i . e . , uncivilized , impul¬

sive , and cruel conduct of people who had not yet been touched by the

revelation of God ' s law and mercy . 54

With reference to the Torah , the Qur ' an declares the preservation of

human life a core value of society : Whoever kills a human being ( nafs ),

except as a lawful punishment , shall be regarded as having killed all peo¬

ple ( al - nas jamfan ) \ and whoever saves a life , shall be regarded as having

saved the life of all people ( Qur ' an 5 : 32 ; cf . 17 : 33 ) . 55 The intentional kill¬

ing of a believer is a severe crime to be punished in hell ( 4 : 93 ) . The be¬

lievers are " brethren " ( 49 : 10 ; cf . 3 : 103 ) . Their ethnic and genealogical di¬

versity is not a burden , but part of God ' s plan to make men recognize one

another and compete in righteousness ( 49 : 13 ) . Charity among them is en¬

couraged , usury prohibited ( 2 : 261 - 81 , 4 : 36 ; 5 : 2 ; 9 : 60 ; 74 : 42 - 44 ; 89 : 18 , 30 -

34 ; 107 : 1 - 3 ) . The weak and oppressed should be protected ( 4 : 75 ) . In case

of conflict , retaliation should be moderate ( 5 : 45 ; 16 : 126 ) ; patience , for -

52 Cf . A [rthur] S [tanley ] Tritton , The Caliphs and Their Non -Muslims Subjects : A Critical
Study of the Covenant of ' Umar [ 1930 ] , London : Frank Cass , 1970 ; Antoine Fattal , Le
statut legal des non - musulmans en pays d 'Islam [ 1958 ] , Beirut : Dar el - Machreq , distr .
Librairie Orientale , 1995 ; Claude Cahen , art . " Dhimma" [ 1961 ] , EI 2 [ fn . 45 ] , vol . 2 , 227 -
31 ; Claude Cahen , Halil inalcik , and P . Hardy , art . " Diizya" [ 1963 ] , ibid ., 559 - 67 ; Rudi
Paret , " Toleranz und Intoleranz im Islam " , Saeculum 21 ( 1970 ) , 344 - 65 ; Georges G .
Conn , Contribution a 1 'etude des societes multi- confessionnelles: Ejfets socio -juridiques
et politiques du pluralisme religieux , Paris : Pichond & Durand -Auzias , 1971 , 129 - 251 ;
Albrecht Noth , "Moglichkeiten und Grenzen islamischer Toleranz " , Saeculum 29 ( 1978 ) ,
190 - 204 (pp . 196 - 200 ) ; Khoury , Toleranz im Islam [ fn . 51 ] ; C .E . Bosworth , " The Con¬
cept of Dhimma in Early Islam " , in : Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire : The
Functioning of a Plural Society, eds . Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis , vol . 1, Lon¬
don and New York : Holmes and Meier , 1982 , 37 - 51 ; M .O . H . Ursinus , art . " Millet "
[ 1991 ] , EI 2 [ fn . 43 ] , vol . 7 ( 1993 ) , 61 - 64 .

53 See also Qur ' an 2 :272 ; 10 :99 , 198 ; 29 : 18 ,46 ; 42 :48 ; 50 :45 ; 88 :21 - 22 ; 109 :6 . - On the
ambivalence of surah 2 : 256 , see Rudi Paret , " Sure 2 , 256 : la ikraha fi d - dlni . Toleranz
oder Resignation ? " Der Islam 45 ( 1969 ) , 299 - 300 .
54 Ignaz Goldziher , " Was ist unter „ al - Gahilijja " zu verstehen ? " , in : idem , Muhammeda -
nische Studien [ 1889 ] , vol . 1 , Hildesheim : Olms , 1961 , 219 - 28 ; see also idem , " Mu -
ruwwa und Din " , ibid . , 1- 39 .
55 Cf . Sebastian Giinther , art . " Bloodshed " , EQ [ fh . 43 ] , vol . 1 , 240 - 41 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS 105

giveness , and reconciliation are encouraged ( 3 : 134 , 159 ; 16 : 126 , 42 : 40 , 43 ;

41 : 34 ; 49 : 9 - 10 ) , not the least the offer and acceptance of blood money

( 4 : 92 ) . In everyday life , Muslims should neither laugh at one another nor

call each other names ( 49 : 11 ) . They should avoid speaking ill of or spy on

each other ( 49 : 12 ) . Polite greetings should be met with still more polite

greetings ( 4 : 86 ) . Evil should be repelled with good in order to turn one 's

enemy into one ' s friend ( 41 : 34 ) .

Aware of the obvious advantages of unity and reconciliation , the early

generations of the ummah tried to solve their internal dissensions and

schisms in a similar spirit . During the battle of Siffln ( 37 / 657 ) , Mu ' awi -

yah ' s followers , on the advice of ( Amr b . al - As , put leaves of the Qur ' an

on their lances to convince the followers of AIT to accept arbitration based

on consultation of Scripture . Medieval Arab historians tried their best to

clear the traumatic memory of the first inner - Muslim battle , the Battle of

the Camel ( 36 / 656 ) , from too divisive issues . 56 The famous concept of the

" four rightly - guided caliphs " ( i . e . , Abu Bakr , cUmar , cUthman , and 5All )

reflected , not the least , the efforts of Muslim mainstream thinkers to re¬

trieve common ground between the parties of TJt hm an and All and their

respective historical ra mi fications . 57 Muslim jurists opined that rebels

( bughat ) should not be treated as criminals . 58 Many of them were reluctant

to decide whether a Muslim had become an apostate and pleaded for the

postponement ( irja 7) of that decision until the Last Judgment . 59 Even con¬

victed apostates could escape capital punishment by repenting and declar¬

ing their renewed allegiance to Islam . 60

56 Cf . Tarif Khalidi , " The Battle of the Camel : Trauma , Reconciliation and Memory " , in :
Crisis and Memory , eds . Angelika Neuwirth and Andreas Pflitsch , Beirut / Wiirzburg :
Orient - Institut / Ergon , 2001 , 153 - 63 .

57 Cf . Josef van Ess , " Political Ideas in Early Islamic Religious Thought " , British Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies 28 ( 2001 ) 2 , 151 - 64 ( pp . 153 - 56 ) .

58 Cf . Khaled Abou El Fadl , " Ahkam al - Bughat : Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebel¬
lion in Islam " , in : Cross , Crescent , and Sword [ fh . 50 ] , 149 - 76 ; idem , Rebellion and
Violence in Islamic Law , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2001 .

59 Cf . Fazlur Rahman , Islam , Garden City , NY : Doubleday Anchor , 1966 , 98 - 99 ; W .

Montgomery Watt , Islamic Political Thought : The Basic Concepts , Edinburgh : Edin¬
burgh University Press , 1968 , 57 - 59 ; idem , The Formative Period of Islamic Thought ,
Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press , 1973 , ch . 5 ; see also W . Madelung , art .
" Murdii ' a " [ 1992 ] , EI 2 [ fh . 43 ] , vol . 7 ( 1993 ) , 605 - 07 ; van Ess , " Political Ideas " [ ft .
57 ] , 154 ff .

60 Cf . Frank Griffel , " Toleration and Exclusion : al - Shafi cI and al - Ghazali on the Treat¬
ment of Apostates " , Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 64 ( 2001 ) 3 ,
339 - 54 .
 THOMAS SCHEFFLER
106

The treatment of dhimmis , heretics , and apostates certainly became

harsher in the course of time : 61 The escalation of internal politico - religious
power struggles , most notably the challenge of Isma ! IlI propaganda ( 9th-
12th centuries ) and the rise of Safawl Shfism ( 16th century ) , was accom¬
panied by clearer and less lenient distinctions between ' belief and ' unbe¬
lief , ' orthodoxy ' and ' heresy ' . External threats , most notably the military
advances of the Byzantine empire in Syria and Northern Mesopotamia
( lOth - llth centuries ) , the Crusades ( 11th— 13th centuries ) , the Spanish
Reconquista ( llth - 15th centuries ) ; the Mongol invasions ( 13th— 14th
centuries ) , European colonialism ( 19th- 20th centuries ) , and Western ' post -
colonial ' hegemony , provoked emphatic calls for Muslim solidarity and
increased doubts about the loyalty of non - Muslim subjects . All in all , the
interplay of ' internal ' and ' external ' threats created a climate in which it
became much easier to condemn other Muslims as traitors and unbeliev¬
ers , 62 more difficult for apostates to return to Islam , 63 and much more
acceptable to put pressure on dhimmis .
Several long - term social processes worked in the same direction : Con¬
version to Islam reversed the numerical balance between Muslims and
non - Muslims in many regions of the Middle East and North Africa 64 and ,
thus , slowly reduced the incentives to accommodate non - Muslims at the
local level . In the course of time , especially during social crises , it became
less and less risky for local political and religious entrepreneurs to direct
the anger of frustrated urban crowds against non - Muslim minorities . In ad¬
dition , the systematization and dogmatization of Islamic thought that
accompanied the rise of a distinct class of Muslim religious specialists , the
hdama \ facilitated the development of less ambiguous , stricter , and severer
rules for the treatment of non - Muslim subjects .

61 Cf . Cahen , " Dhimma " Paret , " Toleranz und Intoleranz " [ fn . 52 ] 356 -
[ fn . 52 ] , 227 - 30 ;
64 ; Noth , " Moglichkeiten
und Grenzen " [ fn . 52 ] , 201 - 04 . See also : Karl Binswanger ,
Untersuchungen zum Status der Nichtmuslime im osmanischen Reich des 16. Jahrhun -
derts , Miinchen : Trofenik , 1977 ; Bat Ye ' or , The Dhimmi : Jews and Christians under
Islam [ 1980 ] , London : Associated University Presses , 1985 ; idem , The Decline of
Eastern Christianity under Islam : From Jihad to Dhimmitude : Seventh - Twentieth
Century [ 1991 ] , London : Associated University Presses .
62 Emmanuel Sivan , Radical Islam : Medieval Theology and Modern Politics [ 1985 ] ,
New Haven : Yale University Press , 1990 , ch . 4 .
63 Cf . Griffel , " Toleration and Exclusion " [ fn . 60 ] , 350 - 53 .
64 Cf. Richard W . Bulliet , Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period : An Essay in
Quantitative History , Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press , 1979 ; Youssef Cour-
bage and Philippe Fargues , Christians and Jews under Islam , London : Tauris , 1997 .
 THE RADICALISM OF THE POWERLESS
107

As Rodney Stark has shown , monotheist religious organizations , their ex¬

clusive claims for absolute truth notwithstanding , have often been ready to
tolerate a " substantial amount of religious nonconformity " in the regions
under their control as long as their monopoly was not threatened by other
powerful religious organizations . During periods of substantial religious
conflicts with powerful competitors , however , " toleration will be withheld
or withdrawn " not only from threatening religious groups , but also " from
nonthreatening but nonconforming " ones . 65 In times of ' external ' threats ,
thus , toleration of ' internal ' diversity will be among the first ' collateral '
casualties .
The history of Islam has been no exception to that rule . But precisely
because of this it is important to acknowledge that Islam ' s basic doctrinal
approach to non - Muslims and dissenters was canonized in a period of po¬
litical success and not in an era of frustrating defeats and powerlessness . 66
Sacred texts and traditions , once canonized , enjoy a relative autonomy
from the shifting fashions of Zeitgeist . Sure , they are open to different
interpretations , but they cannot be changed or interpreted at will . In the so¬
cieties of the Middle East , cultivating a deferential attitude towards the in¬
tegrity and authority of Scripture has often helped to counterbalance the
voluntarism , arbitrariness , and opportunism of despotic political leaders .
The founding generations of the ummah , confident of their success , had
been in a position to deal with many opponents in a spirit of civilized vio¬
lence rarely found among their less successful contemporaries . The heri¬
tage they transmitted to their successors consisted , not the least , in a body
of moderating norms and moral precedents that later , less successful , gen¬
erations could not disregard or circumvent without seriously distorting its
letter and spirit .

65 Rodney Stark , One True God: Historical Consequences of Monotheism , Princeton , NJ :

Princeton University Press , 2001 , ch . 3 , 115 - 74 ( quotations pp . 121 , 123 ) .
66 Cf . Paret , " Toleranz und Intoleranz " [ fn . 52 ] , 359 ; Noth , " Moglichkeiten und Grenzen "
[ fii . 52 ] , 197 .
 THE POETRY OF THE KHAWARIJ :
VIOLENCE AND SALVATION
T arif Khalidi

My aim in examining the poetry of the Khawarij is to explore the function

and meaning of violence during the first century of Islam . Violence pre¬

sents the historian with an interpretative challenge . As a historian , one

tends to give easy assent to the view that communal violence only gains its

meaning from specific contexts , from the social and ideological conflicts

within a particular society at a particular time . 1 On the other hand , violence

is seen by many social scientists as a psychologically recurring condition

and one which involves deep structural continuities . 2 It is the interplay

between psychological continuities and historical discontinuities which

creates the complex puzzle for the interpreter of violence .

For the kind of synthetic analysis of violence that I have in view , the

poetry of the Khawarij is well suited . Its basic themes may be said to have

become fully articulated by the end of the Umayyad period which thus

provides their context . It forms a fairly coherent body of poetry with rec¬

ognizable contours . 3 So far as I know , no serious doubts have been cast on

its authenticity and its thematic coherence argues strongly for such authen¬

ticity , as does its transmission .

Let me begin with a few broad figural characteristics of this poetic

corpus by way of broaching my principal interest . To a reader or listener

attuned to its polemic , it is a poetry that seeks consciously to overthrow

not only its political opponents but their memory , language and poetry as

well . It is therefore and to that extent a poetry of negation , deliberately

severed from the luxuriance and urbanity of the life and language that sur -

1 This is well argued in David Nirenberg , Communities of Violence : Persecution of

Minorities in the Middle Ages , Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1998 .
2 This is the argument of Dominique Colas , Civil Society and Fanaticism : Conjoined
Histories , Stanford : Stanford University Press , 1997 .
3 The poetry of the Khawarij is conveniently assembled and with a useful introduction
in : Ihsan ' Abbas , Shi'r al -Khawarij , 3rd printing , Beirut : Dar al - Thaqafa , 1974 . The
references that follow are to the numbered extracts in the ' Abbas edition followed by
the line .
110 TARIF KHALIDI

rounds it . Neither love nor nostalgia , both being major feeders of memory ,
nor indeed any other mundane diversion can conceal the barrenness of the
world and of the human soul . Cut off from the community , from the pleni¬
tude of life , KharijI man is the frailest and most exposed creature imagin¬
able , utterly alienated from the human reality . He is a human being at the
very limits of spiritual and physical endurance , pursuing his path through a
desolate landscape . Mirroring this desolation and instability is a series of
images and forms : the birds of prey [ 18 : 2 ; 53 : 3 ; 163 : 5 ] , the cup of death
[ 20 : 6 ; 107 : 8 ; 153 : 5 ; 199 : 10 ; 280 : 8 ] , the valleys of dread [ 107 : 6 ] , the

gleaming sword [ 51 : 1 ] , the lean horse [ 94 : 3 ; 165 : 1 ; 210 : 3 ] , the paws and
fangs of war [ 285 : 1 ] , the river of injustice [ 26 : 1 ] , the sea of extinction
[ 107 : 4 ] , the bartered soul [ 28 :2 ; 123 : 10 - 11 ; 236 : 4 - 5 ] , the creature inces¬

santly arriving and departing [ 42 : 5 ; 155 : 2 ; 176 : 8 - 10 ] .

18 :2 *>L —IS bl —il*J y- jiW lit :—(■ J —

53 : 3 —li L« l —UJ jv- ij >- oLilp (_ gj

1S * t
163:5 \j \ jJs -j jvg-:—P Ij— -* *

20 :6 Vj \ 4 - A \ [jA T 1 iJ

107 : 8 ijj ^ ^ ' 4 - IT d ^ J

153 : 5 4_P j >r \jji \ Xb J —P jb -N ■" j j I * 1

^ f j, * a *' o *
199 : 10 \ g flfiS 5- j Llj j \
i *> S" " j ll L«jA PO C ^ (j *

280 : 8 c-JjLJo ^ ^ j

« + Ji It * - c t
107 : 6 J qj J 1 &IS"* J I frjj
AS- * 4 -pj ! ^

51 : 1 J ! c5 ( 3*^

94 : 3 J -— U (j & c£ ^ 4 <0^ 1
 THE POETRY OF THE KHAWARIJ 111

165 : 1
^ jl . -L 9 lil JJL jl jk \

210 : 3 j >7 4S"*y£ - J -s i - L I& j * -JJ

« 1g . . to <1) 1t —^ jJ - 1 (3 015" Jij

285 : 1 oUuLwJl i b IjJli bLdl jLatl >u ^ * j

26 : 1 djIj d)^ —li <J j I ? —j

1

* ,* ^ ^ > *
107 : 4 2C ->jil J^rj ^ P SjL^ IS"" C-J ^ A- lj I JU> 3

28 : 2 jS <d
\ \ C. ^ —) j Cs^" ^ £jj£
(

123 : 10 -
jfiS ' \ J LpLj XJI flj 4^ »JLP ^ JJ \ iy£ - j A/i ^
11

^ prlj JfT (3 ci ^ 3' ^ \J* c£ _^ V2Jajl

236 :4 - 5 Ml ij ^ $jjJ % 5 liijl " ^ 1 ^ ^ jl i ^_

* bfl » J ^ Al J b!- l Ob J
( J >rj \ i (J, l » J (_j) &l £J

42 : 5 81 ( J p ^ Jj —j J ji ^ ^
sS c 4 * c *
155 : 2 1 JjJLJUJ 1 ?rlj31 O i j ^ . ^-4 J tt \ J C « «»JU

176 :8- 10 jlJ ^ ^ * . l [ ^3 ^ Jo L51 p ^ y j SlJ ijl L

£
< jl ^ j jv^-L—/• £ —jl j CU ^ Jj J P l>J jl j i_ - f 'jT

jlgJl Ju
( " J ^> J> - Jl O ^ ^ !l b J Lj ^_ Aj Jl' jl
(S
Pj

Beckoning to him from the opposite end is a vision or promise of salva¬

tion , but it is a salvation that can only be deserved by endless labour and
sacrifice , in suffering , renunciation and death . Between these two poles of
negation and reassurance , Khariji poetry swings violently back and forth ,
from elegy to triumphal hymn , from complaint to praise . There is thus in
Khariji poetry a sense , one might even say a Faustian sense , of the urgency
and desirability of motion , of acting quickly to dispense with a present
112 TARIF KHALIDI

which is fleeting , seductive , unjust and not fully real , a nightmare which
the Khariji is summoned to abjure and escape [ 179 : 1 ] .

179 : ! ^3y ilj jy Ll _- jj

i jjjJl

We need now to examine some of these themes at closer range , to bring

our eyes and ears closer to this turbulent poetry with a view to determining
the matrices and filaments of violence which tie it together . To be faithful
to its truth , one must be faithful to its oscillation between self and sur¬
roundings , sensitive to the dialogue that many Khariji poets set up between
speech and self on the one hand , speech and society on the other . For the
Khariji is involved in two combats simultaneously : he must subdue his
soul and he feels religiously bound to subdue his enemies . To accomplish
this aim , an entire spectrum of social norms and values must be overturned
and consequently words must change their meanings . The dread of battle is
replaced with the dread of God [ 57 : 2 ; 27 : 1 - 3 ; 3 : 7 - 9 ; 108 : 7 ] , the marks and
privileges of honour and nobility are replaced with the marks of piety
[ 39 : 1 - 3 ] ; the encounter with the enemy becomes an encounter with the

beloved [ 288 : 3 ] , the commerce of things becomes the commerce of souls

[ 123 : 10 - 11 ; 236 : 4 - 5 ; 28 : 1 - 2 ] , the tribal bond is replaced by the tie of spiri¬

tual brotherhood [ 42 : 1 - 2 ; 27 : 7 ; 52 : 1 ] , A Khariji woman poetess speaks of

forsaking the " soft spear " , i . e . , the penis , for the deadly spear of battle
[ 248 : 1 - 2 ] ,

57 : 2 J— / Jj —
43
✓ J £
( oiiJ J xiSil V 01S'

o£ c 5 ^ £ o
27 : 1- 3 j 1* 3 1SI a ll3»- ljjl lil <J , LJ jl 1 A

JL ) ! JJili - l OjL / 5 lit y >rj —J

JljJt>\
< Oj£ > L-JjiiJl 131 oJ P p\j r ^ jl
J ^ __ »l ( ,

3 :7 - 9 ^ 4i) l a ll ^

ljjlj>cil 1 lj ^ Vl
j* ^ lil
s 55 x a
bjLi A\) 1 OJjt; J ^ 5 (_ £jiU jl j ^Jllll ^J, l 1_^ lj

108 : 7 LJl ^xil ^ ^ ^ Jt ?rjJl ^3 _^ ~1 Jju^ I 131

(
 THE POETRY OF THE KHAWARIJ 113

39 : 1- 3 _c jf £L j ijj ^ lii Sij - J iJ v ft jf

(

■, ■ - £J
<_ 1 4_<L> J J 4 _ PX< , ygjj ( V- J- l S'

(Cj — £ii j — A ^ — si j — £Jj JJJ —'J

1

288 : 3 jUa ^- l U ill Jas ^ lil i ^ L

j p- \ ^ AjlJlpt I itSo

123 : 10 - 1— ^ 1^ LP1.« - ~>i «fi » A oT 4-o- JLP <3^ ^ 1y^~ J 3

11 ^ :
J5 " LjjJl (3 <J ^ ' WjJ (-£J v ? flll

* ^
236 :4 - 5 Sj ^ *> L 5 iijl j J,j J ^ jl £^ ) }
^ /

yi
* « J ^ k! ^ Li- l <j { l >r 3
( J >rj \4 A J J &i £jl J

28 : 1- 2 UjjI l» 4) llj ta
*!> IS^a JJj ^ — qj ^U-UJ ^ d -—Jjj

\jlc 4J c — 1 c. ^ x^*. J j y *' ^ ^ J^ - J S

(
" * s

42 : 1- 2 * ?£ N/ jvib ^ IJU_P j' - JJ

\ U ^ Jl IjJLi g \j * I jl 8 J SJ
' If "
ex x 1* 0
j - *J ^ * t 01 V |& ^

011
<
27 : 7 ji dl dji dJ prj !> VI jv-g - J-I V (jt

52 : 1 JjL^ a ^
( J ^jLJtJl ' -J? c - 3j
( J -^ >- lj ^ 1

.. . - •» ® r . ' > s 1 M .
. 1
- - -
<-
248 : 1- 2 $ 4 I O ^ "J ^ ^ ^ c— ' J

Jjl ^ J ~ p <U * iJlij Jjl ^ j»J ; IJ a <l) ll i

Almost anywhere one turns in this poetry , one will find a reversal of one
sort or another , an overturning of the normal or customary . The aristocratic
Quraysh pray behind the Bakr ibn Wa ' il [ 251 : 1 ] , the Amazonian Ghazalah
terrifies the heart out of Hajjaj the Terrible [ 194 : 1 - 3 ] , a small band of
fighters overcomes a more numerous [ 34 : 7 ] , and even death , the subduer
of all things , is itself subdued by the ajal , God ' s appointed destiny [ 173 : 1 ] ,
114 TARIF KHALIDI

Jib (j d -Lis ^ ^ J—! <_s *^ <-) (J | y. — 81

173 : 1 j La | S1 01 9 O j
4j \ llj 4jjjL>- Oji - J '
t J ^1 ^

These reversals run through Khariji poetry like a conceptual grid or struc¬
ture . It would be hard to find in Khariji poetry even a hint of an acceptance
or approval of any societal norm or value . It is this radical repudiation of
the community which led Jahiz to affirm that every single faqih of his day
would be of the opinion that the Khawarij were outlaws and must be
fought . 4
If there is such a thing as a " Khariji soul " , how is it constituted ? What
energizes it into action ? In what orbit or orbits does it move ? Let us first
consider the existential dilemma confronting all Kharijls : Should I sit
( iqu 'ud ) or should I get out ( khuruj )! Repose versus rebellion is the basic
psychic choice , the ever - present , ever - tormenting challenge . When the
choice to act is finally made , it is often spoken of as a response to a divine
summons and is thus a sudden , ecstatic action [ 75 : 3 ] , frequently accompa¬
nied by violence or dramatic , perhaps even ludic , confrontations with gov¬
ernment figures or society .

«. 1
75 : 3 (_S -LgU <^5^ ^— 1 ^ —poIJ L» lil ^ *t. ic4 jjs>l pr \

The Khariji immediately abandons the community , both literally and in

every other sense of the term . He joins his brothers and thereafter he hurls
himself upon his erstwhile qawm , who live in sin ; he hurls at them , not
only his spear but the qawari c of the Qur ' an as well , the Terrors of the Day
of Judgement described therein [ 279 : 20 ; 280 : 17 ] .

4 Jahiz , Al- Bayan wa - l- Tabyin , ed . A . S . Harun , Cairo : ' Isa al - Babl , 1948 - 50 , 3 : 130 .
 THE POETRY OF THE KHAWARIJ 115

279 : 20 J
j . ^Jl
v Q » ^ j \ j S J L& jl : a

280 : 17 eJU - l [$ j Ll i' Sj ■« l « 0 » «0" l'jj P (5jl C £jlj 5 jJb j

Even for the Khariji whose circumstances forced him to live in a sinful
society , the urge to act constantly anguished his conscience [ 179 : 1 - 4 ;
154 : 1 - 5 ] .

179 : 1- 4 Ji aV C- Slj ll i ■ ; j ^ j -iJl ^ iL~j ^

o > S ° Z s t
j J 5" J .I O ^J s^ j ^ a^ l

^ ^ X V ^ J — 51j J —^ j ' f J—'

£. «Hj L — Sta iij is j»j * ! Uijj ; i

t *+ * , * * '
154 : 1- 5 J *> \ J J j! ^ ! \1 ?- j 1 Jl sL U J> lj a ii
/ * 0 * ° >
J , l xilj JjI ^sJd \ iS ^
' ejj * ! L Pjj Li ^ oJ * j ijj Pj
i
c$ ji C~^ Ojil j— J -" —

Jl jI i ^ —'. c ^ (3 ' j—
s5 " '

Jl 5 c Jl Lj & \j 1 A jU U _ JoJl 4 li iJi J j «i

To abjure society meant to abjure its symbols , its consensus , its falsity of
thought and speech . The KharijI thus feels impelled to declare himself
innocent of the taint of sin that attaches to cAli , Mu cawiyah , ' Amr ibn al -
cAs and their followers [ 151 : 1 - 2 ] ,

151 : 1- 2 uyiv Cx" J l ?' ^ 0 " J r^

J _ < j " ^ cii ' j

Ll ^ j aJl (3 Aiil iijl j 2 j «j

This declaration of innocence is a confession of faith and an act of clean¬

sing , like the traveller who leaves a city and shakes its dust from his feet .
 TARIF KHALIDI
116

A new man is born , possessed of Qur ' anic certainty , yaqin , as contrasted

with the confusion and darkness in which sinners live [ 155 : 12 ] ,

155 : 12 Uy tw dJLil i V Li Sjil 01 O SIS' ISj ^

Thereafter , the Khariji looks forward to salvation rather than backwards to

his past . In cleansing his soul , he cleanses his memory also . Like many

movements of radical religious dissent , the Khawarij dispensed with his¬

tory and memory and directed their gaze forwards to an on - rushing future .

As they mourn their dead , their greatest desire is to follow them on the

same path [ 128 : 4 ; 153 :2 ] .

i I n
128 :4 — a LdIjjl ^

153 :2 j— ' Vj I— ; 4P jj ' bui — p I— i

j,s 5*

The journey itself is now clearly marked : all the sign - posts are visible and

there only remains the duty to equip oneself well for that journey by the

performance of meritorious deeds . If any earthly provisions are needed ,

these are only the helmet and the shield , the sword and the spear , the ever -

present companions of the Khariji traveller [ 232 : 9 ; 48 : 1 ] ,

^ * * o x ^ * ' o S * 6
232 :9 4jj L / 2» L— I_/ ** -" J Ipj -i aL O » ijj ">

48 : 1

The Khariji self - portrait is built upon a series of denuded images . The
Khariji is barefoot and naked [ 123 : 6 ] , He looks sick [ 279 : 16 ] , He is short¬

lived [ 81 : 3 ] ,

123 :6 ui — i (j — ^ s - 1!y — ilj alj — f - 51 a>

' -

279 : 16 j >*- .Jl ^ — * tj $ j — la ^ jl Jpy > t^ c, ^ £, jl — S~ ^ gj

81 :3 jl fljA * 23 alj ^ ®
 THE POETRY OF THE KHAWARIJ 117

He disavows all pleasure and diversion [ 279 : 22 - 23 ] , He dedicates his life

to sword and spear . By killing an enemy , the Khariji warrior cleanses his

sins [ 163 : 1 - 4 ] , When he lies dead on the field of battle , the birds of prey

find little to feed on in a body emaciated by fasting [ 18 :2 ; 53 : 3 ] ,

O a a * ' -
279 :22 - jJ I J P 4 jjj 7 ij ss- Lft J f oJ Sj d) \ Js >
23 ' *

Jl Ipo ^ — II i_ -— pj IS ! ^ yc — ll j — I \— * iif ,— j

163 : 1- 4 UL - Jl jli - l j A 2 a! iS ' cJCil - (jl ll ^ j -5

Lib ^>1 j ^ l (j * T I f ^ j v? ; «l ^ P ^ ^ P ^ »l

lil ^ (_£ .S £ _L J l_4 a 4jj ^ I J

iJlj -j * 4) ll Jj , P ajjj Si (jjl 4^ wvo> - li b Oj —

5= * £ 0S> ^ -f ^ *
18 :2
*j *>L IS W ^ ILu jjail (3llP J isJ
^ ^ ^ n<
53 :3
Is L >l ^ orl (j \ Lflj pjay - jiJall oLslp (_£jJ

He is silent in assembly , respectful , trustworthy and generous in spirit ,

perpetually terrified of sin [ 140 : 2 ] , a lion by day but stays up all night in

prayer , wailing like a woman [ 125 : 14 - 15 ; 179 : 12 , 10 , 15 ] .

140 :2
I— — liJI **- i ^ l 1" - I-* <qtII I— a l^ |

125 : 14 - 0 >l $Jl xJ \ J ~ \ JLP JlL . ^ 1 jU j \-f ll I «l ^ UP Jl

0 *il ^ iJl . .ujl g- l^jJl r j' L; 9 JjT jji 111 I * lil I »\j

His greatest comfort is the company of his brethren and the frequent dis¬

sensions among Khawarij groups inspire the most pathetic of all Khariji

verse [ 121 : 9 - 12 ; 135 : 1 - 3 ; 142 :1] ,

118 TARIF KHALIDI

121 :9 - 12 Ujji j Jlls ll Ijlj lil 4 ^ 2^ ^ lp li a^ ^ jipfj

j <3 ! j —*

I bjjZK * Ml jl st=- aJl — «i Mj 3

( JJl yMlj (3J aJ

I sij^alj I I 4 j -« J ®lj — Jlj I iL°j Ijji £■

135 : 1- 3 L_-> jJslj ^ j ail 43j—QJ (*" ^ <"""*) ^ j s

jJri JsJl^ -j ^ J £■ 1 ^ ^ 1 ^ f
s s JS
o * * 9 * i
^ . 1^ 4- 1 ^-fcllplj ^_ P ^ J 3
( -4^ 0 ^ I a

142 :
1 1j£ -j. s ^ ^ Sj 1 £jl jj£- l L) 1 U js »- ^ aS"

Among them there are no rich or poor , no family , no worldly possessions

[ 278 : 2 - 5 ] . To live a new life meant also to speak a new language . For the

Khawarij prided themselves on their scholars , orators and poets [ 81 :4 ] . But

their speech , like their way of life , is pure and truthful , unlike the hypoc¬
risy and deceit in the speech of their enemies [ 184 : 1 - 3 ] .

.? <* .
278 :2 - 5 j fljlll J P 0j a )? * I J ^ j* A
. • , „0 ^ •? -»» . <« /■ .
_/ j JJ -5 p- fr * ^ 3u
1/ * (•" * ' ^ V^ U2>- JJ -5J

j fcjJl ay
ay . J Oj
uj *-L^J i V jv >■ -
i :^2J ijy »
✓ x

f j ^ p -*'j 1 *-* J (Hi _r "

5> * * > * * *
81 :4 j \ j >r ^ ^ J S"* £.L u s^ 3 f. L \ls>- i>r I a \ £. 1 pi

\ fl ' o> A
184 : 1- 3 *Ji C£ «AJ ! { \ * Aii L) J ^ ^

j sdi ^
s
lujiil J ^2.3 ^ ^ ^ s
s ^ 0

st «a<Ij o ,. ««*1^ 4_3 l^a 41 (3 ^ ^

 THE POETRY OF THE KHAWARIJ 119

It follows that the portrait of the enemy is almost diametrically opposite to

their own . In broad perspective , there is a struggle between two abodes ,
two dars , one inhabited by sinners , the other by the friends of God [ 20 :2 ;
75 : 1 ; 160 : 3 - 4 ; 176 : 1 ] ,

20 :2
tSj J ^ j ijfy - IsliLl jU i pj : ojl

75 : 1 L . Jj — sJi > j ^ [$ 4 ( I J . gjji j v

160 :3 - 4 (ji \y > ^ P Lg~, 9 ^ i jlj ; aJ ^ - j dill y ^i Ij ^rj I

(jilf -j i_ .— Lg- .— 9 j, I ^ IaI — aj jU — > lj —

176 : 1 jU i I ; L& I Sjl .5 C — ol §_•» !J a L

r —J
<_ ^

This is of course reminiscent of St Augustine . But unlike the Augustinian

inhabitants of the City of God , who are enjoined to pass through this world
quietly and like pilgrims , the KharijI city is a warrior camp , lying in wait
for its antagonist . As the two sides faced each other in battle , the Khariji
poet saw his enemies as mercenaries , fighting for the sake of booty , and
saw himself as fighting for divine reward and truth [ 34 : 2 ; 63 : 1 ; 183 : 1 - 2 ] .
The epithets that the Khawarij fling at their enemy are frenzied : they are
unbelievers and thieves , accursed libertines , despots , exploiters , legislators
of sin [ 100 :4 ; 35 : 2 ; 125 : 2 ; 236 : 2 - 3 ] ,

34 :2 aj \ *Jt \ J ^ 9 ^ g ^lp 1jLs >- I * 1 LJ 9

63 : 1 j ^ Ll Ajj f- AJLjP jJaJl jiJ J - ls ^ A S"

183 : 1- 2 IJi y Ja *j jl ^ *—* J ^

I y ^y >ji ] \ C-JLfUaP C~«-9l iji L^ j IjJl aJ

100 :4 j 9lS ^ i_ jl j sjlA > - jl yiil 1JLa> ^ ^

£ * \ g ^ O
35 : 2 j J LJU ? a . l )} aAJI Ju od J a3
 TARIF KHALIDI
120

125 :2 J *^23 ^j 1 Oi — AjIj L$ \j

236 :2 - 3 VI * <j — ® *■—•' i— ^ ^ ®

^ Ait j J J =L | i ] ^ _J aljf -U IP jL *• J r
;- JS

It is a struggle whose object is nothing less than to rid God ' s earth of in¬
famy . And inasmuch as the tribal webs of kinship penetrated all life , the
Khawarij tore this web to shreds in the name of a revolutionary Islamic
fraternite , going far beyond the Qur ' an in their anti - tribal zeal .
It is , in fact , tempting to posit that , in one important respect , the con¬
flict between the Khawarij and the rest is a conflict over the language of
the Qur ' an . This is evident in the manner in which Khariji poetry appropri¬
ates , as if by right , a great deal of the vocabulary and imagery of the
Qur ' an , to the point where their poetry appears to wish to recreate the con¬
ditions of the Qur ' anic world itself . Their enemies are described as the
" Confederates " ( al - ahzab ) , the forces massed against the Prophet in the

Qur ' an [ 1 : 1 ; 21 : 1 ] ,

j. 0 * s *

1: 1 ^ P — Sj ABI ^ ~i (j -° J P

21 : 1 i
X Sip ^ Aill OA * -— j — 9 /- ^ x- /• 0 ' s

The Terrors of Last Judgement ( the Qur ' anic qawari c mentioned above ) are
hurled at their enemies like incantations . The palaces of the enemy ( qusur )
are the transient palaces of Qur ' anic Thamud , awaiting God ' s anger and
prefiguring the moral contamination of city life [ 230 : 1 ; 131 : 4 ] , They them¬
selves are the Qur ' anic small band (fi 'ah qalllah ) that will triumph over the
larger band (fi 'ah kathirah ) [ 34 : 7 ] .

230 : 1 sLail 3 2j
( 4 j* i jj
1* LJJLSI 3
(

131 :4 I u ~ >js > Jpj \ j .

jv- pUiP Ji

34 :7 lijj a ji . SvJl aJl p dLi ji P 5L UJi Sj; aJl j, &

 THE POETRY OF THE KHAWARIJ 121

Indeed , the great metaphor which defines their being and organizes their
existence , the metaphor of " selling " themselves to God , is itself a literal
response to a Qur ' anic metaphor .
I conclude with a number of disparate observations for which I do not
claim any great theoretical rigor . To reintroduce the interpretative chal¬
lenge described at the beginning of my paper , and where violence is con¬
cerned , I am not sure whether these observations on the poetry of the
Khawarij reinforce the historically contingent school of interpretation or
the psychologically recurrent school . Khariji poetry presents us with two
contrasting visions of life , or perhaps more accurately , one vision and its
reconstruction of an opposite . Underpinning these two contrasting visions
is a violent political conflict over the moral fabric and destiny of the Mus¬
lim community . If one wishes to array the arguments for violence as a
psychologically recurrent phenomenon , one can point to themes in Khariji
poetry which seem to reinvent themselves across many cultures and peri¬
ods . Thus , violence as a moral imperative , holy or salvationary violence if
you like ; violence as an escape from the unbearable disorder of an impure
and inadequate world ; violence that pits the political and legal order
against the theocratic , the homo politicus against the homo dei , the asser¬
tion of state authority against the direct mediation of God : this sort of vio¬
lence is a typology that makes the Khawarij the comrades of many similar
movements in Islamic and non - Islamic history alike . In medieval European
history , the Anabaptists come immediately to mind .
On the other hand , if one takes a historically contingent view of this
poetry , one could argue that the Khawarij would not have been thinkable
without the emergence of a political consensus perceived by the Khawarij
to be essentially sinful . For the Khawarij , the great fitnah was a spectacle ,
a game of power and not a struggle between right and wrong . They saw
through this sham , and saw therefore that all their enemies had come to
partake of a consensus whereby they had sold their souls to the world . Put
very simply , it is my contention that the emergence of the politico - legal
concept of ahl al - sunna wa - 'l -jamd 'a from beneath the larger theocratic
concept of the ummah of God is what produced the violent reaction of the
Khawarij . In more general terms , it was the formulation of a concept and
practice of a civil society which brought into being a violent and contradic¬
tory formulation of a society of God . The first formulation mythologizes
the past ; the second mythologizes the future .
The Khawarij had two basic ideological weapons : their oratory and
their poetry . In both , they projected what one might call an aesthetics of
violence , a celebration of the caravan of martyrs in contrast to the illusory
caravan of desires and dreams . It would be possible of course to detect in
122 TAR1F KHALIDI

their poetry something of the jahili imagery of the alien and the outcast .
But it is also easy to see how different their poetry is from that of their
contemporaries who are , according to them , lost in the celebration of what
is transient and false . The violence of their ideology may be psychologi¬
cally recurrent but their aesthetic of violence is astonishingly and uniquely
their own .
 DAR AL - HARB AND DAR AL - ISLAM :
TRADITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Ridwan Al - Sayyid

Abu Jafar Muhammad b . Jarfr al - Tabari ( d . 310 / 923 ) , a great jurist and
eminent historiographer , introduced the chapter on al -jihad ( Holy War ) in
his book Ikhtilaf al -fuqaha 3 by citing four Qur ' anic verses that elucidated
Muslim jurists ' view of the world and the role of the Muslim community ,
ummah , at the dawn of the 4th century of the hijrah :

" Before this We wrote in the Psalms , after the Message ( given to Moses ) :
' Myservants , the righteous , shall inherit the earth ' " ( Qur ' an 21 : 105 ) .
" We have not sent thee but as a ( Messenger) to all mankind , giving them
glad tidings , and warning them ( against sin) , but most men know not "
.
( Qur ' an 34 :28 )
" Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good ,
enjoining what is right , and forbidding what is wrong : They are the ones
to attain felicity " ( Qur ' an 3 : 104 ) .
" It is He Who hath sent His Messenger with Guidance and the Religion
of Truth , to cause it to prevail over all religion , even though the Pagans
may detest ( it) " ( Qur ' an 9 :33 ) . '

Al Tabari advocated what had been a jurisprudential consensus in the 3rd

-

century of the hijrah . It stated that the ummah was required , by virtue of
Islam , to safeguard (witness ) and rule the earth that it " inherited " from the
Great and Almighty God and to lead humankind , whom God had chosen as
His vice - regent on this earth . Apparently , at a relatively early stage , 2
prominent Muslims accepted these interpretations of the verses dealing
with " inheritance " , manifestation , witness , and domination , calling for that
which is good and rejecting that which is forbidden .

1 Das Konstantinopler Fragment des Kitab al - ikhtilaf al -fuqaha ' des Abu Ja f' ar
Muhammad ibn Jarir at - Tabari , ed . Joseph Schacht , Leiden : Brill , 1933 , 1- 2 .
2 Cf. Ridwan al - Sayyid , al -Jama 'ah wa - 'l- mujtama ' wa - 'l- dawlah , Beirut : Dar al -
Muntakhab al - ' Arabl , 1997 , 61 - 74 ; Dorothea Krawulsky , " Nazrah fi al - harakiyyah al -
tarTkhiyyah li - Idiyulujiyya al -jihad fi al - islam " , al -Ijtihad 3 ( 1991 ) 12 , 109 - 44 (pp .
110 - 15 ) .
124 RID WAN AL - SAYYID

The History of al - Tabari mentions that cUmar b . al - Khattab addressed

troops , which were heading to Iraq in the year 14 / 635 , saying : " March on
the earth that God , in his Book , had promised you to ' inherit ' Simi¬
larly , in the year 16 / 637 , Sa cd b . Abi Waqqas , the leader of the Muslim
army in the battle of al - Qadisiyyah , said to Rustam , the leader of the Per¬
sian army : " Muhammad announced the Arab ' s vice - regency and their ' in¬
heritance ' of the earth . Indeed , God had sent us , and brought us forward to
drive people out of paganism into monotheism , from life ' s distress to its
extensiveness , and from the injustice of [ other ] religions to the justice of
Islam . " 4
Later , in the year 96 / 714 , when Qutaybah b . Muslim al - Bahili tried to
convince Muslim warriors of the legitimacy of fighting the Turks , he said :
" God has placed you in this position in order to honor His religion , and to

prevent wrong doing . . . God has promised His prophet victory in an au¬
thentic tradition and pronounced this in His Book , when He said : ' It is He
Who hath sent His messenger with Guidance and the Religion of Truth , to
cause it to prevail over all religions , even though the Pagans may detest
( it ) " ' ( Qur ' an 9 : 33 ) . 5

This notion of Islam and its functions , which led to the general organi¬
zation of ddr al - islam ( abode of Islam ) and dar al - harb ( the lands of war ) ,
however , were not taken for granted by some jurists during the 1st and 2nd
centuries of the hijrah . One group of Meccan and Medinan jurists did not
consider jihad a religious duty . The most distinguished of these jurists was
Sa ' Id b . Al - Musayyab ( d . 94 / 712 ) , quoted by cAbd al - Razzaq al - San canI ( d .
211 / 827 ) in his book al -Musannaf , in which he advocates defensive , rather
than offensive , warfare . 6 Similarly Ata ' b . Abi Rabbah ( d . 114 / 732 ) and
cAmr b . Dinar ( d . 172 / 788 ) did not see jihad as a religious obligation , 7

whereas Ibn Jurayj ( d . 150 / 767 ) gave priority to pilgrimage and minor
pilgrimage ( cumrah ) over jihad .
This peaceful attitude can be traced to the second half of the 2nd cen¬
tury through Sufyan al - Thawri ( d . 161 / 778 ) , al - Fudayl b . ' Iyad ( d . 187 /
803 ) , and Malik b . Anas ( d . 179 / 759 ) . Some sources have mentioned that

3 Muhammad b . Jarir al - Tabari , Kitab Ta 'rikh al - rusul wa - 'l- muluk. , i .e . Annates quos
scripsit Abu Djafar Mohammed ibn Djarir at - Tabari , ed . M .J . de Goeje et al ., 3 series ,
15 vols ., Leiden : Brill , 1879 - 1901 , ser . 1, 2160 .
4 Ibid . , ser . 1 , 2271 - 72 .
5 Ibid . , ser . 1, 1179 .
6 Abu Bakr cAbd al - Razzaq al - San ' ani , al -Musannaf , ed . Hablb al - Rahman al - A ' zami ,
: al - Maktab al - Islaml , 1970 - 72 , vol . 5 , 171 - 72 ,
Beirut no . 2971 .
7 Ibid ., vol . 5 , 171 , no . 2971 .
 DAR AL -HARB AND DAR AL -ISLAM
125

Sufyan al - Thawri went even further , saying that military expedition pre¬

vented other obligations , 8 while al - Fudayl b . Tyad considered worship near

the tomb of the Prophet far better than jihad . 9 Malik b . Anas found jihad

unnecessary , unless Muslim lands were attacked . In addition , he did not

encourage fighting before calling upon people to join Islam ( al - da (wah ) . ]0

Nevertheless , this wavering attitude towards offensive warfare faced

strong opposition among jurists in the middle of the 2nd century of the
hijrah . A prime example was that of Ibrahim b . Adham (d . 161 / 778 ), who
declared jihad one of the most distinguished acts of worship ; in his view ,

the ultimate act of renunciation ( zuhd ) is sacrifice of one ' s soul for the Al¬

mighty . 11 Ibn Adham left Khurasan to participate in jihad as part of a gar¬

rison ( murabit ) on the borders of the Byzantine Empire . There , in the north

of Bilad al - Sham and its coast ( current - day Jordan , Palestine , Syria and

Lebanon ) , Ibn Adham met Abu !Ami Abd al - Rahman b . Amr al - Awza cT

( d . 157 / 744 ) who was known for his texts on jihad and siyar and who had

spent his life in a garrison and as a fighter on the coasts and northern parts
of Bilad al - Sham . 12 Ibn Adham met Ibn !Abdallah b . Mubarak al - Marwazi

( d . 181 / 797 ) , who also came from Khurasan , studied with al - Awza % wag¬

ing holy war on his side and participating in the funding of volunteers who

fought Byzantines on the frontiers of Bilad al - Sham . 13

Fighting alongside al - Awzal was Abu Ishaq al - Fazari (d . 186 / 802 ),

known for his writings which prompted people to practice jihad and die for

8 Shams Muhammad b . Ahmad b . ' Uthman al - Dhahabl , Siyar a 'lam al - nubala ',
al - DTn
eds . Shu ' aib al - Arna ' ut and Husain al - Asad , Beirut : Mu ' assasat al - Risalah , 1401 / 1981 ,
vol . 7 , 269 . Al - Shaybanl ( or al - Sarakhs ! ) mentioned in his book Shark kitab al -siyar
al - kabir , vol . 1 , 187 , that al - Thawri did not see any obligation for jihad unless Mus¬
lims were attacked ( Muhammad b . Ahmad al - SarakhsT , Sharh kitab al -siyar al - kabir
li-Muhammad b . al -Hasan al - Shaibam , 5 vols . , eds . Salah al - DIn al - Munajjid and
cAbd al - cAz ! z Ahmad , Cairo : Matba ' at shirkat al - i ' lanat al - sharqiyyah , 1971 - 72 ) .

9 al - Dhahabl , Siyar a 'lam al - nubala ' [ fn . 8 ] , vol . 8 , 421 - 42 .

10 Al - Tabari , Ikhtilaf al -fuqaha ' [ fn . 1 ] , 4 , no . 5 , 194 , 195 ; Majid Khadduri , The Islamic
Law of Nations : Shaybani 's Siyar , Baltimore , MD : John Hopkins Press , 1966 , 57 - 58 .
11 al - Dhahabl , Siyar a 'lam al - nubala ' [ fn . 8 ] , vol . 8 , 388 - 89 .
12 ' Abdallah Muhammad al - Juburi , Fiqh al - imam al -Awza 'i: awwal tadwin li-fiqh al -
imam , Baghdad : Matba ' at al - irshad , 1977 , vol . 2 , 471 - 72 . See also Joseph Schacht , art .
" al - Awza 'I " , in : The Encyclopaedia of Islam , new ed . , vol . 1 , Leiden/ London : Brill /
Luzac , 1960 / 772 - 73 .
13 ' Abdallah ibn al - Mubarak al - Marwazi , Kitab al -jihad , ed . Nazih Hammad , n . d .,
1971 , 4 .
 RIDWAN AL - SAYYID
126

God ' s sake Abdallah b . al - Mubarak went even further in his writing on
. 14 c

jihad , entering into polemics against his companions who gave precedence
to other acts of worship over jihad . Consequently , after a battle that took
place in Tarsus against the Byzantines , cAbdallah b . al - Mubarak sent al -
Fudayl b . cIyad these verses of poetry :

You who are worshipping God in the holy precinct ,

if you watch us you will realize that your means are useless and odd .
For while you are there tinting your cheeks with colorless tears ,
our chests are being tinted with blood . 15

We can safely deduce from the texts of Imam al - Shafi ci ( d . 204 / 820 ) that
infidelity is the sole valid reason for war . According to Abu Hanifah ( d .
150 / 767 ) , and Malik b . Anas ( d . 179 / 796 ) , on the other hand , valid reasons
for war rest upon two factors : aggression or fear thereof . In fact , al - Sha -
fiTs view laid the foundation for the concept of ddr al - islam and dar al -
harb . 16
An important question arises at this point : Why did the viewpoint of
al - Shafi ' I and Ibn al - Mubarak take precedence over the views of al - Fudayl

bin ( Iyad and Malik b . Anas ? In other words , why did the peaceful con¬
cepts of ' call ' ( da 'wah ) and preaching for Islam retreat in the face of such
concepts as combat and strife ?
Historical proof exists that Bilad al - Sham , the center of the Umayyad
Caliphate , was frequently attacked by the Byzantine army and was , there¬
fore , in need of defensive military support based on religious motives .
Literature from that period refers to polemics between Syrian jurists and
jurists from other countries about the necessity of jihad on land and sea

14 Abu Ishaq al - Fazarl , Kitab al -siyar , ed . Faruq Hamadah , Beirut : Mu ' assasat al - risala ,
1987 , 347 . See also : Ikhtilaf al -fuqaha ' [ fri . 1] , 78 - 79 . Cf . also Ridwan al - Sayyid , " al -
TadwTn wa - ' l - fiqh wa - ' l- dawlah " , al -Ijtihad 2 ( 1989 ) , 100 - 102 .

15 Diwan al - imam 'Abdallah ibn al -Mubarak , al - mutawaffa sanat 181 hijriyyah , ed .

Mustafa Bahjat , al - Mansurah [ Egypt ] : Dar al - Wafa ' , 1987 , 36 - 38 .
16 Muhammad b . Idris al - Shaii ' I , Kitab al - Umm , 7 vols . Cairo , 1321 - 25 / 1903 - 08 , vol . 4 ,
84 , 90 , 96 - 97 . See also Tabari , Ikhtilaf al -fuqaha ' [ fn . 1] , 9 . Cf. Wahbah al -Zuhayll ,
Athdr al - harb fi al -fiqh al - islami: dirasah muqaranah , Damascus : Dar al - Fikr , 1983 ,
106 - 12 ; Ridwan al - Sayyid , " Kutub al - siyar wa - mas ' alat daray al - harb wa - ' l - silm " , in :
Fi mihrab al -ma 'rifah : dirasat muhdah ila Ihsan 'Abbas , ed . Ibrahim al - Sa ' afin , Beirut :
Dar Sadir , Dar al - gharb al - islami , 1997 , 131 - 47 . See also : Majid Khadduri , The Law of
War and Peace in Islam : A Study in Muslim International Law , London : Luzac , 1940 ,
40 ; idem , Islamic Law of Nations [ fn . 10 ] , 57 - 58 ; Rudolph Peters , Jihad in Medieval
and Modern Islam : The Chapter on Jihad from Averroes ' Legal Handbook 'Bidayat
al - mudjtahid ' and the Treatise 'Koran and Fighting ' by the late Shaykh al -Azhar,
Mahmud Shaltut , Leiden : Brill , 16 - 17 .
 DAR AL -HARB AND DAR AL -ISLAM
127

and the view that the Prophet himself had forseen that the people of Bilad

al - Sham would bravely resist the enemies of Islam , while members of

other countries would decline from so doing . 17

The Umayyads were known for their persistent summer and winter

campaigns ( al - sawa ' if wa - ' l - shawatT ) in the Byzantine Empire , in order to

conquest more lands or to prevent Byzantine armies from counterattack¬

ing , as they had done during the two civil wars in the first century of the

Hijrah . As time passed , this trend became an ideology , which contributed

to Umayyad legitimacy as the defenders of Islam . Quoting the great Syrian

jurist Sa cId b . cAbd al - cAz ! z , Abu Zur cah al - Dimashqi said : " Mu ' awiyah

raided summer and winter the lands of Byzantine for sixteen summers .

Then he sent his son Yazld , in the year 55 , with some of the Prophet 's

companions on land and by sea , until they crossed the gulf and fought the

people of Constantinople . " 18

Simultaneously , another evolution was taking place alongside the per¬

sistent war on the Byzantine front : the development of the Islamic Empire

and its vocation . This evolution became obvious through the designated

title of " khalifat Allah ", which Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs gave to

themselves , as well as through their emphasis on the verses of victory to

Islam and the vice - regency of Muslims under the banner of the Caliph and

amir al - mu ' minm . Furthermore , the Abbasid Caliphs gave themselves ad¬

ditional titles , such as The Devastator ( al - Saffah ), The Victorious {al -

Mansur ) , The Rightly Guided ( al - Mahdi ) , The Prudent ( al - Rashld ) , The

Trustworthy ( al - Ma cmuri ) , and The Guarded ( al - Mu ' tasim ) etc . 19

Given this evolution , a state policy developed , based upon the concepts

of invasion and jihad , the coercive interpretative judgments of the jurists

of al - Sham , and their discretional judgment that agreed with the preceding

policy . General agreement between jurisprudence and state policy , espe -

17 Abu al - Qasim ' AH b . al - Hasan Ibn ' Asakir , Tarikh madinat Dimashq , ed . Salah al - DTn
al - Munajjid , vol . 1 , Damascus : Matbu ' at al - majma 1 al - cilmi bi - Dimashq , 1951 , 103 ,
129 , 163 , 185 . See also : ' Abdallah b . al - Mubarak , Kitab al -jihad [ fn . 13 ] , 157 ; Sunan
Sa 'id bin Mansur , ed . Sa ' d ' Abdallah ibn cAbd al - ' Aziz Al Humayyid , al - Riyad : Dar
al - Sumay % 1993 , vol . 3 , no . 2381 ; cAbd al - Razzaq , al - Musannaf [ fn . 6 ] vol . 5 , 173 ;
Ridwan al - Sayyid , al -Jama 'ah [ fn . 2 ] , pp . 213 - 14 .

18 Tarikh Abl Zur 'ah al - Dimashqi , ed . Shukrallah b . Ni ' matallah al - Qawjanl , vol . 1 ,
Damascus : Matbu ' at majma c al - lughah al - ' arabiyyah bi - Dimashq , s .d . [ 1980 ] , 188 .

19 Cf . Ridwan al - Sayyid , -d\ -Jama 'ah [ fn . 2 ] . See also Wadad al - Qadi , " The Religious
Foundation of Late Umayyad Ideology " , in : Saber religioso y poder politico en el
Islam : actas del simposio internacional , Granada , 15 - 18 octubre 1991 , Madrid :
Agencia Espanola de Cooperacion Internacional , 1994 , 231 - 73 . Also see Patricia
Crone and Martin Hinds , God 's Caliphs : Religious Authority in the First Centuries of
Islam , Cambridge et al . : Cambridge University Press , 1986 , 86 - 87 .
128 RIDWAN AL - SAYYID

cially during the first three centuries , did not always follow the same trend ,
nor was the influence one - sided . The previous explanation has strong justi¬
fication , if we seriously consider variant juristic interpretations of the rela¬
tionship of the Muslim people with the rest of the world .
While al - Shafi ci was overlooking the assumptions of early jurists about
the meaning of war and its causes , students of Abu Hanifah , such as Abu
Yusuf ( d . 182 / 798 ) and Muhammad b . al - Hasan al - Shaybanl ( d . 189 / 805 ) ,
were defining dar al - kufr or dar al - harb as lands where infidels rule , lands
adjacent to other infidel territories , and lands where Muslims or free
non - Muslims under Islamic protection ( ahl al - dhimmah ) could not live
peacefully . 20 In a state where the hostility of Muslims and their proteges is
provoked , jihad must take place without hesitation irrespective of ques¬
tions of legitimacy . Jihad continues until doomsday , unaffected by either
the virtue of justice or the viciousness of tyranny . If , for any reason , jihad
becomes impossible , the best way to salvation - according mainly to the
Malikite school of jurisprudence - is emigration from the land of infidels
to the lands of Muslim domination . Such was the case before the conquest
of Mecca during the days of the Prophet . 21

II

During the medieval ages , the imperial concept of dar al - islam was chal¬
lenged for a number of reasons :
- The Spanish recapture of Toledo ( 470 / 1077 ) ,
- The final re - conquest of Sicily by the Normans (483 / 1091 ) ,
- The crusader invasion of the coasts and land of Bilad al - Sham
( 500 / 1106 ) ,

- The fall of the last Andalusian fortress in Grenada , Spain ( 898 / 1492 ) .
Muslims jurists and politicians , however , presented many pleas , which
maintained stability and the feeling of Islamic supremacy in the Muslim
consciousness . Central Islamic authorities offered no official concessions .
In case of an armistice , the truce endured for 10 years , in accordance with

20 Al - Sarakhsl , Sharh kitab al - siyar al - kablr [ fn . 8 ] , vol . 3 , 81 - 82 . See also ' Ala ' al - DIn
Abu Bakr b . Mas cud al - Kasani , Kitab bada 'i ' al -sana 'i ' fi tartlb al -shara 'l, 7 vols . ,
Cairo : al - Matba ' ah al -jamaliyyah , 1327 - 28 / 1909 - 10 , vol . 7 , 130 - 31 .
21 Abu al - Walld Muhammad b . Ahmad Ibn Rushd [ " al -jadd " ] , Kitab al - muqaddamat al -
mumahhadat [ Cairo : Matba ' at al - sa ' adah ] , new . ed . , Beirut : Dar Sadir , 1970 , vol . 2 ,
285 . Cf . Abu Bakr Muhammad b . ' Abdallah Ibn al - cArabI , Ahkam al - Qur'an , ed . Mu¬
hammad al - Bajjawi , 4 vols ., Cairo : Dar ihya ' al - kutub al - ' arabiyya , 1376 - 78 / 1957 - 59 ,
vol . 1 , 484 ; Ridwan al - Sayyid , Siyasiyyat al - islam al - mu 'asir : muraja 'at wa - mutaba 'at ,
Beirut : Dar al - Muntakhab al - ' Arabl , 1997 , 83 - 95 .
 DAR AL - HARB AND DAR AL -ISLAM
129

the prophetic tradition in sulh al - Hudaybah , with an occasional renewal of

the truce . The principle of jihad existed whenever it was attainable . In¬

deed , it was through jihad that coasts and Islamic lands dominated by the

Crusaders were eventually reclaimed . Where jihad was impossible , the

principle of emigration from dar al - kufr to dar al - islam was exercised .

Emigration was sanctioned through the legal opinions {fatawa ) of the

Malikite jurists concerning Sicily and other Andalusian cities . The general

fatwa approved sacrifice of family , money , and country to join dar al -

islam , which early Muslims did , when they migrated from Mecca to Me¬

dina . Only Muslims who were handicapped or captured were allowed to

stay on in degraded lands .

These various images of legitimacy and persistence were confronted

with inconsistencies as the modern ages emerged :

In the 12th / l 8th century , Holland took over Java and the Malay Archi¬

pelago without contract or covenant . The Sultans and Caliphs were left

with mere religious , non - political privileges . In the treaty of Kuguk Kay -

narca ( 1188 / 1774 ) between Russia and the Ottoman Empire , the Ottoman

Sultan officially abandoned a part of dar al - islam - the Crimean Peninsula ,

where the Islamic population was majority - in exchange for certain pre¬

rogatives related to endowments ( awqaj ) , judges ( qudat ) and mosques

( masajid ) . Thereafter , this Muslim Sultan , who named himself the Caliph

and amir al - mu ' minin , enjoyed neither political nor nominal authority over

the Muslim subjects in Crimea . 22 In 1330 / 1912 , the Ottomans accepted , in

an agreement with the Italians , to withdraw from Libya , leaving the Liby¬

ans to fight their colonizers alone .

The growing British influence in India and the French occupation of

Algeria ( 1246 / 1830 ) caused fundamentalist ( salaflyyun ) and Malikite ju¬

rists to call upon the Muslims of India and Algeria to emigrate to dar al -

islam . Although jurists condemned Muslims who lived under the authority

of infidels for being faithless , the latter did not emigrate in big numbers . In

fact , emigrants who left India encountered great catastrophe in the forms of

disease and starvation .23 After the defeat of 1273 - 74 / 1857 , the Muslims of

India were effectively unable to emigrate or wage war . Their religious and

political elite experienced a drastic state of anxiety , which later led to the

revival of the Ottoman - sponsored Caliphate movement in the east . The

Algerians , of whom very few emigrated , justified that they were gathering

22 Roderic H . Davison , Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History , 1774 - 1923 : The Impact
of the West , Austin , TX : Texas University Press , 1990 , 30 - 50 .

23 A .C . Niemeijer , The Khilafat Movement in India , 1919 - 1924 , The Hague : Nijhoff ,
1972 , 30 - 50 .
 130 RID WAN AL - SAYYID

in Tlemcen ( Talamsan ) and the districts of Morocco for jihad under the
leadership of Emir cAbd al - Qadir . They did wage war until cAbd al - Qadir
was expatriated .
We can safely say that the reform and liberation movements , in the
name of Islam , established a resilient relationship between the principles of
jihad , and hijrah ( emigration ) . Nonetheless , the results of jihad , even in
successful cases , were advantageous not to dar al - islam or Pan - Islamism
( al -jamfah al - islamiyyali ) but to an emerging era of nationalism and patri¬
otism . Turkey is a case in point . Leaving behind its symbolic Islamic lead¬
ership , the country abolished the Caliphate in 1342 / 1924 . A new local and
international system emerged in dar al - islam , represented by the League of
Nations , which developed after World War I and became after World War
II the United Nations . Other views , however , saw Islam politically emerg¬
ing within the traditional international system during the Napoleonic era .
During this period , the Ottoman Empire entered into a number of interna¬
tional agreements and alliances with Austria , Russia , Great Britain , France ,
Germany - Prussia , and later the unified Germany , which incorporated two
forms of concessions : ( i ) a gradual withdrawal from the Balkan region and
( ii ) recognition of concessions related to great European countries and

their subjects living under the Ottoman Sultanate . Eventually , new agree¬
ments were made , which influenced the ascending sway of these countries
in the international configuration , as well as the rise of ethnic and national
problems in Ottoman lands , Balkan states and other countries .
Muslims individuals , institutions and states faced this international sys¬
tem and its impact on dar al - islam by many means : waging holy war , emi¬
grating ( hijrah ) if confrontation were impossible , and encouraging the
ideology of Pan - Islamism , which stood for solidarity and concurrence
among and beyond existing political structures . When these factors ap¬
peared unattainable , the motives for a Muslim Congress came into view . 24
This congress was comprised of Muslims of influence , as well as those
capable of exercising interpretative judgment ( ijtihad) to deliberate on
confrontation of the situation and maintenance of Muslim solidarity .
Although these steps contributed significantly to Islamic awakening
and solidarity , they were not enough to overcome the post - World War I ,
European strategy of domination . Turkey , in particular - the heartland of
dar al - islam - accommodated to the recent developments . The result was
the official termination of dar al - islam after the abolition of the Caliphate
in 1342 / 1924 . The dual historical notions of jihad and hijrah had failed .

24 Martin Kramer , Islam Assembled : The Advent of the Muslim Congresses , New York :
Columbia University Press , 1986 , 69 - 70 .
 DAR AL -HARB AND DAR AL -ISLAM
131

III

At its beginning , the system of dar al - islam was founded on practical or

strategic bases within the Islamic state as an ideological and legislative

cover to organize international affairs . However , given doctrinal and scrip¬

tural support of jurists , it became a ruling system that determined Muslim

relations with the whole world . However , it was impossible for dar al -

islam to preserve the purity that had characterized the first three centuries

of the hijrah . Later , unable to guide relations with the non - Muslim world ,

Islam as a universal message and a state would have ended . Eventually ,

international Islamic relations did not comprise the details of dar al - islam .

Out of necessity , other intermediary juristic possibilities among states ,

such as al - muwada ' ah wa - ' l - ahd ( reconciliation and convention ) , 25 arose .

Text about these relations abound , such as the writings of Usamah bin

Munqidh , travelers , geographer - explorers , and even documents of coun¬

tries built on ruined parts of dar al - islam , such as Sicily , Spain , and Portu¬

gal . They reveal that trade , social , and scientific relations took place even

during the periods of war . Consequently , the Indian Ocean and the Medi¬

terranean persisted as a medium of peace and trade until the 16th - century

Portuguese invasion monopolized these relations .

The malleability and resilience of Islamic jurisprudence also had its

limitations . In its pure state , it was established on the principles of belief

and disbelief . The other side of the hijrah issue emerged , when Islam as a

religion expanded into such regions as East Asia and Africa , during an era

considered an age of crisis . Muslims could do nothing about the confined

limits of juristic and scholastic theology ; under these circumstances , such

issues as the utility of interpretative judgment ( ijtihad ) was of no use .

Despite this , the Indian reformer Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan ( 1817 - 1898

C . E . ) dared to pose the question : " Are Muslims obliged to fight the British

Crown ? Or , in other words , what would happen to their faith if they do not

fight it ? " 26 His answer , condemned by Indian jurists and jurists across the

Muslim world , came as such : jihad can no more be a pillar in Islam . It was

proven after the defeat of 1273 - 74 / 1857 that jihad had led only to futile

25 Cf . Muhammad Abu Zahrah , al - 'Alaqat al - duwaliyyah ji al - Islam , Cairo : al - Thaqafah

wa - ' l - irshad al - qauml , 1384 / 1964 , 54 - 54 ; Subhl al - Mahmasam , al - Qanwi wa - 'l - 'alaqat
al - duwaliyyah ji al - Islam , Beirut : Dar al - cilm li - l - malayyln , 1392 / 1972 , 50 - 52 ; cAb -
dallatlf Husni , " al - Tasawwur al - islam ! li - l - calam " , al - Ijtihad 3 ( 1991 ) 12 , 89 - 108 (pp .
95 - 100 ) .'

26 William Wilson Hunter , The Indian Musalmans : Are They Bound in Conscience to
Rebel against the Queen ? , London : Triibner , 1871 ( 3rd ed . , Delhi : Indological Book
House , 1969 ) .
132 RID WAN AL - SAYYID

death of Muslims . Ahmad Khan justified this from reinterpreting Qur ' anic
verses ( ta 'wil) about jihad according to circumstances of revelation in a
manner inapplicable to the Indian state , thereby evading the injunction to
fight and emigrate . 27
In the Arab sphere , on the other hand , Muslims had a different perspec¬
tive . Al - Tahtawi ( 1801 - 73 ) and Khayr al - DIn al - Tunisi ( 1820 - 89 ) were
concerned with establishing laws on the basis of interests ( iqamat
al - ahkam 1aid al - masalih ) . Later , a manuscript of al - Shatibl ' s book
al -Muwafaqat was discovered , which Muhammad cAbduh ( 1849 - 1905 )
published after long teaching it in Tunisia and Beirut during his days of
exile . Through this book , the purpose of Islamic sharfah ( law ) ( maqasid
al - sharfah ) went beyond analogical deduction to become an interesting
topic among Muslim circles during that period . 28
Topics , such as patriotism , equality , and international relations , were
also discussed in Istanbul from the 1840s . Indeed , the Ottoman Constitu¬
tion of 1293 / 1876 declared equality between all Ottoman subjects without
racial , religious , or regional segregation . Religious segregation ( Islamic
superiority ) was no longer accepted as reasonable , 29 given this decree , the
European onslaught and great privileges of foreign subjects , as well as
privileges of non - Muslim Ottoman subjects protected by these European
countries .
Given that the ascending trend of the 19th century resided in motives
of progress , preserving Muslim interest according to the concept of
sharFah required a diversion towards the West in order to seek knowledge .
Muslims were not embarrassed to ' resemble infidels ' ( at - tashabbuh bi - 'l-
kuffar ) in areas that benefited them . In 1907 , this stance reached its climax ,
when Rashld Rida ( 1865 - 1935 ) answered a reader ' s question in his journal
al -Manar . " Oh you Muslim , never say that this consultative system [ con¬

stitutional system ] is a fundamental principle of religion , and we have de¬

duced it from the holy book and the biographies of the orthodox Caliphs
( al - khulafa ' al - rashidun ), and not from associating with the European and
Western statues . For , if we were not considering the state of these people
as an example , neither you nor the likes of you would have thought of such
a system as a part of Islam . " According to Rida , the political system in
Islam is a constitutional system , although its mechanisms and rudiments
are exclusively European .

27 Cf . Dorothea Krawulsky , " al - Islam wa - ' l - islah : al - wazlr Rashld al - DIn wa - ' l - tajdld al -
islaml bi - Iran fi ai - qarn al - rabi c ' ashar al - mlladl " , al - Ijtihad 2 ( 1990 ) 8 , 105 - 33 .
28 al - Sayyid , Siyasiyyat [ fn . 21 ] , 161 - 67 .
29 Davison , Essays [ fn . 22 ] , 112 - 32 .
 DAR AL -HARB AND DAR AL -ISLAM
133

Today , the situation has changed . Between the 1920s and 1970s , Is¬

lamic identity experienced a revival . Managing to change priorities and

interests gave great importance to concepts of identity , symbols , and slo¬

gans . Although Abu al - A cla al - Mawdudi ( d . 1400 / 1979 ) and Sayyid Qutb

(d . 1386 / 1966 ) insisted on Muslim ' superiority ' , 30 what evolved instead

was distinction , separation , and even a strong desire to form independent

characteristics of Islamic identity . During the 1970s , this schism led to the

revival of the ideological concepts of dar al - islam and ddr al - harb . In fact ,

Muslim revivalists did not perceive the world through the notions of belief

and disbelief but rather through " the holy and the filthy " motives , due to

the prevailing aggravation of this thought which left some of its traces till

our days .

The old jurisprudential apprehension of the world is incapable of en¬

compassing the world 's diversity and multiculturalism . Contemporary

revivalists are against such a world . They are neither capable of under¬

standing nor dealing with such a world . Yet , we cannot deny the contribu¬

tions of the reform movement . As we have seen , the old set - up is an

interpretative set - up , and the texts , which gave this set - up legitimacy , were

developed in a later period . In order to reach a new interpretative stance ,

which can actively help contemporary Muslims participate in universal

decision - making , they must benefit from the experience of the two previ¬

ous centuries . In order to influence world order and questions related to the

Declaration of Human Rights , one must develop the capacity to exert in¬

fluence from inside . This would serve Muslim and world interests at large .

To make proposals from outside , however , means the setting of conditions

we are unable to impose , let alone control .

A great difference exists between Islam , the " call " , and Islam , the dis¬

tinctive identity . Our experience with the revitalization of distinctive

Islamic identity in the second half of the 20th century was miserable and

gloomy . We should return to Islam , the " call " , so that new opportunities

may be opened . Such opportunities will liberate texts from the burden of

history and allow free and responsible interaction with the rest of the
world .

30 Al - Mawdudi wrote his first epistle on jihad in 1928 , as a response to Hindu accusa¬
tions claiming that Islam expanded by the force of sword . Two other epistles on jihad
were written by Hasan al - Banna ' ( d . 1368 / 1949 ) and Sayyid Qutb . All three epistles
were published in one book at Cairo in 1977 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE DU JIHÀD 1
Edgard Weber

A l ' heure où les violences religieuses sont à nouveau à l ' ordre du jour , et

sous des formes multiples , il est nécessaire une fois de plus de réfléchir sur

l ' apparition exacerbée de ce phénomène . Tout homme est violent , les psy¬

chologues nous l ' apprennent . Toute culture ou civilisation est ou peut être

violente quand il lui semble que ses intérêts majeurs sont en cause . Chaque

société a fait l ' expérience de la violence , mais elle tient à réglementer celle -

ci , d ' une part en l ' interdisant à titre strictement individuel , mais aussi en la

rendant parfois obligatoire à titre collectif C ' est ainsi que les guerres ont été

organisées et que le ' citoyen ' a été contraint de les faire pour le bien de ' la

Patrie ' ... ' l ' État ' . . . ' l ' intérêt supérieur ' . Les religions chrétienne et musul¬

mane n ' ont pas dérogé à cette règle de l ' Histoire . Chrétiens et musulmans ,

à travers une histoire de plus de quatorze siècles , se sont fait la guerre et

ont utilisé la violence tout en exhortant les croyants , en d ' autres heures , à

exercer la bonté , le pardon et la miséricorde . Les uns et les autres ont justi¬

fié le recours à la violence et le justifient encore , si nécessaire , à partir

d ' une cohérence établie par un ' appareil ' théologique séculaire . Les argu¬

ments ne manquent pas , ni d ' un côté ni de l ' autre . Et souvent les hommes

ont conclu que c ' est Dieu lui - même qui la veut ! Dans les pages qui suivent

nous évoquerons essentiellement le processus de codification du jihâd

musulman 2 en rappelant , d ' une part les auteurs principaux de cette codifi¬

cation , d ' autre part en évoquant le contenu de leur réflexion .

Cette codification juridique du jihâd se fait grosso modo au moment de

l ' apparition des grandes écoles juridiques 3 , au moment aussi où l ' islam est

1 Nous transcrirons ainsi le mot sauf dans les titres d ' ouvrage ou citations d ' auteurs .
2 Nous avons déjà traité cette question dans notre livre : Edgard Weber et Georges Rey -
naud , Croisades d 'hier , djihâd d 'aujourd 'hui : théorie et pratique de la violence dans
les rapports entre l ' Occident chrétien et l ' Orient musulman , Paris : Editions du Cerf,
1988 . Nous en reprenons ici une partie .
3 II s ' agit
évidemment de l ' école hanafite fondée à Bagdad par Abu Hanïfah ( 699 - 774 ) ;
l ' école
malikite fondée à Médine par Mâlik ibn Anas ( 716 - 795 ) ; l ' école hanbalite fon¬
dée à Bagdad par Ahmad ibn Hanbal ( 780 - 855 ) et l ' école chafiite attribuée à un disci¬
ple de Mâlik , Muhammad ibn Idrîs al - Shâfi ' î ( 767 - 820 ) .
 136 EDGARD WEBER

arrivé à son expansion maximale .4 Il devenait alors nécessaire de structurer

une pratique dont les premiers éléments sont prescrits par le Qur ' àn , et

dont Mahomet a donné en partie l ' exemple ainsi que ses premiers compa¬

gnons . Les musulmans de la conquête en feront un devoir religieux .

L ' empire abbasside , dès le milieu du Ville siècle , mais déjà l ' empire

omayyade , doit réglementer un certain nombre de problèmes que pose le

jihàd : celui , par exemple , de l ' impôt à payer . Qui doit payer quoi ? Mais

aussi comment mener le jihàdl Quel sort réserver aux captifs ? Quel rôle

exact doit jouer le calife dans cette opération ? L ' empire s ' étant constitué

dans ses limites maximales , il faut désormais en assurer l ' organisation . Le

jihàd ne fait pas exception à cette nécessité d ' organisation et de rationali¬

sation .

Les présupposés de la codification

Si l ' on examine les traités qui codifient le jihàd , une première constatation

s ' impose . Celui - ci apparaît essentiellement comme une actualisation per¬

manente de la Révélation divine qui en est la source essentielle , même si

l ' on sait que le jihàd des débuts de l ' islam ne différait guère , dans sa

forme , de la pratique de la razzia 5 que connaissaient les Arabes de l ' anté -

islam depuis bien longtemps . Mais le Qur ' àn proclame désormais le jihàd

comme ordre d ' Allah et non plus comme une pratique ancestrale liée à des

conditions socio - économiques propres aux tribus arabes . Certes , le socio¬

logue ou l ' ethnologue est capable , aujourd ' hui , de mettre facilement en

lumière le lien qui rapproche la razzia du jihàd , si l ' on considère , par

exemple , l ' appropriation des biens d ' autrui à laquelle les deux institutions

conduisent . On pourrait également montrer que le jihàd n ' a pu être pensé

et donc appliqué que parce que les Arabes en avaient déjà une pratique

similaire dans la razzia . Le jihàd s ' appuie en fait sur une pratique ances¬

trale que la foi nouvelle modifie plus au plan de sa signification qu ' au plan

de la pratique . Désormais il n ' est plus question de faire des razzias contre

ses coreligionnaires , la razzia n ' est plus dirigée contre des tribus arabes

ayant adopté l ' islam mais contre ceux qui ne partagent pas l ' islam et qui ne

4 Robert Mantran , L 'Expansion musulmane ( VlIe -XIe siècles) , Paris : Presses universitai¬
res de -France , 1969 . Une vision synthétique de l ' histoire de l ' islam et des conquêtes se
retrouve aussi chez : Dominique et Jeanine Sourdel , La Civilisation de l 'Islam classi¬
que, Paris : Arthaud , 1968 ; André Miquel , L 'Islam et sa civilisation , VUe -XXe siècle ,
Paris : Armand Colin , 1977 ; Roger Caratini , Le génie de l ' islamisme , Paris : Michel La -
fon , 1992 .

5 Montagne , La Civilisation du désert , Paris , 1947 et T .M . Johnstone , art . " ghazw " , in :
Encyclopédie de l 'Islam , nouv . éd . , tm . 2 , Leyde : Brill , 1965 , 1079 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 137

connaissent pas encore le lien de la foi nouvelle . Le jihâd se présente dé¬

sormais comme le ciment d ' une nouvelle unité entre les différentes tribus
ralliées à Mahomet et qui doivent apporter l ' islam à ceux qui sont restés en
dehors de la prédication , à savoir les gens du Livre : Juifs et Chrétiens mais
aussi les païens .
Le dàr al - islâm 6 , à savoir les pays qui ont adopté officiellement
l ' islam , constitue l ' ummah du Prophète : la communauté du Prophète et

s ' oppose ainsi au dàr al - harb 7 : le territoire de la guerre , qui englobe tous

les autres humains . Encore faut - il distinguer à l ' intérieur du dàr al - harb , le
statut particulier accordé aux ahl al - kitâb , à savoir " les gens du Livre " 8 ,
désignant principalement les Juifs et Chrétiens . Ceux - ci forment plus pré¬
cisément le dàr al -sulh 9 , avec lequel les musulmans peuvent établir des
traités de non - hostilité . Le jihàd est donc un commandement d ' Allah qui
demande aux musulmans d ' ouvrir à l ' islam les territoires qui ne connais¬
sent pas encore la nouvelle prédication . Le jihàd se confond alors souvent
aux futuhàt 10 , à savoir en fait aux conquêtes entreprises par les premières
générations de musulmans au détriment de l ' empire perse et byzantin .
Outre les commandements explicites dans le Qur ' àn pour accomplir le
jihâd , les codificateurs ultérieurs justifient encore cette pratique par
d ' autres points .

L ' exemple du Prophète

Le jihâd , dans la codification juridique classique , apparaît en même temps

comme une fidélité exemplaire de la pratique même du Prophète . Le Qur¬
' àn stipule clairement que l ' Envoyé d ' Allah a pratiqué le jihâd . Et Ibn

6 Dàr al - islâm signifie mot à mot : maison de l ' islam , territoire où la soumission à Allah
est réelle .
7 Dàr al - harb : maison de la guerre , soit territoire sur lequel peut être porté la confronta¬
tion armée .
8 Outre les Chrétiens et les Juifs , l ' expression " gens du Livre " s ' appliquent aussi aux
Sabéens et même à tous ceux qui se réclament d ' une " Écriture " . Ceux - là sont alors
protégés par l ' islam et payent en retour la dhimmah et sont considérés comme des
dhimmîs . Ceux qui croient en plusieurs dieux sont assimilés aux kufjar et doivent être
convertis à l ' islam . Voir M . Khadduri , art . " sulh " , in : Encyclopédie de l 'Islam , nouv .
ed , tm . 9 , Leyde : Brill , 1998 , 880 f.

9 Dàr al -sulh : maison de la réconciliation , soit le territoire où le musulman peut faire un

pacte ou une trêve avec un non - musulman .
10 Ce mot vient du verbe fataha : ouvrir .
 138 EDGARD WEBER

Hishâm dans la célèbre sïrah largement repris par Ibn Ishàq 11 relève en
effet dans le détail les actions menées par le Prophète . Il suffît d ' en men¬
tionner les principales :
623 attaque d ' une caravane mekkoise ( Qur ' ân 22 : 39 - 40 )
623 attaque d ' une caravane mekkoise à Nakhlah durant le mois sacré de
rajab ( Qur ' ân 2 : 217 ) . Cette attaque est la première véritable transgres¬
sion de la coutume arabe au profit d ' un ordre nouveau .
624 bataille de Badr près de Médine ( Qur ' ân 8 : 1 ) . Mahomet reçoit la
charge de faire la répartition du butin .
624 l ' expulsion de Médine ( Yathrib ) du clan juif des Qaynuqâ ' ( Qur ' ân
59 : 2 ) .
625 bataille d ' Uhud ( Qur ' ân 3 : 121 - 25 ) . Cette défaite des musulmans est
comprise comme un appel à la patience et l ' endurance ( sabr ) .
625 l ' expulsion des juifs Nadïr ( Qur ' ân 59 : 6 ) . À cette occasion est posée la
question des moyens employés : a - t - on le droit de couper les palmiers ?
627 bataille du Khandaq ( Qur ' ân 39 : 3 ) . Les musulmans sont assistés par
les anges . La réalité et l ' imaginaire ne font qu ' un .
630 prise de la Mekke et destruction des idoles ( Qur ' ân 9 : 58 ) . La question
de la répartition du butin se pose avec acuité .
630 l ' expédition vers Tabuk et la révolte de certains musulmans ( Qur ' ân
9 : 81 ) . La révolte est étouffée dans l ' œuf mais elle pose la question du

sort des schismatiques .

Ces dates que le Qur ' ân est censé corroborer dans plusieurs versets servent
désormais dans la tradition de référence à la codification juridique .

La tradition du hadïth

exemple du Prophète n ' est pas la seule instance juridique . Avec le

L '

temps , et dans des circonstances nouvelles , le codificateur se trouve parfois

devant des questions dont la réponse n ' est ni dans le Qur ' ân ni dans la
pratique du Prophète . Il a recours alors au hadïth : aux propos que le Pro¬
phète est censé avoir tenu sur le jihâd . Nous savons que les traditionnistes
ont collecté une masse impressionnante de hadïth précisant le devoir du
jihâd et toutes les conduites qui s 'y rapportent . Tous les détails contenus

11 La traduction allemande de la sïrah est : Ibn Ishàq , Das Leben des Propheten , tr . G .
Rotter , Tubingen : Horst Erdmann Verlag , 1976 . Nous nous sommes reporté au texte
arabe : al - sïrah al - nabawiyyah , édité par Ahmad Hijâzi al - Saqqâ , Dâr al - turâth al - ' arabï
( s .d .) . Voir surtout les articles " sïra " , in : Encyclopédie de l 'Islam , nouv . éd ., tm . 9 ,
Leyde : Brill , 1998 , 686 - 89 ; " Ibn Hishâm " , ibid . , tm . 3 , 1965 , 824 ; ' Ibn Ishâq " , ibid . ,
834 ; " maghâzï " , ibid . , tm . 5 , 1986 , 1151 - 54 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 139

dans les paroles rapportées par al - Bukhàrï ( m . 870 ) 12 , Muslim ( m . 875 ),

Abu Dà ' ùd al - Sijistânï ( m . 889 ) 13 , al - Tirmidhl ( m . 892 ) et d ' autres tradi -

tiormistes 14 se retrouvent dans les traités de droit pour préciser tel ou tel

aspect du jihâd . Le codifïcateur avait là une source plus souple et plus

ample que le texte du Qur ' ân . Le hadith n ' est - il pas là précisément pour

compléter ce que le Qur ' ân n ' a pas stipulé ?

Les droits byzantin , perse et talmudique

Outre ces deux grandes sources musulmanes de l ' élaboration juridique , le

Qur ' ân et le hadïth , une critique minutieuse des textes juridiques montre

aussi que les droits déjà existants au Ville siècle comme le droit romano -

byzantin 15 , ou persano - sassanide , voire même talmudique 16 et les canons

particuliers des différentes églises orientales ont pu jouer un rôle dans cette

élaboration juridique musulmane .

Nous ne voulons comme preuve que le parallélisme qui existe entre le

Deutéronome chapitre 20 et certaines questions abordées dans les traités de

jihâd . Déjà la Bible stipulait le sort des femmes et des enfants , la manière

de mener la guerre , la manière de traiter les prisonniers . . . C ' est également

la Bible qui rapporte comme le Qur ' ân , l ' idée selon laquelle c ' est en fait

Dieu qui veut la guerre et qui la mène en donnant la victoire à qui il veut ...

Le passage du Deutéronome nous paraît important car il est déjà lui aussi

une sorte de codification de la milkhama pratiquée par les Hébreux mille

ans avant Jésus Christ et qui régit les rapports entre monothéistes et poly¬

théistes au moment où se fait la conquête de la Palestine au nom même de

Dieu .

12 Le recueil le plus prestigieux des hadïths est incontestablement celui d ' al - Bukhàrî : al-
sahîh qui groupe pas moins de 7397 hadïths classés en 3450 rubriques ( abwâb ) .
13 Le recueil de ce dernier contient pas moins de 4500 hadïths .
14 Comme al - Nasal ( m . 915 ) , Ibn Màjah ( m . 887 ) sans oublier les recueils primitifs
comme celui d ' Anâs ibn Mâlik ( m . 740 ) : Kitâb al -muwatta '.
15 Jeanne Ladjili - Mouchette , Histoire juridique de la Méditerranée , droit romain , droit
musulman , Tunis : Publications scientifiques tunisiennes , 1990 ( = série Histoire du
droit ; 1) . On ne peut que recommander de se rapporter à la très riche bibliographie de
cette étude concernant les sources du droit musulman .
16 Guillaume Cardascia et Imbert Monier , Le droit hébraïque dans l 'histoire des institu¬
tions et des faits sociaux des origines à l 'aube du Moyen -Age , Paris , 1955 . Voir aussi
le Talmud de Jérusalem , tr . M . Schwab , 11 vols . , Paris : Imprimerie Nationale , 1878 -
1890 ; et le Talmud de Babylone , The Babylonian Talmud in English , tr . I . Epstein , 36
vols . , Londres , 1935 - 1953 ; Hermann Leberecht Strack , Introduction au Talmud et au
Midrash , tr . M .- R . Hayoun , 7e éd . , rev . par G . Stemberger , Paris : Le Cerf , 1986 .
 EDGARD WEBER
140

La razzia

Il faut ajouter enfin que la pratique du jihâd si elle a été rationalisée un

siècle après la mort de Mahomet ne reste jamais totalement étrangère à la
coutume ancestrale des Arabes de la razzia 17 d ' une part et du tha 'r 18
d ' autre part . Beaucoup de savants chercheurs ont souligné le lien entre ces

pratiques . La razzia était naturellement un code oral , donc non écrit . En la

réinterprétant , l ' islam lui donnera une dimension nouvelle , en la finalisant
et en la mettant au service d ' une cause religieuse . Les grandes différences
entre razzia et jihâd sont évidentes : désormais le jihâd institue un état
permanent entre le dur al - harb et le dâr al - islâm . Et de nombreux hadïth
précisent que le jihâd doit se poursuivre jusqu ' à la fin des temps . Le jihâd
est une obligation collective (fard Idfâyah) qui doit être menée essentiel¬
lement par le calife . Elle ne devient obligation individuelle (fard al - 'ayn)
que si la sécurité de la ummah est en cause . Le jihâd est désormais la seule
' guerre ' juste et les rivalités tribales sont désormais prohibées au profit de

l ' expansion de l ' islam à laquelle tout croyant doit contribuer . La vendetta

(tha 'r) prend désormais une tout autre dimension . Elle est appelée à dispa¬
raître au profit de la fraternité et de la solidarité musulmane .

Jihâd et traités de fiqh

Remarquons que la codification du jihâd se trouve dans les traités de fiqh
et non dans les traités réservés à l ' art militaire . C ' est que le jihâd n ' est pas
à proprement parler une guerre : harb , comme on peut l ' entendre aujourd ' hui .
Il se trouve dans les traités de jurisprudence parce qu ' il touche au statut du
croyant que la jurisprudence musulmane doit définir . Plusieurs questions
doivent ainsi obtenir des réponses juridiques claires . Qui doit payer les im¬
pôts ? Un juif ou un chrétien qui est normalement contraint à la capitation
('jizyah ) 19 et au quint ( kharâj ) 20 , doit - il continuer à les payer s ' il se convertit

ou bien ne paye - t - il plus que la zakât ( le versement volontaire du musul -

17 Voir Johnstone , " ghazw " [ note 5 ] , 1079 .

18 II s ' agit là de la vengeance ou des représailles . On l ' entend aussi par loi du talion . Le
prix du sang , diyah , a été exposé par Joseph Chelhod , Le Droit dans la société bé¬
douine : recherches ethnologiques sur le 'orf ou droit coutumier des Bédouins , Paris :
Marcel Rivière , 1971 (= Petite Bibliothèque sociologique internationale ) . Voir aussi E .
Tyan , art . " diya " in : Encyclopédie de l 'Islam , vol . 2 , 1965 , 350 - 52 .
19 Voir article " Jizya " in : Encyclopédie de l 'Islam , 1965 , 573 - 581 ; et Antoine Fattal , Le
Statut des non - musulmans en pays d 'Islam , Beyrouth : Imprimerie Catholique , 1958 .
20 Une abondante bibliographie sur la question se trouve dans Claude Cahen et al . , art .
" kharâdj " in : Encyclopédie de l 'Islam , vol . 4 , 1978 , 1062 - 87 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 141

man à sa communauté )? On sait que dans les premiers temps de l ' islam

certaines conversions se faisaient pour échapper au kharâj et à la jizyah .

Plus tard , les caisses de l ' empire étant vides , les convertis et même les

musulmans de longue date seront parfois contraints à payer plus que la

zakàt . Les conquêtes posent encore une autre question : à qui et comment

distribuer le fay 3 ( le butin collectif pris sur les non - musulmans ) ? Qui peut

bénéficier de l ' iqtâ ' ( attribution de terres faite aux militaires )?

Outre les questions toujours délicates touchant à l ' argent et au partage

de la richesse , il faut aussi déterminer le statut du croyant et de l ' incroyant ,

préciser les droits et les devoirs de chacun . Au moment où la codification

juridique du jihâd s ' impose , il existe encore de grands ensembles consti¬

tués de juifs , de chrétiens , de zoroastriens et à plus forte raison de païens

dans les terres africaines et asiatiques . . . Le statut du croyant exige des rè¬

gles claires sur la pureté légale . Le martyr , le mujâhid , tombé en plein ji¬
hâd a - t - il besoin d ' être lavé et enseveli comme un musulman ordinaire ? Si

le mujâhid combat dans le chemin d ' Allah , doit - il accomplir toutes les

prières légales prescrites au croyant ordinaire ? Peut - il être dispensé du

jeûne qui risque d ' amoindrir ses forces contre l ' ennemi ?

Ces quelques questions montrent clairement que le jihâd fait donc par¬

tie de l ' activité spécifique des fuqahâ des spécialistes de la jurisprudence

musulmane appelé fiqh . Quatre écoles juridiques se partagent traditionnel¬

lement cette élaboration .

Les traités qui ont codifié la théorie du jihâd sont nombreux . Un des

premiers traités de jurisprudence a été composé par un juriste du Khurâsàn ,

cAbdallâh ibn al - Mubârak ( m . 797 ) , qui écrivit un Kitâb al -jihâd 11 . Lui -

même semble être mort dans une expédition près de Hït sur l ' Euphrate . Il

aura plus tard deux disciples : Yahyà ibn Âdam ( m . 810 ) qui composa un

Kitâb al - kharâj représentatif de la tendance traditionnaliste ; et Abu cUbayd

al - Qàsim ibn Sallâm ( m . 838 ) , grammairien , juriste et exégète qui écrit un

Kitâb al - amwâl 22 .

Les quatre écoles classiques

L ' école hanafite

Une des premières écoles juridiques officielles est sans conteste l ' école du

maître du ra 'y , la libre opinion : Abu Hanïfah ( m . 767 ) qui avait fait de

21 Edition Nazïh Hammâd , Beyrouth , 1971 .

22 Edition du Caire , 1353 .
142 EDGARD WEBER

l' estimation personnelle ( istihsân ) une des sources de sa doctrine . Dans sa

profession de foi , le Kitâb al-fiqh al - akbar , il condamne les khâridjites , les
qadariyya , et les djahmiyya . Il ne dit rien des murdji ' ites , car il en était , ni
des mu ctazilites parce qu ' ils sont postérieurs .
L ' école hanafite connaît trois représentants importants . Le premier est

Abu Yusuf Ya cqùb ( m . 798 ) , disciple de Abu Hanïfah mais capable de

s ' écarter parfois de la doctrine du maître . Abu Yusuf Ya cqùb préconise la

libre opinion ( m 'y ) , et compose pour Hàrùn al - Rashïd un manuel de fiqh

pour répondre à toutes sortes de questions relatives à la politique , à
l ' administration , au droit . . . intitulé : Le Livre de l ' impôt foncier 23 (Kitâb al-

kharâj ) . On y trouve dans un exposé sans véritable plan déterminé la ré¬

ponse à certaines questions que posait le jihâd . Ainsi la question du par¬
tage du butin est traitée avec une grande insistance . La fin du traité aborde
les questions du jihâd proprement dit . Pour répondre à beaucoup d ' entre
elles , Ya cqub s ' appuie sur l ' exemple du Prophète , et recourt au hadïth .
Il devient un cadi important d ' al - Mahdï et de Hàrùn al - Ràshïd ,
occupant même la charge de grand cadi sous ce dernier . C ' est un contem¬
porain de ! Umar II ibn cAbd al - cAzïz ( 683 - 720 ) qui doit calmer le mé¬
contentement des mawâlï en les inscrivant dans le dïwân de l ' armée et en
supprimant la jizyah qui pesaient sur eux . Mais il rétablit de nouveau , pour
les dhimmïs , les prescriptions vestimentaires et le devoir de soumission
imposée par cUmar I . A sa mort les Arabes des frontières passent dans
l ' opposition . La révolte abbasside du Khurâsàn n ' est pas loin . En effet , al -

Mansùr devient calife de 754 à 775 auquel succède al - Mahdï ( 775 - 785 ) et
Hàrùn ( 786 - 809 ) . Son livre est en fait un véritable traité de finances publi¬
ques , de fiscalité et de justice criminelle . On y trouve les premiers élé¬
ments propres au jihâd quand il donne une réponse aux problèmes du par¬
tage , du sort des captifs , les moyens employés à faire la guerre , le rôle du
chef , le droit d ' exercer Y aman , la paix et les trêves . . . Il aborde aussi l ' atti¬
tude à adopter envers les rebelles à l ' intérieur de l ' islam , envers ceux qui
se repentent ou pas .
Le second disciple est Muhammad al - Shaybânî ( m . 805 ) qui est sans
doute le disciple le plus brillant d ' Abù Hanïfah . Il devient cadi de Raqqah
sous al - Hârùn . Il assiste à la chute brutale des Barmacides en 802 . Son
action est principalement liée à la politique califale d ' al - Hàrûn . Il écrit un

23 Abu Yûsuf Ya ' qûb , Livre de l ' impôt foncier , trad . E . Fagnan , Paris : Geuthner , 1921 ,
27 - 43 . La fin du livre est principalement consacré à la conduite de la guerre sainte ,
295 - 334 . D ' autres livres lui sont attribués : un Kitâb al - athâr qui est un recueil de tradi¬
tions , et un Kitâb al - radd 'alâ siyar al -Awzâ % dans lequel il répond en effet à al -
Awzâ ' ï , et réfute les opinions du docteur syrien , sur le droit militaire .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 143

Kitâb al - siyar al - kabîr 24 dans lequel il codifie le plus la pensée de Abu

Hanïfah . Il est l ' auteur du premier véritable traité consacré aux subterfuges

( ihiyaî ) juridiques . Ce qui montre qu ' il fallait sans doute très souvent adop¬

ter la Loi à la réalité sociale infiniment plus complexe que la pure élabora¬

tion des théologiens .

Le troisième est al - Qudur ! ( m . 1037 à Bagdad ) qui est peut - être le plus

représentatif du hanafisme avec son Mukhtasar 25 , véritable manuel du

hanafisme aussi connu que la Risâlah de Qayrawânï chez les Malikites . Al -

Qudûrî est déjà le témoin d ' un monde arabo - musulman qui a perdu son

unité politique . Le califat résiste encore sur le terrain spirituel mais déjà les

provinces iraquiennes tombent entre les mains des Hamdànides arabes et

des Bouyides iraniens , puis des sultans turcs seldjukides . En effet , en 1034

les Turcs Oghuz guidés par les Seldjuk pénètrent en Iran . Quinze ans plus

tard , le calife Qâ ' im donne le titre de rukn al - dïn et de sultan au chef des

Seldjuks : Tughtil Beg . Pour le Moyen Orient l ' aventure turque commence

dès ce onzième siècle . Les Fatimides du Maghreb se révoltent , l ' Egypte

fatimide aura son calife , les Omayyades d ' Espagne éclatent en reyes de

Taïfas et les Berbères almoravides s ' apprêtent à la conquête de

l ' Espagne ... A sa mort Ferdinand 1er de Castille s ' empare de Léon et

confirme la Reconquista . 1037 est aussi la date de la mort d ' Ibn Sïnâ . Sans

qu ' il y ait un grand ordre logique , ce livre précieux traite du rituel , des

contrats , du statut personnel , du droit pénal et des successions . Al - Qudùrï

apparaît donc à un moment où l ' empire abbasside connaît de très grands

problèmes internes dus à la lutte des Fatimides mais aussi des Qarmates et

de la vieille opposition entre sunnites et chiites .

24 Edition et commentaire d ' al - Sharakhsï , Hyderabad , 1916 - 17 et Le Caire 1957 . Il est

également l ' auteur d ' un Kitâb al-siyar al -saghîr dont une traduction partielle est faite
par Majid Khadduri , The Islamic Law of Nations : Shaybânï 's Siyar, Baltimore : John
Hopkins Press , 1966 . Une étude très instructive sur les débuts du droit musulman a été
faite par Joseph Schacht , The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence , Oxford : Cla -
rendon Press , 1950 ; idem , An Introduction to Islamic Law , Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
1964 .

25 Le chapitre consacrée à la guerre sainte à été traduit en latin par Rosenmuller en 1847
dans Analecta arabica , Leipzig , 1825 - 1829 , et en français par Ch . Solvet , Paris , 1829 .
Bercher a fait la traduction en français d ' un des chapitres , intitulé Kitâb al - siyar . Il est
enfin l ' auteur d ' un Kitâb al - nikàh ( sur le mariage ) et un Kitâb al - tajrîd sur la diffé¬
rence entre Hanafites et Chafiites . On trouve également de larges passages traduits du
Mukhtasar par Bousquet et Bercher , Le Statut personnel en droit musulman hanéfite ,
Tunis s .d .
144 EDGARD WEBER

L 'école malikite

Les premières théories du jihâd se trouvent dans le Muwatta 3 de Mâlik Ibn

Anas ( m . 795 ) . Il est le fondateur de l ' école du hadïth comme Abu Hanîfah
l ' est de l ' école du ra 'y . En effet , tout son livre est un traité de fiqh fondé

sur le hadïth rapporté essentiellement par des Médinois ou des traditionnis -

tes rencontrés à Médine et à La Mekke . L ' auteur insiste plus sur la
condamnation des schismatiques qadariyya et khâridjites parce qu ' ils sont
susceptibles d ' engendrer corruption (fasàd ) et désordre dans la
communauté , que sur la pratique du jihâd contre les Infidèles . Selon lui ,
l ' État devait pourchasser avec rigueur tout schismatique qui pouvait
menacer la Loi .
Un de ses disciples réputés est Ibn Abï Zayd al - Qayrawànï ( m . 996 )
qui composa une Risâlah 26 dans laquelle il se fait le propagandiste de Mâ¬
lik en Afrique du Nord . Il est contemporain de l ' arrivée des Fatimides en
Ifrlqiyah . Rappelons qu ' en 969 les Fatimides d ' Afrique du Nord entre¬
prennent la conquête de l ' Égypte sous le commandement du sicilien Jaw -
har et fondent al - Qàhirah et al - Azhar . Hàkim règne au Caire de 926 à
1021 . En Ifrlqiyah , à Mahdiyyah , c ' est le Berbère sanhadjien Bâdis qui
gouverne au nom des Fatimides 996 - 1016 . Al - Qayrawànï s ' éteint juste
avant cet événement qui en 1007 provoque la fondation de la dynastie ziri -
des à Mahdiyya et celle des Hammadides à la Qal ' ah des Banî Hammâd
dans le Hodna . Il vécut essentiellement à Kairouan à un moment où
l ' Afrique du Nord est traversé par de graves événements politiques et reli¬

gieux . Le chapitre XXX de son livre est entièrement consacré au jihâd .

Quelques siècles plus tard on trouvera al - Khalïl ibn Ishâq ( m . 1365 )
avec son Mukhtasar 21 qui eut une influence très grande en Afrique du
Nord . Contemporain d ' Ibn al - Khatïb ( 1313 - 1375 ) , il est l ' auteur d ' une
importante histoire de Grenade et de la dynastie nasride d ' Espagne . La
Reconquista espagnole est en voie d ' achèvement et l ' Afrique du Nord est

26 Léon Bercher en a fait la traduction en français : La Risâla ou Epître sur les éléments
du dogme et de la loi de l 'Islam selon le rite malékite , Alger : Editions populaires de
l ' armée , 1975 .

27 Son œuvre principale a été traduite par M . Perron , Précis de jurisprudence musulmane
ou Principes de législation musulmane civile et religieuse selon le droit malékite ,
Paris : Imprimerie nationale , 1848 - 1852 . En 1889 , Edmond Fagnan faisait paraître à
Alger Les Concordances du manuel de Sidi Khalil . Il en fit des traductions sur le ma¬
riage et la répudiation et aussi sur le jihâd (Le Djihâd ou guerre sainte selon l 'école
malékite , Alger : A . Jourdan , 1908 ) . Georges - Henri Bousquet fit une autre traduction
partielle : Abrégé de la loi musulmane selon le rite de l 'Imâm Mâlek , Alger : Maison des
Livres / Paris : Maisonneuve , 1958 . Il faut mentionner enfin la traduction intégrale de
Guidi en italien .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 145

divisée plus que jamais . Il est le témoin d ' une fusion des tendances égyp¬

tiennes et maghrébines de l ' école malikite .

L ' école hanbalite

Dans l ' école hanbalite il faut mentionner Ibn Battah 28 ( m . 997 ) , théologien

et jurisconsulte formé à Bagdad qui séjourne , avant de mourir en cette

ville , à La Mekke , à Damas , Basra . . . Il est l ' auteur d ' une profession de foi

notifiée dans Ylbânah saghïrah et l 'Ibànah kabïrah ( dont le texte semble

perdu ) . Comme le fondateur de l ' école , il proscrit toute innovation ( bid 'ah )

qui risque d ' altérer la religion du Prophète dans le dogme , le culte , le droit

et la morale . Ibn Battah en tant que sunnite s ' oppose au Bouyides favora¬

ble au chiisme , mais aussi à la falsafa et au mu ctazilisme . C ' est en 980 , 17

ans avant sa mort , que le Bouyide cAdud al - Dawlah restaure certaines for¬

mes sassanides en adoptant le titre de chah in chah , le port du diadème

( tâj ) . C ' est aussi l ' époque de la théorie du double pouvoir : le califat et la

prophétie appartiennent aux Arabes mais la royauté appartient aux Per¬

sans ! En Asie Centrale , les Samanides de Bukhârà ( 992 ) sont chassés par

les Turcs islamisés : les Qarakhànides . Et en 999 , deux ans après la mort

d ' Ibn Battah , le calife Qâdir reconnaît les conquêtes de Mahmùd de Ghaz -

nah et finalement son indépendance . Les Ayyubides , entreprenant la res¬

tauration du sunnisme s 'y intéressèrent particulièrement ainsi qu ' à Qudâ -

mah .

Plus tard on aura le théologien et jurisconsulte Muwaffaq al - Dïn ibn

Qudâmah al - Maqdisï 29 ( 1146 - 1223 ) , né près de Jérusalem et mort à Damas

qui compose la célèbre ( Umdah . Sa vie correspond à la période couvrant la

deuxième à la sixième croisade , soit l ' avènement de Nur al - Dïn en 1146 à

l ' arrivée de Frédéric II en Syrie en 1228 . C ' est aussi l ' avènement de Sala -

din en Egypte en 1169 , la fondation de la dynastie kurde des Ayyubides

1171 et l ' abolition du califat fatimide du Caire , la prise de Hattïn en 1187

28 Henri Laoust , La Profession de foi d 'Ibn Batta , traditionniste et jurisconsulte musul¬

man d 'école hanbalite , Damas : Institut français de Damas , 1958 . L ' introduction ren¬
ferme une abondante bibliographie .
29 La traduction de son œuvre a été faite par Henri Laoust , Le Précis de droit d 'Ibn Qu -
dàma : jurisconsulte musulman d ' école hanbalite né à Jérusalem en 541 / 1146, mort à
Damas en 620/ 1223 , Beyrouth : Institut français de Damas , diff . Paris : Adrien Maison -
neuve , 1950 ; George Makdisi , Ibn Qudama 's Censure of Spéculative Theology , Lon -
don : Luzac , 1962 . Voir aussi George Makdisi , L 'Islam hanbalisant , Paris : Geuthner ,
1983 . Du même auteur on signale : Ibn 'Aqîl et la résurgence de l 'islam traditionnaliste
au Xle siècle ( Ve siècle de l 'hégire ) , Damas : Institut français de Damas , diff. Paris :
Adrien Maisonneuve , 1963 .
146 EDGARD WEBER

qui est une victoire écrasante de Saladin sur les croisés et la reprise de
Jérusalem en novembre de 1187 . Enfin il faut mentionner la prise d ' Acre
en juillet 1191 . Ibn Qudàmah est contemporain également du fameux géo¬
graphe Yâqùt ( 1179 - 1229 ) . Il est un des meilleurs représentants du combat
doctrinal armé contre les Francs durant la période des croisades . Il parti¬
cipe même avec Saladin à la reprise de la Ville Sainte . Il aura vécu durant
une période particulièrement agité au Moyen Orient où le réarmement
idéologique et religieux contre les Francs , contre un monde non - musulman
est évident .
Un siècle plus tard , un autre juriste d ' importance mobilise l ' islam
contre un autre danger non - musulman . Il s ' agit d ' Ibn Taymiyyah 30 ( m .
1328 ) à Damas , disciple lointain d ' Ibn Hanbal ( m . 855 ) puisqu ' il vient
cinq siècles après lui .
Ibn Taymiyyah est connu pour son opposition aux Mongols au plan
politique et aux innovateurs musulmans ou à ceux qui provoquaient des
schismes au plan religieux . Homme engagé , comme on dirait aujourd ' hui ,
il vit à une époque où le dàr al - islàm eut à souffrir à l ' est des poussées des
Mongoles non encore convertis , à l ' ouest de la vague d ' invasion franque .
Bagdad avait été pris dès 1258 par Hulagu et le littoral méditerranéen était
entre les mains des Croisés . Sa rigueur hanbalite accompagnait son bouil¬
lonnant engagement temporel . C ' est lui qui sera l ' auteur de la célèbre
formule : " l ' islam est religion et État " ( dïn wa - dawlah ) . Les conditions
socio - politiques dans lesquelles Ibn Taymiyyah a évolué expliquent en
quelque sorte son besoin farouche et explicite de revenir à un islam plus
offensif . Il s ' oppose ainsi aux soufis et surtout aux Chiites qu ' il accuse
d ' innovation ( bid'ah ) et par là d ' être des ennemis intérieurs plus dangereux

que les Juifs et Chrétiens . Envers ces derniers , il ne manque pas de ferme¬
té , car leur monothéisme est un monothéisme imparfait . Les imiter risque

d ' aboutir à une dégradation des mœurs musulmanes . Jamais Ibn

Taymiyyah n ' encourage la persécution , mais rappelle qu ' il faut appliquer
strictement le statut de dhimmï. Si l ' intérêt de la communauté devenait
prépondérant , les Musulmans auraient le droit de les exiler comme l ' avait
fait antérieurement le calife rUmar . Il réclame impérativement d ' exclure
tout non - Musulman de toute charge publique qui pourrait avoir une impor¬
tance dans la vie politique et militaire . L ' ennemi extérieur étant trop fort ,
Ibn Taymiyyah sait que tout jihâd offensif serait voué à la perte . Il insiste¬
ra donc sur le jihâd défensif . Néanmoins , le jihàd demeure une des œuvres

30 Son point de vue sur le jihâd se trouve au chapitre XX dans son traité al - Siyàsah al -
shar 'iyyah traduit par Henri Laoust , Le Traité de droit public d 'Ibn Taymîya . I. Tra¬
duction annotée de la Siyâsa sar 'iya , Beyrouth : Imprimerie catholique , 1948 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 147

les plus méritoires qui soient . Il sera même supérieur au pèlerinage . Mais il

n ' en fait cependant pas un pilier de l ' islam .

Ibn Taymiyyah sera suivi par Ibn Qayyim al - Jawziyyah ( m . 1350 ) et

l ' historien Ibn Kathïr ( m . 1373 ) . Son influence sera grande sur la doctrine

wahhabite de l ' Arabie Saoudite jusqu ' à nos jours . Et la méfiance actuelle
des Séoudiens à l ' encontre des Chiites trouve ses racines dans la doctrine

même d ' Ibn Taymiyyah .

Ces trois grands juristes vivent à une époque où l ' Egypte est entre les
mains des Mameluks . L ' Asie Mineure est entre les mains de tribus

d ' origine turcomane , ces tribus d ' abord déstabilisées par l ' arrivée des

Mongols , vont finalement dominer tout l ' Asie Mineure et même prendre

pied en Europe balkanique . Notons enfin que c ' est aussi l ' époque de ce

géant que fut Ibn Khaldun au Maghreb et en Égypte ( 1332 - 1406 ).

L ' école chafiite

L ' école chafiite est fondée par al - Shàfi cï ( m . 820 ) qui compose son célèbre

Kitàb al - umm . C ' est chez son disciple al - Màwardï que nous relevons la

codification du jihâd .

Al - Màwardï ( m . 1058 ) est l ' auteur des Ahkâm al - sultâniyyah ? x, qui de¬

vient le plus important traité de droit sunnite . Al - Màwardï vit principale¬

ment à Bagdad où il s ' oppose au Bouyide Jalàl al - Dawlah à ce qu ' il prenne

le titre de chah in chah . Il est en quelque sorte un des artisans de la restau¬

ration du sunnisme et défenseur du califat sunnite contre les prétentions

chiites des Bouyides . En 1055 les Turcs seldjukides de Tughril Beg ren¬

versent les Bouyides de Bagdad et l ' année suivante s ' emparent de Mos -

soul . L ' année de sa mort en 1058 une tentative ismaélienne menée par

Basàsïri échoue devant Bagdad .

Puis , Abu Bakr al - Bayhaqï ( m . 1066 ) , juriste ash carite qui synthétise le

chafiisme dans son Kitâb al - sunan al - kubrâ . Il aurait été le premier à ré¬

unir les enseignements juridiques d ' al - ShâfiT Vers la fin de sa vie il est à

Naysâbûr . Un an avant qu ' il ne meure en 1065 arrive au pouvoir le vizir

Nizàm al - Mulk chez les Ghaznavides qui seront les grands artisans de la
restauration sunnite .

Al - Ghazàlï ( m . 1111 ) est l ' auteur bien connu de VIhyâ ' hilûm al - dïn ,

son œuvre majeure . Il participe ardemment à la restauration sunnite .

31 Ce traité est traduit : Edmond Fagnan , Les Statuts gouvernementaux , ou Règles de droit
public et administratif , Alger : A . Jouraud , 1915 ( et Paris 1982 ) . Voir aussi Henri
Laoust " La pensée et l ' action politique d ' al - Màwardï " , Revue des Etudes Islamiques
36 ( 1968 ) ; et Erwin I .J . Rosenthal , Political Thought in Médiéval Islam , Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press , 1958 .
 EDGARD WEBER
148

L ' importance de ce théologien , penseur mystique n ' est plus à faire . En ce

qui concerne notre sujet , il met une sourdine au jihàd armé et intériorise
cette recommandation .

En Espagne musulmane Ibn Hazm ( m . 1064 ) , zâhirite , prône une lutte

armée plus fermement que ses pairs du monde oriental . Il est le contempo¬

rain de la conquête almoravide au Maroc . En 1062 Yusuf ibn Tashfîn

fonde la ville de Marrakech d ' où partira la conquête proprement dite . Il

assiste aussi à la Reconquista de plus en plus pressante et le démembre¬

ment du califat omayyade commencé en 1030 et la constitution d ' une tren¬

taine de royaumes indépendants : les muluk al - tawà ' if . En 1054 , dix ans

avant sa mort , Ferdinand 1er prend Tolède . Il est vrai qu ' Ibn Hazm est de

plus en plus en contact avec le dâr al - islâm .

Au XlVe siècle Ibn Hudhayl 32 , dans son Tuhfat al - anfus wa - shfâr suk -

kân al - Andalus , commandé par Muhammad V ( 1354 - 62 , celui - là même

qui prendra Grenade avec l ' aide de son vizir Ibn al - Khatïb ) , se donne pour

tâche de réveiller l ' ardeur du jihàd contre les princes chrétiens . Il donnera

une version abrégée de son premier livre au moment où le péril devient de

plus en plus grand pour les musulmans d ' Espagne .

Que peut - on dire dans une première conclusion si l ' on songe à ces dif¬

férents codificateurs ? On constate que chacun a vécu à des moments où le

monde arabo - musulman avait besoin de se ressaisir . Des synthèses magis¬

trales devaient être faites tant pour trouver les solutions face au danger

venu de l ' extérieur ( Turcs , Croisés , Mongols . . .) que de l ' intérieur ( voire

les différentes sectes musulmanes : kharédjismes , mu ctazilisme , fatimides ,

chiismes , qarmates . . . ) . Il faut à tout instant sauver l ' unité de la ummah . Le

jihàd a donc connu une actualisation permanente selon les besoins de la

communauté .

Il s ' agit essentiellement d ' une notion que la ummah n ' a jamais ignorée :

la notion d ' intérêt : maslahah , que nous pouvons comprendre aujourd ' hui

par " la raison d ' État " . Faut - il s ' étonner du fait que les peuples les plus

anciens ont déjà privilégié l ' intérêt public à l ' intérêt particulier ? La raison

d ' état entraîne très souvent un réalisme politique qui modifie et assouplit

les règles abstraites d ' une juridiction . Dans l ' histoire de l ' islam on observe

parfaitement ce réalisme et il faut bien noter que les moments d ' hostilité

avec l ' étranger sont finalement minimes en comparaison des longues pé¬

riodes beaucoup plus marquées par des accords de non - agression . Le jihàd

ne comporte pas seulement des hostilités , mais aussi la possibilité d 'amàn ,

c ' est - à - dire de protection accordée par un musulman à celui contre qui

32 Ibn al - Hudhayl , L 'Ornement des âmes et la devise des habitants d 'El -Andalus , traité
de guerre sainte islamique , tr . L . Mercier , Paris : Geuthner , 1939 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 149

devrait être exercé le jihâd . Les traités de paix , ou les trêves conclues entre

musulmans et autres , font partie du jihâd . Il y aurait sans doute de quoi

modifier sensiblement la compréhension du jihâd si l ' on accordait davan¬

tage de place à la trêve . Si l ' on relevait aussi qu ' étymologiquement le mot

jihâd renvoie à jahd , signifiant un effort à faire et non à ce qu ' une mala¬

droite traduction rend par " guerre sainte " . Ainsi l ' islam a toujours distin¬

gué le jihâd majeur qui est une lutte contre ses passions et le jihâd mineur

qui est le recours aux armes quand plus aucune autre solution n ' est possi¬
ble .

Le jihâd n ' échappe donc pas à des conditions sociologiques et politi¬

ques que la foi investit entièrement ou partiellement selon ses besoins . Le

jihâd ne doit donc pas seulement être expliqué par un ou deux versets du

Qur ' ân mais aussi par un ensemble bien plus large qui englobe les circons¬

tances historiques qui , elles , déterminent souvent dans le concret la notion

même du jihâd .

Le contenu des traités

Il faut voir maintenant le contenu de ces traités que nous avons évoqués et

qui se complètent les uns les autres . Plusieurs points de vue peuvent être

envisagés . Une fois de plus nous n ' évoquerons que les grandes lignes . Et

au lieu d ' examiner systématiquement les réponses données par chacun des

grands juristes dont nous avons mentionné le nom , nous nous contenterons

d ' évoquer principalement celles d ' Ibn Qudâmah . Les points essentiels

autour desquels tourne la codification juridique se trouvent répartis de la

manière suivante :

- l ' appel au jihâd comme devoir ,

- la da ' wah préliminaire ou l ' appel à la conversion ,

- le rôle du calife ,

- les participants au jihâd ou mujâhidûn ,

- les moyens employés ,

- le sort des prisonniers ,

- la rétribution et le problème du butin .

A ) Le devoir de jihâd externe

Les jurisconsultes sont unanimes à souligner que le jihâd est un devoir

pour le croyant , s ' appuyant sur le texte du Qur ' ân , qui est explicite sur ce

point . Si l ' on s ' en tient à la stricte attestation coranique , le jihâd semble se

trouver sur le même plan que les cinq principaux piliers ( arkân ) de l ' islam .
 150 EDGARD WEBER

Il arrive en tous les cas au premier plan des impératifs religieux et des
obligations ( Hbâdât) du croyant envers son Dieu .
Pour les auteurs de ces traités , le jihàd demeure certes une obligation
de droit divin (fard ) mais aux yeux des Sunnites ( 80 % de l ' islam ) , le jihàd
est exclu des arkàn traditionnels . Le croyant peut donc considérer que le
devoir de jihàd est accompli dès l ' instant que le calife ou un état musul¬
man s ' y consacrent . Ibn Qudâmah fait ressortir ce devoir :

" La guerre légale (jihàd ) est un devoir d ' obligation sociale (fard kifàyah ) ,-
quand un groupe de Musulmans en assurent l ' exécution d ' une façon sa¬
tisfaisante , les autres en sont dispensés . Le jihàd devient un devoir per¬
sonnel d ' obligation stricte (fard cayn ) pour tous les Musulmans qui se
trouvent en ligne ou dont le pays est [ envahi ] par l ' ennemi . Il n ' est
d ' obligation que pour les hommes libres , pubères , doués de raison et ca¬

pables de combattre . Le jihàd est la meilleure des œuvres surérogatoires ".

Pour certains auteurs , le jihàd prévaut sur la prière , l ' aumône et le pèleri¬
nage . Ibn Taymiyyah note que ce n ' est qu ' à Médine que Dieu a donné la
permission de combattre et de tuer à Mahomet et aux musulmans . Trois
pages plus loin , il en donne l ' importance :

" Dieu a en effet répété cette obligation et a glorifié le jihàd dans la plu¬
part des sourates médinoises . . . On ne saurait compter le nombre de fois
où le jihâd et ses mérites sont exaltés par le Livre et la Sunna . Le jihàd est
la meilleure des formes du service volontaire que l ' homme consacre à
Dieu . Les docteurs s ' accordent à le proclamer supérieur au pèlerinage et
la cumra , ainsi qu ' à la prière et au jeûne surérogatoire , comme le montrent
le Livre et la Sunna " . 33

B ) Le but du jihàd

Le but du jihàd est essentiellement l ' obtention soit de la conversion ou de

la soumission des gens du Livre , c ' est - à - dire essentiellement les juifs et les
chrétiens , soit la conversion ou l ' esclavage ou la mort de l ' idolâtre . Il ne
constitue donc pas à tuer mais à convertir comme le rappelle clairement
Ibn Taymiyyah : " La loi impose le devoir de combattre les infidèles ( kuf-
fàr ) , mais non celui de les tuer quand on s ' est emparé d ' eux . Quand un
infidèle a été capturé , à la guerre ou en d ' autres circonstances ... le chef de

33 Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité [ note 30 ] , 123 et 125 . Ibn Hudhayl citera force hadïths pour
montrer la supériorité du jihàd . Il consacre tout le premier chapitre au mérite du jihâd .
Cf . Ibn Hudhayl , L ' Ornement [ note 32 ] , 106 - 15 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 151

l ' État décide de son sort de la façon qu ' il estime la meilleure " . 34 A plu¬

sieurs reprises le Qur ' àn rappelle au croyant de ne pas tuer son semblable

( 6 : 151 ; 25 : 58 ; 17 : 33 ) . Le but du jihâd est d ' étendre l ' islam qu ' il s ' agisse

des polythéistes ou des apostats , comme le rappelle également Ibn Qudà -

mah .

C ) Le rôle du calife

Dans la stricte tradition , c ' est au Calife que revient le devoir de conduire le

jihâd contre ceux qui , après avoir reçu l ' appel ( al - dtfwah ) , ne se soumet¬

tent pas et n ' acceptent pas le statut de dhimmï . La sharfah fait du jihâd un

devoir propre au calife . Traditionnellement , c ' est la seule guerre qui soit

donc un devoir pour le Calife , devoir en fait de protéger le dâr al - islàm ,

c ' est - à - dire le monde de la loi coranique . Mais il doit aussi mener le jihâd

dans le dâr al - harb , le monde de la guerre pour y faire régner la loi corani¬

que . Le rôle joué par le calife ou l ' Imam est capital dans le jihâd .

L ' obéissance qui lui est due est considérée par certains comme un impéra¬

tif divin . Pour Ibn Qudàmah , " il faut combattre derrière tout chef , que ce

soit un homme de bien ou un homme dépravé " . 35 Il explicite encore : " Il est

interdit d ' engager le combat sans l ' autorisation du commandant en chef

( amïr ) , sauf pour répondre à une attaque soudaine ou pour saisir une occa¬
sion favorable " . 36

Le jihâd se terminait normalement avec la conversion de l ' ennemi .

Mais le chef de l ' expédition pouvait également signer des trêves par ré¬

alisme politique , dirions - nous , comme le montre Ibn Qudàmah . En effet ,

selon lui , le chef de l ' Etat a le droit de conclure une trêve ( muhâdanah ) s ' il

estime qu ' il y a intérêt à le faire . " La conclusion d ' une trêve relève de la

compétence exclusive du chef de l ' État ou de son représentant " . 37 La

conséquence de cette trêve est que les musulmans n ' ont plus le droit

" d ' acheter des infidèles avec lesquels une trêve a été conclue et qui sont

faits prisonniers par d ' autres infidèles " 38 .

Conjointement à la trêve , le musulman peut accorder Yamân à

l ' infidèle , soit une protection reconnue . Dans ces trêves , le jihâd prévoit

pour ainsi dire des sorties possibles pour éviter la trop grande violence . La

vie humaine est respectée autant que possible . En somme le jihâd n ' est

34 Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité , 129 .

35 Ibn Qudàmah , Précis [note 29 ] , 272 .

36 Ibid . , 273 .

37 Ibid . , 280 .

38 Ibid . , 280 .
152 EDGARD WEBER

jamais une fin en soi mais un moyen prescrit pour élargir l ' islam . Ce point
devrait faire l ' objet d ' une nouvelle interprétation du jihâd . Le jihâd n ' étant
qu ' un moyen pour répandre la religion , il est implicite qu ' il existe d ' autres
moyens .

D ) L 'appel à la conversion ou al - da cwah

Faut il avertir les infidèles avant de leur déclarer la guerre , comme nous
-

avons déjà vu plus haut ? Ou bien peut - on les surprendre au moment où ils
s ' y attendent le moins comme le fit le Prophète lui - même à l ' encontre des

Banû Mustaliq ? Les traités de jihâd et de jurisprudence proposent des ré¬

ponses divergentes à ce sujet . Pour les uns , l ' infidèle au contact du dâr al-
islâm est coupable de ne pas se renseigner sur la foi musulmane , il ne mé¬
rite donc pas qu ' on l ' avertisse une nouvelle fois ; de surcroît , il n ' aura pas
l ' occasion de se préparer à la riposte et la victoire des musulmans sera

d ' autant plus facile . Pour d ' autres , la da 'wah préliminaire est de rigueur .

Pour Ibn Qudâmah il n ' en est pas de même : " Il est permis de surprendre
les infidèles à la faveur de la nuit , de les bombarder avec des mangonneaux
et de les attaquer sans déclaration ( du cah ) . Le Prophète attaqua les Banu
Mustaliq à l ' improviste . . . " 39 .
Quoi qu ' il en soit , la da cwah est conçue une fois de plus comme un ap¬
pel à la raison humaine . Le monde est rempli de signes que la raison peut
comprendre . L ' existence de Dieu est démontrable par la raison humaine .
Tout homme qui n ' accepte donc pas cette vérité démontrable se met dans
une attitude de refus conscient et d ' opposition à l ' islam . Cette rébellion
justifie dès lors l ' intervention des musulmans , d ' autant plus que le Qur ' àn
donne une supériorité à la ummah sur les autres nations dans son rôle bien
déterminé : " Vous êtes la meilleure Communauté ( kuntum khayra ummatin
ukhrijat li - l - nâs ) qu ' on ait fait surgir pour les Hommes : vous ordonnez le
Convenable , interdisez le Blâmable et croyez en Allah " ( Qur ' ân 3 : 110 ) .
Le jihâd est devenu en quelque sorte le pacte entre le croyant et Dieu ,
l ' instrument du pacte , mïthâq , primordial , le moyen de faire enfin régner à

nouveau l ' Ordre initial voulu par Dieu . Le jihâd a donc une fin éminem¬
ment spirituelle et le verset coranique le plus cité en ce sens est :

"Combattez ceux qui ne croient pas en Allah ni au Dernier Jour , [ qui ] ne

déclarent pas illicite ce qu ' Allah a déclaré illicite , [ qui ] ne pratiquent pas
la religion de Vérité ; parmi ceux ayant reçu l ' Écriture ! [ Combattez - les ]

39 Ibid . , 273 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 153

jusqu ' à ce qu ' ils paient la iizyah , directement et alors qu ' ils sont humi¬
liés " ( Qur ' ân 9 : 29 ) .

Si les infidèles répondent à la da 'wah , deux solutions se présentent selon

qu ' ils sont gens du Livre ou polythéistes . Examinons le premier cas . Soit
ils embrassent l ' islam et deviennent des membres de la ummah avec les

mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs que les coreligionnaires , soit ils demeu¬

rent sourds à l ' islam et dans ce cas , deux autres solutions peuvent être

adoptées . Ils peuvent se soumettre dans le meilleur des cas en payant un

impôt de capitation , la jizyah qui leur accorde le privilège de dhimmï c ' est -

à - dire de protégé ; ou bien ils continuent à lutter et ils méritent la peine de

mort . Pour ce qui est des polythéistes , théoriquement ils n ' ont le choix

qu ' entre la conversion ou l ' extermination . Le Qur ' ân vient justifier cette

position par le verset suivant : " Tuez - les partout où vous les atteindrez !

Expulsez - les d ' où ils vous ont expulsés ! La persécution [ des Croyants ]

(fitnah ) est pire que le meurtre . . . " ( 2 : 191 ) . Mais cette théorie , il faut bien le

dire , est restée généralement abstraite .

E ) Le sort des captifs

Le but du jihâd n ' est pas de tuer mais de convertir comme le rappelle clai¬

rement Ibn Taymiyyah qui en ce point est en accord avec Ibn Qudâmah :

" La loi impose le devoir de combattre les infidèles ( kuffàr ) , mais non celui

de les tuer quand on s ' est emparé d ' eux . Quand un infidèle a été capturé , à

la guerre ou en d ' autres circonstances . . . le chef de l ' État décide de son sort

de la façon qu ' il estime la meilleure " 40 . A plusieurs reprises le Qur ' ân rap¬

pelle au croyant de ne pas tuer son semblable ( 6 : 151 ; 25 : 58 ; 17 : 33 ) .

L ' infidèle qui continue à combattre est passible de mort . Celui qui se

soumet a la vie sauve et devient esclave . Ibn Qudâmah précise qu ' il n ' est

pas permis d ' exécuter des otages , mais il n ' est pas permis non plus de les

libérer tant que les hostilités demeurent . La libération est obligatoire quand

il n ' y a plus d ' engagements 41 .

Si la vie leur est accordée , ils peuvent être vendus comme esclaves , on

peut aussi exiger une rançon (fidyah ) pour leur libération . On peut aussi

faire preuve d ' indulgence envers lui en le laissant libre après acceptation

de la capitation . Selon Ibn Taymiyyah , c ' est le chef de l ' État qui décide du

sort des captifs .42 Le Qur ' ân sert une fois de plus de modèle : " Ensuite , ou

40 Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité [note 30 ] , 129 .

41 Mâwardï , Statuts [note 31 ] , 103 .

42 Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité [note 30 ] , 129 .

154 EDGARD WEBER

bien libération , ou bien rançon après que la guerre aura déposé son faix .
Cela [ est l ' ordre d ' Allah ] , Si Allah voulait , Il se déferait d ' eux ; mais [ Il se
sert de vous ] pour vous éprouver les uns par les autres " ( Qur ' ân 47 : 4 ) .
Si les uns s ' appuient sur ce verset pour prohiber la mort des captifs ,
d ' autre invoquent aussi le Qur ' ân dans le sens contraire , " . . . tuez les Infidè¬

les quelque part que vous les trouviez ! Prenez - les ! Assiégez - les ! Dressez
pour eux des embuscades ! " ( Qur ' ân 9 : 5 ) . Mais la suite du verset exige la
vie sauve à ceux qui se convertissent . " . . . S ' ils reviennent [ de leur erreur ] ,
s ' ils font la Prière et donnent l ' Aumône , laissez - leur champ libre ! Allah est

absoluteur et miséricordieux ! " ( Qur ' ân 9 : 5 ) .

Généralement sont épargnés les femmes et les enfants à condition tou¬
tefois qu ' ils n ' aient pas participé au combat , ainsi que les infirmes , les
débiles , les vieillards et les prêtres et les anachorètes tenus à l ' écart de la
lutte , comme le stipule expressément Ibn Qudâmah . 43 Les femmes doivent
être réduites en esclavage 44 si elles participent à la lutte et l ' enfant mineure
ne doit pas être séparé de sa mère . Certains traités prévoient que l ' on peut
confisquer les biens des monastères et des moines . On leur laissera juste le
nécessaire .
Pour Ibn Taymiyyah les mutilations sont parfois permises :

"Les mutilations { tamthïî ) sont interdites , sauf en cas de représailles . . .

Nous devons donc nous abstenir de mutiler les corps des infidèles que
nous avons tués , de leur couper les oreilles ou le nez , de leur ouvrir le
ventre , à moins qu ' eux - mêmes n ' aient mutilé certains des nôtres . Bien
qu ' il soit permis de procéder à des mutilations en cas de représailles , il est
cependant préférable de s ' en abstenir " 45 .

Cette restriction du juriste indique son sens de l ' équilibre et sa méfiance de

tout excès comme le montre encore une citation qu ' il fait d ' un hadïth :

"Le Prophète , quand il nommait un chef à la tête d ' une avant - garde ou
d ' uncorps d ' armée , lui disait : Va de l ' avant , en invoquant Dieu et pour
cause . Combats tous ceux qui nient Dieu , mais sans zèle fanatique et sans
mauvaise foi . Ne mutile pas tes ennemis et ne tue jamais un enfant "46 .

43 Ibn Qudâmah , Précis [ note 29 ] , 273 .

44 Le Deutéronome prévoit que la femme captive peut être prise comme femme légale
par le combattant . Si elle cesse de plaire , " tu la laisseras partir à son gré , sans la vendre
à prix d ' argent : tu ne dois pas en tirer profit , puisque tu as usé d ' elle " ( Deutéronome
21 : 14 ) .

45 Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité [ note 30 ] , 80 .

46 Ibid . , 81 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 155

F ) Les moyens employés

La technique du jihâd a été naturellement déterminée par les juristes . Rien

n ' est laissé au hasard de la conduite des individus . Toutes ces applications

pratiques se réfèrent très souvent à la conduite même du prophète ou de ses

compagnons immédiats . Les musulmans peuvent donc utiliser en premier

lieu des espions pour connaître la force de l ' ennemi . Car l ' engagement ne

sera fait que si l ' islam a une forte chance de triompher . Si l ' e nn emi est en

surnombre , les musulmans attendront le jour où ils peuvent s ' imposer à

l ' infidèle . Toutes les ruses , hiyal , sont permises dans la lutte , mais ne sont

pas acceptées les mensonges grossiers , la traîtrise , la rapine , les mutilations

sur l ' ennemi .

Le combattant doit donc s ' engager dans l ' action guerrière sans crainte .

Mais selon les juristes , il doit épargner les artisans , commerçants et agri¬

culteurs qui ne prennent pas les armes . Dans la toute première page du

libre de la guerre de Ibn Qutaybah , nous trouvons des recommandations

semblables . Il est explicitement rappelé que Umar ibn al - Khattâb aurait

recommandé de ne pas tuer les vieillards , les femmes et les enfants 47 .

Quant aux dégâts , Ibn Qudâmah les subordonne au but du jihâd . Après

avoir rappelé que les musulmans furent scandalisés par le Prophète qui

avait fait couper les palmiers des Nadir , al - Màwardï stipule par exemple :

" L ' émir peut aussi combler les points d ' eau des ennemis ou les empêcher

d ' en faire usage , même s ' il y a parmi eux des femmes et des enfants , car

c ' est là l ' un des meilleurs moyens de les affaiblir et de l ' emporter sur eux

soit de vive force soit par traité " .48

On peut donc conclure que dans la réflexion sur le jihâd s ' est posé la

question du respect des personnes . Les juristes adoptent des positions dif¬

férentes à propos des dommages naturels . Abu Bakr aurait recommandé de

ne pas démolir les maisons , de ne pas saccager les champs et les vergers ,

de ne pas tuer les animaux . Le Qur ' àn lui - même fustigeait déjà l ' homme

qui semait le scandale sur terre , détruisait récolte et bétail ( 2 : 205 ) . Dans la

pratique , il était prévu que le chef , l ' émir , pouvait supprimer les réserves

d ' eau pour que l ' infidèle ne puisse plus en profiter et prolonger la guerre .

Pour la même raison , les animaux pouvaient être tués et les positions des

adversaires êtres détruits si le bien commun des musulmans l ' exigeait 49 La

47 Ibn Qutaybah , cUyùn al - akhbâr , Le Caire : Dâr al - maktabah al - misriyyah , 1925 , 107 .
Cette recommandation est soulignée par tous les auteurs : al - Mâwardï , Statuts [ note
31 ] , 83 ; Ibn Qudâmah , Précis [ note 29 ] , 273 .

48 Mâwardî , Statuts [ note 31 ] , 106 .

49 Ibid . , 104 - 06 .
 EDGARD WEBER
156

technique de guerre permettait - elle de tuer aveuglément les humains ? La

réponse à cette question est donnée par al - Màwardî :

"Le meurtre soit des femmes soit des enfants n ' est permis ni au cours de
la bataille ni autrement . . . Si les ennemis se servent pendant le combat de
leurs femmes et de leurs enfants comme d ' un bouclier , ceux - ci doivent
être respectés et l ' on ne doit viser qu ' à tuer les hommes : mais si ces der¬
niers ne peuvent être atteints qu ' au prix de la vie des femmes et des en¬
fants , la chose est permise . Si la couverture était constituée par des captifs
musulmans , dont il faudrait sacrifier la vie pour arriver jusqu ' aux enne¬
mis , la chose serait défendue . . . " . 50

Il est incontestable que le jihâd ainsi codifié est loin des massacres aveu¬
gles que les guerres modernes peuvent provoquer en raison d ' un armement
incontrôlable .

G) Les mujàhidun

Le combattant dans le Chemin de Dieu , al - mujàhid , doit être un homme

libre , majeur et doué de toutes ses facultés de raison 51 , enfin avoir les
moyens nécessaires pour rejoindre l ' armée . Ne sont pas tenus à faire le
jihâd l ' impubère , le fou , l ' esclave , la femme , l ' aveugle , l ' infirme et le
manchot . D ' une manière générale , les enfants et les vieillards ou les infir¬
mes sont exclus du jihâd .
Dans le cas où l ' armée est suffisamment importante et que le risque de
défaite est écarté , les femmes peuvent se joindre à la troupe mais sans par¬
ticiper au combat . Celui qui est endetté doit préalablement payer ses dettes .
" Nul ne peut entreprendre le jihâd qu ' avec l ' autorisation de ses pères et

mères , s ' ils sont vivants et musulmans à moins que le jihâd ne soit un de¬
voir individuel d ' obligation stricte " , précise Ibn Qudàmah . 52
Le mujâhid dès lors qu ' il part en campagne ne doit pas commettre
d ' actes répréhensibles , sous peine d ' être puni lui - même . Al - Màwardï est

explicite à ce sujet :

" [ L ' imam doit faire respecter par ses guerriers les droits divins qu ' Allah
]
a déclarés canoniquementobligatoires et leur appliquer les peines écrites
émanant de Lui , de sorte qu ' il n ' y ait chez eux ni empiétementreligieux
ni violation d ' un droit , car celui qui fait la guerre sainte est plus que tout

50 Ibid . , 84 .
51 Ibn Qudâmah , Précis [ note29 ] , 271 .
52 Ibid , 272 .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 157

autre lié par les prescriptions divines et astreint à distinguer le licite de

l ' illicite " . 53

Pour appuyer cette règle , al - Màwardï cite immédiatement après le hadïth

suivant :

" Empêchez vos soldats de faire le mal , car jamais une troupe ne fait le
mal sans qu ' Allah jette la peur dans le cœur de ceux qui la composent ;
empêchez vos soldats de se livrer à la fraude , car jamais une troupe de
guerriers ne se livre à la fraude sans qu ' Allah en fasse la chose d ' une poi¬
gnée d ' hommes ; empêchez la fornication chez vos soldats , car jamais une
troupe ne s ' y livre sans qu ' Allah la livre à l ' épidémie " .

Al - Qudûrî donne quelques exemples précis de ce qu ' il ne faut pas

commettre : " Il convient que les musulmans ne commettent ni traîtrise ,
ghadr , ni vol du butin de guerre , ghulul et qu ' ils n ' infligent pas aux enne¬
mis des traitements atroces , muthla " . 54 Pour al - Mâwardï encore :

"Nul ne peut avoir de relations sexuelles avec l ' une des jeunes filles cap¬
tives tant qu ' elle ne lui a pas été attribuée dans sa part et alors il doit at¬
tendre la fin de l ' istibra . Si cependant il l ' a fait avant le partage , il encourt
un châtiment discrétionnaire mais non une peine fixée , car il a sur elle un
droit de copartageant ; mais il doit verser une dot d ' équivalence , qui
s ' ajoute à l ' ensemble du butin " . 55

Les devoirs religieux du mujâhid sont allégés . Il ne fera que trois prières
par jour au lieu de cinq , il n ' est pas tenu de jeûner pour ne pas s ' affaiblir
devant l ' ennemi . Il doit faire preuve en revanche de patience , sabr , et de
constance . 56 Car l ' initiative de l ' engagement avec l ' ennemi ne dépend pas
de lui , mais du chef qui commande l ' expédition et qui lui peut avoir reçu la
permission du calife .
Les auteurs insistent tous sur le fait que le musulman ne doit pas tour¬
ner le dos mais combattre . La fuite n ' est donc pas permise en théorie si
l ' ennemi n ' est pas deux fois supérieur aux musulmans . Al - Màwardï rap¬

pelle que la défense de fuir est claire dans le Qur ' àn ( 8 : 66 ) :

"Défense a été faite à tout musulman de fuir devant deux adversaires qui
le valent , sauf dans l ' une de ces deux circonstances : quand , se livrant à

53 Màwardï , Statuts [ note 31 ] , 88 .

54 Qudùrî , Statut [ note 25 ] , p . 127 .
55 Mâwardï , Statuts [ note 31 ] , 107 .
56 Ibn Hudhayl , L ' Ornement [ note 32 ] , chap . XIV et XVI .
 EDGARD WEBER
158

des manœuvres guerrières , il se retire pour prendre du repos ou par stra¬

tagème et qu ' il reprenne ensuite la lutte , ou quand il se replie pour rallier
un autre groupe et continuer de combattre " . 57

Sur ce point le Qur ' ân est en effet particulièrement explicite :

" ( O vous qui croyez ! ) , quand vous rencontrez ceux qui sont infidèles , en
marche [ contre vous ] , ne leur montrez point le dos ! Quiconque leur mon¬
trera le dos , en ce jour - sauf s ' il se détache pour un [ autre ] combat ou
s ' il se retire pour [ rejoindre un autre ] corps - , [ celui - là ] encourra la colère
d ' Allah , et son refuge sera la Géhenne . Quel détestable Devenir " ( 8 : 15 -
16 ) .

Selon la tradition , au début de l ' islam , Allah avait imposé à chaque mu¬

sulman de combattre dix polythéistes . . . Mais quand l ' islam eut acquis de la

force et recruté des adhérents plus nombreux , Allah allégea cette obliga¬

tion et n ' imposa plus au musulman qui se mesurait avec l ' ennemi que de
tenir tête à deux adversaires .

Le Qur ' ân rappelle que la fuite est en fait inutile : " Dis [ leur donc ] : Fuir

ne vous sera pas utile . Si vous fuyez la mort ou le combat , vous ne jouirez

[ de la vie ] que peu [ de temps ] " ( 33 : 17 ) . Ibn Taymiyyah en donne en quel¬

que sorte la raison :

" Tout individu ou toute collectivité qui l ' entreprennent se trouvent placés
entre deux sublimes alternatives : la victoire avec le triomphe ou la mort
du martyr avec le paradis . Tout être doit vivre et mourir : or , c ' est dans le
jihâd qu ' il peut vivre et mourir au mieux de son bonheur dans cette vie et
dans l ' autre . Négliger le jihâd , c ' est perdre ou compromettre ces deux
formes de bonheur " . 58

Il faut réserver une place particulière au combattant qui meurt sur le champ

de bataille , le martyr 59 ( shahïd , pluriel : ( shuhadâ ') . La tradition réserve une

très grande importance à celui qui a été tué dans le Chemin d ' Allah . Le

Qur ' ân fournit en cela les meilleures attestations . Le paradis leur est pro¬

mis sans détour : " Allah a acheté aux Croyants leurs personnes et leurs

biens , contre don à eux du Jardin . Ils combattent dans le Chemin d ' Allah .

Ils tuent ou sont tués . Promesse [ solennelle ] ! ..." ( 9 : 111 ) . Leur sort dans

l ' au - delà est celui de la vie : " Ne dites point de ceux qui sont tués dans le

57 Mâwardï , Statuts , 90 .
58 Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité [ note 30 ] , 127 .
59 On se rapportera au second livre des Macchabées dans lequel l ' idée de martyr apparaît
pour la première fois dans la tradition juive .
 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 159

Chemin d ' Allah : [ Ils sont ] morts . Non point ! [ ils sont ] vivants mais vous

ne [ le ] présentez pas " ( 21 : 54 ; cf . 2 : 207 , 215 ; 3 : 151 , 163 , 194 ; 22 : 57 ; 61 : 10 -

12 ; 4 : 74 ; 9 : 89 - 112 , 121 , 122 ) . Le martyr n 'a pas besoin d ' être lavé avant

d ' être mis en terre . Al - Màwardï écrit à ce sujet : " Le musulman qui suc¬

combe en martyr est enveloppé dans les vêtements qu ' il portait en combat¬

tant et ainsi inhumé , sans qu ' on lave son cadavre et sans prières " 60 . Il est

donc purifié par son sang , physiquement et spirituellement .

Al - Màwardï a compris que le martyre pouvait avoir une fonction toute

spéciale :

" Un commandant de corps de troupes , quand il veut provoquer le zèle

pour la guerre sainte , peut , de plusieurs concurrents qui veulent s ' exposer
au martyre , choisir celui dont il sait que la mort violente aura pour effet
ou d ' exciter davantage les fidèles au combat pour mieux la venger , ou
d ' être , par l ' audace déployée contre eux par amour de la religion , une
cause de découragement chez les mécréants " .61

L ' auteur fait preuve d ' une bonne observation psychologique . Le martyr

n ' a rien à craindre . Car tous ses péchés lui sont pardonnés par fait même .

On verra la même pensée se développer chez les croisés . La croisade ex¬

piait les péchés du croisé . Certains princes chrétiens partaient en croisade

pour se faire pardonner les péchés . Le hadïth a abondamment développé

les bienfaits attribués aux martyrs . Ils seront même intercesseurs auprès de

Dieu au même titre que Mahomet . La tradition étendra au fur et à mesure

que l ' on avance dans le temps le mérite du martyre à des musulmans qui

ne meurent pas forcément sur le champ de bataille . Ainsi on verra souvent

cités les hadïth s suivants : " Qui succombe en défendant son bien est un

martyr " . . . Ibn Hudhayl explicite en quelque sorte le mérite du martyre en

citant deux hadïth s:

" Le martyr a, aux yeux de Dieu , six avantages : il lui est pardonné
d ' emblée ; il voit immédiatement le siège qui lui est assigné au paradis ; il
est exempt de l ' épreuve de la tombe et de la grande terreur ; on le cou¬
ronne du diadème de la vénération dont chaque rubis vaut mieux que la
terre avec tout ce qu ' elle porte ; on le marie avec soixante - douze épouses
aux beaux yeux et il intercède en faveur de soixante - dix de ses parents ".
" Celui qui combat dans la voie de Dieu et vient à mourir ou à être tué , ce¬
lui - là est un martyr , quand bien même il devrait la mort à l ' écrasement

60 Mâwardî , Statuts [note 31 ] , 106 .

61 Ibid . , 82 .
160 EDGARD WEBER

par son cheval , son chameau ou à la morsure d ' une bête venimeuse ; si
même il mourait dans son lit , d ' une mort quelconque , il serait martyr " . 62

Les Sunnites voient en l ' oncle de Mahomet , Hamzah , tué à Uhud ,

l ' exemple du martyr . Mais ce sont les Chiites qui mettent l ' accent d ' une

manière encore plus grande sur le martyre en célébrant la mort de Husayn

tué à Kerbela , le martyr des martyrs , shahïd al - shuhadd ' . Les cérémonies
funèbres , tcfziyah , commémorent durant le mois de 'âshûrà ' cette mort du
fils d ' cAlï .

H) Le butin ou la récompense

Le mujâhid reçoit une gratification pour le jihâd , selon Ibn Qudâmah :

" Tout combattant qui reçoit , pour une campagne , une dotation quel¬
conque en conserve , à son retour , le reliquat , à moins que cette dotation
n ' ait été spécialement affectée à cette campagne ; dans ce cas il doit le
rendre pour le faire servir à d ' autres expéditions . Tout combattant qui a
reçu , pour une campagne , un cheval en conserve la propriété à son retour ,
à moins que ce cheval n ' ait été constitué waqf ' . 63

Tous les théoriciens s ' accordent également pour que le combattant puisse
recevoir une gratification supplémentaire . " Le commandant en chef a le
droit d ' accorder , sans conditions , des parts supplémentaires aux combat¬
tants qui ont rendu d ' éminents services aux musulmans . . . Il pourra dire par
exemple : Quiconque entrera dans la brèche , ou escaladera le rempart , aura
tant . . . " 64 . Ibn Taymiyyah est d ' accord avec cette loi :

" Le chef de l ' État , toutefois , est autorisé à augmenter la part des combat¬
tants qui ont causé à l ' ennemi un surcroît de dommages , quand par exem¬
ple , un détachement a été chargé d ' une mission d ' avant - garde , quand un
soldat a réussi à escalader une forteresse et en a permis la conquête . . . voi¬
là ce l ' on appelle anfâl , attribution supplémentaire " . 65

Un des points délicats du jihâd reste le partage du butin . Rien d ' étonnant
que les juristes aient prévu des solutions divergentes selon qu ' il s ' agit de
définir les différentes catégories de butin , les différents bénéficiaires du
partage , les taux de partage . . . Le Qur ' ân avait donné un début de solution .

62 Ibn Hudhayl , L 'Ornements [note 32 ] , 113 .

63 Ibn Qudâmah , Précis [note 29 ] , 274 .

64 Ibid . , 275 ( et 258 ) .

65 Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité [ note 30 ] , 29 - 30 .

 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 161

" [ Les Croyants ] t ' interrogent [ Prophète ! ] sur le butin . Réponds : Le butin

est à Allah et à l ' Apôtre . . ." ( 8 : 1 ) . Dans la même sourate on lit encore :

" Quelque chose que vous preniez , en butin , sachez que le quint [ en ] appar¬

tient à Allah , à l ' Apôtre , au Proche [ de celui - ci ] , aux Orphelins , aux Pau¬

vres , au voyageur . . . " ( 8 :41 ; cf . 59 : 6 - 8 ; 33 : 27 ; 48 : 15 , 19 , 20 ) . Ce partage doit

" être effectué avec justice , sans qu ' aucun privilège soit accordé à la fonc¬

tion , à la naissance ou au rang , conformément à l ' exemple que nous ont

légué le Prophète et ses califes " 66 .

C ' est un devoir du chef de guerre que de faire le partage du butin :

" L ' Imam partage le butin . Il en prélève d ' abord le quint , puis il répartit
les quatre autres cinquièmes entre les ayant - droit , deux parts au combat¬
tant à cheval et une part au combattant à pied , selon Abu Hanlfah . . . On
n ' accordera point de part à l ' esclave , ni à la femme ni au tributaire ,
dhimmï , ni à l ' impubère . L ' Imâm leur fera seulement , sur le butin , des
dons sans importance , radakh , dans la mesure où il le jugera convena¬
ble " . 67

Dans le butin il faut distinguer les biens propres du captif ( salab ) , ce qui a

été conquis par les armes ( ghanîmah ) et qui inclut les prisonniers de

guerre , les femmes et les enfants , biens meubles et immeubles et les terres

conquises , ce que l ' on obtient sans coup férir comme les biens immobiliers

et les terres conquises fay m en dehors du champ de bataille , enfin les grati¬

fications ( nafal - anfâl ) accordées à certains mujâhids .

La tradition veut généralement que la ghanîmah soit distribuée , après

prélèvement du quint , aux combattants . C ' est elle , avec le fay * qui permet

en quelque sorte de financer le jihâd . Celui - ci pouvait également être fi¬

nancé par des donations pieuses ( waqf ), ou des taxes de guerre (jifàl )

quand le trésor public ne permettait plus de payer le combattant .

Le combattant peut s ' emparer de la dépouille de son adversaire . Mais

le fay ' revient généralement à l ' État . La fraude dans le butin est sévèrement

prohibée . " Il n ' est pas d ' un Prophète d ' être victime d ' une fraude " ou " Il

n ' est pas d ' un Prophète de frauder " ( Qur ' ân 3 : 161 ).

Les auteurs ont généralement développé les chapitres relatifs au par¬

tage du butin , car il fallait qu ' il n ' y ait aucune injustice commise . L ' intérêt

66 Ibid . , 29 .

67 Qudùrï , Statut [ note 25 ] , p . 136 . Voir aussi Ibn Taymiyya , Traité [ note 30 ] , 29 et 31 .

68 Pour Ibn Qudâmah , Précis [ note 29 ] , 278 , " Tous les biens que les infidèles abandon¬
nent dans leur panique et dans la fuite , sans que l ' on ait à mettre en mouvement contre
eux chevaux et chameaux , et tous les biens enlevés aux infidèles sans combat sont
fay ' " . Voir aussi Ibn Taymiyyah , Traité [ note 30 ] , 34 - 37 .
 162 EDGARD WEBER

de ce problème est moindre aujourd ' hui du fait que les guerres ne

s ' accompagnent plus de prise de butin au sens des commentateurs .

Conclusion

Ce qui ressort donc de ces traités , notamment des traités émanant du droit

sunnite , c ' est une certaine conciliation entre les vibrants appels coraniques

et la réalité politique de l ' heure , ce que l ' on peut résumer en parlant d ' une

harmonisation entre la théorie et la pratique . La théorisation imposée par la

diversité des événements est sensiblement la même pour les diverses éco¬

les juridiques , voire les tendances en islam comme celle des Kharédjites et

des Chiites ou des Ismaéliens . Les nuances qui les séparent ne sont jamais

radicales . On peut parler d ' un consensus relativement uniforme dès le dé¬

but de l ' islam jusqu ' aux siècles de la nahdah , de la Renaissance arabe .

Mais qu ' en est - il aujourd ' hui ? De cette notion du jihâd nous pouvons

dégager quelques grandes lignes directrices qui ne peuvent échapper au¬

jourd ' hui à une réflexion fondamentale et qu ' il faut confronter aux valeurs

du XXe siècle . Si cet effort n ' est pas fait , l ' homme reste prisonnier non pas

d ' une foi mais d ' une pensée qui , codifiée au Xe siècle , s ' est depuis figée

peu ou proue . Les savants de l ' âge classique de l ' islam ont élaboré une

pensée originale à partir des données de l ' univers conceptuel de leur épo¬

que . Or , le monde a changé aujourd ' hui . On ne donne plus la même défini¬

tion à la personne , la liberté , la société , la vérité . . . comme autrefois . Cer¬

taines vérités doivent donc être repensées .

Ainsi si l ' islam se présente comme la seule véritable religion fonda¬

mentale de l ' homme , si le salut de ce dernier vient donc essentiellement de

l ' islam par le biais du jihâd , quelle valeur possèdent les autres religions

monothéistes voire les philosophies religieuses de l ' Extrême Orient ?

Si le croyant doit rechercher l ' intérêt de cette communauté , ummah ,

musulmane par laquelle l ' islam doit être annoncé au monde entier , quel

lien doit - il établir avec les hommes qui n ' ont pas sa foi ?

Si le jihâd peut devenir l ' expression du sabr , la constance , et si cette

constance peut se manifester à travers l ' utilisation des armes mais aussi de

la parole , quelle constance le croyant peut - il montrer dans la lutte contre

l ' ignorance et la pauvreté des pays du Tiers - monde ?

Si la nostalgie d ' un âge d ' or porteur d ' une pureté doctrinale est affir¬

mée plus que jamais , l ' homme d ' aujourd ' hui peut - il nier l ' histoire , la

sienne comme celle de l ' autre sans vérifier scientifiquement le bien fondé

de cette nostalgie ?

Si le Qur ' àn , incontestablement , appelle , dans certains cas , aux armes

et à la lutte , il encourage aussi la patience , le pardon , la charité . Depuis

 LA CODIFICATION JURIDIQUE 163

l ' origine peut - on dire , les deux courants : tolérance et recours aux armes

ont été alternativement utilisés , prêchés , recommandés . Selon des circons¬

tances socio - politiques , il est démontré que toute perspective religieuse est

tributaire des conjonctures de l ' heure . La violence peut - elle être justifiée

en soi et devenir une idéologie inspirée par Dieu ? Ne faut - il pas plutôt

avoir le courage d ' étudier les raisons sociales , politiques , psychologiques

et psychanalytiques . . . qui poussent les hommes à la violence ?

 Part II
History and Memory
 HISTOIRE ET MÉMOIRE ENTRE
CROISADE ET JIHÀD
W ajih Kawtharani

Partant de l ' hypothèse soutenue par Jacques Le Goff dans son livre His¬

toire et Mémoire , j ' ai émis quelques idées sur le problème que suscite un

sujet problématique : élucider l ' articulation entre deux niveaux de rapports :

( i ) rapport Occident / Islam , ( ii ) rapport croisad djihàd .

Jacques Le Goff propose une distinction entre deux " histoires " , celle

de la mémoire collective et celle des historiens . " La première " , écrit - il ,

" apparaît comme essentiellement mythique , déformée , anachronique . Mais

elle est le vécu de ce rapport jamais fini entre le présent et le passé . Il est

souhaitable que l ' information historique prodiguée par les historiens de

métier , vulgarisée par l ' école et - c ' est au moins ce qui devrait être le cas

pour les mass médias , corrige cette histoire traditionnelle erronée .

L ' histoire " , conclue - t - il , " doit éclairer la mémoire et l ' aider à rectifier ses
erreurs " .1

Mais comment appliquer cette distinction entre mémoire et histoire sur

les récits et les discours historiques ? Comment faire cette rectification

" souhaitable " souhaitée par les historiens de métier ? La mémoire collec¬
tive , surtout écrite , s ' infiltrant consciemment ou inconsciemment dans les

récits historiques , s ' intègre dans l ' histoire et devient partie d ' une histoire

qualifiée comme " scientifique " ou " objective ", à force de répétition , et

sous le poids du " présent " et de ses implications politiques et idéologiques .

C ' est à partir de cette confusion qu ' il devient difficile de faire la distinc¬

tion et de rectifier les contre - sens . Mais cette difficulté implique , d ' autre

part , un effort assidu et une relecture permanente de l ' histoire .

J ' ai étudié deux exemples historiques où s ' entremêlent Histoire / Mé¬

moire dans deux champs du rapport : Occident / Islam , croisade / / z7zâJ : ( 1)

les guerres méditerranéennes du XVIe siècle ; ( 2 ) les guerres de conquêtes

coloniales déclenchées au cours du XIXe siècle et prolongées sous une

forme de guerres nationales et de résistance au cours du XXe siècle dont

les conséquences se font encore sentir aujourd ' hui .

1 Jacques Le Goff , Histoire et Mémoire , Paris : Gallimard , 1988 , 194 .

168 WAJIH KAWTHARANI

Dans la première phase , les termes de croisade et de jihâd paraissaient

certes claires dans les documents historiques de l ' époque , miroirs de la
mémoire , surtout de la mémoire collective , mais ils apparaissent aussi dans
les récits historiques contemporains comme des éléments conceptuels et
explicatifs des guerres et des conflits qui ont éclaté aux deux bouts du bas¬
sin de la Méditerranée : dans la Péninsule ibérique où les catholiques
d ' Espagne menaient une guerre d ' expulsion et de liquidation ( une croi¬

sade ) contre les Morisques musulmans , et aux abords des Balkans où les
Ottomans musulmans menaient une guerre d ' expansion dans les pays des
chrétiens , une guerre de jihâd .
Plusieurs historiens et chroniqueurs croient au caractère religieux ou au
caractère religio - culturel de ces guerres où s ' établit une dualité conflic¬
tuelle , fixe et constante entre deux camps : Islam / Chrétienté , Orient/ Occi¬
dent . Même Fernand Braudel qui s ' est intéressé profondément à l ' étude
des structures socio - économiques et a mené de recherches dans les couches
historiques au - delà de l ' histoire événementielle de la Méditerranée du
XVIe siècle , écrivait : " Mais la question morisque n ' est qu ' un épisode d ' un
plus large conflit . En Méditerranée , la grande partie s ' est jouée entre
Orient et Occident , dans une éternelle ' Question d ' Orient ' , pour l ' essentiel
débat de civilisation . . . " . 2
Mais partir d ' une telle formulation de la guerre entre Orient et Occi¬
dent , et donner au débat de civilisation une dimension religieuse , c ' est
donner à l ' histoire une certaine " immobilité " . Or , dans l ' histoire , il y a
toujours un dialogue entre mouvement et semi - " immobilité " , selon
l ' expression de Braudel lui - même .3 Et dans cette histoire de dialogue entre

mouvement et semi - immobilité , il n ' y a pas une seule histoire ( une histoire
unique ) , il y a des histoires , des conjonctures , et la tâche de l ' historien
consiste à étudier et expliquer ces conjonctures à travers les temps de
l ' histoire . Ainsi , qualifier le rapport Orient / Occident par l ' éternelle " Ques¬

tion d ' Orient " , c ' est donner à la mémoire collective occidentale , qui s ' est
constituée dans une conjoncture bien déterminée et exprimée par un esprit
religieux de croisade , un caractère non historique , un caractère mythique .
De même , considérer le jihâd des musulmans , à l ' époque des croisades
ou à l ' époque des guerres méditerranéennes du XVIe siècle , comme une
constante de leur religion , c ' est aussi rendre l ' histoire immobile , sans
prendre en compte les espaces et les conjonctures .

2 Fernand Braudel , La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l 'époque de Philippe

II [ 1949 ] , t . H , Paris : Colin , 1979 , 95 .

3 Ibid . , 213 .
 HISTOIRE ET MÉMOIRE ENTRE CROISADE ET DJIHÂD 169

Or , même si Braudel utilise le qualificatif " éternel " en ce qui concerne

la Question d ' Orient , son analyse historique va accorder au mouvement et

aux conjonctures un dynamisme - moteur . Selon Braudel , " une éclipse de

croisade s ' annonçait " non seulement à la suite de Lépante ( 1571 ) , mais

aussi auparavant lors des guerres victorieuses successives pour chasser les

musulmans après le drame de Grenade ( 1499 - 1502 ) . Lépante , signe de la

défaite turque , devient dans son analyse " une conclusion " . Il écrit " qu ' avec

cette saute de vent du dernier tiers du XVIe siècle , l ' idée de croisade

contre l ' Islam perdu de sa force , rien de plus naturel . En 1581 , l ' Église

d ' Espagne protestera non contre l ' abandon de la guerre turque , mais contre

le paiement d ' impôts devenus sans objet ..." .

A la fin du XVIe siècle , la Méditerranée , s ' ouvre largement à la pirate¬

rie , aux petites guerres , aux guerres intérieures et aux troubles socio - poli -

tiques dans les villes et les campagnes . C ' est le signe de la décadence de la

Méditerranée , mais c ' est aussi la marque du non - sens de la croisade ou de

jihâd . Braudel l' exprime bien : " La guerre des pirates brûle une croisade
[ ou un djihad ] : ni l ' un , ni l ' autre n ' intéressent plus personne , sauf les fous

et les saints ." La grande guerre quitte la Méditerranée pour se loger au

Nord , à l ' ouest sur l ' Atlantique . Après Lépante et précisément à partir de

1618 , " avec les premiers feux de la Guerre de trente ans , la grande guerre

recommence , c ' est loin de chez elle : La mer intérieure n ' est plus le cœur
violent du monde " .4

Au cours des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècle , les conflits entre les puissances

européennes , qui se transformaient peu à peu en sociétés et États capitalis¬

tes et expansionnistes , avaient pour objectif la domination du monde , à

travers une mainmise sur le grand commerce , les marchés , les routes et les

centres géostratégiques des océans et des continents . Citons , à titre

d ' exemple , les conflits axés sur la Mer Rouge et le Golfe à partir de rôles

successivement joués par les Portugais , les Hollandais et les Anglais .

Aussi , dans cette conjoncture , les " capitulations " qui étaient dans un

premier temps des dons et " faveurs gratuites " des Sultans aux commer¬

çants européens ( souvent français à l ' origine ) , ressemblèrent de plus en

plus , dans un deuxième temps à des " capitulations " au sens strict . A la fin

du XVIIIe siècle , la faiblesse " irrémédiable " de l ' État ottoman laissa les
" faveurs " se transformer en " liens d ' asservissement " avant de forcer

4 Ibid ., 112 .
170 WAJIH KAWTHARANI

l ' Empire ,qui tomba dès lors sous la tutelle des Puissances européennes , à
une " véritable capitulation " . 5
Cette tutelle s ' étendait aussi aux sociétés ottomanes et à leur démogra¬
phie pour devenir , sur un plan socioculturel et religieux , " un régime de
protection " . Il s ' agit en outre de ce qu ' on va appeler dans la littérature
politique , surtout consulaire , " minorités non - musulmanes " : un système de
protection vis - à - vis d ' un système traditionnel des millets .
Avec cette nouvelle phase , un nouveau problème se dessina dans la
conjoncture du rapport Occident / Islam , pour rendre la mémoire collective
plus compliquée et extrêmement chargée en tensions socioculturelles ,
confessionnelles et communautaires .
Ainsi la conquête coloniale , inaugurée au Proche - Orient , par
l ' expédition de Bonaparte en 1798 , à la suite de la Révolution française ,

inaugure à son tour un nouveau langage et un nouveau vocabulaire politi¬

que et culturel : mission civilisatrice , modernisation , éducation , aide hu¬
maine de toute sorte . Mais tout cela est aussi synonyme d ' occupation ,
d ' exploitation des richesses nationales , du démembrement et du partage du

pays et de la frustration des gens considérés " indigènes " ou peuplades

" non - civilisés " .

Même le souvenir des croisades ne tarde pas à s ' éveiller , surtout dans
les milieux coloniaux et chez les militaires de droite . A la suite de la ba¬
taille de Maysalun ( 24 juillet 1920 ) où les troupes françaises écrasèrent la
résistance nationale , le général Gouraud entre dans Damas avec " un esprit
de Croisade " ; il s ' adresse au tombeau de Saladin : " Nous - voilà revenus ,
Saladin " .
En écho , l ' esprit de jihâd chez les Musulmans colonisés se réveille , à
son tour , comme un réflexe de défense , réminiscence du passé provoquée
par un nouveau défi .
Nombreux sont les exemples que l ' on peut tirer des expériences du
monde musulman envahi par les guerres coloniales d ' une part , et les guer¬
res de résistance nationale d ' autre part . Contentons - nous de faire allusion à
un type de récit colonial .
L ' étude faite , par exemple , sur les récits du commandement français et

sur ses réactions vis - à - vis du mouvement rifain ( 1924 - 26 ) , donne un

exemple indicatif d ' une mémoire qui recourt , cette fois - ci , à un certain
rationalisme ou à un certain scientisme pour s ' exprimer , s ' expliquer et se
vérifier . Un historien français ( Daniel Rivet ) , dans son étude sur le mou -

5 Adel Ismail , L 'histoire des pays arabes dans les archives diplomatiques : Thèmes et
références 1535 - 1945 , Beyrouth : Éditions des Œuvres Politiques et Historiques , 1992 ,
vol . I , xxv .
 HISTOIRE ET MÉMOIRE ENTRE CROISADE ET DJIHÂD 171

vement rifain de Abd el - Krim ( cAbd al - Karïm ) , qualifie ce genre d ' expli¬

cation de " stock d ' images préfabriquées " . Et dans ce stock d ' images , trois

équations , selon lui , affleurent : 6

1. " C ' est d ' abord la corrélation rigide établie à partir d ' un déterminisme

géographique simpliste entre l ' environnement rifain hostile et répulsif

et la nature farouchement indépendante et pillarde de ses habitants ( . . .) .

Une atmosphère sinistre comme le pays lui - même , entoure tout , ( . . .)

les hommes et les choses semblent avoir été crées pour la lutte " .7

2 . L ' équation entre Islam et fanatisme , une des données permanentes de

la représentation de l ' Orient par l ' opinion française , ressort avec viru¬

lence d ' après Lyautey : " Le Musulman , le Marocain ne connaît et ne

respecte que la force " . Un réflexe de croisade , co mm e le dit Rivet ,

semble beaucoup avoir agi sur les responsables civils , dans le parti co¬
lonial à la Chambre . Pour eux , Abd el - Krim incarne un mouvement

" xénophobe et religieux " .

3 . La dernière équation consiste à lier le mouvement à " une affaire inter¬

nationale " . Le mouvement est manipulé par une autre puissance rivale

( les Bolcheviques ou les Allemands ) et prend forme sur une base tri¬

bale , religieuse et jamais " nationale " .

Conclusion

L ' histoire est - elle un éternel retour , co mm e on le dit habituellement et

comme on interprète certains phénomènes contemporains ? Adel Ismail

( cÂdil Ismâ cïl ) , historien libanais , ambassadeur dans plusieurs pays occi¬

dentaux , spécialiste des archives diplomatiques européennes , y répond :

" c ' est une assertion erronée . L ' histoire ne se renouvelle pas , mais c ' est

l ' homme qui , suite à des conjonctures politiques et sociales stagnantes ,

renouvelle les erreurs du passé et les attribue à l ' inéluctabilité du destin " .8

Mais l ' homme qui porte les erreurs du passé est une mémoire , une

mémoire portant un stock d ' images réelles et irréelles . L ' ensemble de ces

images se rapporte à la psychologie sociale des gens , des groupes , des

6 Cf . Daniel Rivet , " Le Commandement français et ses relations vis - à - vis du mouvement
rifain 1924 - 1926 " , dans : Abd el-Krim et la République du Rif, Actes du Colloque inter¬
national d ' études historiques et sociologiques , [ Paris ] , 18 - 20 janvier 1973 , Paris :
Maspéro , 1976 , 104 - 09 .
7 Cette idée est développée dans un rapport présenté à Poincaré , citée par Rivet , " Com¬
mandement " [ note 6 ] , 104 - 05 .
8 Ismail , L 'histoire des pays arabes [ note 5], lxxxiii .
172 WAJIH KAWTHARANI

communautés , à l ' ethnologie et à l ' anthropologie , plutôt qu ' à l ' histoire et

qu ' à la recherche historique .
Partant de ce qu ' on vient de dire , la mémoire et ses vocables ( comme
jihâd et croisade ) doivent obéir à la recherche historique , critique , relative
et rationnelle . Le " vécu " , aussi amer , pénible , tragique soit - il , ne doit pas
pousser les hommes , surtout les chercheurs , à confondre les différentes
périodes de l ' histoire : ne pas revivre le passé sans pour autant l ' oublier .
Les fuqahà : et les penseurs musulmans de la nahdah ( les réformateurs
du XIXe et début du XXe siècle ) ont déployé un effort considérable dans
la jurisprudence pour donner à la notion de jihâd et aux notions de dâr al -
harb et dâr al - islâm une explication adéquate aux transformations mondia¬
les , et à la modernité apportée alors par l ' Europe , malgré le caractère colo¬
nial de cette dernière .
Les tentatives ont échoué , non par leur nature ou par leur fonction his¬
torique , mais à cause des erreurs qui ont été commises par les stratégies
des grandes puissances occidentales . La création de l ' État hébreu en 1948
a compliqué la situation à tel point qu ' un historien et diplomate comme
Adel Ismail rapporte : " Ce sujet , est devenu en Orient et sur le plan interna¬
tional , le problème le plus épineux dans les annales politiques du XXe
siècle . Il a profondément envenimé les relations entre le monde arabe et
l ' ensemble des pays occidentaux européens et États - Unis d ' Amérique . Il

constitue par sa complexité la face moderne de la vieille Question

d ' Orient " . 9 - Ainsi , même un diplomate modéré comme Adel Ismail

tombe , malgré sa conscience historique critique , dans un piège anachroni¬

que , en évoquant à niveau la mémoire de la " Question d ' Orient " . Est - ce
l ' impasse ? Non , mais les obstacles et les dilemmes contrecarrent les efforts

de l ' esprit historique et les tentatives de la conscience humaine .

La science historique éclaire toujours la mémoire dans la mesure où
elle corrige ses erreurs , sonde son imaginaire , rectifie ses anachronismes ,
la rend plus relative et plus rationnelle . Par la suite , l ' histoire , en tant que
science en construction , pourrait peut - être , avec la sociologie des religions
faire de la religion , dont l ' expression idéologique et culturelle se manifeste
au niveau de la mémoire , un facteur de paix et de réconciliation .
Ce qui importe , c ' est la logique de " l ' action " comme le dit Bertrand
Badie dans son étude sur " Démocratie et religion " 10 . Dans notre question

9 Ibid .
10 Bertrand Badie , " Démocratie et religion : logiques culturelles et logiques de l ' action " ,
Revue internationale des sciences sociales 43 ( 1991 ) 3 , 545 - 55 ( version anglaise :
" Democracy and Religion : Logics of Culture and Logics of Action " , International So¬
cial Science Journal 43 ( 1991 ) 3 , 511 - 21 ) .
 HISTOIRE ET MÉMOIRE ENTRE CROISADE ET DJIHÀD 173

( Le religieux : facteur de violence ou de réconciliation ? ) , c ' est la logique de

l ' histoire en action qui importe , et non la logique culturelle ou le sens du

texte religieux en soi . Ce qui rend le " religieux " et le " sacré " violent ou

réconciliant est l ' ensemble complexe des situations , des circonstances ,

c ' est - à - dire la conjoncture des acteurs historiques à " longue durée " .

L ' expression religieuse devient dans cette conjoncture un facteur de paix

ou de violence . Tout dépend de ce que les gens sèment dans l ' histoire et
dans le monde .
 ON BEIRUT 1

Elias Khoury

One is at a loss . What must a writer write when asked to do so on Beirut ?

It is as if one could say it all while saying nothing . As if writing were the

practice of truth and falsehood at once . For we have made of this city a

myth without a story , or with an unfinished story at best . The city has be¬

come a mirror for our dreams , daydreams , hallucinations and nightmares ,

for our truth and for our lies ...

But come then . Let ' s try to brush away the layers of dust and grime , of

tales of heroism and self - deception that coat our memories . Let us go into

the city in search of our own words .

' There ' - meaning ' here ' - before the sea ( that limit that both conjoins

and separates ) we can discern possible approaches to the memory of the

city .

The first approach is through the idea of the fugitive . Beirut emerged

from the odd encounter between two groups of fugitives or exiles . Citizens

of Arab countries fleeing repression met the citizens of Lebanon who were

fleeing sect , tribe , clan and family . These two groups of fugitives met in

the Beirut of the 1950s in what was a peculiar historical coincidence . Pal¬

estine had only recently fallen leaving a strong sense of defeat . Beirut re¬

mained the only significant Arab port after the fall of Haifa . And the Arab

Levant was entering a period of intense change that required a city with all

that this represents : freedom , debate and investigation for new modes of

expression . The Lebanese of Beirut were not like those who lived in the

other cities , towns and villages of Lebanon . Here , in Beirut , there was the

possibility of the individual or something approximating it . Elsewhere in

the country there were only sect and family . Here was the modern city ,

flanked by the American University of Beirut in the west and the Jesuit

University in the east . And despite there being no grounds for comparison

between the two , one can say there was a kind of complementarity be¬

tween them , with the former opening to the burgeoning and simmering

l Translated by Juan Camilo Gomez - Rivas .

176 ELIAS KHOURY

currents of thought from the different corners of the Arab world and the
latter bearing the conservative ruling class of Lebanon .
The fugitives of Lebanon were escaping the history that the pioneers of
the Arab nahdah had failed to write . And those from elsewhere in the Arab
world came in search of new ideas . From this encounter modern Beirut
was born . The Beirut of al -Adab and Shfr , of Mawaqif and Hiwar , and
before all others of al -Makshiif. The Beirut of al - Tarlq . The city striving
for fundamental change . It is for this reason that Beirut was not a Lebanese
city . Nor was it an Arab one , which means that it did not serve as a mirror .
Beirut was , rather , a marginal city that had started to become central with¬
out anyone ' s knowledge . It dealt with and interpreted its experience as
being marginal . Perhaps this was the gravest mistake of all . It embraced
Syrians , Palestinians and Iraqis , unaware that it was doing much more than
simply giving them a home . It was turning margin into center . For it is true
that the modern qasidah was not born in Beirut . And it is true that modem
Arab figurative painting was born in Baghdad . But only marginal Beirut ,
with its blend of modernity and fantasy , was able to adopt the new while
affording it its own distinctive flavor . Beirut was unaware though that the
act of absorption is only the beginning . And that once begun , such a move¬
ment must be played out to its end .
This end was necessarily a revolution .
Beirut betrayed its revolution through civil war . It gave up revolution
in exchange for war . The revolution had been the city ' s dream . The war ,
its nightmare and ultimate death .
The second approach is through the idea of ambiguity . When modern
Beirut developed in the 19th century it did so under entirely ambiguous
circumstances . It was the capital of the Mutasarrifiyyah without really
being a part of it . And despite its being in an Ottoman province it was
never compelled to surrender its own idiosyncratic character . The city was
thus a capital and the antithesis of a capital by being a city outside of the
state , in a province at the margins of the Ottoman Sultanate . In a similar
manner , Beirut was witness to the war of 1840 - 1860 without really taking
part in it . Is it not ironic that the war should spread to Damascus while
sidestepping Beirut ?
This condition of ambiguity would continue until the outbreak of the
civil war of 1975 - 1990 . Perhaps Beirut paid the price of having erased its
memory . By entirely turning its back to the Mountain , torn apart during the
first civil war , the city engaged in an ominous cultural practice through the
unprecedented act of erasing and forgetting a war , a war that had been seen
as a mark of shame . The later war ' came back ' , in a sense , to avenge itself .
For civil wars are not to be erased from reality or from memory . They are
 ON BEIRUT
177

only reborn or reincarnated . Banished from the written , they take to the

spoken . Erased from memory , they colonize the subconscious .

The third approach is through meaning . Beirut ' s fugitives and exiles

failed to possess a clear awareness of the city that had taken them in . The

modern qasldah had found a vehicle in a Syrian poet returned from the

United States named Yusuf al - Khal . A revolution in thought was growing

around the practice of criticism , self - criticism , and the existential commit¬

ment to the rebirth of Arabic civilization and to the kind of life that loudly

proclaims it wants ' to live '. A blend of socialism and nationalism was

spawned from conversations in cafes , debate groups and theaters . . . Yet all

of this was unable to create a form of critical thought capable of addressing

the roots and fundamentals of our culture , a tool necessary for paving the

way for revolution . For true criticism of the Nasserite Movement , with its

project of national revival , didn 't actually begin in earnest until its time

had passed or , in other words , until after its defeat in 1967 . Criticism of

religion never developed outside the framework of political discussion .

And the crucially important subject of secularism was not broached until

the sects had ravaged and destroyed everything and each other .

Beirut would make a decision that would be played out between two

frontiers . One was the mirror of Arab and Lebanese realities , which like a

flame would burn with their growth and go out with their death . The other

was the laboratory that had created a new reality , generated from a vision

that completed and intersected with the project of Arab Revival , which had

originated in Egypt and abroad and had found in Beirut its window to the
world .

Beirut chose the easy route . It was content with being a mirror . It re¬

tained its form of laboratory , but it neglected this function in favor of the

mirror . And thus it happened that Beirut ' s cultural - intellectual revival be¬

came enmeshed with its commercial and mercantile life , and alongside the

service economy grew a service culture , building its own legends and de¬
lusions .

And when Beirut drove out cAbdallah al - Qasiml , imprisoned Sadiq al -

cAzm , and banned Majdalun , it was not aware that it was betraying itself .

It was surrendering to the process of becoming incorporated into the Leba¬

nese regime , and becoming obedient to the Arab one . It seems to have

believed it was scheming , dealing and maneuvering in order to extend its

ambiguous hold on its lifeline .

The three approaches here outlined lead us to the truth behind Beirut 's

wartime destruction . In Beirut , the Lebanese regime had had limited ability

to act . The Arab regime had felt compelled to harass the city into wariness .
178 ELIAS KHOURY

And the Israeli regime had found no solution other than to overrun it with
tanks .
And yet , this interpretation relieves Beirut of responsibility .
We bemoan the city today as if it were entirely heedless of itself . Bei¬
rut is reclaiming its role , or so it believes , by becoming a city for busi¬
nessmen , receiving into its open space a distortion of the Arabic dream ,
mocking itself and others .
And here , the moment of truth . The old ambiguity has begun to fade ,
for Beirut can no longer exist without Lebanon . The war brought the city
into Lebanon without Lebanon being brought into the city . If today Beirut
wishes to remain a mirror , it will reflect only the collapse of Lebanese
society , the influence of Arab repression , and the rubble left by the Israeli
invasion .
Are we then confronted by an ineluctable decision ?
We may decide in favor of a mirror for wealth and the glorification of
power on the one hand , or , on the other , for the city that built an urban ,
democratic and secular society . The latter makes its culture from the pre¬
sent , from what is lived , experienced and spoken , and it creates a new lit¬
erature that will inherit from the old only after an inevitable pause for re¬
flection and mourning .
 REVISITING SECTARIANISM

USSAMA MAKDISI

In his infamous article entitled " The Clash of Civilizations " Samuel Hunt¬

ington lays out a deceptively simple thesis : 1 Conflicts in the post - cold war

era are not determined by ideology , politics or economics , or by material

or national interests , but by civilizational differences . In his article , whose

title he borrows from Bernard Lewis 's essay on the " Roots of Muslim

Rage " 2 , Huntington is at pains to prove that there are indeed coherent ,

primordial civilizational groupings . He suggests , for example , that there is

such a thing as a " Western " civilization which has been in constant con¬

flict with an " Islamic " world for 1300 years . Huntington 's thesis rests

upon one simple assumption , which cannot withstand the most tentative

historical scrutiny , namely that civilizations are organic , bounded , un¬

changing , and primordial . He even goes so far as to attempt to draw a line

on a map to demarcate the fault lines between so - called " Western " ,

" Slavic " , and " Islamic " civilizations . It is not difficult to surmise the thrust

of Huntington 's argument : when " they " ( the Muslims , the Chinese , the

Slavs ) attack " us " ( the Judeo - Christian West , but really meaning the

United States ) , they are motivated not by grievances over land or oil , but

by a basic civilizational urge . Arabs , he insists , are not anti - Western be¬
cause of the West 's colonial treatment of the Arabs , or because of its

staunch support of Israel which dispossessed the Palestinians and occupied

their land , but because the Arabs innately are locked into a civilizational

clash . That there are double standards in the way the United States con¬

ducts its foreign policy is inevitable ( and therefore justified ) because clash¬

ing civilizations understand , act and think in totally different manners .

Huntington , in other words , disregards , indeed he obliterates , historical

context .

Huntington ' s argument mimics the justification of a sectarian system

in Lebanon . Both share the same assumption of atavistic loyalties that per -

1 Samuel P . Huntington , " The Clash of Civilizations ? " Foreign Affairs 72 ( 1993 ) 3 , 22 -
49 .

2 Bernard Lewis , " The Roots of Muslim Rage " , The Atlantic Monthly 266 ( 1990 ) 3 , 47 -
60 .
 USSAMA MAKDISI
180

force structure the political world . While Huntington discusses " civiliza¬
tions " , the sectarian system in Lebanon insists that " sects " must be the
foundation for Lebanon ' s complex political culture . Lebanon is saddled
with a sectarian system because it is assumed that Lebanon is a country
divided ontologically , religiously , culturally , and hence politically , into
sects . The religious community is assumed to be the only possible founda¬
tion for any realistic project of modernization and development . What I
would like to propose is that this kind of thinking , like Huntington ' s
" Clash of Civilizations " , rests on a single assumption that historical scru¬

tiny reveals to be unsound . The notion of an unchanging , primordial sect

that should and must be at the foundation of modern politics is a recent
invention . I suggest that in modern Lebanon sectarianism - that debilitat¬
ing web of supposedly tribal religious loyalties that undermines national
solidarity - draws meaning only insofar as it is juxtaposed with a notion of
nationalism itself - the proposition that people from different regions , with
different accents , should somehow feel a bond of loyalty to a single entity
called Lebanon . Sectarianism is like nationalism : both are figments of
modern political imagination . Sectarianism is not an age - old problem . Its
coherence is a product of nationalist imagination . To be sure , the concern
with what is today called sectarianism reflects a tormented and precarious
national existence , and to that extent , it is a perfectly understandable and
legitimate concern . My contention is only that we should spend less time
trying to figure out who supposedly " caused " sectarianism , as if indeed
sectarianism is a self - evident phenomenon that requires no further investi¬
gation , but what does sectarianism signify , what are its manifestations ?
And what is the context in which it first arose ?
To understand the historical nature of sectarianism , to put it in its
proper historical context , is first and foremost to recognize the imperial
nature of traditional Lebanese society . It is to confront what we think of as
" our " own past and to admit that there was no such thing as the " Leba¬

nese " in any national sense , just as there were no " Turks " trying to steal
our imagined freedom and independence . It is also to admit that there is no
such thing as a single Maronite or Druze identity that defies time . It is to
accept the fact that traditional society was far more unpleasant than we
would like to believe , and that we must always be on guard to distinguish
between actual traditions ( in all their complexities ) and invented traditions
( with all their simplifications ) . Ottoman Lebanese society was imperial in

the sense that two utterly opposed communities structured local society ,
which was itself legitimated by , and subordinate to the Sultan in Istanbul .
The first was an elite community that regarded its control over religious
and secular knowledge as essential to a hierarchical ordering of society . Of
 REVISITING SECTARIANISM 181

course , this elite group was itself highly stratified , and highly sensitive to

constantly shifting imperial networks and alliances . Nevertheless , its

members included Lebanese notables and those who chronicled their histo¬

ries , as well as Ottoman government officials and religious leaders . They

shared what Albert Hourani has described as a " politics of notables ," a

sophisticated portable elite culture that was reproduced across the Ottoman

Empire . 3 This first community existed above , exploited , and defined itself

against the second community , the ahali , or the common Druze and Ma -

ronite villagers who comprised the bulk of indigenous society . Immutable

and unbridgeable difference in the political order was expressed through

metaphors of knowledge and status rather than through those of race , relig¬

ion , or nation . The sectarian movements of the mid - nineteenth - century

challenged this imperial order and opened the realm of politics to the non -
elites .

There are no references to sectarianism ( ta ' ifiyyah ) in chronicles of

18th - and 19th - century Mount Lebanon . This is because religion buttressed

a hegemonic political order whose main fault line lay between commoners

and notables , or cawamm and ay an . Politics in Mount Lebanon , as histori¬

ans from Asad Rustum to Leila Fawaz have pointed out , was dominated by

several large families , each of which was subdivided into competing

branches . This quasi - oligarchy , presided over by the Ottoman governor of

the vilayet of Saida ( Sayda , Sidon ) , oversaw a rigid social order . While

education and personal law remained the prerogative of different religious

communities , they nevertheless contributed towards maintaining a social

hierarchy that discriminated between commoners and elites rather than

between Muslims and Christians . Religion , in other words , presented no

barrier to a stable nonsectarian political order .

Yet despite this nonsectarian political system , 18th - and 19th - century
Mount Lebanon was a world incommensurate with a modern nationalist

imagination of a " tolerant " Lebanon . I say this because quite simply such

emphasis on religious toleration fundamentally misses the point that local

society was defined by a rigid social hierarchy and by a social violence

that animates just about every page of local chronicles , a violence of elites

against commoners ( rather than Christians against Muslims ), a violence

that undergirded a dynamic elite politics but also a rigid social order that

separated high from low - in terms of speech , salutation , dress , title , forms

of punishment , land , and access to power , and of course , centrality to his -

3 Albert Hourani , " Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables " [ 1968 ] , in : The Mod¬
ern Middle East : A Reader , eds . Albert Hourani , Philip S . Khoury , and Mary C . Wil¬
son , Berkeley : University of California Press , 1993 , 83 - 110 .
182 USSAMA MAKDISI

torical chronicles . It is also extremely important to note that this world was
utterly incommensurate with the Mount Lebanon imagined by nineteenth -
century European travelers and missionaries . These men conceived of
Mount Lebanon in strictly sectarian terms . They imagined a Christian
mountain refuge besieged by , but still holding out against , an Islamic Ot¬
toman despotism . And so it came as a huge surprise to Jesuit missionaries ,
for example , that when they arrived in Beirut , they could not tell Muslim
from Christian - largely because the local inhabitants shared the same
manners and customs , because Christians often took Muslim names , and
because both Muslims and Christians spoke the same language , which one
Jesuit described as a " guttural language , which one might say befits cam¬
els . " 4 What shocked the Jesuits most , however , was the intermixture of
Christians , Druzes , and Muslims :

" We are sorry to say that there was a sort of coexistence [ fusion ] between
the Christians and Muslims of Sayda . They visited each other frequently ,
which resulted in intimate relations between them and which introduced ,
bit by bit , a community of ideas and habits all of which was at the ex¬
pense of the Christians . These latter joined in the important Muslim
feasts , and the Muslims [ in turn ] joined in the Christian feasts ; this kind
of activity passed for good manners , sociability , while in truth it resulted
in nothing more than the weakening of religious sentiments . " 5

Nowhere was the divide in traditional society more apparent than in the
discourse and practice of punishment . One of the great sins a notable could
commit was to undermine the order of things by inciting commoners into
the elite space of politics , or conversely , to deny the commoners their tran¬
quility which might force them into rebellion . Even a cursory reading of
local chronicles reveals a constant Ottoman anxiety about the trespassing
of secular social boundaries . Islamic metaphors were certainly used in
Ottoman political practice - nobody can or should deny this - but they
were used to reinforce a secular hierarchy . In other words , it was only at
certain historical moments that markers of religious difference were high¬
lighted . One example will have to suffice here . It was only when Bashir
Janbulat , who was the most powerful Druze notable in early nineteenth -
century Mount Lebanon , rebelled against the authority of Bashir Shihab
that he was accused of being a " heretic " and executed by ' Abdallah Pasha ,

4 Quoted in Michel Jullien , La nouvelle mission de la Compagnie de Jesus en Syrie

1831 - 1895 , 2 vols . , Tours : Imprimerie A . Mame et Fils , 1898 , vol . 1 , 19 .
5 Ibid ., 263 .
 REVISITING SECTARIANISM 183

the Ottoman governor of the vilayet of Saida . 6 In cases that did not result

in death , however , punishment of disloyal elites was a highly ritualized

affair that physically marked their fall from grace and at the same time

symbolized their partial reintegration into a reaffirmed social order . The

cutting off of the tongue or the gouging out of the eyes were not simple

barbarisms practiced by the Shihabs against rival elites . Since a notable

was the " face " of respectable society ( awjuh al - bilad in Arabic ) and the

voice of society ( soz sahibleri in Ottoman ) , mutilation , especially blinding

and muting , rendered a notable symbolically and physically unfit to gov¬

ern , for he could not see and could not speak in a society where one mark

of prestige was to be " eloquent " in language .

Ordinary villagers who rebelled against authority were condemned in

an altogether different manner . Their sin , according to the elites , originated

in ignorance rather than in conscious heresy . The chronicles consistently

used the terms cumum , :ammah , a ' wamm ( halk in Ottoman ) to distinguish

the " commoner " ahall from the " notable " awjuh and a cydn ( soz sahibleri

in Ottoman ) . Because order and Ottoman government were necessarily

" just , " anything that tended to disrupt public order with its built - in restric¬

tions and hierarchies was immediately interpreted as the work of mischief

makers who had stoked the passions of the ignorant and unwise common

folk . For instance , when both Muslim and Christian villagers rebelled

against Bashlr Shihab ' s rapacious taxation in 1821 , the chronicler Haydar

Ahmad al - Shihabi ( who was a cousin of Bashlr ' s ) described how the ex¬
hausted commoners threw themselves at the feet of their master and

begged for forgiveness , " acknowledging their errors , admitting their guilt

and their ignorance (jahl ) and the baseness and inferiority of their minds .' "7

Tanyus Shahln and the war of 1860

Having briefly and schematically laid out the chief characteristic of the

traditional social order of Mount Lebanon - the separation between com¬

moners and elites — , the question is , how then , and why , did sectarianism

first emerge as a political problem ? Historians of Mount Lebanon agree

that the three decades from 1830 to 1860 constituted a turning point in the

region ' s history . During this period , Mehmed Ali ( Muhammad CA1I ) inau¬

gurated a massive project of Egyptian modernization , the Ottoman Empire

launched its Tanzimdt reforms in 1839 , and European political and eco -

6 Haydar Ahmad al - Shihabi , Lubnan fl 'ahd al - umara ' al - shihabiyym , ed . Asad Rustum
and Fu ' ad Afram al - Bustam , 3 vols . , Beirut : Editions St . Paul , 1969 , vol . 3 , 776 .
7 Ibid ., 689 .
184 USSAMAMAKDISI

nomic involvement in the Levant increased tremendously , especially after

1840 when Ibrahim Pasha ' s army was routed in Syria by Great Britain ,
Austria , and the Ottomans .
Mount Lebanon lay at the epicenter of these developments . It was the
site of the major battles between the Anglo - Austrian - Ottoman alliance and
the Egyptians . It was the site , as well , of the first tentative Ottoman efforts
at implementing the ambitious program of reform laid out in the 1839
Gulhane proclamation . Following the restoration of Ottoman rule to Syria
in 1840 , Europeans and Ottomans found themselves at odds as to how best
reform Mount Lebanon . The Ottomans preferred direct and centralized ad¬
ministration . The Europeans insisted on indirect Ottoman rule . Both sides
agreed , however , on the principle of absolute equality of Muslim and non -
Muslim subjects as " stipulated " by the Gulhane decree . Both sides also
agreed to respect the " ancient " privileges of Mount Lebanon . There was a
fundamental contradiction in this desire to at once maintain the " ancient "
privileges of Mount Lebanon , which had long been administered by elite
families along nonsectarian lines , and to insist on the formal and public
equality of Druzes and Maronites . Religion emerged as a critical and key
feature in the political landscape of Mount Lebanon following 1840 . The
issue was now before Druze and Maronite elites to rethink politics along
sectarian lines and to propose this rethinking as an " ancient " tradition .
Sectarianism emerged , then , as a vehicle by which religious elites at¬
tempted to transform their respective religious communities , hitherto qui¬
escent and supportive of a nonsectarian polity , into mobilized but rigidly
ordered political communities . The Maronite Church took the lead in this
endeavor to forge a single and coherent political ta 'ifah . Nowhere was this
better represented than in the efforts of Bishop Niqula Murad to narrate a
history of a Maronite dominated Mount Lebanon . In his Notice Historique
sur I ' Origine de la Nation Maronite et sur ses Rapports avec la France ,

sur la Nation Druze et sur les diverses Populations du Mont Liban , Murad
presented the case for a Maronite Shihab rule over Mount Lebanon , justi¬
fied primarily by the " fact " of a heritage of Maronite Shihab rule . 8 Murad
set out to lay a foundation myth for a modern political vision of a Maronite
Mount Lebanon . That his principal contention was patently false , for the
Shihabs had never ruled Mount Lebanon because they were Maronites ,
was significant not so much because of its gross inaccuracy but because
Murad felt confident in making such a claim in the first place . He com -

See Nicolas Murad , Notice historique sur I 'origine de la nation Maronite et sur ses
rapports avec la France , sur la nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont
Liban [ 1844 ] , Paris : Cariscript , 1988 .
 REVISITING SECTARIANISM
185

bined a notion of history ( Mount Lebanon ' s " ancient " privileges ) with a

plea for a sectarian future for Mount Lebanon . Murad wanted to build a

socially ordered Maronite Mount Lebanon . He assumed the social segrega¬

tion of the old regime between cawamm and a 'yan could and would be

subsumed within a Maronite dominated political order .

Historians of Mount Lebanon , of course , have been sensitive to the

competing claims put forward by Druze and Maronite elites , including the

Maronite Church . They have not , however , paid enough attention to the

anxieties inherent in this shift of politics from a nonsectarian basis in the

old regime to an increasingly sectarian foundation for post - Tanzimat

Mount Lebanon . This is because historians , following the 19th - century

European archives upon which they rely , assume that what occurs during

1840 to 1860 is a degeneration of an elite society , a regression into pri¬

mordial sectarian loyalties , and hence into mindless tribalism and fanati¬

cism . They have missed the most important ingredient of this period , its

revolutionary character , in the sense that sectarianism ushered in an en¬

tirely new way to interpret history and politics . Murad ' s Notice historique

is certainly one example of this at the elite level . There is , however , an¬

other example from the popular level which sheds even more light into the

contradictions , the tentativeness and the anxieties inherent in the emerging

sectarianism . I am referring to the Kisrawan rebellion in the predominantly

Maronite district of Kisrawan under the leadership of the commoner

Tanyus Shahln .

Although there were many causes for the Kisrawan rebellion , it was

the Ottoman Tanzlmat reforms that inadvertently provided Shahln and his

followers with the stage and possibility for political action . Shahln was a

product of the open - ended struggle between European , Ottoman and local

elites over the relationship between religion and politics that developed in
Mount Lebanon after the Tanzlmat . Unlike the elite rivalries between and

within Maronite and Druze elites which , bitter and protracted as they were ,

did not propose a fundamental change in the social order , Shahln equated

reform with a legitimization of Christian communal rights - and he under¬

stood communal rights to justify popular participation in politics . The el¬

ites were not terrified of the physical violence of Shahln ' s rebellion , but of

its symbolic violence to an increasingly mythologized traditional history ,

geography , and social order , and of its political violence to an elitist sec¬

tarianism ushered in by the Tanzlmat . To be sure , the rebellion began as a

revolt against excessive taxation and onerous customs , but demands soon

escalated to equality between Khazins and the villagers . Khazin homes

were looted but not occupied , their orchards were raided , their silk facto¬

ries plundered , and on July 13 , 1859 , the wife of a Khazin notable and her
 USSAMA MAKDISI
186

daughter were killed by unknown assailants . In the face of an Ottoman

commission of inquiry dispatched in late 1859 , the villagers consistently

maintained that they were not in rebellion against the Ottoman state . They

claimed they were ignorant of who was behind the troubles , that the Sub¬

lime state was surely more knowledgeable than they were , and stated that

the Khazins were perfectly free to return to their homes when they wanted .
At the same time , however , the ahali demanded from the Maronite Patri¬

arch that , in accordance with the imperial edicts , the " station [ manzilah ] of

the shaykhs be [ equal ] to ours without exception " and representatives be

elected by the people " to defend the rights of the poor ahali who were not

capable of defending themselves . " 9 The bid for Christian liberation was

directed both at Christian and Druze notables , for as Shahin put it in a let¬

ter in May of 1860 , " I have a boyoroldi [ buyrultu , Ottoman proclamation ]

from the Seven Sovereigns . . . giving liberty to all Christians [ stating ] that

they are not to be in bondage to anyone ; if you desire emancipation from

slavery , no one can prevent you , neither the mushir nor the kaimakam . " 10

Tanyus Shahin repeatedly invoked his subversive authority as " general

representative of the Christians " to morally challenge what he saw as the

corrupt traditional elites . 11 Shahln 's subaltern Christian " reading " of the

Tanzlmat was possible precisely because he never considered himself in

rebellion against the Ottoman State . Far from it , he always insisted that he

was a loyal subject . It was from this position that he articulated the escalat¬

ing demands of the harakah , demands which ranged from fair taxation to

full - fledged equality , and finally to a final repudiation , in 1860 , of what

was now viewed as " Druze " rule over Christians in the religiously " mixed "

districts of Mount Lebanon . In other words , the rejection of Druze control ,

and the desire to live under Christian control was both explicitly and im¬

plicitly tied to a desire for equality and freedom in line ( allegedly ) with the

Tanzlmat . The social and the sectarian were fused together : one did not

degenerate into the other ; rather , one expressed and entrenched the other . It
was this tension between the social and sectarian that led to the outbreak of

the war of 1860 . When Christian villagers in the " mixed " districts heard of

9 Archives du Patriarchat Maronite ( Bkirke , Lebanon ) , tiroir du Patriarche Bulus Mas -

' ad , documents des annees 1857 - 1861 ( hereafter AB ) ; drawer of Bulus Mas ' ad , n .d .
but probably 1859 ; AB , drawer of Bulus Mas !ad , February 7 , 1859 , and AB , drawer of
Bulus Mas ' ad , March 14 , 1859 .
10 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland ( Belfast ) , D 1071 H / C / 1/ 1/ 13 . This is an
English translation found in the private papers of Lord Dufferin at the Public Records
Office of Northern Ireland . The original Arabic document is missing . The reference to
the " Seven Sovereigns " is not clear .
11 AB , drawer of Bulus Mas ' ad , April 2 , 1860 .
 REVISITING SECTARIANISM 187

Shahln ' s rebellion , and more importantly when they saw that it was not

immediately crushed , they also turned against their notables - who were

Druze - in 1860 . Maronite youths organized themselves into militias ,

called themselves the jahalah ( which turned an old - regime discourse of

ignorance on its head ) , and launched their own bid for liberation . The 1860

war was not simply a war between Maronites and Druzes , but also a con¬

flict between commoners who interpreted the Tanzimat to mean social

liberation for Christians and Druze notables who understood the Tanzimat

to mean a confirmation of their " ancient privileges . " The penultimate act in

the war over the Tanzimat began . It ended when the Maronites of the Shuf
were defeated and massacred .

Memory , historiography and sectarianism

In conclusion , sectarianism emerged as a problem in the mid - nineteenth

century in Mount Lebanon . As a practice and as a form of politics , it re¬

flected the contradictory desires of the Europeans and Ottomans to reform

Mount Lebanon in accordance with supposedly " ancient privileges " ( about

which no group could agree ) and in line with the Tanzimat reforms which

stipulated equality between Muslim and non - Muslim . Sectarianism also

reflected the tension between an elite wish to maintain a rigid social order

and a non - elite will to broaden the hitherto exclusively elite political

sphere . As a practice , moreover , it highlighted a contradiction in the

Tanzimat itself between subjecthood ( quiescent , tax - paying , deferential

Ottoman subjects as understood by the Ottoman rulers ) and citizenship

( active , discerning , involved Ottoman subjects as understood by Shahln ) . It

did so because sectarianism defined politics not simply as an elite privilege

which was regulated by Ottoman rulers , but as an arena of communal

rights in which non - elites could propose themselves as the defenders of the

community ' s rights . That this transformation , this change in the meaning

and significance of politics , was sectarian in nature should not obscure its
break with tradition . That it was violent should also not obscure its trans -

gressive and emancipatory aspects . That Europeans , Ottomans , and ( today )

Lebanese , all insist that sectarianism is premodern , in other words , that

they all ( in different ways ) create a discourse of a premodern sectarianism

as a foil to their own self -proclaimed modern identities , should also not

obscure the newness of sectarianism , nor its complexity , nor its contradic¬
tions .

This last point is crucial because it indicates what I believe to be the

greatest failure of imagination on the part of historians dealing with mod¬

ern sectarian violence . In their obsession to classify violence as opposed to

188 USSAMA MAKDISI

reform ( instead of as an expression of reform ) , historians have wholeheart¬

edly and uncritically adopted the perspective of nineteenth - century Euro¬
pean and Ottoman officials . In the wake of 1860 , for example , the foreign
minister of the Ottoman Empire , Fu ' ad Pasha - who was one of the leading
Tanzimat statesmen - went personally to Syria to ensure that modern Ot¬
toman law and order were properly imposed . He rounded up all the Druze
notables and confiscated their lands . And he stayed in Beirut until mid -
1861 to make sure that almost every one of the major Druze leaders was
sentenced to death for their alleged failure to prevent the massacres of
Maronites , although in the end , because of British pressure , the sentences
were first commuted , and eventually , rescinded . What is important to note
is that from the outset of his mission , before he had even begun any inves¬
tigation , Fu ' ad Pasha concluded that the violence in Mount Lebanon was a
reflection of an " age - old " ( kadim iil- cereyan ) tribal struggle between Ma¬
ronites and Druzes . 12 In report after report , Fu ' ad Pasha contrasted the
punishment of the Druzes inflicted by his modern army - whose outfits
and organization reflected the new face of the Empire - with the supposed
tribal savagery of local inhabitants . He condemned Tanyus Shahln as a
" brigand " and he suppressed the Kisrawan revolt with the full support of

the British and French governments as well as that of the Maronite Church .
The point here is to understand the implications of Fu ' ad Pasha ' s con¬
victions rather than their veracity . The description of the conflict as " age -
old " conveniently located sectarianism in a premodern world dominated by
fanaticism , ignorance and tribalism . The Ottoman punishment - following
supposedly impartial investigations and sentences in accordance with re¬
formed and allegedly unambiguous penal codes and carried out by a
Tanzimat army in the presence of European representatives - was , by con¬
trast , understood by Fu ' ad Pasha to be modern . He informed the inhabi¬
tants of Syria soon after his arrival there : " Because the Sublime State never
accepts that the slightest harm or aggression should befall any of the
classes of imperial subjects who take shelter under its protection , and
because the events [ which transpired ] were contrary to the principle of
civilization current in the world and beyond the pale in every manner , the
Sublime State , in accordance with its duty to ensure justice , has decided to
punish those involved in the events . " 13 Modernity , in other words , was a
contest between reforming Ottomans and Europeans . The local setting -
Mount Lebanon - provided only the stage for this modern contest . For

12 Ba§bakanlik Archives , Istanbul [ hereafter BBA ] , BBA BEO A . MKT .UM , 415 / 56 , 1
M 1277 ( July 20 , 1860 ) .
13 BBA IRADE D 31753 , Leff . 3 , n .d .
 REVISITING SECTARIANISM 189

Fu ' ad Pasha , the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon were not simply savage
( for that was a fairly standard Ottoman description of rural regions long

before the Tanzimat ) , but savage in the context of a race of progress

against civilized , yet mischievous , Europe . Local inhabitants did not make
or move history as much as they were pawns and objects of a modern his¬
torical struggle that pitted , in Fu ' ad Pasha ' s view , powerful yet scheming
Europeans against beleaguered but sincere Ottoman reformers .
Another implication was the nature of citizenship in the post - reform
Ottoman Empire . Fu ' ad Pasha repeatedly claimed that he had come not just
to uproot corruption and end violence , but to reinscribe social order within
a modern nation - state . The ideology of progress allowed Fu ' ad Pasha to
deploy the language of corruption (fesad ) and social limits (hudiid) -
thereby tapping into classical Ottoman ruling discourses - to equate the
modern Ottoman subject with the tolerant , obedient and quietist subject .
Fu ' ad Pasha reminded his soldiers that although they were in Syria " to
bring peace and security to this area and to punish the sins of the group
[ i . e . , the ahali Ottoman subjects ] because of their cruel acts " , they were

also there to " show everybody what the worth and value of a soldier is and
let all our compatriots ( vatanda§larimiz ) know our Padi§ah ' s justice . " 14
According to Fu ' ad Pasha , therefore , the soldiers acted on behalf of their
theoretical compatriots in Mount Lebanon - compatriots who were stuck
in a savage tribal landscape . The imperial soldiers constituted the vanguard
of Ottoman modernity , rationality and nationalism . They were to lead by
example , for in addition to being commanded to obey the person of the
Sultan , the soldiers and their Ottoman compatriots were exhorted to be
loyal to an abstract Ottoman nation . They were meant to embody a concept
of national allegiance - which like loyalty to the House of Osman of the
old regime , flowed up the social order , from periphery to center . Fu ' ad
Pasha envisioned an Ottoman modernity which included subject - citizens
who listened , followed and obeyed rather than actively participated in the
governance of the Empire .
For Fu ' ad Pasha the violence of 1860 did not represent the beginnings
of a complicated , and still tentative age of Ottoman nationalism but of the
end point of premodern cycle of indigenous tribalism . Accordingly , Fu ' ad
insisted that his restoration of order in Mount Lebanon was not based on
the principle of maza ma maza , or letting bygones be bygones ( which is
the way Ottoman officials previously had dealt with local violence ) , but on
uprooting local society from its tribal past and forcibly , yet benevolently ,
entering it into an age of modernity . Underlying this Ottoman restoration

14 BBA IRADE MM 851 / 3 , Leff . 4 , n .d .

190 USSAMA MAKDISI

of order was a refusal to acknowledge any implications that sectarian mo¬

bilizations of 1860 may have had for the course of imperial reform , let
alone for the future of the Empire . Underlying the restoration of order , as
well , was an untidy effort to sweep under the rug all the contradictions of
Tanzimat modernity - contradictions , for example , between deferential
subjecthood and active citizenship and between religious and social libera¬
tion that were at the heart of the violence of 1860 and that detracted from
the coherence of Ottoman nationalism until the very end of the empire .
Fu ' ad Pasha , finally , oversaw the reorganization of Mount Lebanon
into a model reformed province , the mutasarnflik of Cebel - i Liibnan ,
which was to be governed henceforth by an Ottoman Christian of non -
Lebanese origin . Fu ' ad Pasha - and it must be said , the European ambas¬
sadors of Britain , France , Russia , Austria and Prussia - also mandated that
a council was to be created to aid the Governor in administration . This
council , which included members of every major religious sect in Mount
Lebanon on the basis of proportional , and hence , supposedly equitable
representation , lay the basis for the modern sectarian political system that
dominates Lebanon till today . The irony , of course , is that while Fu ' ad
thought he was eradicating a destructive tribal will to sectarian violence ,
he , in fact , created a sectarian principle of government which guaranteed
the emergence of a culture of sectarianism . I say this because the mainte¬
nance of a so - called " balance of [ religious ] communities " - communities
which hitherto did not exist as coherent political units - became the ulti¬
mate end of political life . I say this , also , because implicit assumption of
all politics henceforth became that without this so - called " balance of
communities " 1860 would be re - enacted , and therefore nothing must be
done that disturbs this so - called " balance of communities " : no secular civil
law and no secular foundation for politics , no discussion of 1860 which
became publicly , at least , a forgotten event . Privately , however , 1860 lived
on in the memories , narratives , and archives which continually threatened
to undermine the stability of post - war Mount Lebanon . The edict that an¬
nounced the new order in Mount Lebanon boldly asserted that Fu ' ad Pasha
had succeeded in " erasing the traces of the painful event " of I860 . 15 This
Ottoman exercise in deliberate amnesia - which presumed to represent and
silence thousands of imperial subjects whose lives and memories were
obviously and indelibly attached to the events of 1860 - was motivated , no
doubt , by a genuine attempt to rebuild trust and to lay the foundations for a
cohesive society . Yet while Mount Lebanon did indeed enjoy what histo¬
rian Engin Akarli has referred to as the " Long Peace " under Ottoman

15 AB , drawer of Bulus Mas ' ad , proclamation dated 1278 h . [ 1861 / 1862 ] .

 REVISITING SECTARIANISM 191

stewardship which lasted until the First World War , local inhabitants could
not so easily forget I860 . 16
I have argued in this presentation that while traditional society was , in
a sense , politically secular , it was nevertheless shaped by an extremely
rigid and hierarchical social order . I have stressed that sectarian mobiliza¬
tions fundamentally challenged this order . That Shahin failed to protect his
Christian compatriots and that the energy of his rebellion dissipated as the
Druze - Maronite war of 1860 unfolded , that Shahin himself quickly disap¬
peared from the scene is , in a sense , quite immaterial . Just as his emer¬
gence reflected a crisis among the elites , and a breakdown of traditional
order , his own failures reflected the impossibility of cohering a single ,
united sectarian identity . The first round of a new open - ended and inher¬
ently unstable sectarian game had ended . In plain English , secularism of
tradition had ended ; and in its place arose an unstable sectarian modernity .
This modernity , like others that we witness today in the fields of Kosovo ,
may not be what we like . But it is here for all to see . The sooner we accept
this fact , the quicker we will be able to comprehend and appreciate its
complexity and figure out ways to both harness its potential positives - its
impulse towards social equality and towards general political participation
in a society that historically knew neither - and mitigate its obvious nega¬
tives .

16 See Engin Akarli ' s The Long Peace , Berkeley : University of California Press , 1993 .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE :
PATRIARCHE ILYAS AL - HUWAYYIK VERSUS
JAMAL PACHA
Youssef Mouawad

in the Game of Nations there

" . . . third ,

are no winners , only losers . The ob¬

jective of each player is not so much
to win as to avoid loss .
The common objective of players in
the Game of Nations is merely to keep
the Game going . The alternative to the
Game is war . "
Zakaria Mohieddin ( 1962 ) 1

Nous sommes en 1914 . Fin juillet - debut aout , les hostilites sont declarees
en Europe . Le ler octobre , le gouvernement ottoman abolit les Capitula¬
tions . Le 28 octobre , il entre en guerre aux cotes des Empires Centraux .
Jamal Pacha ( Cemal Pa§a) , ministre de la Marine et commandant de la
Quatrieme Armee , arrive debut decembre a Damas . Son objectif declare
est de chasser d ' Egypte les troupes britanniques qui y sont stationnees . II
dispose des pleins pouvoirs en Syrie et se comporte desormais en vice- roi .
En face de lui , au Mont - Liban , le patriarche maronite Ilyas al - Huway -
yik , elu en janvier 1899 , a soixante et onze ans . II aurait souhaite une vieil -
lesse tranquille et le voici confronte pendant trois ans a une situation qui
peut illustrer un cas - type des rapports entre dominant et domine , majori -
taire et tolere , musulman et dhimmi .
Pour recomposer cet exercice de style , deux textes ont ete mis en lice .
Le premier intitule Dalci 'il al - Hnayah al - samadaniyyah 2 ( " Les indices de la
protection divine " ) par le pere Ibrahim Harfush qui fut responsable des
archives du patriarcat maronite a BkirkI a partir de 1927 et qui , de ce fait , a

1 Epigraphe de l ' ouvrage par Miles Copeland , The Game of Nations : The Amorality of
Power Politics , London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson , 1969 , 7 .

2 Ibrahim Harfush , Dala ' il al - Hnayah al - samadaniyyah , Jounieh : Matba ' at al - Mursalin
al - Lubnaniyyin , 1934 .
194 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD

une excellente connaissance des dossiers et de la correspondance entre -

tenue au cours de la periode 1914 - 1918 . Le second texte est la biographie
de l ' archeveque maronite de Beyrouth Mgr Butrus Shibli : Tarjamat al-
mutran Butrus Shibli? L ' auteur , Michel Shibli , reproduit dans cette bio¬
graphie de larges passages du journal de l ' archeveque en question . Ces
deux textes , mis cote - a - cote , nous donnent non seulement une idee de la
chronologie des evenements , mais ils nous revelent egalement les mentali -
tes de deux representants d ' une communaute a " faible coefficient de secu -
rite " plongee , qui plus est , dans cette periode de crise grave que furent les
annees 1914 a 1918 .
Sur fond de guerre , d ' epidemies , de famine et de repression , deux ac -
teurs sont face a face : le vieux patriarche et le Jeune Turc , l ' officier otto¬
man et l ' homme de religion . Le decor plante , deux personnages vont jouer
et vivre un drame en deux actes . Ce ne sont pas sur des questions de fond
tels que 1' imposition fiscale , la conscription ou le desarmement de la popu¬
lation chretienne que les problemes vont surgir , mais sur des questions de
forme . L ' officier ottoman veut mettre au pas le clhimmi , le rappeler a
l ' ordre . Les mesures vexatoires seront prises autour de deux themes ma¬

jeure : le ferman d ' investiture et les visites protocolaires .

Premier acte : Le ferman d ' investiture

Le 11 decembre , Jamal Pacha re ? oit a Damas trois prelats venus lui sou -
haiter la bienvenue au nom du patriarche . Cette delegation lui remet une
lettre de Mgr Huwayyik , l ' assurant de l ' attachement et de la fidelite des
Maronites a l ' Etat ottoman . 4 Jamal Pacha se fait rassurant et confirme que
les privileges de la Montagne ne seront pas abolis . II adresse une lettre au
patriarche dans laquelle il lui demande d ' user de son pouvoir pour faire
regner le calme et la paix . 5 Jusque - la tout se passe bien . Les craintes ma¬
jeures des prelats , relatives a la conscription et a l ' imposition fiscale , sont
ecartees . L ' entrevue est dans l ' ensemble satisfaisante et l ' honneur est sauf,
meme si les troupes ottomanes occupent le Mont - Liban et que la loi mar -
tiale y a ete proclamee . 6 Mais c ' est mal connaitre le terrain mine et les
retournements de situation . Nous sommes dans le monde de l ' imprevisible
et la delegation n ' a pas encore repris son souffle , que le lendemain meme ,

3 Michel Shibli , Tarjamat al-mutran Butrus Shibli, Beyrouth : Imprimerie Catholique ,

1929 .

4 Harfush , Dala 'il , 527 - 28 .

5 Ibid ., 528 - 29 .
6 Shibli , Tarjamat , 188 .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE
195

un pretre qui accompagnait les prelats , est convoque aupres de Jamal qui

souleve a nouveau la question du ferman du patriarche et des eveques .

Ici , il faut rappeler qu ' aussitot elus , tous les patriarches et eveques

d ' Orient devaient presenter une requete aupres du Sultan afin d ' etre offi -

ciellement investis dans leur nouvelle charge . Seul le patriarche maronite

echappait a cette regie qui regissait les autorites ecclesiastiques dans

Pempire ottoman . Les Maronites voyaient dans cette franchise le symbole

de leur particularisme , la consecration de leur autonomie et ils en tiraient

une certaine fierte . En l ' occurrence , Jamal Pacha allait exiger de Mgr Hu -

wayyik , quinze ans apres son election , de faire cette requete " humiliante " .

Mgr Butrus Shibli , qui faisait partie de la delegation , aussitot rentre

dans son diocese de Beyrouth , est rappele par Jamal Pacha a Damas . Le

patriarche Huwayyik , qui prefere etre le plus loin possible du nouveau

maitre de la Syrie , se rend dans le Mont - Liban septentrional et donne a

Mgr Shibli ses instructions : " Nous ne changerons rien de ce que nous ont

legue nos predecesseurs " est son mot d ' ordre . 7 Nous verrons que tout au

long de cet episode , le patriarche va agir par personnes interposees et evi -

ter de rencontrer Jamal Pacha en personne . Par ailleurs , les choses ont

change . La communaute maronite ne peut plus compter , comme dans le

passe , sur une puissance europeenne telle que la France pour defendre ses

privileges . La crainte se propage dans les rangs de la population car , en

cette seconde moitie de decembre , des notables libanais sont exiles a Jeru¬

salem et l ' archeveque maronite de Tripoli est convoque devant le tribunal

militaire siegeant a Aley .

Jamal Pacha et Mgr Shibli 8

L ' entrevue entre Jamal Pacha et Mgr Shibli a lieu a Damas le 23 decembre

au soir . Le journal de l ' archeveque de Beyrouth nous renseigne sur la te -

neur de l ' entretien qui porta sur deux themes : le ferman et les armes aux

mains des Chretiens du Liban , reputes francophiles . Jamal Pacha n ' est pas

dupe du sentiment de ces derniers . Mgr Shibli le remercie de n ' avoir pas

precede au desarmement de la population . La reponse de Jamal vaut la

peine d ' etre citee : les armes doivent rester aux mains de la population , car

on aurait besoin de l ' assistance des Chretiens pour repousser l ' ennemi de

nos cotes en cas de debarquement ennemi . Mgr Shibli n ' a plus qu ' a ren -

cherir en notant que les Maronites sont des gens paisibles et qu ' ils ne gar -

dent leurs armes que pour defendre leurs biens .

7 Ibid . , 189 ; Harfush , Dala 'il , 530 .

8 Shibli , Tarjamat , 190 - 97 ; Harfush , Dala 'il, 530 .
196 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD

Jeu d ' hypocrites ! Jamal Pacha sait pertinemment que la population

chretienne se souleverait contre lui a la nouvelle d ' un debarquement allie .
Mgr Shibli sait que Jamal Pacha n ' est pas dupe , et ainsi de suite . . .
L ' officier ottoman sait que le prelat ne croit pas un mot de ce qu ' il dit . Et

pourtant c ' est dans les limites de la courtoisie et de la regie du jeu . Le

mensonge et le double langage sont l ' usage consacre . L ' essentiel est de ne
pas perdre la face , de ne pas en arriver aux dernieres extremites . Le
dhimmi doit protester de son innocence , proclamer verbalement son appui ;
il doit cacher et occulter ses intentions veritables . L ' homme au pouvoir ,
Jamal Pacha en l ' occurrence , n ' a pas a en demander plus ; il doit se satis -
faire de l ' apparence . II doit se contenter du lip service , car nous sommes en
pays d ' Islam , en territoire de dhimmitude , ou Jamal Pacha doit fournir a
Mgr Shibli des arguments au cas ou celui - ci viendrait a en manquer , puis -
qu ' apres tout il est son partenaire sur la scene . II doit l ' aider a camoufler
ou a justifier les choses graves . Les Maronites francophiles dont les jour -
naux fran <? ais vantent les exploits guerriers contre les Turcs , deviennent ,
pour la bonne cause , les sujets fideles du sultan ottoman . 9 Simulation et
mensonge , flatteries et surencheres sont monnaie commune . 10

La question du ferman "

Jamal exige lors de cette entrevue que le patriarche et les eveques fassent
la requete officielle relative au ferman d ' investiture . Cependant Jamal ,
aussi haut place qu ' il soit , ne l ' exige pas comme l ' aurait fait un militaire .
Tout au contraire , il plaide sa cause et defend son point de vue . II se fait
diplomate pour ne pas heurter son interlocuteur . Ce dernier doit savoir
jusqu ' ou resister , et combien atermoyer ? Jamal rappelle le fait que tous les
prelats des autres Eglises chretiennes requierent le ferman , et que par ail -
leurs , les membres du gouvernement , dont lui meme , ont ete confirmes
dans leurs postes respectifs par le Sultan . II ajoute , en outre , que le ferman

9 Harfush , Dala 'il, 522 - 26 .

10 Cf . les remarques d ' un occidental , le pere Jean - Maurice Fiey quant a son sejour irakien
dans son autobiographie inedite : Une petite vie tranquille , 19 : " Le milieu voulait en ef-
fet , et cela a toujours ete pour moi une chose difficile a comprendre que Ton parle
contre sa conviction intime , quand la conjoncture exigeait que l ' on suive l ' attitude offi¬
cielle , que ce soit a propos de la Tchecoslovaquie , ou de tel probleme mondial ou inte -
rieur . On apprenait en Irak a dire ce qu ' il faut dire , devant qui il faut le dire , comme il
faut le dire , quand il faut le dire , tout en sachant que votre interlocuteur ne vous croyait
pas , et savait que vous le saviez " .
11 Shibli , Tarjamat , 191 - 97 .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE 197

n ' a d ' autre raison d ' etre que l ' investiture des prelats et la confirmation de

leurs privileges .

Devant cet exces de courtoisie et de propos raisonnables , ou le ton

n ' est jamais passionne , ou il n ' y a pas l ' ombre d ' une menace ni d ' un chan¬

tage , Mgr Shibli repond que si le patriarche grec - orthodoxe demande

l ' investiture , c ' est qu ' il le faisait deja sous l ' empire byzantin , et qu ' il de -

vait bien en referer a une autorite superieure alors que les Maronites ,

n ' ayant jamais rompu avec Rome , n ' etaient pas censes y avoir recours . Se

basant sur un fait contestable sinon faux , Mgr Shibli defend sa these . II va

jusqu ' a dire que l ' Etat ottoman ne va quand meme pas abolir aujourd ' hui

ce que les sultans ont accorde jadis . Pour defendre un privilege , on a re¬

cours a l ' argument historique , a la tradition , a l ' immemorial . On prend a

temoin l ' histoire , le passe . On s ' y accroche afin qu ' il n ' y ait pas un prece¬

dent . De meme que dans une situation inverse , on se base sur le precedent ,

sur l ' exception pour eviter l ' application de la regie . Faisant appel a la ge -

nerosite de son partenaire , usage oriental par excellence , Mgr Shibli ajoute

que les Maronites sont en droit d ' esperer non seulement que l ' on n ' abroge

pas leurs droits acquis , mais qu ' on leur accorde encore plus de privileges .

Maniere classique mais habile d ' en appeler a la grandeur d ' ame de

l ' interlocuteur . En d ' autres termes , un compliment detourne qui , en flattant

l ' antagoniste , peut le desarmer . Cette attitude de surenchere peut se reveler

payante . Mgr Shibli ne comprend pas par ailleurs l ' importance que l ' on

donne a cette affaire " secondaire " alors que des prelats de divers pays

catholiques , tout fideles et devoues qu ' ils soient a leurs gouvernements

respectifs , n ' ont pas a requerir l ' investiture . Ainsi , comme ce systeme a

toujours fonctionne d ' une maniere satisfaisante , pourquoi ne pas continuer

a s ' y conformer ?

Jamal Pacha ne s ' avoue pas vaincu . Sa reponse est que tout cela est de

l ' histoire ancienne et ne peut constituer un obstacle aux reformes que

compte entreprendre le gouvernement ottoman . Mais ne voulant pas inter -

rompre le cours du debat , il se reprend pour dire que le fait d ' etre titulaire

d ' un ferman , pour un eveque residant en dehors du Mont - Liban , peut

s ' averer utile .

Le prelat maronite essaye de tirer son epingle du jeu . Jamal , voyant

que l ' on toumait en rond , finit par dire qu ' il veut regler la question d ' une

maniere definitive et radicale . Mgr Shibli va jusqu ' a rappeler combien un

tel denouement pourrait heurter la communaute maronite , et que si lui -

meme l ' acceptait , sa communaute le refuserait et il serait amene a demis -

sionner . Cette fois le prelat invoque une autre autorite que la sienne , un

autre moyen de dire qu ' il n ' est pas en mesure de donner satisfaction a son

interlocuteur . Les choses trainent . Jamal laisse entendre qu ' il est dispose a
 198 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD

intervenir personnellement pour obtenir gain de cause . Mgr ShiblT finit par
dire qu ' il n ' a pas de pouvoir de decision et que le patriarche meme ne peut
en decider sans consulter les eveques et le Saint - Siege . Jamal n ' ignore pas
cela , il reitere cependant qu ' il souhaite regler cette question dans les delais
les plus brefs .
Dans une lettre du 27 decembre adressee au patriarche , Mgr Shibll
suggere a ce dernier de laisser trainer les choses autant que possible , Jamal
Pacha pouvant changer d ' avis . 12 Neanmoins Jamal n ' attend guere . Ohan -
nes Kuyumjian Pacha , mutasarrif du Mont - Liban , fait comprendre a Mgr
Yusuf Saqr que " Jamal Pacha souhaite avoir la reponse du patriarche avant
une semaine sinon il faut s ' attendre . . . " . Ainsi , l ' homme au pouvoir peut
tout remettre en question . II peut se permettre de jouer le jeu tant que bon
lui semblera . Au - dela d ' une certaine limite , il peut l ' interrompre . Au -
jourd ' hui , on qualifxerait cette attitude d ' abus de pouvoir . Sur ce terrain ,
l ' un des joueurs peut se rappeler qu ' il est egalement arbitre et changer les

regies du jeu ou meme les ajuster a sa convenance ; question de mesure , car

Jamal Pacha veut remporter une victoire d ' autant plus satisfaisante qu ' elle
est gagnee sans avoir recours aux grands moyens .
Le patriarche maronite n ' a plus qu ' a convoquer les prelats de sa com -
munaute , pour prendre la decision qui s ' impose . Le 10 janvier 1915 , une
requete est adressee au Ministre de la Justice et des Cultes pour requerir le
ferman , qui est bien sur accorde . Mais l ' affaire ne s ' arrete pas la . Le wall
de Beyrouth exige que le patriarche se deplace en personne pour recevoir
le ferman alors que des rumeurs circulent au sujet de son eventuel exil a
Jerusalem . 13 Le wall promet qu ' un accueil officiel sera reserve a Mgr Hu -
wayyik et laisse miroiter l ' attrait de la chose en disant que l ' influence de
ce dernier n ' en sera que plus grande , et que d ' ailleurs cette visite dissipe -
rait tous les malentendus et rendrait service au Mont - Liban . Mgr ShiblT
doit a nouveau faire preuve de tous ses talents de diplomate et pretexte que
c ' est la mauvaise sante du patriarche qui l ' empeche de quitter son siege .

Tout est bon pour reculer l ' echeance . Le 26 avril , pour jeter du lest , Mgr
Shibll verse de la part du patriarche le montant de la vente des billets de
loterie en faveur de l ' armee ottomane . Effet appaisant de l ' argent verse , le
wall semble avoir renonce a exiger la visite du patriarche . Le 29 avril , le

ferman est remis par ses soins .

Ainsi s' acheve ce premier acte relatif au ferman d ' investiture .

12 Ibid . , 196 .
13 Ibid . , 198 - 99 .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE 199

Acte II : les visites protocolaires

La campagne de Suez lancee par Jamal contre les troupes britanniques a

lamentablement echoue en fevrier 1915 , et le blocus maritime des allies
s ' exerce sur les cotes avec les consequences que cela implique . Jamal Pa¬

cha qui a gagne la premiere manche en imposant le ferman au patriarche ,

est ulcere de ce que ce dernier ne se soit pas deplace en personne pour lui
rendre visite . Le patriarche n ' a pas encore accompli cet acte d ' allegeance
personnelle , pretextant sans cesse l ' eloignement geographique , son age
avance et ses ennuis de sante . De tels arguments , qui peuvent prevaloir a
l ' egard du wall de Beyrouth , sont inoperants en l ' espece . L ' usage est que

l ' on rende visite a un personnage aussi haut place . D ' un autre cote , il est

acquis que le patriarche ne se deplace pas . Un usage contre un autre usage .

La question de la preseance est primordiale en dhimmitudeland .
Le 13 juillet 1915 , l ' archeveque maronite de Chypre Mgr Bulus cAw -
wad adresse sous le sceau du secret une lettre au patriarche , le mettant au
courant d ' un entretien avec un notable libanais . 14 Ce dernier avait ete char¬
ge par un officier turc de requerir la presence du patriarche a Sawfar ou
Jamal allait passer quelques jours . Ainsi , par personnes interposees , la
sommation est faite . Mgr cAwwad informe le patriarche que Jamal ne va
pas accepter les excuses d ' usage , car desormais il se trouve au Mont -
Liban . Le refus d ' obtemperer constituerait une atteinte grave a sa majeste
le Sultan , a l ' Etat ottoman et a la personne de leur representant . L ' officier
a semble - t - il insiste pour que la visite ait lieu sinon . . . Menace et chantage
a la mesure de 1' offense et de l ' affront que le patriarche commettrait a
l ' egard de sa majeste imperiale . D ' intermediate en intermediate , la me¬
nace prend de l ' ampleur et se fait plus insidieuse ou plus sournoise . Jamal
n ' acceptera pas des excuses de sante car il est dispose a depecher des me -

decins de sa part et , par ailleurs , les hesitations du patriarche peuvent en -

tramer une intervention militaire au siege patriarcal . La sommation est
toutefois accompagnee d ' une promesse . Le baton et la carotte . Car ce geste
de courtoisie peut etre allechant . Jamal promet qu ' une telle visite aura de
bons resultats et qu ' elle sera accompagnee du faste voulu par la circons -
tance . Pour forcer la main du patriarche , il propose meme de lui envoyer
une voiture automobile . Et , echange de bons precedes , Jamal promet de lui
rendre sa visite .
Jamal agit comme si le patriarche etait coupable , comme s ' il avait
quelque chose a se reprocher et qu ' une telle visite pourrait dissiper les
malentendus . Le fait d ' obtemperer a une telle sommation dissiperait les

14 Harfush , Dala ' il , 538 - 40 .

 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD
200

malentendus . Mais le patriarche est - il coupable d ' un crime ? Peut - etre ! En

tout etat de cause , sur le dhimmi pese une suspicion , un je - ne - sais - quoi

d ' inavouable . II a le devoir de toujours protester de sa bonne foi , de son

honnetete . De par son statut , il est sous surveillance . II doit done surenche -

rir pour conflrmer sans cesse sa loyaute , sa fidelite .

Le patriarche ne se fait pas prier . Cet homme de 72 ans qui se dit souf -

frant , va faire 150 kilometres , la distance approximative entre son siege a

DIman et le bourg de Sawfar . 15 Mgr Shukrallah Khuri qui l ' accompagne

fait etat de la terreur qui s ' etait emparee d ' eux et rapporte que le patriarche

s ' en etait remis a la providence . Quand le dhimmi n ' en peut plus , il n 'a

d ' autres ressources que le divin . Dans l ' etat de crainte seculaire , il se sent

dans son tort comme un coupable convoque devant ses juges . 16

La premiere entrevue 17

L ' entrevue a lieu le 21 juillet 1915 a Sawfar . L ' accueil est chaleureux et a

la mesure de la dignite du personnage . Jamal fait preuve de courtoisie .

Cela s ' impose . Quand on a tant exige de quelqu ' un , on ne peut le traiter

cavalierement . Jamal est ravi d ' etre arrive a ses fins , d ' avoir fait plier les

resistances . Maigre victoire , car au fond le patriarche ne va pas , pour au -

tant , lui etre acquis . Mais en Orient , demande - t - on plus qu ' un acquiesce¬

ment du bout des levres ou qu ' une approbation verbale ? Le patriarche a

lache du lest , ayant donne entre autres une satisfaction d ' amour - propre au

pacha , ce dernier doit lui rendre la pareille . La courtoisie et la fraternisa¬

tion 18 qui s ' accordent si facilement en nos pays ne doivent pas cacher qu ' il

y a dans l ' accord intervenu , un gagnant et un perdant . A ce jeu , on ne brise

15 Ibid . , 542 .
16 La notion de providence divine chez certains Chretiens d ' Orient a ete analysee par Jean
Maurice Fiey , " Les chroniqueurs syriaques avaient - ils le sens critique ? " Parole de
I 'Orient 12 ( 1984 - 85 ) , 260 - 64 .

17 Harfush , Dala 'il, 543 .

18 Cet etat des choses peut etre compare a la " protection " dans un environnement tribal
tel que decrit dans l ' ouvrage du Commandant Victor Muller , En Syrie avec les Be¬
douins , Paris : Librairie Ernest Leroux , 1931 , 153 : " La protection obeit a des regies
speciales . La tribu protegee paie une redevance au chef d ' une tribu qui va la defendre
contre toutes les autres . II ne restera plus au protege qu ' a choisir , chez ses protecteurs ,
un ' frere ' , pour le defendre contre les convoitises des bedouins de cette tribu . Cette de¬
claration de fraternite entrame bien l ' obligation de payer un petit tribut , la ' khoua ' ( de
akh = frere ) . Mais moyennant cette double prime - qui n ' est d ' ailleurs pas lourde -
' khoua ' payee au chef pour la defense ' exterieure ' et ' khoua ' payee au ' frere ' pour la
defense ' interieure ' , les fellahs et semi - sedentaires pouvaient vivre a peu pres tranquil -
les " .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE
201

pas definitivement son adversaire , mais on lui donne plutot les moyens de
reprendre son souffle . 19
Les deux hommes ont des choses a se dire : le patriarche doit attirer
l ' attention du pacha sur la misere qui s ' abat sur la population . Cependant

Jamal n ' hesite pas a aborder le sujet epineux de l ' attachement des Maroni -
tes a la France . Le patriarche doit s ' en tirer en affirmant que cet attache -
ment a la France bienfaitrice s ' est toujours fait dans le cadre de l ' obeis -
sance que ses coreligionnaires devaient a l ' Etat ottoman .
Nous n ' avons pas les details de l ' entrevue mais Mgr Huwayyik est
quand meme une personne assez sage pour ne pas demander de faveurs
qu ' il serait dans l ' obligation de rendre un jour . La question de la misere et
de la famine doit avoir ete effleuree en termes tres generaux , avec des
promesses lenifiantes de la part du pacha . Ce dernier se sent d ' autant plus
important que le patriarche a recours a lui .

La deuxieme entrevue 20
Jamal promet de rendre la visite au patriarche dans sa residence de Diman .
Mais ce n ' est qu ' un officier de son entourage qui s ' y rend pendant que
Jamal poursuit sa tournee dans le nord du pays . Au patriarcat , on est per -
plexe . Mgr Huwayyik charge deux prelats de se rendre aupres du pacha
pour s ' enquerir de la situation . Ce dernier s ' etonne du fait que personne ne
soit venu a sa rencontre , et qu ' il n ' y avait pas foule pour le recevoir . On lui
repond que le patriarche avait rassemble un grand nombre de notables pour
lui souhaiter la bienvenue , mais c ' est un officier qui est venu a sa place . Le
pacha semble accepter l ' argument . Dans ce jeu , personne n ' est cense avoir
le dernier mot . Jamal se rend le 31 juillet a DIman ou un grand accueil lui
est reserve . Le patriarche intervient en faveur de certains membres du cler-
ge et de certaines personnalites exilees dont Mustafa al - cImad , un Druze .
Devant l ' etonnement du pacha , le patriarche repond que certes ce dernier
n ' est pas Maronite , mais c ' est un Libanais . C ' est transcender sa propre

communaute et s ' elever au - dessus des divisions . Une noblesse d ' ame , un
geste gratuit qui en appelle a la magnanimite de Jamal . Plus je suis gene -
reux , plus je suis en droit d ' exiger de l ' autre . Le pacha fait droit a sa de -
mande .
D ' autres rencontres vont suivre . Mais depuis juillet 1915 , la situation
se deteriore sur le terrain . Les rapports du pouvoir et du dhimmi sont aussi

19 Henri Jalabert , Un Montagnard contre le Pouvoir : Libcin 1866 , Beyrouth : Dar el -

Machreq , 1975 , 5 .

20 Harffish , Dala 'il , 544 .

 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD
202

des rapports circonstancies , des rapports en situation : ils dependent d ' une

configuration generale , ils en sont la consequence . Ou plutot il y a interac¬

tion . Les circonstances , l ' environnement peuvent rendre le pouvoir ma -

gnanime , ou au contraire severe , capricieux , arbitraire ou tracassier . Le

pouvoir peut considerer qu ' il est indispensable de faire un geste , de sevir

pour retablir l ' equilibre , pour calmer l ' opinion dominante ou majoritaire . II

peut trouver un pretexte . Si une defaite est subie , il peut diriger les soup -

90ns vers quelqu ' un ; il peut l ' accuser de traitrise , d ' intelligence avec

l ' ennemi . D ' apres Harfush , l ' execution des deux freres Philippe et Farid

al - Khazin en 1916 etait la suite logique de l ' execution des deux freres

Mahmasani . 21 Rite sacrificiel , violence reconciliatrice : deux Chretiens pour

deux Musulmans . L ' equilibre est retabli .

La troisieme entrevue 22

C ' est dans ces circonstances difficiles que la troisieme entrevue entre le

pacha et le patriarche a lieu . Le patriarche ne va plus pouvoir faire la fine

bouche comme precedemment , car entre - temps , des documents trouves au

Consulat de France a Beyrouth incriminent l ' archeveque de Beyrouth Mgr

Shibll et d ' autres personnalites maronites .

Evidemment , l ' invitation a rendre visite a Jamal doit encore revetir les

memes formes , et se faire par intermediaries . Un notable maronite fait part

du souhait du pacha a un pretre , qui adresse une lettre a un prelat de

l ' entourage du patriarche , lui demandant de convaincre ce dernier de se

rendre aupres de Jamal a Beyrouth . Dans cette lettre pointe une menace

indirecte : l ' entrevue eviterait a la communaute maronite " beaucoup de

maux " . Le vieux patriarche va devoir quitter une fois de plus sa residence

de DIman . L ' entrevue a lieu a Beyrouth . Mgr Huwayyik doit se disculper

aux yeux de Jamal , car les documents trouves au Consulat de France font

etat d ' interventions de prelats maronites afin de modifier les regies du

protocole regissant le regime de la mutasarrifvyyah du Mont - Liban . Jamal

y voit un acte de haute trahison , auquel a ete mele Mgr Huwayyik quand il

n ' etait encore qu ' eveque . Le patriarche a recours a des prodiges de diplo¬

matic , proteste encore de son innocence et de l ' attachement de sa commu¬

naute a l ' Etat ottoman . Jamal va - t - il en etre dupe ? D ' ailleurs n ' a - t - il pas

donne a la question une ampleur et une signification trop graves ? Ces do¬

cuments impliquent - ils reellement la haute trahison ? Le procede est

classique , on fait monter les encheres comme au bazar pour amener

21 Ibid . , 551 .
22 Ibid ., 548 .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE 203

l ' interlocuteur a faire des concessions , a protester encore plus de son inno¬

cence . Le fait de ravaler l ' autre vous donne le sentiment de votre propre

importance et vous confirme dans un statut qui est naturellement superieur .

Cela fait , Jamal se montre genereux , fa ? on de dire , vous n ' etes pas venu

pour rien , le fait de vous redefmir comme inferieur et de m ' investir de

cette superiorite , vous amene des faveurs en contrepartie . Ainsi , il promet

de fournir des approvisionnements en denrees a la population . Le patriar -

che s ' en tire a bon compte : rien que cette humiliation d ' avoir a s ' incliner ,
encore une fois , devant l ' autorite .

L 'entrevue ratee 23

La regie du jeu implique que Jamal rende la visite . II le fait en se rendant

en cortege officiel au siege de Parcheveche de Beyrouth dont le titulaire ,

Mgr Shibll , est desormais en exil a Adana . Mais le patriarche vient de quit¬

ter les lieux . L ' entrevue n ' a pas lieu , mais qu ' a cela ne tienne , Jamal depe -

che de sa part le wall de Beyrouth et le mutasarrif du Mont - Liban pour

rendre la politesse au patriarche qui se trouve a Bkirkl .

Le dementi 24

Les choses ne peuvent en rester la . Des que Ton a regie un probleme et que

l ' on se croit a l ' abri , un autre peut surgir . Le patriarche est a DIman lors -

qu ' il reijoit debut octobre un telegramme requerant ses representants au -

pres de Jamal . C ' est Mgr Abdallah Khuri qui se deplace a Sawfar pour

rencontrer le pacha . Jamal est furieux a propos d ' une campagne de presse

fran ^ aise qui fustige le regime oppressif et cruel des Ottomans dont souf -

frent les Chretiens au Liban . Selon les journaux parisiens , ces derniers

n ' attendent qu ' une intervention militaire fransaise pour se joindre aux

allies et faire de leur pays une colonie fransaise .

Jamal exige que le Mgr Huwayyik adresse une lettre au Ministere des

Cultes a Istanbul pour protester contre ces allegations mensongeres . Le

dementi du patriarche doit lui etre prealablement soumis . Ce point etant

acquis , Jamal va se reveler magnanime et promettre la distribution de den¬

rees alimentaires . II finit meme par proposer de l ' argent . Mgr Khuri ne

peut que refuser , avec toute la courtoisie d ' usage , en promettant au pacha

de ne pas manquer d ' en informer le patriarche .

Mgr Huwayyik redige une lettre de protestation moderee , se disculpant

23 Ibid .

24 Ibid . , 552 - 59 .
204 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD

et confirmant l ' attachement de la communaute maronite au sultanat . Muni

de ce dementi et d ' une lettre d ' accompagnement remerciant le pacha pour
les cent mille kilos de grains accordes , Mgr cAbdallah Khuri se rend a Da -
mas ou il remet les documents . Quelques jours plus tard , lorsqu ' il flnit par
rencontrer Jamal , celui - ci lui exprime son insatisfaction quant a la teneur
du dementi ; il lui remet un projet de lettre dans lequel il est stipule que la
famine est due aux sauterelles , a la pauvrete et au blocus maritime des
allies , et que les personnes qui ont ete executees , Font ete conformement a
la decision du conseil de guerre pour crime de haute trahison . Le lende -
main de l ' entretien , lorsque Mgr Khuri revoit Jamal , il lui fait part de ses
commentaires au sujet du projet de lettre . Le patriarche , etant un homme
de religion et n ' ayant pas fait partie du tribunal militaire , ne peut valable -
ment affirmer que les condamnes l ' ont ete pour crime de haute trahison et
que d ' autre part , la famine a fait de tels ravages qu ' on ne peut en rendre
responsable les autorites . Jamal , sensible a ces suggestions , corrige de sa
main le projet de lettre . Enhardi , Mgr Khuri se croit en mesure de pouvoir
encore modifier le texte , en disant que la lettre est redigee dans un style qui
n ' est pas celui d ' un homme de religion .

La confusion s ' installe , on discute sans cesse sur des points de detail .
Bien entendu , personne ne va reprocher une telle lettre au patriarche qui
avait toutes les raisons de se soumettre . Mais Mgr Khuri se croit oblige
d ' ergoter . Toute negotiation a cependant une limite : Le pacha flnit par
interrompre le jeu en disant : il n ' y a que vous les Maronites pour me faire
de telles remarques , ce que ne fait pas le patriarche des Grecs qui a accepte
d ' operer le dementi selon mes propres termes .

Un officier ottoman raccompagne Mgr cAbdallah Khuri a Diman . Le

projet du dementi modifie est recopie , signe par le patriarche et remis a
l ' officier .

Une lettre au Pape 25

Jamal s ' est rendu a Istanbul , d ' ou il revient debut janvier 1917 . Comme
c ' est l ' usage , le patriarche lui delegue Mgr cAwwad a Beyrouth pour lui

presenter ses respects , et pour attirer son attention sur les ravages provo -
ques par la famine . En raison de l ' ampleur de la catastrophe , Mgr Hu-
wayyik est amene a demander de l ' aide . Mais le blocus des cotes par les
allies ne peut etre reproche a Jamal . Les Britanniques ont detourne sur
Alexandrie un bateau de vivres americain . Saisissant l ' occasion , Jamal
suggere au prelat que le patriarche adresse une lettre au pape lui deman -

25 Ibid . , 560 .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE
205

dant d ' intervenir . Ni une ni deux , Jamal se met a dieter la lettre a Mgr

cAwwad en fran9ais . Ladite lettre , une fois signee , est remise a Jamal pour

qu ' il la fasse parvenir au pape . L ' attitude de Jamal est tres curieuse . Ne

perd - il pas la face en intervenant de la sorte ? N ' est - ce pas une preuve de

faiblesse ? Entre - temps , les mauvaises nouvelles se succedent . En mars , on

apprend le deces de Mgr Shibli , exile a Adana . La famine bat son plein . Le

patriarche doit sortir de sa reserve . En avril 1917 , il depeche une delega¬

tion a Damas aupres de Jamal au sujet de 1 ' approvisionnement en vivres .

Entrevue on residence forcee ? 26

En mai 1917 , des rumeurs se propagent quant a la decision prise par Jamal

d ' exiler le patriarche . Les autorites ecclesiastiques maronites font la sourde

oreille . II s ' agit surtout de ne pas relever la chose et de faire comme si de

rien n ' etait ; il est inutile et meme dangereux de se faire remarquer , il faut

au contraire se faire tout petit , se faire oublier . Le patriarche adresse meme

un telegramme de felicitations le 9 juillet 1917 a Jamal qui vient de rece -

voir une haute distinction ottomane . Un telegramme de remerciement lui

est adresse en retour .

Jamal , se trouvant a Bhamdun , envoie le 18 juillet une lettre au patriar¬

che lui demandant de venir le voir au sujet des vivres a distribuer . Cette

invitation est plutot une sommation de se presenter . L ' officier qui porte la

lettre doit convoyer le patriarche jusqu ' au pacha . Mgr Huwayyik croit

reellement que e ' est l ' exil qui l ' attend . II est re ? u avec beaucoup d ' egards

a Bhamdun . La discussion tourne autour de la question des vivres . Jamal

s ' excuse d ' avoir a se rendre a Damas ou une mission l ' appelle et demande

au patriarche de l ' attendre sur place , le temps qu ' il revienne . Faire venir le

patriarche de si loin pour le faire patienter est une entorse tres grave aux

regies d ' usage . Neanmoins , le patriarche doit calmer les esprits , surtout

dans le nord du pays ou les rumeurs quant a son arrestation peuvent susci -

ter des troubles . Quoique certain d ' etre desormais assigne a residence , le

patriarche a le reflexe d ' adresser un telegramme a son siege pour rassurer

les siens .

Cependant les intentions de Jamal ne sont pas claires ; veut - il reelle¬

ment exiler le patriarche ou seulement le garder a portee de main ? A - t - il

laisse courir le bruit quant a son intention de l ' exiler , ou n ' est - il pas sur

lui - meme du sort qu ' il compte lui reserver ? Jamal veut proceder par etapes

et amener Mgr Huwayyik a Zahle ( Zahlah ) . II s ' y prend de maniere assez

indirecte . II adresse au mutasarrif du Mont - Liban et au qa ' imaqam du Kes -

26 Ibid . , 563 - 73 .
206 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD

ruan ( Kisrawan ) , un telegramme en forme de proclamation , d ' apres lequel

des vivres sont distribues aux couvents , et que le patriarche , ayant ete regu

avec beaucoup de faste , a demande a se rendre a Zahle . Le Journal Officiel

doit publier ces informations . Inutile de dire que le patriarche n ' a pas fait

pareille requete . Aussi bien Jamal que le patriarche cherchent a dissimuler

la verite pour calmer les esprits .

Le 5 avril 1917 , Jamal adresse au patriarche une lettre lui demandant

de lui faire l ' honneur d ' etre son hote a Zahle et plus precisement au Grand

Hotel , siege de son quartier general . Le patriarche va - t - il done etre le pri -

sonnier sinon l ' otage du pacha ? Ne pouvant refuser l ' invitation , Mgr Hu -

wayyik trouve des excuses et en appelle a la magnanimite de son interlocu -

teur . II lui adresse une lettre le 7 aout , le remerciant de son invitation et de

sa bienveillance , et lui disant sa reconnaissance et le plaisir qu ' il aurait a se

rendre a Zahle pour le rencontrer . Neanmoins il pretexte sa sante , le chole¬

ra qui fait son apparition a Zahle mais egalement - ce qui est assez auda -

cieux - les malveillantes interpretations de certains . II demande , in fine ,

l ' usage de la voiture de Jamal Pacha afin de pouvoir faire le deplacement

jusqu 'a lui . Cette lettre de soumission est accompagnee d ' une lettre au

Ministere de la Justice a Istanbul disant grand bien de Jamal et de son ad¬

ministration . Cette lettre avait semble - t - il ete exigee par Jamal a un mo¬

ment donne . Elle est publiee par la presse turque . Mgr Huwayyik , ayant

adresse les deux lettres , n ' a plus qu ' a attendre la decision du pacha .

Jamal lui repond le 11 aout 1917 . II se dit touche par les sentiments

cordiaux que le prelat exprime dans ses lettres . Est - il veritablement dupe

de ses proclamations ? Le " dit " prend toujours le pas sur le " non - dit " . Le

proces d ' intention fait au dhimml est toujours en cours . A la suite d ' une

entrevue , ou l ' on proteste de son innocence , ou l ' on apporte verbalement la

preuve de son attachement , l ' audience est remise , levee sans que pour au -

tant le proces ne soit clos . Jusqu ' a la prochaine echeance . On ne condamne

que rarement a des sentences definitives , car on a besoin de l ' inculpe qui

doit a chaque fois repeter le meme scenario . Et a chaque fois , le pouvoir ,

legitime et conforte par les protestations , doit sinon declarer l ' innocence ,

du moins reporter l ' audience .

Pourquoi ce changement ? A - t - il suffi de la lettre au Ministere de la

Justice pour lui faire changer d ' avis ? On fera etat , plus tard , de

l ' intervention du nonce apostolique et meme de l ' Autriche - Hongrie . Mais

ladite lettre au Ministere a certainement aide , e ' est ce bakhshish moral ,

cette khuwwah , rangon symbolique qu ' on doit verser encore et toujours .

Jamal ne semble pourtant pas avoir renonce a amener le patriarche a Zahle .

II explique qu ' il compte bientot se rendre au Mont - Liban , et qu ' il mettra

 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE
207

alors volontiers sa voiture a la disposition du patriarche afin qu ' il fasse le

deplacement .

Jamal vient a Sawfar . Le patriarche se contente de lui deleguer deux

prelats . Apres les civilites d ' usage , ceux - ci disent au pacha qu ' il n ' ignore

pas que le patriarche n ' a pas l ' habitude de resider en dehors de son siege ,

et que si le pacha n ' y voit pas d ' inconvenient , Mgr Huwayyik peut se ren -

dre a BkirkT . On finit par convenir qu ' il ira au siege de Mgr Awwad a

Qurnat Shahwan dans le Metn . La poire est coupee en deux . Certes , la

decision d ' exil semble ecartee ; le patriarche n ' est pas non plus en resi¬

dence surveillee ou forcee . Mais il n ' est pas pour autant lave de tout soup -

9on et de ce fait , il ne peut reintegrer son siege . La menace pese toujours

sur lui . Le dhimmi ne peut jamais regler son probleme de maniere defini¬

tive ; pas de securite totale ni d ' assurance a long terme .

Jamal se rend entre - temps a Istanbul et a Berlin . L ' initiative du pape

Benedicte pour la paix tombe a l ' eau . Les Anglais prennent Gaza et les

avions allies bombardent le port de Beyrouth . Les denrees alimentaires

sont hors de prix . Le 9 octobre 1917 , Jamal est de retour a Damas . Le pa¬

triarche lui depeche deux prelats porteurs d ' une lettre . L ' entrevue a lieu le

14 octobre a Bhamdun . Jamal fait part aux emissaires de son intention de

charger le mutasarrif du Mont - Liban , Isma ' il Haqqi Bey , de se rendre au -

pres du patriarche a Qurnat Shahwan . La visite a lieu le 17 octobre : Isma ' Il

Haqqi porte une lettre de Jamal a Mgr Huwayyik dans laquelle il le remer -

cie des sentiments qu ' il exprime dans sa correspondance et lui promet aide

et protection . Le 18 octobre , le patriarche revient a BkirkT apres avoir ren¬

du visite a Ismail Haqqi Bey a Ba cabda .

Mais ce n ' est pas fini . Quelques vingt jours apres l ' arrivee du patriar¬

che a Bkirki , Jamal laisse entendre a un notable maronite qu ' il est fache

avec le patriarche car ce dernier a fait intervenir en sa faveur le nonce

apostolique a Istanbul , alors que rien ne necessitait une telle demarche .

Cependant , Mgr Huwayyik saisit 1 ' occasion offerte quand Jamal monte en

grade et lui adresse le 7 novembre une lettre de felicitations accompagnee

des copies de deux telegrammes envoyes a Istanbul faisant son eloge et

niant le fait d ' avoir fait intervenir le nonce apostolique en sa faveur , ce

dernier n ' ayant agi que de son propre chef et en toute bonne foi . Dans ces

deux telegrammes , le patriarche affirme qu ' il est heureux sous l ' autorite de

Jamal Pacha , et que s ' il s ' est deplace en dehors de son siege , c ' est volon -
tairement et avec 1' accord de ce dernier .
 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD
208

Les dernieres entrevues 27

En cette fin d ' annee 1917 , la situation s ' est degradee entre Jamal et le
commandement allemand . Jamal , de passage a Beyrouth , souhaite voir le
patriarche qui se rend aupres de lui le 3 decembre , sans autre forme de
proces . Le jour meme , le pacha lui rend la visite . C ' est un Jamal aigri a
cause de son conflit avec les Allemands , et qui se met a faire des confiden¬
ces au patriarche . Manoeuvre d ' approche assez habile . Certes , les Empires
Centraux n ' etaient pas encore battus , mais en Orient la situation evoluait
en faveur des allies . Jamal confie a Mgr Huwayyik que les Turcs ne sont
entres en guerre que pour en finir avec la tutelle etrangere et que tutelle
pour tutelle , celles de la France et de la Grande Bretagne sont moins
contraignantes que celle de 1 ' Allemagne . Jamal , en se confiant , perd de sa
superbe . Donne - t - il raison au patriarche d ' avoir choisi la France comme
protectrice ? Le patriarche doit - il se sentir soulage pour autant ? Non , le
vieux prelat connait bien le jeu et sait ce qu ' il faut attendre des retourne -
ments de situation . II ne doit tirer aucune fierte de ce qui arrive , encore
moins le montrer . Jamal blesse dans son amour - propre peut etre encore
plus dangereux , il peut faire payer tres cher au patriarche le fait de l ' avoir
surpris dans un moment de faiblesse .
Jamal donne un diner a Beyrouth en l ' honneur des chefs religieux , et
invite bien entendu le patriarche . Ce dernier decline 1 ' invitation . Le pa¬
triarche a une position a maintenir coute que coute , il ne va pas se meler a
des prelats d ' autres rites ou d ' autres rangs . Jamal ne s ' en offusque pas . Le
patriarche a compris qu ' il peut desormais refuser de se plier aux volontes
du pacha sans encourir ses foudres .
En janvier 1918 , Jamal se rend a Istanbul . II ne manque pas d ' envoyer
un telegramme de vceux au patriarche , ce dernier lui repond par un tele -
gramme de remerciement . Ayant appris que Jamal est tombe en disgrace ,
Mgr Huwayyik lui ecrit le 13 fevrier une lettre le remerciant de sa bien -
veillance et regrettant de le voir prolonger son sejour a Istanbul , alors qu ' il
sait pertinement qu ' il ne sera plus amene a le rencontrer . D ' apres Harfush ,
cet exces de courtoisie s ' explique aussi bien par la prudence du prelat que
par la sollicitude que Jamal lui a temoigne lors de leurs dernieres entre¬
vues . 28
Le 16 fevrier , le patriarche adresse probablement une derniere lettre a
Jamal , devenu entre - temps gerant du Ministere de l ' interieur , ou il lui de -
mande son intervention dans une affaire de distribution des vivres . Le fait

27 Ibid . , 575 - 76 .
28 Ibid ., 577 .
 EXERCICE DE DHIMMITUDE
209

de quemander est un acte de soumission . Le pacha peut l ' ignorer , mais un

tel acte doit le remplir de satisfaction , surtout dans la situation de disgrace

ou il se trouve . L ' intervention du patriarche peut certainement avoir ete

motivee par la famine , mais elle a egalement ete faite dans l ' idee de ne pas

couper les ponts . Toujours la crainte et la hantise du lendemain .

Le 14 mars 1918 arrive le rempla ? ant de Jamal Pacha . Deux prelats lui

presentent leurs respects de la part du patriarche , en expliquant que ce

dernier ne peut se deplacer en personne pour des raisons de sante . Le

meme scenario se repete et toujours les memes pretextes .

Le patriarche use de la meme prudence les premiers temps de

l ' installation de Faysal a Damas , en attendant l ' arrivee des Fransais .

Postface

Ce face a face qui dura quelques annees , fut un terrain de manoeuvre . Ja¬

mal Pacha se revela parfois tres courtois ( et en ce sens sa legende noire

doit etre nuancee ) a l ' egard du vieux patriarche . II avait accepte les regies

du jeu . II prenait le temps de convaincre son interlocuteur et n ' avait pas

immediatement recours a la force brutale , militaire qu ' il etait . Mais il avait

a son avantage , quand les negotiations trainaient en longueur , le pouvoir

d ' interrompre le jeu , de recourir a la menace , puisqu ' en tout etat de cause ,

celui qui domine fera en fin de compte , prevaloir son point de vue .

Vivant dans une insecurity relative , selon l ' epoque ou le pays , le

dhimmi ne sait jamais quand le sort va s ' abattre sur lui , quand on viendra

lui reclamer une vieille dette , l ' execution d ' une obligation qui ne sera , en

tout etat de cause , jamais prescrite . En ce sens , il vit en sursis . Cette situa¬

tion precaire developpe en lui certains reflexes : une grande flexibilite , du

doigte , du savoir - faire , des talents de diplomate et une patience a toute

epreuve . Le moindre geste inconsidere lui couterait tres cher , lui ferait

perdre les acquis et le resultat d ' annees de labeur . Le role qu ' il est cense

jouer implique qu ' il ferme les yeux , qu ' il detourne le regard . La duplicite

est son lot , la flatterie une arme de defense . Aux propos de Louis de Co -

rancez , qui dit que la faussete est la qualite dominante du Maronite en rai -

son du mepris ou il est tenu par le Musulman , 29 repond le texte de Volney

qui parle des rapports entre Grecs et Turcs en ces termes : " lis ( les Grecs )

ont du devenir fourbes , pour echapper par la ruse a la violence ; menteurs et

vils adulateurs , parce que I ' ho mm e faible est oblige de caresser l ' homme

29 Louis de Corancez , Itineraire d 'unepartiepen connue de I 'Asie Mineure , Paris : Eber -

hard et Renouard , 1816 , 161 - 62 , cite dans Dominique Chevallier , La Societe du Mont-
Liban a l 'epoque de la Revolution Industrielle en Europe , Paris : Geuthner , 1982 , 14 .
210 YOUSSEF MOUAWAD

fort ; dissimules et mechants parce que celui qui ne peut se venger ouver -

tement concentre la haine ; laches et traitres parce que . . . " . 30

Dans son autobiographie , le metteur en scene americain Elia Kazan ,

fils d ' immigres grecs originaires d ' Anatolie , parle des " distorsions caracte -

rielles " 31 de son propre pere qui , meme installe aux Etats Unis , vivait en¬

core dans le culte du gozumiiz yok , ce qui veut dire en turc : " nous n ' avons

pas d ' yeux " . 32 En d ' autres termes , certaines personnes ne savent rien des

humiliations qu ' on leur inflige , car elles ne les voient pas . Et c ' est la peut -
etre le secret de leur survie .

30 Volney , Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie ( 1784 - 1785 ) , Paris , ed . 1825 , vol . 2 , 309 - 10 , cite
dans Bat Ye ' or , Le Dhimmi , Paris : Editions Anthropos , 1980 .
31 L ' expression est de Bat Ye ' or , Dhimmi , 305 .
32 Elia Kazan , Une Vie , Paris : Grasset , 1989 .
 TRANSCENDING SECTARIAN STRIFE :
NAFlR SURIYYAH AS MESSAGE AND MEDIUM

S amir M . S eikaly

/
As civil war engulfed Mount Lebanon in the summer of 1860 , and as bitter
communal violence spilled over into some other regions of Ottoman Syria ,
it seemed as if not only the possibility , but even the very idea , of coexis¬
tence itself had altogether dissolved in pools of blood and recurring cycles
of fierce sectarian strife . 1 Paradoxically , it was at almost the same time that
there arose in the coastal town of Beirut , submerged at the time by an over¬
flow of displaced and destitute refugees , a still small voice preaching the
need to reconstruct the reality of coexistence - albeit on new foundations .
That voice belonged to Butrus al - Bustanl 2 ; it was mediated on the pages of
a little publication which he called Nafir Siiriyyah (The Syrian Clarion) .
Essentially a broadsheet , of which only a mere eleven numbers appeared
irregularly between September 1860 and April 1861 , Nafir Siiriyyah was
nevertheless of great significance both as a message and as a medium . 3

1 For a recent detailed study of the 1860 events see Leila Fawaz , An Occasion for War:
Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 , Los Angeles : University of Califor¬
nia Press , 1994 . The work in question does not refer to either Butrus al - Bustani or to
Nafir Siiriyyah .
2 Academic studies relating to al - Bustani have not progressed much beyond the point
reached by Albert Hourani , Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798- 1939 , Cam¬
bridge : Cambridge University Press , 1983 . However , much information and useful
analysis can be found in the two following articles : Butrus Abu - Manneh , " The Chris¬
tians Between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism : The Ideas of Butrus al - Bustam " ,
International Journal of Middle East Studies , 11 ( 1980 ) , 287 - 304 , and A . Groiss , " Mi¬
norities in a Modernizing Society : Secular vs . Religious Identities in Ottoman Syria ,
1840 - 1914 " , Princeton Papers in Near East Studies , 1994 , no . 3 , 39 - 70 . In Arabic
there is the important work of Ytisuf Quzma Khuri , Al-Mu 'allim Butrus al -Bustani ,
1819 - 1883 , Beirut : BIsan , 1995 .

3 The issues of the paper used in this study are the ones reprinted recently under the title
Nafir Siiriyyah , Beirut : Dar al - Fikr li - l - Abhath wa - l -Nashr , 1994 . The editor of this
collection is in all probability the author of the Arabic book cited in No . 2 above . All
Arabic terms reproduced in this study are from this source .
212 SAMIR M . SEIKALY

II

In the first place , al - BustanT ' s message was addressed not to his country ' s
Christians , Muslims or Druzes but , as he put it , to abna ' al - watan ( the sons
of the fatherland ) , a category which comprehended them as separate reli¬
gious communities but which at the same time was meant to transcend
their sectarian identities . Conflict between them as it had developed since
1840 and as it was expressed in 1860 represented , for al - Bustani , a virtual
descent into barbarism ( tawahhush ) , a reversion to a condition of inhuman¬
ity in which the faculty of reason yielded to blind passion , indiscriminate
violence prevailed and all recognized moral norms were defiled . Sectarian
warfare , at all times and in all places , could not , he affirmed , confer vic¬
tory on any party ; it rather entailed defeat for all the parties involved .
Thus , contrary to all appearances , the outcome of 1860 did not amount to
the triumph of one religious community over another ; it , in fact , repre¬
sented an abject failure for all the communities involved on both the mate¬
rial and moral planes . Materially , religious war had virtually ruined the
country ' s economy : its infrastructure had been gutted ; its commerce inter¬
rupted ; its agriculture neglected and its labor force either killed or dissi¬
pated .4 The impact on the moral plane , al - Bustani insisted , was even more
damaging . Sectarian strife , he reasoned , operated to reduce men to a sub¬
human level in which dissension replaced concord , co - operation was meta¬
morphosed into conflict and social responsibility into vile self - regard . In
short , sectarian strife negated social existence and all forms of higher civi¬
lization ( tama.dd. uri) ? Sectarianism ( madhhabiyyahlta 'ifiyyah) could not , in
other words , uphold society because it was essentially divisive in nature ,
defective as an integrating principle and incapable of sustaining a hetero¬
geneous society . Being , in a religious sense , a pluralistic entity , Ottoman
Syria therefore required an alternative integrating principle around which
to cohere .

4 See Najir Suriyyah , November 8 , 1860 . The article carries the following sub - title :
"Khasa 'ir al - watan . "
5 For his analysis of the moral consequences of sectarian strife see Nafir Suriyyah , No¬
vember 19 , 1860 and December 14 , 1860 . Both articles are entitled "Khasa 'ir al -
watan al - adabiyyah ." Al - Bustanl indulged in some linguistic analysis in order to dem¬
onstrate that man ( al - insan ) was by nature sociable and gregarious Quns) . It was civil
strife that drove him back to a sub - human level . This analysis can be found in the No¬
vember 19 , 1860 , issue of the paper .
 TRANSCENDING SECTARIAN STRIFE 213

III

In Nafir Suriyyah , Butrus al - Bustanl identified al - watan , or what he later

called al - usbah al - wataniyyah , as constituting the principle most condu¬

cive to the creation of a new unified Syrian order . There is not in the Nafir

a developed or systematic nationalist ideology nor should one expect it to

be there . Indeed given the size of his broadsheet and its short life span , al -

Bustani could do no more than expound his message in general terms to

the effect that there was a way out of Syria ' s sectarian dilemma and that by

subscribing to the national doctrine of al - watan . Nevertheless he did man¬

age to develop a number of seminal ideas which in later years were to oc¬

cupy center - stage in the rising nationalist discourse .

In Nafir Suriyyah , al - watan stood in its relation to sectarianism as its

opposite and negation : sectarianism was exclusive but al - watan was all -

inclusive ; sectarianism was divisive but al - watan was integrative ; sectari¬

anism was destructive , while al - watan was fundamentally creative . For al -

Bustanl , Syria , which he also called barr al - Sham and cArabistan , was first

of all a territorial reality . 6 It was , moreover , the fatherland even though its

inhabitants were not as yet fully aware of the fact . They , he reminded

them , occupied a common living space ; they partook of the same air and

water ; they shared similar traits and mutual material interests and , most

importantly , they were bound together by the links of a common culture

created by the general employment of the same Arabic language . 7 This be¬

ing the case , he argued , the fatherland exercised such centripetal pull as to

counterbalance all other centrifugal tendencies arising from either ethnic or

religious differences . 8 In any case , as he conceived of it , al - watan was a

political entity and as such excluded any concern with matters of faith or

religion , not because these were in themselves unimportant but on account

of the fact that they involved the relationship between man and his Maker ,

not that between men in society . In fact , he argued , it was because the po¬

litical and religious realms were habitually confounded that his society had

6 In Nafir Suriyyah there is no exact territorial delimitation of geographical Syria . But

by the 1860 ' s Syria was usually defined as extending from the Euphrates in the East to
the Mediterranean in the West and from the Arabian desert in the South to the Anato¬
lian plateau in the North . See , for example , Hadiqat al -Akhbar , May 29 , 1866 .
7 For the bonds that linked all Syrians together and the paramountcy of the Arabic lan¬
guage in that process see Nafir Suriyyah , September 29 , 1860 , November 19 , 1860 ,
and February 22 , 1861 .
8 For the gravitational pull exercised by al - watan see Nafir Suriyyah , October 25 , 1860 .
214 SAMIR M . SEIKALY

degenerated into a condition of brutal civil war . 9 By implication , therefore ,

al - watan for him constituted an imagined secular order , a common politi¬
cal space binding abna ' al - watan in overlapping circles of material and
moral interdependence . In it all their differences would be transcended and
they would be transformed into a new moral community upheld by the
new public spirit of patriotism , the love of country and countrymen .
Writing in the aftermath of the chaos that had engulfed his country , it
was perhaps inevitable that al - Bustanl would tend to dramatize the trans¬
formative power of patriotism . But he was realistic enough to recognize
that the attainment of genuine patriotic existence in al-watan demanded a
daily re - affirmation of belonging and necessitated perennial nurturing of
the reality of coexistence by the regular exercise of the civic virtues of na¬
tional brotherhood , tolerance , concord , respect and affection .

IV
The message being proclaimed by al - Bustanl was both new and , in a way ,
even revolutionary not only because it involved a giant mind - shift but also
because it meant to restructure Syrian society along radically different
socio - political and moral lines . But it is probable that his message would
have been still - born had he not made use of a novel medium which made
its dissemination possible . That medium , of course , was the press which ,
as the print revolution , was gradually winding its way into Syria . It would ,
in this context , be wrong to assume that al - Bustanl got into the business of
publishing in its embryonic phase as a kind of commercial venture likely
to yield considerable financial rewards . In fact , throughout , he regarded the
press as being , primarily , an educational medium capable of carrying a
message like his own which existing sectarian and foreign missionary
schools could not but reject . The press thus became a confrontational in¬
strument to challenge bigotry and religious fanaticism and to break down
the monopoly exercised by such schools over the minds of their students .
He , of course , never denied that institutions of learning were crucial for the
attainment of an advanced civilization . 10 But he regarded sectarian and
missionary schools as being trapped by their own religious character and
ethos and , as such , unable or unwilling to spread the national doctrine of

9 His arguments for the separation of the political and religious spheres are strewn all
over the paper . Especially important are Najir Suriyyah , January 14 , 1861 , and Febru¬
ary 22 , 1861 .
10 For the link between al - watan , education and progress see Najir Suriyyah , April 22 ,
1861 . The article carried the subtitle " al - tamaddun
 TRANSCENDING SECTARIAN STRIFE 215

al - watan . That could only be done by national schools and , in their ab¬
sence , by the press of which , of course , Nafir Suriyyah was one instance . 11
The medium itself , and the message it conveyed , would therefore serve to
liberate Syrians from the incubus of sectarian strife ; it would redirect their
visions and loyalties towards al - watan that would comprehend them all as
compatriots , equal citizens in a state that belonged to all irrespective of
their faith or how they worshipped .
In 1860 there was , it is true , much sectarian strife in Syria . There was
also the promise of future lasting reconciliation , or so , at least , al - Bustam
believed . The achievement of such a state , he said in Nafir Suriyyah , re¬
quired the Syrians to undertake an act of double transformation . In the first
place they needed to abandon their sectarian identities in favor of a more
humane , more accommodating , one represented by al - watan . In the second
place they had to elevate themselves to a higher existential plane character¬
ized by the separation of religion and civilization , the former satisfying
their personal spiritual and emotional needs , the latter enabling them , as
equal partners , to become masters of nature and of their own destinies . In
this human endeavor , he said , all their differences would be permanently
transcended .

11 His belief in schools and the press did not , of course , wane after Nafir Suriyyah ceased
publication . In fact he went on to establish a " National School " in 1863 . He also
played a leading role in the world of journalism publishing for almost two decades
( 1870 - 1886 ) the celebrated periodical al-Jinan . The main editorials of that periodical
have been re - issued in a two - volume work : Yusuf Quzma Khuri , Iftitahiyyat majallat
al -Jinan a ! Bayrutiyyah , 1870 - 1884 , Beirut : Dar al - Hamra ' , 1990 .
 DISPLACED PALESTINIANS ,
RELIGIOUS CONFRONTATION ,
AND THE ' RE - PRODUCTION ' OF SPACE
IN THREE CONTEMPORARY NOVELS 1

MaherJarrar

In The Production of Space , Henri Lefebvre argues that " [ l ] iterary authors

have written much of relevance [ concerning the representation of space ],

especially descriptions of places and sites . But what criteria would make

certain texts more relevant than others ? ... [ T ] he problem is that any

search for space in literary texts will find it everywhere and in every guise :

enclosed , described , projected , dreamt of , speculated about . What texts can

be considered special enough to provide the basis for a ' textual ' analy¬
sis ? " 2

On the other hand , Michel Foucault argues that " Space is fundamental in

any fonn of communal life . . . [ and ] in any exercise of power . " 3 Foucault ,

says David Harvey , treats " the space of the body as the irreducible element

in our social scheme of things , for it is upon that space that the forces of

repression , socialization , disciplining , and punishing are inflicted . The body

exists in place and must either submit to authority ( through , for example ,

incarceration or surveillance in an organized space ) or carve out particular

spaces of resistance and freedom from an otherwise repressive space ." 4

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference held at the
American University of Beirut ( Building City and Nation : Space , History, Memory,
and Identity , July 1- 3 , 1999 , organized by the Center for Behavioral Research , AUB ) .
It forms part of a research project on which I am working ( Mellon Award , Summer
1998 ) , dealing with the concept of space in modern Arabic nouveau roman . I wish to
express my appreciation to Professor Samir Khalaf for his encouragement and help .
2 Henry Lefebvre , The Production of Space , tr . D . Nicholson - Smith , Oxford , UK , and
Cambridge , MA : Blackwell , 1997 , 14 - 15 .
3 A citation from an interview with Michel Foucault where he talks to Paul Rabinow ,
reprinted under the title " Space , Power , and Knowledge " , in : The Cultural Studies
Reader , ed . Simon During , London and New York : Routledge , 1993 , 168 .
4 David Harvey , The Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of Cul¬
tural Change [ 1990 ] , Cambridge , MA and Oxford , UK : Blackwell , 1997 , 213 .
218 MAHER JARRAR

Space in narrative is portrayed in a very complex way and cannot be

reduced to mere description . It can be a space of action , a center of social
values . At times registered by the senses , it can reflect moods and atti¬
tudes , as well as relations of power . Hence , one would be dealing with
' cultural space ' or ' anthropological space ' . Moreover , the representation of

space in narrative is modeled through the semiotic system of language . In

this regard , Lotman differentiates between

"the spatial structure of the world view and spatial models as a metalan¬
guage of the description of cultural types . In the former case the spatial
characteristicsbelong to the object being described , in the latter to the
metalanguage of description . . . [ I ] n this case , spatial models act as a kind
of metalanguage , while the spatial structure of the world view acts as the
text in this language . " 5

It is against this background that I shall be approaching samples of space

representation in three novels that deal with the theme of Palestinian
displacement from their ' native space ' at the hands of the Zionist State in
1948 . Zionism , as Edward Said puts it , " was not only a reproduction of
nineteenth - century European colonialism , . . . Zionism aimed to create a
society that could never be anything but ' native ' ( with minimal ties to a
metropolitan center ) at the same time that it determined not to come to
terms with the very natives it was replacing with new ( but essentially
European ) ' natives . ' " . 6 " In short " , he adds , " all the constitutive energies
of Zionism were premised on the excluded presence , that is , the func¬
tional absence of ' native people ' in Palestine ; institutions were built de¬
liberately shutting out the natives , laws were drafted when Israel came
into being that made sure the natives would remain in their ' nonplace , '
Jews in theirs , and so on . " 7 One of the first aims of Zionism was to ' re¬
produce ' new social , religious , and cultural meanings of spaces in order
to create new identities for the multitude of nations that came to colonize
and live in the land and to emphasize the connection between the ' people
of Israel ' and the ' land of Israel ' . Michael Walzer ' s Exodus and Revolu¬
tion ( 1985 ) furnishes such an ideological ' historical narrative ' , captive to
the religious effects of culture , as Edward Said puts it . In a piercing re -

5 Juri Lotman , " On the Metalanguage of Typological Description of Culture ", Semiotica
14 ( 1975 ) 2 , 101 .
6 Edward W . Said , The Question of Palestine , London and Henley : Routledge and Ke -
gan Paul , 1980 , 88 .
7 Ibid . , 82 .
 DISPLACED PALESTINIANS
219

view , Said argues that Walzer ' s interpretation can only serve to justify
contemporary sectarian claims that are expansionist in nature , much as
the text itself justifies the many ramified exclusions of the Canaanites
from the world of moral concern . 8
As a result of this Zionist policy , hundreds of Arab towns were de¬
stroyed . 9 New settlements were erected , and cities and city streets were
given new names . Hikes were organized as a means of ' marking ' territory
and declaring ownership of the land . A plethora of museums were built to
commemorate and celebrate the historical narrative of the state . New sa¬
cred sites of Jewish saints re - emerged in a number of Israeli development
towns , especially those inhabited by North African Jews . 10 Power was ( and
is ) expressed by monopolizing and recreating space not only to shape a

new identity , but moreover , as a process of domination aiming at relegat¬

ing and excluding the natives . 11
A few preliminary points need to be made about my choice of these
novels . Firstly , they can be read as representative samples for a new poetic
style , an Arabic ' nouveau roman ' . Second , they all share the experience of
war , the founding of the Zionist state of Israel and its effects on both the
real space and the mental space ( s ) . Accordingly , third , they can be studied
as examples of the effects of colonization / post - colonial strategies 12 and
their direct mediation in both the cultural and material - spatial spheres . Yet
another point requires consideration : these three novels evoke representa¬
tions of space whose effective kernel lies in memory , both individual and
communal .

8 For the dispute between Michael Walzer and Edward W . Said , cf . William Hart , Ed¬
ward Said and the Religious Effects of Culture , Cambridge : Cambridge University
Press , 2000 , 4 - 5 .
9 The Zionist state destroyed between 290 and 472 villages during 1948 ( cf .
Walid Khalidi , ed . , All That Remains : The Palestinian Villages Occupied and
Depopulated by Israel in 1948 , Washington , D . C . : Institute for Palestine Stud¬
ies , 1992 , xvi ) .
10 Cf . Eyal Ben - Ari and Yoram Bilu , eds . , Grasping Land : Space and Place in Content -
porary Israeli Discourse and Experience , Albany , NY : State University of New York
Press , 1997 , 1- 24 .
11 For the concept of ' exclusion , ' cf. David Sibley , Geographies of Exclusion : Society
and Difference in the West , London and New York : Routledge , 1995 , 73 - 89 .
12 For a discussion of the usage of these terms in modern discourse , cf . Ania Loomba ,
Colonialism / Postcolonialism , London and New York : Routledge , 1998 , introduction
and pp . 1- 20 .
 MAHERJARRAR
220

The first scene I take from Emile Habibi ' s The Pessoptimist 13 , The
second from Elias Khoury ' s Bab al - Shams 14 and the third from Anton
Shammas ' Arabesques , 15
Habibi ' s main character in The Pessoptimist is an anti - hero , a picaro , 16
who leaves his native city of Haifa during the May 1948 war to Lebanon ,
like thousands of the refugees drafted to this fate . In the summer of the
same year , he decides to sneak back into what has become the state of
Israel to live as a third class goy in a now aggressive space subject to daily
harassment and under constant surveillance . Until a couple of months
earlier , this had been his natural anthropological space .
The first example , which illustrates this grotesque situation , belongs to
the field of topological meta - textual level , what Lotman calls the ' verti¬
cally oriented space model ' . 17 The model expresses concepts of spatial
orientation , such as top /bottom and right / left , and reflects the actual rela¬
tions of power in real space . 18
Sa cId , the Pessoptimist , arrives at the door of the military governor on a
donkey , seeking the sanctuary of a certain prominent official , known as
Adon Safsarsheck .

" [ The donkey ] proudly mounted the three steps at the building ' s entrance .
Soldiers rushed towards me amazed . I shouted , ' Safsarsheck , Saf¬
sarsheck ! ' A fat soldier ran toward me shouting , ' I am the military gover¬
nor , dismount ! ' . . . When I alighted from the donkey , I found that I was
taller than the military governor . I felt much relieved at being bigger than
him without the help of the donkey ' s legs . . . I settled comfortably into a
chair in the school they had converted into the governor ' s headquarters .
The blackboards were being used as Ping - Pong tables . ' I am Abu Isaac .
Follow me , ' he ordered . So I followed him to a jeep parked near the en¬
trance . My donkey was standing beside it , sniffing . ' Let ' s go , ' said Abu

13 ImTl HablbT , Al - Waqa 'i ' al -gharibah fi ikhtifa ' Sa ' id Abi al - Nahs al - Mutasha ' il
[ Haifa : Dar "Arabisk , 1974 ] , 2nd ed . , Beirut : Dar Ibn Khaldun , 1974 ( English edi¬
tion : Emile Habibi , The Secret Life of Saeed The Pessoptimist , tr . Salma Khadra
Jayyusi and Trevor LeGassick , London : Zed Books , 1985 ) .

14 Ilyas Khun , Bab Al - Shams , Beirut : Dar al - Adab , 1998 .

15 Antun Shammas , 'Arabeskot , Tel Aviv : ' Am ' Oved ve - Sifre Maikelmark , 1986 ( Eng¬
lish edition : Anton Shammas , Arabesques , tr . Vivian Eden , New York : Harper and
Row , 1988 ) .

16 Cf . Maher Jarrar , " A Narration of ' Deterritorialization ' : Emile Habibi ' s Pessoptimist ",
a paper read at A Tribute to Edward Said , Beirut , July 1 , 1997 .

17 Jurij M . Lotman , Die Struktur literarischer Texte , tr . R .- D . Keil , Miinchen : Fink , 1993 ,
313 - 14 .

18 Lotman , " Metalanguage " [ fn . 5 ] , 102 ff .

 DISPLACED PALESTINIANS 221

Isaac . He climbed into his jeep and I mounted my donkey . But he

shrieked in fury , and my donkey and I so shook with fear that I fell from
its back and found myself in the car next to the military governor " (p . 14 ) .
" . . . I shifted my position , trying myself to expand a little in my seat , but
the driver complained and I withdrew . Then he stopped and asked me to
move into its open back , saying , ' Each of us sits in his own place ' " (p .
42 ) . 19

In an ironic language full of parody , the modeling parameter of the spatial

opposition reveals the symbolic implications of the vertical semiotic of

hierarchical power and submission exercised over the body of the native

and his trajectory of vision . Not everyone is in the same place . The place

and , thus , the space of the ' native ' have been destroyed , and a new power ,

whose ' gaze ' can ' mark ' his body , has taken over . 20 Accordingly , the ' na¬

tive ' should ' dismount ' his donkey and submit to the new power of the

' Landrover ' , the symbol of colonial power , which ' marks ' territory and

declares ownership of the land .

After receiving the patronage of Adon Safsarsheck , Sa cId the Pessop -

timist , seeks a house in which to live . His parents ' house , which the family

left only a couple of months earlier , still stands in Wad ! al - Jimal , it never¬

theless is now occupied by an European Jewish family .21 He finds an aban¬

doned house that used to belong to an Arab from Haifa . After a while ,

however , some discharged Zionist soldiers evict him from that house . 22
He settles in another abandoned house and furnishes it with broken

doors from evacuated Arab homes ( p . 45 ) . In his new house , Sa cid lives

secluded and obscured , feeling no safety , for the military authority force

their way into houses all hours of day and night , searching for Arabs who

have sneaked back to their homes ( p . 57 ) . In one of these instances , the

military authorities surround his house , broke open the door , search the

house and manage to throw Sard ' s relative , who was visiting , out onto the

stairway ( p . 60 ) .

After his marriage he moves to another house , but even before stepping

over its threshold , a man from the " Custodian of Enemy Property " arrives

to confiscate his belongings ( p . 95 ) . There he lives with his wife and son in

permanent fear . Instead of talking they whisper lest they should be heard ,
for the walls have ears .

19 Habibi , Pessoptimist [ fh . 13 ] , 11 , 12 , 14 , 42 .
20 Cf. Steve Pile , The Body and the City , London and New York : Routledge , 1997 , 251
ff.
21 Habibi , Pessoptimist , 46 - 47 .
22 Ibid . , 43 .
 MAHER JARRAR
222

The house is a space of security and refuge , of familiarity . 23 It " passes

everywhere for a special , still sacred , quasi - religious and in fact almost

absolute space . . . [ I ] t is as much sacred as it is human . " 24 Routine acts of

social reproduction - eating , sleeping , sex , cleansing , child - rearing - are

based in and around the home .

Sa cId the pessoptimist , though he lives in a house , is actually both dis¬

placed and homeless . The feature of demarcation or boundary is lacking in

this home . The walls do not secure privacy . Even the threshold , door and

window , which provide the spatial opposition between interior and exte¬

rior , have lost their function . The house is transformed into a house of

fears and worries , isolated with no mention of a neighborhood or commu¬

nity . Sa cId cannot even move freely in space , he is being watched and his

movements registered by the authorities .

The space of his home leads to no other place . It is isolated on all

sides , incapable of prolonging the network of its vanished communica¬

tions . Sa cId is ' homeless ' , not only because he is a stranger in his ' heimaf

but also because he is living " the dramatic loss of power over the way in

which his identity is constructed , since the home no longer shields from

the public gaze " , 25 the gaze of the military authorities . 26 The mind - body is

in the place of the colonized : invaded , conquered , constantly policed by an

all - seeing eye , suffering the whims of an arbitrary power and threatened by

barbaric punishment .

I have argued elsewhere that Habibi ' s novel is a polyphonic narration

with carnivalesque elements . " As composed of distances , relationships ,

analogies , and nonexclusive oppositions , it is essentially dialogical . A

carnival participant is both actor and spectator . " 27 The carnivalesque of the

novel stems from the mimic gestures of the anti - hero and the distorted

relation to his body and to both social and cosmic spaces , all of which

invoke the state of a dream . The dream closes up with Sa cId being freed by

his extraterrestrial friend , who carries him on his back and flies away with

23 Cf. Gaston Bachelard , Poetik des Raumes , tr . K . Leonhard , Frankfurt /M . : Fischer ,

1997 , 60 - 90 .
24 Lefebvre , The Production of Space [ fn . 2 ] , 121 .
25 Neil Smith , " Homeless /global : Scaling places " , in : Mapping the Futures : Local cul¬
tures, global change , ed . Jon Bird et al . [ 1993 ] , London and New York : Routledge ,
1996 , 105 .

26 Jarrar , "A Narration of ' Deterritorialization ' " [ fn . 16 ] , 7 .

27 Michail Bachtin , Literatur und Karneval : Zur Romantheorie und Lachkultur , tr . A .

Kaempfe , Frankfurt / M . : Fischer , 1990 , 47 - 48 ; see also Julia Kristeva , Desire in Lan¬
guage : A Semiotic Approach to Literature , ed . L . S . Roudiez , tr . Th . Gora , A . Jardine
and L . S . Roudiez , New York : Columbia University Press , 1980 , 78 .
 DISPLACED PALESTINIANS 223

him blaming him alone for his quietism . The motif of flying is the invari¬
,
ant of textual meaning expressing violation and aspiration , it implies the
construction of an ideal textual world . 28 In fact , one of the last scenes ap¬
peals for the creation of a pluralistic , democratic space , where Jews and
Arabs live together (p . 205 ) .
The second novel , Elias Khoury ' s Bab al - Shams , oscillates between
two spaces : the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Upper Galilee .
The implied narrator , who lives in concealment and fear amidst death in a
refugee camp in Lebanon , calls back the memories of the marginalized ,
uprooted Palestinians , the memories of their lost geographic abode as well
as of their personal inner spaces .
The place , locale , becomes the focal center of Khoury ' s novel , where
geography and history are closely interwoven and where the past grows
into a continuous present . The inner architectonic structure of the novel
thrusts the reality of the work of art into the surrounding reality of life to
merge the two in an intersecting construct , juxtaposing the closed spaced
of the refugee camp with the open , though destructed space , of Upper
Galilee . The locus , which interweaves this spatial opposition of ' close /
open ' , is a mythical cave on an open hill facing the sea and surrounded
with a Roman olive field . This mythical space becomes the symbol of the
creation of a new future , a door for hope and light , where rituals of fertility
and liturgies of memory take place between the refugee fighter sneaking
from Lebanon , " weaving both spaces with his footsteps " 29 , and his wife
who remained in occupied Palestine .
Khoury ' s narrative is constructed upon a variety of complex modern
techniques and upon recurring changes in the phraseological point of
view . 30 The result is an open structure aspiring towards the approximation
of diffusion ; of flux ; of constantly forming , dissolving , and reforming rela¬
tionships with an impression of simultaneity . 31

28 van Baak , The Place of Space in Narration : a Semiotic Approach to the Problem of
J .J .
Literary Space, with an Analysis of the Role of Space in I. E . Babel 's Konarmija , Am¬
sterdam : Edition Rodopi , 1983 , 39 .
29 Cf . Michel de Certeau , The Practice of Everyday Life , tr . Steven Rendall , Berkeley :
University of California Press , 1984 , 97 .
30 Cf . Mahir Jarrar , " Al - Qass , wa - ' l - mawt , wa - ' l - dhakirah : ' Bab Al - Shams ' malhamat al -
wa cy wa - ' l - adab al - muqawim " , al - Tariq 58 ( 1999 ) 2 , 120 - 25 .
31 Concerning the novels of an open spatial structure , cf. Sharon Spencer , Space , Time
and Stiiicture in the Modern Novel , New York : New York University Press , 1971 ;
Carl Darryl Malmgren , Fictional Space in the Modernist and Postmodernist American
Novel , Lewisburg : Bucknell University Press , 1985 .
224 MAHER JARRAR

It will suffice here to give only one example of the representation of

space in Khoury ' s novel .
The grandmother of Khalil , the implied narrator , lies on the bed of
death in a small room in a refugee camp in Lebanon surrounded by her
three daughters and their husbands . 32 One of the husbands , Ahmad al -
Jashshi , a man of 45 , takes the implied narrator to an adjoining room and
tells him about the visit he paid , a month earlier , to his uncle ( i . e . , Ahmad
al - Jashshl ' s uncle ) in their native village in Palestine , al - Ghabisiyyah . The

village stands deserted in ruins ; the Israelis have uprooted the olive trees ,
the symbol of the Palestinians ' homeland , and planted pine trees in their
place . 33 Ahmad tries to locate the family house . Wild grass and stinging
nettle , which fill the courtyards of the once inhabited village , obscure the
pathways and the roofless house with its hollowed doors and windows . He
tries to find the orchard north of the house and recognizes it from the rusty
iron door and the old fig tree . He eats some figs and some Indian figs .
His uncle urges him to go back , but Ahmad insists on entering the
neighboring orchard of the Hammad family . He recalls that there used to
be a gap in the wall separating their orchard from the Hammad ' s , which he
used to slink through as a small boy in order to steal pomegranates . He
finds the gap , enters it to find himself directly in front of the pomegranate
tree and starts gathering cobs . When Ahmad tries to go back , however , he
can no longer find the gap , as if the wall closed up on itself . He can no
longer hear his uncle ' s voice or footsteps . He shouts to his uncle that he
will meet him at the village mosque . He does not recall how much time has
elapsed ; he feels lonely and frightened that the Jews will come and find
him . Ahmad explains how he walked all around the village in order to find
the mosque , how he was afraid the grass might swallow him up , how he
hears his own panting and is afraid of it .
Back in refugee camp in Lebanon , Ahmad al - Jashshl tells Khalil that
their village , al - Ghabisiyyah , is waiting for them . They should return , pitch
their refugee tents there , and rebuild the village . He asks Khalil whether he
would like to join , so they may go together to see their homeland ( al-
bilad) . The moment Ahmad utters the word " homeland " , they hear howl¬
ing coming from the adjoining room . They realize that the woman ( i . e . ,
Khalll ' s grandmother ) has died . No one moves , but tears pour copiously ,
as if every one had been waiting for a signal , and the signal came from the
grandmother ' s room .

32 Khun , Bab al - Shams [ fn . 14 ] , 319 - 22 ( an abridged and paraphrased translation , M .

Jarrar ) .
33 Concerning this phenomenon , cf . ibid . , 173 , 196f. , 203 , 270 , 320 , 322 , 507 .
 DISPLACED PALESTINIANS 225

Two spaces are evident in this example : the space of the two - room

house in a refugee camp in Lebanon and that of the deserted village under

occupation . The first is a closed space haunted with death ; the second is an

open space of memory , ' the romantic ruin ' . To make a connection between

these two marked points in space requires a journey . A new voice takes

over the narration in order to introduce a shift in the ' point of view '

marked by the use of the Palestinian dialect of that specific area . Hence ,

the representation of the village space is " iconocized " 34 and framed by the

scene of death whose space is the refugee camp in Beirut .

In opposition to death , which prevails in the camp , the space of the vil¬

lage revives the memory . Though the colonial power has tried to block the

memory and to ' re - mark ' the space by cutting down the olive trees - the

symbol of the occupied people - and planting pine trees instead ( this re¬

minds us of Yehoshua ' s short story " Facing the Forests " 35 ) , Ahmad ' s re¬

vived memory nevertheless reorients its sense of spatial dimension . This

dimension is based on the feature of binarity inherent in the chronotope 36

of ' the crossroad ' , ' left / right ' and ' east / west ' , which reveals the thematic

of dilemma . The point of reference of this orientation act is the open

square of the village , the locus of gatherings and collective memory , which
is now deserted .

The narrator ' s own bodily and psychological experience stands in the

center of the village as a representative of the displaced community . The

roofless house , covered with grass , indicates the absence of demarcation

features and boundaries ( i .e ., a ceiling , windows , and doors ) . The house

evokes a structure involving loss and the absence of habituation and inti¬

macy , a source of anguish , for the once familiar place is no longer a milieu

of communication or a ground for union .

To try to compensate for this existential sense of loss , the memory tries

again to situate itself through another overt boundary chronotope : the rusty

iron door of the orchard . Ahmad 's recognition of the familiar landmark

opens a transition to a familiar situation , to what Bakhtin calls a ' historical

inversion ' 37 , and hence to an emotional experience . " When space feels

34 Cf . van Baak , The Place of Space in Narration [ fh . 28 ] , 28 f .

35 Abraham B . Yehoshua , The Continuing Silence of a Poet : The Collected Stories of

A . B . Yehoshua , London : Peter Halban , 1988 , 203 - 336 .

36 M . Bakhtin , " Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel " , in : The Dialogical
Imagination . Four Essays , ed . M . Holquist , tr . C . Emerson and M . Holquist , Austin :
University of Texas Press , 1981 , 98 .

37 Ibid ., 146 f .
226 MAHERJARRAR

thoroughly familiar to us , it has become place . " 38 No longer drifting in

space it has its place in our memories and bears a name and a specific loca¬
tion within a community : " neighboring to the Hammad ' s " .
Entering the orchard is equivalent to the " Paradise Lost " of childhood ,
of warmth , and of tastes of fruits - figs , Indian figs , and pomegranates -
typical of the Palestinian village . This experience becomes associated to a
moment of innocence and adventure in the childhood of the uprooted refu¬
gee man . He trespasses the gap in the wall to the neighbors ' orchard . The
wall is the semantic boundary of the most inner sphere of the self, the
realm of the pomegranates of the memory . As in a dream , though , the wall
closes up . The familiar place is transformed into a space of fear and horror .
The present superimposes it self on the past , and Ahmad is lost . Familiar
sounds and locations gradually disappear . Feelings of apprehension and
horror take over , and the fear of the enemy , the monster that usurped
childhood and its paradise and whose physical presence haunts the narra¬
tive , awakes like a nightmare .
This oral narration forms an " iconocized " space , which serves the
function of what de Certeau calls " spatial legislation " : to put out bounda¬
ries , to " authorize " and to " found " . 39 It is framed by the scene of the death
of the grandmother , the bearer of collective memory .
The open spatial structure of Khoury ' s novel moves between two death
incidents . It is as if death discloses the " death of the author " 40 and becomes
the actual generator of the narrative . The death becomes the starting point
from which the implied narrator moves at the beginning of each narrative
cycle in order to open up the gaps of the collective memory and to bring to
birth the stories of the marginal , uprooted people . Khoury segments his
narrative into a large number of self - sufficient segments , each opening a
' gap ' to a startling distinctive voice . The overall effect of such a structure

on the reader is similar to that of a photo album . One can compare it to

reading Edward Said ' s narrative framing the pictures of Jean Mohr in
Said ' s After the Last Sky . The text is experienced both statically , as iso -

38 Tuan , Space and Place : The Perspective of Experience , Minneapolis : University

Yi - Fu
of Minnesota Press , 1977 , 73 .
39 de Certeau , The Practice of Everyday Life [ fn . 29 ] , 122 - 24 .
40 More in the sense of Foucault than that of Barthes ; cf. Roland Barthes , " La mort de
1' auteur " , in : Le Bruissement de la langue , Paris : Seuil , 1984 ( = Essais critiques ', 4 ) ,
63 - 69 ; Michel Foucault , " What Is an Author ? " in : idem , Language , Counter - Memoiy,
Practice : Selected Essays and Interviews , ed . Donald F . Bouchard , tr . D .F . Bouchard
and Sherry Simon , Ithaca , NY : Cornell University Press , 1977 , 113 - 38 ; and see Ilyas
Khurl ' s approach in his " Mawt al - mu ' allif ' , in : al-Dhakirah al - mafqudah : dirasat
naqdiyyah [ 1982 ] , Beirut : Daral - Adab , 1990 , 72 - 76 .
 DISPLACED PALESTINIANS
227

lated but vivid pictures of significant narrative moments , and serially by

various principles of continuity . It presents a fictional reality - complex that
is at once simultaneous and sequential , and the reader feels the tension
between the two perspectives .
The third example , a paragraph from Anton Shammas ' Arabesques ,
forms the conclusion . The novel discloses what de Certeau calls ' the para¬
dox of the frontier or boundary ' , where the frontier functions as a third
element , a space " in - between " , or a " Z wischenraum " : 41

" My new home has walls in name only . They tremble at the touch of a
hand and seemingly at the touch of a voice . Walls that allegedly give a
sense of security and protection , but that could remind Yehoshua Bar - On
of a poem by David Avidan :

The security situation of Israel

Is like a toilet without a lock
One hand keeping
The door shut from within .

For this you must know : On the other side of the kitchen and the bath¬
room lies another dwelling unit , which is the inverted twin of the one that
protects me , and there Pedro dwells , and across the no - man ' s - land of the
kitchen and the bathroom he sends me smoke signals , which seep under
my door and envelop me like a saccharine melody that will not relent for
four more months . Without advance planning we might simultaneously
open our doors to the bathroom - or worse . And since these doors cannot
be locked , thanks to some obscure American logic , the situation in the
bathroom will always be one of maximum alert , in anticipation of the
hand that will suddenly fling open the door and of the mouth that will
emit an embarrassed apology in an unintelligible language .
How to describe a home to someone you love ?
You could start with the orange drops redolent of cloves casually sprin¬
kled over the toilet seat . " 42

41 de Certeau , The Practice of Everyday Life [ fn . 29 ] , 126 - 28 .

42 Shammas , Arabesques [ fn . 15 ] , 149 - 50 .
 THE VICTIMS ' TALE :
MEMORY AND FORGETTING IN THE STORY OF
VIOLENCE *

Peter van der Veer

The Preamble of the Indian Constitution , the foundational text of the In¬

dian nation - state , reads as follows :

" We , The People of India , having solemnly resolved to constitute India

into a Sovereign , Socialist , Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to
all its citizens : Justice , social , economic and political ; Liberty of thought ,
expression , belief , faith and worship . . ." .

The Indian historian Gyanendra Pandey reports that he heard these lines

read out on national television on the eve of Indias ' Republic Day , January

25 , 1990 , when he visited Bhagalpur , a small town in Northern India . Just

a month before his visit a massacre had taken place in Bhagalpur , in which

as many as thousand people , most of them Muslims , had been killed and

some 40 , 000 people had to leave their homes for relief camps . Pandey had

come to record the victims ' story , to get a full picture of the massacre , but

was made to reflect on the story of the nation , on national history , when he

watched national television in Bhagalpur . 1

The simultaneity of hearing the victims ' story and watching the pom¬

posity of the nation ' s celebration of itself lends itself to black laughter , for
ironic distance from the official discourse of the nation - state . But these are

only moments of escape from the fetishization of state power , fragments

which are soon domesticated into national history . Maurice Halbwachs and

recently Pierre Nora make a sharp distinction between history and collec¬

tive memory . Nora argues that history wishes to suppress memory and that

only " Lieux de Memoire fragmented , archival remains , are allowed to

* This article was published earlier in : Violence , Identity , and Self - Determination , eds .
Heut de Vries and Samuel Weber , Stanford , CA : Stanford University Press , 1997 .

1 Gyanendra Pandey , " In Defence of the Fragment : Writing about Hindu - Muslim Riots
in India Today " , Economic and Political Weekly , Annual Number , March 1991 , 559 -
72 ( reprinted in : Representations 37 [ 1992 ] , 27 - 55 ) .
230 PETER VAN DER VEER

stay within the historical narrative . 2 The question is : What does national
histoiy do with the victims ' tale ? As we know , ' history ' is the grand narra¬
tive of the modern nation - state . The stories different groups have about
their past , about the inner differences within the nation , are incorporated ,
re - interpreted , framed into History . ' History ' as sign of the ' Modern ' is
absolutely central to the idea of ' Progress ' or ' Development ' and thus to
both colonialism and the liberal nation - state . The eighteenth - century idea
of ' Progress ' combined Christian salvational expectation with social disci¬
plines of rational prediction . And the schematization of evolutionary stages
by the Utilitarians , the ideologues of British colonialism , inserted the
" People without History " into the story of progress . Liberation of the

" People in the West" and the colonization of the " People in the Rest " are

thus much more closely connected then one might gather from critiques of
post - Enlightenment thought . Let us invoke the " specter " of Karl Marx :
' history ' through the agency of British colonialism had , by necessity and

however cruelly , to wake the Indian nation from its oriental slumber in
Marx ' s view and indeed , the history of colonialism is the history of the
nation - state , both in England and in India . Through ' history ' , as the story
of liberation from oppression , the individual citizen learns to identify with
the nation - state . History is therefore a necessary social discipline to pro¬
duce the modem subject , but , again , what is done with the victims ' tale ?
Ernest Renan argues in his famous lecture on the idea of the nation , 3
delivered in the Sorbonne in March 1882 , that memories of the past are
connected with the collective will to live together in the nation of today .
Renan saw serious historical scholarship as a danger to nationalism , since
it forces us to look at the violent origins of the nation - state . In his view ,
" forgetting and even the historical error are an essential factor of the for¬

mation of the nation " . In another passage in his lecture , however , Renan
claims that nationalism implies " that every French citizen should already
have forgotten Saint Bartholomew ' s day , the massacres of the Midi in the
thirteenth century " . Renan recalls these historical events in his lecture and
assumes that his audience knows them , but at the same time he suggests
that they " should have been forgotten already " . Benedict Anderson has
recently argued that this is precisely how " the lessons of history " work ,

2 Pierre Nora , " Between Memory and History : Les Lieux de Memoire ", Representations
26 ( 1989 ) , 26 .
3 Ernest Renan , " Qu ' est ce que c ' est une nation ? " [ 1882 ] , CEuvres Completes , vol . 1,
Paris : Caiman - Levy , 1947 - 1961 , 887 - 906 .
 THE VICTIMS ' TALE 231

namely , through the remembering / forgetting of historical experience

within the national narrative . 4
The dark stories of terror and bloodshed are only memorized to be re¬
membered / forgotten . They are re - interpreted as either necessary steps to¬
wards liberation or ' incidents ' of no consequence to the unfolding of the
main plot . The official history of Indian nationalism , as told in Indian edu¬
cation , is the progressive story of the liberation of the ' People ' from for¬
eign domination and thus the narration of patriotic love , but within that
general frame there is the story of partition , of hatred and violence between
Hindus and Muslims . The subtext is that of events , of incidents that are
called " communal " in order not to let them disturb the text of the "Nation¬
al " , the emergence of freedom , of a normal , liberated nation - state . They

have to be given meaning within the narrative frame of the emergence of a

liberal nation - state . And when they do not fit , they are signs of " backward¬
ness " , of " attempts to turn back the clock of history " , to quote Salman
Rushdie ' s The Satanic Verses on the Iranian revolution .
I think that it is wrong to say that a unitary , homogenous history oblit¬
erates the memory of pogroms and massacres . In some cases and to some
extent there are attempts to do just that . Textualizations of violent events
are open to a variety of interpretations , and , while there are often many
versions of what happened , only one version gets an official status , be¬
comes part of the state ' s archive , and that version is often plotted along the
lines of a master - narrative . If one has read one account , one has read them
all . The official version is sometimes not established by marginalizing
other accounts , but by the systematic destruction of evidence , as witnessed
by Gyanendra Pandey during his visit to Bhagalpur . Not only do the police
records ( historian ' s favorite source for violence ) often ignore massacres , in
which the police has been involved , as much as they can , but one of the
elements of violence itself is the destruction of evidence . Fire is a favorite
instrument in communal riots to destroy the bodies of the victims , the
houses in which they lived , so that the story of the victimized community
can be more easily disputed . The fetishization of numbers in the debates
about what actually happened is often striking . It is impossible to totally
deny that anything happened , but numbers play an important role in the
calculus of how ' serious ' the events were . Ironically , it is the politics of
numbers in modern elections that is a motivating force in these massacres
in the first place .

4 Benedict Anderson , Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism , London : Verso , 1991 .
 PETER VAN DER VEER
232

Nevertheless , more often than not , it is not so much that the memory of
violent events is totally obliterated , that these events are suppressed , but
that they are memorized as fragments of a story of which the unitary , ra¬
tional subject is the liberal nation - state . History is a teleology which leads
to ' India ' , that is the liberated Indian nation - state . Suffering and pain do
acquire their meaning from the larger story of progress , unless they are
' senseless ' , that is incoherent , without any meaning for the larger story .

This narrative strategy in dealing with the past is also useful in dealing
with the present . The suppression of civil riots by the state - often causing
more victims than the riots themselves - is thus generally called a " return
to normalcy " . Civil riots are illegitimate and worrisome incidents which
are ' senseless ' not only because they threaten the state ' s monopoly of
physical force , but also its narration of its own legitimacy , based on the
collective will to live together . Government and not violence is therefore
the term the state uses for its own employment of physical force .
Liberal government allows for debates in the Offentlichkeit , the public
sphere , and for the expression of the will of the people in elections , but ,
according to its own theory , it has to monopolize violence by suppressing
violence between individuals and groups in society . In this way the theory
presupposes a distinction between the free expression of opinion and the
use of violence , between speech acts and other acts . However , words can
hurt and the role of insults , slander , rumors and propaganda is quite impor¬
tant in the dynamics of physical violence . Slogans like " Babar ki santan ,
jao Pakistan ya kabristari ' ( " Babar ' s offspring [ that is : the Muslim com¬
munity ] , go to Pakistan or to the graveyard " ) , when uttered freely in the
streets , are forms of physical violence and the distinction between words
and acts is like that between a knife and an iron rod . More profoundly ,
when college and university teachers educate their students in a history of
Hindu oppression by Muslims , the discursive premises of violent acts have
been laid . Finally , since words are often the main object and result of our
studies - even when visual material is also used to " tell the story " - , we
have to realize that the narrativization of violence in victims ' accounts ,
police reports , media representations is what we have to interpret .
There is a strong current in recent historiography and anthropology to
go beyond the story of the state , to get the " history from below " , from the
" People " . The idea is to disrupt and decenter the singularity of statist and

elitist narrative . In the history and anthropology of violence one would

thus go straight for the victims ' tale . One of the challenges here is not to
slip into an essentialist humanism which constructs the authenticity of a
victimized subject . It is the kind of problem Derrida ' s work , I think , has
alerted us to .
 THE VICTIMS ' TALE 233

Let us look briefly at a fairly typical argument which derives its inter¬
pretive authority from the victims ' point of view . I take as a rather random
example what the well - known , former BBC correspondent in India , Mark
Tully , has recently written about the Ahmedabad riots between Hindus and
Muslims in 1990 . On April 3 , 1990 , a Muslim was stabbed to death in the
old city of Ahmedabad . Within an hour of that murder four Hindus were
stabbed in separate incidents . A curfew was imposed in the immediate
vicinity . Over the next three days the trouble built up , with police opening
fire to disperse groups throwing stones at each other . On the fourth day of
the riots , April 6 , twenty - three people were killed and seventy injured .
Curfew was extended to the other areas of the city with a record of com¬
munal violence . Then , on April 7 , a rumor swept through the city that the
priest of the Jagannath temple had been killed . That created another round
of violence which was stopped by the army on April 14 .
The violence was interpreted in the Indian press as caused by religious
fundamentalism . Tully , however , spoke to poor Muslims in the city who
blame politics , not religion . In his view , most editorial writers don ' t speak
to poor Muslims and so are easily carried away by the fashionable fear of
fundamentalism . He ends his discussion of the Ahmedabad riots by writ¬
ing :

" thepoliticians and the press continue to blame the riots on religious fun¬
damentalism . This may be convenient for the politicians and fashionable
for the press , but according to the victims - who ought to know best - it ' s
just not true . The victims of the riots don ' t even know the meaning of the
word ' fundamentalism ' , but they do know that it is not religion that di¬
vides them " 5 .

So if it is not religion that divides Hindus and Muslims , what is it ? In the

,
view of the poor Muslims interviewed by Tully it is the economy and poli¬
tics which divide people in rich and poor and the poor get killed . Tully
elaborates this view by arguing that politicians make use of the underworld
- heavily involved in bootlegging - to create riots between Hindus and
Muslims whenever it suits them politically . Moreover , police and under¬
world are hand in glove . Besides the political reasons for Hindu - Muslim
riots , Tully looks at economic causes , such as large - scale unemployment
due to the crisis in the textile mills .
It is a bit disingenuous of Tully to say that the political economy ex¬
planation of communal violence has escaped the Indian press , since they
do not speak to the victims of riots , while he does . In fact , the political

5 Mark Tully , No Full Stops in India , London : Viking , 1991 , 267 .

 PETER VAN DER VEER
234

economy explanation is perhaps the most generally accepted in at least the

Indian English - language press and it cannot have escaped anyone in India .
The interesting thing is rather that the victims ' tale agrees with nationalist
historiography that the state is the subject of history . However , the state is
not represented as an instrument of the People , but as an evil , autonomous
force outside of society that causes disharmony . The People are repre¬
sented here as , essentially , tolerant , peace - loving and not given to religious
strife . The victims ' stories say that what appears to be religious is not reli¬
gious at all , that violence does not come from the People , but from the
state . Tully privileges the victims ' narrative . The victims ought to know
best , as he says .
The discursive strategy of the victims is to externalize the state and , in
that way , to exorcize violence . This externalization can be interpreted as a
sign that the victimized community wants to stay on in the neighborhood
and attempts to recreate the imaginary community of the neighborhood by
saying that an external force , the state , was the perpetrator of violence , not
the neighbors . More profoundly , however , the victims ' tale draws attention
to the ambiguous hyphen of the nation - state and to the insecure location of
religion in modernity . Let us first explore the hyphenated nation - state
somewhat further . Not only in the victims ' tale , but also in much radical
historiography about violence the state has done it . In the colonial period it
was the divide - and - rule politics of the colonial state that first created reli¬
gious communities and then set them up against each other . By dividing
Indian civil society along religious lines , the state had a perfect raison
d ' etre , to ensure order . When it increasingly failed to perform that func¬
tion , it was replaced by two nation - states , India and Pakistan , in which the
rulers derived their legitimacy from ' The People ' . The postcolonial state ,
however , inherited the divisions in civil society that had been created by
the British . Politicians depend on votes and the electoral process almost
forces them to exploit the religious divisions in society . This is enhanced
by the fact that the Indian state has increasingly turned to reservation poli¬
cies for so - called backward classes in order to change access to education
and government employment . This is part of what one might call the pene¬
tration of the modernizing state in civil society , and many Indians see this
as a disruption of the social fabric of society and thus the cause of vio¬
lence .
This summarizes part of the writing on both the history and the present
state of communal affairs in India . One of the problems with it is its de¬
pendence on a clear - cut boundary between state and society . The state is
conceived as an autonomous entity , outside of society . It is seen , volun -
taristically , as a structure of intentions , plans , and policy making which has
 THE VICTIMS ' TALE 235

effects on an external society . Timothy Mitchell has recently argued that

this topological metaphor is misleading , since it tends to reify both state
and society . He suggests that

"the state should be addressed as an effect of spatial organization , tempo¬

ral arrangement , functional specification , and supervision and surveil¬
lance , which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into
state and society . The essence of modern politics is not policies formed
on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other , but
the producing and reproducing of this line of difference " . 6

His argument is that the distinction between state and society is not only an
analytical tool which enables one to look at the centralizing role of power¬
ful institutions which claim monopoly of legitimate force . More impor¬
tantly , " methods of organization and control internal to the processes they
govern create the effect of a state structure external to those processes " . 7
At the same time that power relations become internal as disciplines , they
appear to take the form of external structures . To go one step further , the
methods of organization and arrangement that produce the new effects of
structure also generate the modern experience of meaning as a form of
representation . As Derrida seems to argue in his work , the metaphysics of
modernity creates the experience of an ontological distinction between
physical reality and its representation .
In the Indian discussion the problems with drawing the boundary be¬
tween state and society often emerge in criticism of the role of the state .
Seemingly opposite positions about whether the state is too strong ( au¬
thoritarian and centralizing ) or too weak ( fragile and ineffective ) are often
taken by the same writer in discussions of the Indian state . For example ,
Rajni Kothari , a leading political scientist in India , has recently argued that
" even the repressive character arises out of the fragility of the modern state

rather than its power , especially in past - colonial ( sic ) societies . The more
fragile and ineffective and powerless a given state , the more repressive it
becomes " . 8 One would imagine that in order to be effectively repressive
the state needs power . What Kothari perhaps wants to say is that the state
does not effect social change in the direction he thinks desirable . One of
the main reasons for its falling short of expectation is the erosion of the

6 Timothy Mitchell , " The Limits of the State : Beyond Statist Approaches and Their
Critics " , American Political Science Review 85 ( 1991 ) 1 , 95 .

7 Ibid . , 77 .

8 Rajni Kothari , " State and Statelessness in Our Time " , Economic and Political Weekly ,
Annual Number , March 1991 , 553 .
236 PETER VAN DER VEER

autonomy of the state vis - a - vis " dominant interests , be they the monied
interests in the form of the private sector and its international purveyors
trying to influence economic decisions , be they the communal and caste
interests seeking to hoodwink the state for sectarian ends , or be they the
more professional mafia interests that have spread themselves through
criminalisation of the polity at the grassroots " . 9 Again , the externality of
the state becomes problematic as soon as interest groups to which the
writer does not belong become dominant .
An interesting element brought into the discussion of the state by
Kothari ( and many others ) is the international context . This larger context
reinforces the trope of externality , since the Indian state is part of a global
system which is often understood as even more truly external , indeed ' for¬
eign ' . Kothari argues that there is an " erosion of self - reliant statehood and
a growing hold over the state by transnational interests and their techno¬
cratic agents " 10 . Again , there are interest groups taking hold over the state ,
but now they are located mainly outside of Indian society with as collabo¬
rators within Indian society , the much - maligned middle class . This feeling
that it is the middle class with its economic ideology of privatization which
sells a formerly self - reliant society out to world capitalism makes the In¬
dian state seem as foreign as its predecessor , the colonial state . The con¬
nection is made with some rhetorical over - kill by Jan Breman in his analy¬
sis of the causes of recent anti - Muslim riots in Surat , West India : " For the
flourishing condition of her informalised economy , so praised by the over¬
seas lords of the global syndicate with its headquarters in Washington , the
late - 20th - century version of the former East India and other foreign Com¬
panies , Surat has paid a high price in recent months " . 11 We seem to have
come full circle : Communalism has been caused by the colonial state and
independence has not liberated Indian society from this problem , imposed
on it , as it were from outside . Instead it is perpetuated under the neo -
colonial conditions of late capitalism . The metaphor of " the foreign hand "
is routinely used in India to summarize this and other kinds of externaliza -
tions of communal troubles . The state dissolves here to some extent in
larger economic processes , although it is still the agent of privatization by
giving subsidies and tax exemptions and by regulating labor and capital
inputs .

9 Ibid .

10 Ibid . , 554

11 Jan Breman , " Anti - Muslim Pogrom in Surat " , Economic and Political Weekly , April
17 , 1993 , 741 .
 THE VICTIMS ' TALE
237

In terms of modern political ideas the state should be the instrument of

the political will of the people . The modern state finds its legitimacy in the

regular election of the people ' s representatives . One of the main difficul¬

ties here is that the modern state produces through a variety of social disci¬

plines not only the modern individual as a disciplined social subject , but

also the community as political agent . The modern state both individual¬

izes and totalizes . This it does by means of classification , of which the

census was one of the main examples in the colonial period . The modern

Indian state has an elaborate system of communal representation and enti¬

tlements which produces both the modern individual and the modern

community . It is a constant endeavor to try to determine where the bounda¬

ries between state and society and between individual citizen and member

of a community are , since this line is re - drawn again and again in the very

process of politics . The concept of the state , not as an external , essential -

ized agent , but as a series of often violently conflicting disciplines of or¬

dering society , thus continues to be essential . Indeed , it is the state that

produces violence , but the state is not an autonomous , external agent .

My analysis should therefore not be mistaken as a rejection of the

concept of the state . To quote Michel Foucault , " Maybe what is really

important for our modernity - that is , for our present - is not so much the

etatisation of society , as the ' governmentalization ' of the state " . 12 With

" governmentalization " Foucault refers to the new relations of power under

modernity which are not simply the product of the expanded capacity of

the state apparatus , of " the etatisation of society " . A new , self - regulating

field of the social for articulating effects of power - public opinion , private

property , the market , the judiciary - emerges to produce the hyphenated

nation - state . What remains to be seen , however , is what Foucault means

with " our modernity " . I would argue that a singular , universal history of

modernity does not exist , although I do accept that Western history since

the 19th century has had an overriding importance in the making of the

modern world . The teleology of the modern nation - state , of " our moder¬

nity " demands that both state and nation are secular . Since the 19th cen¬

tury , however , religion has been the site of difference on which the strug¬

gle for alternatives to Western modernity in many parts of the colonial

world took place . In that very struggle new religious discourses and prac¬

tices have emerged which - in a highly complex and unsatisfying move -

have been placed in the category of fundamentalism - a term derived from

12 Michel Foucault , " Governmentality " , in : The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmen -
tality, eds . Graham Burchell , Colin Gordon , and Peter Miller , Chicago : University of
Chicago Press , 1991 .
238 PETER VAN DER VEER

USA Protestantism - precisely because they are different from the domi¬
nant secularized , privatized religious forms of the late twentieth century
West . I prefer for at least some of these new discourses the term religious
nationalism , since they articulate discourse on the religious community
and discourse on the nation .
Nationalism has to be connected to secularism to be truly modern and
enlightened . ' Politicized religions ' threaten both reason and liberty . The
post - enlightenment urge to define religion as an autonomous sphere , sepa¬
rate from politics and economy is , of course , at the same time also a liberal
political demand that religion should be separate from politics . However , it
is precisely the effect of the normalizing and disciplining project of secular
modernity that religion becomes so important as a source of resistance .
What is often forgotten in theories of nationalism is that the very forces of
centralization and homogenization which are integral to nationalism al¬
ways create centrifugal forces and resistances based on assumed differ¬
ence . 13
Whatever the success of the political demand that religion should be a -
political in Western societies ( and this is in fact an open issue ) , it is unwise
to try to understand religious nationalism as a flawed and hybrid moder¬
nity . Rather , one should try to understand it , as one does with the national¬
isms of Europe , as a product of a particular history of at least one century .
That particular history is in this case one of Western colonial domination
and to say this is not to blame colonialism for producing a flawed religious
nationalism , since there is nothing flawed here , but to say that the post -
colonial predicament can only be understood in relation to the colonial
transformation of the societies I am talking about . What is regarded there
as religion might be quite different from what modern Christians or mod¬
ern liberals regard as religion . Surely the question is how religious power -
institutions , movements - produces religious selves and religious models
for correct behavior . Part of what I refer to here is the socialization of reli¬
gious identity and difference . As Talal Asad has observed , it is not mere
symbols that implant true religious dispositions , but power ranging from
laws and other sanctions to the disciplinary activities of social institutions .
It is not the mind that moves spontaneously to religious truth , but power
that creates the conditions for experiencing that truth . This is what Augus¬
tine catches in one word : disciplina . Power does not only work positively

13 Peter van der Veer , Religious Nationalism : Hindus and Muslims in India , Berkeley :
University of California Press , 1994 .
 THE VICTIMS ' TALE
239

in inculcating certain truth , but also negatively by systematically exclu¬

ding , forbidding and denouncing . 14
Again , " politicization " and " depoliticization " of a separate sphere ,
called " religion " is precisely the result of the Enlightenment discourse of
modernity which assigns religious faith to the private domain as a matter
of personal beliefs without political consequences in the public sphere .
Religious discourse and practice in the political arena has come to be seen
in the West as a transgression of what religion is supposed to be . There is a
strong feeling that violent conflict between religious communities is a vio¬
lation of the ' original intent ' of the founders of the religions involved or of
God himself . Real religion produces harmony and tolerance and can thus
be sharply distinguished from " politicized religion " , politics in religious
disguise . In important ways , this entire mode of thinking is the result of a
specific historical development in Europe in the wake of the religious wars
of the 16th and 17th centuries .
These interpretations of religion cannot account for the central role of
power and violence in religious discourse as well as in religious expansion
and conversion over the centuries . This is much more accepted in the
analysis of Islam than in that of Hinduism . Tolerance is the prevailing
trope in discourse about Hinduism and in that of the modern Hindu as
well . This consensus along the political spectrum in India is ultimately
founded on a 19th century construction of ' Hindu spirituality ' and , as
such , a product of a collusion between orientalism and Hindu nationalism .
The point here is that modern Hindus have come to interpret hierarchical
relativism in Hindu discourse - there are many paths leading to god , but
some are better than others - in orientalist terms as " tolerance " . This leads ,
in a universalist version , to an inclusion of all religions in the Vedanta , the
spiritual " essence " of Hinduism in its philosophical form , as in the phi¬
losopher - president Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan ' s famous formula : " The Ve¬
danta is not a religion , but religion itself in its most universal and deepest
significance " . 15 In the more narrow version of the VHP ( Vishwa Hindu
Parishad , World Hindu Council ) , this inteipretation stresses " tolerance "
within but excludes the religions that " came from outside " and are intoler¬
antly bent on converting Hindus .
Power and violence are as crucial to Hindu discourse and practice as
they are to Islam ( or Christianity for that matter ) . Religions are not pleas -

14 Talal Asad , Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity

and Islam , Baltimore , MD : Johns Hopkins University Press , 1993 , 34 , 35 .
15 Wilhelm Halbfass , India and Europe , Albany , NY : State University of New York
Press , 1988 , 409 .
240 PETER VAN DER VEER

ant and theology is a cruel calling . They deal with evil , with the dark
forces of the night , with demons . They are about violence , both in sacri¬
fices and in pogroms . In Hinduism there is a strong interest in blood sacri¬
fice , the killing of large numbers of goats and buffaloes ; and the frenzy of
the participants grows palpably with the progress of the ritual . It is an in¬
tensity which only a pogrom can produce . And while Robertson Smith and
Durkheim want to stress the creation of social bonds through sacrifice , it is
striking how disruptive these things really are . Georges Bataille is at least
partly right , when he argues in his comment on Michelet ' s famous La Sor -
ciere ( " The Witch " ) , that sacrifice is performed to increase the intensity of
life by the contradictory act of killing the Other . The moments of intensity
are the moments of excess . 16
Hinduism abounds in gory stories about the slaying of the demons who
threaten the order of things . One of the most famous stories is about the
god Rama who fights with the four - headed demon Ravana . Whenever he
cuts off one head , a new set of heads pops up to replace it like in a fast
video - game . This obsession with numbers , of threatening fertility is also
one of the deepest emotions in relation to the Muslim Other . The fertility
of Muslims is seen as overwhelming ; since the colonial census - operations
of the 19th century , there is the fear that soon they will outnumber the
Hindus and take over the country . There is also a strong element of sexual
jealousy in this fertility myth which harps on the notion that Muslims may
marry four wives ( again as licentious as the over - sexed demons ) . It is tell¬
ing that the holy foreskin ( or rather the absence thereof ) is the sign of dif¬
ference . The pants of suspect males are pulled down during riots to see
whether they are Muslims . When they are , they are killed . The equation of
Muslims and demons is quite explicit also in the idea that Muslim saints
are the only ones who can deal with the powers of darkness since they are
so close to them . 17 From the logic of Hindu beliefs and ritual practice fol¬
lows that Muslims who do not know their place in the hierarchy and want
to usurp the higher place of the Hindus , are like demons who want to take
over the place of the gods . The only way to sustain the dharma , " the order
of things " , is to kill the demons , i . e . , the Muslim Other .
Particularly important is the articulation of Hindu ideas of sacred space
and modern ideas of national territory . This expresses itself most clearly in
a politics of space that constitutes the context of much communal violence
in India . Riots and rituals have come to be linked in the construction of

16 George Bataille , Literature and Evil , New York : Urizen Books , 1973 .
17 Peter van der Veer , " Playing or Praying : A Saint ' s Day in Surat " , Journal of Asian
Studies 51 ( 1992 ) 3 , 545 - 65 .
 THE VICTIMS ' TALE
241

communal identities in public arenas . 18 Ritual processions through sensi¬

tive areas often end in full - scale riots . Often one is confronted here with

" rituals of provocation " . A symbolic repertoire , derived from the ritual

realm of animal sacrifice , is often used to start a riot : a slaughtered cow in

a Hindu sacred space or a slaughtered pig in a Muslim sacred space . Riots

often contest boundaries between communities whose notions of public

space are related to personhood and community . Irving Goffman speaks of

" territories of the self ' which can be invaded by specific rituals of viola¬

tion . Therefore , the form of killings , the mutilation of bodies , the murder

of adult men in front of their wives and children is so important not only in

the creation of maximum terror , but also in violating the physical and

moral integrity of the victimized community . In the anti - Muslim riots in

Surat and Bombay after December 6 , 1992 , the victims were forced to utter
"Jay a Sri Ram " (" Hail to Lord Rama" ) before they were killed or raped . 19
Public space itself is , to an important extent , constructed through ritual and

rioting : one ends up having Muslim areas , Hindu areas and mixed areas .

Conclusion

Violence is in my view a " total " social phenomenon . As Marcel Mauss

explains in The Gift , " these phenomena are at once legal , economic , reli¬

gious , aesthetic , morphological and so on " . 20 It is interesting to note , how¬

ever , that in modern society this total fact is discursively cut up in different

pieces . The economic and political pieces constitute the real elements ,

while the religious is relegated to the unreal . As I have argued , this de¬

pends , to a significant degree , on a discursive construction of Western

modernity , in which a modern construction of public and private makes

religion a private matter of the individual . Something similar is also true

for the way modern power results in the drawing of a boundary between

state and society . Unlike religion , however , the state comes to be seen as a

very real , but external agent whose actions impinge on society .

The trope of externality is also used by victims of violence , but in a

very functional manner , namely to pacify communal relations on the local

18 Cf . Sandria Freitag , Collective Action and Community : Public Arenas and the Emer¬
gence of Communalism in North India , Berkeley , CA : University of California Press ,
1989 .

19 Asghar Ali Engineer , " Bastion of Communal Amity Crumbles " , Economic and Politi¬
cal Weekly , February 13 , 1993 , 263 ; Sudhir Chandra , " Of Communal Consciousness
and Communal Violence : Impressions from Post - Riot Surat " , Economic and Political
Weekly , September 4 , 1993 , 1883 .

20 Marcel Mauss , The Gift , London : Routledge , 1974 , 76 .

 PETER VAN DER VEER
242

level . To say that it is the changing economy or the changing maneuvers of

politicians or the changing tactics of the police functions as an externaliza -
tion of violence that is endemic among the common people themselves .
However , it seems to be difficult to regard religion as an external , histori¬
cal force like the state . Religion makes itself appear as a habit of the heart ,
the hard core of a community ' s identity , as a thing that cannot change and
is non - negotiable . To say of violence that it is religiously motivated makes
it seem inescapable , although , definitely , we know that religion does
change , that religious institutions lose functions over time and , sometimes ,
disappear . But religious discourse tries to deny historical change and de¬
rives its power to an important degree from its success to do so . Indeed , in
that sense , religion is ideology , but it does not hide class dominance , it
hides its own history , its rootedness in society .
There is no true story of violence . Violence is a total phenomenon , but
it comes to us as a total fragment . Sometimes , when the Traumarbeit of the
nationalist imagination or the externalizations and Verschiebungen of the
victims have not done their work ( as yet ) , fragments continue to stick out .
Something terrible has happened and there is no plot , no narrative , only
traces which lead nowhere . Gyanendra Pandey , with whose visit to Bha -
galpur I began my talk , argues for the fragment as showing the limits of
historical knowledge . He cites poems of a Muslim teacher in Bhagalpur ,
Manazir Aashiq Harganvi , and I will end with one of them : Khud apne aap
lco dlioondte hue / Ab turn us kinare par khare ho / Jahan se koi nahi lauta
/ Koi nahi n lautta dost / Ab to turn bhi nahin laut pauge / Yaad ki sirf ek
shart rah jayegi ki jab bhi kahi / Fasad hoga / Turn bahutyaad aoge .

In search of yourself you have now reached that shore

From where no one has returned
No one ever returns , my friend
Now you , too , are lost forever .
There remains but one condition of memory :
That whenever , wherever
A riot occurs
I shall remember you . 21

21 Pandey 's translation .

 PartIII
Religion and Civil Strife
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN
THE BALKANS AND IN LEBANON
Mario Apostolov

The challenge of the communal conflicts in Lebanon and Bosnia for the

stability of the international order indicates at least three important prob¬

lems that demand further scholarly analysis of the confessional relations in

the eastern Mediterranean . First , the " secularization hypothesis " and the

conviction that religious politics is an outdated paradigm are based on

premature conclusions . While fundamentalist ideologies remain limited in

scope and popularity , many people stick to their confessional group identi¬

ties in the search for individual security in an inherently unstable environ¬

ment . Second , certain societies meet serious difficulties in adjusting to the

fundamental transformations of the modern age . The rise of the nation -

state system and the growing interaction among people with different

backgrounds raise new problems that need well - elaborated responses .

Third , certain crucial threats to plural societies in the region come from the

immediate international surroundings . The ambitions of stronger neighbors

and the heated Arab - Israeli and Serbo - Croatian confrontation were detri¬

mental for the fragile balance among various religious communities in

Bosnia and Lebanon .

The Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean belong to the historical re¬

gion through which the frontier between Christianity and Islam moved

back and forth , leaving a deep imprint on the social psychology and nu¬

merous enclaves of captive minorities . Georges Corm calls Lebanon " the

last fragment of the Ottoman Empire " with its principle of separating con¬

fessional communities . 1 Yet it is no less justified to describe in the same

way , for example , Bosnia , whose society is split into three separately func¬

tioning religious communities . Indeed , the Balkans and Lebanon are part

of the same zone of the civilizational frontier between Christianity and

Islam , in which the alternative of conflict or cooperation has always been

open . Historically , the inability to find the proper institutional framework

for the accommodation of various confessional identities both in south -

1 Georges Corm , Geopolitique du conflit libanais , Paris : Decouverte , 1987 , 48 .

246 MARIO APOSTOLOV

eastern Europe and in the eastern Mediterranean has been an important

factor pushing for communal violence .
Both in the Balkans and in the Middle East political identity is divided
between the existing state institutions and the loyalty to a particular con¬
fessional community . Human identity is thus split on several layers , corre¬
sponding to different types of social cleavages . This complicates commu¬
nal relations in the Balkans , where the various religions have entered the
historical process of nation and nation - state formation . It contributes to the
departmentalization of this region , which has no sense of regionalism and
regional integration . The failure to construct a proper political system ( on
both country and regional levels ) to match the mixture of identities fosters
communal conflicts .
It is the search for more personal security in response to combined po¬
litical , military , social , economic and financial turmoil , rather than some
fanatic belief , that makes people in the region today turn back to their con¬
fessional identities . This traditional group identification inevitably takes
place with reference to the " other " . Thus Orthodox Christian peoples in the
Balkans want to be clearly distinguished from their Muslim neighbors .
Croatian and Slovene Catholics want to distance themselves from the very
idea of the Balkans altogether , as a backward and mixed zone populated by
Muslims and Orthodox Christians .
While the similarities in the inter - confessional relations in the Balkans
and the Middle East , including Lebanon , are abundant , the two areas have
their own specifics . They represent two different modalities within the
framework of the Christian - Muslim frontier . Indeed , one of the character¬
istics of the Balkan peoples , regardless of whether they are Christian or
Muslim , is the link between ethno - cultural nationalism and religion . This
connection between religion and ethnic nationalism in the Balkans , and its
exaggeration in the contemporary political realities are among the key
characteristics of the Balkan region . The dimensions of nationalism in the
Middle East , with its elusive notion of Arab nationalism and artificial bor¬
ders , are completely different .
The Balkans are perceived as a region politically broken into a number
of small socio - political entities which seek self - sufficiency . This is where
the term balkanization comes from . Historically , the Balkan nations have
always felt a shortage of resources to guarantee themselves their own secu¬
rity , whenever they were left to decide their fate on their own . This fact
has , among others , two implications for our discussion . On the one hand ,
" national " political authorities broadly use religious identity and religious

rhetoric internally , in the hunt for the souls of co - believers . The unity of
the community was arguably opposed to the threat of the " other . " On the
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 247

other hand , local politicians have constantly sought assistance from pa¬
trons abroad to strengthen the security of their communities or states .
Thus , for example , the religious ties among Orthodox Serbs , Greeks and
Russians , or those of the Bosnian Muslims with Turkey , Iran and the rich
Arab monarchies were brought back to the international scene in the
1990s . The strife for power among young nation - states and the activities of
egoistic et hni c entrepreneurs and lobbies are , therefore , to a large extent
responsible for the insecure environment in the region .
The Balkan population is divided among the following ethnic and lin¬
guistic groups : Slavic peoples ( Slovenes , Croatians , Bosnian Muslims ,
Serbs , Montenegrins , Bulgarians , and Macedonians ) ; Romanic peoples
( Romanians , Moldovans , Vlahs ) , Greeks , Albanians , Turkic peoples

( Turks , Tatars , and Gagauz ) , Hungarians , and Gypsies . In many cases ,

these cleavages do not correspond to the confessional division of the pen¬

insula . By religious affiliation , one can distinguish the following groups :
Orthodox Christians ( Greeks , Bulgarians , Macedonians , Moldovans ,
Serbs , Montenegrins , Romanians , and the Albanian Orthodox , Gagauz and
Vlach minorities ) , Muslims ( Turks , Albanians , Bosnian Muslims and mi¬
norities of Muslim Bulgarians [ Pomaks ] , Muslims of the Sandjak , Tatars ,
and Muslim Gypsies ) , and Catholics ( Slovenes , Croatians , Hungarians and
minorities of Catholic Albanians , Uniate and Catholic Romanians , Uniate
and Catholic Bulgarians ) .

Nation - state formation and religion in the Balkans

Speaking of an unstable environment in south - eastern Europe , it is logical
to look in the following paragraphs into the process of nation - state forma¬
tion as an important factor contributing to this instability . The medieval
Balkan Orthodox Christian countries demonstrated a strong link between
state sovereignty and " national " church autonomy , ever since Boris I con¬
verted Bulgaria in 865 to Christianity of the Eastern rite , while establishing
an autocephalous patriarchate . Orthodox Christianity is inscribed in the
Greek historical tradition , but the independent ( autocephalous ) Orthodox
churches refer to themselves as Eastern ( rather than Greek ) Orthodox .
Catholicism established itself in the Western Balkans , but it kept cer¬
tain specifics , such as the use of the Slavonic Glagolithic script by the
Croatians . When the Muslim Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453 ,
they established control over the conquered peoples by means of the millet
248 MARIO APOSTOLOV

system , 2 stationing the heads of the East Orthodox , Armenian and Judaic
communities in the new capital , under the watchful eyes of the sultan . The
formerly autocephalous churches were abolished and all Orthodox Chris¬
tians were brought under the jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch of the Rum
millet 3 and his Phanariote clergy . The task was as much to deal with the
organizational matters of the religious communities as to keep these com¬
munities under control . The Phanariote rule was challenged by the reestab -
lishment of the Patriarchate of Pec in 1557 by the Ottoman Grand Vizier
Mehmed Sokolovic , an islamized Slav from Herzegovina , and by the exis¬
tence in Montenegro of a theocracy ruled by a bishop ( vladika ) . The Patri¬
archate of Pec thus for the first time covered the territory from Kosovo to
Belgrade , contributing , before it was abolished again , to the rise of con¬
temporary Serbian nationalism .
The most serious challenge , however , came with the establishment of
Balkan national churches as part of the struggle for political independence .
The establishment of national churches went hand in hand , if not one step
ahead of the establishment of national states . The ecclesiastic partition of
the peninsula thus even preceded its political departmentalization . It was
the Greek nationalist movement , which dealt the first heavy blow . Even
though the Phanariote Patriarchate was regarded as a Greek Church , politi¬
cians in Athens established a national church in 1833 , three years after
independence . The Phanariote Patriarch vehemently refuted its legitimacy
until 1850 , and insisted on his title " ethnarch " ( spiritual leader of the na¬
tion ) rather than patriarch until 1923 . Pashalis Kitromilides argues that
these events marked a move from a universalist to a nationalist vision of
the church institution . 4 Yet what the Greek nationalists really did not ap¬
preciate were the traditionally close relations of the " universal " patriarch
with the Ottoman authorities .
The other Orthodox peoples of the Balkans also started establishing
their own national churches in heated confrontation with the Phanariote
and Ottoman authorities . After the unification of Wallachia and Moldova
into a Romanian state in 1856 , the Romanian Orthodox Church proclaimed

2 Millet is a Turkish corroboration of the Arabic word millah meaning creed , religion or
faith , and not , as broadly interpreted in the literature , nation , the word for which in
Arabic is ummah . The millet system was established as the Ottoman version of the Is¬
lamic dhimmi system of protection of " People of the Book " ( Christians , Jews , and ,
originally , Zoroastrians ) under Muslim rule .

3 The term Rum comes from Rome , alluding to the Roman origins of the Byzantine
Empire , yet it actually refers to Orthodox Christianity .

4 Pashalis Kitromilides , ' " Imagined Communities ' and the Origins of the National
Question in the Balkans , " European History Quarterly 19 ( 1989 ) , 149 - 94 .
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS
249

its autonomy in 1864 but was recognized in compliance with the canonical

rules by the Patriarchate of Constantinople only in 1885 . The Bulgarians

struggled for an autonomous church from 1824 until 1870 . Eight years

before Bulgaria was granted autonomy in 1878 , the Sultan issued a ferman

( decree ) establishing an autocephalous Bulgarian Exarchate . The Serbian

Patriarchate of Pec was recognized again in 1879 , and officially transferred

to Belgrade in 1920 . As far as these developments expressed a return to the

institutional strength of the Christian institutions after centuries of almost

unlimited control by a Muslim power , they were part of the popular under¬

standing that the goal of the Balkan nationalist movements was rejoining

Christian Europe . It is interesting to follow the development of these ideas

right until the early 1990s , when both the Serbs and the Croats insisted that

they were the real ally of the Western powers . The Western criticism of
Serbia ' s treatment of Bosnian and Kosovar Albanian Muslims was inter¬

preted in Belgrade as treason .

The establishment and reestablishment of national church institutions

can be interpreted as the expression of the free will of the local peoples for

independent development . Yet the problems started when the various Bal¬

kan nations laid contending claims on frontier populations and territories .

After the Balkan Wars , the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the

Phanariote Patriarchate in Macedonia was abolished . After 1918 , the Ser¬

bian Patriarch effectively claimed jurisdiction over nearly all Orthodox

churches in Serbia , Montenegro and Macedonia , while the Greek Orthodox

Church took over the southern parishes in Macedonia . This was accompa¬

nied by the emergence of new " national " Orthodox Churches : Albanian in

1922 , Macedonian in 1967 , and Montenegrin in 1993 . 5 The tendency of

claiming church autonomy before independence was kept . In the Albanian

case , the authorities opted for inclusive nationalism and buttressed the

creation of a " national " church , in order to distance the Orthodox minority

from the Phanariote and Greek influence . In the process of establishing

nation - states in the Balkans , the national churches effectively claimed ju¬

risdiction over the Orthodox Christians in their territory . Border changes

and the emergence of new states also followed this tendency , turning relig¬

ion into one of the instruments of national assimilation . Indicatively , the

attempts of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia and of the Serbian minority in

the young Macedonian state make only futile attempts to be transferred

under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian and Serbian patriarchates , while the

5 Paul Moizes , Yugoslavian Inferno : Ethnorelisious Warfare in the Balkans , New York :
Continuum , 1994 , 136 .
250 MARIO APOSTOLOV

decision has to be taken by the national church of the state under whose
sovereignty the minorities live .
It is clear now that the historical process of Serbian nation - state forma¬
tion has not yet been finished . The Serbian nation , which defines itself in
Herderian cultural terms , has been historically dispersed throughout a vast
area in the Western Balkans , mixed with other peoples . The independent
Serbian state , before 1914 , was far from covering all territories where
Serbs lived , while incorporating numerous minorities . The former Yugo¬
slavia included all Serbian communities , but was not a Serbian national
state . Both Milosevic and his opposition understood the Serbs ' historic
task in the 1990s in terms of building a modern Serbian nation - state .
The talks about Orthodox unity against a Muslim threat should be un¬
derstood within the context of the search for political influence at home
and support from abroad ( from Russia ) by certain politicians in Serbia and
Greece . The conflict in Kosovo should also be viewed in the context of
Serbian and Albanian nation - building . The Organization of the Islamic
Conference made it clear in a statement announced in Geneva in April
1999 , during the height of the Kosovo crisis , that the conflict was not reli¬
gious . Certain Islamic states , such as Iran , clearly distanced themselves
from NATO ' s action in favor of the Kosovar Albanians . The regime of
Milosevic may have falsely interpreted the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs in
Krajina , Croatia , in 1997 , and its own silence during that crisis , as a green
light by the West for the creation of ethnically pure states within the for¬
mer Yugoslav republics . 6 As a consequence , Belgrade may have concluded
that the West would be permissive on the purification of Serbia ' s Kosovo
province .

The Balkan Muslims and nationalism

The Muslim peoples of the Balkans stepped on the road of nationalism

later than their Christian neighbors . By the time when the Turks left the
heartland of the peninsula in 1913 , 70 % of the Albanians , 45 % of the Bos¬
nians , and numerous communities of Turks , Slavs and Greeks in various
countries were Muslim , islamized or settled in the region with the assis¬
tance of the Ottoman authorities . All of them felt part of the dominant

6 The eminent US " realist " political analyst John Mearsheimer wrote a number of arti¬
cles on the necessity to create pure nation - states for the appeasement of the Balkans .
See , for example , John Mearsheimer , " Shrink Bosnia to Save It " , New York Times ,
March 31 , 1993 .
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 251

Muslim ummah , and this fact retarded the development of nationalist feel¬
ings among the ethnically distinct communities . 7
The establishment of a distinct Albanian national consciousness around
an Islamic core crystallized in 1878 - 1920 , when the wave of nationalism
and nation - state building was about to marginalise the Albanians as loyal
subjects to the Ottoman sultan . The islamization of Albania had once
started as a punitive Ottoman measure for the resistance of the Christian
leader Skanderbeg in the sixteenth century . Yet later the majority of the
Albanians not only accepted Islam , but made out of it a cultural shield
against the influence of the stronger Christian Greek and Slavic neighbors .
After the independence of Albania in 1913 , all governments in Tirana suc¬
cessfully emphasized the necessity of a participatory nationalism for all
Albanians , including the Muslims , the 20 % Christian Orthodox and the
10 % Catholics in the Albanian state . The self - styled Communist rulers of

the country in 1945 - 1990 imposed a ban on all religious names , Muslim
and Christian alike , with practically the same objective as their non -
communist predecessors - an inclusive Albanian nationalism .
Kemal Ataturk ' s notion of nationalism did not immediately take hold
among the Balkan Turkish communities . Yet when certain grievances over
Ataturk ' s anti - religious policies died away , many Turks embraced the
Herderian vision of a Turkish nation based on shared culture . There is a
case to be made for the important role of Muslim identity in modern Turk¬
ish nationalism , despite the declared loyalty to secularism of the Kemalists .
Indeed , the territory of modern Turkey is strikingly more homogeneous in
confessional terms than it was at the time of Ataturk ' s accession to power .
People with Muslim identity make up 99 % of the population today . Fur¬
thermore , the contemporary Islamist and nationalist appeals in Turkey aim
at an identical popular support : the Anatolian and recently urbanized popu¬
lar mass , frustrated by the unequal distribution of the newly acquired
wealth . Time and space do not permit to elaborate on this argument in
more detail here . Yet it once more supports the major thesis in this article :
that social and economic insecurity breeds necessity to identify with an
established confessional community .
The existence of a Muslim nation was officially recognized in Yugo¬
slavia for the first time in 1971 and it was stipulated in the constitution of
1974 . This " Muslim " nation constituted then 39 % of the population of
Bosnia - Herzegovina , 13 . 4 % of that of Montenegro and a majority in the

7 One of the best accounts of the history of the Balkan Muslims is Alexandre Popovic ,
L 'Islam balkanique : les musulmans du sud - est europeen dans la periode post - otto -
mane , Berlin : Osteuropa - Institut an der Freien Universitat Berlin , 1986 .
252 MARIO APOSTOLOV

Sandjak region between Serbia and Montenegro . 8 The intention of Tito ,

himself a Croat , was to counterbalance the dominant Serbian position in
Yugoslavia . The recognition of the Muslim nation was accepted negatively
by the Serbian and Croatian communities , because from that moment on
they started associating the republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina with a form of
statehood for the Muslims , a drastic drawback in their eyes from the for¬
merly recognized plural character of Bosnia . Many people still insist that
Muslim can only be a socio - religious category in the Bosnian context .
They are right to the extent that it was only the atrocities of the war of
1992 - 1993 , that left the Bosnian Muslim community with one dominant
option : nationalism and the demand for the creation of a nation - state for
their community .
Bosnia and Albania have a similar history and a similar combination of
religious communities : Muslim , Orthodox and Catholic . Yet the advent of
nationalism led to the consolidation of a religiously inclusive Albanian
nation and to the dramatic collapse of the Bosnian society . What made the
difference was the existence of consolidated national states of Orthodox
Serbs and Catholic Croats next to Bosnia , which , in the specific atmos¬
phere of nationalism in the Balkans , attracted those portions of the Bosnian
population who were related to them in terms of confessional identity ,
making it national . The Bosnian war of 1992 - 1995 represents a stage in the
formation of the Muslim , Serbian and Croatian nations . Bosnia witnessed a
centrifugal pattern of nation - formation , quite different from the consolida¬
tion of the Albanian nation .

Religious minorities in the age of nation - states

The treatment of religious minorities in south - eastern Europe since the end
of the eighteenth century demonstrated a major trend in the evolution of
intercommunal relations . After 1699 and 1821 , Austria , Hungary and the
Serbian Principality were left free , if not encouraged , by Europe to clear
their newly liberated territory from Muslims and Muslim places of wor¬
ship , associated with the formerly dominant Ottoman Turks . 9 The

8 Hugh Poulton , The Balkans : Minorities and States in Conflict, London : Minority
Rights Publications , 1991 , 39 .
9 Arguably , had Eugene of Savoy held onto Sarajevo in 1697 , Bosnia could have been
as Christian as Serbia today . See , for example , Ivo Banac , " Bosnian Muslims : From
Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Postcommunist Statehood , 1918 -
1992 " , in The Muslims of Bosnia -Herzegovina : Their Historic Development from the
Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia , ed . Mark Pinson , Cambridge , MA : Har¬
vard University Press , 1994 , 132 .
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 253

Russo - Turkish treaty of Adrianople from 1829 banned Muslims from es¬

tablishing themselves in the autonomous Wallachia and Moldova . Begin¬

ning from the Crimean War in 1856 , the situation changed . The Sublime

Porte was obliged by new accords to respect the rights of its Christian sub¬

jects . 10 The newly autonomous Bulgaria had to accept in 1878 the principle

of tolerance towards Muslims in its territory . When the Serbs stepped into

Kosovo in 1913 and in Bosnia in 1918 , under the watchful eyes of their

European patrons , they could no more follow the earlier policy of conver¬

sion of the newly acquired territory . It can be argued that this evolution

towards tolerance to religious minorities was the general trend in the Bal¬

kans , following the evolution of the concept of minority and human rights

in Europe . Only the mass persecution of Armenian , Greek and other Chris¬

tians in Turkey in the early twentieth century and the notorious

Greco - Turkish population exchange threw a shadow on this general trend .

Unfortunately , with the events in Bosnia and Kosovo , we are witnessing

once more a setback in the evolution of religious minority rights in the

Balkans . 11

Religion has been a major channel of transferring collective identity in

history , and the Balkans clearly demonstrate this . This potential has been

widely used by coalitions of ethnic entrepreneurs , following their particu¬

lar interest in the different countries of the region . The events in the former

Yugoslavia indicate that the process of nation - building is not yet finished

in the Balkans , and that various communities claim rights that infringe

upon the rights of others . All crimes in the Bosnian and Kosovar wars ,

notably mass murder , rape , destruction of homes and ethnic cleansing ,

have had one goal : the establishment of optimal nation - states by Serbs ,

Croats , Bosnian Muslims and Albanians , even if the weight of the crimes

is very unequally distributed .

During the civil war in Bosnia , the three co mmu nities went beyond the

typical demands of a confessional minority seeking the protection of its

right to free exercise of its religion , and turned to the creation of separate

nation - states . Various factors contributed to this political separation : the

influence of neighboring Serbian and Croatian nationalism ; the specific

historical myths of the three communities ; the categorical distinction in the

former Yugoslav federation among " nations " , " nationalities " , and " ethnic

10 The earlier regime of the capitulations concerned primarily the protection of foreign
expatriates in Ottoman territory .
11 I have developed the idea of the evolution of the notion of minority rights in south¬
eastern Europe in Mario Apostolov , " Les droits des minorites et la securite des Etats
dans l ' histoire de l ' Europe du sud - est " , Relations Internationales 89 ( Spring 1997 ) ,
37 - 51 .
 MARIO APOSTOLOV
254

groups " ; and the rise of nationalist politicians taking advantage of the op¬

portunities created by the unraveling of the former political system . The

collapse of the communist system and the ideology of Yugoslavism elimi¬

nated two potential foci of collective identity . In the ensuing ideological

vacuum , people in Bosnia turned to their traditional confessional identities

in the search for security . Yet , in a region dominated by the spirit of na¬

tionalism the confessional distinctions were only a background for the

affirmation of nation - states . Confessional identity combined with national¬

ism , driven by the necessity of group identification rather than religious

extremism . The immense suffering and hatred inflicted by the war ce¬

mented the distinctions among the three communities and the nation - state

building process of the three distinct communities . 12

Arab nationalism and religion

The nation - state logic inevitably spread into the eastern Mediterranean in

modern times . Yet nationalism followed different paths of development in

south - eastern Europe and the Middle East , where the superposition of na¬

tionalism over traditional patterns of identity created a special multi - layer

structure of identity , based on the loyalty to local , state and broader cul¬

tural communities . Arab nationalism , based on culture , printed language

and a sense of common destiny , has a raison d 'etre according to most con¬

temporary theories of nationalism . 13 Yet it has hardly ever been given a

chance , unlike another form of nationalism : the civic loyalty to a given

state , e . g . , Iraq , Kuwait , Libya or Egypt . Furthermore , identification with

local or confessional communities : Maronite , Shia , Alawi , etc . , often over¬

shadowed state patriotism , thus rendering the very concept of a nation

obsolete . It is obvious that the development of nation - states has reached

different stages in the different countries in the Middle East . Because of

historical , cultural , geographical , institutional and psychological reasons ,

Egypt , for example , is closer to the image of a nation - state than Kuwait or

Iraq .

12 According to Bosnian sources 278 , 800 people were killed in the war from 1992 to
1995 , which represents 6 . 3 % of the entire pre - war population . Over 50 % of these vic¬
tims were Muslims . In September 1996 , 1 , 370 , 000 people ( 58 .2 % of the pre - war popu¬
lation ) were displaced . 1 , 250 , 000 of them were abroad . See " OMR! Special Report :
Pursuing Balkan Peace " , vol . 1 , no . 39 , online , www . omri . cz/Publications / SR/SR . html ,
October 1 , 1996 .
13 See for example Benedict Anderson , Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Ori¬
gins and Spread of Nationalism , London : Verso , 1989 , 44 .
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 255

Arab nationalism can be identified with at least three different phe¬

nomena : the renewed self - esteem of all who speak Arabic and subscribe to

Arab culture ; the political movements which led to the establishment of the

independent Arab states ; and the opposition to foreign intervention and

oppression . Many problems are still related to the difficulties in defining

Arab nationalism . Is it just a cultural movement ? Does it pursue the ulti¬

mate goal of any nationalism , the creation of a unified national state ? Does

Islam belong to Arabism , if there are millions of Arab Christians ? 14 The

movement for unity ( wahdah ) has always been an auxiliary perspective in

the major tendency of asserting sovereignty within territorial states , with

borders defined during the colonial period . Such attempts as the 1958 un¬

ion of Egypt and Syria or the pan - Arab ideology of the Baath Party proved

futile . In this sense , pan - Arabism is not nationalism per se but a reversal to

the imperial idea of an overarching political authority . Arabism is thus a

general reference of identity , a reservoir of a broader loyalty , which gives

force to any group within it . As far as Lebanon is concerned , Arabism had

priority over Muslim solidarity in the foreign policy of the Arab countries

with reference to the Lebanese crisis in 1975 - 1990 . Moreover , even if cer¬

tain forms of communal specific nationalism ( as for example among the

Maronites ) developed inside Lebanon , they never destroyed the Lebanese

nation - state project .

Civil wars and the necessity to redefine collective identity

in the Balkans and in Lebanon

It was individual security concerns that made traditional confessional iden¬

tities fill the ideological vacuum in the former Yugoslavia after 1989 . In

the war of 1992 - 1995 , the Bosnian Muslim leadership oscillated between

the idea of preserving a multi - ethnic Bosnian state ( uniting all Muslims ,

but mixed with other communities ), the defense of dispersed Muslim

pockets , and the creation of a separate Bosnian Muslim state with smaller

territory but clearly defined borders . The wartime reality induced the

choice of defending the scattered Muslim enclaves and then the creation of

a Bosnian Muslim state and nation . Similarly , the Bosnian Croats and

Serbs established separate polities , which became virtual appendices to the

Croatian and Serbian nation - states .

14 Arab Christians were actually the first to transfer the European notion of European
nationalism to the Arab world . The final success of Arab nationalism against the Ot¬
toman power was secured by the shift of the Muslim Arab majority to a preference for
the Arab watan ( motherland ) over the universal Muslim ummah .
256 MARIO APOSTOLOV

The tragedy of Lebanon went through the same convulsions of oppos¬

ing security concerns . In 1975 - 1990 , the Maronite elite split on how to
protect its people , core territory , and enclaves in " hostile territory " ( such as
the Shouf ) : through secession from the Lebanese state ; continued union
with the Muslims ; or some form of federation with them . The Shia also
oscillated between loyalty to the Lebanese State , the ambition to be the
leading community speaking for all Lebanese Muslims , and the will to
protect Islam in its Shia version against a host of enemies . One can hope
that the people in Lebanon have reached the understanding that their indi¬
vidual security can be better guaranteed through a new plural and democ¬
ratic arrangement , rather than strengthening the communal identities in
opposition to each other . Such an understanding has not yet been reached
in the former Yugoslavia .
In this situation , Western security structures have become a key ele¬
ment in checking the wave of communal conflicts in south - eastern Europe .
Despite the attachment to the concept of nation - states , the international
diplomacy managed to impose a peace project , whose declared goal was
the construction of a plural Bosnian polity . The key to understanding why
the politicians of the three communities accepted this solution is that , de¬
spite the fighting and hatred , all of them have always looked towards the
West to formulate and check their positions in an unfinished story of na¬
tion - and state - building . Yet the international community also faced the
difficulty of defining and recognizing nations , states and confessional
groups . 15 In October 1991 , Yugoslavia questioned the Badinter commis¬
sion of the European Community , " who can be the subject of the right to
self - determination " : nations , federal units , collectivities or territories ? 16
The commission built its answer upon the principle that any secession
should follow the administrative borders of the constitutive republics of
Yugoslavia , rather than the ethnic boundaries . This decision jeopardized
the political status of 2 million Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia , of 750 , 000
Croats in Bosnia - Herzegovina , and of almost 2 million Albanians in Ser¬
bia . 17

15 See , for example , Laura Silber and Allen Little , Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation , New
York : TV Books , Penguin , 1996 , and Robert Fisk , Pity the Nation : Lebanon at War,
London : Deutsch , 1990 . The authors of these books call Yugoslavia and Lebanon na¬
tions , despite the strong internal divisions .
16 John Zametica , " The Yugoslav Conflict ", London : International Institute for Strategic
Studies , Adelphi Papers 270 , 1992 , 63 .
17 Hakan Wiberg , " Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia " , in : Ole Waever ,
Barry Buzan , Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre , Identity, Security and the New Security
Agenda in Europe , London : Pinter , 1993 , 104 .
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 257

The existence of religious minorities confused the process of nation -

state building . In general , distinct confessional identities hamper the estab¬

lishment of homogeneous nation - states , while they do not offer an alterna¬

tive in terms of state division ( with the exception of Bosnia , where confes¬

sional difference gave rise to nation - state building ) . This indicated once

more that even if the nation - state is the dominant paradigm in the world

now , it is far from being the only and inevitable alternative of political

organization not only in Europe but also in the Middle East . Yet the two

plural societies , in which a federal principle was attempted , Lebanon and

Bosnia , experienced two of the most perplexing internal conflicts in the

world of the last fifty years . The idea of the nation - state played a different

role in the two cases : unifying in Lebanon and divisive in Bosnia .

The problem of accommodation in divided plural societies

Historically , nationalism in both the Balkans and the Middle East stems

out of two major sources : the increased self - confidence of the formerly

subordinated peoples in the multi - ethnic empires and the intellectual influ¬

ence of nationalism in the West . Since the wars of 1911 - 18 , nationalism

was institutionalized and the nation - state became the norm of political

organization . As a consequence , the two regions were profoundly affected

by the basic contradiction of the Versailles international system : the con¬

tradiction between the proclaimed right to self - determination and the real

situation in which practically all states were multi - ethnic and multi -
confessional .

Two states created in the 1920s under French guidance , Yugoslavia

and ( Greater ) Lebanon , practically followed the French experience of na¬

tion - building : a willful policy of molding a nation from different elements

( speaking similar languages and dialects ) in a " melting pot " framed by a

well defined state institution . In both countries , the project of nation - state

building went through serious crises related to the plurality of confessional

identities .

Both countries later adopted certain consociational arrangements , fol¬

lowing the terminology of Arend Lijphart , to solve the problems of a

divided plural society : " political confessionalism " in Lebanon and the

socialist federation principle in Yugoslavia . Lijphart recommends conso¬

ciational democracy as the best peaceful solution for divided societies .

Plural societies comprised of more than two segments among which there

exists , to a certain degree , a balance of size and power are , according to

Lijphart , most suitable for establishing a stable and democratic consocia¬

tional regime with its four characteristic elements : grand coalition of the
 MARIO APOSTOLOV
258

elites of the major segments ; effective mutual veto ; proportionality of rep¬

resentation in civil service nominations and fund allocation ; and a high
degree of autonomy for each segment in matters of its internal concern . 18
The suitability of consociational arrangements for plural societies is due to
the principle of a grand coalition of all segments , in contrast to the typical
democratic majority rule , which may be perilous for plural societies , di¬
vided along ethnic or religious cleavages . Lijphart views consociationalism
as a means of accommodating conflicting demands within divided plural
societies .
Lijphart ' s theory , however , came under severe criticism because of the
serious crises in certain plural societies analyzed by Lijphart , notably in
Lebanon . Consociationalism arguably encourages the distinctiveness of
minorities and the articulation of their separate interests , which increases
the risk of communal dispute . This criticism found an unfortunate justifica¬
tion in the outbreak of the conflicts in Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia .
Stephen Ryan notes another gap in Lijphart ' s theory , namely that it ignores
the international settings in which the attitudes of elites and grass root
members of the minorities are formed . 19
Nevertheless , several difficult cases should not serve as the basis for
refuting the whole theory . The plural societies of Lebanon and Bosnia
represent a good case for the establishment of consociational arrange¬
ments , because they are comprised of a number of segments close to equal¬
ity in size and power . Both attempts at devising consociationalism proved
unsuccessful because of the absence of a minimal democratic basis and
because of external intervention , inimical to the information of consocia¬
tional democracy in these countries .
The former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina also repre¬
sented a kind of plural arrangement : it was conceived from the very begin¬
ning as a plural polity accommodating the Orthodox , Catholic and Muslim
communities . Both political systems experienced serious problems at the
end of the twentieth century . The reason was not any inherent incompati¬
bility of the various religious communities or the inapplicability of the idea
of consociational democracy to the non - Western world , but the lack of a
sufficient democratic basis for the plural regimes . Only members of the
communist elite participated in the ruling multi - ethnic coalition in the for¬
mer Yugoslavia , while the fate of the Lebanese plural political system with

18 See Arend Lijphart , Democracy in Plural Societies : A Comparative Exploration , New

Haven , London : Yale University Press , 1980 , 25 - 45 .
19 Stephen Ryan , Ethnic Conflict and International Relations , Aldershot : Dartmouth
Publications , 1990 , 21 .
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 259

its principle of fixed representation was determined for many years by the
power of the traditional communal elites .
Consequently , and this is the major policy conclusion from this essay ,
new political forms of accommodating various confessional and political
identities , probably on a regional level , should be sought , taking into ac¬
count the necessity for economic , social and political development ( de¬
mocratization ) of the region .
 ALGÉRIE : L '

DIX ANS DE GUERRE FRATRICIDE :

QUELLE RÉCONCILIATION POSSIBLE ? *
H abiba D jahnine

L ' exemple de l ' Algérie est propice à la compréhension des clivages politi¬

ques et sociaux qui peuvent naître dans une société dont l ' imaginaire est

fondamentalement pluriel . Ces clivages ont malheureusement conduit à

une guerre longue et à multiples facettes , car les tortionnaires se recrutent

dans tous les bords et les victimes aussi . A qui profite cette guerre ?

Tenter de comprendre au - delà des chiffres la complexité de la problé¬

matique de la violence en Algérie en lien avec les enjeux multiples qui

nourrissent les luttes tant du côté du pouvoir que du côté des islamistes ;

c ' est exprimer loin des visions bicéphales les termes d ' un conflit qui op¬

pose une société à elle - même . Une société traversée par des clivages qui

sèment le doute , la discorde et la haine .

Qu ' est ce qui a rendu inévitable l ' explosion de la guerre ? Est - ce

l ' acharnement des islamistes à vouloir imposer une république islamique

ou alors est - ce l ' entêtement de l ' armée à se maintenir à tout prix à la tête

du pouvoir ? C ' est peut - être les deux ...

Revisiter l ' histoire de ce pays , l ' histoire du nationalisme algérien et de

la guerre de libération ( Guerre d ' indépendance qui a duré de 1954 à 1962 ,

date de l ' indépendance de l ' Algérie ) , semble être un exercice nécessaire à

la compréhension de la place du religieux dans la définition de la person¬

nalité de l ' Algérie , mais aussi de son utilisation à chaque étape critique de

la formation de cette nation , comme le dit l ' historien algérien , Mohamed

Harbi ( Muhammad Harbî ) , " L ' islam est inscrit dans les profondeurs de la

réalité algérienne " 1.

L ' utilisation de la religion en Algérie comme argument de l ' unité na¬

tionale n ' est pas du tout le monopole des islamistes . La religion musul¬

mane n ' a eu de cesse d ' apparaître tout au long des règnes des pouvoirs qui

Essai mis au point en septembre 1999 .

1 Mohamed Harbi , " L ' Algérie prise au piège de son histoire ", Le Monde Diplomatique ,
mai 1994 , 3 .
 HABIBA DJAHNINE
262

se sont succédés comme un retour vers l ' authenticité , comme l ' identité
suprême qui peut unir tous les Algériens quelque soit leur appartenance
sociale ou ethnique . Mais est ce suffisant ? La négation des autres com¬
posants culturels , politiques et idéologiques de ce pays , ne tardera pas à
créer la discorde .
Depuis sa création , le F . I . S . ( Front islamique du salut , al -jabhah al - is -
lâmiyyah li - l - inqâdh ) s ' est déclaré ouvertement pour la mise en place de
l' État islamique ( dawlah islâmiyyah ) . Au lendemain de la révolte des jeu¬
nes du 5 octobre 1988 , les militants du mouvement islamiste sont sortis des
mosquées - qu ' ils occupaient déjà depuis déjà plus d ' une décennie - pour
scander des slogans radicaux contre le pouvoir en place . Ils ont su redon¬
ner espoir aux jeunes en mal d ' identité et de reconnaissance . Ils ont su
aussi cristalliser le sentiment national , si cher aux Algériens , à travers
l ' islam .

Ce mouvement qui était jusque là contenu dans les universités , a saisi

l ' occasion d ' occuper la rue grâce au ras le bol des jeunes qui voulaient du

pain , du travail et de la dignité . Le 10 octobre 1988 une manifestation s ' or¬

ganise , à sa tête le futur leader du F . I . S . , Ali Benhadj 2 . La foule scandait
" État islamique " , l ' armée est sortie des casernes , elle a tiré sur la foule . Il y

a eu prés de 200 morts .

L ' État et l ' armée étaient discrédités . Pour les islamistes l ' heure était

venue de parler ouvertement de la construction d ' un parti islamique pour

récupérer et orienter cette radicalisation qui s ' exprimait chez les jeunes en
mal d ' alternative .
Il y a eu par ailleurs beaucoup d ' arrestations , des jeunes et des mili¬
tants de tous les bords sont sauvagement torturés dans les caves des caser¬
nes et des postes de police . Après plusieurs semaines d ' état de siège , le
pouvoir en place organise un référendum pour redonner la parole au peu¬
ple , il en résulte le multipartisme , la liberté de création d ' associations , et la
libéralisation de la presse .
Le panorama politique et social de l ' Algérie est en pleine transforma¬
tion . Des partis naissent , d ' autres sortent de la clandestinité . Les associa¬
tions féministes se constituent dans plusieurs villes d ' Algérie , des associa¬
tions à caractère culturel et social occupent le terrain .
Cet élan démocratique montre a quel point la société civile était prête
à exprimer ses différentes tendances . Les intellectuels et des artistes de
tous les bords sont invités à s ' exprimer sur des plateaux et les ondes des
médias , on critique ouvertement le pouvoir , on dénonce la torture et

2 Ali Benhadj {'Alï b . Hàjj ) : enseignant de formation , numéro deux du F .I . S . depuis sa

création .
 L ' ALGÉRIE : DIX ANS DE GUERRE FRATRICIDE 263

l ' injustice. Les courants démocrates et laïques côtoient et affrontent les

mouvances islamistes , le débat est rendu publique , deux questions restaient
quand même posées : Combien de temps allait durer cette façade démocra¬
tique ? Et devant un tel foisonnement d ' idées , quelle Algérie construire ?
Pour le F .I . S . , l ' instauration de l ' État islamique allait apporter des mo¬
difications en profondeur des mœurs d ' un pays qui a " dévié " du droit
chemin , qui s ' est trop " occidentalisé " . Dès sa création , des commandos
s ' attelaient à faire régner l ' ordre . Il fallait revenir aux origines , à la sacro -

sainte authenticité . Ils avaient la prétention de vouloir représenter tous les

Algériens . Des meetings sont organisés pour appeler la communauté des
croyants à suivre les préceptes de l ' islam et de se battre contre la société et
le pouvoir impies ( ,tâghût ) qui résistent à la construction de l ' État islami¬
que . Les compagnes tournaient autour du port du voile islamique pour les
femmes , de l ' interdiction de la consommation de l ' alcool , de la suppres¬
sion de la mixité dans les écoles , les lieux publics et les transports en
commun , de l ' interdiction des fêtes , galas , pièces de théâtre , cinéma . . . , du
retour des femmes travailleuses au foyer , de l ' interdiction de la contracep¬
tion etc . En bref , l ' instauration des lois islamiques dans toutes les catégo¬
ries de la société , et s ' il le faut par la violence . . .
On situe historiquement le début de la violence de la " deuxième guerre
d ' Algérie " à l ' interruption des élections législatives par le pouvoir en place

en décembre 1991 . Le F . I . S . avait remporté la majorité des voix lors du

premier tour de ces élections après avoir obtenu la majorité des sièges lors
des élections communales en 1990 . Trois millions d ' électeurs votent F . I . S .
Le président en place , Chadli Bendjedid 3 , démissionne , il est remplacé par
le Haut Comité d ' État ( majlis al - a ' là li - l- dawlah ) qui prend les commandes
et décide de dissoudre le F . I . S . , il organise une répression sanglante à
l ' encontre des dirigeants et des militants islamistes . Interpellations , empri¬

sonnements , tortures , liquidations sommaires , ouverture de camps d ' inter¬

nement dans le Sud algérien . Telles furent les sanctions réservées aux
membres de ce mouvement pour soit disant " sauver la démocratie " . La
frange radicale du F . I . S . entame sa riposte , ils la promettent sanglante . Ils
rejoignent les maquis et appellent au jihâd ( combat au nom de dieu ) et à la
lutte armée pour instaurer l ' État islamique que le pouvoir et l ' armée leur
ont confisqué .
Le choix de la lutte armée pour le F . I . S . , n ' était pas évident . Cette dé¬
cision a fait l ' objet de négociation dans les rangs des islamistes qui étaient

3 Chadli Bendjedid ( Shâdhili b . Jadïd ) : ancien président de la république algérienne .

Militaire de carrière , il a succédé a Houari Boumedienne (Hawwârï Bùmadyan ) , prési¬
dent de la république de 1965 à 1979 , après son décès en 1979 .
264 HABIBA DJAHNINE

à la recherche de la meilleure stratégie pour prendre le pouvoir . S ' il est

vrai que le discours de la contrainte a d ' emblée fait partie de la propagande
du F . I . S . , la possibilité du passage à la violence n ' était pas envisageable
selon l ' entendement des populations qui avaient soutenu ce mouvement
dés sa création . Les dirigeants du F . I . S . étaient persuadés que l ' État isla¬
mique allait être instauré par les urnes . Ce n ' était pas l ' avis de tous les
islamistes .
Déjà dans les années quatre - vingt le mouvement islamiste radical , diri¬
gé par Moustapha Bouyali 4 , s ' était manifesté à travers plusieurs attentats .
Dès sa création cette tendance s ' est exprimée au sein du Front Islamique
du Salut . Abassi Madani 5 , partisan de l ' État islamique par les urnes , ne
s ' est pas prononcé en faveur de l ' aile radicale armée de son mouvement . A

la suite du congrès de Batna (Bâtinah , ville de l ' Est algérien ) en juillet

1991 , les adeptes de la lutte armée quittent le F . I . S . et refusent d ' aller aux
législatives .
En juin 1991 , le F . I . S . appelle tous ses militants à occuper les rues des
grandes villes du pays pour demander des présidentielles anticipées . Cette
manifestation , sous forme de " désobéissance civile " était un moyen de
pression pour fragiliser l ' État et déployer les forces de ce mouvement .
Cette démonstration de force par l ' occupation des rues matin et soir , outre
le fait qu ' elle paralyse les artères des grandes villes du pays , commençait à
inquiéter la population ainsi que le pouvoir en place . Abassi Madani et Ali
Benhadj ( les deux figures charismatiques du mouvement intégriste ) sont
arrêtés . L ' armée tire sur la foule , on assiste à une guérilla urbaine , car les
manifestants ont violemment protesté contre les attaques de l ' armée .
Tout convergeait vers l ' explosion de la violence . Dès 1992 la riposte
s ' organise , la dissolution du F . I . S . et la forte répression qui s ' en est suivi ,

ne fait qu ' encourager les militants islamistes de tous les bords de rejoindre
le jihàd . Les groupes armés se sont constitués , ils sont rejoints par les dis¬
sidents du congrès de Batna et par les " Afghans " qui sont des militants du
mouvement des Frères musulmans ( al - ikhwân al - muslimïn ) , qui ont été
formés dans les camps d ' entraînement militaires en Afghanistan .
Islamistes de tous bords certes , car ceux qui ont refusé l ' hégémonie du
F . I . S . ont toujours fait bande à part par leur radicalisme . On les identifiera

par la suite comme étant les G . I . A . ( Groupes islamiques armés , al -jamà cât

4 Moustapha Bouyali (Mustafà Bùya 'lï) : ancien militant du F .L .N ., tué en 1987 .

5 Abbasi Madani ÇAbbâsîMadânl ) : enseignant de psychologie à l ' université de Bouze -
réa à Alger . Il est le numéro un du F .I . S . Jusqu ' à son emprisonnement en 1991 suite à
la manifestation pour des présidentielles anticipées . Il est aujourd ' hui en résidence sur¬
veillée .
 L ' ALGÉRIE : DIX ANS DE GUERRE FRATRICIDE
265

al - islàmiyyah al - musallahah ) . Les autres , ceux qui sont restés fidèles au

F . I . S . , vont se constituer pour former le Mouvement islamique armé ( al -

harakah al - islâmiyyah al - musallahah ), qui prendra le nom d ' Armée is¬

lamique du salut ( al -jaysh al - islâmï li - l - inqàdh ) à partir de juin 1994 et qui

s ' étendra sur plusieurs régions . Depuis , un climat de peur et de terreur

règne sur une Algérie en sang . Il s ' en est suivi dix ans de guerre sanglante ,

on compte plus de 150 . 000 morts , des centaines d ' orphelins , de veuves et

de veufs . Dix ans de guerre aveugle qui n ' a épargné personne par sa sau¬

vagerie et sa barbarie . Le peuple algérien est pris en étau , il oscille entre

deux pôles de violence qui s ' affrontent avec chaque jour son lot
d ' assassinats , d ' attentats , d ' arrestations , de tortures et de viols et comme

toile de fond une crise économique des plus inquiétantes , inflation , chô¬

mage , misère ...

La guerre a crée un clivage important dans la société , plusieurs idéolo¬

gies s ' affrontent et se confrontent , pour tenter de donner des explications à

cette logique de la violence qui ne veut ni cesser , ni trouver la voie du

compromis et du dialogue qui puisse mettre ce pays sur le chemin de la

paix .

Mohamed Harbi écrira : " Tragique , l ' actuelle situation de violence en

Algérie prend racine dans les multiples erreurs du Parti - Etat FLN au pou¬

voir durant plus de trente ans . L ' extrémisme religieux n ' est point la con¬

séquence d ' une sorte de crise mystique qui se serait emparé d ' une partie de

la population , mais le résultat de politiques myopes , ayant sacrifié les en¬

jeux culturels et symboliques au nom d ' un dirigisme économique noyé

dans la corruption et les intérêts des clans " .6

L ' État algérien a avancé depuis le début du conflit la carte de l ' amné¬

sie . Faisant croire à l ' opinion nationale et internationale , qu ' il viendrait à

bout de ce " terrorisme résiduel " et de ces groupuscules armés très rapide¬

ment . Et ce en déployant ses forces et en développant une stratégie

d ' irradiation définitive de ce phénomène . En bref , il envisageait d ' en finir

avec les islamistes en les exterminant . Au début des attentats , le discours

officiel ne faisait à aucun moment état de façon transparente de l ' impor¬

tance de ces groupes armés qui exécutaient des policiers , des gendarmes ,

des personnalités du monde de l ' art , des journalistes . . . Il pensait pouvoir

maîtriser son action en banalisant le phénomène , et en refusant de considé¬

rer les islamistes comme une force politique qu ' il convient de combattre

comme telle . Lorsque les négociations se font , c ' est dans le secret le plus

total . Ne sont médiatisés que les exploits de l ' armée . Laissant ainsi le peu -

6 Mohamed Harbi , " L ' Algérie prise au piège de son histoire " [ note 1] ,
266 HABIBA DJAHNINE

pie dans le désarroi , réagissant dans l ' impuissance totale à des phénomènes
qu ' il ne maîtrisait pas .
Le pouvoir en Algérie , tout le monde le sait à présent , est entre les
mains de l ' armée . Au lendemain des élections législatives l ' armée s ' est
sentie menacée . Le pouvoir allait leur être confisqué par le F . I . S . élu par 3
millions d ' algériens . Cette défaite est évidement due à son incapacité
d ' apporter des réponses à un peuple en attente de réels changements éco¬

nomiques et sociaux ; en attente aussi d ' un regain de sa dignité . La rupture

avec le pouvoir parait être largement consommée , même si une partie des
électeurs sont restés liés au modèle de l ' État fort et ont continué à le sou¬
tenir . Leur argument était : il faut choisir entre la peste et le choléra . Ils ont
choisi de soutenir l ' armée qui tente de profiter du chaos général pour se
racheter une virginité en " sauvant la démocratie des mains des barbares
islamistes qui veulent instaurer un État totalitaire et bannir la pluralité et la
liberté d ' expression " . Entre temps rien ne pouvait arrêter leur frénésie des
réformes économiques pour instaurer une économie de marché . La classe
politique s ' est ainsi retrouvée divisée en deux camps . Plusieurs partis , dont
le F . L . N . ( Front de libération national , jabhat al - tahrïr al - watanî ) et le
F . F . S . ( Front des forces socialistes , jabhat al - quwâ al - ishtirâkiyyah ) , ont

dénoncé ce qu ' ils ont appelé le coup d ' état militaire et demandent la pour¬
suite du processus électoral . Ils ont constitué ce qui sera plus tard le cou¬
rant des réconciliateurs , partisans d ' une solution négociée avec toutes les
forces politiques , entre autre , les islamistes et pour l ' alternance du pouvoir .
Par contre le R . C . D . ( Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie , al -
ijtimâ ' min ajl al - thaqâfah wa - 'l- dïmùqratiyyah ) et le Tahadi ( al - tahâdï , " le
défi " , les dissidents du Parti d ' avant - garde socialiste , hizb al - talï 'ah al - ish¬
tirâkiyyah , issu de l ' ancien Parti communiste algérien ) se sont rangés du
côté du pouvoir , appellent à l ' irradiation des islamistes et ont constitué ce
qui deviendra par la suite les partisans de la thèse d ' éradication . Ce clivage
ne tardera pas à diviser le camp des laïco - démocrates déjà faible et minori¬
taire . Les associations qui soutiennent le pouvoir sont médiatisées et pro¬
mues . Les autres sont réprimées , marginalisées et boycottées par la presse .
De leur côté les islamistes gonflent leurs rangs , développent leurs ma¬
quis et leurs réseaux de soutien , et surtout tuent , mutilent , posent des bom¬
bes . Tout cela au nom de la religion . La toile de fond reste tout de même
un terreau favorable à plusieurs types d ' explosions sociales . Le peuple
algérien est dans une quête de modèle social . Son identité plurielle , son
histoire confisquée , la misère créée par le libéralisme sauvage , le chômage ,
sont autant de facteurs qui poussent vers une radicalisation dans la défini¬
tion de l ' identité ; on entendra : " nous sommes tous musulmans et pas des
Européens " , mais aussi : " nous sommes Berbères et Kabyles et pas des
 L ' ALGÉRIE : DIX ANS DE GUERRE FRATRICIDE 267

Arabes " . Cette définition de soi par la négation , montre la cohabitation

d ' une multitude de comportements sociaux qui peuvent paraître contradic¬

toires mais qui ne sont que le fruit d ' une histoire faite de colonisations de
guerres et de conflits . La pluralité de la société algérienne devra devenir un
lieu d ' accomplissement de soi au lieu d ' être une raison de la discorde .

Du terrorisme et des formes de violence

Dès 1992 la presse nationale et internationale regorge de nouvelles sordi¬
des sur les crimes commis par des commandos islamistes . Peu de journaux
font état des crimes politiques , du nombre de disparus et des abus commis
par l ' armée . Il serait intéressant d ' examiner l ' évolution de la violence en
lien avec l ' importance de l ' implantation des groupes islamistes et des
coups médiatiques qu ' ils veulent provoquer .
Lors de la journée scientifique du 15 juin 1996 à Alger , organisée par
la fondation Mahfoud Boucebci 7 sur le thème " Violence : quelle réparation
possible ? " , Dr Farida Lahrech Nouar (Farïdah Lahrish Nuwwâr) a présen¬
té une étude sur deux volets : Le premier volet concerne un échantillon de
500 personnes violentes auteurs d ' attentats . Le but était de connaître leurs
situations professionnelle et sociale et leur passé criminel . Il apparaît que
seulement 13 personnes sur 500 avaient un antécédent judiciaire , les autres
étaient plutôt des pères de famille ou des étudiants et très peu de chômeurs .
C ' est dire que les militants islamistes ne se recrutent pas seulement dans

les rangs des déshérites comme on a voulu nous le faire croire au début du
conflit . Le deuxième volet de l ' étude concernait les victimes des agres¬
sions . Le médecin légiste s ' est attelé à connaître les types de lésions trou¬
vées sur les cadavres et le type d ' armes utilisées par les agresseurs . Ces
résultats s ' étendent de 1991 à 1995 . " Les cadavres mutilés sont utilisés
comme moyen de communication entre agresseur et leurs interlocuteurs ,
les blessures infligées sont autant de messages " , écrira - t - elle . 8
En 1991 il y avait un cadavre par semaine . Les victimes appartenaient
à des partis politiques , des corps de l ' année , de la gendarmerie ou bien des
fonctionnaires des corps de l ' État . Le but du mouvement intégriste était de
gagner l ' opinion du peuple algérien qui avait déjà exprimé son méconten¬
tement vis - à - vis de l ' Etat .

7 Mahfoud Boucebci ( Mahfûd Bûsabsï ) : éminent psychiatre , assassiné le 15 juin 1993 .

8 Farida Lahrech Nouar , " Agresseurs et agressés , la violence des chiffres : point de vue
d ' un médecin légiste " , dans : Violence , quelle réparation possible ? Actes de la journée
scientifique du 15 juin 1996 , Alger : Fondation Mahfoud Boucebci , 1996 , 46 .
 HABIBA DJAHNINE
268

En 1992 les victimes civiles étaient plus nombreuses , deux cadavres

par jour . Les blessures sont dues aux armes à feu et explosifs . Les tueries
aveugles sont utilisées pour interpeller l ' opinion publique et impliquer la
population dans la logique de la terreur .
En 1993 sept cadavres par jour , apparition des mutilations de cadavres
et d ' égorgements . Toute la population est touchée , en plus des attentats
ciblés contre des journalistes , artistes ou personnalités politiques .
En 1994 plus de 10 cadavres par jour , l ' agresseur s ' acharne sur la vic¬
time , les cadavres sont retrouvés sans tête , dépecés , mutilés . . . Les victimes
sont de tous les rangs sociaux , commerçants , riches propriétaires , agri¬
culteurs . . . Nul n ' est épargné .
En 1995 cinq cadavres par jour , le retour en force d ' attentats ciblés ,
plusieurs femmes et intellectuels sont assassinés par balle . Les agresseurs
veulent être médiatisés de nouveau .
En 1996 les massacres dans les villages font de nombreuses victimes ,
enfants , femmes enceintes , bébés . . . L ' opinion internationale est indignée ,
en Algérie on parle de guerre interne dans les rangs des islamistes . La po¬
pulation qui avait jusque là soutenu les groupes islamistes , dans certaines
régions du pays , les lâchent et les dénoncent . Les représailles ont été terri¬
fiantes . De 1996 à nos jours ces massacres de civils continuent , l ' armée
promet la fin de la guerre . Malheureusement on n ' y voit pas l ' issue . . .
Cette comptabilité macabre nécessaire à la compréhension du phéno¬
mène de la violence nous donne des indications sur l ' évolution du conflit
qui oppose l ' armée aux islamistes , les islamistes aux islamistes , les patrio¬
tes aux islamistes . En effet la cohabitation avec des informations quoti¬
diennes sur les chiffres des crimes est arrivée presque à banaliser le phé¬
nomène de la violence . Les seuls mots de consolation que les familles
entendront sont : " vous n ' êtes pas les seuls " . Un sort commun , une violence
commune , un trauma collectif . Aucune action de l ' État ne vient apaiser
cette grande douleur . D ' ailleurs aucune enquête n ' est menée pour détermi¬
ner les noms de responsables . Les victimes n ' ont pas de visages et les cri¬
minels n ' ont pas de noms . Il n ' y a que des chiffres .

Une histoire en marche

Une histoire en marche signifie pour l ' Algérie des explosions multiples qui
émanent d ' un peuple à la recherche d ' une voie pour se réapproprier son
pays loin des dictatures et des luttes pour le pouvoir .
Il y a une urgence dans la compréhension de tous les phénomènes qui
s ' entrechoquent , de la guerre qui a créé une culture du doute et de la mé¬

fiance . Ces paramètres conduisent indubitablement vers d ' autres liens . De

 L ' ALGÉRIE : DIX ANS DE GUERRE FRATRICIDE 269

l ' autodéfense à l ' auto - organisation à l ' éclatement des modèles imposés par

le pouvoir , en place depuis 35 ans , ou bien par les islamistes qui ont tenté

depuis leurs entrées dans le jeu politique d ' imposer de nouvelles mœurs .

Comme le dit le Dr Khalil Hamdane ( Khalïl Hamdâri ) en parlant de la

violence : " elle est le produit de l ' affaiblissement des liens sociaux ; les

idéaux politiques s ' affrontent , il y a émergence d ' idéologies ethniques , re¬

ligieuses ou culturelles avec revendications identitaires totalitaires . " 9 Dans

la recherche de solutions , intellectuels , politiciens , et chercheurs n ' ont eu

de cesse de développer plusieurs types d ' analyses qui sont faites dans le

vif des événements . Cette urgence de comprendre la précipitation vers

l ' horreur , vient du désir de trouver les clefs du problème et par conséquent

le chemin qui pourra mener vers la paix .

Une histoire en marche signifie aussi une nation naissante et un peuple

poussé dans son retranchement pour trouver les termes d ' une possible ré¬
conciliation .

Plusieurs visions de la religion musulmane s ' affrontent . Si la religion a

été un argument de discorde , elle a aussi été celui de la conciliation , d ' où

complexité . Certains l ' utilisent pour atteindre le pouvoir , en prétendant

détenir les clefs du paradis en prônant le retour au Livre , " al - kitâb le

Qw 'ân . Les autres parlent de " rahmah " , la paix et la tolérance . Dans le
discours de l ' ex - président algérien Ahmed Ben Bella 10 , lors du congrès

constitutif du M .D . A . ( Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie , al -

harakah min ajl al - dimùqratiyyah Jî al -Jazâ 'ir ) il dira en parlant de la reli¬
gion : " ( . . . ) pour maintenant , pour longtemps encore du moins , le monde

d ' une seule idéologie , d ' une seule philosophie , d ' une seule religion est

forclos . Certes , notre devoir à nous musulmans , notre conviction que

l ' islam est propre à faire le bonheur des hommes ( . . . ) . Mais cela doit résul¬

ter d ' un libre choix , en dehors de toute contrainte . ' Pas de contrainte en

religion ' dit le Coran . ( . . . ) L ' islam est la religion de la tolérance . . . " . 11

Dans cette Algérie en marche , les forces en présence ne seront pas

éternellement les mêmes . Aujourd ' hui le F . I . S . est affaibli . Il n ' est plus ce

qu ' il était ou ce qu ' il croyait être . Plusieurs documents anonymes ou si¬

gnés circulent en Algérie grâce au réseau Internet . Ils font état de la guerre

9 Khalil Hamdane , " La violence : des problématiques " , dans : Violence, quelle réparation
possible ? [ note 8 ] , 77 .
10 Ahmed Ben Bella (Ahmad b . Ballâ ) : premier président au lendemain de l ' indépen¬
dance en Algérie . Destitué de ses fonctions en 1965 par Boumediene suite à un coup
d ' état . Depuis il s ' est exilé et a crée le Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie . Il
habite aujourd ' hui en Suisse .
11 La citation est extraite d ' un discours que Mohamed Harbi a repris dans L 'islamisme
dans tous ses états , ed . M . Harbi , Paris : Arcantère , 1991 , 145 .
270 HABIBA DJAHNINE

des clans au sein de l ' armée . Après dix ans de guerre d ' autres liens se sont
crées dans la société algérienne . L ' individu qui était complètement fondu
dans la collectivité , commence à émerger . Les différentes composantes de
la société algérienne sont désormais incontournables . Républicains , isla¬
mistes , féministes , berbéristes , socialistes sont obligés de trouver ou
d ' imaginer le type de lien qui peut être créé dans cette société pour en finir

avec la guerre . Les forces d ' hier ne sont plus celles d ' aujourd ' hui , des
groupes de pression se sont constitués . Mais il reste dans cette société des
criminels qui n ' ont pas été jugés , des victimes qui ne sont pas indemnisées ,
ni même reconnues .
La tolérance est un concept qui est utilisé pour proposer à des groupes
qui ' normalement ' ne devraient pas exister , d ' être acceptés au sein d ' une
société ou règne une hégémonie de la pensée . Tolérer l ' autre comme un
être différent mais pas égal . D ' où conflit .
La réconciliation ne doit pas être l ' endroit de l ' amnésie , mais celui de
la reconnaissance . Demain enfants de victimes et de criminels iront dans
les mêmes écoles , s ' assoiront sur les mêmes bancs de classe . Comment se
regarderont - ils ? Comment pourront - ils confronter leurs douleurs et leurs
haines ?
Depuis deux ans d ' autres types de combat se mettent en place . Le peu¬
ple algérien revendique la justice , le travail , l ' arrêt de l ' inflation . Les fa¬
milles des disparus en Algérie revendiquent que des enquêtes soient me¬
nées pour que leurs enfants et maris soient retrouvés .
L ' amnésie a été le lot de l ' Algérie depuis l ' indépendance . Rompre le

silence c ' est parler ouvertement des crimes commis par les islamistes et
par l ' armée . C ' est parler ouvertement des exécutions sommaires et de la
torture . Que de vraies enquêtes soient menées pour connaître les noms des
islamistes responsables des crimes et qu ' ils soient jugés et punis .
Pour que la réconciliation des enfants de ce pays soit possible il faut
dépasser la culture du flou qui règne et qui n ' a produit qu ' une culture de la
rumeur à défaut d ' avoir des institutions et des médias qui répercutent réel¬
lement les faits et qui nomment les responsables .
La réconciliation passera par la reconnaissance des victimes , et par le
jugement des tortionnaires et des criminels quel que soit leur bord .
 POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE CULTURE
OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY :
CONFRONTATION OR ACCOMMODATION ?

Haldun Gulalp

Introduction

The Merve Kavak9i incident made the headlines soon after the April 18 ,

1999 , general elections in Turkey . Kavaksi , a young female deputy elected

on the Virtue Party ticket , came to the parliament for the swearing - in

ceremony wearing an Islamic style headscarf . The Virtue Party ( Fazilet

Partisi ) , as the successor of the pro - Islamist Welfare Party ( Refah Partisi )

which had been recently closed down for violation of the secularism prin¬

ciple of the Turkish constitution , thus once again entered a collision course

with Turkey ' s " secular " establishment .

Virtue Party leaders , however , claimed that this was the personal deci¬

sion of Ms . Kavakgi and did not signify a challenge to the secular founda¬

tions of the Turkish Republic . It was , they argued , rather a question of civil

rights : the freedom of a Muslim woman to cover her head in public .1

After the closure of the Welfare Party , the struggle for democracy ,

human rights , and civil liberties became the new platform in which politi¬

cal Islam redefined itself in Turkey . There is perhaps no question that the

way in which the secular establishment dealt with the challenge of the

Welfare Party was far from democratic , ironically giving political Islam

the opportunity to reposition itself as a pro - democratic party . Yet , one

could not , based on this , readily agree with the observation of some schol¬

ars who have suggested that the challenge posed by political Islam would

contribute to the expansion of democracy in Turkey , because the Islamic

reassertion represents the rise of " civil society " against the " state " .2 As in

1 Milliyet , May 3 , 1999 .

2 See , e .g . , Niliifer Gole , " Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics : The Case of
Turkey " , in : Civil Society in the Middle East , vol . 2 , ed . Augustus Richard Norton ,
Leiden : Brill , 1996 , 17 - 44 ; M . Hakan Yavuz , " Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah )
Party in Turkey " , Comparative Politics 30 ( 1997 ) 1, 63 - 82 .
272 HALDUN GULALP

other countries in the region , agents of political Islam in Turkey have often
used the term " democracy " in their campaign for power ; but this has not
been unproblematic . Both the program of the Welfare Party and the state¬
ments of doctrine by Islamist ideologues in general as well as Welfare
leaders in particular clearly indicated totalitarian tendencies , as will be
illustrated below .
At another level , however , one might say that electoral competition
generally has a moderating effect on non - mainstream political movements ,
including political Islam . Indeed , both the Welfare Party and the Virtue
Party have been conforming and skillful participants of electoral politics in
Turkey . Yet this observation leads to the more critical argument of this
paper - a point which may seem obvious enough when stated , but is often
neglected in the myriad analyses that treat Islamism as a sui generis phe¬
nomenon 3 : doctrinal issues aside , an Islamist political party is , at best , only
as democratic as the mainstream political structure . It belongs to the same
cultural environment and political tradition as the other political parties ,
and has the same means at its disposal ; it also competes with those other
parties on the same race - track , for the same seat of power .

Politics within bounds

A striking feature of the general elections which took place on April 18 ,
1999 , in Turkey was the degree of dullness of the preceding campaign
period . This was widely attributed to the fact that the political field had
been severely restricted by the military , making it difficult for political
parties to present themselves as anything other than " centrist " and causing
a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the electorate .
The creation of this restrictive atmosphere began during the coalition
period ( 1996 - 97 ) between the pro - Islamist Welfare Party of Necmettin
Erbakan and the center - right True Path Party (Dogruyol Partisi ) of Tansu
(filler . Welfare had emerged from the general elections of December 24 ,
1995 , as the dominant party within a parliamentary plurality . This outcome
upset all expectations ; and , amid rumors of an impending military coup ,
six months worth of endless negotiations between political parties and a
short - lived attempt at an anti - Islamist minority coalition between two cen¬
ter - right parties finally gave way to a Welfare Party - led coalition govern -

3 For a notable exception , however , see Ghassan Salame , " Introduction : Where are the
Democrats ? " , in : Democracy without Democrats ? The Renewal of Politics in the Mus¬
lim World, ed . Ghassan Salame , London , New York : I . B . Tauris , 1994 , 1- 23 . See also
Roy Mottahedeh , " The Islamic Movement : The Case for Democratic Inclusion " , Con¬
tention 4 ( 1995 ) 3 , 107 - 25 .
 POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 273

ment . From the first day , the Welfare Party and the Welfare - led govern¬

ment were put under intense pressure and forced to grant concessions to
the " secular " establishment .

The efforts of the establishment in Turkey to contain what it perceived

as the Islamist threat to the republican regime culminated in the issuance of

the celebrated February 28 , 1997 , decisions of the National Security Coun¬

cil advising the pro - Islamist government in power to take measures against

anti - secular ( i . e . , pro - Islamist ) activities around the country . In the after¬

math of this incident the government was forced to resign , the Welfare

Party was closed down for violation of the secularism principle of the con¬

stitution , and its leader Erbakan was banned from politics for five years .
The Turkish electorate ' s manifestation of its frustration with " centrist "

politics can be dated back to the late 1980s and early 1990s . From that

point on , mainstream parties suffered continuous decline throughout the

decade . On the center - right , Turgut Ozal 's Motherland Party ( Anavatan

Partisi ) , which started out with 45 % of the national vote in 1983 when the

first elections after the 1980 coup took place , took a downward turn in

1987 and ended up with a meager 13 . 2 % in 1999 . The True Path Party of

Suleyman Demirel , later taken over by Tansu (filler , reached its peak in

1991 when it seemed poised to displace the Motherland Party on the cen¬

ter - right . Although True Path received 27 % of the national vote in that

year , it was down to 12 % in 1999 . On the center - left , the " social -

democratic " party ( which underwent a number of transformations and

mergers , and hence assumed a number of different names during these

years ) reached its peak in the nation - wide local elections of 1989 with

28 . 7 % of the votes , and suffered a continuous decline thereafter to go all

the way down to 8 .7 % in 1999 . This outcome being below the national

threshold of 10 % , the Republican People ' s Party ( Cumhuriyet Halk Par¬

tisi ) , originally founded by Kemal Atatiirk and recently reconstituted after

its closure by the military regime of 1980 , was unable to win any seats in

the parliament for the first time in its long history .

The rising star of the 1980s and 1990s was , of course , the pro - Islamist

Welfare Party , which increased its votes from 4 .4 % in 1984 to 21 . 4 % in

1995 , registering almost a five - fold growth in eleven years . An important

factor that made Welfare grow so rapidly was its success in distinguishing

itself as an alternative to mainstream politics in Turkey . 4 After Welfare

was closed in early 1998 , its members of parliament switched as a block to

the Virtue Party , which was founded to replace Welfare in anticipation of

4 See Haldun Giilalp , " Political Islam in Turkey : The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party " ,
The Muslim World 89 ( 1999 ) 1, 22 - 41 .
274 HALDUN GULALP

its closure . The Virtue Party , however , was inevitably forced to present
itself as " centrist " this time around .
It was this state of affairs which contributed to the dull atmosphere of
the election period , but which also caused two fringe parties to emerge
unexpectedly , just as the Welfare Party had done previously : the Democ¬
ratic Left Party ( Demokratik Sol Partisi ) and the Nationalist Action Party
(Milliyetgi Halk Partisi ) . The Democratic Left Party , led by Bulent Ecevit ,
the legendary leader of social democracy in the 1970s , had turned into a
marginal clique of Ecevit in the post - 1980 period . It was no longer claim¬
ing the legacy of the Republican People ' s Party , and was being identified
more with its platform of nationalism than its attention to left - wing issues .
The Democratic Left Party hovered around 9 - 10 % until 1995 , when it
leaped to 14 . 6 % in the general elections of that year , and became the larg¬
est party with a remarkable 22 . 2 % in 1999 .
The biggest surprise of the 1999 elections was the Nationalist Action
Party which in a way replicated Welfare ' s success story : from 2 . 9 % in
1987 to 18 % in 1999 , making it the second largest party in the Turkish
parliament . It repeated Welfare ' s performance for more or less the same
reasons : the electorate ' s frustration with mainstream politics and the
party ' s apparent responsiveness to Islamic sensibilities . Preliminary re¬
search on the electorate ' s choices on April 18 , 1999 , indicates that the
Nationalist Action Party was seen as an alternative to the Virtue Party
( Welfare ' s successor ) , which was perceived to have failed to pursue the

cause of the Welfare Party with the same vigor . The Nationalist Action
Party had stolen votes from the pro - Islamist voter base . 5 The Virtue Party
was now down to being the third largest party with only 15 . 4 % of the
votes . Yet , the Kurdish issue notwithstanding , the most important split in
Turkish politics remained the secularist / Islamist divide .

Symbols and politics

In its February 28 , 1997 , meeting , the National Security Council (Milli
Giivenlik Konseyi ) issued a number of legislative and administrativemeas¬
ures designed to curb Islamist activism around the country . Foremost
among these measures was the stricter implementation of the Kemalist
dress code , a code legislated during the national revolutionary regime in
1934 . In an attempt to appease the mainstream circles of power , the Wel -

5 Tanju Tosun and Giilgiin Tosun , " 18 Nisan Segimlerindeki Oy Kaymalarinin Istatistik -
sel Yorumu " , Milliyet , April 30 , 1999 ; Yilmaz Esmer , " 18 Nisan Analizi " , Milliyet ,
May 2 - 6 , 1999 .
 POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 275

fare - led government at the time began a crackdown in the Islamist

neighborhoods of Istanbul , arresting many of its own supporters for viola¬

tion of the Kemalist dress code . Welfare leaders soon began to speak the

same language as the secular establishment : they were claiming to be at the

forefront of the struggle against " irtica " ( religious reaction ) . It was to no

avail , however , because the pressure from the army and the secular media

continued unabated , until the downfall of the Welfare - led government .

A highly charged point of contention between the Islamist political

movement and the secular establishment was the still unresolved issue of

whether female university students could wear the Islamic headscarf on

campus . Having in effect renounced its Islamist claims and repositioned

itself on a platform of civil rights and liberties , the Virtue Party 's most

important ( perhaps , sole ) link to the policies of its predecessor , Welfare

Party , was its commitment to the headscarf issue . The struggle was now

being waged not as part of a policy of Islamizing society and politics , but

rather in terras of the freedom of individuals to dress as they please .

The results of the 1999 elections , however , seemed to show that Virtue

was found to be ineffective in its pursuit of the headscarf issue . Apparently

having failed to convince many voters with Islamic sensibilities , Virtue

lost votes to the Nationalist Action Party which held a similar position .

This may be one of the reasons why the party leadership turned the Merve

Kavak ? i incident into a spectacle . Virtue ' s loss of votes , on the other hand ,

was also partly due to the justified fear of supporters that it would not be

allowed to remain in power , as had been the case previously with the Wel¬

fare Party . This could clearly be seen in the difference between the votes

cast for local governments and those cast for the national parliament in the

April 18 , 1999 , elections . In local government results , Virtue was much

closer to the rate achieved in the 1995 general elections . 6 Virtue emerged

with the highest percentage of the local government votes and retained

such important mayoralties as Istanbul and some other big cities ( although

not Ankara ).

The controversy about whether women students should be allowed to

wear the Islamic headscarf on university campuses has erupted repeatedly

since the rise of the Islamist movement in recent decades . 7 But there is a

striking similarity in the way in which both parties involved in the contro -

6 Erol Tuncer , " Kesin Sonuclar " , Radikal , May 29 , 1999 .

7 See Emelie A . Olson , " Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey : ' The
Headscarf Dispute ' " , Anthropological Quarterly 58 ( 1985 ) 4 , 161 - 71 ; and Niliifer
Gole , The Forbidden Modern : Civilization and Veiling , Ann Arbor : The University of
Michigan Press , 1996 .
276 HALDUN GULALP

versy have approached the issue . There has seemed to be little public dis¬
cussion about the substantive issues of the relationship between the politi¬
cal principle of secularism and the symbolic meanings of dress , such as ,
for instance , how the need for diversity ought to be balanced with the need
to prevent discrimination or where the dividing line between the public
(mutual responsibilities ) and the private (personal freedoms ) ought to be
drawn . The actual debate sounds more like a confrontation of wills . It
seems as if the side that appears more determined and persistent in its de¬
mands will in the end force the other side to yield .
Although this may perhaps be considered normal for those who may
regard wearing the headscarf a religious imperative , the opposing secular¬
ist argument sounds equally religious in its own way . Indeed , even a cur¬
sory review of the arguments of the secular establishment would reveal
that the ban on wearing the headscarf in universities relies more on the
belief in the existence of some unquestionable truths than on a sound po¬
litical judgment or ethical principle . The extant ban simply violates the
right of those who wear the scarf for religious reasons to exercise their
faith , and it denies the right of those who wear it for political reasons to
exercise a political freedom .
The Islamist spokespeople object to this secularist imposition in the
name of human and civil rights . By doing so , however , they also miss the
real motive of the secular establishment . The problem from the secularist
point of view is that the headscarf is a uniform which expresses a social
and political choice , an assertion of identity . No doubt , Islamist women are
covered not because they feel that they look good in them , but because
they believe they have to . Hence , just as it is true for Islamists , so for the
Kemalist / secularist imposers of this dress code , wherever there is a higher
and sacred truth , human rights cannot be an issue . The point , then , is that
this mutual belief in respective unquestionable truths is the only frame¬
work within which the debate on the dress code can be understood . The
secularist and Islamist epistemologies are remarkably parallel insofar as
they both rely on unquestionable truths .

Turkish secularism and Kemalist fundamentalism

The conflict between Kemalism and Islam in Turkey partly originates from
the politicization of Islam ; but it also partly originates from the quasi -
religious interpretation of Kemalism . In Turkey , religion occupied the
center of the public and political space at the time of the creation of the
nation - state . Kemalism forced itself into that space and specifically at¬
tempted to relegate religion into the private realm . Kemalism ' s project
 POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 277

regarding religion was to emulate the Protestant revolution of turning faith

into a private personal matter . Kemalism tried to accomplish this by sup¬

pressing religion ' s political role and by regulating its public appearance

via state fiat . 8 Political secularization in Turkey was thus accomplished in

a way which has denied intellectual secularization because Islamic sacred

and unquestionable truths have been replaced by the Kemalist ones . This ,

in turn , has generated problems with establishing and maintaining democ¬

racy in Turkey .

The most striking similarity between Kemalism and the religious mode

of thinking can perhaps be found in the repressive atmosphere around

which the " belief in " or the " love for " Kemal Atatiirk and his ideology are

cultivated . Indecent years , together with the rise of the Islamist party in

local and national elections , it has become common practice to put the

representatives of this party on the spot on live TV shows with such ques¬

tions as " do you really love Atatiirk ? " . The effectiveness of this line of

questioning is better appreciated in light of the fact that there is a law

which regulates crimes committed against the memory of Atatiirk . Remi¬

niscent of the blasphemy laws of medieval Christianity , this law , which

was passed in 1951 and is still in effect , was invoked in numerous recent

prosecutions of leaders and supporters of the Islamist party and has led to

convictions involving prison terms .

In addition to such legislation , there is also a circle of Kemalist follow¬

ers , constantly reminding the public of what is right and what is wrong in

terms of Kemalist truths . An example that illustrates this can be found in a

statement made by the former chief judge of the Constitutional Court ,

which ruled in favor of closing down the pro - Islamist Welfare Party . At a

meeting organized by the pro - Kemalist Association for Modern Life , on

occasion of the chief judge 's retirement from office , the retiring judge

stated the following in his farewell speech : " You may not love Atatiirk .

But you cannot attack him . If you do , it means that either the blood [ in

your veins ] or the milk [ you have suckled ] or your stock [ i . e . , essence ] is

spoilt " . 9 In other words , it seems that according to this prominent judge , if

one dares to criticize the official line , one is worthy of abuse , rather than

an intellectual counter argument .

For the secularist elite , then , people are not free agents , but members

of a community defined by some higher authority and are ontologically

charged with the task of serving that ( national ) community , just as a be -

8 See Nikki R . Keddie , " Secularism and the State : Towards Clarity and Global Com¬
parison " , New Left Review , no . 226 ( 1997 ) , 21 - 40 .

9 ATVEvening News , December 16 , 1997 .

278 HALDUN GULALP

liever is supposed to serve God , within the terms of rules that are not of
their own making and that are safeguarded by reference to tradition and the
threat of punishment .

Islamism versus democracy

Islamists may be opposed to the centralizing and unitary ideology and
practices of the Kemalist state , but are they therefore more democratic ?
Paralleling a general Islamist argument , many Islamist writers in Turkey
reject democracy because it is a Western system opposed to the Islamic
notion of the sovereignty of God . According to the prominent Islamist
theorist Abdurrahman Dilipak , for example , " Democracy is the Trojan
horse of Western cultural imperialism " . 10 But what about the politicians of
the Islamist party , who may not necessarily be bound by pure doctrine and
have to adapt to the rules of the electoral game ? A totalitarian bent could
be seen in numerous statements and actions of the Islamist party leaders
both while they were in opposition and while they were in power .
An instructive example may be found in the statements of the formida¬
ble Tayyip Erdogan , who , as soon as he began to emerge as the young and
promising star of Islamism in his bid for the mayor ' s seat of Istanbul , won
notoriety for his much - publicized statement that " democracy is a means
and not an end " 11 . Erdogan certainly was not the only prominent Islamist
politician stating this idea . Already two years before this interview ,
Necmettin Erbakan , the leader of the Welfare Party , had the following to
say about democracy in a published book which was advertised as the
party ' s political program : " It should never be forgotten that democracy is a
means , not an end . The real end is the creation of Saadet Nizam i " - i . e . ,
the " felicitous order " , a reference to the Golden Age of early Islam . 12
Necmettin Erbakan was as critical of democracy in the 1970s , when he
headed the National Salvation Party , as he has been in the 1980s and
1990s , as head of the Welfare Party . Tinker Alkan , in his study of the Na¬
tional Salvation Party , reports that democracy was criticized mainly be -

10 Abdurrahman Dilipak , Sorular , Sorunlar ve Cevaplar , Istanbul : Beyan Yayinlari ,

1993 , 93 .

11 Tayyip Erdogan , " Interview with Tayyip Erdogan " , in : 2 . Cumhuriyet Tarti $ malari ,
eds . Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar , Ankara : Basak Yaymlan , 1993 , 419 - 20 .
12 Necmettin Erbakan , Tiirkiye 'nin Meseleleri ve Qoziimleri , Ankara , 1991 , 46 .
 POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 279

cause it was opposed to Islam and replaced divine revelation with the votes
of ordinary people . 13
This anti - democratic tendency occasionally converges with a totalitar¬
ian one , originating from the self - image of political Islam in Turkey best
expressed , again , in Tayyip Erdogan ' s following words :

" We believe that almost all people in Turkey , both due to their natural ex¬
istence and due to the geography they live in and the historical mission
they carry , are already Muslim . But they have been deterred from fulfill¬
ing this characteristic . They have been suppressed by force . If we could
lift this oppression in their brains , they will naturally select Islam . For
their essence consists of faith " . 14

Another revealing manifestation of this totalitarian tendency can be found

in the Welfare Party ' s much advertised proposal for a "just economic or¬
der " . 15 Although purportedly promoting a free market system , in this pro¬
posed order banks are owned by the state so that they are reliable ; sale and
purchase of commodities are done through government agents who read
prices off a computer ; even the number of workers needed for a particular
type of business , their wage rate , and so on , are all determined through
corporatist structures . Perhaps most revealingly , in this proposed economic
and social order , prospective entrepreneurs get a document of " praise "
from the " moral community " that they belong to , before they can embark
on a business . 16
It should also be noted , however , that this last idea is not unprece¬
dented in Turkish political history . Already back in 1943 a law was passed ,
bringing the chambers of trade and industry under complete tutelage of the
government , justified on the grounds that " a lack of moral integrity [ was ]
manifested in the behavior of the business community " 17 . As already
noted , it again seems that despite their appearance of opposition Islamists
and secularists in Turkey share a common political culture .

13 Tiirker Alkan , " The National Salvation Party in Turkey " , in : Islam and Politics in the
Modern Middle East , eds . Metin Heper and Ralph Israeli , New York : St . Martin ' s
Press , 1984 , 92 - 93 .
14 Erdogan , " Interview " [ fn . 11 ] , 432 .
15 For summary descriptions see Giilalp , " Political Islam in Turkey " [ fn . 4 ] , 27 - 28 ; Ya -
vuz , " Political Islam " [ fn . 2 ] , 73 - 75 .
16 Necmettin Erbakan , Adil EkonomikDiizen , Ankara , 1991 , 30 - 36 .
17 Ayse Bugra , State and Business in Modern Turkey : A Comparative Study, Albany :
SUNY Press , 1994 , 241 .
 HALDUN GULALP
280

The Islamist political party has had an authoritarian tendency in its

practices as well . The Welfare Party ' s record , in opposition as well as in

power , is replete with examples that reveal the lack of democracy in the

party ' s internal operation and in its failure to support democratic principles

in critical political decisions . The Welfare Party was a part of the same

system that brought it down . It showed no sympathy when the pro - Kurdish

Democracy Party was closed by the constitutional court and , in return , it

did not get any from the parties which it asked for help to change the con¬

stitution in order to overturn the court ' s ruling against Welfare itself . Wel¬

fare leaders complained of political motives when the middle levels of the

Imam - Hatip schools were closed ; but they themselves had earlier used the

same schools politically to recruit their activists . Welfare turned democ¬

ratic after it was closed down , but had earlier missed a wonderful opportu¬

nity to display support for democracy when they showed unwillingness to

join forces with the people 's democratic initiative opposing the Mafia

within the state . 18 In short , Welfare strategy was not oriented towards

changing the political structure , but rather towards acquiring control of the

existing state apparatus .

Conclusion

Scholars often talk about the moderating influence of participation in po¬

litical processes and the radicalizing effect of exclusion and repression . 19

What has transpired in Turkey in recent years , however , refutes this rea¬

soning . It seems that in Turkey pressure has led to moderation . This fur¬

ther attests to the lack of democratic culture : repression and threat of ex¬

clusion have worked . The party that claimed to present an alternative to the

mainstream has now been beaten into line with the others . But if the sys¬

tem itself is not fully democratic , how can one confidently expect that the

party pushed into line with the others is ?

The irony of the Turkish case is that the military has often claimed the

right to be the defender of democracy , and now the Islamists express their

resentment of the secular establishment , including the military , by invok -

18 For further details see Haldun Giilalp , " The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey : The
Refah Party Episode " , in : New Perspectives on Turkey , no . 21 ( 1999 ) , 35 - 59 .
19 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr , The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution : The Jama 'at - i Islami
of Pakistan , Berkeley , CA : University of California Press , 1994 , 219 - 23 ; Gudrun
Kramer , " The Integration of the Integrists : A Comparative Study of Egypt , Jordan and
Tunisia " , in : Democracy Without Democrats ? [ fn . 3 ] , 200 - 26 ( pp . 222 - 23 ) ; John
Esposito and John Obert Voll , Islam and Democracy , New York : Oxford University
Press , 1996 , 198 - 201 .
 POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 281

ing democracy . The leaders of the Islamist party complained of the un¬

democratic way in which the secular establishment dealt with them , but

how much can the Islamist party ( in its various reincarnations ) , a product

of the same political culture , credibly portray itself as a champion of de¬

mocracy ? Does not the same secular establishment pursue its undemocratic

practices in the name of defending " secular democracy " against the threat

posed by political Islam ? The opportunistic and self - serving use of the

term " democracy " appears to be a common practice for the self - proclaimed

proponents of both Islamism and secularism .

Turkey ' s recent experience with political Islam has not only revealed

the poverty of its democratic culture , but it has also reconfirmed the poten¬

tial conflict between secularism and democracy in Turkey . 20 The " secular¬

ism " of Turkey ' s Kemalist establishment has been manifested as a sacred

and unquestionable matter of faith , almost as a quasi - religion , rather than a

political principle suitable to modernity and democracy . This recent ex¬

perience , then , has only helped to reveal more clearly the totalitarian ele¬

ments within the mainstream political culture , leading to calls on the part

of non - Islamist democrats to open the system up to more diversity and

pluralism . It is possible that the further democratization of the system

might in fact lead to a decline of the Islamist challenge ; or , if the argument

of this paper is correct - that is , that the Islamist party has the tendency to

fit the mainstream norms - a more democratic system might move the

Islamist party along in the same direction .

20 See Ernest Gellner , " Kemalism " , in : idem , Encounters with Nationalism , Oxford , UK
and Cambridge , MA : Blackwell , 1994 , 81 - 91 .
 THE RADICALIZATION
OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES

Samir Khalaf

A defining element in Lebanon ' s checkered socio - political history , one

which has had Substantive implications for the character and magnitude of
collective strife , is the survival and reassertion of communal solidarities . In
fact , the three over - arching and persisting features - foreign intervention ,
the re - awakening of primordial identities , and the escalation of protracted
violence - are all intimately related . This is , what informs the major thrust
of this essay . I have elsewhere made an effort to explore how the unre -
solved regional and global rivalries have contributed to the protraction and
escalation of conflict and the reassertion of communal solidarities . 1 The
aim here is to document a few of the persisting features underlying the
survival of communal loyalties , particularly those aspects of Lebanon ' s
" retribalization " exacerbated by the inside - outside dialectics . How and

under what circumstances , to be more concrete , are communal loyalties

radicalized ?
By focusing on different episodes - ranging from peasant uprisings ,
factional feuds , " class " and ideological struggles to other intermittent inci -
dents of civil strife - it is possible to elucidate how , regardless of their
origins and overt manifestations , they are all transformed ( or deformed )
into sectarian hostility . It is also then , as will be seen , that the conflict be -
comes bloodier , uncivil and more mir ed into the tangled world of foreign
intervention .
In effect what is being suggested here is that it is possible , for purposes
of analysis , to identify three different layers or magnitudes of violence .
There is first social strife , the product largely of socio - economic dispari -
ties , asymmetrical development , ideological rivalries , relative deprivation
and feelings of neglect and dispossession . These , normally , are non¬
militant in character and express themselves in contentious but non -
belligerent forms of social protest and political mobilization . Second , if the

1 Samir Khalaf , Civil and Uncivil Violence : A Histoiy of the Internationalization of

Communal Conflict in Lebanon , New York : Columbia University Press , 2002 .
 SAMIR KHALAF
284

socio - economic disparities persist and the resulting hostilities are unap -

peased , particularly if accompanied by feelings of threatened communal

legacy and confessional loyalties , conflict and discord are inclined to be -

come more militant and bellicose . It is here that social discord is trans -

formed into communal violence ; or , in the words of Bowyer Bell , that civil

strife passes the point of no return into civil war 2 . Finally , civil violence is

not , or does not always remain , " civil " . When inflamed by the atavism of

re - awakened tribalism , enmity and deep - seated suspicion of the " other " ,

internecine feuds , and unresolved regional and global conflicts , collective

violence could readily degenerate further into the incivility of proxy wars

and Surrogate victimization . It is here that violence acquires its own inher -

ent self - destructive logic and spirals into that atrocious cycle of unrelent -

ing cruelties .

Within this context , it is meaningful to identify and account for some

of the circumstances associated with the tenacity of communalism and its

various manifestations . An effort is also made to consider how social strife

is deflected into communal violence and ultimately descends into further

barbarism and incivility . Queries of this sort are not only of historic sig -

nificance . There has been recently renewed theoretical interest in the

nature , manifestations and consequences of renewed " tribalism " and reas -

sertion of local and communal identities , particularly as they relate to the

forces of globalization and post - modernity .3

2 J.Bowyer Bell , The Gun in Politics : An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict, 1916-
1986, New Brunswick , NJ : Transaction , 1987 .
3 There has been a profusion of writing recently exploring various dimensions of the
globalization of ethnic and communal violence . Interested readers may wish to consult
the following : Benjamin R . Barber , Jihad vs . McWorld , New York : Ballantine , 1996 ;
Zbigniew Brzezinski , Out of Control : Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty -first
Centioy , New York , Toronto : Scribner , Maxwell Macmillan , 1993 ; Michael Ignatieff ,
Blood and Belonging : Journeys into the New Nationalism , New York : Farrar , Straus &
Giroux , 1994 ; Theodor Hanf , Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon : Decline of a State and
Rise of a Nation [ 1989 ] , London : I .B . Tauris , 1993 ; Sudhir Kakar , The Colors of Vio¬
lence , Chicago and London : University of Chicago Press , 1996 ; Daniel Patrick
Moynihan , Pandaemonium : Ethnicity in International Politics , Oxford et al . : Oxford
University Press , 1993 ; Walter B . Wriston , The Twilight of Sovereignty : How the In¬
formation Revolution is Transforming our World, New York , Toronto : Scribner ,
Maxwell Macmillan , 1992 ; Milton J . Esman and Itamar Rabinovich , eds . , Ethnicity,
Pluralism , and the State in the Middle East , Ithaca and London : Cornell University
Press , 1988 ; Milton J . Esman , Ethnic Politics , Ithaca , NY , et al . : Cornell University
Press , 1994 .
 THE RADICALIZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES
285

The resilience of communalism

For some time mainstream theoretical paradigms - i . e . , those associated

with modernization , Marxism and their offshoots - were quite tenacious in

upholding their views regarding the erosion of primordial ties and loyal -

ties . Despite the striking ideological differences underlying the two meta -

theories , they shared the conviction that ties of fealty , religion and Com¬

munity - which cemented societies together and accounted for social and

political distinctions - were beginning to lose their grip and would , ulti -

mately , become irrelevant . Indeed , to proponents of modernization theory ,

notions like familism , tribalism , confessionalism were not only pejora -

tively dismissed and trivialized , they were seen as obstacles to modernity .

So - called " traditional " societies , in other words , were expected to break

away and disengage themselves from such relics of pre - modern times if

they are to enjoy the presumed fruits of modernity or to become full -

fledged nation states . Given the resilience of traditional loyalties , some

proponents made allowances for interim periods where " transitional " so¬

cieties might linger for a while . Eventually , however , all such precarious

hybrids will have to pass . They cannot , and will not , it was argued by a

generation of social scientists in the sixties and seventies , be able to resist

the overpowering forces of industrialization , urbanization and seculariza -

tion .4

Likewise to Marxists , communist and socialist regimes were perceived

as " giant brooms " expected to sweep away pre - existing loyalties . If non -

class attachments and interests survive or resurface , they are treated as

forms of " false consciousness " to mask or veil fundamental economic and

social contradictions . In short , ethnic and primordial loyalties were treated ,

as Theodor Hanf put it , as transitory phenomena by modernization theo -

rists and as epiphenomenona by Marxists . 5 Both agree , however , that pri -

mordialism was destined to disappear . Both , of course have been wrong . It

is a blatant misreading , if not distortion , of history in both advanced and

developing societies . It is a marvel , in fact , that such misrepresentations

could have persisted given persuasive evidence to the contrary .6

4 As early as 1960 scholars were already challenging such false dichotomies and neo -
evolutionary views of social change and modernization . See , among others , Rupert
Emerson , From Empire to Nation : The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and Aß -ican
Peoples , Boston : Beacon Press , 1960 .
5 Theodor Hanf , " Ethnurgy : on the Analytical Use and Normative Abuse of the Concept
of " Ethnic Identity " , in : Nationalism , Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Enrope , eds .
Keebet von Berda - Bechman and M . Verkuyten , Utrecht , NL : Utrecht University ,
1999 , 40 - 51 .

6 For a representative cross - section of the literature , see Daniel Lerner , The Passing of
 SAMIR KHALAF
286

Ernest Gellner provides such evidence while exploring the nature of

nationalism and cohesion in complex societies . He finds it conceptually
Atting to reexamine the role of shared amnesia , collective forgetfulness
and anonymity in the emergence of nation - states . Among other things he
argues that the presumed erosion of primordial allegiances is not a prereq -
uisite to the formation of cohesive nation - states . Likewise , the formation
of strong ruthless centralizing regimes is not the monopoly of any particu -
lar State of culture . Seemingly cohesive and integrated old states are not as
culturally unified and homogeneous . 7
Of course here Ottoman Turkey became the prototype of the " mosaic "
where ethnic and religious groups not only retained much of the so - called
primordial and archaic identities , but they were positively instructed -
through edicts , centralization , fiat , etc . - never to forget . As such , the Ot¬
tomans were tolerant of other religions , but they were strictly segregated
from the Muslims . The various " millets " , in other words , mixed but were
never truly combined in a homogeneous and unified society . Today such a
dread of collective amnesia is amply visible in the dramatic events sur -
rounding the collapse of the USSR and the unfolding disintegration of
Eastern Europe .
Nor are the nascent new nations today bereft of the loyalties and insti -
tutions often attributed exclusively to civil and secular nation - states . Per -
haps conditions of anonymity are true in time of swift or revolutionary
social changes and turmoil . But after the upheavals , when the deluge sub -
sides , when social order is restored , internal cleavages and continuities
resurface . New memories are invented when the old ones are destroyed .
Indeed , " most societies " , Gellner reiterates , " seem allergic to internal ano¬
nymity , homogeneity and amnesia " . 8
Lebanon ' s political history , both in good and bad times , reinforces this
self - evident but often overlooked or misconstrued reality . Throughout its

Traditional Society : Modemizing the Middle East , New York : The Free Press , 1958 ;
Gabriel A . Almond and James S . Coleman , eds . , The Politics of the Developing Areas ,
Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 1960 ; Gabriel A . Almond and G . Bingham
Powell , Jr . , Comparative Politics : A Developmental Approach , Boston : Little , Brown ,
1966 ; David Apter , The Politics of Modemization , Chicago and London : University of
Chicago Press , 1965 , S .N . Eisenstadt , Modemization , Protest and Change , Englewood
Cliffs , NJ : Prentice - Hall , 1966 ; Edward A . Shils , Political Development in the New
States , ' s - Gravenhage : Mouton , 1965 ; Lucian W . Pye , Aspects of Political Develop¬
ment. An Analytical Study , Boston : Little , Brown , 1966 .
7 Ernest Gellner , Culture, Identity and Politics , London : Cambridge University Press ,
1988 .

8 Ibid ., 9 .
 THE RADICALIZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES 287

epochal transformations - the emergence of the " principality " in the seven -
teenth and eighteenth centuries , the upheavals of the mid - nineteenth Cen¬
tury and the consequent creation of the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon
( 1860 - 1920 ) , down to the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 , the Na¬

tional Pact of 1943 , the restoration of unity and stability after the civil war
of 1958 , and the aftermath of almost two decades of protracted violence -
some salient realities about the ubiquity of recurring " retribalization " are
reconfirmed . One might argue that Lebanon has not been detribalized suf-
ficiently to be experiencing retribalization . The term , nonetheless , is being
employed here rather loosely as a catchall phrase to refer to the resurgence
of communal loyalties , particularly the convergence of confessional and
territorial identities . As has been demonstrated by a score of socio -
economic and political historians , the sweeping changes Lebanon has been
subjected to , from internal insurrections to centralized and direct rule by
foreign powers or the more gradual and spontaneous changes associated
with rapid urbanization , spread of market economy and the exposure of a
growing portion of the population to secular , liberal and radical ideologies ,
etc . . . . did little to weaken or erode the intensity of confessional or sectar -
ian loyalties . Indeed , in times of social unrest and political turmoil such
loyalties became sharper and often superseded other ties and allegiances . 9
Confessional loyalties have not only survived and retained their pri -
macy , they continue to serve as viable sources of communal solidarity .
They inspire local and personal initiative , account for much of the re -
sourcefulness and cultural diversity and vitality of the Lebanese . But they
also undermine civic consciousness and commitment to Lebanon as a na -
tion - state . Expressed more poignantly , the forces which motivate and sus -
tain harmony , balance and prosperity are also the very forces which on
occasion pull the society apart and contribute to conflict , tension and civil
disorder . The ties that bind , in other words , also unbind . 10

9 Substantive and persuasive evidence can be extracted from a score of studies in Sup¬
port of such views . See , among others , Dominique Chevallier , La societe du Mont Li-
ban ä l ' epoque de la revolution industrielle en Europe , Paris : Geuthner , 1971 ; Iliya F .
Harik , Politics and Change in a Traditional Society : Lebanon , 1711 - 1845 , Princeton ,
NJ : Princeton University Press , 1968 ; Samir Khalaf , Persistence and Change in 19th
Century Lebanon : A Sociological Essay , Beirut : American University of Beirut and
Syracuse University Press , 1979 ; Elizabeth Picard , Lebanon , a Shattered Country :
Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon [ 1988 ] , New York : Holmes & Meier ,
1996 ; Kamal Salibi , The Modern Histoiy of Lebanon , London : Weidenfeld and
Nicolson , 1965 .
10 Samir Khalaf and Guilain Denoeux , " Urban Networks and Political Conflict in Leba¬
non " , in : Lebanon : A History of Conflict and Conscious , eds . Nadim Shehadi and D .
Haffar Mills , London : I .B . Tauris , 1988 , 181 - 200 ; Samir Khalaf , " Ties that Bind : See -
 SAMIR KHALAF
288

As the cruelties of protracted violence became more menacing , it is

understandable why traumatized and threatened groups should seek shelter
in their communal solidarities and cloistered spaces . Confessional senti -
ments and their supportive loyalties , even in times of relative peace and
stability , have always been effective sources of social support and political
mobilization . But these are not , as Lebanon ' s fractious history amply dem -
onstrates , unmixed blessings . While they cushion individuals and groups
against the anomie and alienation of public life , they also heighten the
density of communal hostility and enmity . Such processes have been par-
ticularly acute largely because class , ideological and other secular forms of
group affiliation have been comparatively more distant and abstract and ,
consequently , of less relevance to the psychic and social needs of the up -
rooted and traumatized . Hence , more and more Lebanese are today bran¬
dishing their confessionalism , if we may invoke a dual metaphor , as both
emblem and armor . Emblem , because confessional identity has become the
most viable medium for asserting presence and securing vital needs and
benefits . It is only when an individual is placed within a confessional con -
text that his ideas and assertions are rendered meaningful or worthwhile .
Confessionalism is also being used as armor , because it has become a
shield against real or imagined threats . The more vulnerable the emblem ,
the thicker is the armor . Conversely , the thicker the armor , the more vul¬
nerable and paranoid other communities become . It is precisely this dialec -
tic between threatened communities and to urge to seek shelter in clois¬
tered worlds which has plagued Lebanon for so long .
Massive population shifts , particularly since they are accompanied by
the reintegration of displaced groups into more homogeneous , self-
contained and exclusive communities , have also reinforced communal
solidarity . Consequently , territorial and confessional identities , more so
perhaps than at any other time in Lebanon ' s history , are beginning to con -
verge . It is in this sense that " retribalization " is becoming sharper and
more assertive . Some of its subtle , implicit and nuanced earlier manifesta -
tions have become much more explicit . Political leaders , spokesmen of
various communities , opinion makers and ordinary Citizens are not as reti -
cent in recognizing and incorporating such features in their daily behavior
or in bargaining for rights and Privileges and validating their identities .
Even normally less self - conscious and more open communities such as
Greek Orthodox , Catholics and Sunni Muslims , are beginning to experi -

tarian Loyalties and the Revival of Pluralism in Lebanon " , The Beirut Review 1 ( 1991 )
1 , 32 - 61 .
 THE RADICALIZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES
289

ment with measures for enhancing and reinventing their special heritage

and particular identity .

Recently such Symptoms of " retribalization " have become more pro -

nounced . Ironically , during the pre - war and pre - Tä ' if periods when confes -

sionalism was recognized , its manifestations and outward expression were

often subtle and attenuated . Groups seemed shy , as it were , to be identified

by such labels . More so during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s when

nationalism and other secular and so - called progressive and ideological

venues for group affiliation had special appeal . 11

Today , as deconfessionalization is consecrated by Tä ' if and , to the

same extent , by public opinion , the overt expressions of communal and

sectarian identities have become much more assertive . Political leaders and

spokesmen of various communities , of all persuasions , are not at all reti -

cent or shy in invoking such parochial claims . Indeed , dormant and quies -

cent communal identities are being reawakened , often reinvented , to vali -

date claims for special privileges .

Universities , Colleges , research foundations , voluntary associations ,

special advocacy groups , radio and TV stations are all being established

with explicit and well - defined communal identities . So are cultural and

populär recreational events and awards to recognize excellence and en -

courage creative and intellectual Output . Even competitive sports , normally

the most transcending and neutral of all human encounters , have been fac -

tionalized by sectarian rivalries .

These and other such efforts can no longer be wished away or mysti -

fied . They must be recognized for what they are : strategies for the empow -

erment of threatened groups and their incorporation into the torrent of pub¬
lic life . The coalition of confessional and territorial entities , since it draws

upon a potentially much larger base of support , is doubtless a more viable

vector for political mobilization than kinship , fealty or sectarian loyalties .

Hence , it was not uncommon that protest movements and other forms of

collective mobilization of social unrest , sparked by genuine grievances and

unresolved public issues , were often deflected into confessional or com¬

munal rivalries .

Theodor Hanf coins the term " ethnurgy " to highlight such conscious

invention and politicization of ethnic identity . 12 Circumstances associated

with the emergence and mobilization of such identities are instrumental in

11 For further details , see L . Melikian and L . Diab , " Stability and Change in Group Af¬
filiation of University Students in the Middle East " , The Journal of Social Psychology
93 ( 1974 ) , 13 - 21 .
12 Hanf , " Ethnurgy " [ fn . 5 ] ,
290 SAMIR KHALAF

accounting for the pattern and intensity of intra - and interstate conflict .
Since all societies are , to varying degrees , horizontally stratified with ver -
tical cultural cleavages , conflict is bound to reflect both the horizontal
socio - economic disparities and the deep cultural divisions . By themselves ,
however , the strata and cleavages will not become sources of political mo -
bilization unless groups are also made conscious of their distinctive identi -
ties . Differences in themselves , horizontal or vertical , become politicized
only when those who share common distinctive attributes also share
awareness of their distinctiveness . Analogically , Hanf translates Marx ' s
" class - by - itself ' (.Klasse an sich ) and " class - for - itself ' {Klasse für sich )

into ethnic group loyalties . Hence only an ethnic group " for itself" can
become a source of political mobilization .
Within this context it becomes meaningful to identify circumstances in
Lebanon ' s socio - political and cultural history which heighten and mobilize
the political and radical consciousness of communal and confessional iden -
tities . Of course , technically speaking , communal and confessional attach¬
ments are not strictly " ethnic " in character , if by that is meant that the
assignment of special or distinct status , within a culture or social System is
arrived at on the basis of purely racial or physical characteristics . But if
" ethnicity " is broadened to incorporate variable traits associated with relig -

ion , communal , ancestral affiliations , dialect and other behavioral and sub -
cultural distinctions , then confessional and sectarian identities may well
assume some ethnic attributes . 13 It is also then that these identities become
sharper and more militant . They acquire a density of their own and coa -
lesce around sentiments of solidarity and collective self - consciousness .
It should be noted here that religiosity and confessionalism are not co -
terminous . Indeed , results of an empirical survey carried out in 1982 - 83 ,
on a random sample of households residing in selected urban districts and
neighborhoods of Beirut , revealed some sharp distinctions between the
two . Curiously , as respondents indicated that while their religiosity ( as
measured by the degree of changes in the intensity of their spiritual beliefs ,
religious commitments and observations of rituals , practices and duties of
their faith ) had been declining , their confessional and sectarian identities
and prejudices were becoming sharper . 14

13 Donald L . Horowitz , Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley : University of California

Press , 1985 , xi .
14 Unpublished survey conducted by Samir Khalaf and Salim Nasr in 1983 - 84 on the
impact of civil unrest on socio - cultural transformations and the adaptation of various
communities of chronic and protracted strife ( Department of Social and Behavioral
Studies , American University of Beirut ) .
 THE RADICAUZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES 291

On the whole , a surprisingly large proportion of what presumably was

a literate , cosmopolitan and sophisticated sample of Professionals , univer -
sity and College teachers , intellectuals , journalists and the like , displayed
strong confessional biases , distance from and intolerance towards other
groups . This was apparent , for example , in their disapproval of inter -
confessional marriages , preference for parochial schooling for their chil -
dren , reluctance to associate and live with other sectarian and religious
groups . 15 More poignant , perhaps , it was becoming increasingly visible in
this rather " narcissistic " preoccupation with one ' s Community and corre -
sponding exclusionary sentiments and phobic proclivities towards others .
This heightened confessional consciousness , understandable in times of
sectarian hostility and fear , started to assume fanatic and militant expres -
sions of devotion to and glorification of one ' s group . The relative ease
with which the various communities were politically resocialized into mili -
tancy was largely an expression of such aroused communal conscious¬
ness . 16
Populär accounts then were keen on depicting , often with noted
amazement , the eagerness with which impressionable teenagers flocked to
the barricades , just as their older brothers only a few years back had taken
to frivolous pastimes , such as night - clubbing , fast cars , pinball machines
and sleazy entertainments . ' 7 This is all the more remarkable since we are
dealing with a fairly quiescent political culture , one without much back -
ground or tradition in military service , conscription or prior experience in
para - military organizations .
In short , what these and other manifestations imply is that religion is
not resorted to as a spiritual or ecclesiastical force . It is not a matter of
communing with the divine as a redemptive longing to restore one ' s sense
of well - being . Rather , it is sought largely as a form of ideological and
communal mobilization . Indeed , it is often people ' s only means of assert -
ing their threatened identities . Without it , groups are literally rootless ,
nameless and voiceless .
Such realities , incidentally , are certainly not unique to Lebanon . In an
insightful and thoroughly documented study of Hindu - Muslim rioting and

15 See results of survey published in successive issues of al -Nahär ( January 14 and 24 ,

February 4 and 19 , 1997 ) .
'6 Observers and commentators at the time uniformly noted how puzzled they were by
the readiness the seemingly quietist self - indulgent and carefree youth displayed for po¬
litical mobilization and militancy .
17 Jonathan Randal , Going all the Way , New York : Vintage , 1984 , 112 - 13 .
292 SAMIRKHALAF

violence in India , Sudhir Kakar reaches essentially the same conclusion . 18

The author also draws on other historical encounters - such as the anti -
Semitic pogroms in Spain in the fourteenth Century , of sixteenth Century
Catholic - Protestant violence in France , and anti - Catholic riots in eight -
eenth Century London - to validate the inference that all such instances of
collective mobilization were more a byproduct of cultural identities and
communalism rather than a reflection of religiosity of revitalization of
religious zeal as such :

" If we look closely at individual cases around the world , we will find that
the much - touted revival is less of religiosity than of cultural identities
based on religious affiliation . In other words , there may not be any great
ferment taking place in the world of religious ideas , beliefs , rituals , or any
marked increase in the sum of human spirituality . Where the resurgence
is most visible is in the Organization of collective identities around relig -
ion , in the formation and strengthening of communities of believers .
What we are witnessing today is less the resurgence of religion than ( in
the felicitous Indian usage ) of communalism where a community of be¬
lievers not only has religious affiliation but also social , economic , and po -
litical interests in common which may conflict with corresponding inter -
ests of another community of believers sharing the same geographical
" IQ
space

To Kakar , communalism then is a State of mind elicited by the individual ' s

assertion of being part of a religious community , preceded by the aware -
ness of belonging to such a community . He goes further to maintain that
only when , what he terms , the " We - ness of the community " is transformed
into the " We are of communalism " can we better understand the circum -
stances which translate or deflect the potential or predispositions for intol -
erance , enmity and hostility and how these are ultimately released into
outward violence . 20 Enmity , after all , can remain at a latent level . As will
be demonstrated , hostility between the various communities in Lebanon
did not always erupt in bloody confrontations . Rather , it managed , and for
comparatively long Stretches , to express itself in a wide gamut of non -
violent outlets and arrangements ranging firom mild contempt , indiffer -
ence , guarded contacts , distancing to consociational political strategies and
territorial bonding in exclusive spaces .

18 Kakar , The Colors of Violence [ fh . 3].

19 Ibid . , 166 - 67 .
20 Ibid . , 192 .
 THE RADICALIZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES
293

This is why it is instructive to identify those interludes in Lebanon 's

checkered history - the critical watersheds so - to - speak - during which

feelings of communal identity are undermined and when the vague , unde -

fined threats and fears become sharper and more focused . It is also during

such moments that communities sought efforts to reconnect and revive

communal solidarity and mobilization . Identifying with and glorifying the

threatened virtues of one 's own group is heightened and rendered more

righteous - as the psychology of in - group / out - group conflict reveals - if it

is reinforced by enmity towards the out - group . 21 If uncontained , especially

when amplified by rumors and stoked by religious demagogues , the hostil -

ity could easily erupt into open violence . By then only the slightest of

sparks is needed for violent explosion .

A drop of blood here and there , in moments of aroused communal pas -

sions , always begets a carnage . If I were to express this prosaically or more

crudely , there is a relationship afiter all between hot - headedness and cold -

blooded violence . The more impassioned and impetuous groups are , the

more likely they are to be merciless and guilt - free in their brutality . Hot -

headedness should not here be mistaken for mindlessness . Hard - core fight -

ers , both by virtue of their youthfulness and effective resocialization , are

normally impelled by an ardent , ofiten sacrificial , commitment to the cause

and strategies of combat . Hostility is thus made more legitimate by dehu -

manizing , depersonalizing and reducing the enemy into a mere category ; a

target to be acted upon or eliminated . The " other " becomes no more than

an object whose body is worthy of being dispensed with .22 Assailants can

now co mm it their cruelties with abandon and without shame or guilt . It is

also then that collective violence degenerates into barbarism and incivility .

Social strife and communal violence

By drawing on the rather prosaic distinctions between " horizontal " and

" vertical " divisions , one can begin to isolate the circumstances which radi -

21 For further details , see Herbert Kelman , " On the Sources of Attachment to the Nation ",
paper presented at the meeting of the International Society of Political Psychol¬
ogy , San Francisco , July 6 , 1987 .

22 For further details , see V .D . Volkan , Cyprus : War and Adaptation '. A Psychoanalytic
History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict , Charlottesville : University Press of Vir¬
ginia , 1979 ; V .D . Volkan , " The Need to have Enemies and Allies : A Developmental
Approach " , Political Psychology 6 ( 1979 ) 2 ; Sam Keen , Faces of the Enemy : Reflec -
tions of the Hostile Imagination , San Francisco : Harper and Row , 1986 ; Ofer Zur ,
" The Psychohistory of Warfare : The Co - Evolution of Culture , Psyche and Enmity ",
The Journal ofPeace Research 24 ( 1987 ) 2 , 125 - 34 .
294 SAMIR KHALAF

calize communal loyalties . At least one can better gage and ascertain the
magnitude and direction conflict is likely to assume as ordinary social
strife is deflected into communal and fractious violence and how this esca -
lates or degenerates into barbarism and incivility .
Horizontal socio - economic disputes , at least as the experience of
Lebanon is concerned , are more likely to remain comparatively mild and
less belligerent . Affected strata are prone to experience various degrees of
deprivation and neglect . Their social Standing is undermined . They become
less privileged . Like other impoverished , aggrieved and dispossessed
groups , they resort to collective protest to dramatize and , hopefully , correct
the injustice and inequities . Such mobilization , however , unless it is de¬
flected into confessional and communal hostility , rarely escalates into vio -
lent confrontations .
Communal and sectarian rivalries are of a different magnitude . While
social strata are embittered by loss of status , material advantage and privi -
lege , " ethnic " groups ( in this sense confessional and communal forma -
tions ) are threatened by the loss of freedom , identity , heritage and even
their very national existence . As Hanf aptly put it , " politicizing ethnic dis -
tinctions shifts the struggle from divisible goods to indivisible princi -
ples " . 23
It is at precisely such junctures , as socio - economic and political rival¬
ries in Lebanon are transformed into confessional or sectarian conflict , that
the issues underlying the hostilities become " indivisible " . The intensity of
violence is bound to become more savaging and merciless . It is also then
that prospects for resolving the conflict non - belligerently become all the
more unlikely .
In his probing analysis of civil strife in Ireland , Bowyer Bell expresses
this poignant dilemma in terms which are quite applicable to Lebanon ,
particularly with regard to that fateful threshold when civil strife crosses
over to the " point of no return into civil war " .

"A prolonged civil war is the most overt indication of an attenuated socie -
tal schism . In the preliminary civil discord - no matter how divisive and
mutually contradictory are the elements involved , no matter how long -
standing the opposing values or how deep - seated the distrust - a society ,
however strained or artificial , continues to exist . Once civil strife has
passed the point of no return into civil war , however , the prewar society
has , for better or worse , committed suicide . There can be no restoration of
the uncomfortable but familiar past , for civil war can lead only to the ul -

23 Hanf , " Ethnurgy " [ fn . 5 ] , 45 .

 THE RADICALIZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES 295

timate triumph and imposition of a new society , cherished by the victors ,

inconceivable to the vanquished " . 24

Alas , this is a lesson the Lebanese are yet to learn despite their repeated
encounters with both civil strife and civil wars . It is in this explicit sense
that prolonged or recurrent wars are the most overt indication that some -
thing is not changing . The belligerent equality so - to - speak has never trans -
formed itself into the peaceful inequality that entails the designation of one
as victor and the other as vanquished . Despite the intensity , massiveness
and depth of damage and injury , the wars went on . They imperiled and
demoralized everyday life . There was perpetual hurt and grief with no
hope for deliverance or a temporary reprieve . Like a malignant cancer , it
grows but refused to deliver its victim from the anguish of his pain . The
enfeebled patient lives on , doomed as it were to be rejuvenated by the very
sources of his affliction .
This is why Lebanon ' s experience in this regard , both past and more
recent , is not very encouraging . In fact , it is quite dismal . Throughout the
hostilities of 1975 - 90 , cycles of violence were interspersed with efforts of
foreign emissaries interceding on behalf of their shifting client groups to
broker a short - lived cease - fire or an abortive political settlement . Leba¬
non ' s political landscape is strewn with the wreckage of such failed efforts .
Cease - fires , in fact , became the butt of political humor and populär deri -
sion . As soon as one was declared , it was summarily violated . These were
more ploys to win respites from the cruelties of war and recoup losses than
genuine efforts to arrest the fighting and consider less belligerent strategies
for resolving conflict .
Incidentally , comparative evidence on the relationship between civil
violence and conflict resolution is very instructive . Unfortunately , much of
this evidence tends to reinforce Lebanon ' s bleak prospects . At least a re¬
cent analysis of how six other instances of civil unrest have ended - Co -
lombia , Zimbabwe , Greece , Yemen , Sudan , Nigeria , and the American
Civil War - suggest that in cases where conflict is primarily of an ethnic ,
communal character in contrast to those provoked by economic and / or
political issues , the likelihood of a negotiated non - belligerent resolution
becomes very slim . 25 Indeed , all communal wars end in blood so - to - speak .

24 Bowyer Bell , The Gun in Politics [ fn . 2 ] ,

25 Rutgers University , " Conference on How Civil Wars End " , Proceedings . March 2 -4 ,
1990 .
296 SAMIRKHALAF

There must be a victor and a vanquished before combatants begin to con -

sider negotiation . 26
Fred Ikle arrives at the same conclusion , particularly when he distin -
guishes civil conflict from internal wars . " Outcomes intermediate between
victory and defeat are difflcult to construct . If partition is not a feasible
outcome because belligerents are not geographically separable , one side
has to get all , or nearly so , since there cannot be two goveraments . . . and
since the passions aroused and the political cleavages opened render a
sharing of power unworkable " . 27 More interestingly , even if any of the
major adversaries is defeated , other participants may not admit or recog -
nize such realities . This , too , has plagued Lebanon for so long . Defeat is a
State of mind ; everyone decides for themselves when they are defeated . 28
Being entrapped in such a setting of unresolved and protracted hostility
is inflammable . The most trivial slight or petty personal feud can become ,
as was to happen time and time again , an occasion for shedding of blood .
Hypersensitivity to being insulted or violated , nurtured by muted enmity ,
almost always provokes a tendency to retaliate out of proportion to the
initial offence . This was clearly the case in the massacres of 1860 , not as
much in 1958 , but much more pronounced in 1975 - 90 .
Quickly during the early rounds of the war of 1976 - 76 , the conflict
started to display many öf the features of confessional struggle . The two
major combatants - the Christian Phalange and their allies and the Pales -
tinians and the Muslim - Left Coalition - behaved as if their very existence
was at stake . Little wonder that the fighting quickly descended into the
abyss of a zero - sum deadly rivalry , where the perceived victory of one
group can only be realized by annihilating the other . Spurred by the fear of
being marginalized or swept by and subjugated in an Arab - Muslim mass ,
the Katä ' ib reacted with phobic fanaticism to what seemed to them at the
time as an ominous threat . They feit that they were resisting not only the
violated authority of State sovereignty but their way of life , unique heritage
and national existence . Often the threat was willfully dramatized to incite
and awaken communal solidarity and , thereby , mobilize reticent Christians
to the cause of militancy .
Moderation is hard to sustain in the midst of distrust and fear . Progres -

26 Jay Kaplan , " Victors and Vanquished : Their postwar Relations " , in : On the Endings of
War , eds . Stuart Albert and Edward C . Luck , Port Washington , NY : Kennikat Press ,
1980 ; 72 - 117 .

27 Fred Charles Ikle , Every War Must End , New York : Columbia University Press , 1971 .
28 Bernice A . Carroll , " Victory and Defeat : the Mystique of Dominance " , On the End¬
ings ofWar [ fh . 26 ] , 56 .
 THE RADICALIZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES
297

sively the Katä ' ib , more so perhaps than other Christian communities , de -

parted from their earlier support of pluralist social arrangements and their

preference to a democratic dialogue for progressive reform . They reverted ,

instead , to a more fanatic anti - Islamic rhetoric . Such awakened parochial -

ism , associated with sectarian hostility , provided added Stimulus for the
cultivation of reflexive hatred .

Palestinians were likewise threatened by the fear of being liquidated .

Lebanon , by the mid - seventies , was their last abode so - to - speak . It had

become at the least their most Strategie stronghold . After the loss of its

Jordan base , the PLO was more entrenched in Lebanon . It also jealously

guarded the political and Strategie gains it had managed to carve there . The

1969 Cairo Accord , by rendering Palestinian refugee camps under PLO

control and , virtually , inaccessible to Lebanese authorities , was tantamount

to an act of national liberation . The logistical and ideological support they

were reeeiving from Arab radical and rejectionist regimes , particularly

after the Egyptian - Israeli peace accord , made their presence in Lebanon all

the more vital for their survival . Hence , they were protecting not merely

the Privileges and freedoms they had acquired in recent years , but also the

political setting which had nurtured and safeguarded their very existence .

So both major combatants were locked into that deadly zero - sum duel .

As the magnitude of sectarian fighting became bloodier , so did with each

renewed cycle of violence , the intensity of vengeance and enmity . Some -

time ago Anthony Storr warned that " it is more difficult to quell an im -

pulse toward violence than to arouse it " . 29 Once aroused it acquires a logic

of its own . It feeds on itself and becomes self - propagating . Again and

again , the omnipresent binary categories of diabolic " them " and virtuous

" us " resurfaced with sharper and more deadly intensity . The enemy is de -

monized further and the conflict is seen as a war between light and dark -

ness , between the virtuous and the damned . As ordinary , quiescent Citizens

are drawn into the vortex of such bellicose hostility , they too become more

amenable to being engulfed in this pervasive and ferocious enmity . Almost

overnight they are transformed into passive , helpless pawns caught up in

an inexorable process . Aroused communities buzz with pejorative anec -

dotes . Adversaries compete in assigning blame and trading invectives .

Attribution and name - calling escalates to new heights . Indeed , especially

in the early rounds of fighting , it was elevated to a high art of rancorous

political discourse . All the repressed residues of the past resurfaced . Ad¬

versaries , once pereeived as rigid , became hopelessly intransigent . " Isola -

tionists " degenerated into bigots and traitors . Disenfranchised and unan -

29 Anthony Storr , Human Aggression , New York : Bantam , 1968 .

298 SAMIR KHALAF

chored masses became aliens with " green faces " . " Borrowed ideologies "
became repressive , chaotic and obfuscating . In short , the bad became
worse ; the unsavory and undesirable degenerated into the repulsive and the
demonic .
One only has to read a sampling of war diaries and accounts of com -
batants , even dispassionate observers or neutral bystanders to highlight the
war - like implications of such predispositions . This seething enmity and
fanaticism is naturally more visible in the polemical platforms of warring
factions , militias and their affiliated political pressure groups and parties . It
also permeated the rest of the society . Pamphleteering , local histo -
riographies , position papers and public pronouncements became legion and
more rancid and divisive in tone and substance . So were church sermons
and Friday mosque khutbahs . Colorful wall graffiti , expressive street dis -
plays , Propaganda campaigns , elaborate obituaries of fallen fighters also
evolved their own populär images and art forms .
Though largely symbolic , in that such manifestations may not inflict
direct and immediate damage , they are nonetheless responsible for prepar -
ing the psychological and moral justifications for outward aggression .
Violence is thus rendered socially acceptable and tolerable . Even wanton
and gratuitous violence becomes , in the words of Robin Williams , " virtu -
ous action in the name of applauded values " 30 .
Like other such " ideologies of enmity " , as John Mack calls them 31 ,
they all converge on three overriding but related objectives : First , the glo -
rification of one ' s Community and the ominous threats to it . Communalism
in this regard becomes a rapacious scavenger . It feeds upon the awakened
sense of a privileged but threatened territorial identity . Second , the propa -
gation of mutual vilification campaigns whereby each group depicts the
" other " , as the repository of all the ills and pathologies of society . Ironi -

cally , the " other " as John Keane aptly puts it , is treated " simultaneously as
everything and nothing " . 32 The enemy is dreaded and feared , but he is also
arrogantly dismissed as inferior and worthless . Finally , the legitimization
of violence against the defiled other . 33

30 Robin Williams , " Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses of Violence " , in : Violence and the
Politics of Research , eds . Willard Gaylin , Ruth Machlin and Tabitha M . Powledge ,
New York : Plenum Press , 1981 , 23 - 45 .
31 John E. Mack , " The Enemy System ", The Lancet , August 13 , 1988 , 385 - 87 .
32 John Keane , Reflections on Violence , London , New York : Verso , 1996 .
33 For further details , see Mack , " The Enemy System " [ fn . 31 ] ; C .A . Pinderhughes ,
" Differential Bonding : Toward and Psychophysiological Theory of Stereotyping " ,
American Journal of Psychiatry 136 ( 1979 ) , 33 - 37 .
 THE RADICALIZATION OF COMMUNAL LOYALTIES 299

The moral and psychological implications of such strategies , though

self - evident , should not be overlooked . By evoking such imagery , the
" other " is transformed into a public menace , a threat to security and na¬

tional sovereignty . Hence it becomes easier to inflict violence against him .

At least the moral inhibitions , associated with such acts of aggression , are
suspended or removed . Indeed , aggression against the " other" assumes a
purgative value . It becomes an act of liberation , the only way to preserve
or restore national dignity and integrity . More palliating , it obviates much
of the guilt of having blood on one ' s hands . And this is not necessarily the
blood of strangers and distant enemies . Remorse in these instances is not
as poignant . But as the ferocity of combat descends into the callused
atrocities of internecine , intra - communal and turf warfare ( as it did when
Christian militias were eliminating their Christian rivals , the in - fighting
between Palestinian factions or between Amal and Hizbullah ) , the blood is
quite often the blood of brothers and kinsmen .
Alas , as the recent history of other episodes of " ethnic cleansing " teils
us , the alleviation of guilt in the frenzy of battle is only momentary . When
wars are nurtured by religious passions and the visceral hatreds that go
with them , they acquire a self - destructive momentum of their own and
they spiral , inexorably , out of control . Altogether they become harder to
forget and even much more difficult to resolve . Entrapped in such an un -
yielding and atrocious cycle of vengeance and reprisal , fighting in Leba -
non started to display many of the pathologies of barbarism inherent in
uncivil violence .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS

Hans G . Kippenberg

To address the issue of religious violence two hundred years after the pub¬

lication of Friedrich Schleiermacher 's On Religion : Speeches to its Cul¬

tured Despisers 1 is a provocation . Schleiermacher refuted any link between

religion and morals . From his perspective , religion stands in opposition to

morals and metaphysics ; as a result , it can have nothing to do with vio¬

lence or even crimes . This conception has had an overwhelming and long -

lasting impact on academic religious studies .

In 1972 , however , the situation changed suddenly . By chance , two

studies appeared , indicating a close link between religion and violence .

Walter Burkert , in Homo Necans , 2 scrutinized Greek sacrifice and traced

its specific elements to an archaic complex of ritual killing in hunting so¬

cieties . Rene Girard ' s La Violence et le Sacre , published independently of

Burkert in the same year , likewise addressed the issue of sacrifice . Accord¬

ing to both authors , sacrifice , at the heart of religion , is an ambivalent ac¬

tion - forbidden , as well as sacred .3

These studies came as a surprise , though the bond between religion

and violence is striking and scholars studying them not without predeces¬

sors . James George Frazer , in The Golden Bough , explained the rude cus¬

tom of succession of priests in the sacred precinct of ancient Aricia - the

successor had to kill the acting priest - as a savage world view , based on a

magical bond between the bodily strength of a priest and the fertility of

1 Friedrich Schleiermacher , Uber die Religion : Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren
Verachtern , Berlin : Unger , 1799 ( English edition : On Religion : Speeches to its
Cultured Despisers , tr . R . Crouter , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1996 ) .

2 Walter Burkert , Homo Necans : Interpretationen altgriechischer Opferriten und

Mythen [ 1972 ] , 2nd ed . , Berlin : de Gruyter , 1997 ( English edition : Homo Necans : The
Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth , tr . P . Bing , Berkeley : Uni¬
versity of California Press , 1983 ) .

3 Rene Girard , La Violence et le Sacre , Paris : Bernard Grasset , 1972 ( English edition :
Violence and the Sacred , tr . P . Gregory , Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press ,
1977 ) .
 HANS G . KIPPENBERG
302

land and beasts . 4 As Frazer pointed out in the preface of the first edition ,
he was inspired by his great teacher , William Robertson Smith . Smith had
been the first to recognize that " Sacred " was an ambivalent category , indi¬
cating either things deprived from daily use or actions prohibited in daily
life . What man is strictly prohibited to do , under normal circumstances , is
permitted in ritual action .5 This ambivalence toward sacred actions was not
restricted only to the case of sacrifice but also to rituals of reversal . 6 Take ,
for instance , the cAshura ' processions of the Shi cTs on the 10th day of
Muharram . When , in past times , Shi cis reenacted the battle of Karbala ' by
street fighting and people were killed , no perpetrator faced a legal charge
of homicide . 7 Christian carnivals also provided a similar pattern at times . 8
Rituals of reversal temporarily suspended valid norms .
The concept of sacred action became particularly important in the
study of social sciences . When Emile Durkheim attempted to explain the
rise of human society as an entity of its own , he adopted the concept . He
argued that the ambivalent structure of ritual actions is fundamental to
constituting a society . 9 In other words , when a group performs acts that are
usually forbidden , but in ritual are sanctioned by the Gods , the group es¬
tablishes a collective identity of its own . Participants transcend their indi¬
vidual interests and concerns . The realm of the Sacred , separated from the
mundane and profane , becomes a source of common morals and world
views . Durkheim ' s theory has had a tremendous impact on social and cul -

4 J. G . Frazer , The Golden Bough : A Study in Comparative Religion , 2 vols . , London -

New York : Macmillan , 1890 ; 2nd ed . : The Golden Bough : A Study in Magic and Re¬
ligion , 3 vols . , London - New York : Macmillan , 1900 ; 3rd . ed . : 12 vols . , London - New
York : Macmillan , 1911 - 1915 .
5 William Robertson Smith , Lectures on the Religion of the Semites . First Series : The
Fundamental Institutions [ 1889 ] , 2nd ed . , London : Black , 1894 .
6 We owe this understanding to Victor W . Turner , The Ritual Process : Structure and
Anti- Structure , New York : Aldine , 1969 .
7 Hans G . Kippenberg , " Jeder Tag ' Ashura , jedes Grab Kerbala : Zur Ritualisierung der
Strassenkampfe im Iran " , in : Religion und Politik im Iran , ed . Kurt Greussing , Frank -
furt/M . : Syndikat , 1981 , 217 - 56 ; idem , " How Dualistic Beliefs are Performed by
Shi ' is : The Stages of Kerbala " , in : Struggles of Gods : Papers of the Groningen Work
Group for the Study of the History of Religions , ed . Hans G . Kippenberg in association
with Han J .W . Drijvers and Yme Kuiper , Berlin - New York : Mouton , 1984 , 125 - 42 .
8 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie , Carnival in Romans : A People 's Uprising at Romans
1579- 1580 , Harmondsworth : Penguin , 1979 .
9 Emile Durkheim , The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life , London : Allen & Un -
win , 1976 ; for the claims of Durkheim ' s theory still unsurpassed : Steven Lukes , Emile
Durkheim : His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study, Harmondsworth : Pen¬
guin , 1973 .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS 303

tural studies . A strong version of the theory assumes that violent killing is
at the root of every society , 10 while a weak version suggests that violent
action can be justified by the interpretation of violence as ritual . 11
Analyzing two recent cases of religious violence - one Islamic and one
Christian - I argue that violence is part and parcel of religions and their
communities . " Religion is generated to tame a violent chaos , and to
achieve that end it must use a new or special form of violence " . 12 These
words by David C . Rapoport , an expert on modern terrorism , are crucial
for understanding the impact of religion on the recent rise of violence . In
this regard , the notion of ' terrorism ' has been defined differently than the
notions of crime and military action . Terrorist actions are intended to
shock . Committed in the name of justice and virtue , their perpetrators
search for public approval . The violence is symbolic , arising as a commu¬
nicative strategy . 13

Turning crimes into sacred deeds : Lebanese Muslims

Thirteen years ago , in 1988 , international newspapers reported about the

French journalist , Jean - Paul Kauffmann . He had been held hostage by
Shlls for almost three years , detained in various places around Lebanon .
His guards repeatedly aroused hope in him : " The nightmare will end
soon " . But their words were lies , spoken - as Kauffmann himself pointed
out - under taqiyyah . Though his words seem to support Western preju¬
dices against hypocrisy and lying in Islamic countries , the practice belongs
to an old and esteemed religious tradition . For a historian of religion , taqi¬
yyah or kitman is an old acquaintance . In a world full of injustice and igno¬
rance , genuine believers have to conceal their identity and deceive the
rulers of this world . An ancient world view , originating with Gnosticism ,

10 Burkert , Homo Necans [ fh . 2 ] , 45 : " Gemeinschaft entsteht . . . aus gemeinsamer Ag¬

gression " , a thesis the author himself later , in the re - edition of 1997 , called " exagger¬
ated and one sided " ( pp . 336 - 37 ) .
11 Burkhard Gladigow , " Homo publice necans : Kulturelle Bedingungen kollektiven To -
tens " , Saeculum 37 ( 1986 ) , 150 - 63 .
12 David C . Rapoport , " Some General Observations on Religion and Violence " , in : Mark
Juergensmeyer , Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, London : Frank Cass ,
118 - 40 (p . 135 ) .

13 Peter Waldmann , Terrorismus : Provokation der Macht , Munchen : Gerling Akademie ,

1998 , 10 - 14 . A comprehensive and well - based study of recent religious terrorism is
Mark Juergensmeyer ' s Terror in the Mind of God : The Global Rise of Religious Vio¬
lence , Berkeley : University of California Press , 2000 .
304 HANS G . KIPPENBERG

was adopted and transformed by the Shl 'Is . 14 As long as the Imam Mahdi
remains in occupation , true believers have to be cautious and conceal their
intentions and their identities . 15 Apparently , Kauffmann played a role in
this apocalyptic plot .
For the Lebanese Shri community , this age - old creed came to life
again , when its admired leader suddenly vanished amidst the troubled po¬
litical situation in 1978 . 16 Musa al - Sadr , a cleric of Persian origin , had
guided the community through the 1960s and 1970s and succeeded in cre¬
ating an organizational identity of the Lebanese Shrls . The Shi ci organiza¬
tion , Amal , was his work . After a meeting with President Ghaddafi in
Libya in August 1978 , Musa al - Sadr was never seen again . The Libyan
authorities said that he left Libya for Rome on Alitalia Flight 881 on Au¬
gust 31 , but he never arrived in Rome .
His followers , belonging mostly to the destitute class of people in
Lebanon , conceived of his fate in terms of their religious worldview . The
true Imam had entered occultation , due to the overwhelming power of the
enemies . In short , he will appear again in power . During his period of oc¬
cultation , those who struggle against the infidels have to observe secrecy
and dissimulation . This type of militancy has been known to Western ob¬
servers since the Medieval Ages , when the famous Assassins charged con¬
spiratorial attacks against selected enemies . 17 In spite of an obvious conti¬
nuity of that religious tradition in modern times , the types of perpetrators ,
motivations and victims have changed profoundly . Besides rulers , anony¬
mous people have also become the target of attacks .
In the 1980s , emulating the Iranian political ShPah , Shfl activists in
Lebanon founded another organization : Hizballah ( hizb allah ) or " the
Party of God " . The notion of ' organization ' is actually much too strong . At

14 Hans G . Kippenberg , Die vorderasiatischen Erlosungsreligionen in ihrem Zusammen-

hang mil der antiken Stadtherrschaft . Heidelberger Max - Weber- Vorlesungen , Frank -
fiirt/M . : Suhrkamp 1991 , 369 - 483 ; idem , " Die Verheimlichung der wahren Identitat
vor der Aufienwelt in der antiken und islamischen Religionsgeschichte " , in : Die
Erfindung des inneren Menschen : Studien zur religidsen Anthropologic , ed . Jan
Assmann , Gutersloh : Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn , 1993 , 183 - 98 .
15 Etan Kohlberg , " Some Imami - Shi ' i Views on Taqiyya " , Journal of the American
Oriental Society 95 ( 1975 ) , 395 - 402 ; idem , " Taqiyya in Shi ' i Theology and Religion " ,
in : Secrecy and Concealment : Studies in the History of Mediterranean and Near East¬
ern Religions , eds . Hans G . Kippenberg and Guy G . Stroumsa , Leiden : Brill , 1995 ,
345 - 80 .

16 For a lively account of the events and its repercussions see Fouad Ajami , The Vanished
Imam : Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon , London : Tauris , 1986 .
17 Bernhard Lewis , The Assassins : A Radical Sect in Islam , London : Weidenfeld &
Nicolson , 1967 .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS
305

that time , Hizballah was a loose network of 1ulama ' with their pupils

( ,taliban ) , dominated by divergent religious , local , and political loyalties . A

specific group responsible for violent attacks was called al -jihad al - islami .

It gained international infamy by bombing both barracks of the American

and French peacekeeping troops one morning in 1983 . 18 But this group ,

too , lacked any solid form . Though Hizballah leaders admitted involve¬

ment in group ' s operations , they contended that al -jihad al - islami did not

exist as an organization on its own . Apparently , the Arabic name was used

to disguise the true identity of its teams . The group was , rather , a ' tele¬

phone organization ' . 19 Compared to a bunch of grapes , various cells con¬

nected to the main organization but operated independently of one other ,

only loosely connected by a person in the background .20

While al -jihad al - islami claimed it was implementing Islamic law , its

actions in some cases contradicted this claim . Islamic law prohibits abduc¬

tion or killing of innocent people . As a result , the manner of fighting

evolved as a major issue . The accepted theological view is that suicide is a

grave sin , and the person who commits it is doomed to Hell .21 Self -

martyrdom through suicide , thus , was problematic . " The Muslim fighter

needed answers to many questions " , a well - known Hizballah cleric said in

an interview : " Is resistance to the occupation obligatory on religious

grounds ? What about the question of self - martyrdom ? " 22 Some fighters

wished for an explicit ruling sanctioning suicide attacks , a fatwa by Aya -

tollah Fadlallah , spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shris after Musa al - Sadr .

Fadlallah resisted the pressure . While rumors circulated that he had blessed

the suicide operations against the American and French barracks in Octo -

18 Martin Kramer , " Hizbullah : The Calculus of Jihad " , in : Fundamentalism and the State :
Remaking Politics , Economies , and Militancy , eds . Martin E . Marty and R . Scott Ap¬
pleby , Chicago : University of Chicago Press ( = The Fundamentalism Project ; 3 ) , 1993 ,
539 - 56 .

19 Magnus Ranstorp , Hizb 'allah in Lebanon : The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis ,
foreword by Terry Waite , New York : St . Martin ' s Press , 1997 , 62 - 65 ( " Use of cover -
names and concealment by Hizb ' allah in abduction of foreigners ").

20 Waldmann , Terrorismus [ fn . 13 ] , 61 - 68 .

21 Martin Kramer , " The Moral Logic of Hizballah " , in : Origins of Terrorism : Psycholo¬
gies , Ideologies , Theologies , States of Mind , ed . Walter Reich , Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press , 1990 , 131 - 57 (p . 142 - 43 fn . 24 ) ; idem , " The Oracle of Hizbullah :
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah " , in : Spokesmen for the Despised : Fundamental¬
ist Leaders of the Middle East , ed . R . Scott Appleby , Chicago : University of Chicago
Press , 1997 , 83 - 181 ( pp . 109 - 10 ) .

22 Kramer , " Hizbullah : The Calculus of Jihad " [ fn . 18 ] , 549 .

306 HANS G . KIPPENBERG

ber 1983 , he denied them 23 and chose not to rule decisively on the matter
of such attacks . Lesser clerics , on the other hand , were more specific .
When interviewed , the director of an Islamic institute in Sur ( Tyre ) ex¬
plained , " We believe that those who carried out suicide operations against
the enemy are , indeed , in paradise " . 24 Recent studies on terrorism agree
that approval by religious leaders is a necessary condition for violent ac¬
tion . 25
Not everyone who wanted to give his life for the sake of Islam could
expect to become a martyr . More was required than the readiness to die . At
least a cleric and an explosives expert had to support the plans for self-
martyrdom . Even then , not everyone was qualified ; women were excluded .
Only men were eligible , provided they were not yet married but old
enough to be deemed individually responsible for their actions . In a study
on this sensitive subject , Martin Kramer concluded , " Given the early age
of marriage in Lebanese Shfi society , this placed a low ceiling on the age
of possible candidates " . 26
The Persian passion play illustrates the importance of approval by oth¬
ers , particularly close relatives . Mother and sisters took part in a young
man ' s deliberations preceding his decision to support Husayn in his des¬
perate struggle against Yazid at Karbala ' . 27 Only when they approved his
decision he could become a martyr .
The particular requirement of approval by others introduces a new
element into suicide : selection and sacrifice . A young man has to be se¬
lected , even chosen , for sacrifice . This view is less inappropriate than it
might appear . In some so - called suicide attacks , the attackers were appar¬
ently fooled . The senders let them believe that the explosive charges had
been equipped with fuses with a 10 - minute delay , so that the attack team
could escape after placing them . In actuality , the fuses were designed to

23 Kramer , " The Moral Logic of Hizballah " [ fn . 21 ] , 142 - 49 ; Ranstorp , Hizb ' allah [ fn .
19 ] , 42 .

24 Kramer , " The Moral Logic of Hizballah " , 147 .

25 Bruce Hoffman , Inside Terrorism , London : Gollancz , 1998 , in his chapter on " Relig¬
ion and Terrorism " ; cf . Waldmann , Terrorismus [ fn . 13 ] , 107 .
26 Kramer , " Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon " , Terrorism and Political Violence
3 ( 1991 ) , 30 - 47 ( p . 40 ) ; this article was also published in Mark Juergensmeyer , ed . ,
Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World , London : Frank Cass , 1992 , 30 - 47 .
27 Robert Henry de Generet , Le Martiyre d 'Ali Akbar , Liege - Paris : Universite de Liege ,
1946 (= Bibliotheque de la Faculte de Philosophie et Lettres de l ' Universite Liege ,
fasc . 95 ) , 17 , 44 - 45 , 70 - 71 , 76 - 79 ; Kippenberg , " Jeder Tag ' Ashura , jedes Grab
Kerbala " [ fn . 7 ] , 240 - 41 .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS 307

detonate without delay . The attackers were ready to die but not seeking
death . 28 They were ' sacrificed ' .
Returning to the approval of religious leaders , when the military situa¬
tion changed in Lebanon and loss of life became unreasonable , Ayatollah
Fadlallah , the spiritual authority of Hizballah , withdrew his tacit support
entirely . In an interview , he explained : " We believe that suicide operations
should only be carried out if they can bring about a political or military
change in proportion to passions that incite a person to make of his body
an explosive bomb " . 29 This was no longer the case . The retreat of Israel
and the US from Lebanon certainly contributed to his change of mind . The
actions then became seen as mere military ones . The majority of the mili¬
tary attacks , anyway , had been without a specific Islamic background . 30
The military calculation , however , was not the only consideration . One
of the founding fathers of Hizballah , Husayn al - Musawi , though not a
cleric , supplied valuable insider information in an interview with the Ira¬
nian newspaper Kayhan . Hizballah had given " political and moral support ,
so that it would not look as if their actions were of a criminal nature . In
this sense , if it had not been for our propaganda , their actions would have
been condemned by the public as criminal acts . We have tried to make the
public understand that their action was in the nature of a jihad , launched by
the oppressed against the oppressors " . 31
As pointed out , terrorist actions addressed a public audience . The
search for public recognition constituted the difference between terrorism
and crimes or military actions . But that condition implied restrictions . The
perpetrators and their cells , asking for public approval , were dependent on
official religious leaders .
Western politicians and media had suspected from the very beginning
that Islam was responsible for the crimes . Don ' t the words of al - Musawi
confirm that powerful prejudice ? They do , and they do not . They confirm
that a criminal action can change class and be rendered religious . They
also indicate awareness that such an interpretation was dependent on other
factors . In some cases , the action was related to religious notions of the

28 Ariel Merari , " The Readiness to Kill and to Die : Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle
East " , in : Origins of Terrorism . Psychologies , Ideologies , Theologies , States of Mind ,
ed . Walter Reich , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1990 , 193 - 207 (pp . 194 -
95 ) .

29 Kramer , " The Moral Logic of Hizballah " [ fn . 21 ] , 148 .

30 Of 31 bomb attacks , only 7 were inspired by ShT c! notions of martyrdom . The others
were military operations organized by other groups . Cf . Merari , " The Readiness to Kill
and to Die " [ fn . 28 ] , 204 .

31 Kramer , " The Moral Logic of Hizballah " [ fh . 21 ] , 142 - 43 fn . 24 .

308 HANS G . KIPPENBERG

enemy . Birgitta Nedelmann has demonstrated that Islamic suicide bombing

in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv resonate Jewish notions of bodily identity .
While the Islamic martyr is expected to enter paradise , the Jewish victim ,
torn to pieces , is threatened in the eyes of the rabbis with losing even his or
her identity . 32

Turning crimes into sacred deeds : Christian Serbs

Abundant historical evidence exists to link religions , besides Islam , and
violence .
Take the Christian crusades against Muslims in the 11th and 12th cen¬
turies or the Christian persecutions of Jews in the 19th and 20th century .
Historical facts testify incessantly to Christians committing ruthless crimes
in the name of the Lord . These facts do not belong to a bygone past . The
war in Bosnia , raging between 1992 and 1995 , is a recent instance of
Christian violence , with the expulsion of Muslims from Kosovo a present
event .
The American scholar , Michael A . Sells , in his award - winning The
Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia , 33 not only collected
evidence of genocide but also analyzed the language of Western politicians
and media covering the events in Bosnia . Massacres , homicides , and rapes
all disappeared behind notions of " ethnic cleansing " or " Balkanism " .
" Balkanism is the distorted depiction of people of southeastern Europe as

barbaric , with the implication that violence , even genocide , is inevitable

and part of the local culture " . 34 The same holds true for the notion of " eth¬
nic cleansing " . The Serbian militia and troops in Bosnia intended - we
were told - to engage in " ethnic cleansing " . This term is rather misleading ,
given the common Slavic origin of the groups at war : Serbs , Bosnian Mus¬
lims and Croats . They " all speak the same language . They all trace their
descent to tribes that migrated to the area around the sixth century and
were Slavic in language and culture by the time they settled in the area " . 35
Western terminologies neutralized the character of the crimes and attrib -

32 Birgitta Nedelmann , " Die Selbstmordbomber : Zur symbolischen Kommunikation

extremer politischer Gewalt " , Eigenwilligkeit wid Rationalitat sozialer Prozesse :
Festschrift Friedhelm Neidhardt , eds . Jiirgen Gerhards and Ronald Hitzler, Opladen :
Westdeutscher Verlag , 1999 , 379 - 414 .
33 Michael A . Sells , The Bridge Betrayed : Religion and Genocide in Bosnia , Berkeley :
University of California Press , 1996 .
34 Ibid . , 125 .
35 Ibid . , 13 .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS
309

uted to them something strange and beyond control . The relation between

religions and rituals of purification has been revealed by Natalie Zemon

Davis for European history in the 17th century . 36

The Serbs were motivated to persecute by an event that occurred long

ago . In 1389 , the forces of the Ottoman Sultan clashed at Kosovo with the

Serb army . Its leader , Prince Lazar , lost not only the war but also his life .

His death on St . Vitus Day , June 15 ( today June 28 ) , marked the end of

Serb independence . From the point of view of the Serbian Orthodox

Church , the beginning of five centuries of Ottoman rule was a beginning of

five centuries of ' slavery ' . Among its members , legends flourished about

the battle , bravery and , foremost , treason . Ecclesiastical writings between

1390 and 1419 turned Lazar into a saint who deserved cultic devotion . His

remnants became relics , brought to Hungary in the 17th century , moved to

Belgrade in 1942 , and ' returned ' to Kosovo in a huge procession in 1989 . 37

In the 19th century , during the struggle for independence from Otto¬

man rule , the Battle of Kosovo became a major focus of a rising new
nationalist Serbian literature . Serbian writers conceived of Lazar as a

Christ - like figure surrounded by disciples , including Judas , the betrayer . In

the Serbian myth , Judas represented the Bosnians , who had converted to

Islam in higher proportions than other Slavic groups . The underlying

meaning of the myth was racist : genuine Slavs are Christians by nature ,

and conversion to Islam equals a betrayal of the Slavic race . 38

When Serb militias purified Bosnian towns of their Muslim popula¬

tions , they conceived of their actions in these terms . Western politicians

and the media reported horrible crimes committed by Serbs . The language

they engaged in the beginning , though , only reluctantly mentioned Christi¬

anity . The Bosnian case was too disturbing . Samuel Huntington has ar¬

gued , not without some success among politicians , that the struggle for

human rights was part of a Western heritage in contradiction with Islam . 39

Serbian Christians did not answer his stereotype of a clash of civilizations

along these lines . The Serbian Orthodox Church opposes the idea of uni -

36 Natalie Zemon Davis , " The Rites of Violence " , in : idem , Society and Culture in Early
Modern France : Eight Essays , Stanford : Stanford University Press , 1975 , ch . 6 . The
issue has been taken up recently by Barrington Moore , Jr . , Moral Purity and Persecu¬
tion in History , Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2000 .

37 Branimir Anzulovic , Heavenly Serbia : From Myth to Genocide , London : Hurst , 1999 ;
Julie A . Mertus , Kosovo : How Myths and Truths Started a War , Berkeley : University
of California Press , 1999 .

38 Sells , Bridge Betrayed [ fn . 33 ] , 36 .

39 Samuel P . Huntington , The Clash of Civilizations , New York : Simon & Schuster ,
1996 , ch . 8 .
310 HANS G . KIPPENBERG

versal human rights and rejects it as a grave sin , replacing God by man .
We should add that , even regarding Western history , Huntington ' s thesis is
biased . Not long ago , the majority of Western Christian theologians and
churches rejected the idea of universal human rights , as Friedrich Wilhe lm
Graf has pointed out . 40
The massacres in Bosnia started with collective actions , which turned
civilians into perpetrators of atrocities . Serb military co mm anders used
alcohol to break down the natural inhibitions of young men . " The final
dehumanization of the perpetrator occurred in ritualized fashion , when
young soldiers were forced to watch torture , gang rape , and killings and
forced to participate . To refuse was to risk death . To participate was to
learn to believe that the victims were not truly human anyway " . 41 By put¬
ting on masks , allegedly endowing them with supernatural power , 42 the
perpetrators turned into heroes of the past and their victims into race trai¬
tors and killers of the Christ - Prince Lazar . After their brute actions , sol¬
diers were administered Holy Communion . Since their deeds were ap¬
proved by most priests in the Serbian Orthodox Church , the Serb warriors
were not required to first confess their sins . 43 We easily can grasp the
logic : Turning a criminal action into a sacred one required respected reli¬
gious leaders . Without their approval and that of the religious community ,
the ' transubstantiation ' of the deeds of Serb warriors would not have oc¬
curred . If religious leaders or layman had withheld their consent , the deeds
would have remained ordinary crimes or military actions . Actual dissent
among Christians , which accompanied the violence against Muslims , was
severely repressed . 44

How to conceive of the destructive power of religion

If we compare the Western media ' s accounts of Bosnia with those of

Lebanon , we encounter a striking difference . In the case of Bosnia , they
focused mainly on the ethnic context of crimes - at the expense of reli -

40 Friedrich Wilhelm Graf , " Die umstrittene Allgemeinheit der individuellen Menschen -
rechte " , in : Unverfugbare Gewifiheit : Protestantische Wege zum Dialog der Religio -
nen , eds . Werner Brandle and Gerhard Wegner , Hannover : Lutherisches Verlagshaus ,
1997 , 72 - 87 .

41 Sells , Bridge Betrayed [ fn . 33 ] , 75 .

42 Victor Turner , The Ritual Process [ fn . 6 ] , contains a chapter explaining that practice :
" Status Reversal : The Masking Function " ( 161 - 66 ) .

43 Sells , Bridge Betrayed [ fn . 33 ] , 43 .

44 Ibid . , 17 .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS
311

gious conceptions . It was the other way around in the case of Lebanon .

The Western media , instead , focused on Islamic justifications - at the ex¬

pense of the military or political conflict , as if Islam itself incited people to

co mm it crimes . In both cases , the obvious link between religious rituals

and crimes was severed , and the ambivalence of religious violence broken

down in two distinct patterns of description .

Scholars of religions , blaming the media for its distorted view on Islam

or on the events in Bosnia , repeatedly urged the academic discipline to

take a glance in the mirror . 45 The dominant paradigm in comparative relig¬

ion , the so - called phenomenology of religion , has contributed tremen¬

dously to obscuring the violent character of religions . We can trace this

tradition back to Friedrich Schleiermacher . In 1899 , hundred years after

the first appearance of Schleiermacher ' s speeches , Rudolf Otto arranged a

new edition of the speeches . In the preface , he explained that the speeches

provided a program of " struggle against rationalist culture and the Philis¬

tinism of rationalism in the state , church , school , and society " 46 . Religion ,

the vision and feeling of the universe , represents a competence of man

independent of knowledge and morals 47

But where do we find that religion ? In his own important contribution

to the study of religion , The Idea of the Holy , Otto proposed a solution .

Since rational concepts are unable to obscure genuine religion , it can only

be grasped by calling upon feelings , " feelings which our discussion can

help to make clear to us , in so far as it arouses them actually in our

hearts . " 48 Through its elucidation as a primaiy given in life , religion can be

made accessible . Humankind , grasping the extraordinary power of the

divine , is fascinated and terrified at the same time . By means of this ap¬

proach , Otto collapsed the ambivalence of the Sacred into one single psy¬

chological category , mysterium fascinosum et tremendum , and removed all

dimensions of cognition and actions .

An entire succeeding generation of scholars of religions clung to that

45 Ibid . , 11 ; Bruce B . Lawrence , Shattering the Myth : Islam beyond Violence , Princeton :
University Press , 1998 ; Edward Said , Covering Islam : How the Media and the Experts
Determine How We See the Rest of the World, rev . ed . , New York : Random House ,
1997 .

46 Rudolf Otto , Preface , in : Friedrich Schleiermacher , Uber die Religion : Reden an die
Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern , ed . Rudolf Otto [ 1899 ] , 7th ed . , Gottingen :
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1991 , xi .
47 Ibid . , xviii .
48 Rudolf Otto , The Idea of the Holy : An Inquiry into the Non -Rational Factor in the Idea
of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational , New York : Oxford University Press ,
1958 , 13 .
312 HANS G . KIPPENBERG

idea They saw their task as describing a pure internal religion , instead of
.
an ambivalent external one . Religions , which were appealed to in public
and used for the justification of social or political aims , were suspected of
being ideology , no longer true religions . The academy , functioning like a
company , refined impure religion . In 1924 , Joachim Wach warned against
the danger of that approach . Pointing to the spread of " psychologism " in
religious studies , he suggested that scholars study religions as external
observable cultural facts , not merely as a psychological state of mind . 49
A particularly precarious notion in this regard is ' autonomy of relig¬
ion ' . Rudolf Otto conceived of religion as something independent of
knowledge and morals . A host of scholars of religions have conceived of
autonomy in a similar manner . I would like to call this approach mislead¬
ing . In Otto ' s day , there was a different understanding of ' autonomy ' , one
I regard as superior . - Philosophers , such as Hermann Siebeck and Wilhelm
Windelband , conceived of ' autonomy of religion ' as creating a split be¬
tween nature and mind , reality and norm , world and meaning , and object
and subject .
According to Max Weber , religious history has generated and estab¬
lished that split in Western culture . Protestant theodicy assumes an inevi¬
table tension between the facts of the world and the yearning for meaning .
This ' disenchantment ' of the world has been a precondition for the rise of
modern rationality . 50 Since the world lacks inherent meaning , meaning
must be attributed by man . Max Weber pointed out that the spread of a
' disenchantment ' of the world affected the character of the Western relig¬

ions themselves . In 1915 , in a chapter on the " Religious Rejections of the

World and their Directions " , he wrote , " Every increase of rationalism in
empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the
irrational realm ; but only today does religion become the irrational or anti -
rational supra - human power " . 51
This idea is similar to that of Rudolf Otto , with one important excep¬
tion . Weber rejected the idea that religious autonomy refers to a perennial
irrational , emotional competence . In his view , religions create a tension
between meaning and facts , allowing individuals to emancipate themselves

49 Joachim Wach , Religionswissenschaft : Prolegomena zu ihrer wissenschaftstheoretischen

Grundlegung , Leipzig : J .C . Hinrichs ' sche Buchhandlung , 1924 , appendix " Uber den
Psychologismus in der Religionswissenschaft " 193 - 205 .

50 Hans G . Kippenberg . Die Entdeckung der Religionsgeschichte : Religionswissenschaft

undModerne , Miinchen : Beck , 1997 , 188 .

51 Hans H . Gerth and C . Wright Mills , From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology , translated ,
edited and with an introduction , New York : Oxford University Press , 1946 [ many re¬
prints ] , 323 - 59 (p . 351 ) .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS 313

from the actual world . In reaction to the rise of rational orders in politics ,

economy , sexuality , art , and science , modern religions justify world rejec¬

tion . 52 It is worthwhile mentioning that the German philosopher , Hans

Blumenberg , recently conceived of the power of religions in a similar way :

" Creating a distance from an overwhelmingly powerful reality " . 53

When religions become systems of their own , and I think they do , it is

wrong to conclude that they must be described by ignoring other social

systems . It is useful to recall G . H . Mead ' s idea that identity is reciprocal

and constituted by relation with the ' other ' . 54 There is no claim of an

autonomous religion that doesn ' t affect attitudes to the established orders

of the world . Religions today empower individuals to reject existing or¬

ders . The arrival of the linguistic turn in religious studies has made it much

easier to reconsider the notion of autonomy . 55

The ambivalence of the Sacred can be conceived of according to alter¬

native interpretations . The very same action can be interpreted either as

murder or as a justified purification of the chosen community , as suicide or

as martyrdom . The meaning of an action depends on more ' than the feel¬

ings of an actor . It depends on the choice of interpretation , a choice that

can be contested . A theory of religion , which ignores this plurality , is

doomed to fail .

Philosophers and political constitutions that control religions

The relation between religion and violence has been an issue in Western

thought since the frightening wars that devastated Germany , France , and

England in the 16th and 17th centuries . The first to address this issue was

Thomas Hobbes , a contemporary of the religious wars of the 17th century

( 1588 - 1679 ) . 56 He suspected religions as major instigators of civil wars . In

52 Hans G . Kippenberg , " Religionsgeschichte in der entzauberten Welt " , in : Religion im

Wandel der Kosmologien , ed . D . Zeller , Frankfurt / M . : Peter Lang , 1999 , 33 - 46 .

53 Hans Blumenberg , Arbeit am Mythos , Frankfurt / M . : Suhrkamp , 1979 , 15 : " Distanzie -

rung von einer iibermachtigen Wirklichkeit ".

54 George Herbert Mead , On Social Psychology , ed . Anselm Strauss , Chicago : University

of Chicago Press , 1964 , ch . 7 .

55 Clifford Geertz , " Religion as a Cultural System " , in : idem , The Interpretation of Cul¬
tures , New York : Basic Books , 1973 , 87 - 125 .

56 Thomas Hobbes , Leviathan , or the Matter , Form , & Power of a Common - Wealth
Ecclesiastical and Civil [ 1651 ] , London : Penguin , 1968 . When Hobbes ' mother heard
that the Spanish Armada had entered British waters , she prematurely gave birth to me ,
he told in his autobiography . And he added : My mother " did bring forth Twins at once ,
both Me , and Fear " ( German translation : Leviathan oder Stoff Form und Gewalt eines
314 HANS G . KJPPENBERG

order to control the disastrous effects of religious power , the civil sover¬
eign had to become a Leviathan 57 or mortal God . In private , citizens were
free regarding their faith . When expressing it in public , however , they had
to take into account the internal peace of the community as a superior
value .
The opposite idea was argued by Samuel Pufendorf , Hobbes ' German
contemporary and author of a widely read book on natural law , De officio
hominis et civis iuxta legem naturalem libri duo , which was published in
1673 According to Pufendorf , the quality of social interaction among citi¬
.
zens was dependent on their religious conscience , which prevented them
from doing harm in secret . Only religion , not the state , could supply cohe¬
sion in society . Any decline in religious conviction would seriously un¬
dermine the moral bond . 58
Jean - Jacques Rousseau , who read and was impressed by Pufendorf ,
propagated his idea with tremendous success . According to Rousseau , the
quintessential religion is that of the heart . 59 Sentiments of the heart , not
verdicts by reason , are the best schoolmasters . Man has merely to consult
himself regarding what he intends to do : what he feels is good - is good ;
what he feels is wrong - is wrong . The best theologian is the conscience . 60
Oblivion of religion leads to an oblivion of human duties . Here the toler¬
ance of Rousseau suddenly breaks down . It is unimaginable to him that
atheists could be good citizens ; nothing is more dangerous to civil society
than atheism . But what about the problem Hobbes had addressed : the
threat of religious intolerance ? Rousseau dealt with it in his " De la Relig¬
ion Civile " , which was later added to his essay , Social Contract . The di¬
lemma is obvious . Abandonment of religion cannot be tolerated , since only
religion warrants the social bond . The social bond that religion supplies ,

kirchlichen und biirgerlichen Staates , ed . Iring Fetscher , Frankfurt /M . : Suhrkamp ,

1984 ; quotation p . XI of Fetscher ' s introduction ) .
57 The title refers to Job 41 :33 - 34 , telling about Leviathan , a mythological figure personi¬
fying chaos but defeated by God : " On earth it has no equal , a creature without fear . It
surveys everything that is lofty ; it is king over all that are proud " . Cf. Carl Schmitt ,
Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes [ 1938 ] , Koln : Hohenheim , 1982 ,
9 - 23 .

58 Samuel Pufendorf , Uber die Pflicht des Menschen und des Burgers nach dem Gesetz
der Natur , Frankfurt/ M . : Suhrkamp , 1994 , ch . 4 § 9 ( p . 56 - 58 )
59 Jean - Jacques Rousseau , La profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard . Aus dem vierten
Buch des "Emile " mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen, ed . Willibald Klatt , Heidelberg :
Carl Winter ' s Universitatsbuchhandlung , 1912 , 116 : " Le culte essentiel est celui du
cosur " .

60 Ibid . , 74 : " La conscience ne nous trompe jamais " .

 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS 315

though , does not contain tolerance . It is the political sovereign , in his un¬
derstanding the citizens themselves , who is able to restrain the destructive
forces of religion .
Immanuel Kant brought a new twist to the issue . Kant acknowledged ,
more than Rousseau had done , at least some of the value of historical relig¬
ions as ' vehicles ' for pure religion . Laymen should emancipate themselves
from ecclesiastical tutelage and use their own reason . Kant addressed that
process in his essay , Der Streit der Fakultaten ( 1798 , The Dispute among
the Faculties ) . 61 The faculties of theology , law and medicine are based on
writings sanctioned by the government : the bible , the law code , and the
medical order . It is the task of the faculty of philosophy to examine these
writings for their compliance with reason . An ongoing process of public
critical examination of authoritative writings , as opposed to distinct set of
common religious creeds , assures the moral bond among citizens and gen¬
erates tolerance .
The constitutions of emerging modern states contain clauses , which
still reflect the problem of tolerance . They guarantee freedom of ' religion '
but not of every religion . The notion ' separation of state and church ' is
misleading , insofar as it evokes the wrong impression that both spheres are
independent of each other . This is not the case . On the contrary ! In the
modern age , religion and state have maintained a specific relation . Take ,
for example , rulings of the United States Supreme Court dealing with al¬
leged violations of the First Amendment of the Constitution . The words of
the amendment sound very simple : " Congress shall make no law respect¬
ing an establishment of religion , or prohibiting the free exercise thereof " , 62
In fact , the words are not so simple . As one scholar observed : " The First
Amendment requires the Supreme Court to talk about religion . It also
mandates disestablishment " 63 .
We find blatant contradictions in the constitutions of other emergent
modern states as well . The effects of religion - oriented clauses are different
from their overt meaning . How should religion be distinguished from secu¬
lar moral or philosophical beliefs ? Clauses require a clarifying jurisdiction ,
which determines what religion is and is not . They do not disestablish re -

61 Immanuel Kant , Der Streit der Fakultaten [ 1798 ] , in : idem , Theorie - Werkausgabe,
vol . ll , Frankfurt / M . : Suhrkamp , 1977 .
62 Gerald Gunther and Kathleen M . Sullivan , eds . , Constitutional Law , 13th ed . , West -
bury - New York : The Foundation Press , 1997 , 1461 .
63 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan , Paying the Words Extra : Religious Discourse in the Su¬
preme Court of the United States , Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press , 1994 ,
181 .
316 HANS G . KIPPENBERG

ligion , per se , but establish a lasting legal discourse on ' genuine religion ' .
American and similar Western constitutional clauses are based on the am¬
bivalent function of historical religions in modern society . They are re¬
garded necessary in supplying a firm moral bond among citizens - and are
suspect of being a source of dangerous intolerance and offense of norms .

The notion 'religion '

The increasing importance of historical religions in the public discourse of

present societies has fostered a new discussion of the notion of ' religion ' .
Not so long ago , similar discussions addressed whether religions should be
defined ' substantively ' , as a feeling of dependence on the universe , or
' functionally ' , as the power of social cohesion or something else . One
author has counted more than 50 definitions . 64
Today , a related issue , the implication and impact of the Western no¬
tion of ' religion ' , is being urgently addressed . 65 To call Judaism , Islam ,
Hinduism , Buddhism and Confucianism ' religions ' is less self - evident than
even scholars of religions are aware . Actually , doing so introduces an ex¬
ternal Western principle into traditions . Scholars are constructing " relig¬
ion " from past traditions , conceived of as normative world views and eth¬
ics . Jonathan Z . Smith has pointed out that the notion ' religion ' is solely a
category of scholarly imagination . 66 We should take that point of view
much more seriously . Due to its conceptual strength , the Western notion of
religion has not remained in the confines of the academy . The German
social scientist , Friedrich H . Tenbruck , indicates that scholars of religions
still claim to be mere observers of religions . In actuality , the foundation of
this assertion has vanished . The history of religions has been affected by
scholarship . " Under the pressure of religious studies , modern religion has

64 James H. Leuba , Psychological Study of Religion , New York : Macmillan , 1912 , 339 -
61 .

65 Ernst Feil , Religio : Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs vom Friihchris -
tentum bis zur Reformation , Gottingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , 1986 ; Michel
Despland , La Religion en Occident : Evolution des idees et du vecn , Montreal : Fides ,
1979 ; Michel Despland and Gerard Vallee , eds . , Religion in History : The Word, the
Idea , the Reality , Montreal : Wilfried Laurier , 1992 .
66 Jonathan Z . Smith , " Religion , Religions , Religious " , in : Critical Terms for Religious
Studies , ed . Mark C . Taylor , Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1998 , 269 - 84 .
 RELIGIONS AND VIOLENT ACTIONS 317

been caught in a new situation and condition " . In other words , the claim to

validity of religious traditions has become dependent on religious studies . 67

As a normative category , ' religion ' has spread and received global rec¬

ognition ; a phenomenon Jacques Derrida has coined " global - latiniza -

tion " . 68 The Latin - Roman tradition contains an element crucial for that

transition . Roman ' religio ' always implied a contrast to ' superstitio ' or

' magicC as an illegitimate religion . The Romans were the first to develop

explicit criteria for discerning a licit from an illicit religion . One of the

most important criteria was ' public visibility ' . Rituals performed in secret

were suspicious and prosecuted by state officials . 69 This critical under¬

standing of ' religio ' underlies the Inquisition of the Middle Ages but did

not vanish with it . When modern state institutions began determining what

religion citizens were free to practice , they were still operating within the

Latin tradition of ' religio '.

Since religions are in a virtual state of tension with the existing order

in modern secular societies , they are subject to a permanent check and

control by the political community . At present , wars are raging between

religions and systems of law . These conflicts have obviously replaced the

struggle between science and religion , which was typical throughout the

second part of the 19th century .

At this point , I would like to propose an explanation for the cases of

Lebanon and Bosnia . The collapse of the public legal order in both states

terminated the public check of religions . Members of the Muslim and

Christian communities , at any given moment , were no longer bound by the

requirements of a legal system enforcing tolerance . The social circles to

which people belonged were reduced to religious allegiances . In such a

situation of decreasing social loyalties , religion was able to aggravate ex¬

isting conflict among citizens . When public examination ceases , religions

can become criminal , due to their inherent ambivalence .

For this reason , religious studies needs to consider the notion of crimi¬

nal religion . It indicates an inherent danger . Bruce Hoffman has presented

figures indicating an increase in the number of victims with the growth of

67 Friedrich H . Tenbruck , " Die Religion im Maelstrom der Reflexion " , in : Religion und
Kultur , eds . Jorg Bergmann , Alois Hahn , and Thomas Luckmann , Opladen :
Westdeutscher Verlag , 1993 , 31 - 67 (p . 35 ) .
68 Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo , Religion , Stanford : Stanford University Press ,
1996 , 11 , 29 - 30 .

69 Hans . Kippenberg , " Magic in Roman Civil Discourse : Why Rituals could be Ille¬
G
Envisioning Magic : A Princeton Seminar and Symposium , eds . Peter Schafer
gal " , in :
and Hans G . Kippenberg , Leiden : Brill , 1997 , 137 - 63 .
3 J8 HANS G . KIPPENBERG

religious commitment . 70 This is strong proof that religion , indeed , " has a
violence - producing dimension , one that is equally essential " for examina¬
tion by scholars of religious studies . 71

70 Hoffman , Inside Terrorism [ fn . 25 ] , in his chapter on " Religion and Terrorism " .
71 Rapoport , " Some General Observations on Religion and Violence " [ fn . 12 ] , 118 .
 LA VIOLENCE MILICIENNE
ET SA LÉGITIMATION RELIGIEUSE

Elizabeth Picard

L ' exemple des milices durant la guerre du Liban ( 1975 - 1990 ) offre un

riche éventail de caractéristiques et de variables sociologiques et politiques ,

propice à la construction d ' un paradigme de la violence . Par delà les débats

entre l ' explication des dynamiques politiques par l ' économie et l ' explication

par la culture 1, il est éclairant d ' inscrire l ' examen de la vio lence milicienne

dans une trajectoire historique qui en éclaire la genèse . Il est nécessaire

aussi de reporter son exercice à un projet de société en relevant les élé¬

ments que cette violence illégitime emprunte au modèle de l ' État - nation

dans une double tradition weberienne ( le monopole de la violence physi¬

que ) et schmittienne ( l ' Autre comme ennemi ) . Enfin , il ne faut pas man¬

quer de relever sa dimension instrumentale en référence à la compétition

pour le pouvoir à l ' intérieur des appareils miliciens .

Cependant la compréhension du phénomène milicien durant la guerre

du Liban réclame une attention particulière à la dimension religieuse de la

culture politique du pays . C ' est principalement dans cette dimension que le

groupe milicien puise la mythologique qui structure son discours identi¬

taire . Depuis le déclin du marxisme et des idéologies sociales , le discours

religieux apparaît comme l ' instrument privilégié de la mobilisation collec¬

tive et comme un nouveau mode de structuration politique . A ce titre il a

fortement marqué les consciences individuelles , le fonctionnement social ,

voire l ' institutionnalisation du politique .

Genèse des milices

La prolifération milicienne est un phénomène moderne , parfois ramené à la

contestation du système étatique mondial depuis l ' effondrement de

l ' URSS , et plus généralement associé à la faiblesse de la légitimité du mo -

1 Jean Leca , " L ' économie contre la culture dans l ' explication des dynamiques politi¬
ques " , Bulletin du CEDEJ 23 ( 1988 ) , 15 - 60 .
320 ELIZABETH PICARD

dèle statonational dans les pays du tiers monde . 2 Mais il est important de
remarquer qu ' elle n ' est ni inconnue de l ' histoire du Proche - Orient , ni
étrangère à son univers culturel . Des travaux historiques sur le Liban ,
consacrés à la dernière période ottomane et à la période mandataire en ont
mis à jour les prémisses éclairantes . Il ne s ' agit plus des systèmes
d ' autodéfense apparus épisodiquement dans les quartiers citadins de la

ville musulmane du Moyen Âge 3 , ni non plus de jacqueries suscitées par

une exploitation foncière et fiscale exorbitante , mais déjà de mobilisations
armées en réaction à un certain ordre politique . Lectures régressives , à la
lumière de la guerre de 1975 - 1990 ? La mobilisation commence dans les
années 1840 , durant la conquête d ' Ibrâhîm Pacha . Leur mission paramili¬
taire achevée avec succès , les montagnards conservent les armes qui leur
ont été distribuées , pour faire face à l ' inévitable revanche . Ensuite , des
villageois du Mont Liban et des habitants de plusieurs quartiers de
Beyrouth décident d ' armer et d ' entraîner des groupes de jeunes volontaires
en vue d ' affronter des groupes d ' autres communautés confessionnelles ,
considérés comme menaçants en raison de l ' évolution des équilibres dé¬
mographiques et économiques 4 . C ' est le moment d ' une rupture qualitative
avec les pratiques ancestrales d ' autodéfense familiale : importations
d ' armes financées par des citadins désireux de s ' acheter une protection

recrutée dans les villages 5 ; sanctification de la guerre par des religieux

pour qui elle offre l ' opportunité d ' étendre leur pouvoir temporel ; entraî¬
nement collectif et distribution d ' un uniforme ; passage à l ' offensive et aux
opérations préemptives jusque dans des régions éloignées 6 . La spirale

2 Nous faisons référence ici aux démonstrations de Bertrand Badie dans L 'État importé,
Paris : Fayard , 1992 , et surtout aux analyses de Joël Migdal , Strong Societies and
Weak States : State - Society Relations and Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton :
Princeton University Press , 1988 .
3 Claude Cahen , " Mouvements populaires et autonomisrne urbain dans l ' Asie musul¬
mane du Moyen Âge " , Arabica 5 ( 1958 ) , 225 - 50 ; 6 ( 1959 ) , 25 - 56 , 233 - 65 .
4 Une étroite corrélation existe entre ces deux ordres de facteurs , ainsi que le montre ,
pour le Liban , Dominique Chevallier , La société du Mont Liban à l ' époque de la révo¬
lution industrielle en Europe , Paris : Geuthner , 1971 ; et pour l ' Orient arabe plus géné¬
ralement , Youssef Courbage et Philippe Fargues , Chrétiens et Juifs dans l 'islam arabe
et turc , Paris : Fayard , 1992 .
5 Samir Khalaf , " Communal Conflict in 19th - century Lebanon " , dans : Christians and
Jews in the Ottoman Empire : The Functioning of a Plural Society, eds . Benjamin
Braude et Bernard Lewis , New York : Holmes & Meier , 1982 , vol . 2 , 108 ; Yehoshua
Porath , " The Peasant Revolt of 1858 - 61 in Kisrawàn " , Asian and African Studies 2
( 1966 ) , 77 - 157 .

6 Leila Tarazi Fawaz , An Occasion for War : Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damas eus in
1860 , London : I . B . Tauris , 1994 .
 LA VIOLENCE MILICIENNE
321

s ' accélère quand l ' État ottoman reprend le contrôle du Mont Liban et tente

d 'y imposer l ' égalité des citoyens . Deux groupes communautaires aux

intérêts politiques rivaux s ' affrontent par les armes . La défense du terri¬
toire tribal soude les combattants à leurs chefs . L ' État ottoman n ' intervient

que tardivement et , une fois l ' ordre rétabli , il s ' emploie à effacer les traces

de " l ' agitation " ( harakât ) . Pourtant , derrière l ' histoire officielle de la " lon¬

gue paix ' "7 qui suit le règlement politique imposé par les Européens en

1861 , puis sous l ' amnésie tranquille du Grand Liban pluricommunautaire

fondé en 1920 , vainqueurs et vaincus garderont une mémoire vive de cette

première guerre civile : le triomphe de la force brute , la supériorité de

l ' entraînement et de la discipline sur le nombre , le caractère simpliste de la

distinction ami / ennemi , et son traitement radical : tuer dans l ' autre camp .

Dans l ' histoire contemporaine du Liban , les harakât de 1860 ne sont

pas le seul exemple d ' une mobilisation populaire qui défie l ' ordre étatique

et échappe aux forces régulières . Durant la première décennie du mandat

français , l ' armée fut confrontée à une série d ' insurrections menées par des

bandes armées ( Hsàbàt ), qui culminèrent avec le soulèvement du Jabal

Druze en 1925 . La mobilisation villageoise et tribale enflamma toute la

Syrie , mais aussi le Chouf et le Liban sud dont les populations

n ' acceptaient pas leur séparation d ' avec la Syrie . Les Hsâbât présentent des

caractéristiques qui suggèrent de les inscrire dans la genèse de la mobilisa¬

tion milicienne : d ' abord , ces forces autochtones s ' affrontèrent plus souvent

entre elles qu ' avec l ' année d ' occupation - en particulier au Liban sud où

les villages prirent parti pour ou contre les Français en fonction des rivali¬

tés entre patrons traditionnels ( za cïm , pl . zifamâ *) . Ensuite , elles conservè¬

rent un caractère local , un objectif d ' autodéfense , et furent organisées sur

une base volontaire et temporaire , et articulées lâchement avec la protesta¬

tion politique urbaine simultanée . Au Liban , de surcroît , elle n ' ont pas

connu la généralisation et l ' ampleur qu ' elles ont eues en Syrie . N ' empêche

que , mobilisées par leur hostilité à l ' égard du pouvoir étatique , elles ont
contribué à structurer militairement et mentalement les désaccords internes

sur le destin du pays .

Harakât et Hsàbàt sont deux temps forts de la mobilisation armée de la
société libanaise , et le phénomène milicien durant la guerre de 1975 en

reproduit nombre de traits . A l ' annonce d ' une provocation - crime de sang

ou empiétement d ' un territoire communautaire - les hommes sortent leurs

armes ( au début , des armes de chasse et bientôt , des armes de guerre dont

le prix sur le marché va s ' effondrer ) et rejoignent le leader local qui orga -

7 Engin Akarli , The Long Peace : Ottoman Lebanon 1861 - 1920 , Berkeley : California
University Press , 1993 .
322 ELIZABETH PICARD

nise la défense , dresse les barrages , assure la liaison avec les groupes al¬
liés . Sans transition , les hiérarchies du temps de paix sont renversées , la
topographie revisitée . Bien souvent aussi , comme en 1860 et en 1925 , ce
sont les combattants qui entraînent le village ou le quartier dans les affron¬
tements en s ' y repliant ou en prétendant se charger de sa protection . Et la
bataille , que leur seule présence suscite , rompt les accords passés à
l ' extérieur , et impose leur domination à l ' intérieur du groupe . 8 Honneur et

sécurité du groupe , solidarité lignagère , supériorité de la force armée : les

critères sont unanimes et leur transgression rare , si bien que le groupe so¬
cial bascule sans transition dans la guerre .
Se pose immédiatement la question de l ' inscription de ce processus de
militarisation de la société dans " pattern " de fonctionnement social , qui
éclaire la centralité des hommes en armes . Une piste séduisante est fournie
par la référence à la " société guerrière " étudiée par Pierre Clastres : 9 ses
réflexions suggestives sur la relation intime entre les combattants et leur
société , et surtout sur la dégradation de cette relation dans la phase où les
combattants choisissent de perpétuer la guerre afin de maintenir leur statut ,
aux dépens d ' une population qui en supporte les effets négatifs . Hypothé -
tiquement indistincts de la " société - pour - la - guerre " dont ils sont partie
intégrante et dont ils ont pour mission d ' assurer la défense , les " guerriers "
incarnent en principe les vertus de cette société : solidarité familiale , foi ,
attachement à la terre , bravoure . Dans la réalité , ils développent collecti¬
vement un ethos guerrier et une institution militaire ( la milice ) . Ils " main¬
tiennent les communautés dans la multiplicité en creusant et recreusant
sans cesse l ' écart entre elles " . 10 Devenus menaçants en raison de leur capa¬
cité à s ' instituer comme " organe politique séparé de la société " 11 , il " pour¬
rait se faire qu ' ils en viennent à exercer aussi [ leur violence ] sur leur pro¬
pre société " 12 . Ils seraient alors rejetés par une société devenue " société
contre le guerrier " .

8 Processus décrit et analysé par Ahmed Beydoun , " L ' été 1976 au Liban Sud " , dans :
Liban: Itinéraires dans une guerre incivile, Paris : CERMOC - Karthala , 1993 , 129 - 69 .

9 Pierre Clastres , " Malheur du guerrier sauvage " , Libre 2 ( 1977 ) , 69 - 109 . Cette théma¬
tique est évoquée dans la conclusion de Samir Kassir , La guerre du Liban : De la dis¬
sension nationale au conflit régional , Paris : Karthala - CERMOC , 1994 , 494 , reprenant
une réflexion développée par Fadia Nassif , Les rumeurs pendant la guerre du Liban ,
thèse de doctorat , Paris V , 1992 , 107 - 08 .
10 Clastres , " Malheur du guerrier sauvage " [ note 9 ] , 71 .
11 Ibid ., 77 .
12 Ibid . , 88 .
 LA VIOLENCE MILICIENNE 323

Une culture de guerre

La référence au type idéal de la " société guerrière " présente l ' avantage

d ' éclairer globalement la trajectoire des organisations miliciennes dans la

guerre de 1975 - 1990 - leur surgissement irrépressible au sein des groupes

locaux et communautaires , leur institutionnalisation , la montée de leurs ambi¬

tions hégémoniques , et enfin leur marginalisation et leur criminalisation . Mais

une telle schématisation laisse échapper une dimension anthropologique ma¬

jeure : celle de la fonction de la violence dans les dynamiques sociales , qui

rend beaucoup plus complexe la relation entre le guerrier et la société .

D ' une part , dans les régions pluricommunautaires et pluriethniques de

l ' ancien Empire ottoman , comme dans certaines autres régions méditerra¬

néennes , les cycles d ' agression et de représailles entre segments ennemis

contribuent autant au maintien de la solidarité interne d ' un groupe qu ' au

rééquilibrage démographique , économique et hiérarchique entre les grou¬

pes . 13 La violence est au cœur des relations familiales , claniques et com¬

munautaires : violence physique ( menace aux cultivateurs , attaques par des

hommes de main , rapts et viols ) , renforcée par une violence symbolique :

appropriation de l ' honneur ( par la généalogie ) et de la mémoire collective

( l ' histoire d ' une famille ) , autant de pratiques " sanctifiées " par la narration
collective réitérée des actes et des situations violentes . 14 A la différence du

modèle cyclique d ' Ibn Khaldùn dans lequel destruction et reconstruction

se succèdent au rythme des dynasties ( dawlah ) qui recommencent chaque

fois le processus d ' accumulation ( mulk ) en invoquant une nouvelle légiti¬

mité sacrée ( da ' wah ) , mais aussi à la différence du modèle de la société

guerrière , la violence des sociétés agonistiques de l ' Est méditerranéen ne

peut être comprise dans sa seule dimension stérile et destructrice .

D ' autre part , lorsqu ' on cherche à cerner les formes d ' organisation so¬

ciale parasitées par le phénomène milicien , il est important de prendre en

compte l ' ambivalence fondamentale des relations entre segments dans les

sociétés plurielles à l ' Est de la Méditerranée . Non seulement ces sociétés

13 Cette fonction structurante de la violence ne caractérise pas seulement les sociétés

segmentaires , cf. Pierre Bourdieu , Sociologie de l 'Algérie [ 1959 ] , Paris : PUF , 1980 ,
mais aussi une société stratifiée comme la société française , cf. Alain Corbin ,
" L ' histoire de la violence dans les campagnes françaises au XIXème siècle " , Ethnolo¬
gie française 21 ( 1991 ) 3 , 231 sq .
14 Michael Gilsenan , " Domination as a social practice : Patrimonialism in North Lebanon :
Arbitrary power , desecration , and the aesthetics of violence " , Critique of Anthropology 6
( 1986 ) 1 , 17 - 37 . Plus consciemment élaborée , et tendue par un projet politique explicite ,
l ' expérience maoïste de Yennan systématise l ' intériorisation de la violence symbolique
par un groupe militant . Cf. David Apter et Tony Saich , Revolutionary discourse in
Mao 's Republic , Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 1994 .
 ELIZABETH PICARD
324

ont développé à travers les siècles des conduites d ' évitement codées par
des coutumes d ' une extrême subtilité , mais elles sont capables d ' inverser
ou de contrôler les effets d ' une relation hostile par des règles
d ' hospitalité 15, d ' asile 16 , et plus généralement de voisinage 17 , dont les ver¬

tus sécuritaires sont concurrentes de celles de la protection des armes . Peu

de sociétés ont cultivé un tel art du débat et du négoce - pas seulement
celui des marchandises mais celui des trêves (sulhah ) et de leur garantie -
tout en conservant des formes de subordination et de domination codifiées
et intériorisées . Enfin , et surtout , les clivages qui segmentent ces sociétés
sont traversés de réseaux d ' intérêt ou de solidarité dont la densité et le bon
fonctionnement tissent des liens de réciprocité bénéfique , une réciprocité
aussi puissante que celle de la violence . Pourtant , il importe de ne pas di ~
chotomiser le partage des valeurs et la distribution des pratiques dans la
guerre au Liban : la convivialité de la société ne vient pas tempérer la
" culture de guerre " des miliciens , pas plus qu ' elle ne tempérait autrefois

les rivalités segmentaires . L ' une et l ' autre se combinent sur un mode com¬
plexe , où les civils peuvent extérioriser la haine de l ' étranger et porter les
mythes de la mobilisation milicienne 18 tandis que les combattants de la
ligne de front partagent une vision cynique du sens de leur mission et
nourrissent même entre eux une relation intime 19 . Cette complexité rend
problématique le dénouement du système de guerre , lorsque ce dénoue¬
ment prétend distinguer guerre et paix , coupables et victimes , combattants
et civils , etc .
Plus critiquable est le fait que le modèle de la " société guerrière " ,
construit dans une perspective anthropologique , s ' applique aux sociétés
sans État dans lesquelles la distinction entre violence fondatrice et violence
conservatrice n ' est pas opérée . 20 Or , dans le cas libanais , la problématique
milicienne se développe au contraire en contrepoint de celle de l ' État mo -

15 Jean Hannoyer , " Hospitalité , économie de la violence " , Maghreb -Machrek 123 (jan¬
vier - mars 1989 ) , 226 - 40 .
16 La notion d ' asile comme ressource de la coexistence confessionnelle au Proche - Orient
a été proposée par Albert Hourani , Syriu and Lebanon : A Political Essay, London :
Oxford University Press , 1946 , 129 - 39 .
17 Xavier Bougarel , " Voisinage et crime intime " , Confluences Méditerranée 13 ( hiver
1994 - 95 ) , 75 - 89 .
18 Marlène Nasr Abou Chedid , " Le Gharîb ( étranger ) ou la difficulté d ' être dans le dis¬
cours libanais sur la guerre civile " , Mots 17 ( 1988 ) .
19 Fawaz Traboulsi , " De la violence : Fonctions et rituels " , Peuples Méditerranéens 64 -
65 (juillet - décembre 1993 ) , 57 - 86 .
20 Georges Balandier , " La violence et la guerre : une anthropologie " , Revue internatio¬
nale des sciences sociales 110 ( 1986 ) , 536 .
 LA VIOLENCE MILICIENNE
325

deme dont elle conteste les excès et souligne les faiblesses . Des balbutie¬

ments de l ' Emirat du Mont Liban à la naissance de la République libanaise

et à son implosion , c ' est bien le problème de l ' État au Liban qui suscite les
mobilisations : celui de ses dimensions , de sa nature , de son insertion dans

la région et du traitement de ses populations . C ' est surtout celui de la légi¬

timité de la construction d ' une force armée détentrice du monopole de la

violence , en raison de la précarité de l ' identité nationale . Sous ces diffé¬

rents aspects , la question de la mobilisation milicienne au Liban mérite

d ' ailleurs d ' être étudiée dans une perspective comparative , en particulier à

l ' intérieur des espaces marqués par la tradition ottomane .

Transitionnelle dans la phase finale de l ' Empire ottoman , la mobili¬

sation de forces paramilitaires prend un caractère moderne au tournant

des années 1930 . Les organisations qui prolifèrent alors au Moyen -

Orient arabe , clubs de jeunes et de sport , scoutisme , gangs locaux et

troupes stipendiées d ' un grand propriétaire foncier , ont pour point com¬

mun de se préparer à l ' affrontement physique , en même temps qu ' elles

sont l ' origine de la fondation des premiers partis programmatiques . Au

Liban , ces mouvements subissent directement l ' influence des fascismes

européens , comme d ' ailleurs le kémalisme turc ou les partis Ba cth de

Syrie et d ' Irak , nonobstant la domination de deux grandes démocraties ,

le Royaume Uni et la France , sur le Moyen - Orient . Le recrutement des

jeunes , l ' entraînement sportif , la démonstration machiste et la fidélité au

chef priment le débat politique , tandis que le lyrisme et la tonalité escha -

tologique du discours habillent un projet corporatiste et autoritaire . Dans

leur organisation ( militarisée , en uniforme , et hiérarchisée ), dans leur

mode d ' action ( les manifestations de masse et les affrontements de rue

entre groupes rivaux ), dans leur recrutement , aussi ( des enfants de la

petite bourgeoisie nouvellement urbanisée et enrichie et des hommes de

main recrutés par un patron , ces mouvements préfigurent la mobilisation

milicienne dans la guerre . Leur mutation volontaire ou contrainte en

partis politiques " civils " dans la première décennie de l ' indépendance ne

fait pas disparaître le noyau dur de leur mobilisation , inscrit dans la mé¬
moire vive de la société . 21

21 Frank Stoakes , dans un article très documenté " The Supervigilantes : The Lebanese
Kataeb party as builder , surrogate and defender of the state " , Middle Eastern Studies
11 ( 1975 ) 3 , 215 - 36 , attribue la permanence de la centralité militaire chez les Phalan¬
gistes , même après leur " civilianisation " , à la rigidité des institutions du parti , imitées
de celle des fascismes européens .
326 ELIZABETH PICARD

Violence et projet de société

Les ingrédients sont présents dès le début de la guerre pour le développe¬

ment du phénomène milicien : une tradition d ' autodéfense , les dysfonctions

d ' une société confrontée aux apories d ' une modernisation manquée , et la

mobilisation des deux matrices jumelles , Katâ ' ib et palestinienne . De prime

abord , le phénomène s ' impose comme une évidence . Le terme de milice

passe dès les premiers mois des affrontements dans le vocabulaire des Liba¬

nais . Pourtant , il recouvre une multitude de postures et de pratiques , qui va¬

rient dans les épisodes de la guerre , au gré des localisations , des références

d ' appel , et surtout de stratégies individuelles ou collectives . Celui qui vou¬

drait en tenter la typologie pourrait se retrouver dans la position des botanis¬

tes du XIXe siècle : multipliant à l ' infini les catégories , construisant des critè¬

res arbitraires . Il en perdrait de vue la structure fondamentale . Or , à partir de

polarisations préexistantes nourries de constructions idéologiques antagonis¬

tes , les milices libanaises ont produit et mis en forme , en les faisant passer

par l ' épreuve de la violence , une culture politique commune nouvelle : elles

ont recomposé l ' espace et redéfini les identités en sélectionnant des éléments

du stock culturel du pays marginalisés en période de paix , et en s ' appuyant

sur de nouvelles bases sociales - générationnelles , géographiques et écono¬

miques . D ' autant qu ' en négatif de leur entreprise de " chaos planifié " combi¬

nant destruction et organisation 22 se profile continuellement la référence à

l ' État , leur ligne d ' horizon et leur pierre d ' achoppement .

Au commencement de l ' entreprise milicienne est la question de la sécu¬

rité . La milice est désormais seul maître de l ' espace où elle se déploie , et de

ses populations . Elle recompose une perception du monde à la mesure de ses

moyens militaires . A l ' intérieur de l ' espace qu ' elle contrôle , ce sont les terri¬

toires " libérés " , les régions " démocratiques " , le " Liban libre " , etc . A l ' exté¬

rieur , elle affronte l ' ennemi . En même temps , chacun de ces territoires est

travaillé par un double mouvement d ' unification et de division , signe de la

précarité des frontières dessinées par une logique de milices dont l ' objectif

premier reste le contrôle de leur propre communauté . Car c ' est d ' abord la

légitimité des ambitions des milices qui est en cause . Au long de la guerre ,

leur prétention à récupérer , à reconstituer , et surtout à dominer exclusive¬

ment des territoires communautaires en continuité historique avec un terroir

ancestral , est continuellement prise en défaut . L ' histoire séculaire du Liban

est d ' ailleurs celle de la recomposition incessante de la carte politique et

démographique , sous l ' effet des conquêtes militaires ou des mutations éco -

22 Issa Makhlouf , Beyrouth ou la fascination de la mort, Paris : Editions de la Passion ,

1988 , 141 . Ce passage est un commentaire de l ' œuvre du peintre Assadour , " prophète
de la tragédie libanaise " .
 LA VIOLENCE MILICIENNE
327

nomiques , en même temps que sous l ' impulsion de stratégies d ' acteurs

concurrents . Si bien que les références territoriales et événementielles consti¬

tuent des mythes ravivés et instrumentalisés par les milices et offerts , voire

imposés , à la mobilisation populaire .

Dans cette gestion militaire du territoire , la référence implicite aux

fonctions sécuritaires de l ' État , en particulier dans un contexte de guerre ,

est présente mais pervertie puisque la règle de droit universelle est récupé¬

rée par des factions illégitimes rivales . Tout à la fois armée et police , la
milice assume des tâches de défense aux frontières et de maintien de la

cohésion interne . Or , parce qu ' elle n ' est qu ' un substitut de l ' armée régu¬

lière , et surtout en raison de l ' imbrication physique et psychologique entre

civils et militaires dans l ' espace urbain où elle se déploie , elle est conduite

à inverser les valeurs collectives de la sécurité ; elle fait naître le danger et

apparaître la peur .

A l ' intérieur du territoire qu ' elle contrôle , la milice vise l ' adhésion du

groupe à une identité commune , à la fois héritée et ' inventée ' en son sein ,

qui fonde la distinction ' ami / ennemi ' et légitime son entreprise . Mais l ' im¬

plication des civils dans le projet milicien est un processus chaotique , sans

cesse remis en cause , parce que la société libanaise est caractérisée par la

pluralité des appartenances identitaires et l ' étonnante fluidité de ses ali¬

gnement politiques , sans oublier la subtilité de dynamiques qui prennent

appui sur les clivages entre segments pour multiplier les échanges . A ce

désordre social apparent ( car les observations des anthropologues montrent

qu ' au contraire il est minutieusement codifié et qu ' il organise la civilité ) , il

faut donc opposer un ordre simple . C ' est pourquoi la participation de la

société à la violence vise à réduire la pluralité et à calcifié les identités

antagonistes , pour lui faire intérioriser l ' idéal unidimensionnel de la mi¬

lice .

Pourtant , si les milices ont infligé un traumatisme durable à la société ,

si la culture de la violence et la fragmentation identitaire sont des caracté¬

ristiques observables encore dans le Liban de l ' après - guerre , l ' adhésion

des populations au projet milicien pendant la guerre même fut moins cer¬

taine . On a pu observer des passages individuels au militantisme , aussi

bien de la part de ruraux sensibles à Y esprit de corps de la milice , que

parmi la jeunesse étudiante de Beyrouth , touchée par le syndrome de mai

68 , en quête à la fois d ' aventure et de discipline - les uns et les autres

cherchant à échapper à la crise matérielle et morale que traverse leur

pays . 23 On remarque aussi des adhésions collectives de type tribal , bapti -

23 Dans un tout autre contexte , on retrouve le thème de la crise identitaire évoqué par
Christian Geffray à propos des jeunes du Mozambique de la guerre civile ( Christian
328 ELIZABETH PICARD

sées dans le sang et liées par les règles de la vendetta . Mais , au - delà des
premiers réflexes d ' autodéfense dans les quartiers , l ' intimité entre la popu¬
lation et la milice se dégrade à mesure que cette dernière s ' institutionnalise
et se professionnalise . De plus en plus , elle est ressentie comme étrangère à
la fois en raison de l ' origine de ses membres et de son mode de fonction¬
nement économique . Le rejet du guerrier , tel qu ' évoqué par Clastres , mani¬
festé par les marches de protestation franchissant les frontières des territoi¬
res miliciens , dont la plus importante , en 1987 , coïncide d ' ailleurs avec la
naissance d ' ONGs locales et avec un réveil du syndicalisme .
Il ne faut pas cependant tomber dans l ' excès qui consiste à dissocier to¬
talement la société de la milice dans l ' expérience de la guerre et , dans la
hâte de refermer la parenthèse milicienne , dissimule bien des zones
d ' ombre refoulées par la mémoire . Par delà l ' ambivalence psychologique

adhésion - rejet qui a touché l ' ensemble de la population dominée par les
milices , celles - ci sont , par leur positionnement au carrefour du répertoire
de la violence et de celui de l ' identité , les agents privilégiés de la restructu¬
ration de leur société d ' appartenance dans un ordre social et moral englo¬
bant les miliciens en sanctionnant celui qui en refuse les règles .
La réflexion sur la production dans la violence d ' une nouvelle identité
sociale doit être complétée par l ' examen d ' un processus qui en modifie le
sens jusqu ' à mettre en cause sa réalité : la compétition pour le pouvoir à
l ' intérieur des appareils miliciens . C ' est qu ' à l ' origine , les milices sont

fondées d ' abord sur un projet militaire qui réclame mobilisation , organisa¬
tion et hiérarchisation du groupe sans ambiguïté , tandis que leurs référen¬
ces identitaires demeurent brouillées par des sensibilités et des intérêts
contradictoires . Leurs leaders sont des chefs de guerre , qui ne se départis¬
sent pas facilement d ' un mépris à l ' égard du politique . Pour se hisser à la
tête du groupe et ensuite maintenir son leadership et conserver les bénéfi¬
ces matériels et symboliques qui y sont liés , le guerrier privilégie l ' affron¬
tement par les armes . La pérennisation du conflit , jusqu ' à ce que des inté¬
rêts stratégiques extérieurs en imposent l ' arrêt , procède de la logique
même du système milicien . Les enjeux économiques sous -jacents à la
compétition intramilicienne sont d ' ailleurs déterminants au point que le
phénomène milicien , lisible à partir de la distinction fondatrice
' ami/ ennemi ' , doit aussi être analysé à partir d ' un questionnement sur la
détention et la redistribution des richesses . 24

Geffray , La cause des armes au Mozambique : Anthropologie d 'une guerre civile , Pa¬
ris : Karthala , 1990 , 180 - 11 ) .

24 Elizabeth Picard , " Liban : La matrice historique " , dans : Economie des guerres civiles ,
eds . François Jean et Jean - Christophe Rufïn , Paris : Hachette , 1996 , 63 - 104 .
 LA VIOLENCE MILICIENNE
329

Le rituel et sa signification

Dans le contexte généralisé de perte de repères et de déstabilisation , lors¬

que les liens se brisent entre une société et les certitudes de son passé , la

reconstruction identitaire passe par un discours de rupture et d ' éman¬

cipation . Rupture avec les " autres " - et au Liban il s ' agit prioritairement
des autres communautés - dans l ' intention de renforcer la cohésion du

groupe . Et rupture avec les politiciens traditionnels et l ' État .

Depuis le milieu des années 1970 , les mouvements politiques liba¬

nais ont eu recours de façon croissante au discours religieux , une ten¬

dance qui a affecté de nombreuses communautés confessionnelles du

Moyen - Orient , y compris ( voire surtout ) en Israël . A Tripoli , le sociolo¬

gue Michel Seurat ( qui trouva la mort dans une prison du Jihâd islami¬
que en 1985 ) a étudié la trajectoire d ' un groupe soudé par des liens loca -
listes , familiaux et communautaires , et par sa confrontation avec les mili¬

tants des quartiers voisins . 25 Seurat observe comment ce groupe change

de registre dans son discours de mobilisation en fonction du contexte

régional et des idéologies dominantes durant trois décennies , passant

tour - à - tour de l ' indépendantisme et du tiers - mondisme au pan - arabisme

puis au marxisme et au palestinisme . Aucune de ces idéologies ne

s ' inscrivait dans les référents identitaires autochtones d ' une société seg¬

mentée auquel le cadre de l ' État - nation avait été imposé avec brutalité .

En fin de compte , le groupe en est venu à se mobiliser au début des an¬

nées 1980 derrière un religieux local , sheikh Sha cbàn , et ses militants
devinrent des islamistes convaincus .

Certains , dont le fameux orientaliste Bernard Lewis , qualifient une

semblable mutation de " retour du religieux " . Pour ces sunnites comme

pour la majorité des chiites libanais , l ' islamisme , c ' est - à - dire la mobilisa¬

tion de l ' islam pour des buts politiques , présente deux avantages qui expli¬

quent son succès comme ciment de la cohésion communautaire et comme

réponse à une crise sociale et / ou politique . D ' abord , l ' islam comme foi ,

sinon comme culture , fournit les codes d ' une mobilisation directement

accessible à la conscience populaire . A la différence des idéologies sécu -

laristes et progressistes qui empruntent à des cultures étrangères leurs caté¬

gories morales , leurs symboles et leur vision du monde , l ' islamisme

s ' inscrit dans l ' univers familier des musulmans , même de ceux qui se sont

éloignés des pratiques religieuses , voire de la foi .

25 Michel Seurat , " Le quartier de Bâb et - Tebbaneh à Tripoli ( Liban ) : Étude d ' une <asa -
biyya urbaine " , dans : Mouvements communautaires et espaces urbains au Machreq ,
ed . CERMOC , Beyrouth : CERMOC , 1985 , 46 - 86 .
330 ELIZABETH PICARD

Ensuite , l ' islamisme se présente volontiers comme un universalisme ,

rival de l ' universalisme de la " démocratie de marché " et de l ' État de droit .
L ' immédiateté et le caractère englobant de son système doctrinaire rendent

incomparablement efficient le discours mythique et métaphysique des

mouvements qui s ' en réclament .
Rien d ' étonnant , dès lors , à ce que la mobilisation armée des chiites li¬
banais se soit opérée dès les premières années de la guerre autourde cer¬
tains rites religieux et en particulier de 'Âshùrà qui commémore le mar¬
tyre de l ' imâm Husayn . " Tradition réinventée " 26 , cette meta - histoire des
événements entourant la bataille de Karbalà 5 ( 680 A . D . ) offrait à la société
chiite de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle une série de thèmes intemporels ,
entre autres sur l ' oppression du pouvoir externe et le malheur de la com¬
munauté - source inépuisable d ' arguments rhétoriques , indéfiniment inter¬
prétables en fonction du contexte . 27 Au début des années 1970 , le rituel de
cÂshûrâ '' fut actualisé et inversé , et transformé d ' un rite pénitentiel à une
démonstration de colère , d ' un choeur de lamentions à des imprécations ,
d ' une manifestation de soumission à un geste de rébellion . Dans l ' intention

de riposter à la violence dont elle se sentait victime , la communauté sancti¬

fiait la violence immédiate de ses combattants , à commencer par la
confrontation des miliciens de Amal ( à partir de 1976 ) et de Hizb Allàh ( à
partir de 1982 ) avec Israël mais aussi avec les autres milices communautai¬
res libanaises , y compris leurs anciens alliés sunnites et druzes .
La sanctification de la violence ne s ' arrête pas à la violence subie ni à
la lutte armée de la milice souvent qualifiée de jihâd . Elle s ' applique sur¬
tout à la violence sacrificielle pour le salut de la communauté . Le milicien
ou l ' auteur d ' une opération - suicide pour la défense de la communauté , loin
d ' être un " bouc émissaire " 28 , est considéré comme un shahïd , à la fois

martyr et témoin . Les opérations de violence politique mises en œuvre par

la milice tissent la vie communautaire d ' un réseau de significations unifi¬
catrices 29 .
Contrairement à un préjugé puissant , l ' instrumentalisation du discours
religieux dans la guerre des milices communautaires au Liban ne fut pas

26 Eric Hobsbawm et Terence Ranger , eds . , The Invention of Tradition , Cambridge :

Cambridge University Press , 1983 .
27 Michael Fischer, Iran : From Religious Dispute to Révolution , Cambridge : Harvard
University Press , 1980 .
28 René Girard , La violence et le sacré , Paris : Grasset , 1972 .
29 Clifford Geertz , " Centers , Kings and Charisma : Reflections on the Symbolics of
Power " , dans : Culture and its Creators , eds . J . Ben - David et T . Clark , Chicago : Chi¬
cago University Press , 1977 , 168 .
 LA VIOLENCE MILICIENNE 331

l' apanage des mouvements islamistes . Pour les chrétiens , devenus démo -
graphiquement minoritaires au moins depuis les années 1950 , et plus spé¬
cialement pour les Maronites qui ne sont plus la première communauté du
pays , le danger réside potentiellement dans le face - à - face d ' un million et
demi de chrétiens libanais et d ' une " masse " arabo - islamique de plus de
deux cents millions de personnes . Ne pouvant formuler leur refus d ' une
modification constitutionnelle qui prendrait en compte ses mutations dé¬
mographiques , la stratégie des leaders chrétiens a consisté , au début de la
guerre , à figer le statu quo politique et à ouvrir la voie à la confrontation
armée en communiquant la peur à la communauté en des termes eux aussi
directement accessibles et globalisant .
Pour élaborer une idéologie " christianiste " , la milice des Forces Liba¬
naises a bénéficié de la caution et de la coopération d ' institutions respecta¬
bles comme les universités et les Eglises . Les archives du moindre couvent
de montagne ont été scrutées à la recherche de la preuve de l ' antériorité et
de la continuité d ' une occupation du territoire par les chrétiens . Plus géné¬
ralement , dans ce pays où la quasi - totalité des universités sont des institu¬
tions privées marquées d ' une claire empreinte communautaire , les appa¬
reils cléricaux ont joué un rôle central dans la construction d ' une identité
collective fondée sur la distinction entre islam et christianisme , et dans la
mobilisation de militants convaincus de lutter pour la défense de leur foi
dans la tradition des Croisades . Ce fut en particulier le cas à l ' université de
Kaslik dont les Moines Maronites fournirent conseils spirituels et projets
politiques aux Forces Libanaises , tandis que la milice stockait ses armes et
entraînait ses hommes dans leurs couvents de montagne . 30
La milice fit plus que puiser dans le discours religieux et la mémoire
collective des communautés chrétiennes . Elle s ' est employé à conférer à
l ' idéologie christianiste une dimension tragique à travers l ' héroïsation de

ses défaites armées ( comme la bataille de la Montagne en 1983 ) et la théâ¬

tralisation des cérémonies religieuses en ayant recours à des éléments mu¬
sicaux et picturaux à forte charge symbolique . 31 Au total , elle a nourri une
confusion entre le religieux et le politique , voire le militaire . Cette confu¬
sion a persisté après la fin de la guerre , depuis la défaite des Forces Liba¬
naises : la croix biseautée de Saint André fleurit sur les façades de
Beyrouth - est , qui se veut à la fois appel d ' un mouvement charismatique et

30 Charles Dhaw , Rukn al - muqâwamah , Beyrouth : Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation ,

1990 .

31 Elizabeth Picard , " De la domination du groupe à l ' invention de son identité : Les
milices libanaises et les paramilitaires nord - irlandais " , dans : Cartes d 'identité : Com¬
ment dit - on " nous " en politique ? Ed . Denis - Constant Martin , Paris : Presses de la
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques , 1994 , 147 - 62 .
 ELIZABETH PICARD
332

allusion à l ' emblème de la milice désormais interdite . La profusion de

nouvelles images saintes aux carrefours est une évocation des victimes de
la guerre , ni amnésie , ni amnistie . Et les statuettes de Saint Élie sont nom¬
breuses , qui brandit une épée qu ' on peut soupçonner vengeresse . À
l ' encontre du discours pacificateur de la hiérarchie chrétienne et des direc¬

tives papales , un message circule dans les consciences profondes de la

communauté chrétienne , nourri de l ' esprit milicien , qui fait de la religion
le justificateur de la violence .
Il ressort de cette étude que la reiigion n ' est pas au cœur des processus
de violence . Tant l ' enchaînement historique des stratégies d ' acteurs , inter¬
nes et externes , que la structuration des rapports de pouvoir , économiques
en particulier , au sein de la société , sont des déterminants plus efficaces de
la violence politique . En tant que produit social , la religion n ' est que ce
que les hommes ( religieux mais aussi incroyants ) en font . En tant
qu ' élément essentiel de la construction sociale , elle peut être interprétée et
instrumentalisée à l ' infini par les opérateurs politiques . En somme , elle se
présente comme un élément neutre , s ' agissant du choix de la violence ou
de la réconciliation . Durant la guerre du Liban , les milices en ont fait un
instrument de leur projet violent . La société civile dont on souhaite si ar¬
demment la consolidation , saura - t- elle en faire un instrument de paix ?
 A VIOLENT " PEACE - MOVEMENT " :
RELIGIOUS WORLD VIEW AND POLITICAL
RECORD OF AFGHANISTAN ' S TALIBAN ,
1994 - 1998 *

Andreas Rieck

Among the numerous militant movements of contemporary political Islam ,

the Taliban ( taliban ) of Afghanistan are unique in their portrayal of them¬

selves as a sort of " peace movement " . This may appear absurd when con¬

sidering their record of continuous warfare and multifarious acts of op¬

pression since the movement emerged on the Afghan scene in late 1994 .

Yet " bringing peace and security for the Afghan people " has been a cen¬

terpiece of the Taliban propaganda ever since , and is of almost equal im¬

portance to their goal of establishing a true Islamic state through full im¬

plementation of the sharfah as they interpret it . Generally speaking , the

Taliban have not viewed their adversaries as irreversible foes , but rather as

" misguided " countrymen who could be " pardoned " and won over for their

" sacred cause " . And although they have employed more violence with

every passing year since 1994 , they have so far kept to their original ideol¬

ogy and goals with remarkable consistency . Throughout more than four

years of warfare their campaigns have always been facilitated by defec¬

tions from their opponents to their side and a steady flow of new volun¬

teers , and many of their victories have been achieved with hardly a shot

being fired .

The Taliban thus provide a unique example for the dialectics of vio¬

lence and reconciliation in contemporary political Islam . They are different

from most " Islamist " movements insofar as they do not propagate Islam as

a political ideology with a specific dynamic agenda , but rather stick to a

traditional , scripturalist version of orthodox Sunni Islam , combined with

the moral codex of Pashtunwall 1. And unlike Islamist movements in other

Muslim countries which have generally emerged in opposition to non -

* Paper finalized May 1999 .

1 Willi Steul , Paschtunwali : Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz , Wiesbaden :
Franz Steiner , 1981 .
334 ANDREAS RIECK

Muslim powers ( either directly as in Lebanon , Palestine , and Kashmir , or

indirectly against the perceived influence of those powers as in Iran and
several Arab countries ) , the Taliban have mainly fought Afghan Islamists ,
after the latter had already defeated Soviet imperialism .

The founding myth of the Taliban and its degree of credibility

The Taliban can be regarded as a late product of the Afghan war which
had started fifteen years before they first appeared . This applies both to
internal dynamics of the Afghan society and to the role of outside forces ,
because Pakistan , the most important foreign backer of the Taliban , has
also been the country most deeply involved with the freedom struggle of
the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviet invasion ( 1979 - 1989 ) . According
to the Taliban ' s own version , however , their movement came into being
through an entirely indigenous uprising , without any foreign interference ,
spreading from a small village near Qandahar ( Qandcihar ) to several large
provinces within a couple of months . The story has become well - known , 2
yet it is repeated here in the words of the Taliban movement ' s founder ,
Mullah Muhammad cUmar , during an interview given in 1996 :

" The Taliban movement is that class of Afghan mujahidm whose purpose
right from the start has been to enforce the commands of the sharfah in
. . . Afghanistan and to banish evil and atheism from this country . This is a
party of sincere mujahidm from many different groups who want the
world to derive benefit from the purpose and fruits of Afghanistan ' s ji¬
had . They are not a formal group , but upon [ sic ] sincere mujahidin 's ac¬
tion of refuting the mischievous forces , are a band and a troupe of re¬
formists .
. . . [ T ] he purpose of Afghanistan ' s jihad was to end the influence and
occupation of Russia . . . and to aid and assist the religion of the Muslims
of Afghanistan . For fourteen years the Afghan mujahidin presented the
gift of hundred thousand lives , hundreds of thousands of men , women ,

2 One of the best accounts is from Anthony Davies , " How the Taliban became a military
force " , in : Fundamentalism Reborn ? Afghanistan and the Taliban , ed . William Maley ,
London : Hurst , 1998 , 43 - 71 ; together with Ahmed Rashid , " Pakistan and the Taliban " ,
ibid ., 72 - 89 . See also Andreas Rieck , " Afghanistan ' s Taliban : An Islamic revolution of
the Pashtuns " , Orient 38 ( 1997 ) 1 , 121 - 42 ( pp . 128 - 31 ) .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE - MOVEMENT "
335

children and elderly were forced to do hijrah ? , and at long last . . . an Is¬
lamic country was established in Afghanistan . 4
However it was unfortunate that the interpretation [ sic ] of this dream
was not fulfilled and the Afghan leaders , in particular Burhanuddln Rab -
bani , Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah MasTid , descended in civil war 5 and
Afghanistan became a symbol of disgrace . It became difficult to save
one ' s life , wealth , respect or honour . This period of time had become one
of lawlessness and mischief and all efforts to correct this condition and
bring about an end to hostilities were unsuccessful . . .
Upon this state of affairs a few culama '- i kiram gathered in Qandahar and
took an oath that they would in the same manner that they launched jihad
with sincerity and reliance in Allah against the kuffar ( infidels ) , against a
power such as Russia , they would today , to end the mischief in the country ,
to establish peace and security , to protect life , wealth and honour and to en¬
force the sharVah , do jihad against the leaders who were devotees to power
and endeavor to make the land of Afghanistan an exemplary state . To this
movement was prescribed the name ' Taliban ' , as only the talabah ( stu¬
dents ) and ' ulama ' of religion can , with sincerity , after freeing themselves
from self interest , accomplish the Islamic obligation of jihad . And , al-
hamdu lillah , Allah Almighty accepted and honoured the beauty of their in¬
tention and within a short period of time . . . bestowed His victory and aid to
the Taliban in fifteen provinces and the Afghan people were liberated from
the oppressive commanders and rulers .
. . . [ In these provinces ] you will find people living their lives in serenity
and peace of mind and the roads and highways are safe . . . The mischie¬
vous forces have been subdued and with peace and security the Taliban
are running a system of government . . . where the . . . rulers and the public
in subjection to a system of sharfah are accountable in front of a court of
law . . . [ F ] or this reason . . . the lives and wealth of people today in this re¬
gion are safe and secure .
The mischievous forces have fled from this region and the good com¬
manders and mujahidin of all the groups have become participants in the
Taliban journey . The public are content and at every place welcome the
Taliban with warmth , because the Taliban . . . have protected their lives

3 An Arabic term for " emigration " with religious connotations in Islam , recalling the
emigration of the Prophet Muhammad and his early followers from Mecca to Medina
in 622 / 1 .
4 He is referring to the proclamation of the " Islamic State of Afghanistan " on April 28 ,
1992 , a few days after the breakdown of the Soviet - backed regime ofNajibullah .
5 This war was mainly fought for the control of Kabul , with other parts of Afghanistan
scarcely affected during the period from 1992 until the emergence of the Taliban . See
Rieck , " Afghanistan ' s Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] , 125 - 28 , and BarnettR . Rubin , The Fragmenta¬
tion of Afghanistan : State formation and Collapse in the International System , Lahore :
Vanguard Books , 1996 , 271 - 80 .
336 ANDREAS RIECfC

and wealth and given them the right to live . This is why . . . from all prov¬
inces of this country requests are being made in abundance for the Tali¬
ban to step forward in their region and they will be welcomed with open
arms ." 6

This statement of Mullah cUmar is completely in line with what Taliban

representatives have repeated ad nauseam to Afghan and foreign interlocu¬
tors ever since they became a military force to reckon with in early 1995 .
The heaviest blame is reserved for those mujahidin leaders who fought for
the control of the capital since April 1992 - and destroyed much of Kabul
( Kabul ) in the process but the birthplace of the Taliban movement has
been the southern province of Qandahar . There , like in other provinces of
Afghanistan ' s Pashtun heartland , the main problem since 1992 had been a
plethora of local commanders who terrorized the population and fought
their petty wars for zones of influence . Mullah cUmar was one of those
mujahidin veterans who had considered the objectives of the jihad
achieved with the fall of the Soviet - backed Najibullah regime , and had
taken up giving lessons at the small madrasah of his home village on the
main road from Qandahar to Herat (Harat ) . It was there that he gathered
the first small group of talabah to punish the " bandits " who were manning
the nearest roadblock for their abuses against the local population . 7
The subsequent rise of the new force , starting with its capture of the
border post Spin Buldak and the conquest of Qandahar ( October 13 and
November 5 , 1994 , respectively ) is so much linked to alleged logistic sup¬
port and other groundwork from Pakistani military institutions that detrac¬
tors of the Taliban have always considered them a Pakistani creation right
from the outset . Even almost five years after the foundation of the Taliban
movement , the degree of its dependence on Pakistan can only be assumed
but not be proven . The authority wielded by Mullah cUmar and the high
respect accorded to him by his followers until this day suggest that the
launching of the Taliban movement was indeed his own brainchild , al¬
though Pakistani intelligence services quickly jumped on the bandwagon
and decided to back the new force . Yet , considering the young age of Mul -

6 Nazeer Laghari and Mufti Jameel Khan , " Interview with the Ameerul Mu ' mineen
[ sic ] " , http : // www . ummah . net/ taliban /intviewl . htm ( Transliterations added by the au¬
thor ) .
7 Rahimullah Yusufzai , " The leader no one knows " , The News ( Islamabad ) , March 30 ,
1997 ; ' Frangoise Chipaux , " A la recherche du mollah Omar " , Le Monde , January 1- 2 ,
1998 .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE -MOVEMENT " 337

lah cUmar and his humble status prior to 1994 , he might as well be a mere

figurehead .8

Whatever the doubts regarding the Taliban 's authenticity and inde¬

pendence , it must be kept in mind that their Afghan rivals have also relied

to a large extent on support from neighboring countries throughout their

wars against the Taliban . Moreover , during the 1980s six mainly Pashtun

mujahidin parties had received lavish arms supplies and financial support

via Pakistan , yet they failed miserably after the Soviet withdrawal and the

surrender of the Najibullah regime to establish a new order . The Taliban ,

by contrast , have been able to unite the Pashtuns in a way unseen since the

times of Ahmad Shah Durrani . 9 Thus , notwithstanding all their shortcom¬

ings , it is appropriate to take them serious as a religious - political move¬

ment with a weight of its own .

Despite a degree of exaggeration , Mullah cUmar rightly points out the

desire of an overwhelming silent majority of the Afghans to find relief

after fifteen years of war and anarchy . This has been an important element
of the Taliban ' s success , at least in the Pashtun areas . Another has been the

sincerity of purpose of both the religious - minded mujahidin veterans and

the genuine Taliban , that is Islamic ma <ira .sa / z- students who have made up

the bulk of Taliban manpower ever since late 1994 . 10 The Taliban have not

only effectively curbed crime through strict and impartial enforcement of

8 Mullah cUmar was less than 40 years old when he founded the Taliban . He had been
the leader of a small mujahidin unit at his home village Singesar near Qandahar . Al¬
though he ran a small madrasah before and after the Soviet occupation , he still refered
to himself as a talib ( student ) because he had never obtained a degree form a larger re¬
ligious school . Since late 1994 , Mullah ' Umar has stuck to an extremely secluded life¬
style , and he did not move from Qandahar to Kabul after the conquest of the latter .
While press reports generally portray him as the undisputed leader of the Taliban
whose word is law , a sort of collective leadership of his most trusted comrades and
other former mujahidin leaders may have emerged behind the scenes long since .
9 Ahmad Shah Durrani , who ruled from 1747 - 72 , was the founder of the Afghan nation
state with Qandahar as its nucleus and first capital . On the difficulties for all subse¬
quent Afghan governments to overcome the tribal fragmentation and impose their au¬
thority in the countryside see Rubin , Fragmentation [ fh . 5 ] , passim .
10 Students from religious madrasahs in Pakistan - Afghans and Pakistanis alike - have
already in the 1980s been encouraged to devote some time every year to the jihad in
Afghanistan ( see S . Jamal Malik , Islamisierung in Pakistan 1977- 84 : Untersuchungen
zur Aufldsung autochtoner Strukturen , Stuttgart : Franz Steiner , 1989 , 301 - 05 ) . During
all major military campaigns of the Taliban since early 1995 , many madrasahs in
Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan have publicly an¬
nounced vacations to allow their students to participate as volunteers . The large major¬
ity of the Taliban volunteers have always been Afghan nationals , however .
338 ANDREAS RIECK

sharVah laws, but they have even disarmed the general population , a
novum in Pashtun society .
However , even the initial expansion of the Taliban into the purely
Pashtun provinces was achieved only through a considerable amount of
military force . 11 Lavish supplies of money to buy off reluctant local com¬
manders were also important , another flaw in the Taliban ' s self - proclaimed
aura of " holy righteousness " . 12 Besides , the Taliban leaders have been
lying outrightly on some matters from the very outset , for example with
their denials of any foreign backing for themselves and their promises to
curb poppy - growing and the production of heroin . 13 Yet it cannot be de¬
nied that they have brought peace and security for some parts of Afghani¬
stan which had been haunted by lawlessness in the previous years , and that
they have generally applied their strict moral code on themselves , too .
Their initial success in the Pashtun areas was impressive and earned them
wide - spread popular approval .

From "peace - movement " to warring party , 1995 - 1996

By mid - February 1995 , the Taliban had defeated or absorbed all local mu -
jahidin groups in the southern Pashtun provinces and reached the outskirts
of Kabul , where the forces of Hikmatyar ' s Hizb - i Islaml had been locked
in a war of attrition with the Tajiks of Ahmad Shah Mas ' ud since three
years . After Hikmatyar evacuated all positions without a fight , counting on
a clash between Mas ' ud and the Taliban , the latter demanded to enter Ka¬
bul as a " neutral force " and disarm all other factions . Thereafter an interim
ruling council was to be formed comprising only " good Muslims " . 14 At
that stage the Taliban did not yet claim any ruling power for themselves ,
their prime objective being to get rid of the " criminal warlords " . However ,
they had not taken into account the intransigence of Mas cud who made a

11 This point is stressed by Davies , " Taliban " [ fn . 2], 55 and 69 . See also his detailed
account of their initial campaigns , ibid ., 43 - 55 .
12 Ibid . , 49 ; Rashid , " Pakistan and the Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] , 77 . According to most press
reports , the bulk of money for the Taliban war effort , including " bribing fees " , from
1994 to 1998 came from Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states .
13 Poppy growing in the southern Pashtun provinces - especially in the Helmand valley -
rapidly expanded under the rule of the Taliban , making Afghanistan the world ' s larg¬
est opium producer from 1996 onwards . The Taliban have occasionally confiscated
some quantities of drugs , but taxes from poppy - growers have been an important source
of their income ever since 1995 .

14 Rieck , "Afghanistans Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] , 132 . The Taliban did not specify which indi¬
viduals would qualify as " good Muslims " at that time .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE - MOVEMENT " 339

tactical agreement with the Taliban only to attack the Hizb - i Wahdat of the

Hazara ( Hazarah ) , another rival for the control of Kabul . Within a few

weeks , both the Hizb -i Wahdat and the Taliban were driven out of the

southern parts of the capital by Mas cud , who has since become the no . 1

enemy of the Taliban . 15

The main reason for the initial failure of the Taliban in Kabul was the

ethnic divide in Afghanistan , which had come strongly to the fore since

April 1992 . At that time , rival ethnic forces had taken control of different

parts of the country and fought for supremacy in the capital . Although the

nominal government of president RabbanI - who had been appointed with

the agreement of all mujdhidin parties in June 1992 - comprised Pashtuns ,

Uzbeks and Hazaras as well , its military backbone led by Mas ' ud was

mainly Tajik . Uzbek and Hazara militias had initially supported the Tajiks

against an onslaught of Hikmatyar ' s Pashtuns , but by early 1994 had allied

themselves with the Hizb - i Islami . Mas cud ' s forces , including numerous

defectors from the former communist army and airforce , had nevertheless

prevailed , relying on his power base in the Panjshlr valley and other Tajik
areas close to Kabul . 16

The Taliban , for their part , have always refused to acknowledge the

fact that they were above all a Pashtun movement , originating from the

Pashtun hinterland . Their religious rigidity may have posed no problem for

most Pashtun villagers , but it did very much so for urban non - Pashtuns ,

especially in Kabul . Besides , Tajiks , Hazaras and other non - Pashtun Af¬

ghans were quick to discover the bid for reestablishing the Pashtun he¬

gemony lost since 1992 in the Taliban ' s religious garb . At the same time

as they were making their first assault on Kabul , the Taliban were attack¬

ing the northwestern provinces around Herat which had been administered

by the Tajik mujahidln commander and former army officer Isma ' fl Khan

since 1992 . As those provinces had since been rather peaceful , the Taliban

did not even have a valid pretext . 17 Although the Taliban were defeated on

the Western front in April 1995 , they led a stunning lightning - offensive up

15 Davies , " Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] , 56 - 59 .

16 The Tajik forces of Mas ' ud had been the first to enter Kabul in April 1992 and had
also incorporated the bulk of material and manpower from the regular armed forces of
the important Kabul garrisons . Later Mas ' ud had been appointed minister of defense
by the Tajik president Rabbani , thus further facilitating the merger of Mas ' ud ' s militia
with professional soldiers .
17 Davies , " Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] , 55 . According to Rashid , " Pakistan and the Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] ,
78 , even Pakistan ' s ISI ( Inter - Services Intelligence ) had discouraged the Taliban to at¬
tack these provinces at that time , but transport traders from Quetta had urged them to
bring the whole transit route from Pakistan to Turkmenistan under their control .
340 ANDREAS RIECK

to Herat five months later , establishing themselves as a harsh occupying

power in that non - Pashtun town in September that year . Shortly after , they
started a new serious offensive to conquer Kabul .
By that time , the Taliban had shed many of their " holy " pretensions
and become more like the other warring Afghan factions , rocketing civil¬
ian quarters in Kabul and making fortunes out of the drugs trade and
smuggling of consumer goods to Pakistan . 18 Yet their warriors had so far
neither committed massacres nor indulged in plunder , as most other parties
had done repeatedly . Most Taliban were still unpaid volunteers , including
Pakistani madrasah - students . 19 However , in the face of multiplying mili¬
tary challenges with occasional setbacks , the Taliban had to resort to force¬
ful recruiting , too , since early 1996 . At that time , Hikmatyar and other
opponents of Rabbani and Mas cud made a last attempt to form an alliance
with the Taliban , but they refused as a matter of principle . On April 3 ,
1996 they made clear their ambition to rule over all of Afghanistan by
proclaiming Mullah cUmar the amir al - mu 'minin at an culama ' convention
in Qandahar . 20
The Taliban justified their refusal to negotiate even a cease - fire with
Rabbani and his " government " in Kabul with allegations that the latter
could not be trusted to honor any agreement and was guilty of numerous
crimes against the Afghan people . The only way to peace according to the
Taliban was for the other factions to surrender their arms and " implement
the sharFah " , or , in other words , submit to Taliban authority . 21 At that
stage the Taliban attacked neither the Uzbeks of the north nor the Hazaras
of central Afghanistan , both of which had their own long - time conflicts

18 Smuggling items like TV sets , air - conditioners and other expensive industrial prod¬
ucts , which are brought to Afghanistan by air , has remained an important source of in¬
come for the Taliban , just as has been the case with the warlords who preceded them .
Iran ' s government has also regularly accused the Taliban of actively supporting the
armed bands of trans - border drug smugglers . See also note 13 .

19 See above , note 10 . Most of these volunteers were apparently sent to the frontlines
without any training or other preparation .

20 Rahimullah Yusufzai , " Ulema endorse Fatwa of Jehad against Rabbani " , The News
( Islamabad ) , April 4 , 1996 . The convention was attended by 1 , 500 ( mostly minor ) 'u -
latna ' from Afghanistan and Pakistan . The title amir ul - mu 'mimn ( " Commander of the
believers " ) had been a privilege of the early Arab caliphs up to the Abbasids , who had
claimed to rule the whole Muslim ummah , and was ridiculed by the Taliban ' s oppo¬
nents at that time .

21 Such were the arguments repeated regularly by Taliban leaders to UN officials in a

number of meetings which I was able to attend when serving with the United Nations
Special Mission to Afghanistan from March to October 1996 . Afghan and Pakistani
mediators were told the same .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE - MOVEMENT " 341

with RabbanI and Mas cud , but concentrated on the capital instead . Kabul ' s
encirclement became almost complete when three Pashtun provinces
around Jalalabad , which had remained neutral since 1992 , were occupied
by the Taliban almost without resistance in September 1996 . Their most
stunning military campaign followed , involving thousands of fresh volun¬
teers from Pakistan and excellent planning and logistics , to break through
some crucial lines of their opponents ' defense . 22 On September 26 ,
MasTid ' s forces staged a hasty retreat to the north , allowing the Taliban a
triumphant entrance into the city , just as they had predicted long before .

The Taliban and their oppression of women

The Taliban had provoked protests already during their first year in power
with the closure of girls ' schools , enforcement of the burqa c ( head - to - toe
cover) , dismissal of female teachers and a general ban for women to work
outside their houses after the conquests of Qandahar ( 1994 ) and Herat
( 1995 ) . However , it was only after their conquest of Kabul that they

aroused worldwide indignation with the same kind of measures . Even the
ruling Mullahs of the Islamic Republic of Iran joined the Western media in
condemning the Taliban for mistreating women , although some Iranians
would view the Taliban ' s excesses as a sinister Western plot " to create the
worst possible image of Islam " . 23
In fact the rules of sexual segregation and restrictions for women ' s
freedom of movement imposed by the Taliban are stricter than in any con¬
temporary Muslim country , at least regarding urban areas . They have been
one of the main obstacles for the Taliban to gain recognition as the legiti¬
mate government of Afghanistan by any Western country even after their
conquest of the capital and two thirds of Afghanistan ' s provinces . Yet the
Taliban have never been much impressed by Western criticism or threats
of international agencies to suspend their humanitarian relief programs if
females were denied benefit from them . 24 Sometimes Taliban officials
have forwarded pretexts , like the lack of financial means to run girls '
schools or the need to achieve peace in the whole country first and thereaf-

22 Davies , " Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] , 64 - 68 ; Rahimullah Yusufzai , " The march to the capital " , The
News , October 4 , 1996 .

23 Iran Weekly Press Digest ( Tehran ) , September 28 to October 4 , 1996 , 7 . Generally on

Iranian attitudes towards the Taliban see Andreas Rieck , " Irans Politik im Afghanis -
tankonflikt seit 1992 " , in : Afghanistan in Geschichte und Gegenwart , eds . Conrad J.
Schetter and Almut Wieland - Karimi , Frankfurt / M . : IKO , 1999 , 109 - 28 , ( pp . 116 - 24 ) .

24 Nancy Hatch Dupree , " Afghan Women Under the Taliban " , in : Fundamentalism Re¬
born ? [ fc . 2 ] , 145 - 66 ( pp . 148 - 50 ) .
342 ANDREAS RIECK

ter care for women ' s issues , but they had plenty of other reasons for their
intransigence .
The root cause for the Taliban ' s attitude towards women must be seen
in the social base of their movement , namely the Pashtun rural hinterland
and the harsh environment of religious schools in Pakistan ' s Pashtun belt
and Afghan refugee camps . As for Pashtun villages in Afghanistan , the
code of conduct for females there has been determined by orthodox Sunni
Islam and the Pashtunwali for centuries and remained unchanged in mod¬
ern times before the communist rulers of Kabul tried to enforce girls '
schools and other forms of female emancipation in 1978 - 79 . It was pre¬
cisely the " violation of female honor " through such measures , often im¬
posed in an arrogant manner , that triggered rural uprisings against the Ka¬
bul government which escalated quickly into a spiral of insurrection and
retaliation by the regime , paving the way for the Soviet invasion . A decade
later , after their victory over the Soviet Union , many of of the mujahidln
set about " violating the honor " of ordinary Afghans themselves , abducting
girls and women from houses or at their roadblocks at will , which was one
important reason for the launching of the Taliban movement as a counter -
reaction . Thus the Taliban have always referred with special pride to their
achievement of providing " complete safety " for females in their realm .
As for the religious madrasahs which have mushroomed in Pakistan
since the 1980s and which most Afghan refugee boys have attended for
some time at least , they are generally characterized by an " insular culture
of deprivation " 25 that shapes the mindset of their graduates . In many cases ,
children are virtually kept prisoners in such schools to prevent them from
being distracted by the " lures " of the outside world . Many of the Taliban
rank - and - file fighters have spent the best part of their youth under the
harsh discipline of a religious madrasah and have been imbued with highly
exaggerated notions of female " virtue " which must be preserved at all cost .
As some of the more mature Taliban leaders have admitted , one of the
reasons for keeping the women of Kabul confined to their homes as far as
possible has been to protect the armed youngsters from the " lures of city
life " . 26
Those most affected by the Taliban ' s harsh rules are the former middle
and upper class women of Kabul and other large towns , especially those
with professional qualifications , whereas not much has changed in the
villages . The Taliban leaders think they can afford to antagonize the
townspeople , who are unlikely to resist anyhow , as long as they keep their

25 Suroosh Irfani , " Taliban ' s Islamic challenge " , Dawn ( Karachi ), October 14 , 1996 .
26 Dupree , " Afghan women " [ fn . 24 ] , 150 .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE -MOVEMENT " 343

own fighting men content . There is also an element of revenge in their

attitude : During the Soviet occupation the villagers , especially in the Pash -

tun provinces , had born the brunt of resistance and Soviet retaliation ,

whereas Kabul 's citizens had by and large remained passive and were

spared . In the following civil war much of Kabul has been looted and de¬

stroyed , and villagers have imposed their law on the now mostly impover¬

ished urban civilians . Besides , enforcing the burqa f on women and other

" Islamic rules " , like obligatory attendance of prayers and growing beards

for men or banning music and TV , are all means of self - assertion for the

Taliban which can be done easily and almost free of cost . 27 They have thus

nurtured their own illusion of " establishing an Islamic state " which other¬

wise has remained rudimentary even after their conquest of Kabul .

Pashtun conquerors in a religious garb , 1996 - 1998

Within hours after their entry into Kabul , the Taliban lynched the former

communist president Najibullah who had taken refuge in a UN compound

for four years . Holding him responsible for the killing of thousands of

innocent Afghans in the 1980s , the Taliban even considered a trial accord¬

ing to the sharTah as a waste of time , 28 but Mullah cUmar launched another

appeal to all remaining rivaling factions to lay down their arms and sur¬

render to the " Islamic government " , in which case most could expect an

amnesty for their previous deeds . 29

Quite to the contrary , the Afghan civil war gained momentum after the
defeat of Rabbani and Mas cud in Kabul . For the first time , all non - Pashtun

militias formed an alliance against the Taliban , and a second front was

opened north - east of Herat , with the Uzbeks of General Dostum confront¬

ing them . 30 The main battle front , however , remained immediately north of

Kabul , where the Taliban tried to force their way along the main Salang

highway and temporarily both entered the Panjshlr and Ghorband val -

27 I owe this observation to another newspaper article from Suroosh Irfani , October 1996 ,
which I can no longer identify .
28 Rieck , " Aghanistans Taliban " [ fh . 2 ] , 137 .
29 Ibid . , 135 - 36 .
30 Abd ul - Rashld Dostum had led an Uzbek auxiliary troop in the service of the Na¬
jibullah regime since the mid - 1980s , but defected to the mujahidin side in March 1992 .
His militia has ruled several provinces in north - western Afghanistan from April 1992
to July 1998 . In 1995 and 1996 he had tactically supported the Taliban on several oc¬
casions due to his conflict with Rabbani and Mas ' ud .
344 ANDREAS RIECK

leys It was in the Shomali plain north of Kabul that the Taliban started
. 31

with ethnic warfare against other Afghans by expelling for the first time
thousands of Tajik villagers from their homes in January 1997 . This area ,
including the important Bagram airbase , has changed hands several times
since October 1996 , and the Taliban claimed to have been surprised to be
shot at by local villagers whom they had not bothered to disarm . 32 In the
Ghorband valley , leading from Kabul to the Hazarajat capital Bamiyan ,
local Pashtuns defected to the Taliban , a pattern to be repeated in subse¬
quent Taliban campaigns north of the Hindukush range . 33
After their victory in Kabul , the Taliban were even less inclined to
compromise with the remaining factions , whom they would henceforth
refer to as " rebels against the Islamic State " ( renamed " Islamic Emirate " in
October 1997 ) . 34 They had become convinced more than ever that it was
their sacred mission " to bring peace and security to all of Afghanistan " , as
they put it . According to the Taliban , a " broad - based government " , the
ever - repeated demand of all Afghan and foreign mediators in the civil war
since 1992 , could be best achieved if their amir ul - mu 'minln ( i . e . , Mullah
cUmar ) appointed representatives from each of Afghanistan ' s 28 provinces .

While the Taliban may have had some individual Uzbeks and Tajiks
within their ranks , 35 their ethnic bias became more and more obvious with
the prolongation of the war . At the same time , however , their " hidden
agenda " of making the Pashtuns rulers of all Afghanistan once more con¬
tributed to maintain an astonishing degree of discipline and unity of pur¬
pose among their fighting forces . On the other side , the "Northern Alli¬
ance " of Tajiks , Uzbeks and Hazaras was never able to overcome the deep -
seated mutual distrust and animosity between its members and was in¬
creasingly pressed by economic hardship .

31 Rieck , " Afghanistans Taliban " [ fn . 2 ] , 136 - 38 . The road via the Salang pass and tunnel
is of special strategic importance as the only viable route of transit from Kabul to
northern Afghanistan .
32 Dawn , January 27 , 1997 . The number of Tajik refugees and displaced persons from
that area reached 100 , 000 during the early months of 1997 , but most of them were able
to return when Mas ' ud and his allies recaptured the area in the summer months of the
same year .
33 Pockets of Pashtun population in the northern half of Afghanistan exist since the reign
of cAbd ul - Rahman Khan , the Afghan ruler from 1880 to 1901 , who laid the ground
for Pashtun political supremacy for the rest of the 20th century .
34 Dawn , October 27 , 1997 . This was another signal from the Taliban that they were not
ready to consider any power - sharing with their rivals .
35 These were mostly madrasah - students or junior 'ulama ' . To the best of my knowledge
no Shiite Hazara has ever joined the Taliban at any time .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE - MOVEMENT " 345

In May 1997 , the Taliban were able to exploit the rivalry between the

Uzbek leader Dostum and his second - in - command , cAbd ul - Malik , and

struck a deal with the latter , allowing thousands of their troops to enter the

north - eastern provinces unopposed . Dostum was abandoned by most of his

troops and fled the country . The Taliban , however , quickly sidelined Abd

ul - Malik , who had hoped to take Dostum ' s place in Mazar - i Sharif with

their help , trying to impose their absolute rule in that town without delay .

In what turned out as their most serious blunder so far , some 2 , 500 inexpe¬
rienced Taliban were sent to disarm the local Uzbeks and Hazaras who

then rose in revolt and massacred hundreds of the intruders . 36 It is worth

noting that the Taliban thus became victims of a major massacre before

they committed such acts themselves . The reason was probably a combina¬

tion of arrogance and political naivety , with many Taliban still picturing

themselves as " liberators " who would be welcomed by the local popula¬

tion wherever the spell of the " warlords " was broken . This would apply at

least to the rank - and - file youngsters , whereas the more experienced leaders

might also have deliberately risked the lives of the forward contingent in

order to arouse the fighting spirit of the Taliban army as a whole . In fact

the flow of volunteers from Pakistan to join the jihad in Afghanistan

reached a new climax after the debacle in Mazar - i Sharif .

The military stalemate between the Taliban and the " Northern Alli¬

ance " continued for another year despite continuous internal conflicts of

the latter . Yet a large Taliban contingent still remained entrenched in some

Pashtun pockets of northern Afghanistan , and throughout the winter of

1997 - 98 the Taliban blocked the supply of food to the central mountainous

region of Hazarajat . In April 1998 , the Taliban agreed to open political

negotiations with their adversaries for the first time 37 after several months

of pressure from the United Stated as well as from the Taliban ' s Pakistani

backers who were desperate to bring the Afghan civil war to an end .38 Ap -

36 Imtiaz Gul , " First fall of Mazar - e - Sharif " , The Muslim ( Islamabad ) , May 30 , 1997 . At
least 400 Taliban were killed immediately . In November 1997 , mass graves of Tali¬
ban , allegedly executed prisoners , were discovered in northern Afghanistan {Dawn ,
November 11 , 1997 ) . General Dostum , who staged a comeback in September 1997 ,
later accused his rival ' Abd ul - Malik of having ordered the killing of 2 , 000 Taliban
prisoners {Dawn , November 29 , 1997 ) .

37 Some meetings between delegates of the Taliban and the " Northern Alliance " under
UN auspices had taken place since November 1996 , but they did not go beyond incon¬
clusive talks about cease - fire and exchange of prisoners .

38 One of the principal objectives for Pakistan to support ( or even create ? ) the Taliban
has been to open its transit routes to Central Asia . Yet although those from Pakistan to
Turkmenistan have been under Taliban control since September 1995 , projects for gas -
and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan have so far been stalled due to the state
346 ANDREAS RIECK

parently their adversaries had yielded to the Taliban ' s demand that a com¬
mission of 'ulama ' should be formed to arbitrate all disputes between them ,
whereas the Taliban had accepted to grant the " Northern Alliance " equal
representation in such a commission although they were themselves in
control of some 70 per cent of Afghanistan . At the opening of the talks of a
so - called " steering committee " - supposed to select 40 ' ulama ' for that
purpose — in Islamabad on April 27 , 1998 , the Taliban delegation gave
their point of view in the following written statement :

„ Since many years , political dialogue is going on aimed at finding a solu¬

tion to the Afghan conflict , but so far , it has not brought about any posi¬
tive result . Afghanistan is the land of Muslim people , and therefore , noth¬
ing else can bring about such a result , except the decision adopted in ac¬
cordance with the law of Allah Almighty .
We are fighting not for power , but for the implementation of the Is¬
lamic order . If our opponents do not accept this claim , then they should
reject it in the light of the Islamic laws , and we will relinquish everything ,
and will immediately hand over the government and the power to them .
We have suggested the Islamic decision by the 'ulama we reaffirm the
same and do not have any other formula , because we consider the deci¬
sion of 'ulama ' as sufficient for solving all the problems . . . " . 39

During the negotiations , the Taliban representatives even climbed down

from their demand that only persons having a degree from a dar ul- 'ulum
( Muslim religious seminary ) could be considered as fulama They at last
accepted that the "Northern Alliance " might appoint any one who had
religious knowledge for the said 'ulama ' commission , provided their deci¬
sions would be taken " in the light of the sharfah " , 40 But apparently neither
of the two sides was really interested in reaching a settlement based on the
current balance of power on the ground . The 'ulama ' commission was
never formed , and the Taliban launched a new offensive against Mas cud -
who had not sent a delegate to the Islamabad talks - on the very first day
of these talks which were broken off on May 3 , 1998 , without result .

of war and insecurity , and the direct route from Pakistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
via Kabul and the Salang highway has remained altogether blocked until this day . In
December 1997 , Pakistan ' s government invited the ousted Afghan president RabbanI
for talks , and in the following months made its most serious efforts so far to press the
Taliban for peace negotiations with their rivals .
39 Quoted from The Frontier Post ( Peshawar ) , April 28 , 1998 .
40 This compromise was reached after intervention by the U . S . ambassador to Pakistan ,
Thomas Simons ; see The News ( Islamabad ) , April 30 , 1998 .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE -MOVEMENT " 347

In the summer of 1998 the Taliban came close to a final military vic¬
tory over the remaining " rebel forces " . Persistent infighting among the
Uzbeks , as well as quarreling between the Uzbeks and the Hazaras for the
control of Mazar - i Sharif , allowed them another lightning campaign in the
western half of northern Afghanistan starting from July . On August 8 ,
1998 , they entered Mazar - i Sharif for the second time and took terrible
revenge for their losses of the previous year , allegedly massacring between
4 , 000 and 5 , 000 Hazaras in the town . 41 Five weeks later they had also con¬

quered Bamiyan , the Hazara stronghold in central Afghanistan . The Tali¬

ban even took the risk of further humiliating Iran - the most important
supplier of arms to their adversaries - by storming Iran ' s consulate in
Mazar - i Sharif and killing nine diplomats . In September 1998 , Iran massed
200 , 000 troops along the Afghan border and was on the verge of a direct
military intervention . 42
After the fall of Bamiyan , only the North - Eastern provinces held by
forces of Mas cud had escaped Taliban occupation . But , pressed by Iran and
the United States and even by their Pakistani and Saudi allies 43 , the Tali¬
ban could not conclude their march to victory and lost some ground in the
following months . They were not even able to dislodge MasTid ' s forces
from their positions immediately north of Kabul which blocked the Salang
highway from the capital to the north . In March 1999 , the Taliban again
held negotiations with their enemies under the auspices of the United Na¬
tions in Ashqabad ( Turkmenistan ) . On March 14 , it was even announced
that both sides had agreed on forming a " unified command " , 44 but instead
of any steps in that direction , fighting resumed on several fronts shortly
after . Mullah cUmar accused Mas ' ud of failing to implement any agree¬
ment and on April 10 , 1999 , excluded the possibility of further talks . 45

41 Kenneth J . Cooper , " The terrible fate of Mazar - i - Sharif International Herald Tribune
( Paris ) , November 30 , 1998 .

42 Rieck , " Irans Politik im Afghanistankonflikt " [ fn . 23 ] , 124 - 27 .

43 Since August 1998 , U . S . pressure on the Taliban has increased to expel or extradite
the Saudi dissident and leader of an international terrorist network Usama bin Ladin .

On August 20 , the U . S . even launched an attack with cruise missiles on an alleged ter¬
rorist camp in Afghanistan ' s Paktia province , which is under Taliban control . On Sep¬
tember 22 , Saudi Arabia , one of the three countries to have recognized the Taliban
government so far ( the others being Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates ) , froze its
diplomatic relations with Kabul because of the Taliban ' s refusal to cut all links with
Usama bin Ladin .

44 Dawn , March 15 , 1999 .

45 Dawn , April 11 , 1999 .

348 ANDREAS RIECK

Conclusion : good intentions , bad results ?

The transformation of the Taliban from a violent movement for redressing

moral ills of society on a local level to the scourge of a whole country fol¬
lows a quite familiar pattern of religious movements in other parts of the
world . In the case of the Taliban , however , only a preliminary balance
sheet can be given . By mid - 1999 it is not yet clear whether the Taliban
have the potential to rule all of Afghanistan for a prolonged period ,
whether their ethnic bias and political incompetence will trigger a devel¬
opment which might lead to the total disintegration of the Afghan state , or
whether they are a mere transitory phenomenon . No doubt the Taliban
have prolonged the civil war and reinforced the ethnic divide in Afghani¬
stan with their uncompromising attitudes , although their original intention
was quite the opposite .
The Taliban themselves would , of course , put the blame entirely on the
stubbornness of their adversaries who have opposed their " caravan for
peace " . They never lost their sense of self - righteousness , which goes along
with a posturing of humble modesty that seems almost genuine on the part
of most Taliban leaders . 46 The Taliban have always been completely con¬
vinced of their final victory , but have never exaggerated their role in it ,
professing even their readiness to step aside once " God ' s will " has been
executed and a " truly Islamic government " established all over Afghani¬
stan . There is little doubt that the leaders of the Taliban have a much
stronger commitment to Islam than to Pashtun chauvinism , but the same
can hardly be said about many of those who do the actual fighting for
them . Thousands of former mujahidin , including important regional com¬
manders , have probably joined the Taliban out of opportunism , and be¬
cause they rightly viewed them as the only force capable of reasserting
Pashtun power . It should also not be forgotten that most pilots of Taliban
airplanes and helicopters , as well as most drivers of their tanks , and other
skilled military personnel are Pashtuns who have already served under the
former communist regime fighting the mujahidin .
The gradual moral decline of a religiously inspired movement which
conquers state power may be inevitable , as history has shown . One could
even concede that the Taliban were rather slow in deviating from their own
moral standards ( which see nothing wrong in keeping women prisoners of
their houses and burqa % for example ) . They made a great progress for
security and law and order in the Pashtun provinces after their initial cam -

46 This was at least my personal impression when attending talks with Taliban leaders
before and after their conquest of Kabul in 1996 [ fn . 21 ] .
 A VIOLENT " PEACE -MOVEMENT "
349

paigns . Then they attacked Kabul and Herat , obviously without valid justi¬

fication , but still without indulging in acts of rampant violence or plunder .

As occupying powers of these two non - Pashtun cities they were oppressive

from the outset , but generally refrained from abuses which would not be

compatible with their religious beliefs . They may mobilize young volun¬

teers with calls for jihad against their opponents , but they have not dubbed

the latter as infidels or preached sectarian or ethnic hatred against them .

The element of ethnic warfare , including forced deplacements , was only

gradually introduced by the Taliban after their conquest of Kabul .

Already in 1997 , the Taliban were accused of having taken revenge of

Hazara villagers near Mazar - i Sharif , 47 but with their massacres of August

1998 they have outdone all mutual atrocities of their opponents in the past .

Even if their own people were the first to be massacred in the same place

the previous year , the ferocity of the Taliban reaction showed a frightening

degree of hate which had built up to that time . There have been further

reports of alleged Taliban massacres in occupied northern Afghanistan

since , 48 committed in the face of local rebellions , and worse is to be feared

if they suffer more military setbacks in future . It seems that a certain gen¬

erosity which the Taliban formerly displayed towards defeated and " repen¬

tant " countrymen could be completely lost if they were to face a substan¬

tial decline of power .

Those parties who took over the different parts of Afghanistan in 1992 ,

had , for all their mutual wars and cruelties , never ceased to negotiate with

each other and had concluded numerous agreements . The Taliban , due to

their religious self - righteousness , have refused meaningful negotiations

with their adversaries for more than three years , and until this day they

have never shown any interest in genuine power - sharing . Their refusal to

admit the ethnic complexity of Afghanistan and the needs of a modern

society will remain the main obstacle for peace as long as the Taliban pre¬

vail as a strong force . It is precisely the sincerity of the Taliban ' s belief in

their own sacred mission which will probably generate further warfare and

naked oppression in the years to come .

47 In September 1997 , the Taliban staged a second attack on Mazar - i Sharif from a
pocket held in the north around the town of Kunduz . During that offensive , they alleg¬
edly massacred 70 civilians in the Hazara village of Qizilabad ( Dawn , September 15 ,
1997 ) .
48 " Talibanaccused of massacring 600 " , Dawn , January 8 , 1999 , referring to an uncon¬
firmed opposition report about the Qaysar district of the North - Western Faryab prov¬
ince .
 Part IV
Religion , Law , and Coexistence :
The Local Dimension
 SORTIR DES GUERRES DE RELIGION :
PRINCIPES JURIDIQUES ET MODÈLES
POLITIQUES
Olivier Christin

C ' est au XVIe siècle que sont abordés pour la première fois , dans des ter¬

mes proches de ceux qui sont encore les nôtres , à la fois le problème du

pluralisme religieux et la question des formes spécifiques de négociation et

de compromis qu ' il rend nécessaires pour éviter guerre civile , clientélisme

militaro - religieux , violence eschatologique , recours à l ' assassinat des sou¬

verains et des princes déclarés " impies " . 1 Ce serait , certes , se méprendre

profondément sur les enjeux réels des accords conclus récemment en Ir¬

lande et au Liban que de les comparer trait pour trait aux précédents histo¬

riques nés des conflits religieux du XVIe siècle ( paix de Cappel en 1531 ,

paix d ' Amboise en 1563 , Édit de Nantes de 1598 , traités de Westphalie de

1648 et bien d ' autres encore ) . Les premières paix de religion , qui mirent

un terme , plus ou moins durable et plus ou moins respecté , aux violences

entre confessions chrétiennes et dessinèrent pour longtemps la carte reli¬

gieuse de l ' Europe , ne préfigurent pas directement les compromis fragiles

de cette fin du XXe siècle , qui s ' inscrivent dans des contextes et des en¬

jeux particuliers comme l ' héritage du colonialisme ou de l ' occupation

étrangère .

Pourtant , les pacifications de la première modernité ont joué un rôle

décisif dans la formation des concepts et des dispositions qui continuent ,

aujourd ' hui encore , de conditionner en partie - et en partie seulement - no¬

tre façon de penser les questions liées au pluralisme religieux , à la neutrali¬

té de l ' État , à la légitimation de la décision majoritaire et aux droit des mi¬

norités , à la protection de la liberté des consciences .2

1 Sur cette question en général , voir Olivier Christin , La paix de religion :

L ' autonomisation
de la raison politique au XVIe siècle , Paris : Le Seuil , 1997 .
2 Voir la tentative intéressante de comparaison de Theodor Hanf, " Instrumenta Pacis :
Remarques comparatives sur la paix de Wetsphalie et l ' accord de Taëf " in : Perspecti¬
ves et réalités du Liban , colloque du centre d ' action et d ' information pour le Liban ,
Paris : Cariscript , 1991 , 165 - 78 .
 OLIVIER CHRISTIN
354

Aux XVIe - XVIIe siècles , en effet , on assiste à un double processus .

D ' une part , celui de l ' affirmation des États modernes centralisés . La chose
est bien connue , pour la France notamment , mais aussi pour l ' Angleterre et
de nombreux pays européens . Les conséquences de cet essor sont multi¬
ples , qu ' il n ' est pas possible de détailler ici , mais plusieurs indices méri¬
tent d ' être évoqués : d ' abord le renforcement de l ' appareil administratif et
judiciaire des Etats , qui instaurent ou tentent d ' instaurer des impôts per¬
manents ( la taille royale en France ) , un appareil judiciaire plus complet
disposant de professionnels mieux formés et plus nombreux ; ensuite le dé¬
veloppement considérables des armées qui confère aux souverains des
moyens d ' action hors de portée de la noblesse et donc un quasi - monopole
de l ' exercice de la violence militaire ; enfin , le contrôle plus étroit des Égli¬
ses ( Concordat de Bologne en France , Actes de Suprématie en Angleterre ,
création des Églises territoriales protestantes dans l ' Empire ) .
D ' autre part , la fracture confessionnelle du XVIe siècle . Au cours de la
première moitié du siècle , se brise irrémédiablement la Chrétienté médié¬
vale , qui ne survit plus qu ' à l ' état d ' utopie ou d ' objectif lointain pour sou¬
verains ambitieux . Dans les faits , la division religieuse de l ' Europe se ma¬
nifeste et s ' approfondit rapidement avec la création des grandes Églises
rivales ( luthérienne , calviniste , anglicane ) face à Rome et la prolifération
des mouvements dissidents et des sectes ( sociniens , anabaptistes ) .
Bien sûr , la carte religieuse de l ' Europe peut , de très loin , sembler as¬
sez simple , opposant un Sud ( Italie , Espagne , Portugal ) resté fidèle à Rome
au Nord ( Angleterre , Ecosse , pays Scandinaves , Allemagne du Nord ) passé
à la Réforme . Mais à mieux y regarder , on prend la mesure de la complexi¬
té et de la confusion de cette carte en raison de la présence d ' importantes
minorités . Catholiques anglais , calvinistes français ou allemands , anabap¬
tistes hollandais se trouvent ainsi isolés et menacés dans des entités politi¬
ques qui ne les reconnaissent pas ou les pourchassent systématiquement .
De multiples lieux de coexistence et de confrontation apparaissent , dans
lesquels les confessions rivales se côtoient au quotidien , au risque de la
violence et de l ' exclusion : cantons mixtes de Glaris et Appenzell , villes
d ' Empire comme Augsbourg , Biberach , Aix - la - Chapelle , régions entières

du royaume de France , dans l ' Ouest ou la vallée du Rhône notamment .

Du coup , des problème neufs surgissent ou se posent dans des termes
inédits , avec un sentiment d ' urgence et de gravité que l ' on retrouve au¬
jourd ' hui au Liban ou en Irlande .
 SORTIR DES GUERRES DE RELIGION
355

Les défis du pluralisme

Le premier de ces problèmes est , bien entendu , celui de la tolérance .3 Des

souverains dont le pouvoir repose en partie sur des fondements religieux ,

comme le manifeste la cérémonie du sacre du Roi de France , peuvent - ils ac¬

cepter la diversité religieuse dans les territoires qui sont sous leur autorité ?

Peuvent - ils ou doivent - ils accepter que certains de leurs sujets ne partagent pas

leur propre confession ? Comme philosophes , juristes et théologiens

s ' accordent à faire de la religion l ' une des conditions sine qua non de la co¬

hésion sociale et de la survie de l ' État , la diversité confessionnelle ne risque - t¬

elle pas d ' aboutir à la confusion , à la destruction du lien social , à la désobéis¬

sance générale des sujets et , pour tout dire , à la guerre civile ? Un Brief dis¬
cours sur l 'état présent, paru en 1564 , à l' occasion de la première paix de re¬
ligion en France , souligne ainsi l ' importance de la religion en tant que lien

social et ciment politique - " ce sont deux poincts qui plus maintiennent

tous Royaumes et républiques que la Religion et la justice , d ' autant que

plus que nuls autres ils lient et unissent les subjects en une même obéis¬

sance " . 4 La fin de l ' unité religieuse ne va - t - elle pas entraîner la dissolution

de l ' État ? Les souverains ne sont - ils pas , par conséquent , tenus de réagir à

ce péril et le roi de France ne promet - il d ' ailleurs pas lors de son sacre

d ' exterminer l ' hérésie de son royaume ?

La réponse à ces questions est nécessairement ardue et délicate . Confron¬

tés à la dissidence religieuse d ' une partie importante de leurs sujets , le Roi et

de France et l ' Empereur notamment , poursuivent ainsi tout à tour une politi¬

que de répression et la recherche de la réconciliation doctrinale , par exemple

au moyen de vastes colloques interconfessionnels destinés à trouver un terrain

d ' entente . Ce n ' est qu ' après l ' échec de ces tentatives qu ' ils se tournent vers

des solutions proprement politiques , les " paix de religion " , qui entérinent à la

fois la division religieuse et l ' autonomie de l ' État .5

3 Pour le XVIe siècle , les travaux essentiels restent ceux de Joseph Lecler , Histoire de la
tolérance au siècle des Réformes , réédition Paris : Albin Michel , 1994 ; Hans R . Gug -
gisberg , " Wandel der Argumente fur religiôse Toleranz und Glaubensfreiheit im 16 .
Jahrhundert " , in : Zur Geschichte der Toleranz und Religionsfreiheit , ed . Heinrich Lutz ,
Darmstadt : Wissenschafïtliche Buchgesellschaft , 1977 , 455 - 81 ; et Mario Turchetti ,
Concordia o Tolleranza . François Bauduin (1520- 1573) e i Moyenneurs , Genève :
Droz , 1984 . Voir aussi pour un survol plus rapide Thierry Wanegffelen , L 'Edit de
Nantes : Une histoire européenne de la tolérance (XVIe-XXe siècle) , Paris : Livre de
Poche , 1998 .
4 Christin , La paix de religion [ note 1] , 60 .
5 Karl Freiherr von Aretin , " Das Problem des Religionsfriedens in der europâischen
O.
Politik Rapports du XVe congrès international des sciences historiques , vol . I , Buca¬
",
rest , 1980 , 198 - 203 .
356 OLIVIER CHRISTIN

Par la paix , l ' État central reconnaît - à titre provisoire - l ' existence
d ' Églises rivales , qui jouissent de garanties légales et d ' une liberté de culte

relative , mais il s ' affirme également comme la seule instance d ' arbitrage et
de conciliation légitime par - delà les différences confessionnelles . De façon
très significative , l ' expression de " raison d ' État" apparaît en France
l ' année même de l ' entrée en vigueur du célèbre Édit de Nantes , qui met un

terme à près de quarante ans de guerres civiles entre catholiques et protes¬

tants . 6 Au nom de la raison d ' État , le souverain peut donc accepter comme
sujets des hommes et des femmes qui ne partagent pas sa foi , en échange
de leur obéissance politique sans faille . La soumission politique est donc le
revers de la liberté religieuse , comme le suggère une tradition historiogra -
phique qui s ' inspire en partie de Cari Schmitt 7 et oublie en la question du
sujet de droit .
Le second problème concerne la violence . Jusqu ' où l ' usage de la force
et de la violence peut - il être justifié en matière religieuse ? La question est ,
là aussi , plus complexe que ne le suggère un examen superficiel des sour¬
ces .
Elle renvoie , d ' un côté , aux réflexions menées sur la nature des obliga¬
tions religieuses des princes et des autorités séculières . Jusqu ' à quel point
les pouvoirs terrestres peuvent - ils contraindre les hérétiques et forcer les
consciences ? Jusqu ' à risquer la guerre civile ou des conversions super¬
ficielles de pure convenance et incompatibles avec une adhésion sincère ?
Ne serait - ce pas , au nom de la défense de la foi , courir le risque de faire
progresser le scepticisme religieux et l ' athéisme , en forçant les hérétiques
à simuler de fausses conversions et à dissimuler leurs convictions réelles ?
Bien peu d ' humanistes et de théologiens approuvent pourtant ce que
nous désignons aujourd ' hui par le terme de tolérance . Le mot d ' ailleurs re¬
vêt alors une connotation plutôt négative , proche de celle attribuée aux
termes voisins de " supporter " ou " endurer " . 8 Autour de quelques lieux bi¬
bliques - comme la parabole du bon grain et de l ' ivraie - et d ' arguments

6 Marcel Gauchet , " L ' État au miroir de la raison d ' État : la France et la chrétienté " , in :
Raison et déraison d 'État , ed . Yves - Charles Zarka , Paris : Presses Universitaires de
France , 1994 , 193 - 244 .
7 Cari Schmitt , Hamlet oder Hekuba : Der Einbruch der Zeit in das Spiel [ 1956 ] , Stutt¬
gart : Klett - Cotta , 1993 .
8 William H . Huseman , " The Expression of the Idea of Toleration in French During the
Sixteenth Century " , The Sixteenth Century Journal 15 ( 1984 ) , 294 - 310 . Pour
l ' allemand , voir Winfried Schulze , " Concordia , Discordia , Tolerantia . Deutsche Politik
im konfessionellen Zeitalter " , in : Neue Studien zur friihneuzeitlichen Reichsgeschichte ,
ed . Johannes Kunisch ( = Zeitschrift fur historische Forschung ; Beiheft 3 ) , Berlin :
Duncker & Humblot , 1987 , 43 - 79 .
 SORTIR DES GUERRES DE RELIGION
357

précis , plusieurs auteurs commencent cependant à condamner l ' usage de la

contrainte , le forcement des consciences , le recours au glaive . A titre

d ' exemple et sans entrer dans toutes les nuances qui séparent les érasmi -

sants , Castellion , Sébastien Franck , les moyenneurs français des années

1560 , on peut citer ici Coornhert pour qui " tuer un homme ce n ' est pas dé¬

fendre une doctrine , c ' est tuer un homme " . La foi , pour lui , ne se défend

pas par la force , mais par la prédication , la charité , l ' exemple .9

Mais la réflexion sur la légitimité de l ' usage de la violence concerne

aussi ceux qui entendent s ' opposer par la force aux souverains et aux prin¬

ces qui les persécutent . Or c ' est précisément au XVIe siècle , que prennent

forme les théories de la résistance , dans l ' Empire , aux Pays - Bas , en

France . La dimension révolutionnaire des guerres de religion ne doit donc

pas être sous - estimée , comme le montre l ' acte d ' abjuration de Philippe II

prononcé par les États - Généraux des Pays - Bas . Les États affirment , en ef¬

fet , qu ' en ne reconnaissant plus l ' autorité de Philippe , ils agissent " en

conformité avec la loi naturelle et pour la protection de leurs propres droits

et ceux de leurs compatriotes , des privilèges , coutumes traditionnelles et

liberté de la patrie , de la vie et honneur de leurs femmes , enfants et des¬

cendants afin qu ' ils ne tombent pas dans l ' esclavage espagnol " 10 .

En France , le massacre de la Saint - Barthélemy entraîne les auteurs pro¬

testants vers une radicalisation des justifications de la résistance , bientôt

reprises aussi par les catholiques extrémistes de la Ligue . Ce qui est dé¬

sormais en jeu , c ' est bien plus que la défense des libertés et privilèges tra¬

ditionnels et l ' invocation assez générale du droit naturel : c ' est la possibi¬

lité même d ' attenter à la personne d ' un souverain ou d ' un prince qui agit

en tyran en persécutant la vraie foi et en bafouant les commandements de

Dieu , autrement dit la légitimité de l ' assassinat politique . Imprégnées de la

brutalité des affrontements religieux et des persécutions des années 1560 -

1570 et traversées d ' attentes eschatologiques , ces mises en forme théori¬

ques du tyrannicide accompagnent et justifient la violence des " guerriers

de Dieu " qui peuplent les deux camps . En fait , dès la fin des années 1550 ,

on observe en France les premières attaques directes contre le roi . Un

pamphlet paru en 1559 affirme ainsi que " le roy notre prince est subjet , et

tous les siens aux commandements du souverain Roy , et commet luy

mesme crime de loese majesté , s ' il détermine quelque chose contre la vo¬

lonté de son Roy et le nostre , et par ainsy coulpable de mort , s ' il persiste

en une erreur qu ' il devrait condamner " . En persécutant les vrais croyants ,

9 Voir ici Lecler , Histoire de la tolérance [ note 3 ] , passim .

10 Cité par Martin van Gelderen , The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555 - 1590 ,
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1992 .
358 OLIVIER CHRISTIN

le Roi se rend donc coupable aux yeux de Dieu d ' un crime épouvantable
qui ne mérite que la mort .
Mais l ' argument reste toutefois encore circonscrit et imprécis , même si
en août 1558 , un protestant nommé Cobache essaye de tuer Henri II en
criant " Dieu m ' a commandé que je te tue " 1' . C ' est en partie la Saint -
Barthélemy qui réveille les tentations tyrannicides et leur donne une viru¬
lence inédite , avant que la Ligue catholique n ' en reprenne les arguments
pour lutter contre Henri III suspecté de tiédeur dans la lutte contre le calvi¬
nisme et bientôt accusé de préparer la succession protestante sur le trône
de France au profit de Henri de Navarre .
Henri III meurt ainsi sous les coups d ' un moine exalté , Jacques Clé¬
ment , que les catholiques intransigeants de la Ligue vénèrent comme un
saint et un martyr : dans son Troisième devis d ' un Catholique et d ' un Poli¬
tique paru en 1589 , le ligueur Jacques le Bossu estime ainsi " que le bon ja¬
cobin [ Jacques Clément ] a tué louablement le tyran et en a dépêtré toute la
France , au grand bien de l ' Église catholique et de tous les gens de bien .
Tout est admirable dans ce meurtre " . Henri IV lui - même échappe à près
d ' une vingtaine de tentatives d ' assassinat , parfois fomentés par les Capu¬

cins , avant de succomber en 1610 dans un attentat . La sacralisation du

pouvoir politique que l ' on évoque volontiers à propos du Royaume de
France au XVIIe siècle prend tout sens dans ce contexte de diffusion des
idées tyrannicides . Rappeler avec insistance le caractère sacré du roi , re¬
présentant de Dieu sur terre , permet en effet de réfuter toutes les justifica¬
tions religieuses des attaques contre le souverain : s ' opposer à lui par la
force , c ' est aller directement contre la volonté de Dieu . Quatre ans après
l ' assassinat d ' Henri IV , la menace des tyrannicides paraît encore suffi¬

samment présente pour que les députés du Tiers - État affirment " que
l ' opinion [ . . . qu ' il . . . ] est loisible de tuer ou déposer nos rois , s ' élever et re¬

beller contre eux , secouer le joug de leur obéissance pour quelque occasion
que ce soit , est impie , détestable , contre vérité " 12 .

Les paix de religion

Ces défis pressants de la guerre civile , de la violence eschatologique et de

l ' assassinat religieux expliquent l ' importance des efforts déployés par les

souverains et les pouvoirs centraux pour tenter de mettre fin aux troubles

11 Mark Greengrass , " France " , in Robert Scribner et al . , The Reformation in National
Context , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1994 , 57 .
12 Proposition du Cahier du Tiers - État aux États - Généraux de 1614 - 1615 , citée par Ro¬
land Mousnier , L 'assassinat d 'Henri IV, Paris : Gallimard , 1964 , 348 - 49 .
 SORTIR DES GUERRES DE RELIGION
359

religieux et aux persécutions sanglantes dont l ' inefficacité avait fini par

paraître manifeste . Les États centraux ont alors recours à des stratégies pa¬

rallèles mais au fond très dissemblables . D ' un côté , se jouent les dernières

tentatives de réunion des Églises ou de rapprochement sur une base doctri¬

nale , qui reposent soit sur une réforme interne de l ' Église catholique afin

de la débarrasser de ce qui heurtaient le plus les protestants , soit sur une

redéfinition des principaux articles de foi pour mieux distinguer ce que les

adversaires ont en commun de ce qui est indifférent , accidentel , secondaire

et qui peut donc être laissé au libre choix de chacun ( adiaphora ). A

Worms , à Haguenau , à Poissy , à Saint - Germain - en - Laye sont ainsi organi¬

sés d ' imposants " colloques de religion " destinés à confronter les points de

vue et à minimiser les divergences .

Ces colloques théologiques échouent . Les pouvoirs se tournent donc

vers une solution strictement politique du différend confessionnel , que les

contemporains vont désigner en France , en Allemagne , aux Pays - Bas du

terme de Religionsfrieden ou " paix de religion " . Les plus connues sont cel¬

les d ' Augsbourg en 1555 , de Nantes en 1598 et d ' Osnabriick en 1598 ,

mais l ' histoire de l ' Europe médiane de la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle

en est en fait jalonnée . Ces paix sont certes différentes en raison des parti¬

cularités institutionnelles et politiques des États et de la grande diversité

des situations confessionnelles . Pourtant , elles présentent entre elles de tel¬

les similitudes , voulues par leurs auteurs , qu ' il n ' est pas mutile d ' en rappe¬

ler les fondements théoriques communs .

On l ' a dit , il s ' agit d ' abord de paix offertes et imposées par le Politique ,

non par les Églises . Ce sont des règlements ou des accords contractuels

conçus , négociés et rédigés en bonne partie par des juristes et des légistes ,

non par des théologiens ou des ministres . Les questions proprement doctri¬

nales y sont donc suspendues ou , plus exactement , mises entre parenthèses ,

les confessions reconnus restant libres de définir leur doctrine et leur disci¬

pline . En ce sens , les paix de religion sont bien des compromis sans com¬

promission : les adhérents des Églises rivales n ' y renoncent pas à leur foi et à

leurs usages ecclésiastiques ; ils définissent seulement une forme de coexis¬

tence pacifique institutionnalisée et garantie par la loi .

C ' est le Politique qui offre aux catholiques et aux protestants un espace

où reconstituer un Bien commun , un intérêt général qui les associe : la paix

civile . L ' unité religieuse désarme la division religieuse . Comme le dit avec

force le chancelier Michel de L ' Hospital dès 1560 , " même l ' hérétique

reste citoyen " . Les formes de compétition et de confrontation entre catho¬

liques et protestants se déplacent donc du terrain de la violence eschatolo -

gique au terrain judiciaire , comme le montre l ' exemple du Reichskammer -

gericht , qui devient l ' instance principale d ' arbitrage entre les confessions
360 OLIVIER CHRISTIN

dans l ' Empire . Chacun tente désormais , autant que possible , de rester dans
le cadre de la loi et d ' en exploiter à son profit toutes les ressources .
Les paix et les règlements , éclaircissements , explications qui les dou¬
blent pour en faciliter l ' application , tentent avant tout de résoudre les pro¬
blèmes concrets de la coexistence confessionnelle . Partage de l ' espace ur¬
bain ( les protestants doivent - ils décorer leur maison si la procession de la
Fête - Dieu passe devant chez eux ? ) , partage des charges et des pouvoirs ( ca¬
tholiques et protestants peuvent - ils siéger dans les mêmes conseils , les mê¬
mes tribunaux ou les mêmes institutions charitables ? ) , réglementation des
relations entre communautés (un catholique peut - il épouser une protestante ?
Dans quelle foi seront élevés les enfants ? ) , conflits sur les calendriers ou les
interdits alimentaires ( les protestants peuvent - il ouvrir leurs boutiques les
jours de fêtes catholiques ou manger de la viande pendant le Carême ? ) sont
au cœur des préoccupations des paix de religion . A Augsbourg , par exemple ,
les riches protestants sont accusés de priver leurs domestiques catholiques de
pain et de farine pendant le Carême pour les inciter à manger de la viande ou
de la charcuterie et à briser ainsi les interdits alimentaires des temps clos . En
1566 , pendant le Carême , les luthériens de la ville organisent un banquet de¬
vant la cathédrale où est encore célébré le culte catholique . ' 3
Soucieuses avant tout d ' ordre public , les paix ne s ' inscrivent donc
pas dans une réflexion sur la tolérance ou les droits de l ' homme . Ni la
paix d ' Augsbourg ni l ' Édit de Nantes ne comportent d ' ailleurs le terme
de tolérance / Toleranz . Ces règlements se caractérisent , au contraire , sou¬
vent par leur fermeture très stricte . Ils n ' offrent de garanties qu ' à leurs
signataires nommément désignés : catholiques et réformés en France , ca¬
tholiques et luthériens en Allemagne . Juifs , anabaptistes , antitrinitaires
n ' y sont pas inclus . Les calvinistes allemands , pourtant de plus en plus

nombreux dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle , ne jouissent eux non

plus théoriquement pas des bénéfices de la paix d ' Augsbourg jusqu ' en
1648 .
D ' une manière générale , les droits des sujets paraissent également très
limités dans ces accords de paix . Partout , l ' État central , les États territo¬
riaux ou la noblesse semblent tirer les véritables profits de la coexistence
institutionnelle , s ' arrogeant compétences , libertés et prérogatives élargies .
En France , par exemple , les seigneurs hauts justiciers se voient concéder la
liberté de culte pour eux , leur famille et leurs sujets . Dans l ' Empire , les
chevaliers sont assurés de leur Freistellung religieuse ; en Pologne , les Ma¬
gnats bénéficient de privilèges considérables . En regard , les droits des su -

13 Lotte Schiller , Das gegenseitige Verhâltnis der Konfessionen in Augsburg im Zeitalter

der Gegenreformation , dactyl , 1933 , 23 - 24 .
 SORTIR DES GUERRES DE RELIGION
361

jets paraissent très maigres . Mais il faut introduire ici une distinction fon¬

damentale entre les paix fondées sur le principe du cujus regio et celles qui

invoquent et inventent une citoyenneté non - confessionnelle .

Deux modèles

Les traités de Westphalie codifient en 1648 deux dispositions longuement

préparées par les débats confessionnels et les affrontements politiques de

la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle : d ' une part le principe de la parité , c ' est -

à - dire du partage égal des charges dans un certain nombre d ' institutions et

de lieux ( Reichskammergericht ou conseil des villes mixtes comme Augs -

bourg , Biberach , Ravensburg ) , d ' autre part le refus de la décision majori¬

taire en matière confessionnelle en vertu de l ' adage Quod omnes tangit , ab

omnibus approbetur . A la Diète , en matière de causa fidei , catholiques et
protestants siègent donc en deux corps séparés , votant séparément ( itio in
partes ) avant de chercher à trouver un compromis amiable ( amicabilis
compositio ) . C ' est là garantir les droits de la minorité , en évitant toute pos¬
sibilité de décision majoritaire ou de confiscation des postes et des charges

au profit de l ' un des camps en présence , mais aussi conférer un statut poli¬

tique et institutionnel central aux confessions .

Les pacifications religieuses françaises et notamment l ' Edit de Nantes

tournent le dos à ce modèle confessionnel et pluraliste . Dans le royaume ,

en effet , point de territorialisation sur le modèle suisse ou allemand . Catho¬

liques et protestants sont amenés à se côtoyer dans les mêmes lieux , les

mêmes villes , les mêmes villages . Ils vivent dans le même État . Comme le

dit l ' article 6 de l ' Edit de Nantes , qui ne fait ici que reprendre la phrase de

Michel de L ' Hospital déjà citée , ils sont " concitoyens " . Lorsqu ' ils se re¬
trouvent dans une même institution , comme un tribunal ou un conseil de

ville , ils votent ensemble , à la majorité des voix . En tant que citoyens ,

membres d ' une même société politique , ils sont égaux et peuvent contri¬

buer ensemble à la détermination du Bien commun . Sujets d ' un même roi ,

auquel ils doivent la même obéissance , ils bénéficient tous de la protection

de la loi et peuvent agir de concert . La répartition des charges publiques

emprunte également des voies différentes de ce que l ' on observe dans

l ' Empire . Selon la lettre de l ' Edit de Nantes , toutes les charges sont théori¬

quement accessibles aux réformés , mais aucune ne leur est réservée . La pa¬

rité ne s ' applique qu ' au cas très particulier des tribunaux mi - partis . Certes ,

dans le détail , de nombreux conseils de ville seront partagés selon de sa¬

vants équilibres entre les deux confessions , mais il ne s ' agira jamais d ' un

principe général et codifié .

362 OLIVIER CHRISTIN

Ce n ' est donc pas dans la confessionnalisation des institutions ou

l ' institutionnalisation des confessions que le royaume sort des guerres de

religion , mais dans l ' exaltation de la raison d ' État qui soumet les corps in¬
termédiaires , les volontés individuelles , les particularismes . Le roi Très -
Chrétien peut accepter que certains habitants de son royaume ne partagent
pas sa foi puisqu ' à ses yeux ils ne sont que des sujets obéissants . " Qui em¬
pêchera que le Catholique ne vive en paix avec le Réformé , aussi bien que
vivaient les trois empereurs chrétiens , Jovien , Valens et Valentinien , avec
Julien l ' Apostat qui s ' efforçait du tout à abattre le christianisme ? Pourquoi
notre Roi ne se pourra - t - il servir de ceux qui sont contraire sa religion s ' ils
sont commodes et profitables à sa République ? " demande l ' auteur d ' un
ouvrage paru en faveur de la première paix de religion dans le Royaume de
France . 14
Le même discours , parfaitement conforme aux intérêts du monarque
absolu qui réconcilie sous la loi et sous son autorité unique l ' ensemble de
ses sujets , au nom de l ' intérêt général du Royaume , se retrouve encore plus
nettement dans la justification de l ' Édit de Nantes que vont développer
partout propagandistes royaux , pamphlétaires , agents de la monarchie dans
les provinces . Un pamphlet paru en 1599 en faveur de l ' édit , affirme ainsi :
" Il est aisé à connaître que la tolérance des deux religions , et la division

qui est en l ' Église , ne doit point être cause de division en l ' État . Mais au
contraire que la division et la désunion qui est en l ' État nourrit et augmente
le schisme et la division qui est en l ' Église " 15 . L ' État souverain et l ' ordre
politique qu ' il instaure sont , dans cette perspective , la seule façon de sortir
des dissensions et des guerres intestines et d ' établir la paix .
Dans l ' exaltation de la puissance souveraine du Roi et l ' autonomisa -
tion du Politique au nom de la raison d ' État , les pacifications françaises
dessinent donc une autre solution aux guerres de religion , ambiguë et fra¬
gile , mais seule capable de concilier l ' inconciliable : l ' unité politique du
royaume autour d ' un roi sacré , représentant de Dieu sur terre , et sa diversi¬
té religieuse . Non sans contradictions internes - qui en préparent d ' ailleurs
l ' échec historique 16 - elles tentent d ' organiser la pax civilis autour des

deux principes essentiels que sont la souveraineté indivisible exercée par le

monarque et la reconnaissance du sujet de droit . Ce faisant , elles préparent
la distinction entre l ' obéissance politique de la personne publique et la li -

14 Christin , La paix de religion [ note 1] , 188 .

15 De la concorde de l 'État par l 'observation des édits de pacification , Paris 1599 , 15 -

16 .

16 L ' Édit de Nantes est révoqué par Louis XIV en 1685 .

 SORTIR DES GUERRES DE RELIGION
363

berté religieuse ( relative ) de la personne privée qui sera au fondement de la

définition moderne de la tolérance .
L ' histoire comparée des formes historiquement contemporaines et con¬

currentes des pacifications religieuses et des coexistences confessionnelles

permet ainsi de se libérer en partie des illusions et des désillusions des inter¬
prétations héritées de Cari Schmitt et souvent adoptées , à leur insu , par les
historiens français trop heureux de pouvoir célébrer dans l ' absolutisme et la
centralisation étatique l ' unique façon de mettre fin aux guerres civiles des
XVIe - XVIIe siècles et de préparer l ' avènement de l ' État laïc . Elle montre ,
en effet , que les principes juridiques divergents des pacifications , forgés
dans la même intention ( ramener la paix civile ) mais dans des contextes
politiques et institutionnels dissemblables , ont peu à peu dessiné deux modes
d ' appréhension opposés du pluralisme , communautaire d ' un côté , républi¬
cain laïc de l ' autre .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA :
POLITICS OF VIOLENCE AND THE STRENGTH
AND LIMITS OF MEDIATION IN BOMBAY '

J ulia E ckert

No concept has so much appeal in peace research as the idea of mediation :

Bringing people of warring communities together and building respect and

tolerance between them has become the focus of hope at a time when most

conflicts appear to be fought over community identities . In what follows , I

shall question the attributing of conflict to community sentiments , empha¬

sizing instead its political dimension . Concepts of reconciliation have to

take into view the rationale of communal politics , as their success depends

on whether they can diminish the returns of violent mobilization .

In the aftermath of the riots between Hindus and Muslims which rav¬

aged the city of Bombay in the winter 1992 / 93 , 2 citizens , stunned both by

the ferocity of the violence and by the fact that a city so proud of its cos¬

mopolitan outlook could descend into such fury , undertook to set up insti¬

tutions which would prevent such events happening in the future . They

established Mohalla Committees , neighborhood councils which aimed at

bringing together members of the different religious communities , police

personnel and concerned citizens to address community tensions and re¬

solve them before they would escalate into violence .

This article discusses the idea and the work of the Mohalla Committees

of Bombay as a model for reconstituting a peaceful coexistence of reli -

1 The research on which this article is based was conducted for the project " Conflict -
mongers and Peacemakers " at the Free University of Berlin , funded by the VW foun¬
dation . The author would also like to thank Roland Eckert , Georg Elwert and Thomas
Zitelmann , and the convener of this volume , Thomas Scheffler , for their valuable
comments .

2 Reports about the riots are published in Citizens for the Protection of Democratic
Rights ( CPDR ) , The Bombay Riots : The Myths and Realities , Bombay : CPDR , 1993 ;
S .M . Daud and Hosbeth Suresh , The People 's Verdict , Bombay : Indian People ' s Hu¬
man Rights Commission , 1993 ; EKTA Samiti ( Unity Association ) , Bombay 's Shame :
A Report on the Bombay Riots , Bombay : ekta Samiti , 1993 ; Dileep Padgaonkar ,
When Bombay Burned , New Delhi : UBS , 1993 ; Srikrishna Commission Report , Mum -
bai , 1998 .
366 JULIA ECKERT

gious communities within a common political system . In their work , the

Mohalla Committees address problems of prejudice , civic tensions , and
religious rituals . The measures employed to bring about communal har¬
mony are determined by what is assessed to be the cause of communal
antagonism . In Bombay , a view of communal antagonism as rooted in the
sentiments of hatred became predominant .
It is suggested in part one that this interpretation became dominant in
the work of the Mohalla Committees as well as the state agencies not be¬
cause of the evidence of the riots , as gathered by the official Inquiry
Commission , but by necessity : A partial view of communalism , which
excluded aspects of the political rationales of violent mobilization , was
forced upon the work of the Mohalla Committees by the political realities
of a situation of " victory " , a partial view which was supposed to offer an
exhaustive solution . The Mohalla Committees were limited to address the
" problem of sentiments " and could not effect structural reforms , although

they did reflect upon their relevance for a long - term solution .
In part two it is suggested that the work of the Mohalla Committees
was limited in effect due to their limited view of communalism . Address¬
ing prejudice , civic tensions and provocations at public rituals does not and
cannot alter either the structures of power or the strategic value of violent
mobilization - it can simply try and make citizens impervious to the calls
of demagogues . This has its limits in the fact that as long as escalation
" pays " in terms of mass support , situations of confrontation can be created

which make communal conflict plausible .

Part three sketches out the strategic rationale of communal riots which
have to be taken into view if such events are to be prevented in the future .
Only if the returns of violent mobilization are diminished , when " modera¬
tion pays " , can the strategic organization of conflict give way to models of
cooperation . The potentials of the Mohalla Committees are limited in this
respect and have to be complemented by the restoration of the rule of law .

1 . The riots and their aftermath

1 . 1 The riots

The idea of the Mohalla Committees was born in Bhivandi , an industrial

town close to Bombay with a long history of communal tensions . A Police
Commissioner of Bhivandi who witnessed the riots in 1984 , devised the
idea of community vigilance against communal riots and initiated the for¬
mation of the committees on every police beat . The aim was twofold : To
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 367

better the relations between residents and the police ; and to bring about

communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims and thus prevent riots .

When , after the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by mem¬

bers of Hindu nationalist organizations such as the VHP ( Vishwa Hindu

Parishad , World Hindu Council ) , the Bajrang Dal ( the youth wing of the

VHP ) and also the Shivsena ( the regional Hindu nationalist party govern¬

ing Maharashtra and Bombay at the time ) , 3 riots broke out in many cities

in India , Bhivandi remained peaceful . Bombay , however , experienced the

most massive communal riots in its history .

The riots began in the night after the destruction of the mosque with

Muslims attacking the symbols of the state in the Muslim dominated areas

of the city , while the BJP ( Bharatiya Janata Party , Indian People ' s Party )

and Shivsena conducted " victory processions " . Over the next two month ,

gangs of Hindus and Muslims attacked each other and each others ' homes .

While the police retaliated brutally in December , firing live ammunition

which injured and killed many people , in the January riots they stayed

largely inactive , or became accomplices in the outright pogrom against

Muslims orchestrated by the Shivsena . 4 The biased role of the police be¬

came one of the most escalatory features of the Bombay riots . By February

1993 , at least 1 , 000 people had been killed , more than 200 , 000 had fled the

city and many had lost their homes and their belongings . Bombay , with its

idea of cosmopolitanism and modernity , lay in shambles ; communal vio¬

lence which had been relegated to the past , to backwardness and traditional

binds had entered into the center of modernity and had put into question

the nature of this modernity .

Human rights groups conducted inquiries into the riots . Compensation

could be claimed for deaths and losses ; private organizations began the

reconstruction of houses ; many of those 200 , 000 who had allegedly fled

the city to their places of origin in other parts of India returned . Frequent¬

ly , however , they did not return to their previous homes . A process of resi -

3 For a report on the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and the events which
led up to this see for example Kamal A . Mitra Chenoy , " Citizen ' s Inquiry Reports on
Ayodhya and Its Aftermath " , South Asia Bulletin 16 ( 1994 ) , 1 - 9 . On the legal judg¬
ment see Rajeev Dhavan , " The Ayodhya Judgment : Encoding Secularism in the Law " ,
Economic and Political Weekly , November 26 , 1994 , 3034 - 40 .
4 The independent inquiries into the riots estimate that in the December phase 90 % of
those who died were killed by police bullets , while in the January phase 30 % died
from police bullets , 13 % burned to death in arson attacks and the rest was killed by at¬
tacks of rioters ( stabbing , necklacing , clubbing to death with sticks and cricket bats . )
This indicates the different reaction of the police to rioting in the December phase of
the riots and in January . 75 % of all those who died were Muslims , who constitute
about 11 % of the city ' s population .
368 JULIA ECKERT

dential segregation of the communities was intensified as people tried to

move into areas where their religious community was the numerically do¬
minant one . 5
When , in March 1993 , 13 bombs exploded killing another 317 people
this was widely seen as an act of revenge for the riots , organized and con¬
ducted by Dawood Ibrahim ' s criminal gang on behalf of " its " community ,
the Muslims . Many Muslims felt that the bomb blasts had rescued them
from their vulnerability . 6 A balance had been struck and a " cold peace " set
in .

" All this made it abundantly clear that unless we had a long - term plan

to mend the social fabric of the city , we were poised for grave urban terror¬
ism . Our city too could turn into another Beirut or a Karachi . Maintaining
peace and harmony in the city became the major concern of many citi -
zens ." 7'
Two institutional frameworks were created to develop instruments for
preventing communal riots in the future . An official Inquiry Commission
under Justice Srikrishna was given the task of establishing " the circum¬
stances , events and immediate causes of the incidents . . . ; whether any in¬
dividual or group of individuals or any other organization was responsible
. . . ; the adequacy . . . of preventive measures ( and ) whether the steps taken

by the police in controlling the riots were adequate . . . ; the measures . . .

which are required to be taken by the administration to avoid recurrence of
such incidents , to secure communal harmony and to suggest improvements
in the law and order machinery . " 8
Secondly , and independently of the establishment of the Srikrishna
Commission , several citizens began to organize the Mohalla Committees
in close cooperation with individual senior police officers . The initiators

5 See : YUVA ( Youth for Voluntary Action ) , Planned Segregation : Riots , Evictions and
Dispossession in Jogeshwari East , Bombay : YUVA , 1996 ; Julia Eckert , ' " Riots :
That ' s something that happens in the slums . ' Land , stadtische Unruhen und die Politik
der Segregation " , Sozialanthropologische Arbeitspapiere , no . 79 , Berlin : Das Arabi -
sche Buch , 1999 , 1- 20 .
6 This became apparent in interviews conducted among Muslim residents in Bombay in
1997 . See Julia Eckert , " Kalter Frieden in Bombay : Zur Koexistenz von Hindus und
Muslimen unter der Shivsena " , Sozialanthropologische Arbeitspapiere , no . 77 , Berlin :
Das Arabische Buch , 1999 , 5 .
7 From an internal report of the Mohalla Committees , 2 .
8 Srikrishna Commission Report , Bombay 1998 , 1 . The Report was published privately
by the Mumbai based journalist Jyoti Punwani in August 1998 as an official publica¬
tion by the government was not forthcoming . All quotations refer to this private publi¬
cation .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA
369

recruited social workers , doctors , teachers and other concerned citizens

who were active in voluntary community work , held a certain respect in

their neighborhoods and , above all , were " not political " . No member of

any political party could sit on a Mohalla committee ; if members of the

Committees aspired to public office or applied for a party election ticket

they had to resign . The exclusion of politically active people from the Mo¬

halla Committees was meant to protect their work from being ( mis -)

appropriated by political parties for their own electoral gains . However , it

was not because the members assumed anti - communalist initiatives to be

invested with huge electoral fortunes , rather the conscious distancing from

politics was due to the assumption that politics would actually destroy all

efforts of / at reconciliation . The Committees were trying to circumvent

" politics " and to construct a direct link between civil society and the state .

1 . 2 Interpretations of the riots

What was it , though , which had to be reconciled ? How could the social

fabric be repaired ? What actually lay at the root of this violence ? In order

to prevent communal riots from happening in the future , as the mandate of

the Srikrishna Commission stated and as the initiators of the Mohalla

Committees had set out to do , they had to explore the causes of the riots .

There is much debate about whether it is appropriate to understand col¬

lective violence by examining its context , to break it down into its ele¬
ments and attribute causal character to individual contextual conditions .

Violence , it is suggested , should be treated more as a total event rather

than a historical process . However , the manifold motives which enter into

the event of violence and even its performative elements , although they
transform each other and are transformed in the event of violence , have a

historical dimension , not only because they are situated within discourses

which legitimate them , but because they are structured by their context .

Moreover , all efforts to prevent violence are based on certain analyses

of its causes , as well as on the situational possibilities within which such

preventive efforts operate . In order to understand the choice of means of

conflict regulation and even reconciliation , or simply the prevention of

violence , the underlying " understanding " of the violence has to be taken
into consideration . The ideas about violence and conflict and its causes are

part of the choices those concerned make , whether for the legitimization of

violence , its strategies and targets , or whether for the course chosen for
reconciliation .
 JULIA ECKERT
370

Various theories held sway in Bombay about the causes of the riots . 9
Without elaborating on the specific social positioning of these theories ,
they can be summarized as following five different reasonings :
(1) Along with the whisky and the sea - breeze of the affluent western
suburbs , which had been involved in the riots to a much lesser degree than
the neighboring slums and the lower middle class areas further into the
city , the theory was frequently put forward that it was " the mob " , " the
Lumpens " of Bombay , the " backward " element of this cosmopolitan city
which had plunged it into violence . There was the version of the " Lumpen
theory " which accredited the violence to the " traditional " character , the
lack of education , civilization , secularization of the " mob " . The " mob " had
brought with it its " traditional " identities from the villages and was , unlike
the individualized and modern citizen , still bound by community , and ,
being less civilized , more prone to violence . In this view , the cause was
justified , but the means were rather nasty .
(2) The left - wing version of the " Lumpen theory " was that the " popu¬
lar element " of the city , living in slums and in situations of so - called in¬
formality defined by deprivation , had vented their collective anger . Al¬
though the aggression was misplaced , targeting Muslims who lived under
exactly the same conditions , it was , in this view , fundamentally a protest
against the insecure conditions of the poor in this rapidly changing city . 10
(3) However , there was an altogether different theory claiming that the
riots were in fact orchestrated by groups with clear economic motives , by
gangs and building magnates and other commercial enterprises using the
riots to fight for their turf or to appropriate property . Many reports about
riots tell stories of such " hidden agendas " : Hansen reports from the com¬
munal riots in rural Marathwada that , among other things , the objective
had been to appropriate the stalls of Muslim traders along the commer¬
cially viable roadside . " Commercial rivalries , such as for example in the
silk industry in Benares , 12 as well as the involvement of builders and slum¬
lords in the riots in Ahmedabad and Hyderabad , 13 have been assessed to be

9 The description of the emic interpretations of the riots is based on a body of 178 inter¬
views and a survey questionnaire of 120 conducted between January 1997 and March
1999 .

10 See for example Jim Masselos , " The Bombay Riots of 1993 : The Politics of an Urban
Conflagration " , in : Politics of Violence , eds . John McGuire , Peter Reeves , and Howard
Brasted , New Delhi : Sage , 1996 , 122 .
11 Thomas Hansen , " The Vernacularisation of Hindutva : The BJP and Shiv Sena in rural
Maharashtra " , Contributions to Indian Sociology 30 ( 1996 ) 2 , 192 .
12 Vibhuti N . Rai , Combating Communal Conflicts , Delhi : Renaissance , 1998 , 73 .
13 Ibid . , 74 - 75 .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA
371

behind the instigation of violence as well as behind its orchestration and

targeting . Such largely economic and often cross - community motives have
been attributed to the Bombay riots as well . 14 Organized looting as well as
land - grabbing were part of the riots . The massive attack on Berampada for
example , a slum situated centrally on prime land in Bandra ( East ) , the new
commercial center of the city , was clearly also intended to clear the land
and sell it profitably to " developers " . Similar strategies became apparent in
several incidents in Jogeshwari and Dharavi . ' 5
This theory was often voiced not only by those who knew about the lo¬
cal structures of the riots , but also by members of the Shivsena who
claimed that the name of their organization had been misused by goondas ,
gangsters who " used it to get their business done " . 16 However , if such
strategies were at work , they largely failed : The Bombay riots tell very few
stories of an economic restructuring . Where they were at work , they can be
said to have taken advantage of the situation and even to have fanned the
flames , but not to have orchestrated the riots . Once a riot is created many
will make use of it for their own ends , which might in itself change the
course of events .
(4) There was , of course also the theory that the riots were simply an
expression of a deep antagonism between religious communities , between
Hindus and Muslims . Some voiced this idea in despair , such as the Report
of the Srikrishna Commission which declared that " Communal riots , the
bane of this country , are like incurable epileptic seizures . " 17
However , the relation of the riots to the antagonism between Hindus
and Muslims was also seen in the light of a just retribution : " We gutless
Hindus finally have to stand up and fight back " , was the comment of an
elegant lady infuriated by a Muslim painter ' s depiction of a Hindu goddess
in the nude . In a similar vein Bal Thackeray , the unchallenged leader of the
Shivsena , justified the riots in an interview with Time magazine in January
1993 :

"Muslims started the riots , and my boys are retaliating . Do you expect
Hindus to turn the other cheek ? I want to teach Muslims a lesson . . . . They
are not prepared to accept the rules of this land . They don ' t want to ac¬
cept birth control . They want to implement their Sharia in my mother¬
land . Yes , this is the Hindus ' motherland . . . . Have they behaved like the

14 Masselos , " The Bombay Riots " [ fn . 10 ] , 118 - 21 .

15 See YUVA , Planned Segregation [ fn . 5 ] ; Eckert , " Riots " [ fn . 5 ] , 13 .

16 Interview with a Shivsena Shakha Pramukh in March 1998 .

17 Srikrishna Commission Report [fn . 8 ] , 4 .

 JULIA ECKERT
372

Jews in Nazi Germany ? If so , there is nothing wrong if they are treated as

Jews were in Nazi Germany . . . . I hope the Muslims have understood the
lessons well . . . . Yes , I am the person fighting for justice . ( The mobs ) are
under my control . . . "

According to Hindu nationalist thought , popularized through many media ,

the fundamental enmity between Hindus and Muslims of India is rooted in
the history of the subcontinent , in the conquest by the Moghul armies , the
partition of British India , responsibility for which is attributed entirely to
the Muslim League . All this turns Muslims into foreigners , invaders with¬
out respect for the indigenous culture , destroying temples and converting
Hindus , disloyal to India as their loyalties allegedly lie politically in Paki¬
stan and religiously in Mecca .
This historical argument is extended to become a culturalist one : It is a
fundamental incompatibility of Hindu and Islamic civilization , the former
being allegedly based on tolerance , the latter on aggression and proselytiz¬
ing . The Hindu nationalist response is to emulate those characteristics
which are attributed to Islam and its followers , " to become like the enemy "
in order to surpass him - a strategy lamented by critics as the semitization
of Hinduism . 18 In both views , critical or not , the cause of communal vio¬
lence lies in the incompatibility of religions , or rather : the nature of mono¬
theistic religion .
(5) Muslims , who bore the brunt of the riots , saw the violence perpe¬
trated against them not as a matter of the incompatibility of religions or of
" communal hatred " , but as one of communal politics . They ( and they were

not alone in this ) attributed a clearly political character to the events , rather
than a social , economic or emotional one . The political nature of the riots
was in their eyes twofold : There was the betrayal by the Congress Party ,
evident in their unwillingness to prevent the destruction of the Babri
Mosque in Ayodhya , as well as the utter failure of the Maharashtrian Con¬
gress Government of Chief Minister Naik to restore law and order , attrib¬
uted to the rivalries with his erstwhile patron Sharad Pawar . The latter duly
took over power again as the Chief Minister after Naik was undermined in
his authority by the riots . This desertion by the Congress Party in many
cases led to a stronger sense of alienation from the body politic than the
attacks by the Shivsena . 19 The politics of communal violence of the

18 Rajni Kothari , " Pluralism and Secularism : Lessons of Ayodhya " , Economic and Po¬
litical Weekly , December 19 - 26 , 1992 , 2695 - 98 .
19 The Congress Party suffered heavy losses in the Maharashtrian Assembly Election in
1995 partly due to the desertion of Muslim voters . See Suhas Palshikar , " Capturing the
Moment of Realignment " , Economic Political Weekly , January 13 - 20 , 1996 , 174 - 78 .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 373

Shivsena were no surprise as they were known as the movement ' s strategy
of expansion - institutional , territorial and electoral - ever since its emer¬
gence in 1966 , although its targets had been swapped in the course of time
and although it had adopted militant Hindu nationalism as its main plat¬
form only in the 1980s , the organisation was considered to have simply
shown its true colors .
The question of the causes is of importance in this context as each
analysis calls for a different process of reconciliation . If the roots of the
conflict lay in the community bonds of the migrants , then the task ahead
was the secularization of the people . If it was the beast - in - man , then it
called for a civilizationary project . If it was the deprivation which caused
such fury , this called for development and economic redistribution . If it
was a case of organized robbery , then it was a matter of law and order . If,
however , it was the antagonism of Hindus and Muslims , the civilizational
clash between incompatible religions , then only separation would bring an
end to this clash . If , however , tangible interests lay at the root of the riots ,
this would require negotiation .
Whether communal riots were seen as " caused " by communal hatred
rooted mostly in the cultural " otherness " of the groups , or whether they
were considered to be part of political strategies of groups or organiza¬
tions , the explanation of the causes would influence the measures consid¬
ered promising to bring about peace . The interpretation which gained
dominance would also determine the way in which the Mohalla Commit¬
tees would have to address communal relations .

1 . 3 The official indictment

When the Srikrishna Commission published its report in the summer of

1998 it stated in response to its task of ascertaining the responsibility for
the riots that :

scale rioting and violence was commenced from 6th January by

" . . . large
Hindus brought to fever pitch by communally inciting propaganda
unleashed by Hindu communal organizations and writings in newspapers
like ' Saamna ' and ' Navakal ' . It was taken over by the Shivsena and its
leaders who continued to whip up communal frenzy by their statements
and acts and writings and directives issued by the Shivsena Pramukh
[ leader] Bal Thackeray . " 20

20 Srikrishna Commission Report [ fn . 8 ] , 30 . The report states also that the first phase of
the riots was a " spontaneous reaction of leaderless and incensed Muslim mobs , which
commenced as peaceful protests but soon degenerated into riots " ( ibid .) .
 JULIA ECKERT
374

Incitement was held responsible for the riots . This clear indictment did not
answer the question , however , of why it had been possible to incite the
citizens of Bombay and why they followed the calls of the Shivsena to
violence .
The findings of the Commission were , however , not intended to be le¬
gally binding for the government , nor did the evidence produced in the
hearings of the Commission constitute legal evidence which could form
the basis of charges against , let alone convictions of the indicted individu¬
als . 21 Its recommendations nonetheless concerned themselves with the
" imperative need for restoring the authority of law and refurbishing the

image of the police " . 22

However , while the Commission did identify individuals and organiza¬
tions responsible for inciting communal hatred and rioting , both offenses
punishable under the Indian Penal Code , 23 and while it did suggest meas¬
ures to restore the rule of law , the state agencies dealt with the events as a
problem of sentiments , of " mob violence " . In the practices of the state
agencies , one interpretation of the causes of the riots gained predominance ,
inexplicitly but practically : All questions of the role of political parties
were largely excluded from their view and the events reduced to that of a
law and order problem . They did not pay heed to the suggestion by the
Commission that the restoration of the authority of law could only be
achieved if the indictments ended in conviction . The authority of law lies
in its binding decisions and the " blindness " of Justice . In Bombay , how¬
ever , Justice was not blind , as those accused of even minor involvement in
the bomb blasts were held in prison without trial for several years under
the draconian TADA laws ( Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention ) ,

21 It was for the government to decide whether to hand over the evidence gathered by the
commission to the state ' s Advocate General to prosecute those indicted by the Report .
When the report had been made public the then Chief Minister Manohar Joshi refused
to take any action , but threatened to take violent street action if anyone harmed Bal
Thackeray .

22 Srikrishna Commission Report [ fn . 8 ] , 36 . The Report does insist , however , that those
indicted of rioting should be prosecuted , that no cases related to communal violence
should ever be withdrawn , and that it is of paramount importance to keep police activi¬
ties free of all political interference .

23 The offenses named in connection with various leading figures of the Shivsena and
other political parties are punishable , for example , under section 153 A , Indian Penal
Code ( IPC ) , for inciting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion ( or
other criteria ) , and section 148 IPC for rioting armed with deadly weapons .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 375

while those indicted for inciting the riots had most cases against them
withdrawn . 24 Nor was any judicial decision even intended to be binding .
Despite the asymmetry of justice and the asymmetry of loss , a " sym¬
metry of guilt " was constructed . In 1996 , following pressures from the
Shivsena government , investigations into the bomb blasts were included in
the mandate of the Srikrishna Commission . ( This did not imply that they
were no longer subject of the special investigation of the crime branch of
the police . ) The idea of symmetry affirmed the treatment of the riots as the
spontaneous violence of antagonistic religious groups . This made it possi¬
ble to read the events as a sequence of justifiable or at least understandable
retaliations between the communities , - a version which members of the
Shivsena government professed throughout the hearings of the Commis¬
sion . The successful Bollywood film Bombay told the story of the riots in
that symmetrical way , placing a purely fictional Muslim instigator at the
side of the Hindu demagogue , and rather more pictures of the familiar
stories of Muslim - perpetrated atrocities . This symmetrical depiction of
hatred and violence was juxtaposed with equally symmetrical visions of
reconciliation 25 and thus opened up the potentials of harmony specific to
such symmetry of hate . Similar constructions of symmetry appear in vari¬
ous analyses of communal clashes . 26 This need for symmetry in the analy¬
sis of collective violence seems to stem from the attempt to deconstruct the
constructs of victims and violators , which are usually a distortion within
the event of violence . Muslims , too , constructed symmetry , thus relieving
themselves of the status of mere victims and claiming back some of the
agency which had been denied to them by the undeniable asymmetry of
the riots , in particular their January pogrom - phase . As this indicates , sym¬
metry is as much a construct of analysis - and sometimes redemption - as
the clear dichotomization of victims and perpetrators .
Such analyses of violence focus exclusively on its psychological as¬
pects , excluding from their view questions of institutions ( rather than sym -

24 Additionally the Shivsena government in 1998 passed a bill of amnesty for all political
charges , these including violent agitations by Sainiks which were thus declared a form
of political protest . On the state ' s failure to hold accountable the Shivsena and its
Sainiks ( " Soldiers " ) for their involvement in communal violence see , for example , A .
Gafoor Noorani , " Riots and Sate Responsibility " , Economic and Political Weekly ,
May 25 , 1996 , 1237 - 38 ; Human Rights Watch/Asia , India : Communal Violence and
the Denial of Justice 8 ( 1996 ) 2 .
25 For a further discussion of Bombay see Ravi Vasudevan " Bombay and its Public " ,
Journal of Arts and Ideas 29 ( 1996 ) , 44 - 65 .
26 See for example the studies of Sudhir Kakar , especially his The Colours of Violence ,
New Delhi : Viking , 1995 .
 JULIA ECKERT
376

bolic representations ) of power and of the structural and systemic possi¬

bilities of violence .
The symmetry of emotional antagonism became the dominant interpre¬
tation of the riots in a process influenced by variously interested construc¬
tions . It gained official status when , for example , the Srikrishna Com¬
mission stated , despite its indictment of " individuals and organizations " :
" In the view of this Commission , till there is a radical change in social

outlook , achieved only by total revamping of social values and widespread

education , communal riots must be treated , perhaps , as an incurable dis¬
ease . . . " . 27 Thus , it had become official that the communal riots were rooted
in human nature , and their cure lay in a civilizational effort . The fact that
this conclusion by the Srikrishna Commission , which contradicted its own
indictments by excluding of that other aspect of communal violence : the
strategic possibilities of mobilization and unification , emerged so promi¬
nently may not simply be due to the interpretation of the evidence , but also
to the realization that the political dimension of the conflict would not be
addressed by the authorities .
The Commission concluded from all its evidence " the stark reality that
the beast in men keeps straining at the leash to jump out " . 28 Such a Hobbe -
sian nature of man calls for the Leviathan . The restoration of the state and
its agents as the neutral arbiter between warring communities was the first
task ahead .

2 . The project of the Mohalla Committees

2 . 1 Restoring the state as a neutral arbiter

The Mohalla Committees were the chief instrument for restoring the state
as neutral arbiter of social conflicts . First , the trust of citizens , especially
those of the minority community , in the role of the state and its agents , in
particular the police , had to be regained . Second , the police had to be de -
communalized . The failure of the agents of the state to act as neutral arbi¬
ters was explained by the fact that the representatives of the state were ,

27 Srikrishna Commission Report [ fh . 8 ] , 4 . The description of the riots as disease is

prominent in the report . It states for example that : " Despite the knowledge of the fact
that the force had been infected by the communal virus , no effective curative steps
were taken over a large period of time as a result of which communal violence became
chronic and its virulent symptoms showed up during the two riot periods " ( ibid . , 35 ,
italics added ).

28 Ibid . , " Epilogue " , 63 .

 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 377

beneath their uniforms , also part of communities . There they simply acted

and felt like any other community member ; the problem of police bias lay ,

true to the interpretation of communal violence as rooted in sentiments of

hatred , in the community boundness of every individual . Thus , the separa¬

tion of office and person had to be recovered .

If police bias was due to primordial community bonds , what caused the

members of the police to act differently in Bhivandi in 1992 / 93 to those in

Bombay ? Immediately after the news of the destruction of the Babri

Mosque broke , the Bhivandi police pre - emptively arrested " known com¬

munal elements " , criminals and gangsters , censored the news and pro¬

scribed any news about the events in Ayodhya . 29 Were the Bhivandi police

officers somehow less community - bound than their colleagues in Bombay

so that they acted swiftly and managed to prevent riots from breaking out ?

Was this due to the work of the Mohalla Committees which had been op¬

erating in the town for several years ?

The Police Commissioner of Thane , in whose jurisdiction Bhivandi

falls , felt that in Bhivandi the police were less subject to political interfer¬

ence . 30 Time and again it has been recommended that the police force

should be insulated from political interference . 31 The police , however , are

not subject to political interference simply because of ideological or com¬

munity affinities of the police cadre , as the programs of the Mohalla

Committees suggest . Political interference is structurally encoded in the

Indian Police Act ( Section 3 ) which , by making the posting and sacking of

police commissioners subject entirely to state governments , encourages the

use of postings as a tool of party politics . Since police officers and other

public servants have frequently been re - posted when going against the

interests of governing parties , favors in the form of biased police action are

also career moves . This does not entirely explain why some police men act

communally and others do not . Certainly , prejudice and communal atti¬

tudes play a vital part . 32 It does , however , add the dimension of structural

arrangements to the analysis of police action . Beyond posting politics ,

these also include the structures of corruption and the structural pressures

for corps spirit . 33

29 A discussion of the constitutionality of the drastic anti - riot measures of the Bivandi
police cannot be provided in this context .
30 Interview in December 1996 .
31 See Srikrishna Commission Report [ fn . 8 ] , 52 - 53 ; Vrinda Grover , Mechanisms of
Police Accountability , Delhi : Ford Foundation , 1998 , 38 .
32 Rai , Combating Communal Conflicts [fn . 12 ] ,

33 Srikrishna Commission Report [ fn . 8 ] , 35 .

 JULIA ECKERT
378

The Mohalla Committees in Bombay were limited to address the

" problem of sentiments " among police personnel and could not effect

structural reforms , although they did reflect upon their relevance for a
long - term solution . Again , a partial view of communalism was forced
upon the work of the committees , a partial view which was supposed to
offer a comprehensive solution .
In the course of their work , the institutionalization of the Mohalla
Committees as a forum of communication between the police and the
citizens was subverted by their subjugation to the police rationale of
" community policing like in America " 34 . Although they had set out to be

mediators between the police and the local citizens , a reform which made
the selection of the members of the committees the responsibility of the
police , turned them into instruments of surveillance . They were thus de -
legitimized as autonomous civil institutions . 35
As this went against all the intentions of the initiators ( both from
among the police and from among the citizens ) the Mohalla Committees
had to be saved from this de - legitimization and from being part of the
" myth of the state " 36 . Maintaining them as autonomous institutions of civil

society meant concentrating their work exclusively on the " Mohalla " , the
local neighborhood . The Mohalla became the site where " society " was
supposed to be practiced , society insulated from politics . Here the task
changed from civilizing the Leviathan to civilizing the Mohalla : Educa¬
tion , enlightenment , and tolerance were to prevent violent conflicts . The
Mohalla Committees addressed prejudices and stereotypes , fear and also
local tensions ; they categorically excluded from their domain questions of
politics and questions of power . The conscious distancing from politics

34 Former Police Commissioner of Bombay , Ramdeo Tyagi in an interview in March

1997 .

35 This reform of the committees was resisted from three sides . Many police constables
felt that the obligatory monthly congregation of the Mohalla Committee was an un¬
necessary further burden on their heavy workload . Moreover , there was the fear that
" too much interaction with the public would carry the impression that the police force
is becoming too soft . The police should be tough and only deal with law and order is¬
sues . . . . ( The ) resolution of social and civic issues . . . is the job of social workers . . .
( The police ) feel threatened by a group of citizens closely watching the working of the
police station " . Contrary to the fears of the police , many Muslim residents now saw
the Committees as police institutions which recruited " informers " and established a
further network of police surveillance . The initiators and active " facilitators " of many
a Mohalla Committee saw what had been supposed to be a forum of communication
transform itself into a ritual performance of state - society cooperation .
36 Thomas Blom Hansen , The Myth of the State : Governance and Mythologies of State
Power in Mumbai , India , Manuscript , 1998 .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 379

was due to the assumption that "politics " would destroy all efforts of rec¬
onciliation and had thus to be circumvented . The goal was communal har¬
mony , and the model was one of respectful coexistence .

2 . 2 The project of religious tolerance

Religious practices , rituals , holidays and processions have frequently been

the occasion of rioting . In Bombay , the processions and public rituals relat¬
ing to Ganeshotsav , the celebration of the elephant headed God Ganesha
have witnessed tensions and conflagrations in particular . This has its his¬
tory : Lokmanya Tilak , a prominent member of the early Indian National
Congress first revived and re - organized the festival in 1893 , partly in order
to circumvent the colonial ban on political assemblies under a governance
that favored religious institutions such as procession . However , the under¬
lying agenda was to create an exclusively Hindu public celebration in
order to mobilize Hindus and provide them with a unitary and uniting
practice . Tilak called on Hindus not to take part , as was common , in the
public celebration of Moharram , but instead to celebrate Ganeshotsav pub¬
licly , thus making Moharram an exclusively Muslim ( Shiite ) celebration
and creating the Hindu counterpart . 37 Because of this correlation to the
politics of communal mobilization , and because of the keeping of this tra¬
dition by the Shivsena , Ganeshotsav is an occasion for high security on the
streets of Bombay . 38
Often , processions become part of local disputes over public space .
Disagreements over procession routes , music , noise and the degree of
exclusive usage of space become a matter of inalienable rights . Such pos¬
sessive logics are contested violently , as the creation of " heteropies " 39
turns public space into zones of mutually exclusive claims .
Although religion is most often also religion - as - community , and such
community is likely to be transmitted also by locality , i . e . , territorial close¬
ness , this does not mean that sacredness is necessarily correlated with ex -

37 See Christophe Jaffrelot , " The Politics of Processions and Hindu Muslim Riots " , in :
Community Conflicts and the State in India , eds . Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli , New
Delhi : Oxford University Press , 1998 , 58 - 92 .
38 In 1997 and 1998 additional to the 37 , 000 strong police force of Mumbai , 20 compa¬
nies of the State Reserve Police as well as four groups of the Rapid Action Force were
deployed in the city ( Times of India , September 6 , 1998 ) . Additionally , 80 , 000 volun¬
teers were trained by the Mandals , the committees organizing the Ganesh festival , to
ensure a peaceful celebration ( Times of India , June 18 , 1998 ) .
39 Satish Deshpande , " Hegemonic Spatial Strategies : The Nation - Space and Hindu
Communalism in Twentieth - Century India " , Public Culture 10 ( 1998 ) , 249 - 83 .
380 JULIA ECKERT

clusivity or antagonism . The correlation is a historical and not a " natural "
one . There are not only various historical examples of syncretic practices
of religiosity and spirituality , constituting the fuzziness of community
boundaries ; there are , moreover , forms of peaceful coexistence of even
clearly demarcated communities . Different religions are not by their very
nature in a constant zero - sum confrontation . The idea that public rituals
embody the oppositional relation of religious communities is a social crea¬
tion of meaning . 40
Such correlation of sacred practice and communal mobilization , his¬
torical as it is , has by now been " naturalized " ; the correlation has gained a
certain automatism , or routinization 41 which is not easily dissolved . This
however , leads us back to the problem of the relation of the state to the
monopoly of coercion : Whether one regards such incidents as spontaneous
or as stage - managed by local political leaders , such local clashes are , ac¬
cording to various studies , 42 easily contained and usually die down
quickly . " No riot can last longer than 24 hours if the state does not want it
to " insists police inspector Vibhuti N . Rai . 43 For such local clashes to esca¬

late , the complicity or the inaction of the state is necessary . This frequently
escalatory role of the state agencies in riots has become apparent from
Bombay to Belfast .
The Mohalla Committees have addressed local clashes related to pro¬
cessions and other public celebrations in order to prevent their escalation .
In 1998 and 1999 , for example , the festivals of Bakr Id ( the Muslim cele¬
bration of Ibrahim ' s sacrifice ) , of Mahavir Jayanti ( The Jain celebration of
the Guru Mahavir ) , of Hanuman chaturthi ( the Hindu celebration of God
Hanuman ) , Easter ( the Christian celebration of the resurrection of Christ )
and the Birthday of Ambedkar ( celebrated widely by Neo - Buddhist and
Dalit communities ) , fell in one week . It was especially feared that the
proximity of the strictly vegetarian Jain festival with Bakr Id , during which
each Muslim family sacrifices at least one goat in remembrance of the
sacrifice of Ibrahim would cause tensions , especially since VHP activists
had organized the obstruction of the slaughtering .

40 See for example Sandria B . Freitag , Collective Action and Community : Public Arenas
and the Emergence of Communalism in North India . Berkeley : University of Califor¬
nia Press , 1989 .
41 Jaffrelot , " The Politics of Processions . . . " [ fh . 37 ] , 71 .
42 See for example Ashgar Ali Engineer , Communalism in India : A Historical and Em¬
pirical Study, New Delhi : Vikas , 1995 ; Rai , Combating Communal Conflicts [ fh . 12 ] .
43 Vibhuti N . Rai in an interview in Combat Communalism 2 ( 1996 ) 6 , 1- 2 , 6 .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 381

Mohalla Committees have , on these occasions , gathered the local

heads of religious communities prior to the festivals , have discussed

routes , organized the help of the representatives of one religious commu¬

nity for the other , for example by mosques offering water to Hindu proces¬

sionists . Religious authorities are asked publicly to pay respect to the other

faiths ' holy days and the Committees encourage members of one religious

community to take part in the religious festivals of the other . " Hindu and

Muslim festivals should be celebrated jointly . Senior officers may attend

such celebrations " stated a directive of the Police Commissioner . This does

not replicate the local syncretic practices as they have been described his¬

torically . The canonization of religious ritual has proceeded too far . The

programs of the Mohalla Committees are ecumenical rather than syncretic ;

they bring together religious authorities of various communities and sug¬

gest a code of conduct that aims to establish amiable relations . They have

sometimes prevented provocations from happening during the festivals and

they have attempted to transform mutually exclusive claims on space into

patterns of coexistence in a common space . It is basically a secular model

which they suggest ( in the Indian sense of the word ) : In all these activities

the Mohalla Committees are trying to establish a code of conduct for a

multicultural coexistence , for " unity in diversity " .

These programs can not , however , match the attendance levels of those

celebrations organized by the Shakhas , the local branches of the Shivsena

where the organization is rooted in the city ' s life . Hence , the ideological
influence of the work of the Mohalla Committees is limited in its reach ;

moreover , while they might prevent unorganized ( spontaneous ) local

provocations , they cannot prevent those which are planned and organized .

2 . 3 The "flesh of peace " : local development

Aware of the fragility of " tolerance " , relegated as it is to the divisive cate¬

gories established by the confrontation , the Mohalla Committees have

endeavored to go beyond these borders and make " people of different

communities . . . meet , plan and work together who otherwise would not

have done so " . 44 Civic issues frequently lead to local tensions , as disputes

over garbage , public toilets , the use of water taps etc . escalate and are sub¬

sequently communalized . Therefore , " . . . Peace efforts need to have flesh

and therefore must be linked to development efforts " .45 Development ef¬

forts , moreover , offer possibilities of building solidarities along the lines of

44 Internal report of the Mohalla Committees , 12 .

45 Ibid . , 4 .
382 JULIA ECKERT

shared experiences and common problems . It is an attempt to change the

logic of organization of civil society from that of ascriptive community to
that of interest community , in this case , the neighborhood .
The efforts to cross community boundaries , or rather : change the defin¬
ing criteria for community by collectively solving common local problems
has been hindered by the fact that residential segregation has frequently
proceeded so far as to segregate civic issues : The borders of housing socie¬
ties , water pipes , roads , of the use of public toilets , public schools , and
police posts correspond to the boundaries of religious communities . With
every incidence of violence the boundaries become more defined as people
leave their homes at the fringes of " their " territory and move into its cen¬
ter . 46
Additionally it is sometimes the boundary of class which implies that
the problems which residents face are not the same and that their interests
might even be contradictory , as in the case of Bandra East with its largely
Muslim slum and its predominantly Hindu Middle Income Housing Colo¬
nies . Development schemes are often established according to these
boundaries , as in Jogeshwari East where the Muslim population is largely
excluded from the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme , an exclusion which is due
to the spatial concentration of the community . 47 Thus , the borders of relig¬
ion and class start to converge .
Moreover , the Mohalla Committees are neither provided with funds for
development nor invested with the authority of binding decisions . All they
can do is organize people to deal with the civic authorities as many other
NGOs do . Unlike the usual Dalals , the informal middlemen between the
state and the citizens : These are invested with funds and powers due to
their collaboration with political powers . The Shakhas Pramukhs , the local
leaders of the Shivsena and in charge of the Shakhas , are , due to the inte¬
gration of local grassroot organization and governing party particular to
the organization , the most efficient Dalals . The Shakhas operate in many
areas with the powers of judiciary , executive and legislative bodies . Here ,
" if you want to solve anything with the police you have to be with the

Shakha . The police will send you to the Shakha " . 48 " Only the Shakha Pra -

46 Eckert , " Riots . . . " [ fn . 5 ] , 13 .

47 The Slum Rehabilitation Scheme was one of the main election promises of the
Shivsena in its 1995 campaign , promising to rehouse 4 million slum dwellers . Devel¬
opers were to receive land for commercial use in turn for building 4 million houses for
slum dwellers ( or houses for 4 million slum dwellers . )
48 Interview in Dharavi , March 1999 .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA
383

mukh can improve our area " . 49 The more citizens are excluded from civic

institutions , the stronger is their dependence on alternative sources of the

services usually provided by the administration . The most effective pro¬

vider is in many areas the Shivsena , as it can fund its grassroot projects

from various sources and help them along through control of the formal

institutions of the state . Formal and informal structures of power of the

party reaffirm each other mutually . 50

The problem of the communalization of local civic problems is less the

tensions arising from the civic crisis itself , than the clientelist dependen¬

cies dominating existence in those neighborhoods of Bombay which are

most severely excluded from civic amenities . The above mentioned " Lum¬

pen theories " do not explain , firstly , why people rebel when they rebel ,

that is : at what point deprivation leads to rebellion . Even if people identify

their situation as one of unjust or relative deprivation , various other forms

of response have been chosen by " the weak " . Secondly , even if people

organize some form of collective action , these theories do not explain why

people relate their plight to community antagonism since the structures of

existence do not privilege Muslims . Some of the explanations about this

specific " framing " of the conflict can be found in the clientelist structures

which the social movement of the Shivsena has established , and the spe¬

cific opportunities for " empowerment " which they create . 51

The Mohalla Committees are not relevant to such conditions . They are

practically unknown beyond their immediate circle of participants . 52 Even

fewer people would trust them either to supply the essential services pro¬

vided by clientelist networks , or the protection which the latter can offer .

These are the limits of the work of the Mohalla Committees and they are

so far rather narrow . However , it is exactly their objective to expand the

limits of their appeal and narrow those of the logic of community enmity .

49 Interview in Jogeshwari , April 1997 .

50 See Julia Eckert , Participation and Violence : Towards a Sociology of Anti - Democratic
Movements , forthcoming .

51 Ibid . , see also Julia Eckert , " Die Gewalt der Aktion : Die Macht der Shivsena in
Bombay " , in : Anthropologic der Gewalt , eds . Sonya Heyer and Jan Koehler , Berlin :
Wissenschaft und Forschung , 1998 , 131 - 48 .

52 In 1999 , a survey conducted in six areas of the city showed almost zero response to
questions on the work of the Mohalla Committees .
384 JULIA ECKERT

2 . 4 Communication : countering prejudice and rumors

Rumors often fan the flames of riots and so it was in the Bombay riots of
1993 . Rumors create situations of fear in which defensive action is taken
as a precaution , thus often challenging the response which had been feared .
In Bombay there was ample information publicly available which could
have countered rumors . The power of rumors depended on the apparent
willingness of people to believe them . The willingness to believe rumors
and to act on them was rooted in the logic of fear which called on every¬
body to assume the worst . " The worst " means that even the most improb¬
able rumors could become plausible because they connected to " shared
mythologies " 53 of threat and otherness , reaffirmed in daily life in the form
of prejudice .
The Mohalla Committees ' remedy against rumor and prejudice are
" fact " and " truth " . In schools and Mohalla meeting halls , as well as in

police stations the Mohalla Committees have sometimes invited priests of

various faiths to address the police and members of the public on the
" Commonalities of Religions " . 54 To dispel their prejudices , ( Hindu ) police

personnel were made to attend lectures which countered misrepresenta¬

tions of Hindu - Muslim relations , of the Moghul conquest of the Subconti¬
nent , of partition at the time of Independence . These lectures aimed at
police people to trade in one knowledge , that of Moghul destruction of
Hindu culture ; of one Muslim being a criminal and therefore a criminal
being a Muslim ; of the " off limits " character of Muslim areas etc . with
another type of knowledge which told of the material interests underlying
wars fought in the name of religion ; of the mixed armies and advisory
boards of Moghul rulers ; of syncretic practices like Sufism ; of the " good
Muslim " and the core of all religion : Peace . As the directive of the police
headquarters stated : " Only the positive side of any religion and issues per¬
taining to communal harmony should be allowed to be discussed " .
This largely educational project was complemented by " harmony pro¬
grams " : The Committees organized drawing competitions among children
on the theme of communal harmony . Mixed cricket teams from all over the
city played in the " cricket for peace " tournament , with its rotating trophy
dedicated by the police . Locally , too , such sports events were organized to
encourage " team spirit " crossing the boundaries of religious community .

53 Georg Elwert , " Fassaden , Geriicht , Gewalt ", Merkur 4 ( 1991 ) , 318 - 32 .
54 See also Kalpana Sharma, Mohalla Ekta Committees : A Documentation , Mumbai :
Mohalla Ekta Committee Movement Trust , 1998 , 2 .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA
385

Such collective activities will most probably change mutual perceptions

and open up communication where it has broken down .
However , such rituals of multicultural coexistence work with clear
identifications of which categories define society , that is , which group
identities underlie coexistence . Rituals of multicultural coexistence do not
alter the modes of political affiliation . They reaffirm the paramount role of
the categories set by the conflict . They have little choice in this .
All the efforts of the Mohalla Committees treat communal violence as
a matter of emotions and sentiments , of cultural perceptions and neighbor¬
hood relations . They radically exclude the aspect of political strategies
from the domain of their activities . The Mohalla Committees probably
need not try to include the propagators of communalism in their efforts : It
is rather unlikely that the instigators of Bombay ' s communal violence
would join a round table talk as they apparently see no need for reconcilia¬
tion . The inclusion of the " militants " has been considered a necessary con¬
dition for the negotiation of a lasting peace in many a conflict . In Bombay ,
however , such a " round table " seems unlikely , as the " militants " of one
side are , until now , in the position of victory . Moreover , as shall be elabo¬
rated below , there is nothing to negotiate . Nonetheless , the exclusion of the
political dimension from the efforts of the Mohalla Committees excludes
from their work a fundamental dimension of communal conflicts .

3 . Violence and cooperation as political strategies

3 .1 Communal hatred or communal politics ?

In this context it is not relevant to enter into the debate on the " origin " of
communities and community identities in India . A strong case can be made
for the idea that the categories according to which civil society is organ¬
ized are strongly determined by state categorization . The state determines
the conditions which privilege certain forms of civil society organization
over others . On the one hand , however , to consider community movements
as mere products of state action is to obliterate their relationship with vari¬
ous tensions within society ; on the other hand , such movements are also
not simply representations of these tensions as they are subject to the ra¬
tionale of political elites claiming to represent them , but acting within the
conditions set by the political order . Whether or not communities are con¬
sidered to constitute the stuff of Indian society or to have been produced
by the state , people still act according to these community identities . The
386 JULIA ECKERT

Mohalla Committees operate within a situation defined by the conflict and

cannot wish away the borders established by it .
However , it is of importance to know whether people ' s actions are an
expression of these community identities , and how these identities have
become so conflicting as to lead to collective violence . Since reconciliation
is at stake it is decisive to know what has to be reconciled . As has been
stressed throughout the article , the categorization of conflicts as an emo¬
tional and cultural problem between two ( or more ) distinct communities
demands certain strategies of conflict resolution , and the Mohalla Commit¬
tees have employed several of these .
This treatment does not , however , take into consideration the opportu¬
nities and rationale of violent action . The question has to be put as to what
actually constitutes the strategic rationale of a riot and how it can be made
un - rational . This implication of an underlying rationale does not deny the
multifaceted nature of violence , and the various and diverging motives of
those who participate in it which this article can only touch upon . How¬
ever , concepts of conflict regulation have to take into view this dimension
of communal riots as it is instrumental in their orchestration .

3. 2 The creation of conflict as a strategy

Different rationales of riots have been mentioned above . However , next to

these imm ediate and varied rationales of riots , there seems to be an under¬
lying rationale of the politics of Hindu - Muslim antagonism .
The history of modern India has witnessed diverse forms of organizing
collectivities and collective identities and make them politically viable .
Regional movements , linguistic movements , caste movements and other
particularistic claims to rights and representation have established
themselves in the political arena , fractioning organizations of political
representation based on the idea of " the common good " or on the " national
interest " . The rise of Hindu nationalism as well as its ideological tenets
have been in temporal relation to the mobilization and representation of
pluralist , and especially lower caste identities . 55 Hindutva , the idea of
" Hindu - ness " and of a homogenous Hindu community , propounded a sin¬

gular and paramount opposition , namely that of Hindus and Muslims to

counter pluralist claims for participation . To construct the Muslim as the

55 Shalini Randeria , " Hindu - Fundamentalismus : Zum Verhaltnis von Religion , Politik
und Geschichte im modernen Indien ", Sozialantliropologische Arbeitspapiere , no . 67 ,
Berlin : Das Arabische Buch , 1995 , 1 - 37 ; Sumit Sarkar , " Indian Nationalism and the
Politics of Hindutva " , in : Making India Hindu , ed . David Ludden , Delhi : Oxford Uni¬
versity Press , 1996 , 270 - 93 .
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 387

" fundamental other " and to construct an existential opposition between the
thus defined communities unified the otherwise fissured structures of soci¬

ety . Such categorization has to make sense . It is not my intention to elabo¬

rate on the multiple situational motives contributing to the rising support

for the Hindu nationalist movements , for the " sense they make " . Their

strength lies partly exactly in the potential of vague militancy to integrate a

mutitude of motives . Communal riots in India show , however , a dynamic

which is apparent in community conflicts in other regions , too , namely that

violence is a most powerful catalyst for the formation of group identities .

Moreover , violence frequently leads to leading positions being taken over

by the instigators of violence as they can more convincingly pose as pro¬

tectors of " their " communities . 56 This dynamic is clearly not related to

" backwardness " or primordial bonds , but rather to strategies of access to

( or control over ) the modern state .

When one conflict is created to obliterate or make invisible all others ,

this poses the problem of there being nothing left to negotiate between the

warring parties as the goal of the conflict lies outside the apparent issue .

3 . 3 The rule of reconciliation

How can a conflict be negotiated which is constructed to obliterate an¬

other , when the issue propounded is not supposed to be resolvable , and

when the issue at stake does not involve the warring parties ? When resolv¬

ing the conflict could only be detrimental to those who propagate it ? Since

the conflict is a strategy to expand the base of ( electoral ) support by unify¬

ing the claims to power the solution seems to lie in making other forms of

expansion more viable . " Making moderation pay " 57 can be achieved either

by making any form of rule dependent on coalitions which include repre¬

sentatives dependent on the support of the minorities . Such structural ar¬

rangements force leaders to take into account the interest of a variety of

groups . 58 The BJP , too , had to display moderation when it was forced to

enter into coalition , partly because its coalition partners were themselves in

regional coalitions which could not afford to lose minority support . Mod -

56 Julia Eckert , Georg Elwert , Kristof Gosztonyi , Thomas Zitelmann , " Konflikttreiber -
Konfliktschlichter : Vergleichende Forschungen in Bosnien , Bombay und Oromiya
Regional State " , Sozialanthropologische Arbeitspapiere , no . 75 , Berlin : Das Arabische
Buch , 1999 , 1- 18 .
57 Donald Horowitz , " Making Moderation Pay " , in : Conflict and Peacemaking in Multi -
Ethnic Societies , ed . Joseph Montville , New York : Lexington , 1991 , 451 - 75 .
58 S .R . Sen , " Communal Riots : Anticipation , Containment and Prevention " , Economic
and Political Weekly , April 10 , 1993 , 631 .
388 JULIA ECKERT

eration can also be made worthwhile if instigation is too costly , that is if it

is sanctioned strictly , as the Report of the Srikrishna Commission has de¬
manded . 59
However , it is not always possible to rely on structural reforms to
make moderation pay : It is rather futile to call for electoral reforms , court
procedures , prosecution and conviction as the way to prevent riots from
occurring when the state , which would have to take these steps , is gov¬
erned by those who would be convicted . ( At least when the prosecution is
a political decision and not legally binding , as in the case of the evidence
produced by the Srikrishna Commission ; or in situations where even le¬
gally binding decisions can be ignored , which are unfortunately common ) .
If the state was the neutral arbiter it would , of course , be beneficial . How¬
ever , it is not . Despite the efforts of the state to recreate its image as such ,
this is not the situation in which the Mohalla Committees operate .
They are therefore restricted to try to make communal incitement det¬
rimental to electoral success by making people impervious to the calls of
demagogues . The efforts to make people denounce strategies of confronta¬
tion have their limits in the fact that situations of confrontation can be cre¬
ated . " For every bottle they throw , this time we will throw two ! " said Mus¬
lim residents of Bombay . 60 Fear of the next attacks , which Muslims know
will go unsanctioned , makes them unable to trust the newly established
structures of cooperation ; these will not protect them . Because " local riots
are not merely local " 61 , the strategy of local reconciliation is not sufficient
in itself . The Mohalla Committees cannot supplant the structural measures
which make moderation pay ; they cannot supplant the rule of law . How¬
ever , for the structural reforms to work it is probably at least beneficial to
do the local work : If people can and want to vote for moderates , modera¬
tion pays . Within a democracy , inciting violence becomes un - rational
when nobody is incited . Imagine there is a war and nobody goes , wrote
Brecht .
Have the Mohalla Committees already succeeded ? There have been no
riots , at least not Hindu - Muslim riots , 62 in Bombay since 1993 . All over
India the number of Hindu - Muslim riots has decreased . 63

59 Srikrishna Commission Report [ fn . 8 ] , 40 , 53 .

60 Interviews in Dharavi in April 1999 .
61 Amrita Basu , " Why local Riots are not merely local : Collective Violence and the State
in Bijnor 1988 - 1993 " , Theory and Society 24 ( 1995 ) , 35 - 78 .
62 In June 1997 , police firing on Dalits led to riots and it seemed for some time that
Dalits might be the next target of the Shivsena ' s violence . The party has , however ,
since changed its strategy and is wooing various Dalit leaders , trying to counter the
 RECONCILING THE MOHALLA 389

There is , however , another claimant for the title of peacekeeper : The

Shivsena . It has on many occasions proudly declared that under its gov¬

ernment there had not been and would not be any riots . Once turned

around , this claim becomes a threat . And sure enough , Bal Thackeray is

already announcing " riots 100 % " if his government falls in the next elec¬
tions . 64

To sum up : Although many motives enter into the riots , the problem

for reconciliation lies not in the sentiments of violence , but in the politics
of violence . Mediation can establish communication where it has broken

down ; it is not sufficient in itself , however , to subvert the rationale of vio¬

lent mobilization . For that , there is " the imperative need for restoring the

authority of law " . 65

coalition which the Congress Party has forged with the Republican Party of India in
Maharshtra .

63 Ashgar Ali Engineer , Communalism and Communal Violence , 1996 , Bombay : Centre
for Study of Society and Secularism , 1997 .

64 Bal Thackeray at a public ceremony at Mulund on April 15 , 1999 .

65 Srikrishna Commission Report [ fn . 8 ] , 36 .

 RELIGIOSITE ET ATTITUDES FACE AUX
CONFLITS ET A LA COEXISTENCE :
QUELQUES PERSPECTIVES EMPIRIQUES
COMPAREES

T heodor Hanf
en collaboration avec petra bauerle

Dans le monde actuel , le nombre des conflits ayant une consonance reli -

gieuse va en augmentant . Pour en analyser les causes , il parait done utile

d ' explorer l ' impact que peut exercer 1 ' identification d ' une personne avec

sa religion sur sa maniere de percevoir les conflits et d ' y reagir .

Y a - t - il un rapport entre la religiosite d ' une part , et des attitudes con -

flictuelles ou bien conviviales de 1' autre part ? Une personne tres religieuse

est - elle plus inclinee a favoriser des solutions pacifiques aux conflits aux -

quelles elle se trouve impliquee , ou bien est - elle portee vers une rigueur

militante ? L ' experience historique et contemporaine est riche en exemples

des deux ideaux - types , du pieux en quete de paix aussi bien que de

Pintegriste decide a faire avancer la cause sainte par la violence .

Ces ideaux - types existent bel et bien dans la realite . Mais que savons -

nous de leur importance numerique relative et surtout de tous ceux , pro -

bablement bien plus nombreux , qui se trouvent entre les deux extremes ?

Une approche empirique peut apporter quelques elements de reponse a

cette question .

Nous avons pu mener six enquetes representatives , dans des pays de -

chires par des conflits , a differents degres de violence : au Liban ( 1987 ),1

en Afrique du Sud ( 1992 et 1996 ) , 2 dans les territoires palestiniens ( 1995 ) ,3

1 Pour les details techniques cf . Theodor Hanf , Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon : De¬
cline of a State and Birth of a Nation [ 1989 ] , London : LB . Tauris , 1993 .

2 Cf . Valerie Moeller et Theodor Hanf , Learning to Vote : Voter Education in South

Africa 's 1994 Elections , Durban : Indicator Press , 1995 .

3 Cf . Theodor Hanf et Bernard Sabella , A Date with Democracy : Palestinians on Society

and Politics , Freiburg / Br . : Arnold - Bergstraesser - Institut , 1996 .
392 THEODOR HANF

au Pakistan ( 1995 ) et en Georgie ( 1997 ) 4 . Les questionnaires 5 contiennent

une serie de questions identiques ou tres similaires , notamment celles qui
portent sur les attitudes religieuses et sur les attitudes concernant la gestion
des conflits .

I — Religiosite - un symptome de crise ?

Dans tous les cas etudies , les resultats des sondages semblent confirmer le
proverbe allemand : " Le malheur appelle la priere " . Les pourcentages des
interviewes qui affirment croire en Dieu , en une vie apres la mort , dans
l ' enseignement de leur religion dans son entite , qui se disent proches de

leur coreligionnaires , qui prient et qui frequentent les lieux de culte regu -
lierement , ne peuvent que faire rever les eveques , pasteurs ou imams des
pays vivant en paix et dans l ' opulence . Dans tous les cas , les reponses
concernant la foi et la pratique religieuse sont fortements correles entre
elles permettant ainsi d ' etablir une echelle de religiosite a valeur alpha tres
elevee , echelle permettant de classer les interviewes en personnes a haute ,
moyenne et basse ou sans religiosite .

Religiosite Liban RSA ' 92 RSA ' 96 Palestine Pakistan Georgie

Haute 65 57 56 48 73 58
Moyenne 22 39 39 42 18 35
Basse 13 4 5 10 9 7
Chiffres en % .

Dans les cinq pays , le nombre des interviewes tres religieux depasse lar -
gement celui des moyennement religieux . Celui des peu ou pas religieux
( " Je peux vivre bien et mener ma vie sans croire en Dieu " ) ne depasse pas

les 10 % sauf dans le cas du Liban . Le cas de la Georgie est particuliere -

ment notable : apres 70 ans d ' atheisme officiel c ' est un pays profondement
religieux qui emerge .
Le cas de l ' Afrique du Sud demontre la stabilite des attitudes religieu¬
ses a travers des changements politiques profonds . Deux ans apres la fin
definitive de 1' apartheid , les chiffres ne varient que tres peu , par rapport a
ceux obtenus deux ans avant cette profonde transformation du pays -
comme d ' ailleurs par rapport a celles des enquetes que nous avons pu faire

4 Enquetes realisees conjointement avec Charles Amjad - Ali ( Pakistan ) et Ghia Nodia
( Georgie ) ; les publications sont en preparation .

5 Pour les questionnaires completes , cf . les publications precitees .

 RELIGIOSITE ET ATTITUDES FACE AUX CONFLITS ET A LA COEXISTENCE 393

auparavant , en 1977 6, 1987 et 1990 . Cette stabilite se confirme aussi pour

1' autre cas pour lequel nous disposons d ' enquetes precedentes , a savoir le

Liban ( 1982 , 1984 et 1986 ).

L ' anatomie sociale de la religiosite des cinq pays a des fortes ressem -

blances . Comme dans maintes autres pays , les femmes sont plus religieu -

ses que les hommes , les personnes agees plus que les jeunes . La religiosite

decroit avec un niveau d ' instruction et de revenu croissant . En ce qui

concerne le facteur de l ' age , la Georgie est une exception tout a fait remar -

quable : Ici , c ' est le groupe des plus ages qui est sur - represente parmi les

non - religieux , alors que ce sont les plus jeunes qui le sont parmi les tres

religieux .

Cependant , la religiosite ne varie pas seulement d ' apres des facteurs

sociaux , mais aussi d ' apres les appartenances confessionnelles et ethni -

ques . Au Liban comme au Pakistan , les chiites se distinguent par une fer -

veur religieuse en dessus de la moyenne . En Afirique du Sud , c ' est le cas

des fideles des eglises reformees et des eglises africaines independantes .

En Georgie , les gregoriens et les musulmans sont largement sur - represen -

tes parmi les non - religieux , tout comme les Chretiens en Palestine . Quant a

l ' appartenance ethnique , on trouve des minorites a religiosite tres intense

telles que les Baloutchi et les Pathans du Pakistan et les metis sud - africains

comme des minorites a religiosite basse - blancs anglophones d ' Afrique

du Sud , Armeniens et Azeris de Georgie , Mohajirs du Pakistan . La condi¬

tion de minoritaire ou de majoritaire , soit en confession soit en ethnie ,

semble done etre inadequate pour expliquer les differences en religiosite .

A cette fin , une etude approfondie des structures et des traditions des diffe -

rentes communautes religieuse parait plus prometteuse . Quoi qu ' il en soit ,

il convient de souligner que les variations en degre de religiosite constatees

se situent a un tres haut niveau : comparees aux cas des pays sans crises

economiques et politiques , meme les communautes les moins religieuses

des cinq pays etudies sont tres croyantes et pratiquantes .

La religiosite elevee serait - elle done un symptome de crise aigue ? Afin

d ' apporter une reponse a cette question , il est utile de relever certains au¬

tres symptomes de crise .

6 Cf . Theodor Hanf , Heribert Weiland , et Gerda Vierdag , South Africa : The Prospects of
Peaceful Change : An Empirical Enquiry into the Possibilities of Democratic Conflict
Regulation , London : R . Collings / Bloomington , IN : Indiana University Press , 1981 .
394 THEODOR HANF

Symptomes Liban RSA ' 92 RSA ' 96 Palestine Pakistan Georgie

Prudence 74 87 87 77 66 89
Peur du changement 34 43 44 17 42 41
Mefiance * 67 71 81 69 40
Envie sociale 72 62 59 43 33 57
Identification avec 58 - 91 79 84 * 67 81
groupe ethnique ou
religieux
Primaute du conflit 28 58 54 7 24 13
ethnique ou religieux
Primaute du conflit 72 30 46 41 67 73
econ . important
* Question non posee dans ce sondage . - Chiffres en % .

Incontestablement , ces chiffres indiquent un etat de crise grave . Entre les

deux tiers et les trois quarts des interviewes professent une prudence tres
conservatrice . Plus du tiers est convaincu que tout changement ne peut
qu ' empirer leur situation , excepte les Palestiniens , dont la grande majorite
juge leur condition mauvaise au point qu ' un changement n ' est concevable
qu ' en allant vers le meilleur . Mis a part chez les Georgiens , de larges ma -
jorites ne font guere confiance a leurs concitoyens au dela du cercle res -
treint de la famille et des proches amis . A differents degres , les interviewes
de toutes les societes etudiees jalousent ceux qui vivent mieux . C ' est la
communaute ethnique ou religieuse qui reunit sur elle les sentiments les
plus forts de solidarite . Pourtant , sauf en Afrique du Sud , les conflits eco -
nomiques sont juges plus graves que ceux entre communautes . Quant au
cas sud - africain , l ' importance primordiale accordee au conflit ethnique ,
s ' explique aisement par l ' impact du systeme raciste . C ' est apres la fin de

celui - ci que le conflit economique attire d ' avantage l ' attention des inter¬
viewes . Cependant , la solidarite ethnique se trouve renforcee . Une conclu¬
sion s ' impose : plus que d ' autres formes d ' organisation , les communautes
sont percues en tant que ressort le plus fiable quand il s ' agit de sauvegar -
der les interets individuels .

Y a - t - il un rapport entre ces syndromes de crise et la religiosite ?

En ce qui concerne la prudence conservatrice , on la trouve , dans tous les

cas etudies , loin au dessus de la moyenne chez les personnes a haute reli¬
giosite . Ce n ' est qu ' en Georgie , que le groupe des non - religieux est con -
servateur au meme degre que celui des tres religieux : il s ' agit surtout
d ' invalides et de retraites , les grand perdants de la fin du systeme socia -
 RELIGIOSITE ET ATTITUDES FACE AUX CONFLITS ET A LA COEXISTENCE 395

liste . Le scepticisme , voir le refiis de tout changement , est egalement

l ' apanage des tres religieux dans tous les cas etudies , ainsi que des non -

religieux georgiens , arriere - garde d ' un atheisme quasi - religieux . Mis a part

la Georgie , la mefiance croit d ' une maniere lineaire avec la religiosite . Par

contre , l ' envie sociale diminue avec une religiosite accrue , les non -

religieux georgiens ne faisant pas exception - ils sont aussi envieux que les

non - religieux des autres pays .

La lecture economique des conflits diminue d ' une maniere lineaire

avec la religiosite montante , tandis que la lecture ethno - religieuse aug -

mente . Finalement , 1 ' identification avec le groupe ethnique ou religieux ,

elle aussi , monte de paire avec la religiosite .

En somme , tous les symptomes de crise se trouvent plus frequemment

lorsque la religiosite est plus intense . II est done permis de considerer cette

religiosite elle - meme comme un symptome de crise - symptome tout a fait

a la mesure des crises reelles que traversent , au moment des sondages , les

pays sous etude .

II - Religiosite et ordre politique

Quelles sont les preferences des interviewes en ce qui concerne l ' ordre

politique de leurs pays respectifs ?

Ordre politique Liban RSA ' 92 RSA ' 96 Palestine Pakistan Georgie
desire
* 45 47 50 77 56
Multipartisme
Presse libre * 72 53 88 83 77
* *
Justice independante 47 73 91 88

Un groupe dominant 30 22 26 13 15 44

Pouvoir partage 80 88 78 76 71 61

Democratie compe - 71 69 80 73 91 78

titive

* Question non posee dans ce sondage . - Chiffres en % .

Ce n ' est qu ' au Pakistan que le systeme multipartite trouve le soutien d ' une

large majorite ( au Liban , nous n ' avons pas pose cette question ainsi que

celles sur la liberte de la presse et l ' independance de la justice ) . En Geor¬

gie , un peu plus de la moitie des interviewes y adherent , dans les territoires

palestiniens juste la moitie , tandis qu ' en Afrique du Sud , entre 1992 et

1996 , on s ' en approche peu a peu . La liberte totale de la presse et

l ' independance de la justice sont fortement desirees par les Pakistanais , les

Palestiniens et les Georgiens . Parmi les Sud - Africains , les adherents de ces
396 THEODOR HANF

deux elements essentiels a la democratic , une majorite nette en 1992 , ont

connu un recul notable en 1996 . Pas moins d ' un cinquieme des interviewes
- il s ' agit surtout de partisans noirs de l ' ANC - n ' y tient plus , une fois leur
parti arrive au pouvoir .
Dans tous les pays multicommunautaires , il est particulierement inte -
ressant de savoir si leurs habitants souhaitent la dominance d ' une des
communautes , s ' ils acceptent que le pouvoir soit partage entre elles ou s ' ils
croient que la democratic competitive peut resoudre les conflits qui les
divisent .
Les partisans de la dominance sont minoritaires dans tous les cas etu -
dies . Cependant , ils sont plus nombreux en Georgie et au Liban
qu ' ailleurs . En Georgie , en effet , c ' est surtout une communaute qui sou -
haite la dominance , celle des Georgiens orthodoxes , qui est de loin la plus
nombreuse et qui detient le pouvoir . Au Liban en 1987 , presque un tiers
des interviewes , issus de toutes les communautes , caressait le reve de la
dominance . Parmi les Sud - Africains , le nombre de ceux qui ont le gout du
pouvoir communautaire a augmente en quatre ans .
Toutefois , dans tous nos pays , de grandes majorites acceptent que le
pouvoir soit partage ou bien que le jeu de la democratic competitive decide
a qui il revienne . Parmi elles , on compte une partie des interviewes qui
auraient prefere que leur communaute domine , mais qui se rendent a
l ' evidence du rapport de forces qui ne le permet pas .

Ya - t - il des rapports entre ces attitudespolitiques et la religion ?

Ils existent , mais ils sont complexes . En ce qui concerne le multipartisme ,

la liberie de la presse et l ' independance de la justice , c ' est parmi les moins
religieux que Ton rencontre , dans la majorite des cas , les partisans les plus
nombreux . Cependant , en Afrique du Sud , les tres religieux eux aussi se
trouvent sur - representes parmi les democrates convaincus . En Georgie ,
enfin , l ' appui aux principes de la democratie augmente lineairement avec
la religiosite ; ceux qui professent l ' atheisme sont les nostalgiques du sys -
teme totalitaire d ' antan .
II est done impossible de deduire de nos chiffres une tendance gene -
rale . Si le lai'cisme au Pakistan , en Palestine et en Afrique du Sud est net -
tement democratique , il ne Test guere en Georgie . Si le soutien pour la
democratie est specialement faible parmi les Pakistanais et les Palestiniens
tres religieux , il est specialement important parmi ceux de l ' Afrique du
Sud et de la Georgie .
En ce qui concerne les opinions quant aux meilleures formules pour
gerer une societe multicommunautaire , les rapports avec la religiosite sont
 RELIGIOSITE ET ATTITUDES FACE AUX CONFL1TS ET A LA COEXISTENCE 397

plus nets . Dans tous les cas , l ' option pour la domination augmente avec la

religiosite . L ' acceptation d ' un partage du pouvoir , elle aussi , est plus fre -

quente chez les religieux et les tres religieux ; par contre , la democratie

competitive est plus appreciee par les non - religieux . Cependant , la Georgie

fait exception dans les deux cas . Plus les Georgiens sont religieux , moins

ils sont enclins a partager le pouvoir , et plus ils preferent le majoritarisme .

Cette exception s ' explique aisement : comme nous l ' avons vu , les Geor¬

giens orthodoxes sont la communaute la plus religieuse - et la communau¬

te majoritaire . Chez eux , majoritarisme et communautarisme coincident .

En somme , si la religiosite a des rapports ambigus avec les attitudes

democratiques , elle en a de tres clairs avec le communautarisme . Ceci dit ,

il convient de souligner qu ' il ne s ' agit que d ' un phenomene relatif . Dans

tous les cas etudies , le partage du pouvoir recueille des majorites tres lar -

ges qui depassent la categorie des interviewes tres religieux , et la democra¬

tie competitive reunit sur elle un nombre de preferences cinq a dix fois

plus grand que celui des non - religieux . Sans doute , la religiosite constitue

un appui au communautarisme et son absence un appui au majoritarisme ,

mais elle ne cree ni l ' un ni l ' autre .

Ill - Religiosite , attitudes conflictuelles et conviviales

Quelles sont les attitudes et les opinions des interviewes sur le conflit et la
coexistence intercommunautaires et surtout sur la violence ?

Tous les pays consideres ici ont vecu , quoique a degres differents , la

violence . Dans tous ces pays , une large majorite la rejette et la juge injusti -

fiable . Cependant , quelques variations sont a noter . Parmi les Palestiniens ,

victimes d ' une occupation etrangere , un tiers environ ne partage pas cet

avis . Les Sud - Africains , en 1992 , rejetaient massivement une violence

per9ue a cette epoque comme emanant d ' un pouvoir minoritaire illegitime .

Quatre ans plus tard , apres le passage du pouvoir a la majorite , le refus de

l ' emploi de la violence se fait plus rare . Par contre , d ' un sondage a l ' autre ,

le soutien a la lutte armee s ' est evapore : apres tout , ce que cette lutte vou -

lait atteindre , fut chose acquise en 1996 .

L ' inevitabilite de la dominance est la plus contestee en Palestine , le

pays le plus homogene parmi nos cas d ' etudes , et au Liban , ou la moitie

environ des interviewes tenait toujours apres onze ans de guerre a

l ' equilibre traditionnel . La conviction , que la coexistence intercommunau -

taire est possible , est partagee par de larges majorites dans tous les pays

consideres - meme au Liban en pleine guerre il n 'y avait pas moins de

70 % des interviewes qui l ' exprimaient . L ' opinion que la presence de diffe -

rentes cultures dans un meme pays constitue une richesse , se trouve chez
 THEODOR HANF
398

les quatre cinquiemes des Sud - Africains , Pakistanais et Georgiens inter¬

viewes et chez les trois cinquiemes des Libanais et des Palestiniens .

Violence , conflit et Liban RSA ' 92 RSA ' 96 Palestine Pakistan Georgie
codx stence
La violence est injusti - * 87 64 67 82 89
fiable
La lutte armee est ne - 36 5 * 8 *
*
cessaire
La domination est inevi¬ 53 75 65 43 64 55
table
La coexistence est pos¬ 70 83 76 76 72 95
sible
Differentes cultures sont 64 83 78 63 77 81
une richesse
Conflit ouvert - tous 77 87 66 * 96 *

sont perdants
86 75 * * 76 73
Malgre tout : la paix est
possible
92 63 89 * 90 94
Le compromis est une
necessite
* Question non posee dans ce sondage . - Chiffres en % .

La conviction qu ' en cas de conflit ouvert tout le monde sera perdant , cons -
titue la pierre angulaire de toute solution pacifique d ' un conflit - ou bien
des efforts preventifs . Dans les cinq sondages ou cette question a ete posee ,
au moins deux interviewes sur trois Paffirment . Une fois de plus , les diffe¬
rences entre les deux sondages Sud - Africains sont notables . Apres le chan -
gement du pouvoir , les reponses affirmatives baissent de presque 20 % .
Pour un tiers des Sud - Africains , ce changement est definitif au point qu ' un
conflit armee , des lors , finirait par la perte d ' un parti , a savoir celui qui
avait deja perdu le pouvoir .
Enfin , dans tous nos cas d ' etude , trois interviewes sur quatre croient
que la paix est possible , et neuf sur dix que le prix a payer sera un com -
promis .
L ' ensemble des ces attitudes et opinions confirme la these que le con¬

flit intercommunautaire n ' est point le produit des masses populaires , mais
plutot des agissements d ' un certain leadership qui arrive a politiser et a
militariser ceux qui , d ' apres tout le materiel empirique a notre disposition ,
ne constitue que des minorites dans leur communautes respectives . Cepen -
dant , les evenements qui se sont produits dans tous les cas etudies rendent
 RELIGIOSITE ET ATTITUDES FACE AUX CONFL1TS ET A LA COEXISTENCE 399

inevitable la conclusion que ces minorites militantes sont parfaitement

capables de mettre un pays a feu et a sang .
Qu ' en est - il de la religiosite dans la constitution des majorites pacifi -
ques et des minorites militantes ?
Parmi ceux qui considerent injustifiable tout recours a la violence , les
plus religieux sont sur - representes dans tous les cas etudies . En Afrique du
Sud cependant , ils sont rejoints par ceux qui ne sont pas religieux . Si les
religieux sont les premiers a rejeter la violence , ils sont aussi les premiers a
accepter la dominance d ' une communaute sur d ' autres . Que la coexistence
dans un respect mutuel soit possible , est une opinion tres largement repan -
due tant chez les tres religieux que les non - religieux .
La valorisation de la pluralite culturelle a des rapports avec la religiosi¬
te fort differents dans les pays consideres . En Afrique du Sud , cette valori¬
sation augmente de maniere lineaire avec le degre de religiosite . En Geor-
gie et au Pakistan , elle diminue de la meme maniere . Visiblement , une
partie des fideles de la religion tres majoritaire - orthodoxes dans le pre¬
mier cas , sunnites dans le second , se passeraient volontiers des apports
culturels des minorites .
En ce qui concerne la conviction qu ' un conflit ouvert serait au detri¬
ment de tout acteur , il n ' a point de correlation avec la religiosite - sauf au
Pakistan , ou la petite minorite lai'que partage largement cette opinion . De
meme , la necessite de faire des compromis est reconnue par croyants et
non - croyants , pratiquants et non pratiquants sans distinction . Ce n ' est que
dans les deux enquetes sud - africaines , que la foi , dans une issue pacifique
des conflits , augmente avec le degre de religiosite .
En resume , la religiosite fait croitre la probability d ' un rejet de la vio¬
lence ainsi que des attitudes positives envers une coexistence en respect
mutuel . Cependant , un humanisme non religieux , bien que tres minoritaire
dans les pays etudies , conduit au meme resultat . Quant a la valorisation du
pluralisme culturel , la religiosite la renforce dans les pays caracterises par
un tel pluralisme , mais elle l ' affaiblit la ou une seule communaute reli -
gieuse se trouve en position de grande force . Sur les perceptions qui por¬
tent sur une issue des conflits , enfin , la religiosite n ' a pas d ' effet notable .

IV — Conclusion

Si la religiosite tres forte que nous avons pu constater dans les cas analyses
n 'est pas en dernier lieu un symptome de crise , elle n ' en est pas une cause
non plus . La religiosite ne constitue ni un appui a la democratie ni un obs¬
tacle . La preference qu ' accordent les personnes a forte religiosite - bien
qu ' elles soient inclinees a l' esprit communautaire - au modele de partage
 THEODOR HANF
400

du pouvoir indique qu ' elles constituent un potentiel pour une politique

non - maximaliste qui cherche la paix par le compromis . L ' ensemble des
attitudes concernant violence , conflit et coexistence fait ressortir claire -
ment que la religiosite ne conduit generalement pas a la violence , mais
plutot a son rejet . De meme , elle favorise la coexistence dans le respect des
autres . Que des personnes a religiosite intense soient , plus que d ' autres ,
prepares a accepter la dominance d ' une communaute sur les autres , montre
que la religiosite ne les amene pas a militer pour un reglement de conflit
equitable , reglement auquel , toutefois , elles ne font pas obstacle .
En somme , la religiosite n ' est certes pas le moteur capable de sortir
une societe profondement divisee de ses conflits . Mais elle fournit , en ge¬
neral , un terrain attitudinal propice aux tentatives d ' en finir avec la vio¬
lence . Et cela n ' est pas sans importance dans des pays dechires par des
emeutes , des conflits armes , voire des guerres . Si le malheur appelle la
priere , cette derniere , semble - t - il , appelle la paix .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND :
THE INTERRELIGIOUS IN LEBANON
Aid a Kanafani - Zahar

The religion of the ' other ' as bond is based on a coexistential model of

adaptive and communicative strategies that groups with basic differences

establish to transform these differences or at least act on them . I define the

religion of the ' other ' as bond as the establishment of relations among

groups 1 of different religions , who live in the same territory and who seek
to structure their relations .

The capacity of religion to generate violence , armed conflict and ha¬

tred between different religious communities has often been emphasized .

This study , in contrast , is based on ethnological fieldwork conducted in a

multi - confessional ( Christian / Muslim ) community since 1994 , four years

after the end of the 1975 - 1990 Lebanese wars . 2 In it , I stress the capacity

of religion to generate cohesion in these very communities and demon¬

strate that the religion of the ' other ' is a factor of bond . The term ' other ' is

used here only to stress the religious difference upon which this work is

based . From my perspective , there is no ' other ' , except in the case of the

absence of inter - marriage , which is discussed at the end of this text .

Rather , Muslims and Christians share the same culture , and religious dif¬

ference is acted upon to make coexistence possible .

1 Coexistence has also been used as a political situation of equilibrium in the sharing of
power ( see , for example , Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon : Decline of
a State and Rise of a Nation [ 1989 ] , London : I .B . Tauris , 1993 ) .
2 The literature on the war in Lebanon is ample . To mention only a few : Walid Khalidi ,
Conflict and Violence in Lebanon , Cambridge , MA : Harvard Center for International
Affairs , 1976 ; Michael C . Hudson , The Precarious Republic Revisited: Reflections on
the Collapse of Pluralist Lebanon , Georgetown : University Center for Contemporary
Arab Studies , 1977 ; Marius Deeb , The Lebanese Civil War, New York : Praeger , 1980 ;
Jonathan Randal , Going All the Way : Christian Warlords , Israeli Adventures, and the
War in Lebanon , New York : Viking Press , 1983 ; Itamar Rabinovich , The War for
Lebanon 1970 - 83 , Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 1984 ; David Gilmour , Lebanon ,
the Fractured Country , London : Sphere , 1987 ; Robert Fisk , Pity the Nation : Lebanon
at War , London : Andre Deutsch , 1990 ; Georges Corm , Liban : les guerres de I 'Europe
et de I ' Orient 1840 - 1992 , Paris : Gallimard , 1992 ; Hanf , Coexistence [ fn . 1] ; Elizabeth
Picard , Lebanon : A Shattered Countiy , New York : Holmes & Meier , 1996 .
402 AIDA KANAFANI - ZAHAR

The community of focus is Hsoun (Hsun ) , a Maronite and Shiite vil¬

lage in the district of Jbeil (Jubail , Byblos ) with 460 electors - 21 years
and older - of which 280 are Shiites . 3 1 rely on electoral lists for a more or
less accurate estimate of the population , as the number of inhabitants var¬
ies according to seasonal and residential fluctuations . A great number of
families spend the winter in the city of Jbeil or in Beirut and its suburbs .
My fieldwork was conducted in an area where no forced displacement
of the population took place , as has been the case in other areas of Mount
Lebanon . 4 In their study on the human consequences of the war , Labaki
and Abou Rjeily do not mention population displacement in this area . 5
Thus , I will not discuss reconciliation , which in this context has the spe¬
cific meaning of restoration of relations after a rupture caused by grave
causes , but coexistence in an area that maintained its level of symbiosis ,
despite the conflict . Reconciliation is , indeed , a characteristic of those

3 The central part of the district of Jbeil is characterised by the continued historical
presence of Shiites , the first inhabitants of this area since the 7th century according to
Chevallier . Stopped by the Mameluks , expelled by the Maronites and the Druze in the
early 14th century in Matn and Kisrwan and by the Ottomans in the 17th and 18th cen¬
turies , they settled in Baalbek ( Ba ' labakk ) and Jabal ' Amil . This nucleus of Shiites re¬
main in an area that has become predominantly Maronite : " Jusqu ' a nos jours , il en
subsiste un ilot a Test de Jebayl , dans la region de Munaytra et d ' Afqa , et de nombreux
groupes qui habitent dans le Hermel , conservent des traditions orales leur rappelant
qu ' ils ont vecu dans la region de Jebayl . Surveilles et submerges par un environnement
maronite devenant volontiers hostile , notamment en periode de tension , puis endettes a
l ' egard des comme ^ ants Chretiens des villes qui les depossederent progressivement de
leurs terres , les Chiites de cette region alimentaient encore au XlXeme siecle un cou -
rant d ' emigration vers le nord - est de la chaine libanaise , vers le Hermel " ( cf . Domini¬
que Chevallier , La societe du Mont Liban a I 'epoque de la revolution industrielle en
Europe , Paris : Geuthner , 1971 , 7 - 8 ) .
4 According to Labaki , 800 , 000 Lebanese , representing more than 30 % of the popula¬
tion , were displaced ( cf . Boutros Labaki , " L ' economie politique des ' guerres pour les
autres ' " , in : Le Liban aujourd 'hui, ed . Fadia Kiwan , Paris : CNRS , 1994 , 205 ) . The
Shiite community suffered the most forced displacement , especially in southern Leba¬
non because of the two Israeli invasions in 1978 and in 1982 and of a perpetual mili¬
tary tension in this region . According to Hanf , one quarter of a million left at least once
to Beirut , or vice versa , or from the Biqa ' . Christians suffered , according to the same
author , the most expulsions : 600 , 000 found refuge in " East Beirut " or inside the
" Christian region " ( cf. Hanf, Coexistence [ fn . 1] , 346 ) . According to Kasparian and
Beaudoin , 125 , 000 families were displaced , one fifth of the total number of families ,
representing 681 , 000 persons and 22 .2 % of the total population . In 1987 , only 35 .4 %
of persons resided where they were born ( cf . Robert Kasparian and Andre Beaudoin ,
La population deplacee au Liban : 1975 - 1987, Beyrouth : Universite Saint - Joseph /
Quebec , Can . : Universite Laval , 1992 , 117 ) .
5 Boutros Labaki and Khalil Abou Rjeily , Bilan des guerres du Liban 1975 - 1990 , Paris :
L ' Harmattan , 1993 .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND 403

villages where members of some communities had to leave and where

some have since returned . Coexistence , though fragile , slowly resumes in a
district with its multiconfessional components , whose vital nerve is , like
other multiconfessional areas in Lebanon , the transcommunal symbiosis .
The war in Lebanon was not a confessional conflict , as has been often
held , but a political and economic one in which religion was manipulated
to serve factional ends . It was triggered by the Palestinian presence on
April 13th , 1975 and ended with an intra - Maronite confrontation in 1990 .
The war consolidated bonds of coexistence by generating solidarity
among religious communities : Christians and Muslims sheltered one an¬
other , cooperated in order to satisfy elementary needs of survival , and
helped one another cross demarcation lines . The structuration of coopera¬
tive bonds between both communities was the natural result of a coexis¬
tence historically anchored in customs . These groups lived in the same
buildings in the same quarters and cooperated systematically . Residents of
Beirut , with its historic Muslim and Christian components , 6 refused to
isolate themselves based on religion . A moral resistance was forged to face
exclusion . They said : " We have always got along " ; " We live peacefully
together " ; " We never made a difference " . The conflict revealed the exis¬
tence of a Lebanese identity expressing itself both in inter - community
cooperation , as well as in rejection of artificial boundaries imposed by
militia chiefs . In Hsoun I was told from members of both religious groups :
" The war got us together " ; " We safeguarded ourselves mutually . In joy
and in sorrow our families are united " .
Violence during the 15 years of war resulted , in great part , from an
instrumentalization of the religious that concealed its integrative nature .
Militia chiefs manipulated religious identity and isolated that identity from
its social context . They mobilized engagements with discourse , based on a
uniform , monolithic vision of religion that separates and places imperme¬
able barriers between communities . The religious component of identity
was exemplified . Militia chiefs succeeded during moments of the war in
transforming a political conflict into a religious one . Statements like " We
made war because we cannot get along " summarize this discourse . Militia
members negotiated their identity to suit political ends , erasing as it were ,
the intricate elements of identity that are shaped and inspired by interac¬
tions with members of other communities . When the multiple components
of identity are reduced to one , when the religious constituent confounds

6 The Jewish religion is also a historical component of Beirut ' s population ; unfortu¬
nately we do not have much information about the interaction among the three com¬
munities .
 AIDA KANAFANI - ZAHAR
404

itself with the identity as a whole , it can become a means of exclusion .

Nationalistic ideals get forged on this unique component and center on the
leader that revendicates this simplification .
We are , thus , presented with a phenomenon of instrumentalization of
the religious . This discourse contrasts with two others : one held by tradi¬
tional religious authorities from all sides that have always supported coex¬
istence ; the second by people for whom exclusivist discourse contradicts
with the pluralistic practices of daily life .
The ' agents ' of coexistence are the elderly persons . In Hsoun , those
who have practiced the wisdom and the ways of living together , who have
developed knowledge of the other , who have participated in each other ' s
feasts , and who have cooperated economically , felt imprisoned by this
uniform vision . In explaining the confessionalization of the war , they in¬
sisted on focusing on the exterior elements , which are strange to the ways
of coexistence . They tried to safeguard the values attached to common life
and to social identity and refused to restrict themselves to one component
of that identity . A moral resistance was forged , one that opposed their be¬
coming partisans to exclusivism . Their discourse was : " We have always
got along and lived peacefully " .
In some families , young men brought up in the spirit of coexistence re¬
fused to enroll in a militia . In other families , important cleavages took
place , expressing the ill ease of elders in the engagement of their children
in a confessional militia . We have here a confrontation of sense . The two
discourses : " We have always got along " and " We have always hated one
another " represent fragile coexistence during periods of the war . In one
sense , the latter is a clear rupture in coexistence .

Two religions, one culture

With two main religious communities , Lebanon has often been viewed as
having two separate and impermeable cultures . I would like to stress , how¬
ever , that Christians and Muslims belong to the same culture . They share
the same Abrahamic origins and the same language , a civilizing Semitic
element . They have participated equally in the formation of Lebanon . 7 The

7 See , for example , Antoine J . Abraham , Lebanon at Mid - Century : Maronite - Druze
Relations in Lebanon 1840 - 1860 : A Prelude to Arab Nationalism , Washington , DC :
University Press of America , 1981 ; Chevallier , La societe du Mont Liban [ fn . 3 ] ;
Michel Chebli , Fakhreddine II Maan , Prince du Liban ( 1572 - 1635 ) , Beyrouth : Uni -
versite Libanaise , 1984 ; Toufic Touma , Paysans et institutions feodales chez les
Druzes et les Maronites du Liban du XVIIeme siecle a 1914 , vol . 1 , Beyrouth : Uni -
versite Libanaise , 1986 ; Kamal Salibi , A House of Many Mansions : The History of
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND 405

major conflicts marking its contemporary history have not been religious .

Rather , factors - such as local political alliances and counter alliances ,

regional and international politics , and social and economic cleavages -

regularly overlap . Even through confrontation and crises , Muslims and

Christians together have shaped and constituted the Lebanese entity . They

share the same implantation in space , the same political vision of this

space , alliance practices and similar conditions of relationship , and access

to land . Group solidarity , family structure , sociability practices , and sense

of honor are common to their Arabo - Mediterranean culture . The Lebanese

culture is also based on the cult of memory , of commemorations in honor

of the dead , where ' giving ' has constant value . Every feast , be it Muslim

or Christian , calls for memory . Every feast is a reminder of equilibrium to

be satisfied between the world of the living and the world of the dead . I

shall return shortly to the importance of commemoration .

A religious community is conceived , above all , as a more or less stable

and confined entity , possessing marked religious traditions , a recognizable

identity , and collective and individual practices that reflect attachment to

the community . Religion molds specific traditions for both Muslims and
Christians .

The culture of the Lebanese , as can be seen in Hsoun , is a culture of

devotion , khushu f, transmitted through intense religious education . Reli¬

gious traditions and practices , observed with fervor , affirm and remind of

singular religious identities . Habitual space , daily gestures and utterances

are charged with religion . Habitation is the focus of a religious density .

Christianity is represented by the presence of the Bible , Mass , the central -

ity of the priest , images of saints , a small sanctuary , and fasts and pilgrim¬

ages . Likewise , central to Islam , are the centrality of the word of the

Qur ' an , daily prayers , prayer rugs , fasts , and pilgrimages . Values and ac¬

cess codes to society , despite these religious identities , are common .

Lebanon , in my view , is not a multicultural society but a culture of ref¬

erence with two variants , a mother culture , a cultural matrix in which reli¬

gious difference is tempered and acted upon . If the religious constitutes a

dominant component of identity in Hsoun , and by enlargement to other

groups in Lebanon , it by no means limits but permits trans - communi¬

cation . If the religious has a privileged status in society and constitutes its

organizational skeleton , the stakes are basic . The religious shapes tradi¬

tions and permits its overtaking . My article is , thus , a reflection on the

bond of religious difference , on the question of the interreligious .

Lebanon Reconsidered , London : Tauris , 1988 ; Engin Deniz Akarh , The Long Peace :
Ottoman Lebanon , 1861 - 1920 , Berkeley : University of California Press , 1993 .
 AIDA KANAFANI - ZAHAR
406

The "sweet " and " bloody " calendar cycles

To grasp interconfessional complexity , I studied Maronite and Shiite feasts
in Hsoun . My research focused on two calendar cycles of both communi¬
ties : the " bloody " cycle , in which sacrifice is at the center of the feast , and
the " sweet " cycle , in which pastry is its focus . Indeed , if certain religious
feasts are basically sacrificial , such as the carnival , marfa ', for Maronites
and the feast of the sacrifice , cid al - adha , for Shiites , others are punctuated
with sweets . Meat effervescence is followed by the appeasement of sweets ,
the barakah of the feast . The particularly ' sweet ' feasts include Epiphany ,
Saint Barbara , and Easter for Maronites and Id al -fitr , commemoration of
the birth of the Prophet Muhammad , and mid - Sha cban for Shiites , to cite
the most important .
Pastry and sweets of Maronite and Shiite feasts are the same , whether
fried , cooked in the oven , stuffed or not . Symbol of the blessed dough ,
Epiphany , called ghutas or dinih , is celebrated with fried pastry : fried balls
cawwamat , doughnuts of semolina ma 'kariin , and fried twisted pastry

zalabiyyah . These very pastries also characterize the commemoration of

the birth of the Prophet Muhammad . Anise and mahalab , perfumed cakes
stuffed with walnuts , almonds or dates ( ma 'muI and aqras ) characterize
Easter and 'id al -fitr , both of which celebrate the end of fasts .
Prepared during different religious feasts , pastry testifies to an inter -
communitarian symbiosis . Furthermore , Muslim and Christian women
prepare pastry with the same gestures and techniques to perpetuate these
culinary traditions . I have shown elsewhere that the symbolism and aes¬
thetics attached to these traditions are the same in both communities . 8
During feasts and commemorations , pastry is the symbol of the joy of
the living , " the blessing of the feast " . Cakes and other sweet preparations
give place not only to exchanges between families of the same confession ,
during visits of the barakah which affirm a religious identity , but also be¬
tween families of different confessions , thereby sealing and consolidating
bonds that bypass strict confessional limits . Pastries circulate from mem¬
bers of one community to members of the other . During the sweet cycle of
the religious calendar , whether Maronite or Shiite , communication takes
place between the two communities .
What happens during the bloody cycle of the two calendars , when the
sacrifice of an animal , highly codified in the Muslim community , is the
basis of the celebration ? A sacrifice , generally that of sheep , is accom -

Ai'da Kanafani - Zahar , " Feter en douceur : les patisseries calendriers Maronites et Chii -
tes a Hsoun ( Liban ) " , in : Cuisines, reflets des societes , eds . Sepia , Paris : Musee de
PHomme , 1996 , 367 - 86 .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND
407

plished by Christians during the Carnival before Lent , as well as to com¬

memorate their dead . In Hsoun , traditions are associated with the latter

during sanctuary feasts , such as the Feast of Saint Elias or the Assumption

of the Virgin Mary . For Muslims , a sacrifice is performed on the occasion

of ' id al - adha . Marriages and funerary rituals may be occasions to sacrifice

for both communities .

On specific occasions ^ ritual slaughter highlights the interreligious

bond in a multiconfessional community . Shiites do not consume meat ,

unless it has been obtained through a highly codified ritual accomplished

by a Muslim sacrificer : direction of the animal ' s head to the Ka ' bah ; tas -

miyyah 9 by pronouncing the formulas of the basmalah , i . e . , saying " In the

name of God , the most Benevolent , the most Merciful " ! 0 ( bi - 'smi llah al -

rahmdn al - rahim ) ; of the takbir ^ i . e . , saying " God is almighty " ( alldhu

akbar ) ; of the tahlil , i . e . , saying " Praise be to God who made your slaugh¬

tering licit " ( subhan man hallalak li - l - dhabh ); and , finally , flowing of

blood by means of specific technical regulations codified in many ahddlth .

The slaughterer must master all elements of the technical act : be dexterous

to inflict as little pain as possible , sharpen the knife to provoke blood effu¬

sion and to avoid repeating the act of slaughter , and - not let the animal see

the knife . These elements are instructed in many ahadith , such as " Provide

relief for your sacrifice " ( arihu dhablhatakum ) and " Sacrifice with kind¬

ness " ( ahsinu al - dhibh ): . .. . i . : ...- iJ ; '.

If there is a prohibition in Islam , it is that of blood being considered im¬

pure ( najis ) and rotten (fasid ) . The Qur ' an is very explicit about this : " Forbid¬

den to you ( hurrimat calaykum ) is carrion and blood , and the flesh of the
swine , and whatsoever has been killed in the name of some other than God ,

and whatever has been strangled , or killed by a blow or a fall , or by goring . . ."

( Qur ' an 5 : 3 ) . The Shiites of Hsoun with whom I worked refer to the authority

of an 'dlim , al - Khul . Precisions are given regarding ritual slaughter 1so that a

maximal effusion of blood can be obtained . It is obligatory ( wdjib ) to section

the four organs ( ddd \ sg . ' udw ) : esophagus ( hulqum ) , pharynx ( mari r ) , called

" channel of the soul " , and the two jugular veins ( sg . wadaj , pi . audaj ) . The

section of the articulation ( (uqdah ) , known as jawzah , must be accomplished

is such a way that it comes out on the side of the head and not on the side

of the body . Al - Khu ' i expounds that when the four organs have been sec -

9 Qur ' an 22 :34 : " For every community We have ordained certain rites , that they may com¬
memorate the name of God by reading it over the cattle We have given them for sacrifice ."
- Translations from the Qur ' an follow : AI- Qw Jan . A Contemporary Translation by Ahmed
Ali [ 1984 ] , rev . ed ., Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 2001 .
10 Some omit " the most Benevolent , the most Merciful " .
 Ai 'DA KANAFANI -ZAHAR
408

tioned , the jawzah comes out automatically with the head . Coming out on
the side of the body means that the section has not been correctly done .
Three other conditions must be fulfilled to insure the ritual validity of
the slaughter : ( i ) it has to be done " from the front " ; ( ii ) the animal must
have its head directed ( istiqbal ) to the qiblah ( i . e . , towards the Ka 'bah in
Mecca ) , unless the slaughterer does not know of this condition or has for¬
gotten about it ; ( iii ) the third condition is to pronounce the name of Al¬
lah . 11
For the Shiites , the tasmiyyah (pronouncing the name of Allah ) , which
precedes the technical act , is indeed a condition for the slaughter to be licit .
They fear , for example , that the formula " In the name of the cross " is said .
That is why they have to witness the slaughter . For those who are not pre¬
sent , the meat is illicit ( haram ) . Refering to a hadlth : " If the ( sacrifice )
does not take place in front of you , it ( the victim ) becomes haram ( for
you ) " ( in ghabat 'alaykum hurrimat ) . The formulas of the tasmiyyah may
include the basmalah , which consists in saying " In the name of Allah " , or
the takblr ( " Allah is the most great " ) . 12 In practice , however , they add ,
" Praise the one who made your slaughter licit " . This formula , said by Shi¬

ites as well as by Christians , expresses the authority to remove the " breath
of life " and symbolizes the passage from divine to human authority .
For Shiites to participate in their sacrificial celebrations , Maronites
delegate the slaughtering to them . This act , the accomplishment of the
Maronite sacrifice by a Shiite , is complex and rife with implications for the
formulation of the coexistential model . 13 Maronites delegate the slaughter¬
ing , so that Shiites can " be introduced to the festivity , and not be excluded .
Religion is communion ; we accomplish our sacrifice according to their rite
( caid tarlqatihim ) so that together we can take part in the whole commun¬

ion of the village . We appreciate this action " . They also say : " So that they
can eat , share (yujabiruna ) " . " We do not make a distinction , for us it is not
as important as it is for them ; for us it is good to be together " . The concept
of jabr , sharing with humility , contributes to the comprehension of the
mechanism involved in living together . It illustrates the importance that

11 ( al - Sayyid ) Abu al - Qasim al - Musaw ! al - KhuT , Minhaj al -salihin , al - ibadat , al - mu 'a -

malat , fatawa marja ' al - muslimln za 'im al - hauzah al - ' ilmiyyah , vol . 2 , Beirut : Dar al -
Balaghah , 1992 , 336 - 7 .
12 Ibid . , 338 - 9 .

13 On the analysis of the sublimated sacrifice , see Ai'da Kanafani - Zahar , " Le religieux
sublime dans le sacrifice du mouton : un exemple de coexistence communautaire au
Liban " , L 'Homme 141 ( 1997 ) , 83 - 100 .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND
409

Christians place on sharing their food with Shiite friends and neighbors ,

with all that the sharing of meals implies for reciprocity and multiple ex¬

changes .

The prohibition against absorbing blood , as announced in the

Qur ' an , is associated in the ritual with several elements that , by no

means , can be dissociated . When they slaughter the sheep of Maronites ,

Shiites conform to this prohibition and to its strict and detailed codifica¬

tion . For Maronites , the absence of sacrificial codification permits them

to delegate this slaughtering . Maronites adapt to the ritual constraints of

the other religion , at the same time ensuring that no transgression

against their own teachings occurs . This adaptation has far reaching

implications . The Maronite who masters the act of slaughter can very

well sacrifice his own animals . By not slaughtering , he expresses the

will not to restrict himself to his own , bypassing the limits to go to the

other , because he knows that his Shiite friends and neighbors will not

partake in the celebration otherwise . He accepts that a rite of another

religion be applied to a practice associated with the celebration of his

feast , a practice that his religion does not prohibit . He does not apply the

categories of the pure and the impure , as do the Shiites , because his re¬

ligion does not establish them . The interreligious bond is defined here

by the application of the ritual principles of another community . In this ,

the Maronites accomplish a conscious act of coexistential structuraliza -

tion .

Among explanations for the harmfulness of blood given by Maronites

is a particularly significant one , that they share with Muslims : We prefer

the Muslim slaughter because it " conform [ s ] to norms ( adbat ) " ; " [ is ] ac¬

complished according to rigorous principles ( ' aid al - usul )" . To which

norms are the Maronites referring , since the slaughter of animals is not

codified in their religion ? Maronites and Shiites uphold the same vision of

blood noxiousness , as that which carries pollution ( zankhah ) . The latter

consists in the smell of meat and , more specifically , that of its blood . The

offal are particularly impregnated . Its management necessitates complex

organization . The flesh of a poorly bled animal is betrayed by its odor ,

color , and taste . The flowing of blood minimizes the effect of zankhah , as

much primordial as eating raw meat is very appreciated . Christian and

Muslim women are intransigent to this respect and strive to neutralize it by

multiple washings and use of vinegar , brine , lemon , and spices . Some im¬

plications of the Muslim ritual , such as the noxiousness of blood and the
410 A 'IDA KANAFANI - ZAHAR

importance of getting rid of it , 14 are incorporated in their own categories .

Consequently , Lebanese Christians do not know the cuisine of blood .
If it is true that transactions are common in many plural societies , it is
nonetheless important to emphasize the patterns involved in the act of coexist¬
ing , particularly in a country where religion has been manipulated to suit po¬
litical purposes . Gn the other hand , although exchanges may seem common in
multireligious societies , they have not always been the norm . Examples exist
of Christians refusing to eat meat obtained by Muslim slaughter : Before
World War I , Jaussen tells us , some Christians of Nablus (Nabulus ) , Palestine ,
avoided buying meat from the bazaar during the Feast of the Sacrifice , be¬
cause the sheep were considered to have been offered to Muhammad or to the
Muslim dead and , consequently , were prohibited to Christians . According to
Jaussen , World War I modified this ' mentality ' , and Christians no longer
made this distinction . 15 Rodinson cites other cases , such as the Christians
of Ethiopia who reproached Europeans for eating meat obtained by Mus¬
lim ritual , for them equivalent to apostasy . 16

A culture of commemoration

To be viable , coexistence must be a system based on simple rules of recipe

rOcity and interdependence . It is this coexistential dynamic that delimits
the interreligious . While Christians adapt to Shiite sacrificial rites , Shiites
participate in the secular aspects of some celebrations associated with the
Christian calendar , such as the Feast of the Virgin Mary ( her birth , as well
as the Assumption ) on August 15 17 and the Feast of St . Elias , the patron
saint of the village . Shiites call the Virgin Mary Maryam bint 'Imran . She
is the only woman to whom an entire surah is devoted ( Qur ' an 19 ) ; another
surah is devoted to her family : "AlJImran " ( Qur ' an 3 ) . On this occasion ,
Shiites share a meal with their Maronite friends . During the evening , they
participate in the joyful celebration associated with the event . The Marian
cult is widely developed in Lebanon and in the - Orient . Father Goudard ,
who lived in Lebanon in 1892 and in 1903 , left a number of chapels and

14 A butcher - shop , owned by a Shiite , opened in Hsoun in 1998 . Both Shiites and Ma -
ronites buy from it .
15 Antonin Joseph Jaussen , Coutumes palestiniennes , vol . 1 : Naplotise et son district ,
Paris : Geuthner , 1927 , 311 .
16 Maxime Rodinson , art . " Ghidha ' " , in : Encyclopedic de I 'Islam , vol . 2 , Leiden : Brill ,
1965 , 1090 - 91 .

17 The Marian cult is very developed in the Orient and in Lebanon ( see , for example , Joseph
Pere Goudard , La sainte Vierge au Liban , Beyrouth : Imprimerie Catholique , 1955 ) .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND 411

churches dedicated to her . For him , Lebanon is the kingdom of Mary :

" There is about Mariam a solidarity , a unanimity that struck me ; even the

indifferent or the atheist has always in the corner of his heart a salam for
her . " He gives examples of Druze women making vows to her . 18
With the Maronite family of Hsoun that dedicated the chapel when it
was constructed , Shiites participate in the celebration of the villagers pa¬
tron saint , Mar Ilyas , on July 20 . Saint Elias may be al -Khadir ( al -Khidr ) ,
the verdant , identified in the Qur ' an by description . 19 However , notes Has -
luck , he may also be Saint George , which seems to hold true in Syria . 20 Gn
the occasion of the feast , the dead of this family are commemorated . 21
Shiites present their condolences to Christian families of the lineage in¬
volved in the celebration " as if our dead were theirs " , sa.y the Maronites .
Later , Maronite elders visit Shiite elders and may share a sacrificial meal .
At night , dances and songs terminate the feast .
Hsoun celebrates several commemorative cults with four villages . This
cycle is governed by specific Maronite families related to one another by
matrimonial ties . They are made to coincide with sanctuary feasts that the
deceased , generally the lineage head or a priest , cherished particularly , like
the Assumption of the Virgin Mary at Mishan ( August 15 ) , Her birth ( Sep¬
tember 8 ) at Fatrf , the feast of the Holy Cross ( September -14 ) at
Shawayya , and on May 5 , during the month of Mary , at Qartaba . The feast
of the patron saint is part of this sacrificial cycle through which a cult of
the ancestors is installed .
As mentioned earlier , the Lebanese culture is one that honors com¬
memoration . Commemorating by giving life to memory establishes conti¬
nuity . Maronites remember their dead during the annual celebration of the
death of a person , on All Saints Day , and on Good Friday . Furthermore ,
some families are implied in a commemorative cycle . Shiites commemo¬
rate their dead on the first day of 'Id al - adha and ' Id al-fitr , when they visit
the cemetery to place flowers and burn incense , and oh the first Thursday
of April , when they distribute cakes and salt and offer meals . They also
celebrate the memory during 'ashura ', performing an " assembly of condo -

18 Goudard , La sainte Vierge [ fn . 17 ] , 52 .

19 In Islam , Elias is a messenger ( mursil , cf . Qur ' an 37 : 123 ) . Al - Khadir accompanied

Moses during his travels and secured to himself immortality with ' the discovery of the
fountain of life ( cf . Qur ' an 18 : 59 - 81 ) .

20 Frederik F . Hasluck , Christianity and Islam under the Sultans , vol . 2 , Oxford : Claren¬
don Press , 1929 , 72 .

21 On the cult of the dead for the ancient Arabs , see Joseph Chelhod , Le sacrifice chez les
Arabes : Recherches sur revolution , la nature et la fonction des rites sacrificiels en
Arabie occidentale , Paris : Presses Universitaires de France , 1955 .
412 Ai 'DA KANAFANI -ZAHAR

lences " ( majlis al - ta 'ziyyah ) commemorating the martyrdom of the Imam

Husayn , as well as their dead .
Both communities prepare a votive gift of cooked and perfumed wheat
aromatized with orange blossom water . Characteristic of the odor of the
Saints for Christians , it is offered to the faithful leaving the chapel on All
Saints Day and on Good Friday . This qamhiyyah , also specific to Saint
Barbara , becomes a marhamah ( from rahima : to have compassion ) " so as
to remember the dead " . Shiites prepare the gift on cashura ' and offer it to
members of both communities .
In these commemorations that associate joy and sorrow , it is neither a
Muslim nor Christian memory that is at stake but the capacity to establish
relations in this multi - religious society . Social ethics get forged and alli¬
ances installed between Muslim and Christian families in the same village ,
and in different villages with the Virgin Mary and the patron saint . An
extra - lineage , extra - family , extra - confessional bond gets structured . Ac¬
commodating oneself to another religion and participating in the com¬
memoration cults of the other community aim at restricting the impact of
strict doctrines . This correspondence between both communities , during
which individuals communicate through their religions , permits them to
live together by a common value system , such that religious difference is
not a cause of distance .
A rite de passage in Hsoun , central to the cohesion of the community , is
that of death and mourning . Everything related to this rite gives rise to sponta¬
neous exchanges . Solidarity must be rigorously shown , constituting a value
that cannot be jeopardized and to which all must conform . " We share alto¬
gether with humility " (nujabiruhum wa -yujabiruna ) . " In joy and in sorrow we
are united " ( bi- l-farah wa - l- tarah nahnu sawa 7) . Bechara Chemali , describing
customs of Mount Lebanon in the beginning of the 20th century , noted the
pluriconfessional participation during bereavement . In the Matn and Shuf, he
notes , where Maronites and Druzes live next to one another , notifications are
addressed to all : " The village in its entirety is involving men and women ,
Christians and Druzes . . . . Everybody is invited to dinner . . . sheep are slaugh¬
tered . These reunions serve to consolidate the union between Christians and to
maintain good relations with those who are not " . 22
During the latest events of the war , as mentioned earlier , coexistence
was sustained . This duty was , of course , observed . In some respects , the
war consolidated bonds of coexistence . In Hsoun , for example , Christians
transported the body of a dead Shiite in Beirut , intervening with militias

22 Bechara Chemali , " Moeurs et usages au Liban . La mort et les funerailles " , Anthropos 4
( 1909 ) , 37 - 53 .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND 413

positioned in the demarcation zone . Once in the village , they helped dig

his tomb . Examples like this are plenty and mark a deeply rooted coexis¬
tence . 23

The interreligious bond

Observations on exchanges between communities have been noted by sev¬

eral authors who read them as economically motivated or as performed out

of convenience . In their study of popular stories in Lebanon , Feghali and

Feghali mention that during Epiphany , the Feast of the Water , the priest

blesses Maronite houses in WadI Shahrur in the South , as well as houses of

Orthodox and Druze families . They also mention Muslim participation in

the Feast of the Holy Cross . They interpret these interconfessional exchan¬

ges as a result of convenience : " Ce melange de confessions diverses fait

necessairement qu ' on est souvent oblige par convenance ( mzamele )

d ' assister aux ceremonies religieuses les uns des autres . Du reste , contrai -

rement a ce que l ' on pense en Europe , il y a au Liban beaucoup de tole¬

rance et d ' entente entre les differentes communautes religieuses . Chacun

evite avec soin de froisser son voisin et de chercher a le convertir a sa con¬

fession " . 24

In her study of the Sunni village , Buwarij , in 1937 - 38 , Fuller puts forth

an economic explanation for why Christians participate with Muslims in the

spring festival , which includes the visit to the same saints : " Both village

men and women often attend Christian feast days in neighboring villages .

This is not primarily out of religious interest but because any large feast

day , Muslim or Christian , particularly in the more populated communities ,

takes on the nature of a fair with buying , selling and entertainment " 25 The

visit of Christians to Muslim saints and vice versa , as Hasluck amply devel¬

ops , seemed to be quite a common practice observed in many parts of the

Ottoman Empire .26 Relations of the villagers with Christians from the sur -

23 Actions against the war were taken by Christian and Muslim associations , students ,
and syndicates . See Hanf , Coexistence [ fh . 1] , 638 - 40 , and Ghassan Slaiby , " Les ac¬
tions collectives de resistance civile a la guerre " , in : Le Liban aujourd 'hui , ed . Fadia
Kiwan , Paris : CNRS , 1994 . Several demonstrations for peace by civilians , like that on
August 20 , 1987 , took place at demarcation zones . See also Antoine Nasri Messara ,
The Challenge of Coexistence , Oxford : Centre for Lebanese Studies , 1988 , 17 - 20 .

24 Michel and J . Feghali , Contes , legendes et coutumes populaires du Liban , vol . 3 , Lou -
vain : Institut Orientaliste , 1977 , 149 .

25 Anne H . Fuller , Buarij : Portrait of a Lebanese Muslim village [ 1961 ] , Cambridge :

Harvard University , 1963 , 83 .

26 Hasluck , Christianity and Islam [ fh . 20 ] .

414 Ai'DA KANAFANI - ZAHAR

rounding villages follow the same pattern : " Relations with the outer world
by peasants going out from the village are primarily of an economic na¬
ture " . 27 What is of prime importance gets demarcated one from the other ,
installing a demarcation between one ' s community and the other : " Be¬
cause Buarij is a Muslim village that is surrounded by a predominantly
Christian majority , the peasants are the more aware of their religious af¬
filiation . This both marks them off from their neighbors and gives to the
community a sense of separateness " . 28
Smock and Smock have estimated that the religious communities in
Lebanon " constitute a major component of the social and political systems
primarily by providing a focus for loyalty ; self - definition and social
identification " . 29 For them , however , " religious ritual and custom provide
one of the most visible reminders of sectarian differences " , 30 Interactions
between the two communities are rare and when they happen are " formally
cordial " :

"People still associate mostly with members of their own or related sects ,
and interactions between adherents of different religious groups , particu¬
larly between Christians and Muslims , remain superficially cordial in a
more - or - less stylized manner . Inter- sectarian relations occur primarily for
economic reasons or on formal social occasions like weddings , funerals
and festivals . . . . To feel socially at ease and to eschew uncertainty , people
pursue a policy that one Lebanese social scientist ( Fuad Khuri ) has de¬
scribed as ' mutual avoidance ' " . 31

In Hsoun , Muslims and Christians participate in the " sweet " and " bloody "
cycles characterizing each community . The religious ritual per se is pri¬
vately reserved for the members of the community . Its secular manifesta¬
tions - including exchange of blessing visits , sacrificial meals , pastry ,
night gatherings , dancing and singing - are not . The first - religious ritual
- illustrates particularistic identity , while the second is identity constructed
and composed of experiences associated with religious events . The identity
thus shaped is not based upon confessional criteria but a collective iden¬
tity . These experiences are charged with joy or sorrow , the effect of which
is to create a strong emotional bond in which confessional sensitivity is

27 Fuller , Buarij , 92 .
28 Ibid ., 79 .
29 David R . and Audrey C . Smock , A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana , New
York : Elsevier , 1975 , 77 .
30 Ibid ., 83 ( emphasis mine ) .
31 Ibid . , 89 .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND
415

replaced by group sensitivity , thereby fortifying the strategic implications

of the interreligious .

Stemming from daily living , coexistence necessitates knowledge of re¬

ligious differences and requires their learning , as well as their transmis¬

sion . Not only are beliefs and cults of the other community not denigrated

but each community also has minute knowledge of the religious life of the

other . On many occasions , Shiites informed me about Maronite cults and

vice versa . For example , a Maronite spoke to me about the importance for
Shiites of the distribution of salt and sweets in commemoration of dead

and for the Feast of Sacrifice , during which the spirit of equality and shar¬

ing is very strong . A Shiite explained the commemorative cult associated

with Saint Elias , situating it in the sacrificial cycle connecting the five

villages and charging it with symbolism . Another explained to me the

manifestations associated with May , the month of the Virgin Mary .

Fieldwork conducted in this multiconfessional community shows that re¬

ligion has to be demystified in order to recognize its consensual capacity . A

religion of passion is witnessed in the observation of cults relative to each

community , and a human religion forged with multiple experiences that

transcend dogma . Christians and Muslims draw from the teachings of their

religions , from the Bible and the Qur ' an , universal aspects such as humility ,

tolerance , and giving which are translated in the local concepts of ulfah ( har¬

mony ) and jabr ( here : partaking with humility ) in the sense of participating .

Religion is thus insufflated with associative dimensions and not of separation .

Extensive emphasis on the role of religion as a factor of separation

characterizes many works on Lebanon . Observation of interreligious

strategies in mixed villages questions the validity of frontiers between

groups based on religion . What this study hopes to show is that religion

can be used as a system of communication and , consequently , that Chris¬

tians and Muslims can be , in fact , very close . Their strategies are political

messages , because they depend on the exchange of signs that are of ulti¬

mate importance to each community . Each celebration devoted to one

community , in actuality , includes the other : " We become brothers "

( inifakha ) , they say . The concept of ulfah ( or , in the local dialect , ilfah )

expresses this transcommunal solidarity . " There is a harmony , a zeal , a

bond between us " (fi ilfah , fi ghirah , ji irtibat ) . Not only are they not

strangers by virtue of their different religions , but they are also , in their

own terms , " two of the same " . This affirmation stresses that the other is

equal , that difference is not only recognized but also respected , and that

denial of the specificity of the other does not exist . The interreligious is not

only the passive acceptance of the other as different , which in itself is not

insignificant , but also the participation in this difference .

 AIDA KANAFANI - ZAHAR
416

In a multireligious society , such as Hsoun , individuals define them¬

selves not in opposition to one another , but in relation and in association to
one another . " There is no « a fra /z- sectarianism " , says one man , " we live
together for centuries ; our hand is in theirs " . The community is united
around basic values derived from each individual religion , as in the exam¬
ple of duty of memory not as a simple duty of memory for each commu¬
nity , but of both , of the whole . Commemorating is , indeed , basic and
permeates the culture . It can also be seen as contributing to the construction
of this interreligious identity , which asserts the will to live together . These
values structure society away from particularistic confessional criteria .
Based on this study of a concrete reality , I have not treated a situation of
conflict but a form of collective cohesion , a bond originating from religion .
The different communities seek to transform this difference by departing
from strict norms . The patterns of the interreligious contribute to specifying
the rules and regulations of the functioning of a multi - confessional society .
In other words , two religious personalities meet at the very point where
religious difference is most evident , in a society where religious organiza¬
tion is deeply embedded and binds members of each community . While
being demarcated from one another ' s feasts , rites , and cults , these commu¬
nities open up to each other not during anodyne , a - religious events but
during feasts and rites of passage , the height of religious expression and
experience . In these festive exchanges , the relational aspect of religion is
exemplified . They concretize what I call the interreligious bond . If religion
is not dismissed during interreligious occasions , it nonetheless gives rise to
a new experience , leading to the formation of other traditions , traditions of
the interreligious .
The real frontier between the communities is to be found in the ab¬
sence of intermarriage . The only marriages contracted are confessional , as
civil marriage is not permitted . 32 Religious communities in Lebanon are ,
first of all , political entities which define the rights and privileges of the
individual , whether a believer or not , and regulate all questions concerning
personal status . They are fully - fledged artificial persons headed by spiri¬
tual chiefs , who at the same time assume temporal and military roles . 33 For
Basile , " La reconnaissance officielle des communautes confessionnelles
historiques donne a leur statut personnel force de loi . . . Toute communaute

32 The latest attempt at date was a law proposed by President Hraoui in 1998 , which met
with resistance from religious communities and was , therefore , halted .
33 See for example Antoine A . Khair , Le moutagarrifat du Mont -Liban , Beyrouth : Uni¬
versity Libanaise , 1973 ; Abraham , Lebanon at Mid - Century [ fn . 7 ] ; and Touma ,
Paysans et institutions [ fn . 7 ] .
 THE RELIGION OF THE ' OTHER ' AS BOND 417

religieuse ainsi reconnue jouit de la personnalite morale avec toutes les

consequences juridiques qui en decoulent " . 34 According to Basile , the re¬

gime of these communities took birth under the Byzantine emperors and

developed in modern Lebanon into a personal autonomy of all confes¬

sional communities and into a personal status . 35 The configuration of con¬

fessional communities as autonomous entities in charge of the personal

status of their members was formally established in the Lebanese constitu¬

tion of 1926 , which granted the communities legislative and judiciary

powers . The state recognizes these communities as legal entities and is

bound to respect their decisions . 36

The autonomy of communities is an Ottoman heritage , itself perpetuat¬

ing the regime of ahl al - dhimmah established during the early Islamic con¬

quests . Communities were recognized with their beliefs and practices . As

long as they paid their taxes , the Ottomans did not intervene . According to

Longrigg , the millet enjoyed the status

" bestowed by the Ottoman Government since its earliest days , with re¬
markable liberality , on the communities of ' people of the Book ' scattered
locally among the Muslim majority : the status of a community autonomy
which included jurisdiction in some civil and all personal - status cases , the
full control of their properties and schools , and the right to be heard by
the Sultan himself through their appointed heads " .37

A marriage between persons of different religions takes place only if one

adopts the religion of the other , that is , renounces his or her religious af¬

filiation . Both Catholic ecclesiastical law and the Islamic sharVah subject

interreligious marriage to strict regulations :

Under the actual codes of the Catholic Church , the Latin code of 1983

( Codex Iuris Canonici , CIC ) and the code of the Oriental Churches of

1990 ( Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium , CCEO ) , a distinction is

34 Basile P . Basile , Statut personnel et competence judiciaire des communautes confes -

sionnelles au Liban : Etude juridique comparee , Kaslik : Universite Saint - Esprit Kaslik ,
1993 ( = Bibliotheque de 1' Universite Saint - Esprit ; 30 ) , 53 .
35 Ibid . , 43 .
36 Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution ( 1926 ) : " La liberie de conscience est absolue . En
rendant hommage au Tres - Haut, L ' etat respecte toutes les confessions et en garantit et pro¬
tege le libre exercice a condition qu ' il ne soit pas porte atteinte a l ' ordre public . II garantit
egalement aux populations , a quelque rite qu ' elles appartiennent, le respect de leur statut
personnel et de leurs interets religieux" ( see Antoine Hokayem , La genese de la constitu¬
tion libanaise de 1926 , Beyrouth : Editions Universitaires du Liban , 1996 , 381 ) .
37 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg , Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate , London :
Oxford University , 1958 , 11 .
418 AIDA KANAFANI - ZAHAR

established between the " mixed marriage " ( matrimonium mixtum ) between
Catholics of different denominations ( Maronite , Greek Catholic , Syrian
Catholic , etc . ) and the " marriage with disparity of cult " ( matrimonium cum
disparitate cultus ) between a Catholic and a non - baptized person . The
marriage with disparity of cult is an impediment that invalidates the union ,
making it nil ( can . 1086 CIC , can . 803 §1 CCEO ) . 3S However , the Church
does not forbid interreligious marriage absolutely . The impediment can be
removed by a dispensation given by the competent authority of the bishop
( can . 795 CCEO) after a request addressed to him by the Catholic party

( can . 843 § 1 CCEO ) . The conditions of the dispensation are that the non -

Christian party does not use any pressure to convert the Christian party and
that it accepts to baptize the children and administer a catholic education .
According to Islamic law , a Muslim man may marry a Christian
woman without her conversion to Islam , provided the children are raised
according to Islam . Furthermore , she does not inherit . A Muslim woman
cannot marry a Christian , unless the latter converts to Islam ; otherwise she
becomes an apostate .
Changing religion may have familial and social repercussions . The
convert is generally not accepted in the new community . Loss of identity
occurs without acquisition of another . The alternative - an expensive one -
is to contract a civil marriage in Cyprus , which is recognized by the state .
The paucity of interreligious marriages contributes to structuring religious
identity along marked frontiers . Religious leaders say : " We are together in joy
and in pain ( bi- l-sara r wa - l- darra 0) , but we are not for inter- marriage " . Many
people affirm this view . A Christian woman expressed her apprehension about
the ease of divorce and potential polygamy . 39 The contrast is all the more
sharp , given that divorce is prohibited for Maronites .

38 Code des canons des eglises orientates , texte officiel et traduction fran ? aise par Emile
Eid et Rene Metz , Cite du Vatican : Librairie Editrice Vaticane , 1997 .
39 Qur ' an 4 :3 : " . . . marry women who are lawful for you , two , or three , or four ; but if you
fear that you cannot treat so many with equity , marry only one . . . " ; and Qur ' an 4 : 129 :
" Howsoever you may try you will never be able to treat your wives equally " . In real
life , polygamy is very limited . See M . Salame , " Une tribu chiite des montagnes de
Hermel ( Liban ) : Les Nacer ed - dine " , Revue de Geographie de Lyon 32 ( 1957 ) 2 , 115 -
25 . - In his study on the illness , development , and alimentation of new borns during
the first 18 months , Harfouche worked between 1960 and 1962 with a sample of 365
families from lower socio - economic strata living around Beirut : 131 Armenian , 120
Maronites , 114 Sunnites . Three Sunnite families ( 2 . 6 % ) were polygamous . In one fam¬
ily , the two women lived in the same house , and in the other two families , women
lived in separate houses . None of the 365 couples were divorced , and only one Sunnite
couple was separated ( see Jamal K . Harfouche , Social structure of low- income families
in Lebanon , Beirut : Khayats , 1965 , 39 - 40 ) .
 NON - VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
Chibli Mallat 1

Literary perspectives

Three - quarters of a century ago , on September 24 , 1927 , a meeting was

held at Ehden in celebration of the Poet of the Cedars , who had just been

appointed " director " of Zghorta . Some of the speeches were published in

Sada al - Shamal ( " Echoe of the North "), a liberal nationalist newspaper

edited and published by lawyer and man of letters Farid Antun . For the

people of Ehden , whose enthusiasm for the day seemed overwhelming in

the reports , 2 Chibli Mallat ( Shibll al - Mallat , 1875 - 1961 ) was considered

the man whose star shone in many a Lebanese and Arab literary circle . The
Poet of the Cedars ' lines on Ehden are remembered to date : " Is Ehden not

anagram for Eden / Hanging to the nest of the eagle / Young woman in the

cedar mountains / Tenderly attended by the cedar 's princely crown " . -
Later , he would write in the introduction to the second volume of his

Dlwan " that fate had wished him to be appointed in a city he loved " .3

1 This chapter is based on a lecture in Arabic , Ehden , North Lebanon , September 23 ,

1999 . Many thanks to John Donohue for a most efficient editing of the English ver¬
sion .
2 A letter sent to the paper by an important national figure , Hamid Faranjiyyah , and
published in the first page of Sada al - Shamal , August 17 , 1927 , reads as follows : " The
idea to celebrate the Poet of the Cedars Chibli bey Mallat has been on the mind of all
of us , but since we do not have enough resources to realise this wish , it behooves you
to transform it into reality , and we hope to be in your midst to join in our gratitude ,
and to have the opportunity to requite part of the debt towards Chibli bey " . Many other
testimonies of Northern personalities were published in the newspaper in the summer
of 1927 . For the relations between the Poet of the Cedars and the people of Ehden , see
Badawl Abu - DIb , " Ihdin ' arfisu shi ' rihi " [ Ehden , bride of his poetry ] , in : Shibll al-
Mallat : Sha 'ir al -Arz, madrasat al - talaqi al - watanl - Chibli Mallat , Poet of the Cedars :
A School for National Identity , ed . Wajdi al - Mallat , Beirut : Joseph D . Raidy Press ,
1999 , 435 - 38 .

3 Mallat , Dlwan , Beirut : n .p . , 1952 , ii , 81 ( " a - laysat Ihdinun tahrlfa 'adnin / mu 'al-
laqatan bi- awkari l- nusuri ; / 'ara 'isu fl jibali l- arzi yarnu / ilayha l- arzu dhu l - taji l -
amiri — " Wa tarahanil - qadaruflahdani baldatin uhibbuha " ) .
420 CHIBLI MALLAT

Though surprising at first in a reflection on the themes of non - violence

and the rule of law , reference to the classical or modern literary scene can
be better understood in the light of the avenues allowed by the foreboding
of literary texts :

I came , in the neighbourhood of the world , to a nation

Which says when roughed up : the sceptre is thought
Its long spears are feathers , its crown
Reason , its blood ink
And its riches are soul , its throne
Heart - far from worldly words - or a tomb 4

Recognition that " the sceptre is thought " echoes a deep Arab literary tradi¬
tion , with Abu al - Tayyib al - Mutanabbl answering the famous lines of his
eminent colleague Abu Tammam , - " The sword says truth better than the
book , its edge draws the line between play and reality " . 5 MutannabI was in
effect also answering himself - " Do not seek glory in wine and women ,
glory is the sword and the assault at dawn " - when he pronounced his fa¬
mous lines :

Reason comes first , only then comes great courage

She is first , he comes second
For without the human brain , the meanest beast
Would be closer to glory than man

The struggle of the pen and the sword is familiar to history since time im¬
memorial . Christ himself is the best - known victim , who had chosen in
martyrdom to reject legions of fighting angels at his beck and call , in a
supreme sacrifice for a different message , a message of non - violence
which will be fulfilled only on Judgment day .
The theme is therefore elusive , and its echo resonates in the best poeti¬
cal texts , from the Gospels ' " At the beginning was the Word " ( John 1 : 1 ) ,
through to Goethe ' s Faust :

4 Namatnl bi - arja 'i l - 'awalimi dawlatun / idha zuhimat fa - l - sawlajanu huwa l -flkru /
Wa - aqlamuha l - sumru l - tiwalu wa - tajuha / huwa l - ra 'yu fiha wa - l - naji 'u huwa l-
hibru / Wa - amwaluha 'izzu l - nufusi wa - arshuha / lahu l - sadru duna l- 'alamina awi - l -
qabru .

5 Al - sayfu asdaqu inba 'an mina l- kutubi / ft haddihi l- haddu bayna l -jiddi wa - l - la 'ibi . -
Most of the Arabic verse in this text is reproduced here from memory , and ascertaining
it in the published collections would be fastidious .
 NON - VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 421

" ' T is written : ' In the Beginning was the Word .'

Here am I balked : who , now , can help afford ?

The Word ? - impossible so high to rate it ;

And otherwise I must translate it ,

If by the Spirit I am truly taught .

Then thus : ' In the Beginning was the Thought .'

This first line let me weigh completely ,

Lest my impatient pen proceed too fleetly .

Is it the Thought which works , creates , indeed ?

' In the Beginning was the Power , ' I read .

Yet , as I write , a warning is suggested ,

That I the sense may not have fairly tested .

The Spirit aids me : now I see the light !

' In the Beginning was the Act , ' I write ." 6

Was the beginning " Word " , " Thought " , " Power " , or " Act " ? The question

remains unanswered , and can be found under the Lebanese cedars ' literary

shade . It has been expressed , in recent times , in high - quality novels by

Lebanese authors from North Lebanon , such as Zghorta - born Rashid al -

Da cif s Learning English , 1 in which Rashid , the narrator , who is at the hub

of the unfolding tragedy , is taken over in a logic of violence which is

stronger than him . The question is equally true in the serene abandonment

of the novel from Zghorta author Jabbur al - Duwayhi ' s Autumn 's Equinox ,8

which follows the narrator in his trivial preoccupations , his library , his

haircut , his felt hat , while the cannon can be heard of vain wars . It is a

struggle between the hero of Rashid al - DaTf in Learning English , and the

6 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe , Faust : A Tragedy , 2 vols . , tr . Bayard Taylor , Boston :
Fields , Osgood & Co . , 1871 , vol . 1 , 68 - 69 ( Pt . I , scene III : The Study ) . - " Geschrieben
steht : ' Im Anfang war das Wart ! ' / Hier stock ' ich schon ! Wer hilft mir weiter fort ? /
Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmoglich schatzen , / Ich muB es anders iibersetzen , /
Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin . / Geschrieben steht : Im Anfang war der
Sinn . / Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile , / Dafi deine Feder sich nicht iibereile ! / 1st er der
Sinn , der alles wirkt und schafft ? / Es sollte stehn : Im Anfang war die Kraftl / Doch ,
auch indem ich diese niederschreibe , / Schon warnt mich was , dafi ich dabei nicht
bleibe . / Mir hilft der Geist ! Auf einmal sell ' ich Rat / Und schreibe getrost : Im Anfang
war die Tat ! ( Goethe , Faust . Der Tragodie erster Teil [ 1808 ] , ed . Erich Trunz ,
Miinchen : Beck , 1999 , 44 , verse 1224 - 37 ) .

7 " Learning English " is the title , in Arabic , of the novel of Rashid al - Dalf published in
Beirut : Dar al - Nahar , 1998 .

8 Jabbur al - Duwayhi , 1'tidal al - kharif , Beirut : Dar al - Nahar , 1997 . The title might also
be rendered as " autumnal temperance ".
422 CHIBLI MALLAT

nameless hero of Jabbur al - Duwayhl in his first novel , and later , in the
woman - hero of non - violence , Duwayhl ' s Rayya of the river . 9
The future as woman had already been noted by the Poet of the Cedars ,
when he arrived in the heart of the North in 1927 :

"I mentioned already how Zghorta had received my appointment fa¬

vourably , but the city had also met me with a thundering revolt against
the decision to transfer its courts to Batrun . I could see ladies , young and
less young , filling the streets criticising Cayla ( Leon Cayla , the French
governor at the time ) . I had meanwhile noticed that all the demonstrators
were women , and that there were no men . It was explained to me that the
customs of Zghorta , and its use of street demonstration , required women
to be in the front .
The Zghorta revolt shook the North , and general public opinion was
largely supportive . . . . Women had invested the Souk and the long pas¬
sage to the Serail opposite my office . . . . I would meet them with joy and
smiles , sharing with them the wish to see the courts back in town . . . . I
spent in this way over fifty difficult days , in the midst of Zghorta ' s revolt
and her revolted ladies . " 10

As in the past , the pendulum is in permanent swing between the emotional

literary violence of Rashld al - Da cif and the peaceful abandon of Jabbur
Duwayhi . It oscillates between blood heroism and the glorification of vio¬
lent resistance , as in Da cIf s narration , and the antithetic world of social
and individual relaxation of Duwayhl ' s protagonists . In this way , literature
expresses its right to be heard , once again , as a privileged window on the
millennial struggle between violence and non - violence , through the torn
identities of the narrators of Learning English and Autumn 's Equinox . Here
one finds a conflictual identity which is enhanced by the ' real ' historical
context . For Ehden and Zghorta , and their twin city Tripoli , have estab¬
lished , with a brief exception at the beginning of the Lebanese wars , and a
dark dawn in June 1978 , a regional haven in a country torn by cruel and
interminable bloodshed .

Horizons of non - violence

Non - violence and the rule of law , non - violence and constitutional opposi¬
tion , non - violence and the future of the Middle East , all can serve as a
point of entry into the concept of non - violence as method , despite the

9 Jabbur Duwayhi , Rayya al -Nahr , Beirut : Dar al - Nahar , 1998 .

10 Mallat , Dlwan , ii , 42 - 43 .
 NON - VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
423

negative semantic charge which the word non - violence carries , in Arabic

and in the European languages : " non - violence " , " la - unf are generically

negative terms . After five or six millennia of written civilization , mankind

has failed , in the East and in the West alike , to conjure up a word which

conveys the message with a positive charge : as if man were destined by

nature to violence , and non - violence had to remain an exception .

The literary answer just sketched is met , regardless of their particular

rhythm and their own language , by philosophical echoes , as in Thomas

Hobbes ' Leviathan , - homo homini lupus or in " violence as the midwife

of history " for Karl Marx , or in the psychology register , in the death - pulse ,

Todestrieb , for Sigmund Freud . In politics , answers can be found with

tragic historical figures , from the Mahatma Gandhi to Kamal Joumblatt .

We shall not discuss here the contradictions and difficulties encoun¬

tered with Kamal Joumblatt ' s thought and practice of violence and non¬

violence , 11 except to note the parallel of Joumblatt 's dilemmas in the

thought of the Mahatma , both having fallen under the gun of the assassin ,

without violence in return , for refusing to accept the diktat of realpolitik .

In his chapter on brutal force ( darugolo in gujarati ) in his best known

book , Hind Swaraj ( 1909 ) , Gandhi wrote : " I hope you will not consider

that it is still physical force , though of a low order , when you would forci¬

bly prevent the child from rushing towards the fire if you could " . This

dilemma , which is expressed here in the barest example , was developed in

Gandhi ' s philosophy of non - violence - ahimsa - in a letter on Nazism

dated 1938 : " If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of and for

humanity , a war against Germany , to prevent the wanton persecution of a

whole race , would be completely justified . " But Gandhi qualified this jus¬

tification of war immediately : " But I do not believe in any war . A discus¬

sion of the pros and cons of such a war is therefore outside my horizon or

province . " 12

The dilemma is both theoretical and eminently practical . One wonders

if Gandhi ' s experience , or that of his spiritual predecessors and active dis¬

ciples , has really met with any success , especially when one considers the

immense armed tension between India and Pakistan fifty years after his

11 This was discussed in part in a presentation to the seminar of progressist thought

( muntada al -fifo• al - taqaddumi ) on 15 March 1999 . Extracts were published in the
daily al -Nahar , March 18 , 1999 . Joumblatt [ Kamal Junbulat ] was assassinated on
March 16 , 1977 , Gandhi on January 30 , 1948 .
12 M . K .Gandhi , Hind Swaraj , Cambridge edition with the annotation of Anthony Parel ,
1996 ,chapter xvi , 86 and note 170 . The letter of 1938 is cited following the Collected
Works of the Mahatma (New Delhi : Publications Division , Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting , 1958 ff .) , vol . 68 , 138 .
 CHIBLI MALLAT
424

death . The recurrent confrontation between the South Asia giants is a

telling sign of the ignored message of non - violence , while mankind is re¬
peatedly faced with a new wave of repression here , a genocide there , and
sundry armed conflicts over boundaries contested in blood .

Non - violence and law

The chasm separating widespread violence in the world and the ideal of
non - violence which mankind aspires to takes us to the reflection of this
dialectic in the legal world .
Law is a decisive mould , which was well understood in this context by
the English literary critic of the nineteenth century , Matthew Arnold :
" Force till Right is ready . " 13 Law is therefore necessary for a passage from

a naive approach of non - violence , which lacks the tools for its effective
application , and a practical and real future which rests on a correct under¬
standing of the dialectic between violence and non - violence in a perspec¬
tive which allows the latter to displace the former .
The aphorism of Matthew Arnold is not new . In a text produced in the
Middle East some forty centuries ago , Hammurabi introduced his Code by
the notion that law owes its justification to its role of protecting the weak
from the strong :

"At that time , Anum and Illil for the prosperity of the people called me by
name Hammu - rabi , the reverent God - fearing prince , to make justice to
appear in the land , to destroy the evil and the wicked so that the strong
might not oppress the weak ." 14

Law has therefore as a primary and fundamental task to protect the weak in
society . But law also is what serves as the way for those in power to le¬
gitimize the supremacy of their rule . This Janus - face of the law has ac¬
companied civilization ever since Hammurabi . The law ' s criterion is the
protection of the weak , but law is also laid aside by the powerful , - the
powerful as ruler - , even if the incumbent sat once amongst the weak . Law

13 Aphorism by Matthew Arnold in his Essays in Criticism ( 1865 ) , translating a phrase

from the Pensees of Joseph Joubert ( 1754 - 1824 ) : " La force en attendant le droit " .

14 This is the very first paragraph of the Prologue to the Code of Hammurabi ( ca . 1750
B .C .E .) , in the translation of G . R . Driver and John C . Miles , The Babylonian Laws ,
vol . 2 , Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1955 , 7 . - The French translation by Finet , Le
Code de Hammurapi , Paris : Le Cerf , 1973 , is even more expressive : " Alors , c ' est mon
nom a moi , Hammu - rapi , le prince pieux qui venere les dieux , pour proclamer le droit
dans le Pays , pour que le fort n ' opprime pas le faible , qu ' ont prononce Anum et Enlil
pour assurer le bonheur des gens " .
 NON - VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
425

is sought by the weak , but it is also a primary function of the strong , so

much so that the weak will never fail , once in power , to proclaim a new

law or use existing law for his own interests and for the protection of his

position as the new ruler .

With law as both a necessary recourse for the weak and as a privileged

tool for the strong , it might be useful to try to reconcile the contrast by a

jump to the famous reflection of Max Weber on the state as the " holder of

the monopoly of violence " . One cannot understand the modern state with¬

out this powerful idea . The state is the exclusive holder of violence be¬

cause the state holds the monopoly of the law . In the state is vested the

beginning of law and its end , as well as the beginning of violence and its

end . No one can challenge the state in this regard . Only the state can dic¬

tate the law , and the state is responsible for its protection and its applica¬

tion , using coercion , if need be , to force the respect by all of the law . This

is an exclusive and absolute mission , and no one can take the law in his or

her hands , since the state is master of legitimate violence . No person or

organism outside the state delegation can mete out violence , and this prin¬

ciple is at the heart of the rule of law , which becomes the equivalent of

non - violence insofar as the state controls any expression of violence and

regulates its use . For the state may resort to violence only in accordance

with legal canons established in detail . This predictibility of the rule of law

makes the state subject to law , an Etat de droit , Rechtstaat , dawlat al -

qaniin .

With taking another person 's life as the supreme degree in violence ,

the ultimate example of this principle is the executioner , who is protected ,

by law , in his very act of suppressing life . The executioner is the ultimate

symbol for the state as possessor of the monopoly over deadly violence ,

and he may exercise this exceptional prerogative only in the wake of a

long and complex juridical process , - arrest , indictment , trial , appeal , cass¬

ation , rejection of executive pardon , and then and only then the execu¬
tioner .

The state then monopolizes violence , but violence must remain an ex¬

ception . With this conclusion in mind , the discussion adumbrated above

can be formulated in the shape of two propositions :

( 1) Law is recourse for the weak and support for the strong .

(2) Law is within the domain of the state , because only the state

has the monopoly over violence .

That second proposition includes a number of exceptions which confirm it ,

for instance the readiness of the state to abandon its right over capital pun -
 CHIBLI MALLAT
426

ishment . This debate over capital punishment is not about to be closed , in

the Middle East or elsewhere , but we shall not develop the theme further
here .
There is another exception which is almost as important as the rule ,
even if it its application is rare within domestic law . This is the right to
legitimate defence , which criminal law universally accepts , and which ,
within the limits prescribed by law , allows the person concerned to resort
to violent means in order to defend herself against an imminent danger ,
including the killing of her aggressor as an ultimate recourse .
This second exception , which happens uncommonly in everyday life ,
has become important in the prospects of public international law . But any
appreciation of this exception qua rule must occur within the context of
another general principle of domestic criminal law , that of " non - assistance
a personne en danger " . This is not a universal principle , but we can find it
both in Lebanese legislation and in the formulation of the French penal
codes . In these codes , a person is criminally liable " if he finds himself in
the presence of a person in danger , has the possibility of saving that person
or helping her . . . without endangering his own life . . . and willingly abstains
from doing so . " 15 In Lebanon , the law punishes the offender with a fine
and a one - month prison term , in France the person accused of " non -
assistance a personne en danger " may be condemned to five years in jail .
This third proposition , which obtains from the two principles of do¬
mestic penal law , can be formulated as follows :

(3) The state monopoly over violence does not prevent an individ¬

ual from resorting to violence in the case of legitimate defence ,

while the state may punish those who omit to assist a person under
clear , imminent threat . 16

Despite the apparent complexity of this combination , this third proposal

lies at the heart of contemporary world conflicts . Criminal omission is a
leading title in the growing debate in the world over the need for the inter¬
national community to intervene in internal or international conflicts when
these conflicts create a situation of imminent threat for a human group , as

15 Art .567 of the Lebanese Penal Code 1942 . Article 223 - 6 of the Nouveau Code Penal
Frangais ( 1994 ) stipulates : " Sera puni des memes peines [ cinq ans d ' emprisonnement
et 500 000 F d ' amende ] quiconque s ' abstient volontairement de porter a une personne
en peril l ' assistance que , sans risque pour lui ou pour les tiers , il pouvait lui preter soit
par son action personnelle , soit en provoquant son secours . "
16 On omission crimes , see Frederic Desportes and Francis Le Gunehec , Le Nouveau
Droit Penal , Paris : Economica , 1994 , 322 .
 NON -VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 427

for the populations of Kosovo and Eastern Timor in recent memory . The
principle , now known as " the right to humanitarian intervention " , jars with
the preceding principle of non - intervention in the domestic affairs of a
sovereign country . The contradiction is important , even if the balance
seems to be increasingly tilting in favour of the principle of intervention .
Therein lies a crucial locus of a change within the realm of law and non¬
violence . While the theory remains uncertain , one increasingly witnesses
the establishment of exceptional rules which attach to the exercise of vio¬
lence by the individual citizen , - legitimate defence , " non - assistance a
personne en danger " and the projection of these principles on world
protagonists , including states , international organisations , and regional
systems like the European Union or NATO .
The balance between the principle of non - intervention in domestic af¬
fairs , and the duty to intervene - militarily if necessary - to assist a people
in clear and present danger , as in Kosovo , Timor and Rwanda , constitutes
the background for pressing studies in public international law , which are
all looking for the right criterion to find the correct balance .
Legal uncertainty in this regard should not come as a surprise , as the
matter concerns a ponderous and most elusive phenomenon in history ,
war .

On each reed which time has grown

Man has planted an iron head 17

Without getting into the difficult ramifications of an old topic , including

the definition of a just war , provocation , aggression , defence , or propor¬
tionality , it remains important to note the recent activation of a principle
which had been forgotten in the annals of international criminal law :
criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity . Since the establish¬
ment of international ad hoc criminal tribunals in former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda , and of the International Criminal Court at the Rome conference
in 1998 , this responsibility is no longer theoretical . Nor can one ignore the
revolutionary development in the establishment of universal jurisdiction by
a number of domestic courts since the decisions of the House of Lords in
the matter of Pinochet , and the application of international conventions and
domestic penal law principles against political figures who are accused of
torture and other serious crimes against humanity .

17 al - Mutanabbi : Kullama anbata al - zamanu qanatan / rakkaba al - mar 'u Ji - 'l - qanati
sinana .
428 CHIBLI MALLAT

This rapid overview of the shifting sands of non - violence and the rule
of law cannot pass over in silence an old debate , which is almost synony¬
mous with the rule of law since time immemorial , and which obtains from
a person ' s moral imperative . This is the fourth , evident proposal of

( 4 ) the equality of all before the law .

The problem was expressed with elegance by Ibn Abi al - Dam , a Shafi cI
jurist of the 7th/ 13th century : " At the origin of the problem is a question " ,
he wrote : " Is justice divisible ? In our school , it is not , the one who is just
in one dirham is just in a thousand dirhams . " 18
In domestic law , justice cannot be fragmented , and the rule of law is
synonymous with its universal application . The theory is straightforward ,
even if the many corollaries are intractable : what if the judge , who is re¬
sponsible for the application of the law , is biased or takes a purposefully
slow course for issuing his decision ? How about the law which is consid¬
ered " exceptional " , and " which is issued for one and only [ one ] time " ?
What about electoral equality between voters , and the equal consideration
of Aristotle in his academy and a shepherd guarding his flock , 19 or be¬
tween a candidate whose money speaks in megaphone and his competitor
whose voice does not carry far because of his limited means ?
Despite these qualifications , equality before the law is a well -
established proposal in domestic law . In contrast , fragmentation of justice
is the rule in international law , which is dominated by the reality of " deux
poids , deux mesures " : immediate application of Security Council resolu¬
tions in Indonesia , their systematic ignorance for over twenty years in
South Lebanon , deployment of troops in Kosovo , icy silence in Tibet , al¬
lied bombing of Iraq , abstention in the Chechen republic . . .
The divisibility of international justice is an additional complication to
the issue of the use of violence in internal and international conflicts , while
scholars are pursuing criteria and principles ahead of which history seems
bent to run . But history cannot wait , and the poet expressed it best :

18 " Wa - asl hadha al - khilaf: anna al - ' adala hal tataba "ad am la ? Al-mashhur ji - 'l-
madhhab annaha la tataba "ad, wa - inna man kana 'adlan Ji dirham fa - huwa 'adl fl
alf " , Ibn Abi al - Dam ( d . 642 A .H ./ 1245 C .E .) , Kitab Adab al - qada ' , ed . Muhammad
' Abd al - Qadir ' Ata 1, Beirut : Dar al - Kutub al - ' Ilmiyyah , 1987 , 96 .

19 al - Mutanabbl again : "yamutu ra 'i al - da 'ni ji jahlihi / mltata jallnusa fi tibbihi " ( " le
gardien de moutons mort dans son ignorance , meme mort que Gallien dans son art me¬
dical " . See the edition of Ibrahim al - Yaziji , Sharh Diwdn al -Mutanabbl , Beirut : Dar
Sadir , 1964 , i , 232 .
 NON -VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 429

Vers toi o humiliee

vie
J ' avance maintenant au pas des certitudes
Enfin convaincu
Que la verite
Ne precede pas toujours Taction . 20

Epilogue

Beyond the philosophical , literary , and political frameworks , four legal

conclusions emerge , which operate also as paradoxes . In our book , the
delicate balance compelled by each must be made to fall , after taking into
account their multiple components , on the side of an eternal moral impera¬
tive , which coincides with the slow human path to non - violence .
The first conclusion is the need to weigh on the balance so that law ap¬
pears as the refuge of the weakest person in society , even if law is also the
ultimate criterion of power . The correct application of the law becomes
tributary of the deep question of law ' s role in the protection of the weak¬
est , and in the ways law might offer a civilized , codified mode of operation
which protects the weak against all forms of violence . A practical , direct
translation of this exercise is the opening of the gate of the constitutional
judge to the citizen .
The second conclusion in a state dominated by the rule of law , a state
which is also endowed with the monopoly of violence , is the need to use
physical constraints only as last recourse , that is in the wake of clearly
established and due legal process , the first characteristic of which is non¬
violence . One enters here the world of classical positive law through its
various expressions , discussed in a previous book in relation to the region :
amongst these expressions rank high the peaceful and regular alternation at
the head of the government , free and recurrent electoral representation , and
a flourishing civil society and the protection of the rights of the person by
an efficient judiciary . By perfecting these levels , the rule of law gets en¬
riched , and violence gets proportionally reduced into the farthest possible
corners . 21
The third conclusion is delineated in the search , at the heart of domes¬
tic criminal law , for what can be refined and exported to stem the wave of
violence which has grown on a planetary scale . We have examined this

20 This is a poem from Rene Char , mentioned here from memory : " Towards you , you
humiliated life , I presently walk with certainty , finally convinced that truth does not
always precede action . "
21 Chibli Mallat , The Middle East into the 21st Century , London : Garnet , 1996 , 173 - 215 .
 CHIBLI MALLAT
430

thesis under the title of legitimate defence and the " devoir d 'assistance a
personne en danger " , as an obligation of solidarity in domestic penal law
which must be translated and deepened in international law by way of the
right of humanitarian intervention , or even as duty of armed intervention if
need be - another paradox to save a population under immediate threat
of annihilation .
The fourth conclusion is governed by the delicate relationship between
traditional criminal law and its current international manifestations ,
through persisting attempts across the world , albeit tentative in the ex¬
treme , to institutionalize a new juridical mode which corrects wayward¬
ness , that is violence , which prevails in international relations and unequal
societies . It is therefore a matter to impose gradually but relentlessly the
rule of law the world over , by means of efficient judicial mechanisms , so
that one legal criterion rules all people and every individual .
Meanwhile , and until the world finds a stable course on the basis of a
coherent and civilized rule of law within existing states and around them ,
one can only note that the commitment to non - violence is at an early stage ,
and that violence will be even needed sometimes , in accordance with pre¬
cise legal criteria which we tried to adumbrate in this brief study . The long
march towards a world civilization where justice is no longer fragmentary ,
and which may finally join the prophet ' s wishes and the words of the poet ,
is just starting .
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS
À LA CULTURE DE PAIX :
LE CAS DU LIBAN

Antoine Messarra

Dans quel contexte se situe aujourd ' hui la contribution des religions à la
culture de paix et l ' éducation à la tolérance , tel que ce terme est défini dans
la Déclaration de l ' UNESCO lors de sa 28e session du 16 novembre 1995 ?
Cette déclaration souligne :

" La tolérance est le respect , l ' acceptation et l ' appréciation de la richesse

et de la diversité des cultures de notre monde , de nos modes d ' expression
et de nos manières d ' exprimer notre qualité d ' êtres humains . Elle est
encouragée par la connaissance , l ' ouverture d ' esprit , la communication et
la liberté de pensée , de conscience et de croyance . La tolérance est
l ' harmonie dans la différence . Elle n ' est pas seulement une obligation
d ' ordre éthique ; elle est également une nécessité politique et juridique . La
tolérance est une vertu qui rend la paix possible et contribue à substituer
une culture de la paix à la culture de la guerre .
La tolérance n ' est ni concession , ni condescendance , ni complaisance .
La tolérance est , avant tout , la reconnaissance des droits universels de la

personne humaine et des libertés fondamentales d ' autrui . En aucun cas la

tolérance ne saurait être invoquée pour justifier des atteintes à ces valeurs
fondamentales . La tolérance doit être pratiquée par les individus , les
groupes et les États ."

Cinq raisons expliquent le phénomène du religieux sans frontières et la

crise de la laïcité dans le monde :

1 . Globalisation et identité : La globalisation , tout en renforçant les exi¬

gences de solidarité , développe les identités individuelles et collective .
2 . La politification du sacré : La compétition démocratique a son revers , à

savoir l ' exploitation de la religion dans la compétition politique et la

multiplicité des groupes habilités à représenter la religion , ce qui me¬
nace l ' effort de sécularisation .
3 . L 'ethnostratégie : Les guerres entre États sont révolues pour de multi

pies raisons . Un nouveau système de guerre se propage consistant dans

432 ANTOINE MESSARRA

exploitation des clivages religieux , ethniques et culturels , surtout dans

l'

les petites nations et dans des enjeux régionaux et internationaux . En

outre les conflits religieux ou exploités comme tels débordent généra¬
lement le cadre d ' un seul pays et favorisent des ingérences communau¬
taires externes .
4 . La soif de repères '. Dans un monde globalisé et de plus en plus orienté

vers le bien - être de consommation , l ' homme d ' aujourd ' hui est avide de
repères qu ' il recherche le plus souvent dans la religion et même dans
des expressions déviantes de la foi .
5 . Les conflits de pouvoir . Les conflits religieux ou exploités comme tels

dans la mobilisation politique sont le plus souvent liés à des conflits de

pouvoir ou de partage du pouvoir , surtout dans les sociétés multicom -
munautaires .

Il découle de ces raisons que les problèmes religieux , quand ils entrent
dans la sphère du politique , ou quand on les y fait entrer artificiellement ,
sont composés . L ' éducation à la convivialité doit aussi être composée .
Le Liban est un exemple du caractère composé des conflits religieux ,
ou sous couvert de la religion ou qui cherchent une légitimité religieuse , un
exemple des nouvelles guerres qui exploitent les clivages religieux et
culturo - religieux dans des enjeux régionaux et internationaux . Un système
sophistiqué de guerres - au pluriel - au Liban n ' a pas cependant réussi à
miner un patrimoine séculaire de tolérance , ou du moins de conflit et de
consensus , même en multipliant les démarcations et en faisant perturber le
conflit . A chaque arrêt des combats , la principale ligne de démarcation qui
séparait les deux Beyrouth se transformait en un nouveau centre ville , avec
des va - et - vient de la population et une affluence telle qu ' on croirait qu ' il
s ' agit de manifestation .

Le Liban est au cœur de trois grandes controverses internationales , tou¬

tes liées directement ou indirectement à des problèmes religieux : la
controverse sur l ' efficience des systèmes de partage du pouvoir (power
sharing ) dans des sociétés multicommunautaires , la controverse sur l ' effi¬
cience du dialogue entre les religions , et la controverse sur la place des pe¬
tites nations dans le système international . C ' est dire que le Liban est un
condensé , un mini - laboratoire des problèmes de la région et du monde à
l ' approche du 3e millénaire . On ne dit pas cela par fierté . Cette situation a

engendré , et engendre , des souffrances . Elle a surtout engendré une intelli¬

gence libanaise de tolérance , que j ' appelle une intelligence plurielle .
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX 433

1 . Typologie des conflits religieux

Comment sauvegarder , protéger et prémunir une expérience originale de

coexistence islamo - chrétienne , et même à l ' intérieur des communautés

chrétiennes et à l ' intérieur des communautés musulmanes ? Une typologie

des conflits " religieux " permet de déterminer les perspectives de régulation

et d ' action éducative et culturelle . Les conflits " religieux " se classifient en

cinq catégories :

1. Théologie : Des divergences et conflits existent entre théologiens ,

exégètes , croyants et incroyants , avec tous les risques de dogma¬

tisme , de prosélytisme et d ' exclusion . Une certaine théologie , telle

que pensée par les exégètes ou perçue par la population , est source

de dogmatisme , de fanatisme et d ' exclusion , parce que ses tenants se

considèrent comme les détenteurs exclusifs de la vérité . Les conflits

théologiques quand ils se limitent aux théologiens sont théologiques .

Le danger provient cependant des approches souvent exclusivement

théologiques de théologiens qui braquent leur analyse sur le pro¬

blème ontologique , en ignorant les effets éventuels et concrets de

l ' analyse dans le débat public parmi des humains mûs par d ' autres

considérations qu ' ontologiques . Les conflits entre théologiens ne

sont donc pas que théologiques , ils sont exploités et manipulés dans

des enjeux de pouvoir et dans la compétition politique et , dans tous

les cas , ils créent et alimentent un esprit de tolérance ou de fana¬

tisme .

2 . Psychologie : Comment les religions sont - elles comprises , vécues et

perçues par les individus et les groupes ? Des stéréotypes , des préju¬

gés et des perceptions altérées de l ' autre sont générateurs de fana¬

tisme . En outre , la foi au contact des réalités quotidiennes risque de

perdre sa pureté et sa finalité et de se transformer dans des sociétés

plurales en une appartenance sociologique , avec une grande difficulté

de départager entre mentalité confessionnelle et mentalité religieuse

au sens de la foi . En outre , l ' ignorance de sa propre religion et de

celle de l ' autre engendre des stéréotypes ou des attitudes de rejet ou

de dénigrement .

3 . Pouvoir . Quand les problèmes religieux se greffent sur des conflits de

pouvoir , ils deviennent générateurs de conflits . Les atteintes aux liber¬

tés religieuses et au droit de participation au pouvoir et aux ressources

collectives provoquent une insécurité psychologique et des réactions de

défense . Quand une communauté religieuse se sont menacée dans son

entité ou dans sa participation au pouvoir et aux ressources collectives ,

ses élites exploitent la religion dans la mobilisation politique et alors

434 ANTOINE MESSARRA

une mentalité confessionnelle se développe , même parmi les non -

croyants et souvent en contradiction avec les exigences profondes de la
foi .
4 . Relations internationales : De petites guerres à longue durée et à tiroirs

se substituent aux guerres traditionnelles entre États , surtout dans les

sociétés multicommunautaires , avec souvent une exploitation des cliva¬
ges confessionnels .
5 . Société civile : L ' exercice par des instances religieuses d ' une autorité de

nature politique nourrit un conflit déclaré ou latent entre la hiérarchie

religieuse et la société civile . On peut en donner un exemple dans le
débat au Liban sur l ' adoption d ' un statut personnel civil facultatif où le
clivage , bien que non ouvertement déclaré , oppose la société civile à
des autorités religieuses .

Comment l' autre est - il perçu ? Il y a trois types de perception de l' autre :

1 . L 'autre - menace politique : Le citoyen une autre religion ou commu¬

d '

nauté religieuse peut être perçu comme une menace , source de mal , de
danger , ou simplement de craintes pour l ' identité personnelle et collec¬
tive et la participation au pouvoir . Cette perception dépend de
l ' évolution de l ' État de droit et de la citoyenneté . La solution ici impli¬

que des garanties constitutionnelles et une profonde culture politique

consensuelle , enracinée dans l ' expérience historique , les mentalités et
les comportements .
2 . L ' autre - rival : Là , l ' autre ne menace pas l ' entité personnelle , mais est

considéré comme un concurrent , un rival dans les affaires et dans les

problèmes de la vie personnelle ou professionnelle . Les solutions ici ré¬
sident dans l ' apprentissage à la négociation , la régulation des conflits et
la médiation .
3 . L ' autre - empathie ou antipathie : Cette forme de la connaissance

d ' autrui , spécialement du moi social , comporte toute la gamme des rela¬

tions d ' amour , d ' affection , d ' amitié ou , au contraire , de répulsion et de

rejet pour des considérations interpersonnelles . La solution ici réside
dans l ' éducation au sens de la relation humaine , sans entrer dans la
complexité des enjeux du pouvoir ou des affaires .

L 'anatomie et le diagnostic des conflits , dont le fondement réel ou dé¬

claré est la religion , permettent de situer la polémologie religieuse dans
trois perspectives : le dogmatisme , l ' exploitation de la religion dans la
compétition politique ou politification , et la fluidité des frontières de
plus en plus diffuses entre politique et religion . On parle de plus en plus
de religions sans frontières . Les questions de territoire sont au cœur de
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX 435

la plupart des conflits interpersonnels et collectifs . Prendre conscience

des principes de base de la territorialité permet d ' éviter ces conflits 1.

Ce sont là autant d ' effets pervers des religions institutionnalisées .

Toute institution est un mal nécessaire . Nécessaire pour la continuité , la

gestion et la transmission . Mais aussi un mal , parce que l ' esprit qui a

animé la fondation risque de s ' altérer dans des enjeux de pouvoir ou

d ' intérêt .

L ' athéisme , l ' incroyance ou la religion molle sont - ils plus favorables à

une culture de paix ? L ' expérience historique montre que l ' athéisme mili¬

tant , surtout quand il est transposé dans la vie collective , co mm e ce fut le

cas dans les idéologies du fascisme , du nazisme et du communisme , et

même dans la Révolution française de 1789 , a justifié tous les crimes

contre l ' humanité . Quand on tue Dieu , ou tue aussi l ' homme 2.

2 . Les composantes d ' une éducation à la paix civile et à la

tolérance par le canal des religions

Dans un monde globalisé , tout se structure sur le modèle de l ' école ,

avec des acquisitions progressives de savoir , des apprentissages et des

adaptations permanentes , au point que l ' éducation n ' est plus exclusive¬

ment scolaire . La plupart des perceptions et des images sociales de la

religion passent en dehors de l ' éducation religieuse dispensée dans les

écoles ou les paroisses . Les divers agents de socialisation , école , fa¬

mille , organisations sociales , groupes de pairs et médias , véhiculent des

valeurs religieuses ou pseudo - religieuses qui influent sur les comporte¬

ments .

1 Erica Guilane -Nachez , Donald Akutagawa , Terry Whitman , Mélons - nous de nos affai -
res \ ( Nos territoires et ceux des autres dans la vie personnelle et professionnelle ) , Pa¬
ris : Inter Editions / Masson , 1997 .

2 Henri de Lubac , Le drame de l 'humanisme athée , Paris , 1944 , et Spes , coll . 10 - 18 , no .

103 - 104 .
 ANTOINE MESSARRA
436

Tableau 1 :
Principaux symptômes d ' intolérance et comportements positifs
correspondants

Symptôme d ' intolérance Comportements positifs de tolérance

1. Langage : Dénigrement et 1. Langue neutre et sans préjugé

déni du droit à la parole

2. Stéréotypes 2 . Ordre public égalitaire

3. Moquerie 3. Relations sociales fondées sur le respect

4 . Préjugé 4 . Processus politique démocratique

5. Bouc émissaire 5. Relations majorité - minorité dans un es -

prit de participation
6. Discrimination 6. Manifestations communautaires

partagées
7. Ostracisme 7. Respect des traditions culturelles

particulières
8. Brimades 8. Pratiques religieuses libres

9. Profanation et dégradation 9. Coopération entre groupes

10 . Expulsion
11 . Exclusion

12 . Ségrégation

13 . Répression
Source : Adaption d ' après le document : La tolérance , porte ouverte sur la paix
( Manuel éducatif à l ' usage des communautés et des écoles ) ,
Unesco , ED - 94 / WS / 8 , 33 pp ., p . 9 .

Dans le cadre du programme " La génération de la relève " pour l ' année 1999

une grille d ' activités scolaires et extra - scolaires a été établie en vue d ' une

éducation à la tolérance et à l ' altérité 3 . En outre dans le cadre du programme

" Observatoire de la paix civile permanente au Liban ", entrepris par la Fonda¬
tion libanaise pour la paix civile permanente , une grille des indicateurs de la
convivialité a été établie . Les indicateurs de la convivialité dans une société

multicommunautaire sont quantitatifs et qualitatifs et permettent d ' analyser le

niveau de progression ou de régression de la convivialité , ou le passage d ' un

cessez - le - feu pacifique à une paix civile durable .

Nous classons ces indicateurs en trois catégories : la culture constitu¬

tionnelle , la mémoire collective , et les défenses de la société civile .

3 Louise - Marie Chidiac

, Abdo Kahi , Antoine Messarra ( dir .) , La génération de la relève
(Une éducation nouvelle pour la jeunesse libanaise de notre temps ) , Beyrouth : Bureau
pédagogique des Saints - Coeurs , Librairie Orientale , 4 vols , parus , 1990 - 1996 , et vol . 5
à paraître .
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX 437

Tableau 2 :

Grille des indicateurs de convivialité ( ou du pacte de coexistence )

dans une société multicommunautaire

A . La culture constitutionnelle

1. Perception de la nature du régime constitutionnel libanais , dans l ' enseigne¬

ment universitaire comme dans la culture politique populaire : degré d ' alié¬

nation et d ' authenticité dans cette perception .

2 . Le consensus sur les principes de base constitutionnels .

3. La perception de la parité dans la Constitution et le Pacte national de Taëf

( dépassement du recensement communautaire , rejet du triomphalisme entre

communautés . . .) .

4 . Degré de perception par les citoyens de la garantie de l ' équilibre et de l ' ab¬

sence d ' hégémonie ou de frustration .

Les pactes

5. La perception du concept de pacte dans l ' histoire générale du Liban et

l ' histoire constitutionnelle comparée .

6. Le respect des pactes : stratégique ou tactique ?

7 . Application du contenu des pactes .

8. L ' approche positive ou péjorative du compromis ( règlement négocié moins

coûteux que la violence ).

9 . Le respect des pactes au niveau des sous - systèmes sociaux : partis et forces

politiques , syndicats et organisations professionnelles , associations non gou¬

vernementales , équilibre volontaire aux élections municipales ...

10 . Perception de l ' égalité et de la non - discrimination devant les emplois publics .

Les élites politiques

11 . Attitude des élites politiques face aux problèmes collectifs : respect du consen¬

sus de base ou confessionnalisation et provocation , le langage politique con¬

sensuel ...

12 . L ' observation des normes juridiques et administratives dans les désignations

et promotions administratives et dans la répartition des charges et des ressour¬

ces collectives .
438 ANTOINE MESSARRA

B . La mémoire collective

13 . La réprobation de la nature civile de la guerre et du recours à la violence .

14 . La participation commune à la commémoration des martyrs de la guerre de
toutes les communautés .
15 . Souci des historiens et leur aptitude à ne pas occulter les moments de consensus
et ses avantages , en termes de coûts et profits , sans nuire à l ' éthique de la re¬
cherche historique .
16 . Existence de symboles nationaux partagés ( martyrs du 6 Mai , indépendance
de 1943 , massacre de Cana . . . ) .
17 . Des monuments historiques symbolisant les souffrances communes .
18 . La participation aux fêtes nationales .
19 . La visite des divers vestiges et lieux touristiques (phéniciens , arabes . . .) .

C . Les défenses de la société civile

La politique étrangère et les rapports avec l ' extérieur en général

20 . Objectifs communs en politique étrangère ( avec possibilités de divergences

éventuelles quant aux moyens ) .
21 . Limite des ingérences extérieures dans les affaires internes .
22 . Limite de la main - d ' œuvre étrangère .
23 . Limite de l ' accès à la nationalité libanaise .
24 . Limite de l ' accès des étrangers à la propriété foncière au Liban .
25 . Perception partagée de la menace extérieure .
26 . La solidarité en période de crise .

L 'armée

27 . Souci des élites politiques sur le moral de l ' armée .

28 . Souci des moyens d ' information sur le moral de l ' armée .
29 . La relation entre l ' armée et la société .
30 . Le profit qu ' en tirent les jeunes engagés dans le service du Drapeau .

État de droit

31 . Degré d ' efficience de la règle de droit pour la protection des droits dans
l ' administration publique , et dans les rapports entre les citoyens et le pouvoir .

32 . L ' indépendance de la magistrature en tant de garantie pour la protection des

droits .
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX 439

L 'espace public

33 . Une relation de communication et de service public dans les rapports entre

l ' administration et les citoyens .

34 . L ' échange de services sociaux tant en période de paix que de conflit .

35 . La participation commune à la signature de manifestes .

36 . La défense par des citoyens de diverses communautés d ' autres concitoyens de

diverses communautés .

37 . L ' unité de comportement face à des problèmes qui ne sont pas directement de

nature religieuse on confessionnelle .

38 . La participation à des manifestations communes , surtout parmi les jeunes .

39 . Les réalisations du gouvernement en vue de l ' extension de l ' espace public

( administration , municipalités . . .) .

40 . L ' existence de centres de l ' espace public exclus de la confrontation confes¬

sionnelle : Banque centrale , Magistrature , Université Libanaise ...

Intérêts socio - économiques

41 . L ' équilibre socio - économique et culturel entre les régions et la faiblesse des

clivages cumulatifs région / niveau socio - économique / niveau culturel / com¬

munauté .

42 . La perception de l ' égalité et la faiblesse du sentiment de privation relative .

43 . Le niveau des appartenances croisées ( overlapping membership ) , c ' est - à - dire

l ' adhésion de l ' individu à des groupements diversifiés .

Culture politique

44 . La croyance dans la spécificité du Liban et de son message , arabe et interna¬

tional , en tant qu ' expérience normative d ' unité dans la diversité à l ' aube du 3e
millénaire .

45 . L ' humour politique et son acceptation dans les divers milieux .

46 . L ' acceptation de l ' opinion divergente sans culpabilisation .

47 . L ' estime et l ' image positive de l ' autre .

48 . L ' attachement aux libertés publiques en tant que dénominateur commun entre
Libanais .

Religions

49 . Les valeurs spirituelles communes .

50 . Les rencontres et dialogues entre les religions .

440 ANTOINE MESSARRA

51 . Le débat sur les problèmes concernant la religion de l ' autre ( par exemple dé¬
bat sur l ' Exhortation apostolique du Pape dans diverses régions ou invitation
par une institution religieuse de responsables d ' autres instances ) .
52 . La participation sociale aux fêtes religieuses de l ' autre .
53 . Le comportement dans les écoles face aux fêtes religieuses chrétiennes et mu¬
sulmanes .
54 . L ' enseignement religieux dans les différentes écoles .
55 . Le respect mutuel entre les dignitaires religieux des diverses communau¬
tés .
56 . La référence commune à des versets de l ' Évangile et du Coran .
57 . La connaissance authentique et sans stéréotypes de la religion de l ' autre .
58 . Les décisions des conseils communautaires .
59 . L ' existence d ' une pensée religieuse chrétienne inculturée dans la réalité liba¬
naise et plus généralement arabe .
60 . L ' existence d ' une pensée religieuse musulmane inculturée dans la réalité

libanaise et plus généralement arabe .

61 . Le respect des libertés religieuses .
62 . L ' absence de domination d ' organisations communautaires sur les libertés

individuelles et collectives ( contrôle social , interdictions , liberté de critique

religieuse sans porter atteinte à l ' ordre public . . . ) .
63 . Le dogmatisme ou l ' ouverture dans la théologie et l ' exégèse religieuse .
64 . La distinction dans la culture politique et les comportements entre le commu¬
nautaire ( socio - culturel ) et la foi .

Mode de vie et échelle des valeurs

65 . Le mode de vie ( habillement , habitat , art culinaire , coutumes . . .) .

66 . La répartition géographique et communautaire des crimes et délits .
67 . L ' attachement des Libanais à la culture arabe .
68 . L ' ouverture aux cultures mondiales .
69 . L ' unité des chansons , arts , lettres , théâtre . . .

Les écoles et les universités

70 . La mixité communautaire dans les écoles et les universités en fonction de la

composition communautaire de la région .
71 . Les universités en tant qu ' espace de dialogue , d ' expression et de diversités
des opinions et attitudes .
72 . L ' extension d ' écoles chrétiennes et musulmanes dans des régions d ' une autre
composition communautaire .
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX
441

73 . Le nombre des élèves d ' une autre religion dans des écoles chrétiennes et mu¬
sulmanes .

74 . Le contenu valoriel des manuels scolaires , notamment des manuels

d ' éducation civique ( altérité , tolérance . . .) ainsi que le contenu valoriel des re¬
cherches scolaires et universitaires .

75 . Le degré d ' autonomie des organisations estudiantines par rapport aux partis

fondés sur des lignes de clivage exclusivement communautaires ou dont la

composition est unicommunautaire .

76 . L ' autonomie de l ' intelligentsia par rapport aux partis fondés sur des lignes de

clivage exclusivement communautaires ou dont la composition est

unicommunautaire .

L 'habitat et le déplacement

77 . La mixité communautaire dans plusieurs quartiers de résidence .

78 . La sécurité psychologique dans le lieu d ' habitat dans différentes régions .

79 . Le degré de retour des Libanais à la mixité communautaire dans l ' habitat ( les

déplacés ).

80 . Les déplacements entre les régions .

Famille

81 . L ' image de la femme chez les différentes communautés .

82 . L ' échange de visite entre les Libanais de différentes régions .

83 . Le contenu valoriel dans l ' éducation familiale .

84 . La diversité dans l ' appellation des enfants .

85 . Les mariages mixtes et les facilités légales pour les mariages mixtes .

Information

86 . Les valeurs diffusées par les médias , surtout en ce qui concerne la tolérance et
la solidarité .

87 . L ' audimat multicommunautaire des divers médias .

3 . Projets et perspectives d ' action

Des projets et programmes sont en cours d ' exécution au Liban en vue de

l ' éducation à la tolérance . Outre les activités multiples qui favorisent les

rencontres et les échanges entre jeunes de différentes régions et commu¬

nautés , il s ' agit des projets et programmes suivants : " La génération de la

relève entrepris par le Bureau pédagogique des Saints - Cœurs ; " Citoyen
442 ANTOINE MESSARRA

pour demain " De la mémoire de guerre à la culture de paix ' et " Obser¬

vatoire de la paix civile au Liban " , entrepris par la Fondation libanaise

pour la paix civile permanente ; le programme du Mouvement des droits
humains ; et les nouveaux programmes scolaires d ' éducation civique élabo¬
rés par le Centre de recherche et de développement pédagogique de 1996 à
1998 et qui sont le couronnement de l ' action de la société civile libanaise
en faveur de la démocratie et des droits de l ' homme . 4
Les perspectives d ' action en vue de la contribution des religions à la
culture de paix sont les suivantes :

1 . Dédogmatiser les théologies et leur enseignement : Les religions insti¬

tutionnalisées ont fini par ériger des démarcations entre les hommes . La pro¬
gressivité et la relativité de la connaissance gagnent tout le savoir humain ,
même les sciences physiques . Il s ' agit de ramener les religions à la spirituali¬
té de la foi . Un musulman est peut - être plus " chrétien " qu ' un chrétien , et un
" chrétien " est peut - être plus musulman qu ' un " musulman " , tels que l ' un et

l ' autre sont classés religieusement ou qui se définissent comme tels . " Le

premier devoir du croyant " , disait Auguste Valensin , " est de rechercher ce
qu ' il y a en lui d ' incroyant . " Il faut puiser du livre de Roger Arnaldez , Trois

messagers pour un seul Dieu 5 toute une démarche , à la fois théologique et

pédagogique , pour une re - spiritualisation des grandes religions .
2 . Le concept de culture religieuse : Il ne faut certes pas mêler la reli¬

gion à tous les problèmes . Lorsqu ' on se réfère à un verset de l ' Évangile ou
du Coran dans un discours non religieux est - ce pour se justifier et donner
un caractère de sacralité à ce qu ' on dit , et donc se couvrir d ' une légitimité
divine , ou est - ce pour la défense de la vérité ?
La tradition rationaliste issue de l ' idéologie de la Révolution française
implique une neutralité pédagogique aseptique ou d ' ignorance mutuelle .
D ' autres expériences , celles de la République fédérale allemande , de la

Belgique et de la Suisse , ne craignent pas la confrontation . Face à des

questions neuves , la première approche se trouve dépourvue de moyens .
Aux notions de neutralité religieuse , d ' obligation de réserve et d ' enseigne¬
ment a - religieux , la réalité contemporaine exige plutôt une attitude d ' hon -

4 La génération de la relève [ note 3 ] ; Muwâtin al -ghad ( Citoyen pour demain ) ,

Beyrouth : Fondation libanaise pour la paix civile permanente , Librairie Orientale , 3
vols . , 1995 - 1998 ; Manâhij al - ta 'lim al - 'àm wa - ahdàfihà ( Les programmes
d ' enseignement général et leurs objectifs ) , Beyrouth : Centre de recherche et de déve¬
loppement pédagogique , 1997 , 832 p . ( Décret 10 . 227 du 8 mai 1997 ) . Sur
Y Observatoire de la paix civile permanente , cf . Fady Noun , L ' Orient - Le Jour , 3 no¬
vembre 1999 .
5 Roger Arnaldez , Trois messagers pour un seul Dieu , Paris : Albin Michel , 1983 .
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX 443

nêteté intellectuelle et de respect des croyances d ' autrui , et non de camou¬

flage de ses propres croyances afin de ne pas froisser la libre pensée
d ' autrui qui , à ce moment , devient , elle , intolérante .

Face à un pluralisme religieux sauvage en Occident comme en Orient

( sectes , intégrismes et intolérances ) , l ' école peut - elle se cantonner dans le

silence de l ' inculture religieuse ? On peut aborder le sujet du pluralisme re¬

ligieux quelque peu sauvage dans les sociétés contemporaines par son as¬
pect le plus extérieur : l ' inquiétude que les sectes font naître dans l ' opinion ,
la recrudescence des groupes politiques extrémistes , souvent terroristes , et
le développement de nouveaux mouvements religieux .
Au Liban , quand les dimensions religieuses ne sont pas négligées dans
l ' enseignement de l ' histoire pour un motif de neutralité en matière reli¬

gieuse , elles le sont pour des raisons qui vont dans le sens d ' une ignorance
délibérée : tout ce qui est " confessionnel " ne fait pas partie de l ' histoire !
Les jeunes libanais savent bien de quoi il s ' agit , parce qu ' ils l ' apprennent
sur le tas dans leur milieu , par les événements , par les moyens
d ' information ou à travers des versions idéologiques dans des manuels

d ' histoire , de littérature ou d ' enseignement religieux .

L ' adoption de critères sur le contenu religieux de l ' enseignement se

situe dans la perspective de la philosophie des articles 9 et 10 de la Consti¬

tution libanaise du 23 mai 1926 , c ' est - à - dire dans le sens d ' une réelle
pédagogie de convivialité . La philosophie de la Constitution et du Pacte
national libanais , comme celle du Pancasila en Indonésie , implique une
traduction didactique , à savoir une connaissance mutuelle des religions
dans le cadre des programmes d ' enseignement , notamment ceux d ' histoire ,
de littérature et d ' éducation civique . Or pour des raisons idéologiques sans
rapport avec la méthodologie historique , les manuels scolaires d ' histoire
répudient tout ce qui a rapport avec les communautés , leur origine , leurs
schismes , leur composition , leur évolution et leur interaction , et cela en
partant du présupposé que le fait est incompatible avec l ' unité nationale .
On relève dans les manuels sinon une stratégie d ' ignorance , du moins
des équivoques notamment sur la nature du fait multicommunautaire , sur
la spécificité du religieux , sur les conflits intra - communautaires et inter¬
communautaires , sur le problème clé du partage communautaire du pou¬
voir et sur la présentation respective - et respectueuse - des religions . La
stratégie de l ' ignorance va à un point tel que , dans presque tous les ma¬
nuels d ' enseignement de l ' histoire du Liban et même dans les manuels
d ' enseignement religieux tant chrétien que musulman , celui qui lit
l ' histoire du Liban à travers des manuels scolaires se dit qu ' il n ' y a pas de

communautés au Liban ou , s ' il y en a , c ' est à l ' occasion de conflits entre

des groupes appelés globalement et sans précision des " druzes " , des " ma -
444 ANTOINE MESSARRA

ronites " ,des " musulmans " . . . ! Dans un pays où il y a dix - huit communautés
reconnues , aucune allusion n ' est faite sur la différence entre chiites et sun¬
nites , sur le schisme qui sépare l ' église catholique de l ' orthodoxie , sur
l ' origine et les caractéristiques de l ' église maronite , sur les fondements de

la religion druze . . .
L ' exemple libanais sur le contenu religieux d ' une pédagogie inter¬

culturelle , avec les aspects négatifs ( laïcisme de la neutralité ou de

l ' ignorance , volonté de dépassement du confessionnalisme par le vide ,
comparatisme de supériorité et , plus généralement , une dichotomie entre
l ' appris et le vécu ) et les aspects positifs ( dont la résistance de la convivia¬

lité malgré 15 années de guerres multinationales ) , cet exemple montre

qu ' il n ' est pas nécessaire d ' orienter l ' enseignement dans une pédagogie
interculturelle . Il s ' agit le plus souvent d ' adopter la voie de la méthode his¬
torique et du réalisme politique et religieux et , bien sûr , de l ' honnêteté in¬
tellectuelle . Il n ' est pas nécessaire d ' " orienter " l ' enseignement de l ' histoire
et des religions au Liban pour constater que la stabilité et la souveraineté
sont synonymes de solidarité nationale et que la soif de liberté et de recon¬
naissance mutuelle est le ciment de l ' unité . De religieux et de politique , le
réalisme doit alors devenir pédagogique . Et il contient une forte dose
d ' idéal pour l ' avenir de l ' humanité .

Une attitude scientifique , et non plus rationaliste , implique que les reli¬
gions soient prises au sérieux par tous les pédagogues , croyants ou non . Il en
découle un rééquilibrage pédagogique , une réévaluation de comportements
culturels traditionnels jugés naguère " dépassés " et une reconnaissance plus
ou moins explicite d ' une inadéquation des méthodes . Les religions sont fac¬
teurs de discorde ou de guerre , mais aussi de paix , d ' évolution , de révolu¬
tion ou de contre - révolution . En tant que laïque , l ' école doit renoncer à la
neutralité aseptique et soutenir des valeurs de coexistence , opposées aux
valeurs d ' exclusion .
Le problème de la religion en éducation n ' est donc pas réductible à la
catéchèse et à l ' enseignement religieux . Il s ' agit d ' un problème de péda¬
gogie générale qu ' il faut aujourd ' hui poser dans la recherche pédagogique
contemporaine sans timidité et sans honte , et plus particulièrement dans les
sociétés multicommunautaires . Comment , à titre d ' exemple , peut - on
concevoir des programmes d ' éducation civique en faisant abstraction du
fait que les croyances religieuses influent sur les comportements sociaux ,
économiques et politiques de la population enseignée ? Cette approche ne
peut cependant être opérationnelle que si à un excès pédagogique a - reli¬
gieux ou anti - religieux on substitue , non pas un autre excès , mais la me¬
sure . La distinction , et non la séparation ou la rupture , entre les essences ,
condition d ' une réelle sécularisation ( notion préférable à celle de laïcité )
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX 445

suppose la connaissance et la reconnaissance de ces essences . Une barba¬

rie sécularisée contemporaine est peut - être le fruit d ' un rationalisme qui
manque de sagesse et de pragmatisme .
Quand l ' éducation ne s ' occupe pas du for intérieur , des organisations
para - religieuses , politiques ou , dans les sociétés multicommunautaires ,
confessionnelles appliquent et proposent leurs techniques . La multiplicité
des groupes habilités à représenter la religion dans l ' opinion menace
l ' effort de sécularisation .

La culture religieuse en tant que corpus nécessaire pour tout enseigne¬

ment contemporain et dans tous les types d ' école implique le respect des
valeurs religieuses , l ' exposé avec authenticité des religions dans les ma¬
nuels et la conformité à la Constitution et aux lois nationales du contenu de
l ' enseignement interculturel . Quand les religions s ' altèrent au contact de la

politique et quand la politique prend un habit religieux , la connaissance

des religions et la traduction didactique de cette connaissance favorisent
la sécularisation .
Le fait de coller des noms d ' auteurs à la fois chrétiens et musulmans
sur la couverture des manuels pour assurer une meilleure diffusion ne con¬
stitue pas un critère suffisant pour la consolidation de la solidarité et la ré¬
duction de la dichotomie entre l ' appris , souvent aliénant , et le vécu convi¬
vial . Ce vécu convivial est riche en faits puisés de l ' histoire et de la vie
quotidienne . On peut citer le livre de Halim Abdallah , Ce qui n ' a pas été
écrit sur la guerre du Liban 6 et les travaux publiés dans Citoyen pour de¬

main , dont le récit sur Khaled Kahhoul qui , en 1976 , a défendu ses cama¬
rades chrétiens devant un barrage de miliciens qui voulaient les prendre en
otage 7 . Il faudra relire la littérature vivante , libanaise et plus généralement
arabe , pour y puiser des récits , hic et nunc ( ici et maintenant ) , donc vécus
et concrets et qui , de ce fait , suscitent la conviction intime ou du moins un
questionnement pratique , exigeant prise le position , courage et sacrifice 8 .

6 Halîm ' Abdallah , Ma lam yuktab 'an al - harb jï Lubnân ( Ce qui n'a pas été écrit sur la
guerre au Liban ) , Beyrouth , 1980 .
7 Tony Georges ' Atallah , al-Jundï Khâlid Kahhùl ( Le soldat Khàlid Kahhùl ) , ap .
Antoine Messarra ( dir .) , Muwâtin al -ghad [ note 4 ] , vol . 2 , 263 - 84 .
8 Antoine Messarra , La religion dans une pédagogie interculturelle ( Essai comparé sur
le concept de laicité en éducation et son application aux sociétés multicommunau¬
taires ) , Frankfurt /M . : Deutsches Institut fur internationale padagogische Forschung ,
1988 ; Dossiers de culture religieuse , Rédaction René Berthier et M .H . Sigaut avec une
équipe de professeurs de collège du diocèse d ' Autun , Ed . Alcapré - Loché , 71000 Ma¬
çon , France ; Jean Vernette , Claire Mondelon ( dir .) , Dictionnaire des groupes religieux
aujourd 'hui , Paris : Presses Universitaires de France , " Politique aujourd ' hui " , et Ed .
Delta , Liban , 1995 ; Claude Sahel ( dir .) , La tolérance (Pour un humanisme hérétique ) ,
Paris : Autrement ( coll . " Morales " ; 5 ) , 1991 .
446 ANTOINE MESSARRA

3. La recherche universitaire sur des faits positifs : La recherche uni¬

versitaire , en versant dans les questions à la mode ou sensationnelles , n ' est
pas innocente . Quand des mémoires , des thèses et des livres sont publiés
sur un chef de milice , un groupuscule de fanatiques ou un mouvement
d ' intégristes , on contribue à amplifier ces courants et à leur donner une re¬

connaissance académique internationale , alors que des courants libéraux et

démocrates ou qui engagent , au sein de la société , une résistance civile en
faveur de la paix civile et de la concorde sont ignorés .
4 . Le discours religieux : Les sermons dans les églises et les mosquées

véhiculent des valeurs de tolérance ou d ' exclusion , et le plus souvent de

rigidité dogmatique ou au contraire de haute spiritualité .
5 . Les médias : Les moyens d ' information risquent d ' alimenter les

dissensions confessionnelles , simplement en multipliant l ' information ou

en l ' amplifiant ou , le plus souvent , dans la recherche du sensationnel ou
des événements saillants , alors que des faits moins visibles de résistance
civile pacifique , de solidarité et de concorde ne bénéficient pas d ' une
couverture médiatique . Dans une société multicommunautaire en particu¬
lier , la charte déontologique du journaliste devrait comporter des clauses
éthiques particulières .
6 . La société civile : En période de crise , les organisations non gou¬

vernementales maintiennent le lien entre la population et exercent une ré¬

sistance civile contre un système sophistiqué de guerre . La mémoire de
guerre peut conduire à une culture de paix . Les traumatismes , la souf¬
france , l ' angoisse , le manque peuvent non pas engendrer la haine , mais
au contraire l ' attachement à la paix . La fin de la guerre coïncide alors
avec l ' envie de coexister . Elle va de pair aussi avec le pardon , la tolé¬
rance , le besoin de justice . L ' aspiration à la paix va alors bien plus loin
que le besoin apparent de sécurité . L ' aspiration à la paix est plus pro¬
fonde . Elle se retrouve dans les propos de ceux qui ont traversé les
épreuves liées à la guerre . On la devine aussi dans les manifestations et
réalisations individuelles ou collectives qui , à des degrés divers , œuvrent
dans le même sens , celui de la réconciliation . La mémoire de guerre a fa¬
çonné le présent et va façonner de façon négative ou positive l ' avenir du
Liban .

Les peuples ont trois manières d ' appréhender leur mémoire et , en

conséquence , de transmettre l ' histoire des conflits aux nouvelles généra¬
tions par le canal de l ' éducation :

1 . La mémoire - culpabilisation : Se fondant sur un fait historique réel ou

amplifié , on s ' acharne à accuser l ' autre , exploitant l ' histoire pour ca -
 LA CONTRIBUTION DES RELIGIONS A LA CULTURE DE PAIX 447

moufler d ' autres injustices , s ' innocenter soi - même et poursuivre après

des décennies des coupables lointains et agonisants afin d ' alimenter

une mémoire qui continue à fouiner une haine originelle . L ' achar¬

nement culpabilisateur finit par se retourner contre le culpabilisant qui

séquestre et limite l ' autre , sans perspective de rédemption , dans un

moment historique considéré comme fondateur d ' une identité pure et

d ' une innocence absolue .

2 . La mémoire conflictuelle : Sous couvert de science historique , des his¬

toriens continuent la guerre après la fin des guerres . Ils se mettent sys¬

tématiquement à conjuguer le verbe tuer à tous les temps et tous les

modes , à rechercher la moindre gifle entre deux adversaires dans une

petite bourgade pour rappeler à tous ceux qui seraient tentés d ' oublier

que les identités en conflit sont irréductibles et fatales , que

l ' interculturel est une illusion et que le compromis est une compromis¬

sion . On connaît cette tendance chez des historiens yougoslaves , irlan¬

dais , libanais ...

3 . La mémoire solidaire : N ' y a - t - il pas une éthique historique qui dépasse

la scientificité réductrice de l ' histoire ? Pour passer de la mémoire de

guerre à une culture de paix , il faut une contrition nationale , grâce à

des historiens comptables qui fouillent et lisent l ' histoire sous l ' angle

du peuple qui subit , souffre , réagit et lutte , comme dans le film de Ziad

Doueri , West Beirut . Il ne s ' agit pas de remuer les plaies et les souve¬

nirs douloureux , mais d ' aborder les souffrances avec authenticité et

sous les angles suivants :

- la résistance civile de la population ,

- le maintien du moral du peuple malgré la situation de guerre ,

- la solidarité des gens face à la guerre ,

- Les engagements en faveur de la paix ,

- Le courage et l ' espoir malgré les conditions contraignantes .

Ces éléments sont des composantes d ' une culture de paix civile .

** *

La mémoire de guerre n ' est pas un fait propre au Liban . Parmi les cas ré¬

cents on peut citer l ' Afrique du Sud et l ' ex - Yougoslavie . Le gouvernement

sud - africain a aboli les lois d ' apartheid presque simultanément avec la fin

de la guerre du Liban . L ' abolition de ces lois discriminatoires a conduit à

la tenue d ' élections démocratiques et la venue au pouvoir en mai 1994 de

Nelson Mandela . Comment coexistent aujourd ' hui les ennemis d ' hier ? La
communauté blanche et la communauté noire ont leurs souvenirs . De vio¬

lences et de souffrances pour les Noirs , souvenirs de pouvoir , de domina -

 ANTOINE MESSARRA
448

tion et de crainte chez les Blancs . Nelson Mandela a été le premier à par¬
donner , F . W . de Klerk le premier à s ' incliner . Quant à la Bosnie -
Herzégovine , démantelée , elle n ' est plus que le reflet d ' elle - même . Dans
les régions où serbes , croates et musulmans se retrouvent les uns à côté des
autres , comment vit - on avec la mémoire de guerre ? A Sarajevo , où l ' on
croise l ' ennemi d ' hier , l ' ami d ' avant - guerre , y a- t - il aujourd ' hui un senti¬
ment plus fort que la haine , le désir de faire la paix ?
 BASIC ISSUES CONCERNING
THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN LEBANON
Sofia Saadeh

1 . Perpetuation of the religious sectarian system

When Lebanon gained independence from French tutelage in 1943 , a

golden opportunity presented itself to embark upon the establishment of a

modern state . Nonetheless , the then President of the Republic , Bishara al -

Khuri , and the Prime Minister , Riyad al - Sulh , decided to keep the status

quo among the sects , while giving predominance to the Maronite and

Sunni representation in the government . This came to be known as the

National Pact ( al - mithaq al - watanT ) that is a form of consociationalism

based on a balance between Muslims and Christians in accordance with the

size of each sect .1

Although the National Pact was a verbal agreement , it came to super¬

sede the written Constitution of Lebanon . The latter had emulated the

French Constitution and guaranteed an absolute equality between citizens ;

it stipulated the separation of Church and State , and stressed the concept of

a republic that derives its authority from the people . The verbal National

Pact that was supposed to be a temporary arrangement as clarified by arti¬

cle 95 of the Lebanese Constitution , ended by triumphing over the princi¬

ples of the modern state and the establishment of a republic . This verbal

agreement became part and parcel of the Constitution of the Second Re¬

public ( or Third Republic , according to Raymond Edde who counts the

First Republic to be the one under the French Mandate and that was

headed by his father ) . The new Constitution , better known as the Ta ' if

Agreement , explicitly defines governmental positions in relation to a strict

50 / 50 division between Muslims and Christians .

While the National Pact guaranteed the distribution of governmental

offices among the various religious sects on the political level , the personal

status laws were preserved to perpetuate this sectarian division within soci -

1 For a detailed study of the millet system see Sofia Saadeh , The Social Structure of
Lebanon : Democracy or Servitude ? Beirut : Dar al - Nahar , 1993 , ch . 2 .
450 SOFIA SAADEH

ety . The irony being that the sole raison d ' etre for the existence of a millet
system under Ottoman rule is the fact that it was a theocratic state and not a
republic or nation state ! Under Ottoman rule , the state was Sunni Muslim and
could not apply its sharfah to non - Muslims . Consequently , it allowed each
religious confession to have its own judicial autonomy . In theory , Lebanon is
not a religious state and consequently is in no need of a millet system ! How¬
ever , the mere fact that the governmental positions have to be divided equally
between Christians and Muslims make keeping the millet system imperative
in order to be able to establish the various religious communities that ought to
be represented on the political level . Furthermore , the millet system would
account for the number of the members of each sect and consequently its size
that has to be proportionate to its political representation . What I am driving at
here is that the preservation of the personal status laws are part and parcel of
the sectarian representation of the political system , and hence of the conso -
ciational system as a whole .
Each community in Lebanon today follows its own laws concerning birth ,
death , marriage , divorce , adoption and inheritance . 2 Moreover , an agreement
was reached between the Christian and the Muslim sects whereby no Chris¬
tian can inherit from a Muslim and vice - versa . For instance , if a Christian
woman is married to a Muslim and does not convert to Islam , she cannot
inherit from her deceased husband on the one hand , and on the other hand ,
cannot bequeath her inheritance to her own children ! In other words , the sects
have agreed to fight any attempt on the part of citizens to contract mixed mar¬
riages by exerting a heavy punishment on those who dare defy the caste con¬
figurations of the sects . It is only appropriate at this juncture to mention the
remark made by former minister Marwan Hamadah who said that he is a
Druze , his mother is Catholic , his wife a Sunni , and his brother - in - law a
Greek - Orthodox . Thus each member of the same family is subject to a
special law that concerns him alone and that is in contradiction to the spe¬
cial laws of the other members of the family .
The sects did not extricate powers from the state all at once , but pro¬
ceeded to follow the step - by - step method . First , the sects secured acknowl¬
edgment from the government as independent legal entities , thus acquiring
a legal status that gives them a wide range of leverage within the political
system . Furthermore , the Christian and Jewish institutions asked the gov¬
ernment to let them supervise the awqaf and any other charitable dona¬
tions . The law which was passed by the Parliament on April 2 , 1951 , also
gave the sects the right to supervise churches , synagogues , monasteries ,

2 Hani Faris , al -Niza 'at al - ta 'ifiyyah fi tarikh Lubnan al-hadith , Beirut : al - Ahliyyah
Press , 1980 , 157 .
 BASIC ISSUES CONCERNING THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN LEBANON 45 J

education , the writing and registration of testaments , and their respective

cemeteries . 3 The Sunni sect soon asked for the same privileges , and their
request was granted by the Parliament in 1956 , to be followed by the Shiite
sect . 4 Some time later , the religious authorities obtained the right for their
religious courts to stop defendants from leaving the country . 5
The various religious agencies holding both economic and legal power
became formidable political institutions : BkirkI is the focal point of the
Maronites , supported by the Maronite Council ; Dar al -Ifta ' is the reference
of the Sunnis . Al-Majlis al - Shfl al -A cla supervises the private affairs of the
Shiites . Majlis al -Millah ( still holding the Ottoman title ) supervises the
affairs of the Greek Orthodox , and Shaykh al - Aql oversees the interests of
the Druze . 6
Remnants of the Ottoman system and the prestigious position given to
the Sunnis are still in effect in the Lebanese Republic . The Sunni mufti
still gets his salary from the Lebanese government . Moreover , all judicial
decisions by the Sunnis are published in the " Official Newsletter " ( al -
Jarldah al-Rasmiyyah ) issued by the government , in exactly the same fash¬
ion as state laws .

Attempts at reform :
2 .

a unified civil code versus the various religious codes

In the course of Lebanese history , four major attempts were made to do
away with personal status laws . All four attempts failed .
In 1936 , the French authorities asked the various religious sects to
submit their legal codes so the government could keep a copy for refer¬
ence . No code was presented . Within the same year , the French High
Commissioner issued a law whereby Lebanese citizens wishing to move
out of a sect and join another could do so by requesting this change from

3 Isam Sulayman , " al - Ta 'ifah wa - 'l- harb " , lecture given at the Carlton Hotel under the
auspices of the Arab Sociological Society in Beirut , January 26 , 1992 , 3 - 5 .
4 Ghassan Salameh , Lebanon 's Injured Identities , Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
1988 , 16 ; Edmond Rabbath , La formation historique du Liban politique et constitu -
tionnel , Beirut : Librairie Orientale , 1973 , 117 .
5 Faris , al-Niza 'at al - ta 'ifiyyah [ fh . 2 ] , 159 ; Michel Ghurayyib , al - Ta 'ifiyyah wa - 'l-
iqta ' iyyah jiLubnan , Beirut : Samya Press , 1964 , 104 .
6 Rabbath , La formation historique du Liban [fh . 4 ] , 58 : " Chacune de ces collectivites
possede des chefs et assemblies , dont l ' esprit est domine par une volonte d ' exclusi -
visme communautaire , par des interets particuliers , le plus souvent contraires a l ' inte -
ret general , tout resonnant de l ' echo des masses , au grand prejudice de l ' Etat que tirail -
lent tant de forces centrifuges " .
452 SOFIA SAADEH

the civil status bureau established for this purpose . The law had to be an¬
nulled in 1939 because of its rejection by the Muslim culama 3 who threat¬
ened with civil unrest . 7
The second attempt was , like the first one , the result of a demand by
the Lebanese government , in 1951 and after independence , requesting the
submission of the various sectarian laws . Again , the sects refused to sub¬
mit their codes . At this point the lawyers decided to take action as they
were weary of the chaos engendered by the various codes . Moreover , the
government found itself in the difficult position of having to carry out the
verdicts of the religious courts by sending the police force after women
who refused to go back to their husbands , and to prevent certain persons
designated by the religious heads from leaving the country !
On January 12 , 1952 , the Lawyers ' Syndicate requested the abolition
of all personal status laws in favor of one civil code . It decided to have an
open strike and not attend judicial courts or tend to legal cases until the
religious laws are completely revoked . Their strike lasted for eight months ,
but came to naught , as both the Christian and Muslim religious heads
banded together to reject such a scheme . 8
Again in 1962 , deputy Raymond Edde , who was also head of the Na¬
tional Bloc , demanded the establishment of a compulsory civil law within
the Parliament , but he did not get the majority of votes which would have
allowed the abolition of the personal status laws .
In 1975 , and at the onset of the civil war , innocent civilians found them¬
selves being killed by marauding militias purely due to their religious affilia¬
tions . Consequently, a third attempt at abolishing the personal status laws
sprang this time from the middle class which was not weakened yet by the
civil war . This class represented all sects , and was more secular in outlook
than the other classes within society . It created a movement that demanded
the removal of one ' s religious confession from one ' s identity card .
The members of the movement went ahead and erased their religious de¬
nomination from their identity cards . When the time came to renew their
passports , the Lebanese authorities refused to issue new passports , claiming
that the scraping of the religious affiliation had nullified their identity cards .

7 Rabbath , Laformation historique du Liban [ fn . 4 ] , 95 : Arrete no . 60 L .R . article 11 :

" Quiconque a atteint sa majorite et jouit de son libre arbitre peut , avec effet civil , sor -
tir d ' une communaute a statut personnel reconnue ou y entrer , et obtenir la rectifica¬
tion des inscriptions le concernant au registre de l ' etat civil , en produisant au bureau
de l ' etat civil de sa residence , un acte contenant sa declaration de volonte et , le cas
echeant , un certificat d ' acquiescement de l ' autorite competente de la communaute ou
il entre " .

8 Faris , al-Niza 'at al - ta 'ifiyyah [ fn . 2 ] , 159 .

 BASIC ISSUES CONCERNING THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN LEBANON 453

The fourth and last attempt was made in 1996 by the President of the
Lebanese Republic , Elias Hrawi [ Ilyas al - Hirawi ] , who proposed a law that
would allow a Lebanese citizen to choose between contracting a religious
marriage or opting for a civil one . 9 In other words , the personal status laws
would not be abolished , but would , alongside a civil code , be available for
those not wishing to comply with religious laws and regulations . The reac¬
tion against such a proposal was as violent as that of 1939 , with demon¬
strations against optional civil marriage , and even threats of a return to a
civil war in the eventuality of the passing of such a legislation . 10 Both the
Shiite and Sunni Muslim religious heads categorically banned even the
possibility of choice , thus violating one of the most fundamental principles
of the Human Rights Charter which is the principle of civil liberties and
personal freedom . It also reflects a prevalent tendency in the Arab world of
the religious infringing on the private domain .
The resistance on the part of the Muslim religious leaders to any form of
civil marriage , even if only optional , is due to the fact that a Muslim woman ,
unlike a Muslim man , is not allowed to marry a non - Muslim . In the eventual¬
ity of her marrying a Christian , she would be punished as an adulteress . 11
Consequently , exchange between Christians and Muslims has been mainly in
one direction , with only Christian women marrying Muslim men , and very
rare exceptions of Muslim women marrying Christian men . 12
Furthermore , some religious leaders objected to the implementation of
an optional civil marriage not only because Muslim women are not al¬
lowed to marry outside their faith , but because they say that Muslim law is
sacred and has specific rules concerning matters such as inheritance where
the female has half the share of the male .
The Christian religious leaders also voiced disapproval . The strongest
voice being that of the Maronite Patriarch , Mar Nasrallah Butrus Sufayr ,
who went as far as to say that whoever contracts a civil marriage will be

9 For the complete text of the optional civil marriage as presented by the President of
the Lebanese Republic , Elias Hrawi , see al-Nahar , February 6 , 1998 , 6 .
10 Hafiz Jabir , " al - Mashru ' al - ashal II qanun ikhtiyari " , al-Nahar , March 13 , 1997 , 16 ;
Yusuf Kafrunl , " al - Qawanln al - madhhabiyyah " , al -Nahar , March 28 , 1997 , 19 ; See
also al -Nahar , March 1 , 1997 , 15 ; and Nahar al - Shabab , April 1 , 1997 , 30 - 32 .
11 Mustafa al - Juzu , " Tawhld qawanin al - ahwal al - shakhsiyyah wa - mushkilatuhu " , al-
Nahar , May 9 , 1998 .
12 Claude Levi - Strauss , The Savage Mind , London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson , 1966 , 124 :
" Each social group will tend to form a system no longer with other social groups , but
with particular differentiating properties regarded as hereditary , and these characteris¬
tics exclusive to each group will weaken the framework of their solidarity within soci¬
ety " .
454 SOFIA SAADEH

considered by the Church as having bastard children ! However , the Chris¬

tians at large did not adhere to such a viewpoint , especially since the idea
of civil marriage seems quite acceptable to the young and educated Chris¬
tians . Polls have shown that 55 . 1 % of Christian university students were
for civil marriage , while 45 . 2 % of Shiite university students were in favor ,
with the Sunnis running close behind at 44 . 9 % . A hopeful note for the
future of civil society in Lebanon is the fact that 80 . 4 % of the American
University in Beirut students from all religious denominations were in
favor of civil marriage . 13
This demonstrates unequivocally that the American University in Bei¬
rut is playing a very important role in integrating the various elements of
the Lebanese society , by facilitating the interaction of students of all faiths ,
and by showing tolerance and respect towards all individuals regardless of
creed . By contrast , the Arab University , which does not have a religiously
mixed student body , came out as the most conservative with only 17 . 8 %
accepting the idea of a civil marriage . 14 This is a clear indication that under
conditions of tolerance , openness towards others is possible , and that
Lebanese society can change and move out of the sectarian - consociational
arrangement . However , this hope is so far restricted to the young , educated
students at the American University in Beirut , in exactly the same pattern
predating the Lebanese civil war . 15
However , society at large has regressed from the early 1970s when in¬
termarriage was more prevalent as testified by the many couples that were
interviewed . 16 Today Lebanese society radically opposes civil marriage
with a mere 17 % in favor ! 17
At present , those who are mostly opposed to even an optional civil mar¬
riage are the Sunnis , both leaders and followers . 18 The Druze religious heads
seem to be divided concerning the issue of civil marriage , with Shaykh al-
cAql, Bahjat Ghaith , opposing it while the Druze judge Sulayman Ghanim

permitting it . For as he said : " It is foolish to change one ' s religion merely

13 This study was carried by International Information at the request of al - Nahar , Janu¬
ary 24 , 1997 , 8 - 9 .
14 al -Nahar , January 11 , 1997 , 5 .
15 For a comparative outlook with the prewar years , see Halim Barakat , Lebanon in
Strife , Austin : University of Texas Press , 1977 .
16 Nahar al - Shabab , January 4 , 1997 , 30 - 33 ; also al-Nahar , January 24 , 1997 , 8-9 .

17 al -Nahar , January 11 , 1997 , 5 .

18 See polls in al -Nahar , January 24 , 1997 , 9 .
 BASIC ISSUES CONCERNING THE PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN LEBANON 455

because one wants to get married " . According to him , the advantage of civil
marriage is that it preserves the religious belief of each partner . 19

3 . Drawbacks of the personal status laws

The preservation of the personal status laws within the Lebanese society as
an extension of the political setup of the consociational system has led to
the following consequences :
1. A duality of legal power between the state on one hand , and the vari¬
ous religious leaders on the other hand , allowing the latter to have a
say in the private affairs of the Lebanese citizens such as marriage , di¬
vorce , and inheritance , and also , into their public affairs such as
schooling , elections , entente , and the sharing of power within the state
among the various sects .
2 . This duality has hampered the law from playing an integrative role in
the establishment of the concept of citizenship regardless of religious
sect . The various and contradictory personal status laws have led and
are still leading to the fragmentation of society into different groups
being geared to different laws . 20
3 . The personal status laws stand in stark contradiction to the tenets of
democracy and the establishment of the principle of equality before the
law . The various personal status laws are a major obstacle facing the
equality of Lebanese citizens .
4 . In addition , the judiciary within the democratic system builds on
positive law , that is , rational law that necessitates the approval of the
people . In democracies , the people decide their fate , whereas in the
religious personal laws , the latter are forced upon the citizens as be¬
ing sacred without any attempts by the religious leaders to adapt the
laws to a changing society .
5 . Modern societies are established within geographical boundaries . Each
society or state has its own specific laws that do not apply to other so¬
cieties . This is why they are known as territorial laws , while the per¬
sonal status laws are really personal in the sense that they have no re¬
gard for national sovereignty and follow the person wherever he / she
goes , thus abolishing the concept of a citizen and the concept of a terri¬
torial state .

19 Nahar al - Shabab , March 1 , 1997 .

20 Rabbath , La formation historique du Liban [ fh . 4 ] , 136 : " Un sentiment national , reel et
affectif n ' acquiert sa plenitude que dans l ' egalite absolue des citoyens devant la loi " .
456 SOFIA SAADEH

6 . Moreover , since the personal status laws are religious in nature , they de¬
rive their authority in Lebanon from various religious institutions that are
foreign to this country . Hence , the personal status laws have led and are
still leading to the intervention and intrusion of foreign countries into the
affairs of the Lebanese citizens through religious institutions .
7 . Because of the diversified forms of laws that a citizen is subject to , and
due to the pull between the religious institutions on one hand , and the
state on the other , a citizen is likely to play one against the other in or¬
der to evade punishment , with the sad consequence of seeing the
Lebanese behaving as if they are above the law .
8 . With the power they hold over people and politics the religious leaders
have greatly weakened the state , leaving it unable to organize a coher¬
ent code of conduct or to legislate on the various personal status laws
despite the fact that it subscribes to the Charter of Human Rights that
refuses to acknowledge discrimination on the basis of creed !
9 . Furthermore , it should be noted that the presence of heterogeneity in a
society does not require heterogeneous laws that cannot be regulated
by the state . The latter case has weakened the state and also weakened
the feeling of a public welfare . Personal laws have led to the deepen¬
ing of particularistic visions of the different groups making up the
Lebanese society .
10 . My last point is one of the most important to be made because it di¬
rectly affects the destiny of half the population : women . The existence of
the personal status laws has guaranteed the preservation of the patriarchal
system within Lebanese society . It has also guaranteed the inferior posi¬
tion of women within this system . It has not given equal status to women
before the law , especially when contracting a religious marriage . 21 The
woman is neither an equal citizen to the man , nor does she have the free¬
dom of movement like a man . Due to the personal status laws , women are
not allowed to get a passport without the acquiescence of their husbands !
The only equal rights women have acquired in the Middle East have been
the result of replacing the religious personal status laws by civil laws .
Two cases in point are Turkey and Tunisia .
Consequently , the emancipation of women and the acquisition of their
rightful place within Lebanese society are intimately connected to the es¬
tablishment of a civil code . Without the latter , women will not be consid¬
ered as independent beings , nor will they be free to play an active role in
the public sphere and accede to positions of power .

21 Muna Yakan , " al -Islam wa -'l- tashri ' al - alarm " , paper presented at a conference on
" Gender arid Citizenship " held at the American University in Beirut , March 19 , 1997 .
 THE NATION - STATE AND RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
S ami Z ubaida

Religious boundaries and their politicization in Middle Eastern countries

persist , or rather , are renewed and reconstructed in relation to political

mutations and international balances of force . This essay traces forms of

inclusion of non - Muslims in the polities of the modern Middle East , with

emphasis on the significance of nation - state formation and proclamations

of territorial citizenship .

It is commonly stated that Muslim polities , notably in Ottoman times ,

were distinguished by tolerance and protection of non - Muslims , primarily

Christians and Jews . The ' Millet System ' is often invoked as an exemplifi¬

cation of this character . Does this follow from religious doctrine ? Cer¬

tainly , Islam considered itself to be the continuation of the monotheistic

Abrahamic mission started by Judaism and Christianity , and Muhammad

saw himself as the last messenger in a line of prophethood from Adam to

Jesus . As such Islam recognized the validity of the older religions , but

considered their adherents in error for not accepting the latest divine

message . Nevertheless , the Qurian , while reproaching , and in places de¬

nouncing those adherents , enjoins their recognition and protection as ahl

al - kitab , the people of the Book , as is well known , but as outsiders to the

ummah of Islam , paying the jizyah poll tax as the price of protection .

While these injunctions were an important factor in policies and senti¬

ments towards non - Muslims , there was a wide range of variation in time

and place in the actual treatment of these communities and their status ,

ranging from thriving communities participating in all walks of life at the

peak of Abbasid power , and again in certain periods of Islamic Spain and

the Ottoman lands , to intense persecution and violence at many points ,

usually at times of turmoil and instability . All these responses , favorable

and unfavorable , could be spoken in religious language . Islam and its

scriptures , like all world religions , are ' multivocal ' : many different and

even contradictory messages can be spoken in its language .

To come back to Ottoman lands on the eve of modernity : Christian and

Jewish communities , as is well known , were self - governing corporate units

under the authority ( highly authoritarian ) of their spiritual heads , backed

458 SAMIZUBAIDA

by the government and responsible to it for collecting taxes and enforcing

discipline . Protected non - Muslims , however , were relegated to an inferior
status , disqualified from holding state office , subjected to additional taxa¬
tion , forbidden from worshipping in public , with a legal prohibition on the
construction of new churches and synagogues , or the extension of existing
ones , and , at times , required to wear special costumes and distinguishing
marks . 1
This formal picture does not encompass the complexities of socio¬
economic life and their considerable variations over time and in different
places . In his study of 18th - century Aleppo , Abraham Marcus traces the
close proximity between members of the different communities in the
crowded urban spaces , in relations of neighborhood , guilds and employ¬
ment , transactions , partnership and friendship . These served to reinforce
the web of urban solidarity and interdependence . These social networks
were an important part of protection and security for non - Muslims . 2
These conditions of security and order , however , did not always pre¬
vail . The depredations of rulers , factional conflicts , wars and economic
crises , all showed non - Muslim communities to be especially vulnerable
targets for extortion and violence . Rulers were forever dreaming up new
ways to extract revenues , and non - Muslims presented easier targets . In
1775 the Pasha of Aleppo imposed further restrictions on dhimml dress ,
leading to great consternation , then bargaining over the price for withdraw¬
ing the edict . 3 A particularly inventive ruse was instigated by the Mamluke
e mir s of Cairo in the late eighteenth century : all Christians and Jews

named after Biblical figures , such as Abraham , David or Joseph ( prophets

to Muslims ) were ordered to change their names . The order was then re¬
scinded on the payment of a negotiated sum . 4
Non - Muslim communities also constituted targets for popular anger
and discontent in times of turmoil and crises , such as the massacres of
Christians in Damascus and other Syrian cities in 1860 , 5 and the attacks on
local Christians and Jews in the resistance to the Napoleonic invasion of

1 Abraham Marcus , The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity : Aleppo in the Eighteenth
Century , New York : Columbia University Press , 1989 , 40 - 41 .
2 Ibid . , 39 - 48 .
3 Ibid ., 41 - 42 .
4 ; Abd al - Rahman al - Jabarti , Tarikh 'aja 'ib al - athar jl al - tarajim wa - 'l-akhbar , vol . 1,
Beirut : Dar al - JIl , n . d . , 639 .
5 Peter M . Holt , Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516- 1922 , London : Longmans , 1966 ,
241 .
 THE NATION - STATE AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY 459

Egypt .6These are times when the normal web of urban life is disrupted by
war , strife and economic dislocation . In addition , the increasing identifica¬
tion of non - Muslims with European interests and powers , and the protec¬
tion extended to them by the European powers , increased hostilities and
resentments , especially when economic depredations were seen as result¬
ing from European commerce . European connections , including education
and employment , were sources of strength and prosperity for many sectors
of the non - Muslim communities , but at the same time adding to the hostil¬
ity of many of their neighbors , and vulnerability in times of trouble .
Outside the cities , where the arm of government did not always reach ,
non - Muslims assured their security either by the force of arms , or by enter¬
ing into relations of fealty and dependence with powerful local chiefs and
tribes . The Assyrians (Nestorians ) of Hakkari in south - eastern Anatolia
were armed mountain tribes who co - existed with their Muslim Kurdish
neighbors , establishing alliances and factions . World War I and the devel¬
opment of nation - states ended the conditions for such de - centralized
autonomies . 7 Other Christians of the Kurdish mountains were either de¬
pendent peasants of powerful chieftains or negotiated protection from local
magnates . These processes , rather than some religious dictates , were the
bases for protection and security of non - Muslims .

Non - Muslims and the incipient modern polities

The reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century attempted to

modernize the military , legal and fiscal structures of state and society , with
some vague model of a modern nation - state behind the thinking . One re¬
forming edict ( khatt - i humayun of 1856 ) decreed equality before the law of
all subjects of the Sultan regardless of religion . This is clearly at variance
with Islamic legal teaching and with tradition and practice and aroused
much protest and resentment . Of course , for most non - Muslim subjects
this edict had little effect , but it was important for urban commercial and
intellectual elites , allowing greater access to public life and institutions . It
certainly did not end the ' Millet system ' , aspects of which continued into
the post - Ottoman states . The edict was only one ( minor ) factor , however ,
among the many which transformed the millets and Ottoman societies in
general .

6 Gabriel Baer , " Popular Revolt in Ottoman Cairo " , Der Islam 54 ( 1977 ) 2 , 213 - 42 .

1 Sami Zubaida , " Contested Nations : Iraq and the Assyrians " , Nations and Nationalism
6 ( 2000 ) 3 , 363 - 82 .
460 SAMI ZUBAIDA

European influences brought about changes and conflicts in the mil¬

lets , especially the Christians . The Catholic conversions , which gathered
force in the seventeenth century , brought about splits in the old millets and
the establishment of new ones under French protection . But it was the
emergence of new elites based on education and commerce which threat¬
ened religious and traditional authorities . The participation of Christian
intellectuals in the Arab cultural renaissance in the nineteenth century is
well known , 8 and this continued to the foundation of Arab states and the
formulation of the doctrines of Arab or regional nationalisms . This Arab
and nationalist stance was not generally shared by all members of these
communities : traditional authority defended itself, and many of the edu¬
cated elites were orientated to new communal identifications . Let me pre¬
sent a typology of attitudes , one that is still pertinent in the present :
( 1) Traditional 'millet ' attitude : a view of the community as a separate
unit which should keep its integrity and corporate identity . Politically , it
aims to defend and promote the interests and security of the community by
negotiations and transactions with government and other centers of power .
The success of its members in commerce or other fields of endeavor is
seen as a strength to the community . European protection and influence ,
especially colonial rule , are welcomed , but European education and styles
of life , in so far as they subvert authority and piety , are treated with suspi¬
cion . These attitudes are typically held by those assuming religious author¬
ity and leadership .
(2) Secession ', the view of the millet as a separate nation which should
seek territorial secession and political independence . The model for this
idea was Greek independence , followed by other Balkan nations . Arme¬
nian nationalists followed this aspiration with the well known tragic con¬
sequences . Assyrians (Nestorians ) followed similar lines , first in Anatolia ,
then in Iraq , resulting in the Assyrian massacre by the Iraqi army in 1933 .
(3) Citizenship attitude : The idea of common citizenship of members
of a nation regardless of religious background . It takes seriously the slogan
of : " Religion belongs to God , but the nation to all its members " . It is moti¬
vated by a desire to get out of the millet ghetto and the dictates of religious
authority , and to participate in public life and politics . This is the attitude
of educated elites who enter public life as functionaries , artists , journalists
or politicians , as well as that of some businessmen who strive for a state of
law and free enterprise unhampered by old restrictions and prejudices .

Albert Hourani , Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798 - 1939 , Cambridge : Cam¬
bridge University Press , 1983 , 95 - 102 .
 THE NATION - STATE AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
461

(4) European identification : many of the educated elites , proficient in

European languages and culture , share some ' orientalist ' attitudes to their

countries , perceived as inevitably backwards and fractious , held back by

the essentially anti - modern forces of Islam and tradition . As such they see

themselves as part of European culture ( which shares their religion and

outlook ) . As such they are civilizing influences in their own countries , but

if conditions should get tough , then they can migrate to Europe or Amer¬

ica , their true spiritual homes . For the Jews of this disposition , Israel pre¬
sented a clear alternative .

With this typology in mind , let us look at the evolution of non - Muslim
communities under the new nation - states .

Religious 'minorities ' in the nation - state

During the periods of European colonial rule , direct or indirect , in many

Middle Eastern countries ( British occupation , then dominance in Egypt ,

Mandates in Iraq and Syria ) the prevailing sentiment of most non - Muslims

( and many of the Muslim bourgeoisie ) was favorable to European rule .

They had a sense of security of life and property and the rule of law , all

favorable to trade and commerce . Some degree of freedom of communica¬

tion and expression also assured a limited scope for participation in public

life . This situation was in marked contrast to the chaotic and repressive

regimes which prevailed in the closing decades of Ottoman rule and the

depredations of World War I . At the same time , many non - Muslim intel¬

lectuals and professionals were prominently involved in the nationalist

struggles and welcomed independence .

The independent states proclaimed equal citizenship regardless of re¬

ligion or ethnicity . The colonial powers and the League of Nations were

particularly sensitive and watchful with regard to the religious ' minorities ',

and Western press and public opinion ever receptive to stories of discrimi¬

nation or persecution of Christians or Jews . 9 The independence movement

in Egypt , led by Sa cd Zaghlul , then the Wafd party he founded , was ever

proclaiming the partnership between Muslims and Copts , with the slogan

al - din li - llah wa - ' l - watan li - l -jamF ( religion [ is directed ] to God , and the

homeland to all [ its children ] ) . Only Lebanon emerged from colonial Man¬

date with a constitution recognizing communal boundaries and making

explicit provisions for power - sharing between them . Turkey , Egypt , Syria ,

9 This public and press concern was well demonstrated in the debates on the fate of
Assyrians in newly independent Iraq in the early 1930 ' s ; see R . S . Stafford , The Trag¬
edy of the Assyrians , London : Unwin , 1935 .
462 SAMI ZUBAIDA

Iraq and Iran , followed by the Maghreb countries , proclaimed universal

and equal citizenship .
This universalism , however , was qualified by rules and practices which
continued aspects of the Ottoman millet arrangements . Non - Muslim com¬
munities , for instance , were designated as separate electoral constituencies
for parliamentary representation in Iraq and Iran . In practically all succes¬
sor states ( not Turkey ) , personal status law was entrusted to religious au¬
thorities ruling in accordance with their own doctrines . Muslim personal
status codes were derived from the sharTah , and in some instances entrusted
to specialist sharfah courts , while Christian and Jewish communities consti¬
tuted their own religious courts , part of a wider corporate organization of the
religious community . In most countries , Islam was proclaimed as the religion
of the state with a requirement that the head of state should be Muslim . More
Islamic elements were added in an ad hoc manner to the constitution follow¬
ing political exigencies , notably by Anwar al - Sadat in Egypt in 1971 , then in
1980 , when he wrote into the Constitution that the sharfah is the principal
source of all legislation in Egypt .
It is widely perceived , quite correctly , that universal citizenship is a
fiction , and that non - Muslims continued to have distinctive political and
social statuses in practice . In any case , for the most part ' citizenship ' in the
legal and political senses is an elusive concept in most Middle Eastern
states where the rule of law is tenuous , and administrative practice capri¬
cious . This was particularly clear with regard to Jewish communities ,
which , at the inception of Israel and the successive wars it entailed , were
subject to varying levels of persecution , by authorities and populace ,
throughout the region , culminating in mass migrations to Israel and else¬
where . Apart from small pockets here and there , ancient Jewish communi¬
ties in Iraq , Morocco , Yemen and elsewhere have been displaced . The
situation with regard to Christians has varied over time and place .
Egypt is the country where Muslim - Coptic partnership in the nation
has been the ideological cornerstone of the modern state . Even the sugges¬
tion that Copts are a ' minority ' is greeted with howls of indignation from
both sides . Copts see themselves , and are seen by liberal nationalists , as
the original inhabitants of the country , maintaining a cultural and almost
mystical continuity with the Pharaonic past . By the same token they arouse
the antipathy of communalist and some religious Muslims . Political and
communal leaders have on many occasions resorted to these sentiments as
a political maneuver to acquire cheap legitimacy . The prominence of Cop¬
tic personalities in the Constitutional movement and the Wafd party in the
first half of the twentieth century made communalist agitation or innuendo
a resort for their opponents , including at one point King Fu ' ad in the
 THE NATION - STATE AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY 453

1920 ' s , playing the Islamic card in a bid for the then recently vacant Ca¬

liphate against Wafd dominated parliament . His son , Faruq , renewed the

maneuvering for the Caliphate and against the constitutional Wafd , at his

accession in 1937 . On that occasion the Palace , with the aid of the rector of

al - Azhar , orchestrated a campaign against Copts as the agents of the Con¬

stitutionalist rejection of the Caliphate , and as such enemies of Islam . 10

More recently , Islamist sentiments and actions have been directed against

the Copts . While respectable leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Is¬

lamic intellectuals continue to proclaim the partnership nationalist slogans ,

many of their more radical followers and ordinary Muslims have followed

different notions of communal separation and subordination . Radical Is¬

lamic groups continue to wage campaigns of violence , pillage and assassi¬

nation against Copts in Upper Egypt . Partly as a result of these insecurities

and partly the readiness of all Egyptians to seek opportunities elsewhere ,

Copts have been migrating in large numbers to North America , Australia

and Europe . This is a tendency notable in all Middle Eastern Christian

communities .

Patterns of non - Muslim inclusion in modern nation - states

The particular history of population composition and movement in each

state have determined the mode of inclusion and exclusion of non -

Muslims . We may discern two distinct patterns :

I . Egypt / Iraq / Lebanon / Syria \ Christians and Jews were native , largely

Arabic speaking communities , sharing in the basic cultural patterns of the

country , following class and region ( e . g . , rural - urban difference ) . Intellec¬

tuals and notables from these communities participated in the public life of

the country , including nationalist / liberationist politics and the independ¬

ence struggles . In modern states and societies , non - Muslims became

largely integrated into the economic life and institutions . For the reasons

enumerated above , however , their differences from Muslims continued to

be marked . At the elite level we find many kinds of subtle discriminations

in education and public employment . Intermarriage between communities ,

no longer rare among the educated , is almost always on the condition of

conversion to Islam of the non - Muslim partner , especially if he is the man .

At the popular level , communities of different religions may coexist as

good neighbors for generations , but face communalist hostilities arising

from political or social changes altering the conditions of coexistence and

10 Elie Kedourie , The Chatham House Version and other Middle - Eastern Studies , Hano¬
ver and London : Brandeis University Press , 1984 , 199 - 203 .
 SAMIZUBAIDA
464

harmony . Jewish communities suffered in this way at the inception of Is¬

rael , as we have seen . Copts in Upper Egypt and elsewhere are subject to
communalist hostility since the rise of the Islamist current , and politicians
are not above playing on these sentiments when it suits them . In Iraq ,
many rich and educated Christians have benefited , on balance , from the
Ba cth regime , but their poorer co - religionists , especially in the North of the
country , have suffered persecution and violence .
II. Turkey and the Maghreb : where non - Muslims were mostly of dif¬
ferent ethnicity and language .
In Turkey , the Christians were predominantly Greek and Armenian
( the most prominent communities in Istanbul , as well as in many regions ) ,

as well as Assyrian , Syriac , and Arab . Jews were for the most part Sephar -
dim , who were Ladino speakers until recent times when they switched to
Levantine French . Many , especially the urban communities , also spoke
Turkish , and in the case of some of their elites , identified themselves as
Ottomans . The modern Turkish Republic , however , emerged from a war of
independence which pitched nationalists under Mustafa Kemal in a war
against the Greeks , leading to the exchange of populations between Greece
and Turkey . Armenian nationalism and separatist aspirations had already
resulted in the famous massacres and the depletion of their numbers . The
Republic , though secular by constitution , emerged in practice as a Muslim
country : Sunni Islam ( of the Hanafi doctrine ) became the implicit criterion
of ' true ' Turkish citizenship . This did not only exclude Christians and
Jews ( mostly nominally Turkish ) but also the Alevis of the South - East ,
with their esoteric religion and suspect allegiance . The Donme community ,
Jews converted to Islam in the eighteenth century after a failed messianic
movement , remained distinct . Though sectors of this community became
ardent Kemalists and Turkish patriots , the community continued to be
viewed with suspicion , subject to attacks and provocation by nationalists
and Islamists . Paradoxically , Sunni Kurds could integrate into Turkish
citizenship much more easily than Turkish non - Muslims or Alevis . Middle
class Sunni Kurdish families who settled in the main cities integrated
through inter - marriage and a bourgeois life style . Religion , in this respect ,
continued to be the most important ' communal marker ' , more so than eth¬
nicity .
The countries of the Maghreb included indigenous Jewish communi¬
ties , originally Arabic speaking and sharing local cultural patterns . Under
colonial rule , many Jews , especially of the elite classes , increasingly iden¬
tified with the French in language , life style and politics . This process went
furthest in Algeria , where the colonial rulers offered full enfranchisement
to the Jews as French nationals . The modern nationalist movements for
 THE NATION - STATE AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY 465

independence in these countries sported much greater Islamic identifica¬

tion and slogans than those of the Mashriq , which , as we saw , included
many Christian elements . The creation of Israel gave rise to popular hostil¬
ity to the local Jews , which culminated in the migration of the bulk of their
communities . Islamic identity became implicitly an integral part of na¬
tional and Arab identification .

Communalism , nationalism and the non - Muslims

Religious ' communalism ' was , and remains , an important force of solidar¬
ity and allegiance in many parts of the world . It is not necessarily based on
religious belief or practice , but on communal identification with a religion .
Religion acts , in this instance as an ' ethnic marker ' . Northern Ireland pre¬
sents us with the most prominent example in modern Europe , in which
communal solidarity and conflict are based on Catholic /Protestant bounda¬
ries , but one in which most members of each community are not relig¬
iously observant . This kind of communalist organization and sentiment
were , and in many cases remain , the most important form of allegiance and
solidarity in our region . Modern nationalism interacted with these com¬
munalist sentiments . An important component of nationalist support , espe¬
cially at the popular level , was an extension of the communalist principle .
European colonial powers were seen as Christians ( and later Israel , as
Jews ) , an extension of a universal Christendom that included local Chris¬
tian communities . The European favor and protection for local Christians
reinforced this view . European support for Greek , then other Balkan na¬
tionalist and separatist movements from the Ottoman Empire added further
evidence . Ahmad Lutfi al - Sayyid , an Egyptian liberal nationalist in the
early decades of this century , describes this sentiment very well :

" ...whenever Egyptians see European statesmen acting in concert against

Egyptian interests or sentiments and agreeing on measures which post¬
pone the day of their independence , they tend to contrast their fortune
with that of the Balkan domains of the Ottoman Empire . They conclude
that these dependencies have won their independence through European
intervention , because their inhabitants are Christians . The impression is
thereby gained that there is a certain type of unity among the Christians in
Europe , and consequently they wish for unity among Muslims capable of
protecting their interests . As Christian unity saved the Balkan countries
from the yoke of the Muslim Ottomans , Muslim unity would save Egyp -
466 SAMI ZUBAIDA

tians from European hegemony . This , we believe , is a naive idea engen¬

dered by a faulty understanding of European politics in the East . " 11

World politics is then seen as a confrontation between Islam and Christen¬

dom , a view that is forcefully revived by some modern Islamists ( and more
covertly by many nationalists ) , referring to the West as ' Crusaders ' , evok¬
ing the historical assault on the lands of Islam , as well as drawing on
Qur ' anic verses against the Jews and the classics of European anti - Semitic
literature to indict all Jews as enemies bent on world domination .
While most nationalist leaders and politicians in every country have
proclaimed universal citizenship and equality of members of all religions
before the law and in public life , the sentiments underlying nationalism in
practice are imbued with these notions of religious solidarity and conflict .
The discrimination against non - Muslims in many public spheres , notably
in education and employment , as well as conflicts and hostilities at the
popular level , are partly fed by these ideas and sentiments . Nationalism in
its classic forms , whether liberal or totalitarian , had pitched its ideological
thrust against communalism of all sorts : tribal , religious or ethnic , in favor
of a homogeneous and united nation . Yet , in practice , communalist senti¬
ments , especially the religious ones feed into its very fabric .

Middle Eastern regimes and the revival of communalism

Politicians and ruling cliques are ever ready to exploit and further com¬
munalist sentiments . Indeed , the regimes of Iraq and Syria feature ruling
cliques transparently based on kinship , tribal and religious affiliations ,
while Yemen has an openly tribal based political system . Important ele¬
ments of communal affiliations feature in all the countries in the region .
These are not persistent features of Arab or Muslim societies , but elements
which are actively fostered , often recreated , by the regimes and their po¬
litical process . Tribalism , for instance , is openly revived by the govern¬
ment in Iraq in the 1990 ' s , placing tribal members , even in the cities , under
the authority and legal jurisdiction of their chiefs . 12 Regime clientelism is a
common process reinforcing communalism throughout the region . The
government and its agencies and personnel enter into deals with different
sectors of the population , granting them protection and material benefits in

11 Quoted by Jamal M . Ahmed , The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism , Lon¬

don : Oxford University Press , 1960 , 61 .
12 Amatzia Baram , " Neo - Tribalism in Iraq : Saddam Hussein ' s Tribal Policies 1991 - 96 " ,
International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 ( 1997 ) , 1 - 31 .
 THE NATION - STATE AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY 457

return for loyalty , cooperation , and , where appropriate , business partner¬

ship . Or , leading members of such groups assume positions within the

ruling party , which is no more than a vehicle of loyalty to the regime , and

use these positions to favor their affiliates . This encourages sectarian and

communalist networks forming around patrons and notables of their com¬

munity , doing deals with functionaries and parties on behalf of their mem¬

bers . Tribes , families , ethnic and regional groups , as well as religious

communities , can benefit from such arrangements . These practices tend to

reinforce or reconstitute primary solidarities and antipathies between

groups at the expense of common citizenship and ideological affiliations .

The suppression or active hindrance of all other forms of social or political

autonomies in most countries in the region enhances these particularistic

solidarity . Conflicts and antipathies , then , are conceived in terms of par¬

ticularistic membership , notably those of religious community .

Conclusion

The countries of the Middle East today are caught between the currents of

globalization and insertion into a ' cosmopolitan ' world system on the one

hand , and virulent forces of ethnic and religious politics . Authoritarian

regimes are steering a course between these forces with a mixture of re¬

pression and compromise . In Egypt , for instance , ruthless ( and seemingly

successful ) repression of radical and oppositional Islamists is combined

with government acquiescence and encouragement of the Islamization and

moralization of public life by conservative religious currents . This combi¬

nation of circumstances presents conflicting constraints and incentives for

the non - Muslim groups , now predominantly Christian . Islamization entails

constraints and threats , and the global openings , incentives for migration

and participation in free societies with economic opportunities ( the Euro¬

pean identification model above ) . Intellectual and public personalities and

elites amongst the Copts , however , are close to the ' citizenship ' option

above . They are engaged in political and cultural endeavors , alongside

like - minded Muslims , to reiterate common citizenship and transcend

communal boundaries . In even more authoritarian regimes , such as Iraq ,

the mere acknowledgement of the problem is taboo : Christian families and

groups seek individual and particular paths to security and advancement . A

political stance on the issue would have grave consequences . For consider¬

able sectors of Christians , migration has been an attractive option . The

proportion of Christians in the total Near East population in 1914 was

26 % . Today it has fallen to below 10 % . According to the demographer

Youssef Courbage , this drop is largely due to differential fertility , the

 SAMI ZUBAIDA
468

Christians , on average , having reduced their family size at an earlier point

in time than their Muslim compatriots . 13 However , Courbage argues , inter¬
national migrations affected Christian populations more than Muslims , and
continues to do so . North America , Australia and parts of Africa and of
Western Europe , now feature large Middle Eastern Christian communities .
Could the Christians go the same way as the Jews and leave a largely relig¬
iously homogenous population in the region ( excepting Lebanon ) ? It
seems unlikely given pressures and commitments for many of the Chris¬
tians . But the trend is there .

13 Youssef Courbage , " Christianity and Islam : Demography in the Middle East " , ISIM
Newsletter , no . 3 / 1999 , 26 .
 Part V

INTERRELIGIOUS DlALOGUE :
Pros and Cons
 THE SYNOD FOR LEBANON AND THE
APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION : A PROGRAMMED
EXERCISE IN SELF - CRITICISM AND
RECONCILIATION
John Donohue s .j .

In May 1997 , Pope John Paul II made a 32 - hour visit to Lebanon and pre¬

sented the post - Synodal Apostolic Exhortation for Lebanon . In the arcane

language of the Roman church , the Apostolic Exhortation signified the

directives which the Pope selected from the reflections of the laity , priests ,

Bishops , Patriarchs , and Cardinals assembled in Rome for the Synod on

Lebanon in November / December 1995 .1

This particular Synod ( November 26 - December 14 , 1995 ) represents

a major attempt at reconciliation - a moral intervention backed only by the

charisma of the Papal office and the personality of Pope John Paul II , an

intervention with no power of material sanction whatever . For this reason

it stands apart and may provoke some useful reflections on the types of

intervention possible to achieve reconciliation .

First , the general background : General Michel Aoun ( cAwn ) , appointed

by outgoing President Amin Gemayel , in September 1988 , to run the gov¬

ernment until elections could be arranged , launched two wars . The first

was the war of liberation from Syria begun in March 1989 and terminated

by an Arab sponsored cease - fire in September of the same year . Then ,

while international instances short - circuited General Aoun by setting up a

parallel government under Syrian aegis , the General launched his second

war - the war of " elimination " , to control the militia of the Lebanese

Forces . That war began in January 1990 and was terminated by the inter¬

vention of the Syrian air force in October 1990 . The General was forced
into exile .

Those two years , coming on the end of a conflict which began in 1975 ,

took a heavy toll on the Christian population of Lebanon and witnessed the

1 The Synod of Bishops is a permanent institution begun by Pope Paul VI in 1965 in

answer to a desire expressed by the Fathers of Vatican Council II . The institution illus¬
trates that the government of the Church is exercised by the college of Bishops united
around the Pope . The Synod , however , has no decision making power . Its role is to
discuss and recommend ( Canon 343 ) .
472 JOHN DONOHUE S .J .

incident which was the proximate cause of the Synod - the Nahr al - Mawt
massacre on October 2 , 1990 : A peaceful candlelight procession had been
organized by pro - Aoun forces to the positions of the Lebanese Forces
maintaining the blockade on the Metn . The group approaching Nahr al -
Mawt at the northern entrance to Beirut was fired on and 21 were killed .
The parallel government merely said it was General Aoun ' s fault . At a
group funeral for the victims at Antelias the crowd vented their anger
against Patriarchs , Bishops and clergy . It was an intra - Christian affair .
Those not engaged with the Lebanese Forces were now not only at odds
with an imposed government , but also completely alienated from the
Church .
Something had to be done ; thus the idea of a Synod for Lebanon was
born . The Catholic community had to put itself in order if it wished to
continue as an element in post - war Lebanon . 2
The Pope announced , on June 12 , 1991 , that a Synod for Lebanon
would be convoked and , in July , Cardinal Etchegaray came with a video¬
taped appeal of the Pope calling for a spiritual mobilization and a work of
reflection and preparation for the Synod . All were asked to register their
judgment on necessaiy changes and reforms . The Pope set as theme for the
Synod : " Christ is our hope : renewed by His spirit and in solidarity we wit¬
ness to His love " . By March 1993 , the opinions expressed had been sorted
and merged into a workable document for reflection referred to as the
Lineamenta 3 which was widely diffused , discussed and commented on .
The fruit of this step was the Work Paper 4 for the Synod which was con¬
voked in November 1995 . The Synodal Fathers and invited observers
commented and discussed in detail the work paper and formulated proposi¬
tions which were presented to the Pope . On the basis of these propositions ,
the Pope would formulate his Apostolic Exhortation . Meanwhile , the

2 The Papal Nuncio at the time , Mgr . Paulo Puente , was influential in bringing this
about . His efforts were not always appreciated by all but it was his effort which
brought the affair to a positive conclusion . See the articles by Carole Dagher , al-
Nahar , September 4 , 1997 , 13 , and by Scarlett Haddad , L ' Orient - Express , no . 2 ( De¬
cember 1995 ) , 10 .
3 The Lineamenta is a rough draft presenting the principal lines for reflection accompa¬
nied by questions to aid reflection . They were announced at Bkerke on March 13 ,
1993 , by Mgr . Jan P . Schotte in the presence of Cardinal Silvestrini . Replies were to
be sent to Rome before May 1 , 1994 .
4 The Work Paper or Document de travail consists of an introduction and three sections .
The introduction sets out the essential points : to promote a spiritual renewal , personal
and communitarian , and to encourage dialogue on all levels . The first section , " Christ
our hope " , is theological . The second section looks to church structures and the third
focuses on witnessing to the love of Christ by service to others .
 SYNOD FOR LEBANON
473

Synod formulated a Final Message which would convey its principal pre¬

occupations without being explicitly a resume of the propositions .5

The Final Message turned out to be a disaster ! Whatever reconciliation

may have been accomplished in Synod cloisters , the Final Message pro¬
voked new alienation from the Muslim communities and the so - called

" Left " . The Mufti , Prime Minister Hariri and Sheikh Shams al - DIn were

unhappy and were sure that the Pope did not agree . Their reactions were

hasty ; as one non - Catholic bishop who attended the Synod remarked , " If

they had taken a few minutes to read the message they would have reacted

otherwise " . 6 It is hard to imagine what the critics thought the Synod would

produce . Perhaps they were expecting the standard final declaration of any

Arab League meeting : thank the local president , condemn Israeli atrocities

and occupation and hope that the decisions taken at last year ' s meeting

would be applied soon .

Consequently , Mr . Hariri went and talked to the Pope . The Mufti of the

Republic sent Muhammad al - Sammak to Rome to protest and things sim¬

mered for a year or so . There were conjectures about what the Pope him¬

self might finally say . Certain circles had the notion that the Nuncio and

the Vatican had a completely different stance from that of the Lebanese

Catholic hierarchy . But the fact that the Vatican formally established rela¬

tions with Israel in June 1994 had led some Muslim quarters to propose

renunciation of the diplomatic relations by the Pope as a prelude to any

visit . 7 Finally , in May 1997 , the Pope came on his 32 - hour visit to present

his Apostolic Exhortation .

The visit ( May 10 - 11 , 1997 ) was a fantastic success . Reconciliation

was apparently accomplished . Former critics outdid themselves in praising

the Exhortation : a plan of action , a new constitution , etc . , etc .8 A careful

5 The Catholic Center for Information in Lebanon printed the original French text along
with the Arabic translation : Message de I 'Assemblee Speciale pour le Liban du Synode
des Eveques , tenue ait Vatican du 26 novembre au 14 decembre 1995 .
6 See al -Nahar , December 25 , 1995 , 3 .

7 Sheikh Sha ' ban said the visit would be positive if the Pope apologized for his attitude
concerning Israel and did not ask for a Syrian retreat ( al -Nahar , May 3 , 1997 , 4 ) .
8 Several headlines in the Lebanese press : " The Apostolic Exhortation effaces the Final
message and exchanges roles between Christian supporters and opposition " ( al -Sqfir,
May 13 , 1997 , 1 ) ; " Moderate discourse of Pope causes a positive shock" ( al -Hayat ,
May 13 , 1997 , 1 ) ; E . Khun : " The Apostolic Exhortation came from the Pope as a head
of State . The Final Message was from heads of Church " ( al -Nahar , May 14 , 1997 , 3 ) ;
" Jumblatt ' s circle explains how he is in continual contact with the Vatican . The Exhor¬
tation is balanced , etc . not like the Final Message " (al -Nahar , May 15 , 1997 , 3 ) . See
also the publication of the Central Information Unit of Hizballah : " A Reading in Papal
Guidance " , August 20 , 1997 .
474 JOHN DONOHUE S .J .

reading , shows that , however , the Pope ' s message was pretty much the
same as the Final Message . What was different ? Was it the personal pres¬
ence of the Pope ? Was it a better grasp on what the Synod was about ? I am
not sure .
What provoked criticism of the Final Message were : 9 ( a) a reference to
withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon ; ( b ) a reference to cultural
pluralism ; ( c ) a reference to consensual democracy . There was also ( d ) a
strong criticism of the economy and economic policy , much to the chagrin
of Mr . Hariri . The Arabic translation of " withdrawal " of Syrian forces was
"jala c al - quwwat al - suriyyah min Lubnan " . The word is that used for the
departure of French Forces from Lebanon and Syria in 1943 . Cultural plu¬
ralism came in Arabic as " muta caddud al -jama 'at wa bi- l- tali mutanawwtf
al - thaqafat " . Ta 'addudiyah had long been a refrain of the Lebanese Forces ,
the principal Christian militia . Consensual democracy , a generally ac¬
cepted term (al - dimuqratiyyah al - tawafuqiyyah ) , is rather innocent . Possi¬
bly it irked Sheikh Shams al - Din because his constant theme was numeric
democracy .
Some may have felt that comparing the Apostolic Exhortation with the
Final Message on these points showed a victory for the critics of the Final

Message . A few of the opposition felt the message had been watered down .
Certainly , the tone of the Apostolic Exhortation is more diplomatic , not
only regarding the government but also with regard to criticism of Church
structures . 10
It would be rash to say that the content of the Apostolic Exhortation
differed radically from the Final Message . True , the Syrians were not men¬
tioned but the presence of non - Lebanese armed forces on Lebanese terri¬
tory was listed among the difficulties along with the occupation of South
Lebanon , the economic situation , the displaced , and extremism .
While " cultural pluralism " as a phrase is not found in the Apostolic
Exhortation there are several references to cultural diversity ( § 45 ) : Each
particular culture is marked by the religious and profane contribution of

9 The press reporting on the Final Message focused on the merely political : Calls to end
Israeli occupation and apply UN resolutions . For internal peace , the Army should ex¬
tend control and the Syrian army can withdraw . Calls for release of political prisoners
and information on missing persons . The return of the displaced is a basic question
without which the country will not be rebuilt . Asks for an end to arbitrary arrests ( cf.
al -Haydt , December 14 , 1995 , 1) .
10 In the following references I refer to the paragraph numbers of the French edition : Une
esperance nonvelle pour le Liban : Exhortation apostolique post -synodale de Sa Sain -
tete Jean -Paul II aux patriarches , aux eveques , au clerge et a tous les fideles du Liban ,
Cite du Vatican : Libreria Editrice Vaticana , 1997 .
 SYNOD FOR LEBANON 475

the different civilizations which succeeded one another on their soil ( § 93 ) .

Each cultural and religious community carries the responsibility for unity
( § 120 ) . The Pope himself calls for the development of a truly Christian

culture based on the Christian vision of man ( §§ 45 , 75 ) .

Nor does the Pope refer to " consensual democracy " . However , at his
very arrival at the airport he spoke of a new Lebanon in which every citi¬
zen has his place , where there is an equilibrium among the vital forces of
the nation and where there is responsibility for and participation in each
decision . In parting he spoke of a new social system granting a place to the
human person and in which groups have a place in national life and in
community decisions .
One can say that the Apostolic Exhortation is more delicately phrased .
However to compare the Final Message and the Apostolic Exhortation , to
see which is more politically correct , is to miss the point of the Synod and
the Apostolic Exhortation .
What was the Synod all about ? The Synod was not essentially politi¬
cal . Rome and the synodal fathers were concerned with reconciliation and
unity : reconciliation of Catholics with their hierarchy ; reconciliation of
Catholic Churches among themselves ; reconciliation of Catholics with
other Christian Churches ; reconciliation of Christians with Muslims .
Still , given the context of divisions and war in which the Synod came
forth it is not surprising that many if not most people read it as a political
document . If one skimmed the Apostolic Exhortation he would certainly
not pause over the theological reflection or the internal church matters that
absorbed the discussions of the Bishops and Patriarchs . It would be normal
for a person to focus on the section dedicated to the Church and society
and to the conclusion . "
Here it can be instructive to take a brief look at the structure of the Ap¬
ostolic Exhortation by listing the section titles with the pages devoted to
each :
- The situation of the Church in Lebanon ( 3 - 27 ) ;
- In the Church hope is based on Christ ( 28 - 56 ) ;
- Renewal of the Church ( 57 - 126 ) ;
- Communion among Catholics and among Christians ( 127 - 43 ) ;
- Dialogue and reconciliation ( 144 - 59 ) ;
- Church and society ( 160 - 83 ) ;
- Conclusion ( 184 - 94 ) .

11 The Final Message was about 6 ,400 words ; the Apostolic Exhortation over 36 , 000
words .
476 JOHN DONOHUE S .J .

A careful reading shows that some 40 out of 194 pages touch on non -
Church matters , that is to say barely 21 percent . But while the bulk of the
Apostolic Exhortation touches on Church matters , it is always within the
framework of an effective participation in the renewal of Lebanon .
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Apostolic Exhortation is
not its political correctness , but rather the frequency of references to repen¬
tance , conversion , mutual pardon , purification and reconciliation . The
concepts are present in the Final Message but not with the same emphasis .
Chapter V , section V is devoted specifically to peace and reconciliation ,
calling for a purification of memories and consciences in order to construct
peace . The Church and its patrimony , its schools and universities , its hos¬
pitals should be regarded as so many ways of serving the society , espe¬
cially the poor and marginalized .
The Apostolic Exhortation also contains an exhortation directed to the
government and legitimate authorities . It is astutely placed under the sec¬
tion on Human Rights . We are told that political authorities should be hon¬
est . Then the Pope makes a telling reflection when he speaks of the need to
form highly competent persons for government who will be able to bring
the country into international life .

Dialogue

Perhaps the section which attracted the most attention was that entitled
" Solidarity with the Arab World " . It is put in the framework of Islamic -

Christian dialogue :

"Open to dialogue and collaboration with the Muslims of Lebanon , the

Catholic church wishes to be open also to dialogue and collaboration with
the Muslims in other Arab countries . I would like to insist on the neces¬
sity for the Christians of Lebanon to maintain and strengthen their ties of
solidarity with the Arab world . I invite them to consider their insertion in
Arab culture , to which they have contributed so much , a privileged place
for conducting with other Christians of Arab countries , a deep and au¬
thentic dialogue with believers in Islam " .

Here the Pope ' s perspective is clearly that of the head of the Church con¬
sidering Catholic presence all over the world as missionary witness . He
considers the Lebanese Catholics as useful witnesses for the Church uni¬
versal . Of course , the Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops of the Middle East
 SYNOD FOR LEBANON
477

had already registered their commitment to Islamic - Christian dialogue in a

long pastoral letter of 1992 . 12

This section on dialogue is well wrought . It is an expression of how the

Church sees itself in a non - Christian environment . It situates dialogue as

the very basis of building a society based on mutual respect . It is dialogue

in the broad sense of the term . And the religious dialogue , which is not at

all excluded , has as its aim the appreciation of the spiritual search of one 's

brothers in their following of the divine will and fostering spiritual , moral
and socio - cultural values .

The aim of dialogue is the formation of an ideal society where public

servants serve and all work for the co mm on good . It is an idealistic vision ,

but possible , if all are ready for peace and reconciliation .

A big if , because from a certain point of view there is no dialogue .

True , the Muslim communities collaborated with the Vatican efforts in

preparing for the Synod and the Muslim members of the National commit¬

tee for Muslim - Christian Dialogue attended the Synod as observers . But

the committee is a political instrument useful in crisis . It does not function

as a framework for collaboration on matters such as human rights and so¬

cial development . 13

The Apostolic Exhortation is moderate and diplomatic , if you will , but

it is above all an exhortation . Religious leaders have the habit of exhorting

- giving sermons - encouraging others and recalling ideals and values . 14 It

is rather extraordinary that the Pope was able to carry it all off as well as

12 See the Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Patriarchs on the Christian Presence in the East ,
A Witness and a Message , Bkerke , Lebanon , Easter 1992 ( in Arabic ) .
13 Following the Spiritual Summit at Bkerke in August 1993 , provoked by the Israeli
invasion of South Lebanon , a "National Committee for Christian - Muslim Dialogue "
was formed in which each of the major religious authorities is represented . The mem¬
bers were : Muhammad al - Sammak ( Sunni ) , Sa cud al - Mawla ( Shiite ) , cAbbas al - Halabl
( Druze ) , Harith Shihab ( Maronite ) , Michel ' Abs ( Greek Orthodox ) , Jean Salmanyan
( Armenian Orthodox ) and Camille Minassa ( Greek Catholic ) . - This committee under¬
took the task of preparing a work paper for dialogue . After a draft was distributed to
the religious authorities on July 25 , 1994 , nothing more was heard of the work paper .
In October , Sa ' ud al - Mawla explained why the work of the committee had been slow
( ial-Nahar , October 21 , 1994 ) . Finally on January 5 , 1995 , the committee held a press
conference to present the unified Work Paper .
14 In the meetings held in the wake of the Pope ' s visit the Muslim participation was
remarkable . See , for example , the colloquium in Sidon with participation of the
Jama ' ah al - Islamiyyah ( al -Naliar , May 29 , 1997 , 8 ) and that in the AUB Alumni Club
with Sheikh Muhammad Kan can ( al -Nahar , June 18 , 1997 , 6 ) and in Zahle ( Zahlah )
with Sayyid Hani Fahs ( al - Nahar , July 26 , 1997 , 20 ) . Also there were positive evalua¬
tions by GhazI al - ' Aridl ( PSP ) in al - Safir , May 21 , 1997 , 5 , and Fawwaz Trabulsl , al -
Safir , May 16 , 1997 , 19 .
 JOHN DONOHUE S .J .
478

he did . He explains why in the very first section of the Apostolic Exhorta¬

tion when he says :

" In my sermon at the end of the Synodal assembly I underlined that the
engagement of Christians is important for Lebanon whose historic roots
are of a religious nature . And it is precisely by reason of these religious
roots of Lebanese national and political identity that we wished to and
were able to put in process a Synodal Assembly in order to seek together
the way for renewing faith , for a better collaboration and a more effica¬
cious common witness , without forgetting the reconstruction of the soci¬

ety " .

And it is most likely the same sentiment that is behind § 15 when he says :

" However , it is important that the country and the region not allow them¬

selves to be won over by the phenomenon of secularization " .

It is this focus on religious roots and renewal of faith that makes the

Pope 's intervention a unique effort to get at the roots of the problem in
Lebanon .

A call for changing mentalities before changing laws is not new , but

the Pope is the first to have made a real effort in that direction . The self -

criticism at the base of the preparation for the Synod was salutary for

Catholics . It healed some wounds and made it possible to continue the

process . The moral authority of the Pope is no doubt a key factor in the

success that has been achieved especially in the Catholic communities and

in relations with other Christians . This authority also has its limits , which

are perhaps most sorely felt in the efforts at dialogue . There is no effective

dialogue ; apparently Muslim authorities feel no need for it . 15

Evaluation

The Apostolic Exhortation is a remarkable document well worth the read¬

ing , but it is legitimate to ask if it has made a difference in Lebanon . Are

there any visible effects or is it just one more example of momentary inspi¬

ration , more words ? In May 1998 , the question was raised in the press .

Here are some of the responses . It is interesting to see that it is not merely

churchmen who come in for criticism ; the state , too , should be carrying its

burden of the changes proposed by the Apostolic Exhortation .

15 See Sa ' ud al - Mawla , al - Hiwar al - islami al - masihi , Beirut : Dar al - Manhal al - Lubnam ,
1996 , 202 .
 SYNOD FOR LEBANON
479

One critic thinks that the people who are reading it are admiring its

form and content but not acting on it . 16 There is no dialogue with the state ,

according to another . The state has not even succeeded in applying the

Ta ' if Accords , much less embarking on building a new Lebanon on the

basis of the Apostolic Exhortation . Churchmen say it has had an effect

within the Catholic community . That , of course , is capital . The primary

aim of the Synod was to overcome the alienation produced by the folly of

the Geagea - Aoun wars . The process of preparing the Synod and the self -

criticism of the Assembly itself was salutary . There is discussion and there

are efforts to put aspects of the exhortation into practice .

Concerning the Apostolic Exhortation , the Lebanese have to be con¬

vinced that it offers principles for building a nation - this cannot be im¬

posed .

On May 1, 1998 , the first congress of the " Movement of Renewal -

from Exhortation to Accord " was held in Beirut at al - Hikmah ( Sagesse ) . 17

The group of 55 recorded a telling criticism of the situation . For Lebanon

the transition wrought by Ta ' if was not a transition of Lebanon from war to

peace but rather a transition from being a " square " where regional battles

were acted out , to being a " card " in the game for a Middle East settlement .

On the Lebanese scene , the group stated that the only choice for Chris¬

tians is to fall in line behind the sterile pillars of power or withdraw from

public affairs . Accept what is or keep quiet . The general conviction of the

group is that " we are in crisis and the natural ways out are all blocked ."

They are searching for ways to release a new spurt of energy to arrive at an
accord on the basis of the Exhortation .

Changing attitudes is a long and difficult process .

It was a unique intervention when compared with others

Outside interventions always have behind them the weight of power and

money , material and physical restraints and rewards . And they are im¬

posed , at least in part .

Spiritual and moral intervention is at a distinct disadvantage unless

there is deep spiritual conviction . There are several indications that the

16 See the evaluation of Carole Dagher , al -Safir , November 5 , 1998 . Waddah Shararah
( in : al - Hayat , April 17 , 1998 ) claims that political and religious authorities have un¬
derstood nothing of the Apostolic Exhortation and consequently have not changed
their comportment or discourse .
17 Reports in al -Nahar , May 1 , 1998 , 8 , and May 4 , 1998 , 6 , give details of the meeting .
 JOHN DONOHUE SJ .
480

Pope is counting on this and the way may be long and arduous . Thus his
warning when speaking of difficulties :

" I know that for a future more serene to take form many sacrifices must
be made , and there must be constant personal asceticism to assure an ac¬
tive , courageous and persevering presence in the affairs of society . This is
something we have to demand from ourselves before we demand it from
others . But one must count also on the grace of the Most High who trans¬
forms hearts and wills and turns them towards the good " .

Evil exists but there is always hope .

Sacred folly ? Perhaps , but well worth the try .

Are there any lessons to be learned ?

Certainly , the lesson of the Final Message is that one has to be extremely
careful to avoid loaded words in public communication . The existing men¬
tality constructs constellations of sentiment around certain words and
phrases . Those words and phrases set off neural reactions no matter what
their context may be . The other side of the coin , of course , is that leaders
and their consultors should learn how to read a text intelligently . Other¬
wise , how could one sense subtle changes in position ?
The principal lesson of the Pope ' s visit is the power of charisma and
the spontaneous response to moral appeals . The final test , of course , is the
follow through and the perdurance of the initial response . This will test the
mettle of all who are seriously interested in finding new forms of fruitful
collaboration . A heavy burden rests on the shoulders of the Assembly of
Bishops and also on the Muslim parties who accepted the challenge to
participate . But then perhaps the Synod , the visit and the Apostolic Exhor¬
tation were merely the much needed moral and spiritual framework allow¬
ing people interested in setting new directions to stand straight and brace
themselves for another serious effort at collaboration .
The resolution of conflict , social development and civil peace depend
on several factors . The Synod and the Pope ' s visit , obviously , cannot turn
a society around in the space of a few years . But all three did offer the
much needed inspiration for many people who are working to that end .
 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE :
METROPOLITAN GEORGES KHODR ' S HOPE
IN TIMES OF WAR

As cad E . Khairallah

Metropolitan Georges Khodr 1 ( b . 1923 ) presents a challenge for those who

reflect on the meaning of faith . What he proposes is not always easy to

follow or accept , precisely because he does not seek easy solutions . Some

may believe that Christianity and Islam are two mutually exclusive world -
views and that , for the sake of reconciliation , one must free the Muslims

from their Islam and the Christians from their Christianity . In contrast ,

Khodr believes that one must free people from the empty shell of their

religions , so they may delve deeper into the mystical depths of these relig¬

ions and experience the same God residing within them .2 This has been the

crux of Khodr ' s position for the past 56 years .

For over half a century , Metropolitan Khodr has struggled to revive the

spiritual sources of Christian Oriental Orthodoxy . Active in the clerical ,

academic , social , and cultural realms , he has wielded great influence , not

so much on the political as on the moral and spiritual levels . 3 His public

* I should like to express my warmest thanks to many colleagues who commented upon
this article , and especially to Ralph Coury .
1 In Arabic : Jiirj Khudr . I am writing the name of Metropolitan Khodr as he himself
writes it in the European languages .
2 Hadlth al -Ahad , 4 vols . , Beirut : Dar al - Nur , 1985 ( henceforth : Hadith ) . Here , Hadlth ,
II , 308 .

3 In 1942 , Khodr co - founded the Movement of Orthodox Youth and was repeatedly its
Secretary General (until 1970 , when he became Metropolitan) . His thoughts and spiritual
vision found an outlet in the periodical al -Nur, which he edited for over two decades
( 1948 - 70 ) . He has played an important role in giving new interpretations to matters of
faith and inter- religious relations through his activities in the Middle East Council of
Churches , whether as a member in the Faith and Unity Commission ( 1984 - ) or as Presi¬
dent of its Theological Commission ( 1976 - 82 ) . The same is true of his activities as presi¬
dent of the Synodal Commission for Ecumenical Affairs of the Orthodox Church
of Antioch ( 1979 - ) , his membership in the Mixed Commission for Catholic -
Orthodox Dialogue , and his intensive work in the framework of the Christian -
Muslim dialogue . In this last domain , he has been also very active academically , as
Professor of Arabic Civilization at the Lebanese University ( 1965 - 70 ) , and then as
482 AS 'AD E . KHAIRALLAH

prominence , starting in 1962 with weekly articles in the Beirut newspaper

Lisan al - Hal , became much greater in the 1970s with Sunday articles in
the prestigious newspaper al-Nahar . His writings had been a spiritual and
moral inspiration for at least a whole generation before the Lebanese civil
war . His basic mystical vision does not prevent him from dealing with the
immediate concerns of his readers . His articles accompanied the civil war
from beginning to end and have been weekly bread for thousands of read¬
ers of all ideological and religious colors .
Collections of these articles and of those written before and after the
war are edited in several volumes , two of which deal directly with Leba¬
non at war : al - Raja ' fi zaman al - harb ( Hope in Times of War ) 4 and Lub -
naniyyat ( Lebanese Matters ) . But Khodr ' s attitude during the war can be
understood only in the light of his general vision , a vision conditioned by a
test of faith , during his youth , which is masterfully recounted in his spiri¬
tual autobiography Law hakaytu masra al - tufulah ( If I Were to Tell the
Process of Childhood ) . 5 One has only to look at his very early lectures and
writings , which began to appear in 1945 , to be astonished by his modernity
and ecumenical spirit . Khodr ' s reconciliatory principles are not an out¬
come of the civil war , nor are they , as with many other religious leaders ,
lip service dictated by political conditions . They were expressed already in
the 1940s , when the Christians wielded greater political power than the
Muslims .
" A conflict " , says Carl Schmitt , " is always a dispute between organiza¬

tions and institutions in the sense of concrete orders , a dispute between

instances and not between substances " , 6 In line with this opinion , I will
present a concrete case study of a prominent Lebanese - Arab writer and
religious ' instance ' , one of the most outspoken champions of a culture of

Professor of Theology and of Islamic Studies at the University of Balamand , which he

helped develop into a full - fledged university , and where he was instrumental in estab¬
lishing a Center for Christian - Islamic Studies .
4 Jurj Khudr, al -Raja ' fi zaman al - harb , Beirut : Dar al - Nahar , 1979 ( henceforth : al-
Raja ') .
5 Jurj Khudr , Law hakaytu masra al - tufulah , Beirut : Dar al -Nahar , 1979 ( henceforth :
Law hakaytu ) . This work exists in a French translation by R . and G . Rizk : Georges
Khodr , Et si je disais les chemins de I 'enfance . Paris : Editions le sel de la terre , Edi¬
tions du Cerf, 1997 .
6 Carl Schmitt , Politische Theologie II : Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder
Politischen Theologie , Berlin : Duncker & Humblot 1970 , 106 , quoted in : Th .
Scheffler , " Religion between Violence and Reconciliation : Pros and Cons " , in : The
Abstracts of the International Conference : "Religion between Violence and Recon¬
ciliation , September 11 - 13 , 1998 " , Beirut : Orient - Institut , 1998 , 4 - 5 .
 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE 483

love and non - violence . I will focus on the core of his vision , his basic prin¬

ciples and reconciliatory positions in a world of confessional hate and

criminal atrocities . I will also analyze his reactions and suggestions for

possible solutions , when faced with the daily experience of the horrors of

war and immediate suffering .

Georges Khodr grew up in a pious Greek Orthodox family , which im¬

parted to him a natural faith of the heart rather than of the intellect or of

the establishment , a Christianity incarnated in the life and works of Christ

rather than in theological beliefs about a transcendent , remote god . He had

a basic affinity with the simple faith of the common people ( inherited ,

more particularly , from his mother ) , a great compassion towards the poor ,

and an existential commitment to action , which he probably learnt from his

father . For him , Christ is immanent and acts in the world . Khodr does not

deny that monks can be saints , but he prefers sainthood to be manifested in

social action , which brings him closer to the Islamic emphasis on engage¬

ment in the world in order to change it . Yet he differs sharply with tradi¬

tional Islamic thinking in his belief that God needs man in order to change

the world . ( This point is discussed below under " Reconciliation and dia¬

logue through the Cross " .)

Khodr ' s vision finds its roots , essentially , in the Sermon on the Mount

and in the words of the Gospel according to St . John , " In the beginning

was the Word , and the Word was with God , and the Word was God . ' " 7 And
this Word was made flesh and was crucified to redeem sinful man . Love is

embodied in the indissoluble triad of God ( incarnate in Christ ) , the other ,

and the self . The Sermon on the Mount teaches love for our enemies . The

challenge is the imitatio Christi in this world , here and now , i . e . , the per¬

manent predisposition for being crucified . Between killing and being

killed , a Christian has no choice . Like Christ he must suffer and forgive .

Some may qualify Christ 's words , " But whoever hits you on the right

cheek , turn the left cheek to him too " , by saying : " But this does not apply

to criminals , etc . " . Khodr takes Christ 's words literally . Christ did not

qualify his words , and Khodr does not . He understands Christianity as the

religion of what he calls maslubiyyah , i . e . , " being crucified " .

Yet , Khodr remains a man of hope . For if Christianity is the religion of

crucifixion , real faith also sees it as the religion of resurrection . This dis¬

tinguished Khodr during the Lebanese civil war from many ' men of faith ',

who seemed unable to let love prevail over hatred or to keep up hope in
times of trial . His sustained discourse about reconciliation reflected a vi¬

sion of love which unites all beings in a higher Being , who transcends

7 John 1:1.
 AS 'AD E . KHAIRALLAH
484

human shortcomings , differences , quarrels , and hatreds and encompasses

them in His everlasting compassion and peace . Not just readiness for rec¬
onciliation , but love and partnership in the God of love , along with the
readiness for self - sacrifice must be our attitude towards the other . Without
this basic vision of life , it is difficult to understand Khodr ' s spiritual and
psychological resilience before , during and after the civil war .

Authentic faith and the Word

The central experience of Khodr ' s spiritual life happened when his faith
was put to the test . He was struck by doubt about the mystery of the sac¬
rament of Holy Communion . This experience 8 took place when he was still
a newly ordained priest and marked the rest of his life . Fulfilling the high¬
est function of a priest , he used to consecrate bread and wine in order to
transform them into the body and blood of Christ . This provides for the
ultimate purpose of the mass : the entire congregation sharing in the body
of Christ . One day , as he was doing the usual ritual gestures and uttering
the words of consecration , " Take and eat it , this is my body . . . Drink it , all
of you , this is my blood . . . " 9 , he suddenly wondered : What if these were
sheer external gestures and simple words which transform nothing ! There¬
upon he remained unable to celebrate mass for about two weeks , subject to
a terrible crisis , until God cast a light in his heart and he won back his
faith . ( This reminds us of what al - Ghazali says about his own crisis with
faith . )
This experience became his criterion for distinguishing the " lamp "
from the " light " , the external form from the inner spirit . Without denying
the intimate relationship between them , Khodr struggles to make people
aware that , without faith , symbols are but empty shells . This criterion ap¬
plies to the personal level , as well as to the church and state levels . Here ,
his sense of integrity leads him to declare : " We must be happy with the
disappearance of the ' Christian World ' , for it was a world of lies , where
the hypocrites mixed between the symbols and the truths . " 10 For what
counts is not the world , but its spirit : " Christianity is neither a world , nor a
story , nor a history , unless it is the world , the story , and the history of God .
Perhaps the history of God , in many of its pages , is written today outside
the ' Christian World ' . " 11

8 He told me his experience in an interview in Geneva , November 1993 .

9 Matthew 26 :26 - 28 .
10 Khudr , Hadlth , II , 32 .
11 Khudr , Hadlth , II , 33 .
 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE 485

The abovementioned " test of faith " , differentiating between mere sym¬

bols and the actual transfiguration of the world , has remained central to

him on the personal and mystical levels . Hence , the great importance he

places on the spoken word in this transfiguration , and the almost sacra¬

mental function given to the act of uttering or writing the Word , i . e . , of

transmitting It to the listener or reader . The efficacious working of the

symbols through faith is a leitmotif running through his works , which are
in themselves a sustained effort to draw nearer to full communion with

Christ while preaching the Word to the whole human race .

Khodr 's first commitment was to revive the spirit of the apostolic

Church of Antioch , which , he believes , was basically different from the

ancient Church of Jerusalem . In his opinion , the latter still had a kind of

Jewish particularism ; in contrast , he views Antioch as the first really uni¬

versal church . He is often accused of being extremist , because he does not

shy from criticizing the clergy , the Metropolitans , and the Patriarch . Al¬

though a man of non - violence , he makes no compromise when it comes to

his faith and his conception of God as Christ . His test of faith was such a

spiritual , existential trial , that his triumph over doubt gave him a resilient

confidence . The hardest times can be overcome as long as man keeps his

eyes on what is essential . Faith is the essence , without which all the rest is

meaningless . The loss and restoration of his faith in the power of the Word

in transforming reality may be the driving force behind his arresting style .

Khodr is a masterful writer . His intimate voice gives the reader the im¬

pression not of listening to a sermon but to the inner voice of someone

meditating or thinking aloud , of uttering his pains , hopes , joys and fears

aloud ; someone expressing his thoughts and wishes to a close friend in

isolation or to a higher Being ; someone full of wounded disappointment or

shining hope , always inhabited by astonishment and compassion in the

face of human weakness and destructiveness . Khodr ' s is a style of medita¬

tion and prayer haunted by the nagging question : How do we live the eter¬

nal Word in everyday life , best express Its Truth , achieve a communion

with It and with the whole congregation of readers ? For another meaning

of the incarnation is that God , Who is the Good , the True , and the Beauti¬

ful , must manifest Himself in this world and through human agency . And

Khodr successfully meets the challenge of Christianizing the Arab lan¬

guage . He refutes the famous 19th - century saying , " The Arabic language

refuses to be Christianized " , i . e . , to lend itself to Christian writings . In fact

his texts are admired by leading Muslim and Christian writers alike . 12

12 He is very moving in his authenticity . Suffice it to mention such poets as Adunis , or

the scholar , writer , and critic Ihsan ' Abbas , who once told me ( in Amsterdam , 1978 ) :
486 AS 'AD E . KHAIRALLAH

Khodr is not an academic writer . It is in concise aphorisms that his

deepest thoughts are expressed within articles , papers or sermons , and then

collected in book form . An exception is his short spiritual autobiography

( If 1 Were to Tell the Process of Childhood ) , written in one unit . Because

his basic vision is mystical , depending upon the inspiration of the moment ,

the ideas come as flashes of varying intensity , illuminating his meditations .

And though it is hard to find a theoretical system in passages of inspiration

expressed in poetic language , one can still trace a basic vision that repeats

itself through innumerable variations , depending on immediate social ,

political , and moral contexts . In what follows , I will try to summarize

some constant elements of this vision .

Redemption and the theology of non - violence

Man is created in God ' s image , and particularly in Christ ' s image , the in¬

carnate , suffering god of love and peace . Man is free to " activate " or actu¬

alize this divine image or to leave it as an empty shell . Activating it for a

Christian is imitating Christ on the way to Golgotha . For Golgotha and

Resurrection require each other . Golgotha is a precondition for Resurrec¬

tion , 13 and Resurrection is the fulfillment of Golgotha , its outcome , ulti¬

mate meaning and the source of hope . Hope means trust , 14 otherwise , to go

the way of Golgotha is foolish nonsense !

Herein lies a major obstacle to reconciliation with Islam , which be¬

lieves in resurrection but not in an incarnate and suffering god . For Khodr ,

however , the notion of original sin and the necessity of atonement and

redemption are the premises of his resurrection theology . The fact that it is

God who undergoes this self - sacrifice in order to redeem man is the center

of Khodr ' s vision and the cornerstone of his concept of non - violence , dia¬

logue , and reconciliation .

In this scheme , God ' s grace plays a central role . Both redemption and

our awareness of it depend on God ' s grace . God sends down His own son

to save man and to offer him eternal life . Similarly , it is the grace of God

through the Holy Spirit that keeps man conscious of redemption through

When it comes to writing on Islam or on Palestine , very few people impress me and
move me so much as does Metropolitan Khodr ( cf . his own comment in Law hakaytu ,
37 ) .

13 Cf . "A grain of wheat remains no more than a single grain unless it is dropped into the
ground and dies . If it does die , then it produces many grains " ( John 12 :24 ) .
14 For a very interesting distinction between raja ' ( immanent trust in God , despite all
calamities ) and amal ( hope for some positive thing emerging in the future ) , see
Hadith , I , 205 - 06 .
 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE 487

crucifixion , i . e . , that to be created in the image of God is to be created in

the image of love , even if love may mean nothing less than self - sacrifice

on the cross . Only this awareness will help revive the spirit of the Church

of Antioch , beyond the decadent establishment and dead conventions .

Such an unusual position in Arabic writing challenges all believers , not

only Christians , to reflect on the meaning of faith . For reconciliation

Khodr requires full love for others and compassion for their weakness . A

Christian must forgive sinners , even when they harm him . Physical vio¬

lence is condemned under nearly any condition . Self - defense is tolerated

only if the original violence aims at separating man from his real Being ,

i . e . , God . Yet , before reconciliation , an evildoer must repent , otherwise it

is a sinful compromise which harms both parties . 15 A Christian must pray

for the salvation of his enemies , but not spare them his criticism if they

persist in their wrongdoing .

On the positive side , reconciliation can have meaning only as a full

recognition of the free personality of the other and as total openness to the

way he understands himself . It cannot be based on fears and prejudices . 16

At the same time , physical non - violence and readiness to forgive are ac¬

companied by a stubborn struggle for justice and charity towards the

wretched of the earth . It does not mean acquiescence to injustice , be it

social or moral ; it means that the struggle should remain non - violent .

Khodr constantly calls upon the men of God to defend the exploited and to

stand for Christian love and for chastity in speech and conduct .

He is a tough critic of the Lebanese clergy , especially the Christian

clergy and their generally aggressive stand during the Lebanese civil war .

In this connection , he believes that " we are collectively responsible for

every drop of blood that has been shed since Abel , even if the victim had

been a murderer . " 17 Then he adds : " I cannot construct a theology of vio¬

lence and condone killing in what I call exceptional cases . Everyone who

kills a soul is a sinner . The nation sins if it executes a criminal . Every citi¬

zen partakes of this crime of execution , so long as we keep this criminal

law which is the remnant of our primitiveness and fondness of revenge . " 18
Thus , he seems to refuse violence even in self - defense . This is more

than non - violence ; it is non - resistance , which differs sharply from the Is¬

lamic position on this matter . To those Christians who claim that such

pacifism invites aggression , his answer is : " True , it is difficult for man to

15 Khudr , al - Raja ', 165 .

16 Cf . Khudr , Hadith , II , 47 .

17 Khudr , Law hakaytu , 138 .

18 Khudr , Law hakaytu , 139 .

488 AS 'AD E . KHAIRALLAH

be a sheep . The sheer existence of the sheep is a temptation for the wolf . I

know that very well . But your sacred Book wants you to be sheep . You

have the choice between that and between being wolves yourselves . " 19

Christian -Muslim dialogue : the trialogue

Many questions yet remain : How does Khodr deal with aggressive inter¬

pretations of the jihad ? How does he deal with Christians who reject

pacifism as un - Christian ? Is pacifism possible for contending parties who

justify terrible mutual aggression and violence in the name of their relig¬

ions ? Can one really present crucifixion as a solution for parents who lost

their children in savage bombings or for people whose homes were de¬

stroyed , whose graveyards were dug up and the bones of whose dead were

thrown to the dogs ?

In the face of such questions , Khodr resorts to a psychological ap¬

proach , supported by historical arguments . He insists on love as the cure

for violence and reminds his readers that the absence of love among Chris¬
tians has often been more destructive than their feuds with Muslims .

" Muslims are human beings " , he says , " and love is a temptation for them ,

for nobody can resist it . It is more effective than any text . " 20 Such a state¬

ment also sheds light on his belief that discussions on reconciliation should

not be based on texts alone . People should be aware of the extent to which

Muslims and Christians have lived peacefully together .

" It will be easier to love , if Christians learn the history of Islam . For if
they get to know it , they will realize that no other history has ever
surpassed it in tolerance . . . Its most negative episodes came rather as re¬
action to the Crusader wars and to Western colonialism . What the Chris¬

tians suffered at the hands of other Christians has terribly exceeded the
difficulties that the dhimmis had to bear during some periods of Islamic
history . " 21

As already mentioned , Khodr 's conception of dialogue is based on the

right of the other to exist as such , religiously and socially . Recognition of

the otherness of the other is a condition for love , dialogue , democracy ,

freedom , and consequently the chance to spread the Word into the con¬

sciousness of other free persons . God is the third point of the Triangle or

Triad . It is God whom we need for any communion between two persons

19 Khudr , Hadith , II , 87 f .

20 Khudr , Hadith , II , 47 .

21 Ibid .
 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE
489

and who promised to be present whenever two persons gather in his

name . 22 Khodr wants to apply this promise to believing Muslims who unite

with Christians in fellowship based on faith . This is the novelty in his reli¬

gious thought .

This explains his commitment to inter - Christian ecumenism and Chris¬

tian - Muslim dialogue . Khodr ' s attitude towards Islam is especially impor¬

tant , because he is a Metropolitan . He studied Islam intensely and taught it .

Citations from the Qur ' an flow naturally from his pen , along with those

from the Bible and the Church Fathers . His style is a living example of the

unity in variety that he celebrates .

In another context , Khodr addresses al - Imam Musa al - Sadr , whom he

greatly admired , and mentions the Qur ' anic verse , " Believers are brothers "
( innama al - mu'miniin ikhwah , Qur 'an 49 : 10 ) , 23 which he takes as witness
to the brotherhood in faith across religious boundaries : " Believers are

brothers , so remember " , he tells al - Sadr , " that you do not want the outer

form of faith , but faith itself . " This shows that for Khodr , faith is the com¬

mon foundation , and that it is enough . All the rest is superfluous . In his

superb address to al - Imam al - Sadr , Khodr goes on to say : " The people of

illumination ( al - ishraqiyyiin ) attract you , as if you liked to listen to the

people of light from all sects , because your soul is in love with divine

splendor , which fascinates us all . " 24 For him , al - Imam al - Sadr possesses , in

the words of Ibn cArabT , " a heart enlightened by the Spirit , enlightening all

about it , through its illu mi nation ." Then he adds : " This is how you have

tried to be . This is how we want you . For you belong to us tooT 25

And here we have a Metropolitan telling a Shiite imam : " You are

Christian " in the deeper sense of understanding Christianity as a religion of

illumination .

Reconciliation and dialogue through the Cross

" God made peace through his Son ' s sacrificial death on the cross and so

brought back to himself all things , both on earth and in heaven . " 26 St .

Paul ' s foundation for peace is Khodr ' s guiding principle in matters of rec -

22 " For where two or three come together in my name , I am there with them " ( Matthew
18 :20 ) . Of course , Christ is with them as God incarnate .

23 Khudr , " Ila Musa al - Sadr " [ 1969 ] , Hadith , II , 292 .

24 Cf . ibid , 291 ff .

25 Ibid . , 292 . Italics mine .

26 St . Paul ' s Letter to the Colossians , 1 :20 , tr . Good News Bible , Collins / Fontana : The
Bible Societies , 1976 .
490 AS ' AD E . KHAIRALLAH

onciliation : " In Christ " , he says , " I find my friends in their plenitude and in
him I find the beauty that my soul yearns for . . . In him my inner self meets
his inner self and I am satisfied , and in this encounter my reconciliation
with all beings is achieved . " 27 Then he reiterates St . Paul ' s saying : " This
reconciliation is the persistence of the peace he made with the blood of his
cross ( Colossians 1 : 20 ) between all that exists on earth and in heaven . "
From this position we see that Khodr has no problem with color , race , or
even religious denomination . We either reach this light from whatever
perspective , whatever time or space , because Christ has already saved us ,
or else we remain simply dead . In other words , Khodr is telling the Chris¬
tians , " Christ does not belong to you much more than to any other people . "
A very important implication of this privileged relation between God
and man presents another serious problem in respect to Islam . Khodr ' s
conception gives man a role in the creation which may be too central for
many Muslims to accept : " The kingdom of God will not be achieved by
the work of God alone , but also by the work of man , who partakes in
God ' s effort . So let God not work alone . Help Christ , bent under his Cross ;
and there on the Golgotha of Suffering we will crucify ourselves , so that
we rise up with Christ in light . " 28 To help Christ " bent under the Cross " is
to help the Holy Spirit , Who moves Christ and moves us to crucify our¬
selves . In another context , Khodr says : " God has given up to us part of his
might when he created us free . He thus accepted that his image on earth be
visible or veiled . " 29 This is a very daring conception , hardly reconcilable
even with the vision of liberal Muslims who , notwithstanding their empha¬
sis upon man ' s responsibility and freedom , still ascribe absolute power to
God . The difficulties of reconciling Muslim and Christian views become
even more problematic when it comes to the image of God on earth as the
one incarnated in Christ . Still , Khodr sees in this the fundamental " mys¬
tery " of the dialogue between two full persons : God and man .

" God has made Himself the invitee , the guest of the free man who calls
him or who keeps him away . God is the one in need of man . We surely
need God , but from the moment He gave up his glory in the first crea¬
tion and in the mystery of incarnation , He also became in need of
man ' s love , since God has put Himself in a dialogue . And dialogue
could only mean two full - fledged , authentic human beings , who face
each other in freedom . If I say ' I ' and if I tell my God ' Thou ' , so it is in

27 Khudr , al - Harakah : Diya ' wa - da 'wah , Beirut : Manshurat al - Ntir , 1992 , 36 ( henceforth :
al-Harakah ) .
28 al -Harakah , 9, written in 1945 .
29 al - Harakah , 153 , written in 1965 .
 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE 491

the utmost seriousness that I stand in His presence and that He grants me
of His presence what He wills . And if we are in the mystery of this
discourse , or if I am , in a sense , the one who makes Him stand in front of
my face . . . so it is at this very point that we understand His spirit ; for
God could withhold His grace from the sacred offerings ( Eucharist ) . " 30

Thus , God ' s presence clearly requires our love and readiness to invite Him
to a dialogue with us . For Khodr , there can be neither dialogue nor com¬
munion between two persons unless God is with them . Likewise , dialogue
and communion with God are possible only through other human beings .
Consequently , the existence of the other as a fully recognized person in his
otherness is a condition sine qua non for my relation with God . And , of
course , only faith in Christ , as God incarnate and on the cross , can estab¬
lish this kind of love relationship . Here comes to mind Khodr ' s experience
of doubt and the demarcation he makes between the enlivening Word ,
source of all redeeming faith , and sheer lip service and external gestures .

Some difficult questions

There are some blunt questions to address to Metropolitan Khodr concern¬
ing the attitude of Christians and Muslims to one another . Why , for in¬
stance , would a Christian freely accept dhimml - status , which may have
been representative of a relative tolerance in the medieval period , but
which is incompatible with a democratic system , based on equal rights of
citizenship and freedom ? Thus , if dialogue with God requires a dialogue
with the other , i . e . , full acceptance of his otherness , we have a grave prob¬
lem with the dhimmi - condition , which Khodr does not ignore but tends to
gloss over for the sake of reconciliation .
Or , in the same vain , why would Muslims be open to Christians when
the Qur ' an tells them that they should not take them as friends , 31 or when
they know that Christians belong to churches which , both in the past and
present , have been reluctant to recognize Muhammad as divinely inspired ?
Beyond fundamentalism and the mentality of anathema , the question
is : Can present - day Muslims and Christians reconsider the core of their

vision of God and His relation to human freedom ? Can Muslims , with their
particular emphasis upon God ' s absolute power , accept with Khodr that
God has given up part of His own freedom to allow man to choose and
establish a dialogue with Him ? Finally , can Islam conceive of a god in

30 al -Harakah , 154 .
31 See : Qur ' an 5 :51 .
 AS 'AD E . KHAIRALLAH
492

need of man , as Khodr says , i . e . , in need of our awareness so that he can

manifest himself ? Man ' s dialogue with God presupposes God ' s readiness
to be contested or even totally rejected . Are present - day Muslims , or for
that matter , many Christians , ready to doubt , to discuss the basic tenets of
their religion , or to allow members of their faith to convert to other relig¬
ions ? In short : Is it genuinely possible to dialogue with the followers of
other gods , if one cannot yet dialogue with one ' s own god ?
Khodr is well aware of these difficulties . In dealing with such issues in
respect to Islam , he concentrates on the humane , spiritual riches of Islam in
both medieval and present times , and he extends his hand to those modern
Muslims engaged in a living theology , free from legalistic fetters . To the
fanatics on all sides and to those who stick to a dated legal system for their
political aims , Khodr has the following to say :

" The follower of Christ , like his master , is born upon a cross and not
bearer of a cross against anybody . We are called to be Christians ( Christ¬
like ) , not crusaders . The ' Household of Christianity ' is not a self-
asserting community as over and against the ' Household of Islam ' . Our
predicament is not with Divine Revelation as we have come to know it
and experience it in both of our traditions . It is , rather , with our interpre¬
tation of this Revelation , and with those who interpret it through political
spectacles by prostituting it to the will - to - power over the weak ." 32

Another major point is the very notion of " reconciliation " as an alternative
to violence . To me , reconciliation seems only the first step towards a genu¬
ine dialogue . It results from the good intentions to center on the common
denominator and to tolerate the differences of the other for the sake of civil
peace and coexistence . Real dialogue , however , involves recognizing the
difference of the other as positive and enriching . It involves seeing the
experience of the other as much a manifestation of God ' s generosity as
one ' s own experience . Khodr is fully aware that reconciliation may content
itself with solving peripheral problems . Thus , it remains a passive , if not
negative , attitude similar to putting out the fire but not kindling any au¬
thentic interest in the other . 33 Dialogue , on the other hand , is an intellectual
and spiritual exchange between two persons , between an " I " and a " Thou "
who fully recognize each other ' s presence . Dialogue does not put out the

32 Georges Khodr , "I Have Called You Friends " , The Muslim World 71 ( 1981 ) 3 - 4 , 163 -
77 (p . 176 ) .
33 Not only to tolerate the other , but to be happy with his presence : " That I welcome you
as Muslim and you welcome me as Christian is deeper than when you just accept me
as citizen " ( Khudr , " al - Janub fT tariq al - tahrfr " [ January 20 , 1985 ] , in : al - Raja ' [ fn . 4 ] ,
173 ) .
 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE
493

difference but kindles a burning bush between these two persons , like be¬

tween God and Moses on Mount Sinai . " The burning bush - at the same

time created flame and uncreated voice - becomes thus for al - Hallaj the

symbol of a mystic union in which the human subject and the divine sub¬

ject discourse together , each witnessing to the Reality of the other . " 34

Among men , God incarnate is present " where two or three are gath¬

ered " in His name , according to the Gospel ( Matthew 18 : 20 ) . And accord¬

ing to a hadith sharlf . " whenever men are gathered together in a house

reading God ' s word and studying it , God ' s saldnah comes down to them
... and God Himself remembers them as His own " . 35 God remembers

them , " in the sense that He manifests His presence . " 36 This implies that

whenever God ' s Word , i . e . , the Holy Spirit and not external legalities , is

present among two persons , no matter of what color , race or creed , God is
their third .

Such knowledge of the other is lacking , especially on part of Muslims .

Relatively few Muslims have an academic knowledge of Christianity ;

many apply the critical method to the Bible but not to the Qur ' an . Khodr ,

nonetheless , counts on co mm on social and moral values rooted in the Bib¬

lical tradition to regenerate a peaceful coexistence . His own contribution is

the discovery of the spiritual depths of Islam both as creed and as rites . In

this context , we find some of his most perceptive and inspiring texts . He

makes it clear that a real Islamic awakening must take place on the spiri¬

tual level , beyond the social , political , and legal levels , and beyond all

outbreaks of fanaticism . But he generally refrains from giving council to

his Muslim partners , thus applying his principle of accepting the other as
he is .

In contrast , his long article " To the Christians of my Country " 37 ad¬

dresses fellow Christians and sums up his ideas on being a Christian in the

world and in Lebanon in particular . " Yes , all comes from the Savior you

worship . . . No good exists in this world without the touch of Christ . But
the Lord touches whomever he wishes . You cannot bind him . . . " He then

reminds Christians that , wherever they may be in the world , they must be

in a situation of " exchange and partnership " :

34 Georges Khodr , " I Have Called You Friends " , 173 .

35 Quoted from Ibn Kathir (Fada 'il al - Qufan , Beirut : Dar al - Andalus , 1978 , 51 ) by
Georges Khodr , " I Have Called You Friends " , 165 .
36 Ibid .

37 Hadith , II , 39 - 43 , written in January 1968 .

 AS 1AD E . KHAIRALLAH
494

" You may become aware that life means that man should forget himself
and that through his genuine consciousness of the other , he ultimately
finds himself . Until now , you have not found the other - in - God . You
looked at him in his ugliness , and every human being , in his vicissitudes
and weaknesses , is not devoid of idiocy , cunning , and egoism . But the
ugliness of the creature does not wipe out from his face the touch of the
Creator . Every human being , in his calling , in the divine potential latent
in him , and in his infinite dimensions , every human being is a Christ . And
you must look at him only from this perspective . You would , then , ani¬
mate in him the divine human , whom he could become . Most impor¬
tantly , you yourselves are nothing and you have no Christ if you do not
consider him in this manner . . . . And if Christ ' s presence consists only in
love , and you don ' t have it , then you have no right to build up the country
and no part in building up humanity ...
You basically exist as seeds that die so that others live . The secret is in

your hands because someone taught you how to accept death . Maybe all
your success lies in this disappearance , in that permanent leap which
transfers the limit of the Church to where you annihilate yourselves ."

This reiterates his words to al - Imam Musa al - Sadr : salvation is not con¬

fined to those who belong to Christ ' s body in this world , i . e . , the Christian

Church . For God ' s workings and epiphanies permeate all nature and , by

extension , all human beings . Love for the other is the necessary condition

for , and the only embodiment of , God ' s presence in man ' s heart and mind .

It is genuine love if it succeeds not only to tolerate but also to cherish the

otherness of the other . It is this very difference that makes out the exis¬

tence of the other as individual and adds to the multiplicity , pluralism , and

richness of existence . Only thus can one enjoy coexistence as enriching

exchange and partnership .

This is an approximation of Khodr 's Utopian vision . Every Utopia ,

when faced with the harsh realities of everyday life , is bound to contain

some paradoxical difficulties , not to say logical contradictions . Khodr

never pretends that his vision is based on rational grounds . The Ocean of

Eternal Being cannot be contained in a rational shell . Only some faint echo

may be perceptible across our frail words struggling to convey the Eternal
Word .

As I said earlier , Khodr is a man of faith , hence a man of hope . Of course ,

this hope would be facile if it were a sheer ' professional ' or programmatic

hope , or even the optimism of the will as opposed to the pessimism of the

heart . This hope commands our respect and often our admiration , because it

never flinched in the midst of general despair ! True , there are moments of

great sadness in Metropolitan Khodr ' s tone . Yet , this sadness is only normal

in the wake of unbelievable atrocities committed by members of the same

 THE WAY OF THE CROSS AS A WAY OF LIFE
495

people against each other , to the old and weary , weak and poor , women
and children , and even the dead in their graves . To survive and still for¬
give , to keep speaking out for love and hope against hate and despair is the
spiritual achievement of very few people during and after the Lebanese
civil war . For these few , Metropolitan Khodr has been an eloquent herald .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE
OF JEWS , CHRISTIANS , AND MUSLIMS :
INTERFAITH DIALOGUE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION
Karl - Josef Kuschel

I - The third wave of pluralization

On the threshold of the third millennium , it is easier than for previous gen¬

erations to overlook the long - term developments characteristic of our time .

Many European countries , including Germany , are currently undergoing a

third wave of pluralization . The first one , breaking up Europe ' s medieval ,

ecclesiastical unity in the sixteenth century , may be called a confessional

or denominational , inner - Christian pluralization . Two centuries later , a

second wave of pluralization eroded the still existing " Christian " unity and

divided society into two realms , a Christian - ecclesiastical and a secular -

humanistic one . Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion - the

" spiritual physiognomy of modernity " - became a mark of our life - world

since . We are the inheritors of that twofold pluralization .

Since the mid - twentieth century , however , a third wave of pluralization

is taking shape in Western Europe , creating new facts on the ground . We

may call it the pluralism of religions . Today , ca . 3 . 2 million Muslims are

living in Germany , about 10 - 12 million in Europe . According to some es¬

timates , their number will rise to 40 million by 2020 . Never before in

modern history , has such a large non - Christian minority lived in Germany ;

never before has it been a Muslim one . ( Even Judaism , for many centuries

Germany ' s largest religious and cultural minority , had ' only ' ca . 550 , 000

adherents at the beginning of the 1930s . ) As a result of this new constella¬

tion , Europe is facing new political challenges . Bluntly speaking : Reli¬

gious pluralization is disrupting both the confessional and the secular -

humanistic status quo . The consensually negotiated separation between an

ecclesiastical and a secular realm is being disturbed by a new religious fac¬

tor challenging advocates of both established Christianity and established

secularism . The experience of pluralization is accompanied by an experi¬

ence of fragmentation : an experience of mental isolation , refusal to dia -

498 KARL -JOSEF KUSCHEL

logue , of self - ghettoization and cultural defense reactions . At present , the

third wave of pluralization is far from being a socially accepted and well -
established reality in Germany and Europe .
Not surprisingly , many contemporaries are experiencing religious plu¬
ralization as a threat , not as an enrichment . Archetypal fears , especially of
Islam , are on the rise . They are mirroring a unique European experience
without parallels in Europe ' s encounters with other non - European civiliza¬
tions . 1 Political and cultural stereotypes of fear and contempt , directed ,
above all , against Islam , have taken root in our base communities , paralyz¬
ing peoples ' willingess to study the spiritual substance of that religion in
all its dimensions . Islam is reduced to an ideology and political weapon of
mass - mobilization . It is , thus , grotesquely disfigured , i . e . , deprived of its
philosophical and cultural dimensions as well as of its rich mystical ex¬
perience , its artistic and literary legacy .
Speculations about the demise of multiculturalism in Europe are
widely voiced (just as if multiculturalism had been a well - established fact
here before ) . On the international level , fears of a " Clash of Civilizations " ,
i . e . , scenarios of violent global conflict in the third millennium , have

gained currency .

II - " Clash of Civilizations ? "

Small wonder that Samuel P . Huntington ' s essay , " The Clash of Civiliza¬
tions ? " 2 - published in 1993 and developed into a book 3 in 1996 - created
considerable stir during recent years : Huntington argues that the main con¬
flicts of twenty - first - century world politics will not develop along the ideo¬
logical fault lines of the East - West divide ( as had been the case in the
twentieth century ) , but between culturally and religiously defined commu¬
nities . The age of the Cold War is over , Huntington claims ; and to him it
even seems to have been only a transient historical anomaly . The military
and economic superiority of the superpowers , he argues , had temporarily
contained the impact of cultures and religions on international politics .

1 See Karl - Josef Kuschel , Vom Streit zum Wettstreit der Religionen : Lessing und die
Herausforderung des Islam , Diisseldorf : Patmos , 1998 ; Jiirgen Osterhammel , Die
Entzauberung Asiens : Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18 . Jahrhundert , Mtin -
chen : Beck , 1998 .
2 Samuel P. Huntington , " The Clash of Civilizations ? " Foreign Affairs 72 ( 1993 ) 3 , 22 -
49.
3 Samuel P . Huntington , The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order ,
New York : Simon & Schuster , 1996 .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE
499

Like a gigantic clamp , the East - West - divide had forced together what did

not belong together .

The collapse of the Soviet Union , however , finally changed that global

constellation . Huntington assumes that the emerging power vacuum will

be used , above all by Muslim states and by China , to build new alliances

based on cultural and religious commonalities . Surprisingly for a political

analyst , Huntington t hink s religion to be a crucial factor in world politics .

According to him , three civilizations will determine twenty - first - century

international conflicts : the Western - Christian , the Oriental - Islamic and the

Asian - Confucian one . Besides those three , Huntington identifies several

other civilizations . Here again it is obvious that the characteristic labels are

derived from the realm of religion . Next to the three civilizations men¬

tioned above , there are , according to Huntington , a Japanese civilization , a

Hindu civilization centered around India , a Slavic - Orthodox one with Rus¬

sia as its core state , a Latin American , and , finally , an African one . The

" fault lines " between these eight civilizations are expected to become the

next central cleavages international politics would have to prepare for .

Meanwhile , Huntington ' s scenario has become the subject of intense

debate among politicians , political scientists , and students of religion .4 For

us , three major objections are particularly important :

( 1 ) Contrary to Huntington ' s allegations , wars during the 1990s did not

develop along cultural fault lines , but rather remained regional conflicts ,

supported by economic , ethnic or economic - geographic causes . The Gulf

War is a striking example ( a " Christian - Muslim " alliance against a " Mus¬

lim " state ) , as are the tensions between Iraq , Iran , and Afghanistan , or be¬

tween Turkey and Syria about the Kurdish question .

( 2 ) It is not civilizations and religions that are agents of world politics

and it is not them that are likely to cause a future strategic crash . The pow¬

ers of disruption rather are in the aftereffects of global modernization : the

emergence of social winners and social losers , societal and social fragmen¬

tation . If fault lines between states should arise , they will not develop

along cultural and religious criteria but , at best , along social ones : North

vs . South , rich Islamic states vs . poor ones , winning regions ( the Pacific

region ) vs . losing ones ( Africa ) . As before , the conflicts to come will not

be about culture or religion , but rather will , by and large , be distributive

4 On Huntington ' s thesis see Bassam Tibi , Krieg der Zivilisationen : Politik und Religion
zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus , Hamburg : Hoffmann & Campe , 1995 ;
Dieter Senghaas , Zivilisierung wider Willen : Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst ,
Frankfurt / M .: Suhrkamp , 1998 ; Volker Rittberger and Andreas Hasenclever ,
" Religionen in Konflikten " , in : Wissenschaft und Weltethos , eds . Hans Kiing and Karl -
Josef Kuschel , Miinchen : Piper , 1998 , 161 - 200 .
500 KARL -JOSEF KUSCHEL

conflicts between strong and weak states or between ruling elites and los¬
ers of modernization .
( 3 ) Particularly ominous is Huntington ' s image of Islam , a negative

stereotype deeply rooted in the Western mind since more than fourteen
centuries . 5 For many centuries , the " Orient " - from the Ottoman Empire to
Persia , India , and China - was stereotyped as " despotic " , " static " , " not
enlightened " , " irrational " , " hedonistic " , and " fanatic " , no matter if it were
for political , religious , climatic , or mental reasons . With Huntington , age -
old fears are gaining currency again according to which the Huns , the
Moors , or the Turks might overrun Europe , the Russians might come , or
the " Yellow Peril " is clouding the horizon in the Far East .
We don ' t have to decide here whether there is some truth in all these
analyses and in the global - strategic scenarios derived from them , or
whether they are just rooted in anxious projections or in economic and po¬
litical interests aiming , for example , at promoting the armaments industry
or legitimating western defense budgets . For us , the decisive question is :
Does it need , after Huntington ' s scenarios , any additional proof to demon¬
strate that dialogue between religions - and especially dialogue between
Judaism , Christianity , and Islam - is an irrevocable task ? If we don ' t want
to indulge in cynic fatalism - under the motto " Dialogue makes no sense ,
the clash of civilizations will come anyhow ; and the self - ghettoization of
cultures is inevitable ( as may be seen in many American cities ) " we will
have to draw at least one conclusion from Huntington ' s argument , namely
that building competence in religious and cultural dialogue is pivotal for
peacebuilding , especially in the age of globalization . 6

Ill - Globalization and interfaith dialogue

The current globalization debate frequently refers to globalization as by no

means being a homogeneous process but as developing in quite different
regional ways and even provoking counter - movements . Economic global -

5 See Kuschel , Vom Streit zum Wettstreit der Religionen [ fn . 1] , ch . 1/ 3 : " Das Islambild
von Mittelalter und Reformation ".

6 Remarkably enough even Huntington , in his book , is addressing this problem , although
only next to the last page : " At least at a basic ' thin ' morality level , some commonal¬
ities exist between Asia and the West . In addition , as many have pointed out , whatever
the degree to which they divided humankind , the world ' s major religions - Western
Christianity , Orthodoxy , Hinduism , Buddhism , Islam , Confucianism , Taoism , Judaism
- also share key values in common . If humans are ever to develop a universal civiliza¬
tion , it will emerge gradually through the exploration and expansion of these common¬
alities " ( Huntington , Clash of Civilizations [ fn . 3 ] , 320 ) .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE
501

ization is not tantamount to cultural and religious globalization . Expecta¬

tions that the globalization of markets would lead to a globalization of

consciousness , a deeper understanding of the Other , or even to more plane¬

tary solidarity , have remained unfulfilled so far . The global overcoming of

economic boundaries is not accompanied by similar developments in inter -

religious communication . On the contrary : In all world religions , funda¬

mentalist tendencies are on the rise ; radicalization and confrontation is tak¬

ing place . Regarding the world ' s religious situation , we may conclude :

( 1) Economic globalization notwithstanding , religions do not merge

into one homogenized religion serving a homogenized world society . As a

matter of fact , we have to assume that the world religions will maintain

their claims to represent mutually exclusive truths . Huntington has a handy

formula : "A person can be half - French and half - Arab and simultaneously
even a citizen of two countries . It is more difficult to be half - Catholic and

half - Muslim . " 7 We may conclude : despite all homogenization within the

one world society - for example , in the realms of fashion , music , electron¬

ics , and consumption - , resistance towards homogenization remains deeply

entrenched in the realm of religion .

In other words : Although , at the level of taste , we may find exactly the

same McDonald 's commodity between Reykjavik and Tokyo , between

Spitzbergen and Cape Town , there will be no " McDonaldization " of world

religions . 8 Time - tested civilizations or cultures that have grown over thou¬

sands of years are likely to retain their distinctiveness precisely because of

their particular religious and ethnic profile . They are more resistant to in -

terchangeability than other realities . We may even add that by promoting

global homogenization and standardization , economic globalization is al¬

most inevitably provoking counter - forces that promote resistance against

homogenization and emphasize the particular and individual . Economic

globalization , thus , is furthering processes of cultural and religious frag¬

mentation , the emphasis of conscious otherness and uniqueness .

(2 ) Contrary to all superficial political theories , which , due to their

critically biased attitude towards religion , are usually neglecting the impact

of world religions , we have to recognize that world religions are playing a

pivotal role in world politics . Even political scientists and politicians are

admitting today that , in this respect , world politics has suffered from mis¬
calculations and mistaken decisions .

7 Huntington , " The Clash of Civilizations ? " [ fn . 2 ] , 27 .

8 See : Ulrich Beck , Was ist Globalisierung ? Irrtiimer des Globalismus - Antworten auf
die Globalisierung , Frankfurt / M . : Suhrkamp , 1997 .
502 KARL - JOSEF KUSCHEL

Particularly instructive is a volume edited by Douglas Johnston and

Cynthia Sampson ( Center for Strategic and International Studies , Wash¬
ington , DC ) : Religion , The Missing Dimension of Statecraft , published in
1994 , provides ample evidence that in many scenarios of international con¬
flict the conflict ' s religious dimension had been completely ignored . As a
result , religion had been either insufficiently restrained and , thus , permit¬
ted to play a negative role , or not sufficiently used to inspire , organize and
protect peacebuilding . Lebanon , Vietnam , and Iran are telling examples .
Within the last twenty years , the Iranian Revolution of 1979 revealed the
most striking failure of western analysts to grasp Islam ' s capability to re¬
suscitate itself as a religion and to assume a new role in world politics . The
American separation between church and state may have supported this
misperception . This is at least what Douglas Johnston , co - editor of the
book , which came out with a foreword of former US President Jimmy
Carter , suggests :

" . . . the
rigorous separation of church and state in the United States had so
relegated religion to the realm of the personal that it left many of us
insensitive to the extent to which religion and politics intertwine in much
the rest of the world . Such an insensivity . . . could lead , and probably had
led , to uninformed and potentially costly foreign policy choices ." 9

On the other hand , the case studies assembled in Religion , The Missing
Dimension of Statecraft , provide evidence that religion frequently helped
promoting or restoring peace ( reconciliation between Germany and France ,
peace in Nicaragua , transition to democracy in the Philippines , end of
Apartheid in South Africa ) . Jimmy Carter , a believing Christian , could re¬
fer to a particularly relevant case proving the positive potential of religion
in solving international crises :

"The negotiations between Menachem Begin , Anwar el - Sadat , and my¬

self at Camp David in 1978 were greatly influenced by our religious
backgrounds . This was evident in the fact that a joint appeal for prayer
preceded our discussions at Camp David and that each of us worshiped
separately throughout our stay together . But the role of religion was
perhaps greater than is commonly recognized or easily quantified . Begin
and Sadat were deeply religious men . Their religious beliefs shaped
their personalities , historical perspectives , and political convictions . If
the talks at Camp David engaged statesmen in the search for a political

9 Douglas Johnston , " Acknowledgements " , in : Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson ,
eds . , Religion , the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, New York : Oxford University
Press , 1994 , DC .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE
503

settlement , in the final analysis they also involved religiously committed men .
Each of the principals at Camp David recognized peace to be a gift from God
and a preeminent human obligation . As the mediator of the talks , I am con¬
vinced that to have overlooked the importance of religion for both Sadat and
Begin would have resulted in a failure to understand these two men ." 10

The political class in Germany , too , including parts of the Left , has recognized

the necessity of rethinking the role of religion in world politics . In 1999 , the

Social Democratic Party of Germany issued a path - breaking memorandum

entitled Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen in einer globalen Gesellschaft :

Risiken , Gefahrdungen , Perspektiven (" Cultural coexistence in a global soci¬
ety : risks , dangers , and perspectives "). Although the negative aspects of re¬

ligions ( violence , political exploitation , irreconcilability ) are dealt with in quite

plain terms , the text defends religion against any " Kulturkampfideologie " ( cul¬

tural - clash ideology ) and emphasizes instead the ability of religions and civili¬

zations to promote mutual understanding :

" Neither a study of the world ' s religions and civilizations nor their inter¬
nal development indicate that enmity between them is for ever prepro¬
grammed by their fundamental principles . Time and again , serious efforts
towards mutual understanding between representatives of all religions of
the world , Islam and Buddhism , Hinduism and Chinese religions , Japa¬
nese and African religions , Christianity and Judaism , have lead to consen¬
sus on the basic values that facilitate peaceful coexistence , mutual respect ,
and active cooperation . Most recently this has been demonstrated by the
editorial process as well as by the content of the final declaration ' To¬
wards a Global Ethic ' , passed by the Parliament of the World ' s Religions
in Chicago , 1994 . " 11

TV - Interfaith dialogue beyond the confines of theology

1. Political science

Today , similarly constructive signals are coming from the camp of political

science . An impressive paper by Volker Rittberger and Andreas Hasen -

10 Jimmy Carter , " Foreword " , in : Religion , the Missing Dimension of Statecraft , loc .
cit . , VII .

11 " Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen in einer globalen Gesellschaft : Risiken ,

Gefahrdungen , Perspektiven . Eine Ermutigung " , in : Das Zusammenleben der Kul¬
turen in einer globalen Gesellschaft : Kongrefi der Friedrich - Ebert - Stiftung am 3.
Februar 1999 in Berlin , Bonn : Friedrich - Ebert - Stiftung , 1999 , 23 - 44 ( p . 26 ) ;
online version at : http : / / www .fes . de /fulltext / akademie / 00652002 . htm # LOCE9E3 .
504 KARL - JOSEF KUSCHEL

clever , two political scientists from Tubingen University , provides ample

proof that the impact of religions on world politics is taken more serious in
contemporary political science than it has been in the past . 12 Considering
that neither the causes for violence nor the propensity to violent conflict -
management have diminished , the two authors suggest that an awareness
of common values among adherents of different religions , achieved by a
dialogue , might help building barriers against violence and facilitate
peaceful conflict - management . In addition , the authors propose two ways
towards reaching these goals :
( 1 ) Religious communities are facing a security dilemma : In order to

reduce the propensity to violence in their respective societies , they have to

be sure that other religious communities will do the same . Otherwise , the
peaceful party would always be ' the fool ' . The only way to escape this di¬
lemma consists in building mutual trust by avoiding abusing the others '
readiness for peace and cooperation . At least , abuse should be detected at a
very early stage in order to diminish its benefits . In this respect , the fact
might be helpful that there is hardly any modern state without a religious
minority . The way a religious majority is treating the minorities in its
sphere of influence would be an important indication of its sincerity to
' cooperate ' on the global level . Trust between the world religions might

grow with their commitment to defend , in their respective spheres of influ¬

ence , persons of different faiths . By this , they would convey their respect
of the norms of a common ethic . A culture of mutual respect would evolve
reducing , in turn , the propensity to demonize ' the enemy ' in situations of
social conflict .
( 2 ) In order to sustain the process of minority protection , religious

communities could , furthermore , agree on establishing a common , non¬

governmental appellation authority for discriminated or oppressed minori¬
ties . Interreligious communication might be institutionalized , for instance ,
by establishing interreligious organizations that could provide a common
framework for discussing problems of interpretation and implementation ,
and for working through the history of interreligious discrimination and
persecution , prejudices , and fears .

2 . Politics

In politics , the world ' s religions are increasingly called upon to commit
themselves to comprehensive international dialogue ( including encounter ,
mutual understanding , and cooperation ) . More than his predecessors , the

12 Rittberger and Hasenclever , " Religionen in Konflikten " [ fn . 4 ] , 161 - 200 .

 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE 505

seventh President of the Federal Republic of Germany , Professor Roman

Herzog ( 1994 - 99 ) , has been an advocate of interreligious and intercultural

dialogue . His long - distance dialogue with the President of the Republic of

Iran , Sayyid Muhammad Khatami ( Muhammad Khatami ) is an important

example . On September 26 , 1998 , Khatami published a path - breaking arti¬

cle in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung entitled " Keine Religion ist im

Besitz der absoluten Wahrheit " ( No religion is in possession of absolute

truth ) . 13 Invoking the tradition of Islamic mysticism , Khatami argues that

the truth of religion is an experience to be made by each believer in his

heart . Although many mystics tried to expound the rational dimensions of

that " way " , the " way " itself consists in the mystical union , not in intellec¬

tual understanding : " . . . the way of the heart is an individual way , not a

collective one ." The final illumination experienced in and through the

presence of God , Khatami says , cannot be communicated through intellec¬

tual concepts and acquired knowledge . The individual ' s religion is an inner

experience , emanating from the union with the origin of creation .

For Khatami , the idea that religiosity is rooted in man ' s soul , is comple¬

mented by a second basic insight : religion , i . e . , the reification of internal

spiritual experience , is subject to historical change . For him , the differences

of opinion between different thinkers , adherents of different doctrines , dif¬

ferent denominations of a religion , and even the conceptual contradictions

inside those denominations are just as many proofs that nobody may claim

to be in possession of absolute truth .

" Which Islam do we mean when we speak of Islam ? The Islam of Abu
Dharr , the Islam of Avicenna , the Islam of the Ash carites , the mystics ,
the orthodox or the literalists ? All of them are testifying to the relativity
of human knowledge including men ' s knowledge of religion . . . . The es¬
sential problem of a community of believers consists in the fact that it
believes in absolute , sublime , and sacred truths and realities , while its

own life and spirit is relative . This means that its relation to those abso¬
lute truths and realities is relative , too . As long as that community is
aware of its boundaries and limits , this contradiction will not become a
fateful one ."

Khatami ' s idea of the fundamental historicity of all external reifications of

religion comes with a third basic thought : the warning not to make those
relative reifications absolute :

13 Sejjed Mohammad Chatami , " Keine Religion ist im Besitz der absoluten Wahrheit ",
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , September 26 , 1998 .
506 KARL -JOSEF KUSCHEL

" Disaster will befall a community of believers not before it is transferring

the absoluteness and sacredness of Religion to Man ' s relative , erroneous ,
temporally and spatially limited perceptions of religion ; when the con¬
cepts Man with all his limitations has arrived at are taken for Religion it¬
self ; and when the idea is gaining ground that only he is a believer who
submits to those concepts . Here we may find the reason why people are
declared sinners and heretics and why wars are waged . "

Khatami ' s article was widely regarded as a sensational invitation to dia¬

logue . In January 1999 , President Roman Herzog replied at the World
Economic Forum in Davos :

" I also feel highly encouraged by the Iranian President Mohammad Kha¬
tami . He has called on the Islamic societies not to hide inside the fortress
of tradition , but to open up to the modern world , without falling prey to
unbridled materialism . His call for a dialogue between the religions and
his initiative for an ' International Year of Cultural Dialogue ' deserve
every support . They appear to me to herald a policy of building confi¬
dence through greater knowledge of and greater respect for one an¬
other . " 14

3 . The Parliament of the World 's Religions

In 1993 , the Parliament of the World ' s Religions , assembled in Chicago ,

passed a common "Declaration Toward a Global Ethic " . The declaration
was supported and signed by representatives and members from all relig¬
ions , including the Buddhist Dalai Lama and the Catholic cardinal and
archbishop of Chicago as well as rabbis , Muslim , Buddhist , and Hindu
leaders , and representatives of smaller religions . 15 The text of the declara¬
tion is based on the fundamental insight that religions possess resources of
spirituality and wisdom that should be mobilized for the benefit of human¬
kind more than before . The elementary maxims on which consensus may

14 Roman Herzog , " Maxims of Responsibility in a Globalized World ( Opening address at

the World Economic Forum , Davos , on 28 January 1999 ) , in : Roman Herzog [ et al .] ,
Preventing the Clash of Civilizations : A Peace Strategy for the Twenty -First Century,
ed . Henrik Schmiegelow , New York : St . Martin ' s Press , 1999 , 65 - 76 ( p . 75 ) . German
version : " Fur eine globale Verantwortungsgemeinschaft " , Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung , January 29 , 1999 .
15 Hans Kung and Karl - Josef Kuschel , eds . , A Global Ethic : The Declaration of the Par¬
liament of the World 's Religions , New York : Continuum , 1993 ; cf . also M . Hofmann ,
" Bibliographie zur Weltethos - Debatte " , in : Wissenschaft und Weltethos [ fn . 4 ] , 493 -
511 .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE
507

be reached are obvious already now . The Chicago declaration claims that
one principle has been accepted as the ethical minimum standard all over
the world :

" There is a principle which is found and has persisted in many religious
and ethical traditions of humankind for thousands of years : What you do
not wish done to yourself, do not do to others . Or in positive terms : What
you wish done to yourself, do to others ! This should be the irrevocable ,
unconditional norm for all areas of life , for families and communities , for

races , nations , and religions ." 16

Moreover , by comparing the religious traditions of humankind , four " ir¬

revocable directives " , which are basically supported in all religious tradi¬
tions , can be identified : 17 You shall not kill ! You shall not steal ! You shall
not lie ! You shall not commit sexual immorality !
The Chicago declaration is important not the least because it translates
these ' negative ' directives into positive maxims applying them , in explana¬
tory texts , to the present situation :
• ' Tow shall not kill " , translated into positive terms , means : "Have
respect for life " . Therefore , the first irrevocable directive is : com¬
mitment to a culture of non - violence and respect for life .
• " You shall not steal " , translated into positive terms , means : " Deal
honestly and fair " . The second irrevocable directive thus is : com¬
mitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order .
• " You shall not lie " , translated into positive terms , means : " Speak
and act truthfully " . Therefore , the third irrevocable directive is :
commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness .
• " You shall not commit sexual immorality " , translated into positive
terms , means : "Respect and love each other " . Therefore , the fourth
irrevocable directive is : commitment to a culture of equal rights
and partnership between men and women .
There is no need to explain in detail how important it would be for the
" Face of the Earth " to meet those four irrevocable directives . Quite a lot

would have been achieved , if people would follow the ethical directives
provided by their own religious traditions . Therefore , the Chicago declara¬
tion addresses in plain terms criticism to the religions :

16 The Parliament of the World ' s Religions , " Declaration Toward a Global Ethic " , in : A
Global Ethic [ fh . 15 ] , 11 - 39 ( pp . 23 - 24 ) . Online version at : http : // \ vww . uni - tuebingen .
de/stiftung - weltethos/dat - eng/ index3 - e . htm .
17 Cf . ibid ., 24 - 34 .
508 KARL -JOSEF KUSCHEL

" Time and again we see leaders and members of religions incite aggres¬
sion , fanaticism , hate , and xenophobia - even inspire and legitimate vio¬
lent and bloody conflicts . Religion often is misused for purely power -
. " 18
political goals , including war . We are filled with disgust

Religious leaders , thus , are particularly called upon to commit themselves

to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness . In unequivocal terms ,
the Chicago declaration , addressing the representatives of religion , states :

"When they stir up prejudice , hatred , and enmity towards those of differ¬
ent belief, or even incite or legitimate religious wars , they deserve the
condemnation of humankind and the loss of their adherents . " 19

4 . The InterAction Council

Of particular interest is the initiative of the " InterAction Council " of for¬
mer heads of government . A draft proposal for a " Universal Declaration of
Human Responsibilities " 20 was published by the InterAction Council on
September 1 , 1997 , as a complement to the Universal Declaration of Hu¬
man Rights . 21 In 1997 , former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt ( 1974 -
82 ) presented this draft to the public , defending it against criticism ( voiced ,
for example , by human rights organizations ) according to which emphasiz¬
ing human responsibilities might relativize or even diminish the status of
human rights . Human rights , the critics feared , might lose their exclusivity
and thus become still more vulnerable to infringements from the side of
the powers - that - be .
This , however , was a grotesque misunderstanding right from the start .
The idea to complement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by a
Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities was meant to strengthen
( and not to relativize ) the former . It was out of the question to play off one

against the other . The Declaration of Human Responsibilities was meant to

support and underpin the ethos of human rights . It is precisely the occur¬
rence of serious human rights violations that demonstrates that mere ap¬
peals to human rights will not get us very far as long as the powers - that - be
are not politically or morally committed to them . The implementation of
human rights requires an ethos , a deep moral self - obligation . Wherever the

18 Ibid . , 17 .

19 Ibid . , 31 .

20 Online text at : http :/ / www .asiawide . or .jp / iac / UDHR / EngDecll . htm .

21 See : Hans Kiing and Helmut Schmidt , eds . , A Global Ethic and Global Responsibili¬
ties : Two Declarations , London : SCM Press , 1998 .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE
509

latter is missing , human rights will be ignored and human rights proclama¬

tions will be nothing but idle talk . It takes a moral impulse , an ethical mo¬

tivation , and a drive towards goodness to realize human rights . Wherever

these are lacking , all declarations will fail . The Declaration of Human Re¬

sponsibilities was precisely aimed at strengthening that impulse , motive

power , and drive .

V — Towards an Abrahamic ecumene

All in all we may conclude that the representatives of humankind ' s great

religious traditions will have to assume a crucial role in the process of con¬

trolling and cushioning economic globalization . Just as there is no global

peace without religions , there will be no global justice . And because there

is no global peace and justice without the religions , the representatives of

the latter are co - responsible for furthering the integration of humankind ,

and not its division . Despite their outrageous abuse , religions will continue

to have an indispensable function , provided they mobilize people for peace

and mutual understanding instead of promoting fanaticism and exclusion .

As before , religions have - despite their " chronique scandaleuse " - spiri¬

tual and moral resources to resist the power - holders and evil spirits of our

time . Despite all problems , religions are still able to motivate people , to

hold up a mirror to society , and to bring about a change of hearts and

minds . The question rather is : are they mentally prepared to assume such a

role in world politics ? Are they able to develop out of their innermost

foundations why they should contribute to furthering humankind ' s solidar¬

ity , and not its divisiveness ?

1 . The theological deficit within the prophetic religions

The great religions of prophetic origin - Judaism , Christianity and Islam -

are not yet sufficiently prepared for the new world situation . I am not talk¬

ing about the co mmi tment of countless individuals all over the world to

peace , humanity , and justice . Neither am I talking about the countless

moral appeals of religious leaders to preserve peace , renounce violence ,

and search for common ground between people of different faiths . Moral

appeals like these are inexpensive ; they don ' t demand any serious invest¬

ment because they do not stem from groundwork at the foundations of

one ' s own religion . These foundations , laid down in the ancient scriptures

of the Hebrew Bible , the New Testament and the Qur ' an , are crucial for

determining whether a religion is prepared to accept either the " stranger " ,

the " Other " or the " unbeliever " in front of God or not . Only by starting
510 KARL - JOSEF KUSCHEL

from these foundational scriptures I will find out whether or not I will be
able to acknowledge the Other as a challenge to my own faith or even as a
source of creative restlessness in my own way of understanding God .
There is no denying : for centuries , all religious communities were im¬
pregnated by theologies of confrontation . Identity was thought to be de¬
terminable by exclusion alone : " I know who I am because I know against
whom I am " ; " I am a Christian because under no circumstances can I be a
Jew or a Muslim " ; " I am a Jew because under no circumstances can I be a
Christian or a Muslim " ; " I am a Muslim because under no circumstances
can I be a Jew or a Christian " .
In Judaism , for example , other religions were mainly used to justify ,
time and gain , the original legitimacy of Judaism . Orthodox Jews were
regarding Christianity and Islam as sectarian or heretical split offs . Sure ,
orthodox rabbis knew of some theological possibilities to tolerate the co¬
existence of Jews and non - Jews ; but one thing was for sure : the Christian
and Muslim witness of faith was irrelevant to an orthodox Jew . To be cer¬
tain of one ' s own God , one did not need the spiritual experience of Chris¬
tianity or Islam .
In Christianity , the dogma , Extra ecclesiam nulla salus ( " No salvation
outside the Church " , Council of Florence , 1442 ) , was for a long time taken
as a self - evident truth . The non - Christian is doomed ! The heathen goes to
hell ! The Reformation , too , did not advance the cause of a theology of re¬
ligions . It was mainly concerned with the Freedom of a Christian ( Luther )
and not with the freedom of religions in general . The latter is a typical
product of the Modern Age . Small wonder that against such a background
respect of Judaism and Islam could not arise . Judaism as a pre - Christ relig¬
ion was considered superseded and discarded . Islam as a post - Christ relig¬
ion was taken as a kind of Christian heresy developed under the influence
of the Devil , or as a brand of paganism to be eliminated by missionary
work or even crusades . Since the Middle Ages and the Reformation , Chris¬
tians considered both religions as products of heresy , unbelief , and work -
righteousness .
For centuries , it has been difficult in Islam , too , not to assume a trium¬
phant and condescending attitude towards other religious communities .
True , the Qur ' an distinguishes between people of different faiths ( Jews and
Christians ) and unbelievers ( idolators ) and has appreciative words about
" the People of the Book " ( Jews and Christians ) . However , at a very early

stage , the latter were subjected to legal discrimination in Muslim society .

Moreover , in the course of time , Muslim theologians began to elaborate Is¬
lam ' s claim to be the only , exclusive way to salvation . Their exegetical
studies , designed to prove that previous revelations had been either abro -
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE 511

gated or superseded by Islam , were by no means inferior to the exegetical

models of Christian theology . It is , furthermore , pretty well known that

even in contemporary Islam ( and particularly in its Arab core countries ) in¬

fluential religious leaders are publicly taking an aggressive stand against

Jews and Christians , continuing the apologetic - polemic tradition of Islamic

theology and driving at a total confrontation with the other religions .

In other words : for centuries the respective religious communities con¬

ceived their particular understanding of God as the absolute one , i . e . , with¬

out taking the spiritual experience of other faiths into account . Corporate

identity was developed with one ' s back towards anybody else . One ' s own

truth could shine brightly the more it was contrasted to a gray or black

background of half - truths or untruths .

2 . The crucial question

This is why we are lacking a comprehensive and constructive theology of

the respective Other in all prophetic - monotheistic religions . We are lack¬

ing a reflection , arising from deep religious concern , on why God has cho¬

sen this and not another way for humankind . Why did He will these three

religions to exist together , against one another , but at any rate not without

each other ? The crucial theological question , thus , should read as follows :

For a Jew : why didn ' t the way of Israel - prescribed in the Torah and

expounded in the interpretations of rabbinical scholars ( Mishnah , Talmud ) -

become the way for humankind in its entirety ? Why did God choose a dif¬

ferent way for the other nations ? And how does the fact that the same God

revealed himself to other nations in a different way affect a Jew ' s under¬

standing of his own faith ? Jesus of Nazareth and the Prophet Muhammad -

are they merely thin branches at the tree of Abraham and Moses ?

For a Christian : the disquieting question of faith results from two per¬

plexities . First , with regard to Israel : How could the Church pursue a the¬

ology of disinheritment towards Israel for almost 2000 years ? And how

was it possible to cultivate an anti - Judaism that nearly wiped out the peo¬

ple of Israel when combined with 20th - century racist anti - Semitism - with

the church watching all this ! Why was it not until the Holocaust that Chris¬

tians finally understood that Israel may and must go its own way before

God and that any attempt to evangelize Israel are a form of blasphemy - in

particular after the Shoah . Second , with regard to Islam : Why did God will

a new revealed religion after everything seemed settled between Him and

humankind through the Christ and the assertion of the Church as a world

political factor ? Until now , we are sensing in almost any Christian theol¬

ogy a kind of uneasiness and helplessness in dealing with such a post -

512 KARL -JOSEF KUSCHEL

Christ religion , i . e . , with a community of faith beyond the confines of the

Church that is testifying God since 1400 years in a different way , relating
hundreds of million people to God without resorting to Christian Christol -
ogy . Until now , large parts of Christian theology are reacting to Islam ei¬
ther with arrogance or with ignorance . Islam is either condescendingly
treated as a primitive , backward form of Christianity or completely ig¬
nored .
The crucial theological question reads similar for Muslims : if Islam is
God ' s definite and ultimate revelation in the history of humankind , why
hasn ' t humankind become Islamic after 1400 years ? Why did the same
God , who entrusted the Prophet Muhammad with the final revelation , al¬
low Jews and Christians to continue to exist ? Why a living Judaism and a
no less vital Christianity at Islam ' s side - not to mention other religions of
Indian and Chinese origin ? How is it , hence , possible to live the Muslim
faith , although God is apparently regarding other witnesses to His truth as
similarly legitimate ?

3 . A comprehensive " Theology of the Other " is lacking in all religions

The most surprising thing , however , is that even nowadays Jewish , Chris¬
tian , and Islamic theologies are largely ignoring the question what the faith
of the Other might mean for one ' s own faith . Is it really of no importance
to an orthodox Jew whether there is a God - willed dispense from Torah and
Halakhah , as Christians and Muslims claim ? Is it a matter of indifference
to a believing Jew whether there exists a belief in God without His explicit
commandments and prohibitions , a life after the Torah - the Torah which
Jews are reading as God 's directives , and not as just another set of rules
and regulations ? Is it irrelevant to a Christian that there was a Prophet after
the Christ asking humankind in the name of God to change its life once
more ? Is it irrelevant to a Muslim that both Jews and Christians ( whose
faiths he believes to have superseded by his own revelation ) are still main¬
taining their claims to the truth , thus questioning the self - evidence of his
own religious decision at two fronts ?
It is time to rethink the existence of the Other in front of God within
the perspective of one ' s own legitimate creed . It is one and the same God
who has willed the history and fate of religions precisely this way and not
another way . We need to think in terms of simultaneity and not in terms of
superiority . We need a theology that allows maintaining one ' s own claim
to truth without excluding or demonizing other claims to truth . Approach¬
ing this problem through Abraham , the common ancestor of Judaism ,
Christianity and Islam , is of crucial importance .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE 513

4 . The root : Abraham , Hagar , and Sarah

Let me start with some autobiographical remarks to explain my commit¬

ment to the cause of an Abrahamic ecumene of Jews , Christians and Mus¬

lims . Theological thought always responds to existential or societal chal¬

lenges , too . Theological reasoning is neither proceeding without subjects

nor beyond time and space .

For a long time I believed that the interpretation of biblical narratives

had come to an end . I felt unable to see any particular attraction in them .

There was no suspense , no depth , and no call . A vital impulse was required

to arrive at fresh insights . That is how I experienced the narratives about

Abraham . For a long time , I took them for already explored and " seen

through " , as theologically safe , but existentially exhausted . There was ,

however , one experience that was to change all this .

In 1989 , I had the opportunity to join a trialogue - group of Jewish ,

Christian and Muslim theologians in the USA . Organized and funded by

the New York National Council of Christians and Jews , the project lasted

for six years . We met once a year to discuss fundamental questions con¬

cerning Judaism , Christianity , and Islam . Having been completely inex¬

perienced in these kinds of encounters , I learnt a lot from our discussions .

Sure , I had looked into modern Jewish theology in Germany before ; I had

had some dialogue meetings with Jewish theologians such as Nathan Peter

Levinson or Pinchas Lapide ; I had dealt with basic issues of Jewish -

Christian dialogue in my classes at the university . But I had been com¬

pletely unfamiliar with Muslim theology . During my theological studies I

had never been asked , let alone taught , to respect Islam from a Christian

point of view as the only post - Christ world religion .

During our discussions I came across one name over and over again :

Abraham . I learnt that Judaism , Christianity and Islam not only conceive

of themselves as monotheistic - prophetic religions but also as Abrahamic

ones . My Muslim partners in particular set great store by claiming that

Abraham plays an important in Islam . Islam without Abraham is unimag¬

inable . This made me reread the scriptures of both the Old and the New

Testament ; and I discovered that Abraham is important for me as a Chris¬

tian , too . " The book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ , the son of David , the

son of Abraham " ( Matthew 1 : 1 ) , this is the very first sentence of the New

Testament . I concluded : If Jews , Christians , and Muslims alike are seeing

Abraham as the father of their faith , it should be possible to explore his

meaning for us today . I started looking for pertinent literature ; but in the

main languages of scholarship I found but a few studies .

514 KARL -JOSEF KUSCHEL

Hans Kiing ' s book , Das Judentum , published in 1991 as part of his
project " Kein Weltfriede ohne Religionsfriede " ( "No global peace without
peace of religions " ) , became an important companion to me . 22 It contains a
short but densely written and inspiring paragraph about Abraham and his
relevance for Judaism , Christianity , and Islam as well as a first theological
outline of an " Abrahamic ecumene " . Later on , I felt particularly challenged
by the Bible interpretations of the Jewish writer and Nobel Peace Price
winner , Eli Wiesel . 23 The same applies to the book of a Christian Ameri¬
can theologian , Jeffrey S . Siker , Disinheriting the Jews : Abraham in Early
Christian Controversy 24 Siker shows how the Abraham narrative was al¬
ready used in early Christianity to disinherit the Jews and make Christian¬
ity the victoriously triumphant religion .
Regarding Islam , I came across the path - breaking study of Youakim
Moubarac , Abraham dans le Coran , 25 the work of a Lebanese - French theo¬
logian ( 1924 - 95 ) in the tradition of his famous teacher Louis Massignon .
Massignon ( 1883 - 1962 ) was probably one of the most important western
Orientalists and students of Sufism in the 20th century . A deeply believing
Christian , he tried to convince his Church that Islam is not heresy , pagan¬
ism or an invention of the Antichrist as supposed so far but instead a relig¬
ion that puts itself in the continuity of biblical tradition and traces its own
origin back to Abraham . " [ TJogether with us they [ i . e . , the Muslims ] adore
the one , merciful God , mankind ' s judge on the last day " {Lumen Gentium ,
16) . This historically unprecedented phrase of the Second Vatican Council
would have never been possible without the work of Louis Massignon . But
all these works were scattered hints . Nowhere did I find a synoptic view .
This is how I came to start my book Streit um Abraham . 26

22 Hans Kiing , Das Judentum , Miinchen : Piper , 1991 ( English version : Judaism : Between
Yesterday and Tomorrow , New York : Crossroad , 1992 ) .
23 Cf . Elie Wiesel , Messengers of God : Biblical Portraits and Legends , New York : Ran¬
dom House , 1976 ( esp . his " The Sacrifice of Isaac : a Survivor ' s Story " , ibid . , 69 - 97 ) .
24 Jeffrey S . Siker , Disinheriting the Jews : Abraham in Early Christian Controversy ,
Louisville , KY : Westminster / John Knox Press , 1991 .
25 Youakim Moubarac , Abraham dans le Coran , I 'histoire d 'Abraham dans le Coran et
la naissance de 1 'Islam , etude critique des textes coraniques suivie d 'un essai sur la
representation qu 'ils donnent de la religion et de I 'histoire ; avec un liminaire de Louis
Massignon , Paris : J . Vrin ( Saint - Amand , impr . de C .- A . Bedu ) , 1958 ( = Etudes mu -
sulmanes ; 5 ) .
26 Karl - Josef Kuschel, Streit um Abraham : was Juden , Christen und Muslime trennt -
und was sie eint , Miinchen : Piper , 1994 ( English version : Abraham : A Symbol of Hope
for Jews , Christians and Muslims , London : SCM Press / New York : Continuum ,
1995 ) .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE 515

I had come to realize that we need a change of mentalities in all three

Abrahamic religions . In all camps there is still too much violence - prone

fanaticism , too much self - righteousness in claiming absolute truth , too

much political - tactical concealing ( often hidden behind a facade of readi¬

ness for dialogue and cooperation ) aimed at establishing the supremacy of

one ' s own religion at the expense of all others . Eretz - Israel fanatics in Ju¬

daism are part of that problem just as Christian evangelizing fundamental¬

ists or Muslim extremists who are dreaming of Islam as a " world power "

and divide humankind by a dualistic ideology of " Abode of Islam " and
" Abode of War " .

All this is quite the opposite of an Abrahamic ecumene . It is the abuse

of religion in favor of totalitarian claims to power , fantasies of world con¬

quest , and self - glorification . The worst blasphemy , as I have learnt from

one of my Muslim colleagues in the USA , Professor Mahmoud Ayoub , is

idolatry . And the worst form of idolatry is the self - idolization of one ' s own

state , one ' s own nation , or one ' s own religion . In the name of the true God ,

those blasphemous idolatrous dreams should be radically demythologized

within all religions , and exposed as what they really are : religious masks of

Man ' s lust for power .

In all religions , however , we also have voices that are willing to em¬

brace , out of their respective religious convictions , the other descendants

of Abraham with a feeling of enrichment . An ecumene of the children of

Abraham that really deserves that name will only come into being if Jews ,

Christians , and Muslims cease denouncing one another as " unbelievers " ,

" apostates " , or " superseded " and begin to accept each other as " brothers "

and " sisters " in their common faith in the God of Abraham , thus participat¬

ing in the " pilgrimage of hope " that has been impressively outlined by

Rev . Marcus Braybrooke , an eminent British ecumenical leader of our

time , in his history of interfaith dialogue in the 20th century . 27

I was exceptionally impressed by the work of Irving Greenberg , one of

the most distinguished orthodox American rabbis , who uses the theological

category of the " open covenant " with regard to Christianity and Islam . As

there is little willingness in Judaism to look at Christianity and Islam in a

constructive theological way , Greenberg ' s is an important voice . " After the

Holocaust and in light of the pluralism of the postmodern world " , he

writes , " Christianity and Islam will have to reject their own claims to su -

27 Marcus Braybrooke , Pilgrimage of Hope : One Hundred Years of Global Interfaith

Dialogue , New York : Crossroad , 1992 . Cf . also : Homer A . Jack , WCRP : A History of
the World Conference on Religion and Peace , New York : World Conference on Relig¬
ion and Peace , 1993 .
516 KARL -JOSEF KUSCHEL

persede Judaism . And Jews will , more clearly than before , recognize these
religions as outgrowths of the original covenant . " 28 Even according to pre¬
sent - day Jewish orthodox understanding , Christians and Muslims may thus
be regarded as living witnesses to the living covenant between God and
Abraham .
Regarding Christianity , I refer to the epochal change in my own , the
Catholic Church : the Second Vatican Council ' s theology of religions ,
which has been acknowledged and continued by the present Pope . As John
Paul II once put it in a much - noticed speech on the occasion of his visit to
the synagogue of Rome on April 13 , 1986 :

"The Jewish religion is not ' extrinsic ' to us , but in a certain way is ' intrin¬
sic' to our own religion . With Judaism , therefore , we have a relationship
which we do not have with any other religion . You are our dearly beloved
brothers and , in a certain way , it could be said that you are our elder
brothers . " 29

Concerning Islam , the Pope , throughout his many meetings with Muslims ,
continuously emphasized what he had told Muslim religious leaders in Ni¬
geria on February 14 , 1982 :

"All of us , Christians and Muslims , live under the sun of the one merciful
God . We both believe in one God who is the Creator of man . We acclaim
God ' s sovereignty and we defend man ' s dignity as God ' s servant . We
adore God and profess total submission to him . Thus , in a true sense , we
can call one another brothers and sisters in faith in the one God . " 30

There are similarly fascinating developments in Islam . True , there was

( and still is ) a strong trend towards exclusivism and absolutism in the his¬

tory of Islam ; but this should not distract us from becoming aware of the
inner plurality of Islamic theology . Since a long time there have been Mus -

28 Rabbi Irving Greenberg , The Jewish Way : Living the Holidays , New York : Summit
Books , 1988 , 72 .
29 Pope John Paul II , " To Representatives of the Jewish Community of Rome ( Rome ,
April 13 , 1986 ) " , in : Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue , Interreligious Dia¬
logue : The Official Teaching of the Catholic Church (1963 - 1995) , ed . Francesco Goia ,
Boston : Pauline Books & Media , 1997 , 332 - 37 (p . 334 ) . - On the theological
background of the Pope ' s statement , see Karl - Josef Kuschel , " Die Kirchen und das
Judentum : Konsens - und Dissensanalyse auf der Basis neuerer kirchlicher Dokumen -
te " , Stimmen der Zeit 117 ( 1992 ) , 147 - 62 .

30 Pope John Paul II , " To the Communities of the State of Kaduna (Nigeria ) and in Par¬
ticular to the Muslim Population ( Kaduna , February 14 , 1982 ) " , in : Pontifical Council
for Interreligious Dialogue , Interreligious Dialogue [ fh . 29 ] , 250 - 52 (p . 251 ) .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE
517

lims who were arguing , from a Qur ' anic perspective , for the coexistence

and cooperation of Jews , Christians , and Muslims on the basis of equal

rights . I was impressed , for instance , by the thoughts of Fuad Kandil

( Fu ' ad Qandil ) about an " Islamic inclusivism " based on the Qur ' an . Kandil

argues that the Qur ' an ' s religious paradigm includes " the whole Judeo -

Christian genealogy of saviors and prophets of the belief in the one God ,

from Abraham to Moses and Jesus " . I was impressed by the way Kandil

defended this genuine Islamic inclusivism against all inner - Islamic tenden¬

cies towards excluding other children of Abraham , i . e . , tendencies employ¬

ing supersessionist theories of revelation ( later revelations supersede ear¬

lier ones ) or propagating a " stage model of eschatological history " that

emphasizes the superiority of Islam at the expense of Jews and Christians .

Against those " constructions and tricks " , Kandil maintains in no uncertain

terms that the core of inclusivist Islamic thought consists in the insight

" that all of the different Abrahamic religions represent ways to salvation

and right guidance ( huda ) of humankind , originating from the same path

of divine revelation , or from the same strand of eschatological history . " 31

Equally important is the work of Muhammad Salim Abdullah ( Mu¬

hammad Sallm ^Abdullah ) in Germany . His book , Islam : Fiir das Gesprach

mit Christen ( " Islam : Towards Dialogue with Christians " ) left an unforget¬

table impression on me . I saw a man doing in his Islamic tradition what I

wanted to do in my Christian one : to develop , out of the sources of one 's

own faith , a constructive theology of the Other in which two things should

be possible at the same time : maintaining the identity of one ' s own faith

while ensuring the greatest possible openness to the concerns and perspec¬

tives of the other children of Abraham . I still remember whole phrases of

Abdullah ' s book , for instance , that Jews , Christians , and Muslims might

meet " as a community of dialogue , commensality or competition " ( aIs

Dialoggemeinschaft , Tischgemeinschaft oder als Wettbewerbsgemein -

schaft ) 32 , - a message that Abdullah emphasized again in November 1998 :

" We have a common origin . The Prophet emphasized that his teachings
are a religion in the biblical tradition . We are the sons of Ishmael . It has
been promised to them that one day they will stand by the side of their

31 Fuad Kandil , " Religioser Pluralismus als Problem fur die Selbstgcwifiheit : Zwei
Ansatze zur subjektiven Verarbeitung des Problems im Koran " , in : Interreligiose
Erziehung 2000 - Die Zukunft der Religions - und Kulturbegegnung . Referate und
Ergebnisse des Niirnberger Forums 1997 , ed . Johannes Lahnemann , Hamburg : EB -
Verlag , 1998 ( = Padagogische Beitrage zur Kulturbegegnung ; 16 ) , 79 - 90 ( pp . 81 , 86 ) .

32 Muhammad Salim Abdullah , Islam : Fiir das Gesprach mit Christen , Giitersloh :
Giitersloher Verlagshaus Mohn , 1982 , 139 .
518 KARL - JOSEF KUSCHEL

brethren . The Qur ' an says in the fifth surah that all three ways - Christi¬
anity , Judaism , and Islam - are legitimate . The plurality of religions is
willed in order to let the children of Abraham compete in goodness . This
means that God will judge me according to how I dealt with Jews and
Christians . And the same holds for the respective reverse cases . " 33

5 . The practice of an Abrahamic ecumene

Conceived in this spirit , an Abrahamic ecumene is not a mere illusion . It is

a living reality developing in many places and countries . In order to en¬
courage all those who are inclined to give up in the face of the many prob¬
lems still to overcome , I will refer to the example of five organizations
with which I am in touch . Despite the disheartening divisions between the
religions , there are by now , all over the world , men , women , groups , and
organizations that support the ideals of understanding and cooperation be¬
tween the descendants of Abraham .

( 1 ) Since 1967 , the Fraternite d 'Abraham ( Brotherhood of Abraham ) 34

in France is working for interfaith understanding in the spirit of Louis

Massignon . Under the auspices of the leaders of the three main religious
traditions in France , it has devoted itself to promoting " the spiritual , moral ,
and cultural values of the tradition of Abraham " , " deepening mutual un¬
derstanding " , and furthering " social justice and moral values , peace and
freedom " ( art . 1 of the Brotherhood ' s statute ) .
( 2 ) In the USA , the Academy for Judaic , Christian and Islamic Studies

at Los Angeles , the work of which I became familiar with in November

1997 , was established in 1977 . 35 Los Angeles is a metropolitan agglomera¬
tion of ca . 12 million inhabitants . Apart from millions of Christians ,
hundreds of thousands of Jews and Muslims are living there . As the Acad¬
emy ' s founding father , a Christian theologian , once put it , " Judaism ,
Christianity , and Islam have linked destinies . They are separate and deffer -

33 Interview with Muhammad Salim Abdullah in Evangelische Kommentare 31 ( 1998 ) , 710 .

34 Homepage at http ://www.fraternitedabraham . com .
35 The basic theological approach of the Academy ' s work is presented in : George B .
Grose and Benjamin J . Hubbard , eds . , The Abraham Connection : A Jew , Christian and
Muslim in Dialogue . An Encounter between Dr . David Gordis , Dr . George Grose and
Dr . Muzammil Siddiqi . Moderated by Dr . Benjamin Hubbard , Notre Dame , IN : Cross
Cultural Publications , 1994 ( = The Church and the World ; 6 ) . - In Germany , a similar
plead for an Abrahamic ecumene has recently been published by a Protestant theolo¬
gian , Bertold Klappert ( Wuppertal ) , in his "Abraham eint und unterscheidet " , Rhein
Reden : Texte aus der Melanchthon -Akademie ( Koln ) , no . 1 , 1996 , 21 - 64 .
 TOWARDS AN ABRAHAMIC ECUMENE 519

ent , but bonded together . They will interact to the end of time . This inter¬
action is always threefold . If there is interplay between two of them , wait a
minute , wait a day , wait for thousand years - the third will appear . " 36
This means that the religious existence of Christians is basically a " tri -
alogical " one . Christians cannot reflect their witness to the faith without
the Jewish and the Muslim Other , and vice versa . The trialogical structure
of the faith applies to all three children of Abraham .
( 3 ) In Sweden , the Children of Abraham Foundation for Religious and

Cultural Coexistence was established in 1991 . The foundation , the work of

which I was privileged to study during a visit in Stockholm in March 1998 ,
is devoting itself to educational work in public schools , i . e . , to working
with Jewish and Muslim children in a secularized , only partially Christian
environment .
( 4 ) A particular sign of hope comes from Sarajevo , a city maltreated

and destroyed by the civil war in Bosnia - Herzegovina . Here , an organiza¬

tion for interfaith peacebuilding , tellingly named Abraham , has constituted
itself in March 1998 . Jews , Christians and Muslims are working together
on concrete projects . In March 1999 , 1 was invited by that organization to
give some lectures in Sarajevo and to become acquainted with their work .
During my visit I became aware of two things : first , the almost superhu¬
man effort of many , especially young people to promote interreligious un¬
derstanding and to work incessantly for re - establishing trust between the
local inhabitants ; second , however , the distorted relations between the dif¬
ferent communities and religions on the ground : poisoned hearts and mu¬
tual hatred , disrupting and even preventing interreligious cooperation at
any moment .
( 5 ) The Three Faith Forum in Great Britain is equally important . It is

the only local organization committed to institutionalized interfaith work

with Jews , Christians and Muslims on the ground .

The history and practice of all these organizations 37 provide valuable ex¬
perience for all efforts to institutionalize interfaith understanding and co¬
operation in other countries , not the least in Germany . The beginnings are
already visible : peace prayers , peace weeks , and weeks of brotherliness in
many German cities in which Jews , Christians , and Muslims are working
together . In short : the theological necessity of an Abrahamic ecumene has
to be translated into concrete steps in society and politics .

36 Dr . George B . Grose ( Los Angeles ), personal communication to the author .

37 Further information on Abrahamic grass roots activities may be obtained from the au¬
thor ( email address : karljosef . kuschel @ uni - tuebingen . de ) .
 LE DIALOGUE ISLAMO - CHRÉTIEN AU LIBAN :
HISTOIRE ET PROBLÈMES
Saoud el - Maoula

Avec la chute de l ' URSS et le démembrement du bloc socialiste , l ' histoire

n ' a pas pris fin . La confrontation entre Est et Ouest , qui avait dominé la

seconde moitié de ce siècle , a été remplacée par une autre confrontation ,

plus profonde et plus compliquée , entre Nord et Sud .

Cette nouvelle confrontation ne s ' exprime plus en termes d ' idéologies

( marxisme contre libéralisme ) , ou de politique ( communisme contre capi¬

talisme ) , mais en termes de religions ( judéo - chrétienne contre islam ) . Ce

qui risque de raviver les illusions et fausses idées de l ' ère des croisades ( vs

jihàd ) , de l ' obscurantisme moyenâgeux , ainsi que l ' esprit de l ' ère colo¬

niale du XIXe siècle . Aussi le dialogue islamo - chrétien n ' est - il - plus un

séminaire théologique , une polémique intellectuelle ou un luxe théorique .

C ' est une nécessité historique et un besoin humain mondial , pour élaborer

un projet de sauvetage de l ' homme et de la civilisation en cette fin de siè¬

cle .

On ne peut plus se contenter aujourd ' hui d ' apparents rapports positifs

( quoique nécessaires et utiles ) entre états ou églises , de même il n ' est plus

acceptable ou suffisant de vanter les mérites de la " tolérance " , de la

" coexistence " ou de " l ' œcuménisme " ou du " témoignage vivant " dans les

actes de charité et de bienfaisance . Il est devenu indispensable aujourd ' hui

d ' introduire le dialogue islamo - chrétien dans un plus large contexte et d ' en

faire une idée - thèse jouissant d ' une place privilégiée dans les projets et les

programmes des États , des partis et mouvements politiques , ainsi que des

institutions civiles ou organisations non gouvernementales . Plutôt que

d ' entamer l ' âge de la " confrontation des civilisations " , les croyants et tous

les militants sincères pour la cause de l ' homme aspirent à ouvrir l ' âge du

dialogue des civilisations , au centre duquel se placerait le dialogue islamo -

chrétien .

Les Libanais sont bien placés , pour diverses raisons , pour initier un tel

dialogue . Celui - ci étant lié à leur sort , dans la mesure où il constitue le

cadre de leur vie commune , de leur unité nationale et de leur recherche

incessante pour construire un état juste et équilibré .

522 SAOUD EL - MAOULA

Ce dialogue a été lancé au Liban d ' une manière spontanée et à travers

des initiatives historiques dont le Pacte national de 1943 1 n ' est pas le
moindre . " Le Liban " a été le fruit d ' un compromis historique entre deux
courants : celui appelant à l ' unité arabe et à la fusion de l ' entité libanaise
dans la ummali , et celui appelant au maintien du mandat français et des
rapports privilégiés avec l ' Occident . Le Liban est né comme entité politi¬
que , sur la base de ce compromis et d ' autres compromis qui visaient à
maintenir la spécificité du Liban , à conserver son unité et permettre son
développement ultérieur . Le compromis libanais est à la base d ' un " dialo¬
gue permanent " qui cherche à faire du consensus national un pôle
d ' attraction , à partir des spécificités des différentes communautés . Il a pour

axiome le fait que ces communautés , par leur pluralité cultuelle et cultu¬
relle , sont une richesse et un don et non un lieu d ' isolement et de réaction .
Donc le dialogue a été et est toujours à la base de l ' expérience libanaise .
Jusqu ' à la dernière décennie , le dialogue a été une initiative chrétienne
dirigée par l ' action des Églises , 2 suscitant des réactions plus ou moins
compréhensives , mais toujours méfiantes de la part des musulmans . Le
dialogue n ' est devenu une cause islamique et un thème de réflexion et
d ' action dans le projet islamique moderne que durant cette décennie et

grâce à des figures audacieuses et savantes comme feu l ' imam Muhammad
Mahdï Shams al - Dïn 3 au Liban , feu le docteur Ismâ ' ïl al - Fàrùqï 4 , et feu le
cheikh Muhammad al - Ghazâlï , 5 ainsi que Muhammad Salîm al - ' Awwâ ,

1 Pacte National de 1943 ; acte fondateur de l ' entité Libanaise et de son État indépendant
et souverain . C ' est un accord non écrit entre les chefs des communautés musulmanes
et chrétiennes qui renoncent à toute allégation à l ' étranger ( arabe ou français ) et instau¬
rent le partage du pouvoir .
2 Cf . Sa ' ûd al - Mawlà , al -Hiwâr al - islàmï al - masïhï , Beirut : Dâr al - Manhal al - Lubnânî ,
1996 .
3 Muhammad Mahdï Shams al - Dîn ( 1933 - 2001 ) , président du Conseil islamique chiite
supérieur et figure intellectuelle et militante du mouvement islamique arabe , auteur de
plus de 40 ouvrages publiés traitant du fiqh islamique . Né en 1933 au Najaf ( Iraq ) où il
a poursuivi ses études avant de retourner au Liban en 1969 pour participer avec l ' imam
Miisà al - Sadr à la formation du Conseil islamique Chiite Supérieur .
4 Ismâ ' ïl al - Farùqï ( 1921 - 86 ) ;
né en Palestine , a obtenu son Ph .D . en philosophie à
l ' Université d ' Indiana ( USA ) .Il a enseigné dans les universités de Syracuse , McGill
et Temple ainsi qu ' au Pakistan et en Egypte ( al - Azhar ) . Il a publié plus de 25 livres
sur l ' islam et les religions . Il est le fondateur et président du Groupe d ' étude islami¬
que à l ' Académie américaine des religions et a été vice président du Colloque inter¬
religieux pour la paix ainsi que fondateur du trialogue abrahamique ( musulmans -
juifs - chrétiens ) .
5 Muhammad al - Ghazâlï ( 1917 - 97 ) était un des fondateurs du mouvement des Frères
musulmans en Egypte à côte de Hasan al - Bannâ 3 ( 1906 - 49 ) . Cheikh Ghazâlï divergea
avec la direction des Frères musulmans après la révolution de Nasser ( 1952 ) et a été
 LE DIALOGUE ISLAMO - CHRÉTIEN AU LIBAN 523

Tariq al - Bishn , Yusuf al - Qaradawï , Muhammad cAmmarah , Fahmï Hu -

waydï , cÂdil Husayn 6, Râshid al - Ghannûshï 7, Hasan al - Turàbï s, Munir

Shafîq 9.

La cause de la prudence des musulmans vis - à - vis du dialogue trouve ,

selon moi , son origine dans deux graves équivoques liés à ce dialogue ,

depuis le début de ce siècle : La première relève de l ' action des missions et

du mouvement missionnaire qui s ' est propagé dès le milieu du XIXe siè¬

cle , créant une réalité politico - culturelle anti - islamique et anti - arabe . La

deuxième relève de la guerre froide entre Est et Ouest à partir du milieu du

XXe siècle qui a engendré les tentatives américaines d ' utilisation du thème

de dialogue pour faire face à l ' avancée du " progressisme arabe " soutenu

par l ' URSS .

Ces deux équivoques ont appelé à plus de prudence et exaspéré la mé¬

fiance arabe et islamique vis - à - vis du dialogue . D ' autant plus que les su¬

jets , agendas , thèmes et modalités du dialogue ont toujours été posés par

les pays ou Églises occidentales .

Le premier pas franchi par les musulmans vers le dialogue en tant que

fait historique et que réflexion culturelle humaine , se trouve être celui de

l ' imam Mûsâ al - Sadr 10 dans sa conception claire et prophétique du Liban

nommé plusieurs fois à des postes officiels du ministère des affaires religieuses . Il a
enseigné en Arabie Saoudite , Qatar , Algérie , et a formé des centaines d ' intellectuels
islamiques dans les années 1970 - 1980 . Il a publié plus de 50 livres .
6 Salîm al - ' Awwà , Târiq al - Bishrî , Yùsuf al - Qaradâwï , Muhammad ' Ammàrah , Fahmï
Huwaydï , cÀdil Husayn : figures éminentes du mouvement islamique égyptien , et ac¬
teurs actifs dans la vie culturelle et politique de l ' Egypte et du monde arabe .
7 Râshid al - Ghannùshï ( né en 1941 ) : président du mouvement islamique tunisien al-
Nahdah , vit en exil à Londres .
8 Hasan al - Turâbï ( né en 1932 ) : président du mouvement islamique soudanais .
9 Munïr Shafîq : penseur islamique palestinien très connu dans le monde arabe , surtout
grâce au rôle qu ' il a joué dans la transformation du christianisme et du marxisme
maoïste et de l ' OLP vers l ' islam militant avec Hamas et le Jihàd .
10 Musa al - Sadr ( né le 5 mars 1928 à Qom , ville sainte et fief religieux de l ' Iran ) d ' une
famille originaire du sud Liban , marié à Parvin Khalïlï ( 1955 ) , 4 enfants ( 2 garçons et
2 filles ) , vint au Liban en 1959 - 1960 à la demande du grand chef chiite religieux de
l ' époque , <Abd al - Husayn Sharaf al - Dïn , habite à Tyr ( Sur) et commença une activité
très intense dans toutes les régions chiites du Liban . Il fut le premier à mobiliser la
communauté chiite , installant des comités d ' entraide et de bienfaisance ainsi que des
écoles et instituts techniques et maisons pour orphelins et handicapés . En 1966 , il an¬
nonce le début de sa campagne pour récupérer les droits de la communauté chiite dans
un Liban à visage confessionnaliste . Le 16 décembre 1967 fut formé le Conseil islami¬
que chiite supérieur ( CICS ) qui élit le 23 mai 1969 Mûsâ al - Sadr comme président .
L ' imam œuvra pour l ' unité et la sauvegarde du Liban et joua un rôle pionnier dans la
sensibilisation de l ' opinion publique par rapport à la question palestinienne , l ' unité des
524 SAOUD EL - MAOULA

et de la vie commune des Libanais . L ' imam Shams al - Dïn a été aussi le
premier musulman à formuler un projet global de dialogue entre l ' islam et
la chrétienté et ceci dans son discours historique intitulé Vers un nouveau
projet de dialogue n .
La proclamation du Conseil islamique chiite supérieur ( al - majlis al-
islâmï al - shfï al - a ' là ) concernant le règlement historique du conflit liba¬
nais ( 1977 ) 12 , ainsi que la proclamation des " Dix constantes historiques
des musulmans " libanais ( Septembre 1983 ) 13 , furent le fruit de la pensée et
de l ' action des deux grands imams ( Sadr et Shams al - Dïn ) .
Leur vision politique se résume dans les termes simples suivants : Le
Liban est la patrie définitive de tous les Libanais , donc de tous les musul¬
mans libanais , ceci implique la reconnaissance de l ' entité , de l ' indépendance
et de la souveraineté du Liban dans ses frontières reconnues . La vie com¬
mune est une richesse sur le plan de la civilisation humaine , et le dialogue
ininterrompu entre les Libanais est un dialogue pour la vie et pour le deve¬
nir . Le Liban serait une entité vide de sens , privé de ses chrétiens ou de ses
musulmans . Le Liban ne prend du sens que dans la vie commune de ses
chrétiens et de ses musulmans . L ' islamité des musulmans libanais n ' est
pas complète sans la présence de ses chrétiens comme la chrétienté de ses
chrétiens n ' est pas complète sans la présence de ses musulmans .
Depuis l ' année 1990 l ' imam Shams al - Dïn a entrepris la création d ' une
commission islamique pour le dialogue (présidée par le docteur Sa cud
al - Mawlà ) . Cette commission a joué un rôle important dans les congrès

locaux et internationaux , ainsi que dans la participation aux travaux prépa¬

ratoires du Synode 14 , et dans la constitution du secrétariat général du

musulmans , le dialogue et l ' entente inter religieuse et inter communautaire . Sa pensée

et son action sont à la base de toute la conception islamique chiite actuelle du dialogue
et de l ' unité du Liban . Il fut enlevé le 31 août 1978 durant une visite officielle en Libye
et ne réapparut plus depuis .
11 Discours prononcé devant un congrès sur le dialogue tenu à Tripoli ( Libye ) avec le
concours du Vatican en février 1976 .
12 Proclamation officielle rédigée par les deux imams , al - Sadr et Shams al - Dïn , visant à
trouver une solution à la guerre civile au Liban et proposant dès cette date des idées -
clefs qui furent à la base de l ' accord du Tâ ' if en 1989 .
13 Proclamation officielle des chefs religieux et politiques des musulmans du Liban rédi¬
gée et annoncée par l ' imam Shams al - Dïn dans une conférence de presse tenue à Dâr
al - Fatwà le 21 septembre 1983 .

14 Le synode des évêques catholiques pour le Liban a été annoncé par le Pape le 21 juin
1991 et après 4 ans de travaux préparatoires fut tenu du 26 novembre au 14 décembre
1995 . Trois représentants musulmans participèrent aux travaux du synode en tant que
délégués fraternels ( Sa ' ud al - Mawlâ , Muhammad al - Sammâk et cAbbâs al - Halabï ) .
 LE DIALOGUE ISLAMO - CHRÉTIEN AU LIBAN 525

sommet islamique libanais 15, puis du Comité national de dialogue 16 . Cette

commission islamique a réussi à faire du dialogue une donnée constante et

vitale dans la vie politique libanaise en avançant des problématiques , des

propositions et des thèmes de réflexion qui sont devenus depuis le langage

courant de la culture et de l ' élite politique libanaise .

Au moyen de colloques , séminaires , meetings de masse ou conférences

et par une participation active à la vie politique , la commission a propagé

l ' idée de la nécessité du renouvellement de la " formule " libanaise - celle -

ci devant se baser sur le dialogue ; sur un compromis renouvelé par un bloc

historique nouveau et novateur ; sur l ' équilibre politique dans la justice et

la dignité de tous et pour tous ; sur la création du courant historique de

l ' entente et du dialogue ; et enfin sur la vraie relation d ' équilibre entre État

et société , entre religion et politique et entre État civil et communautés

religieuses . C ' est cette dernière idée qui nécessite ici quelques précisions .

Les Arabes ont beaucoup souffert durant ce XXe siècle des tentatives

arrogantes et persistantes qui visaient à imiter la laïcité occidentale ( dans

sa version française surtout ) . La vision laïque européenne se basait sur

l ' idée que la modernité instaure une coupure totale entre sacré ( religion ) et

profane ( société ) . Mais la réalité est que l ' Occident n ' a jamais opéré cette

coupure ou séparation ; il a plutôt remplacé une religion ( le christianisme )

par une autre ( la modernité ) , une foi dans le Christ - Dieu par une foi dans le

Progrès - Dieu ou l ' État - Dieu ( en tant que moteur du progrès ) . Le sécula -

risme n ' a pas signifié l ' effacement du sacré devant la modernité mais la

reproduction du rôle du sacré dans un nouveau cadre adéquat au processus

de la modernité . Le concept de coupure a été donc équivoque et ambiguë ,

ce qui a amené à dépourvoir l ' individu de la présence d ' une valeur -

référence face à l ' état érigé en pouvoir total indépendant et absolu .

La société s ' est trouvée par conséquent démembrée , déchiquetée , dé¬

pourvue de points de repères et de raisons d ' être . Avec elle l ' individu lui -

même ( qui était à la base de cette soi - disant tentative de modernité et

15 Un sommet islamique réunit les chefs religieux des trois communautés ( sunnite , chiite ,
druze ) durant l ' année 1990 et décida de former un secrétariat permanent ( al - Mawlâ , al -
Sammâk et al - Halabï ) .
16 Le 2 août 1993 et suite à une invasion israélienne du sud Liban ( 25 juillet —2 août ) , un
sommet religieux fut tenu a Bkirkï , foyer du patriarcat maronite , et auquel assistèrent
les chefs des 18 communautés du pays . Suite à ce sommet fut crée le Comité national
de dialogue islamo - chrétien de sept membres représentant tout le sommet : Sa ' ud al -
Mawlâ ( chiite ) , Muhammad al - Sammâk ( sunnite ) , ' Abbâs al - Halabï ( druze ) du côté
musulman ; et ( du côté chrétien) Hârith Shihâb ( maronite ) ; Camille Minassâ ( grec -
catholique ) ; Gabriel Habib ( grec - orthodoxe ) fut remplacé par Michel ' Abs ( grec -
orthodoxe ) et Jean Salmânyân ( arménien - orthodoxe ) .
 SAOUD EL -MAOULA
526

d ' humanisme ) s ' est déchiré en perdant son identité dans une crise existen¬
tielle .
Pour nous la religion n ' est pas une étape dans l ' évolution de la cons¬
cience ou de la raison , ni un idéal révolu dans l ' histoire . La personnalité
arabe ( musulmans et chrétiens compris ) est une personnalité complexe
dont le noyau et fil conducteur est la religion .
Cette personnalité complexe est formée par plusieurs appartenances ou
niveaux d ' appartenance ( individuelle , familiale , tribale , régionale , profes¬
sionnelle , sectaire , confessionnelle , nationale etc . . . . ) , ainsi que par des
sensibilités et influences culturelles extérieurs ( régionales et internationa¬
les ) . On ne peut pas réduire cet individu à un seul niveau comme celui de
l ' individu citoyen face à l ' État - Dieu .

Pour cette raison , notre devoir est de rétablir la religion dans sa vraie
place , c ' est à dire trouver l ' harmonie et l ' équilibre dans la relation entre
État et Religion , ce qui revient à trouver la bonne formule d ' équilibre entre
Société et État .
L ' État est un système d ' organisation et d ' administration des activités

communes de la société , et de l ' espace commun en général . Dans ce sens ,

l ' État utilise des moyens en fonction de leur efficacité et de leur producti¬

vité , tandis que sa finalité doit rester fidèle par essence aux valeurs de la
société ( valeurs codifiées par la religion ) . L ' Occident a œuvré en sorte que
les moyens utilisés par l ' État soient une fin en soi , sans aucun rapport avec
les finalités de la société , et que la valeur de tout État se mesure par
l ' efficacité de ses moyens et la productivité de ses actions . L ' État s ' est
donc transformé en une valeur référentielle normative .
L ' État pour nous doit être l ' expression directe de sa société . Il doit

s ' adapter et se conformer aux valeurs qui s ' imposent à cette société . C ' est

un État complémentaire de sa société , non un État autoritaire et coupé de

sa société . Les valeurs de la société gouvernent les finalités qui devaient
régir les choix de l ' État dans le domaine de l ' administration et de
l ' organisation de l ' espace commun .

Pour arriver à bâtir cet État , l ' expérience libanaise nous incite à
formuler deux cadres d ' organisation : le premier doit donner au citoyen la
possibilité de l ' action individuelle directe et faire de lui un partenaire du
pouvoir . Le deuxième doit permettre aux différentes communautés de
sauvegarder l ' entente et l ' harmonie du tissu social et l ' unité du pays et de
la société .
Un vrai dialogue sur ces thèmes nous permettra d ' inventer un exemple
de système politique enraciné dans notre expérience communautaire et
ouverte aux changements et à l ' évolution . Ce souci , ainsi que d ' autres , ont
été à la base de la création du " Comité national islamo - chrétien de dialo -
 LE DIALOGUE ISLAMO - CHRÉTIEN AU LIBAN 527

gue " ( al - lajnah al - wataniyyah al - islâmiyyah al - masïhiyyah li - l- hiwâr ) . Ce

comité est né suite au sommet national des chefs religieux de toutes les
communautés libanaises ( dix - sept à cette date : le 2 août 1993 ) et dans le
but de créer un forum stable , permanent , clair et transparent , qui soit en
même temps représentatif et pionnier . Le comité ( dans lequel j ' ai l ' hon¬
neur de siéger en tant que représentant du Conseil islamique chiite à côté
de mes confrères : Muhammad al - Sammàk , ' Abbâs al - Halabï , Hàrith Shi -
hâb , Michel cAbs [ qui vient de remplacer Gabriel Habib ] , Camille Minassâ
et Jean Salmânyân ) a proposé ( le 5 janvier 1995 ) un document conjoint ,
approuvé et signé par les chefs religieux , et qui est d ' une portée historique .
En effet , c ' est la première tentative de ce genre pour élaborer une vision
co mm une vis - à - vis des problèmes nationaux cruciaux ( les reports avec la
Syrie , la résistance nationale , le déséquilibre dans la pratique du nouveau
pacte de Ta ' if etc . . . . ) .
Ce document se voulait un projet de réforme nationale , équilibré et fu¬
turiste , qui renouvelle la confiance des libanais en eux - mêmes et en leur
unité . Il voulait en outre consacrer la naissance d ' un type de solidarités
possibles et voulues , autour d ' un noyau historique de salut national dont le
rôle est assumé par les autorités - références dirigeantes des communautés
religieuses .
Ces autorités - références ont été , et sont toujours , les porteurs du dra¬
peau de la paix civile , de l ' unité et de la solidarité des libanais durant les
plus graves moments de l ' histoire du pays . Elles ont été et sont toujours

"le dernier recours et ressort , les piliers civilisationnels du pays , et le pont

entre le passé , le présent et l ' avenir . Pour ce , elles sont responsables de la
sauvegarde et du maintien des jalons civilisationnels de leur communauté
et du pays . Elles ne sont pas des cadres confessionnels fermés et réaction¬
naires co mm e quelques - uns tendent à les décrire . Si les autorités et pou¬
voirs publics sont responsables de l ' administration et de l ' organisation
des relations entre les citoyens , les institutions - autorités religieuses diri¬
geantes de la société civile , conservent le contenu et sauvegardent l ' unité
de la nation et la continuité entre les générations " . 17

Ces autorités - références ont été et sont toujours la conscience des gens , la
mémoire de leur vie commune et la soupape de sécurité de l ' entente et de
l ' unité . A eux , ainsi qu ' à autres institutions et dirigeants , incombe la tâche

de former le noyau stable du bloc historique qui doit diriger le pays en

cette période décisive . Le bloc historique doit se caractériser par la justesse
et la sincérité de la représentativité ainsi que par la sagesse , le courage ,

17 Communiqué du Conseil islamique chiite supérieur du 25 septembre 1975 .

 SAOUD EL -MAOULA
528

l'ouverture et la prudence . Ce bloc doit prendre en charge la réalisation et

la concrétisation du compromis historique , ainsi la réconciliation nationale
globale , l ' entretien du projet de l ' État et la promotion d ' initiatives du
genre de celles qui construisent les nations .
C ' est au cœur de ces tâches que se place le Comité national islamo -

chrétien de dialogue qui doit oeuvrer pour la construction de l ' identité

politique et culturelle du citoyen et de la société . Ceci passe par la recons¬
truction de la société , le renouvellement de ses liens de solidarité , parallè¬
lement à la reconstruction de l ' autorité de l ' État , et non nécessairement
avec ou contre celle - ci . Dans ce contexte la Commission de dialogue
islamique propose de redéfinir les thèmes et les problèmes du dialogue au
Liban à partir de l ' expérience acquise et des leçons tirées .

L ' élaboration d ' un système de valeurs communes qui renforce

le dialogue de vie

Le dialogue de vie est le plus simple , mais aussi le plus riche . Mais la
consolidation de ce dialogue ne pourra pas se faire à partir des simple
louanges de la convivialité libanaise et des liens de solidarité qui ont sau¬
vegardé le tissu social malgré vingt ans de guerres civiles . Ce qui est im¬
portant aujourd ' hui est d ' avoir une vision et un horizon plus larges pou¬
vant produire une valeur spécifique qui donne à l ' expérience libanaise un
sens et un rôle , justement lié à sa singularité . Il est urgent de renforcer
l ' État , ses pouvoirs et institutions , d ' élargir et de développer les espaces de

vie commune , de consolider et d ' enraciner la pratique démocratique , mais

le vrai souci du dialogue doit aller plus loin pour chercher à élaborer un
système de valeurs communes émanant des deux religions et de l ' héritage
spirituel et culturel des communautés libanaises .
Ceci ne signifie pas la répétition dogmatique des dix commandements
et des préceptes de la sharï 'ah , qui sont pour nous sacrés et importants . Il
s ' agirait plutôt d ' interroger l ' expérience religieuse et l ' héritage spirituel en

vue d ' élaborer une théologie ( un kalâm ) de changement et de libération de

l ' homme ainsi qu ' un fiqh et un canon de dialogue . Ceux - ci formeraient un

système normatif régulateur des valeurs communes et des critères consen¬

suels .
Le dialogue doit donc répondre aux questions concernant les rapports
de l ' homme avec son créateur , avec son frère , avec son milieu , avec
l ' univers , la nature , l ' au - delà , la vie et la mort , le présent et l ' avenir . D ' où

les questions concernant la situation humaine , l ' injustice , l ' exploitation , la

famine , la pollution , le sous - développement , les guerres coloniales ,
l ' occupation , le sionisme , le racisme et l ' impérialisme , le rôle de l ' argent ,
 LE DIALOGUE ISLAMO - CHRÉTIEN AU LIBAN 529

la société de consommation , l ' image et la réalité , les découvertes et la fina¬

lité des sciences etc . . . .
Le rôle et le devoir du dialogue sont de questionner les valeurs com¬
munes pour élaborer les vraies problématiques et poser les vraies questions
concernant la vie de l ' homme et de la société dans ce monde . Ainsi la reli¬
gion devient une base pour le dialogue au lieu d ' être le sujet du dialogue .
Le dialogue aura pour mission l ' invention de nouvelles formules dans
l ' administration et l ' organisation sociales et politiques . Il devra en outre

imaginer de nouvelles méthodes dans le domaine de la culture et de la

production , ce qui permettrait à l ' homme de préserver les progrès matériels
réalisés et de récupérer en même temps son identité perdue .

La justice comme fondement de la politique

Il faut aborder à nouveau la politique comme science humaine et art créa¬

tif, comme éthique et pratique , comme activité théorique et praxis social . Il
faut rétablir la politique au centre du processus de justice et d ' équité dans
la vie quotidienne des hommes . Ceci devient très difficile en ces jours où
la médiatisation de la société de consommation , du sexe et de la violence
pousse à la dégradation , au prosaïsme et à une banalité qui corrompt le
goût , tue la sensibilité et anéantit l ' esprit .
Le dialogue doit être un moyen pour mettre en valeur le vrai sens de la
politique , dans la continuation de la tradition gréco - romaine et judéo -
chrétienne d ' une part , et de la tradition arabo - islamique d ' autre part . La
récupération de la politique - piété contre la politique - pouvoir signifie entre
autres l ' application du principe et la pratique de la démocratie , sauvegar¬
dant par là - même ce qui fonde toute société politique . Le retour du consen¬
sus et de la paix civile , qui se basent sur la justice et l ' équilibre , serait ainsi
rendu possible .
Pour nous musulmans , la justice , l ' équité et l ' équilibre sont trois syno¬
nymes d ' une réalité fondatrice de tout pouvoir et de toute société politique .
Ceci signifie , en termes de vie commune dans une société politique : accep¬
ter tout ce que nécessite le partenariat dans la patrie et la nation . Tout ce
qui sert l ' intérêt des deux partenaires , est approuvé et encouragé , et tout ce
qui va à l ' encontre du bien de l ' un des partenaires est réfuté et repoussé .
Le meilleur exemple de justice dans la vie commune est donné par la
Charte de Médine 18 , qui pose depuis quinze siècles le concept et le prin -

18 La Charte de Médine est le document historique rédigé et signé par le prophète

Muhammad concernant le " gouvernement de la cité " après la migration du prophète de
La Mecque vers Médine ( nouveau mot arabe signifiant " cité " et qui remplace l ' ancien
nom de cette ville : Yathrib ) .
 SAOUD EL -MAOULA
530

cipe de la citoyenneté et a appelé les musulmans et les non - musulmans à

être partenaires égaux dans l ' instauration de la société et de l ' État . Il s ' agit
de la justice dans le partenariat et la citoyenneté .
Justice en arabe , comme nous le savons , signifie équité , équilibre , juste
milieu , ordre et reconnaissance des droits et des devoirs . Ceci nous amène
à conclure avec la majorité des fuqahâ ' et Hilamà ' musulmans , sunnites et
chiites , que nous nous opposons à toute atteinte à quelque droit humain
que ce soit , toute oppression , discrimination , dépossession , menace , priva¬
tion , ou discrimination , et ceci au - delà de toutes considérations liées à la
race , la couleur , le sexe ou l ' appartenance à une communauté , majoritaire
ou non , musulmane ou non .

Dhimmitude et dhimmïs

Nous croyons qu ' on a beaucoup parlé et écrit sur ce faux problème de

dhimmï et de " dhimmitude " , et nous croyons que ce qui a été dit et écrit
émanait d ' une position partiale soit par ignorance , soit par mauvaise foi , au
point que l ' on croirait le monde arabe divisé en deux camps : d ' une part
celui des islamistes appelant à traiter les non - musulmans comme dhimmïs
et le monde occidental comme terre de guerre ( dâr al - harb ) et d ' autre part
celui des élites chrétiennes ou occidentalistes appelant à la séparation des
chrétiens du corps de la nation et de la société par crainte de l ' avenir , ou
par alliance avec l ' Occident plus avancé et porteur de bonheur et de pro¬
grès .
Je crois personnellement qu ' il est temps pour les intellectuels et les
chercheurs occidentaux de tourner la page des récits des voyageurs du
XVIIIe et XIXe siècle et d ' abandonner les rêves des colons d ' Algérie . Il
est temps aussi de dissocier la question juive de la situation des non -
musulmans en terre arabo - islamique . Les musulmans ont dépassé depuis
longtemps ce stade de polémique qui rend impossible toute réflexion . Il
faut lire et connaître les écrits des grands penseurs de l ' islam contemporain
( mentionnés plus haut ) .

Le statut de dhimmï résultait d ' un contrat qui reconnaissait les droits

des non - musulmans à se maintenir dans leur religion et à pratiquer leurs
croyances . Ce contrat comprenait aussi le devoir de protection et de sécuri¬
té . Il découlait de ce contrat des droits et des responsabilités réciproques .

Dans ce sens , les lois concernant ce statut étaient des lois organisationnel -
les de commodité , nécessitées par le climat juridique local et international ,
en une période où l ' État islamique était général ( du genre des grands empi¬
res ) et où il y avait identification entre le projet de l ' État et la réalité de la
ummah .
 LE DIALOGUE ISLAMO - CHRÉTIEN AU LIBAN 531

Le terme dhimmï n ' est pas un terme coranique , et dans la tradition il

n ' est jamais utilisé dans le sens d ' une communauté politique organisée

indépendamment des obligations civiles qui organisent la société - wmma / z.

Ce terme a été le fruit d ' un climat canonique -juridique au moment où

l ' Occident chrétien sombrait dans la purification ethnique et religieuse

voire sectaire . Citons seulement les guerres religieuses , les croisades albi¬

geoises , l ' inquisition , l ' Amérique , le pillage de Constantinople , toutes les

guerres entre Églises chrétiennes jusqu ' au XVIIIe siècle et n ' oublions pas

les guerres impériales et coloniales jusqu ' aux deux dernières guerres mon¬

diales , entre autres .

Durant la longue période moyenâgeuse , le statut de dhimmï a été le

plus haut niveau de justice et d ' équité dans l ' ordre mondial et dans le droit

international . Il a sauvegardé et protégé l ' existence et l ' évolution de toutes

sortes de minorités religieuses et ethniques quand l ' intolérance , l ' antisé¬

mitisme , la haine de l ' autre et le racisme , synonyme de purification ethno -

religieuse totale était la devise de l ' Occident . Si l ' on veut faire le procès du

" dhimmisme " , il faut le rétablir dans le cadre du droit international et de

l ' ordre mondial de son époque . C ' est ce qui nous a amené à dire que ce

terme ne répond pas à une constante dans la législation islamique , qu ' il

s ' agissait plutôt de lois d ' arrangements combinatoires imposées par la

réalité de l ' empire , des relations internationales et de l ' ordre mondial , mais

toujours dans le respect des principes de justice et d ' équité .

Citoyenneté et État civil

Aujourd ' hui nous sommes en droit , et avons peut - être même le devoir de

développer le principe et le concept de citoyenneté sur la base de la Charte

de Médine . C ' est ce que le cheikh Muhammad Mahdï Shams al - Dïn a éla¬

boré dans ses derniers écrits ainsi que les cheikhs Ghazâlï , Turàbï , al -

Ghannùshï , al - cAwwà , Bishrî , Qaradàwï et la grande tendance des Frères

musulmans dans les pays arabes , sans oublier l ' expérience de la Turquie
ou de l ' Iran .

Partant du principe que la présence des non - musulmans à côté des mu¬

sulmans dans une seule entité nationale comporte une dimension nouvelle

qui n ' existait pas au temps de l ' État islamique général , et du fait que le

droit international a changé depuis ; prenant également en compte que les

musulmans sont partie prenante dans la formulation de nouvelles chartes et

dans le processus du nouvel ordre mondial , et qu ' ils ont adhéré et se sont

engagés à respecter les chartes et les lois internationales , nous dirons que

les musulmans sont sommés de respecter tous les engagements tenus d ' un

point de vue juridique et légale .

 SAOUD EL - MAOULA
532

Le cadre juridique organisationnel et le cadre juridique - politique en is¬

lam peuvent et doivent s ' élargir pour faire place aux non - musulmans dans

la société et l ' État , en tant que citoyens libres et égaux . Ce qui est proposé

ici c ' est l ' invention d ' une nouvelle formule juridique qui s ' inspire de

l ' esprit de dialogue , de consensus , et de vie commune . Rien en islam

n ' empêche de faire cet ijtihâd qui est le vrai jihàd , et qui repose sur un

acquis historique représenté par la Charte de Médine , et sur une expérience

riche de quatorze siècles . Il nous faut évoluer et renouveler dans l ' islam et

à partir de l ' islam .

Tolérance et guerre sainte

Ceci n ' est pas faire acte de tolérance . Nous n ' acceptons pas ces longues
diatribes sur la " tolérance en islam envers les non - musulmans " car il est du

droit des non - musulmans de nous dire : " nous ne voulons pas de votre tolé¬

rance , nous voulons notre droit et non pas votre charité " , comme il est du
droit des musulmans de réclamer leurs droits dans les sociétés non -

musulmanes . Nous ne voulons pas traiter nos confrères chrétiens ou juifs

avec " tolérance " mais avec la justice et l ' équité qui leur sont dues et qui

sont le fondement de notre religion . Vous savez bien que le terme de " tolé¬

rance " est une invention occidentale des Lumières , employée peut - être

pour la première fois par Pascal , ennemi intrépide des Jésuites .

Tolérance signifie charité , nous demandons toujours la justice et

l ' équité . Dans ce contexte nous dirons qu ' il n 'y a pas de guerre sainte en

islam , dans le sens donné au terme jihàd . Les principes de la da ' wah ,

( l ' appel à l ' islam ) sont le dialogue , la bonne parole , la sagesse , le sermon ,

mais jamais la violence et la pression . Tout jihàd en islam est un jihàd dé -

fensif pour s ' opposer à une agression et sauvegarder la foi et la nation .

L ' islam refuse toute sorte de jihàd - da cwah ou guerre sainte pour imposer

notre foi à autrui . Être non - musulman n ' a jamais été une raison pour justi¬

fier la guerre contre " l ' autre " . En somme , nous affirmons que les non -

musulmans ont leur place légale et naturelle , et non pas leur place tolérée

dans la société et l ' État . Ceci ne veut pas dire qu ' il n 'y a jamais eu de

guerre sainte durant les quatorze siècles passés . Les " autres " , différents ,

non - musulmans , ont été victimes au même titre que les musulmans des

États de force et de domination , ou États sultaniques ( du sultanat ).

S ' il y a aujourd ' hui un projet qui vise à reproduire l ' État sultanique

( sous n ' importe quelle forme historique connue ) nous nous opposons à un

tel projet . Il est aussi de notre devoir de dénoncer et de répudier les prati¬

ques et les status de l ' État sultanique comme pratiques illégales , ainsi que

les guerres d ' invasion , d ' occupation ou de colonisation menées par ces
 LE DIALOGUE ISLAMO - CHRÉTIEN AU LIBAN
533

États à l ' extérieur des pays de l ' islam . Il faut distinguer entre conquêtes

culturelles et de civilisation et guerres défensives d ' un côté et guerres ou

conquêtes guerrières de pillage et d ' hégémonie de l ' autre .

Réconciliation et dialogue

La renaissance arabe contemporaine nécessite la reconstruction de

l ' identité civilisationnelle , dans une considération réciproque de ce que

cette renaissance signifie pour le monde extérieur et ce que le monde exté¬

rieur signifie pour elle . Ceci nécessite un effort - jihâd - théorique , intel¬

lectuel et pédagogique auquel les chrétiens arabes sont appelés à prendre

part en précurseurs .

D ' un autre côté , la critique de la modernité , des maladies de l ' occi -

dentalisme et de son influence , nécessite un projet commun islamo -

chrétien , pour mettre fin à l ' imitation aliénatrice et pour renouveler le rôle

des chrétiens et de la chrétienté arabe dans la renaissance de nos pays et de

notre civilisation . Ceci signifie qu ' il faut critiquer non seulement les

chimères d ' une modernité qui répète et copie les étapes de l ' expérience

européenne ( dans un autre contexte et une autre époque ainsi qu ' un autre

milieu civilisationnel ) , mais aussi critiquer les formes d ' aliénation qui

frappent les élites islamistes modernes . Ces formes d ' aliénation renou¬

vellent et reproduisent l ' expérience communiste au nom de la religion

qui est devenue l ' idéologie d ' une illusion de pouvoir portée par un idéal

de supériorité maladif . Faire une révision critique générale de nos

concepts théologiques et législatifs et de nos idées et postulats , c ' est là le

vrai dialogue , et c ' est le vrai défi qui nécessite beaucoup de courage et

beaucoup d ' imagination . C ' est une aventure nécessaire pour une vraie

réconciliation et une vraie paix civile durable et fructueuse .

 RELIGION AND POLITICS :
THE CASE OF LEBANON

Muhammad Sammak

The relation between religion and politics can be defined in many different

ways . I will focus on two contradictory ones : ( 1 ) ignoring the frontier be¬

tween one ' s inner life and public actions and , on the contrary , ( 2 ) proving

that religion can , or even should , be the force that persuades people to re¬

discover a connection between day - to - day life and moral order .

The idea of articulating the essential principles of morality , global eth¬

ics applicable to everyone , is spreading with increasing insistence . It is the

other side of this awareness , often aggrieved , that globalization of econom¬

ics and technology is no longer a contentious thesis but an irresistible real¬

ity with concrete effects on people 's lives . Political , social , and cultural

expectations and demands are dragged along with this vast new transfor¬

mation , with impersonal forces of the market rocketing societies out of

control .

The constraints of religion and tradition are here shattered , with noth¬

ing solid to replace them . What results is aggressive , mindless violence in

the attempt to respond . All in all , it turns out that it is much easier to rec¬

ognize universal evils than the universal good to which all should feel

committed . " Cultural relativism " - the notion that " good " and " evil " ,

" right " and " wrong " , are judgments each culture is entitled to make for it¬

self - is a widespread phenomenon . Some have a strong sense that the

dominant discourse on values is simply a continuation of Western domi¬

nance , an attempt to impose Judeo - Christian and Enlightenment principles

on the rest of the world , which learned about them through colonialism .

These people reject the claim of universality . They suspect it is just an¬

other power play , a way of keeping them down still . That is why , given the

two relations between religion and politics mentioned above , it is not diffi¬

cult to formulate a third : the exploration of the misty territory of religio -

political conviction .

It would be , nevertheless , oversimplifying a very delicate issue , if we

say that the first way has been adopted by Christianity or by the Christian

West and the second by Islam . Both the Northern Ireland and Bosnian is -
536 MUHAMMAD SAMMAK

sue prove that , even in secularized Europe , religion still plays an important
role in politics .
This political role is even more dominant in the Islamic world , where a
revolt against its own decay and humiliation has taken the form of a return
to the roots of Islam . Events will show how deep this revolt is and whether
it is right or wrong . It may prove to be neither deeper nor longer lasting
than the Christian revival in Victorian England , though that lasted two -
thirds of a century and helped build a British empire . In 1415 at the Coun¬
cil of Constance , for instance , the conservatives who were trying to stamp
out the beginnings of the Reformation burnt Jan Hus at the stake and ar¬
ranged for John Wycliffe ' s bones to be dug out of their English grave and
tossed into a fire . Yet , by 1436 , a Hussite army forced a first concession
out of the conservatives . By the 1470s , the printed bibles made possible by
Gutenberg ' s press were spreading through Europe ; by 1506 , Zwingli was
preaching in Switzerland ; and in 1517 , Martin Luther nailed his theses to
the church door at Wittenberg . Remember , things happen much faster now .
The consequences of the Islamic revolt or revival spare no country ,
whether Muslims outnumber non - Muslims ( Egypt ) , whether Muslims are
outnumbered by non - Muslims ( India ) , or whether Muslims and non - Mus¬
lims are almost equal in number , as is the case of my country , Lebanon .
Definitions of religion and politics are at odds . Religion is belief in the
sacred ; religious teachings are absolute . On the other hand , as President
Chirac of France says , politics " is not the art of the possible , it is the art of
making possible what is necessary " . Politics is the work of man , while re¬
ligion is the work of God who created man . That is what makes religious
politics dangerous , in the sense that political decisions are figured as or¬
ders from God . When religious leaders are part of the decision making in
any country , or when they influence the process of decision making , they
do so not as representatives of the people but as representatives of God .
This means that opposing them is an opposition to the Sacred and to the
Holy .
In Lebanon , where 18 religious communities with 18 religious leaders
exist , opposition to the Sacred and to the Holy also comes from the Sacred
and the Holy . In both cases , what is really at stake is simply day - to - day
politics .
Religious differences are not so much disputes about doctrine but
about history and power sharing . The Ta ' if National Agreement of 1989
sought to rewind the history of coexistence and bring brotherhood and
unity to the people of Lebanon , balancing religious and confessional inter¬
ests rather than eradicating them . Each of the 18 religious communities
was weak enough to start or stop a war , meant to be a Middle - Eastern war
 RELIGION AND POLITICS : THE CASE OF LEBANON
537

by proxy . Regional and international powers were strong enough to pull

the legs of this or that community to this or that side of the war . Financing

a war for more than 15 years was beyond the economic capabilities of

Lebanon and the Lebanese . Hard currency and advanced armaments and

ammunition poured into Lebanon from different sources : Israel , Arabs , and

non - Arabs . Just after the ceasefire , foreign assistance stopped , and the

Lebanese economy almost collapsed .

Rebuilding Lebanon is impossible without rebuilding the national

unity among Lebanese . This is not a simple story of peacemakers versus

bigots . It is also includes aid donors , who help shape the conditions that

await the return of the displaced , and crucially those who are likely to re¬

spond as much to economic as political signals . All these groups have

mixed feelings .

The return of the displaced , so far , has been " all push and no pull " ,

pushers being mainly the government and non - governmental organiza¬

tions , which believe in coexistence as the only way to a unified and pros¬

perous Lebanon . In terms of pull , it is clear that displaced Lebanese want ,

by all means , to return to their original homes . However , traumatized fami¬

lies on the receiving end are far from being brainwashed to stretch a wel¬
come hand .

The national reunification of Lebanon seeks to subdue without con¬

quest , to brainwash without force , to accomplish social evolution without a

common historical memory .

We have to get to know one another better and to discuss ways of con¬

ducting our disagreements with greater civility . In politics , civility is an

overrated virtue . It is desirable , of course , that political debate be con¬

ducted in a spirit of mutual respect rather than enmity . But too often these

days , the plea for more " civility " in politics is a high - minded way of plead¬

ing for less critical scrutiny of illicit campaign contributions or other mis¬
deeds .

From families and neighborhoods to cities and towns to schools , con¬

gregations and trade unions , the institutions that traditionally provided

people with moral anchors and a sense of belonging are under siege , not

only in Lebanon but also in almost every other democratic country . Taken

together , these forms of community are sometimes described as the institu¬

tions of " civil society " . A healthy civil society is important not only be¬

cause it promotes civility , although this may be a welcome by - product , but

also because it calls forth the habits , skills , and qualities of character that

make effective democratic citizens . Above all , the institutions of civil soci¬

ety draw us out of our private , self - interested concerns and get us in the

habit of attending to the common good .

538 MUHAMMAD SAMMAK

A century and a half ago , Alexis de Tocqueville praised America ' s vi¬
brant civil society for producing the " habits of the heart " on which democ¬
racy depends . If Tocqueville was right , there is reason to worry about the
health of civil society , even beyond its effect on the manners that people
display in stores and on the streets . For , if families , neighborhoods and
schools are in ill repair , they will fail to produce the active , public - spirited
citizens a successful democracy requires , regardless of religion . There is a
dictum in the Babylonian heritage about the virtues of compromise that
goes like this : " Where there is complete truth , there is no peace . And
where there is peace , there is no complete truth " .
What the ancient sages were trying to say was that seeking perfect jus¬
tice for your community or cause might be ideologically satisfying , but it
is not compatible with peace , because peace is built from compromises
painted in shades of gray , not black and white . What makes this wisdom
difficult to follow is the relationship between truth and religion . The defi¬
nition of religion is absolute truth , truth that comes from God .
Is it possible even for the sake of peace to compromise at the expense
of religious truth ? If so , how ? To begin with , I will emphasize two points .
First , there is no way to rewrite a religious Scripture revealed from God . It
is sacred ; therefore , it is not even permissible to reshape it . Yet , we must ,
and I say must , re - think it to rediscover its deeper meanings . This is ijti-
had - innovation . Religious Scripture , as a Scripture from God ( the Holy
Qur ' an ) is not only sacred but absolute . However , understanding the Scrip¬
ture is a human process , and everything human is relative , not absolute .
The Scripture is permanent and stable , while understanding the Scripture is
movable and changeable . When the Scripture enters the human mind , hu¬
man interpretation begins . Human interpretation becomes like any other
human thought : mobile and open to change and reconsideration .
Second , in Islamic theology , Islam started with Abraham and ended
with Muhammad ( P . B . U . THEM ) . Muhammad was not the first Muslim ; he
was the last Muslim prophet , preceded by a series of prophets , including
Moses and Jesus . You are certainly aware that the Holy Qur ' an speaks
highly of Jesus and his mother , the Virgin Mary . I quote only one verse ,
which says :

"Strongest among men in enmity to the Believers wilt thou find Jews and
Pagans ; and nearest among men in love to the believers wilt thou find
those who say ' we are Christians ' : because among these are men devoted
to learning . And men who have renounced the world , and they are not ar¬
rogant " ( Qur ' an 5 : 82 ) .
 RELIGION AND POLITICS : THE CASE OF LEBANON 539

These points are theologically the basis for Christian - Muslim understand¬
ing and brotherhood . Very concrete and with a flavor of sacredness , they
function very well in preserving both Arab Christian - Muslim nationality
and Lebanese national reconciliation .
The Middle East enjoys some special characteristics , which make the
region readily open to foreign intervention : its strategic location between
East and West , its natural fortune of gas and oil , the existence of Jewish ,
Christian and Muslim religious shrines , and ethnic and religious multiplic¬
ity .
Islamic belief in Christianity as a revelation from God is deeply rooted
in Islamic teaching . The Holy Qur ' an says :

" The same religion has He established for you as that which He enjoined
on Noah - that which We have sent by inspiration to thee - and that
which We enjoined on Abraham , Moses and Jesus : Namely , that ye
should remain steadfast in Religion , and make no division therein"
( Qur ' an 42 : 13 ) .

This means that Religion is one , and religious laws are different , which is
also clear in the Holy Qur ' an :

"To each among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way . If Al¬
lah had so willed , He would have made you a single People , but ( His
plan is ) to test you in what He hath given you : so strive as in a race in all
virtues " ( Qur ' an 5 :48 ) .

In this context Islam , though a religion of absolute truth , respects and pre¬
,
serves the right of belief and considers it a natural human right .

" We showed him the Way : whether he be grateful or ungrateful " ( Qur ' an
76 :3 ) .
"If it had been the Lord ' s will , they would all have believed - all who are
on earth ! Wilt thou then compel mankind , against their will , to believe ! "
( Qur ' an 10 :99 ) .

A story told by Ibn cAbbas , one of the prominent followers of the prophet
Muhammad ( P . B .U . H . ) , says that a Christian citizen in Medina became a
Muslim and tried unsuccessfully to convince his two sons to believe in Is¬
lam too . He threatened them with all his means , but they insisted on re¬
maining Christians . The man , Abu Husayn , went to the prophet to seek his
advice . At that moment , a revelation came to the prophet : " Let there be no
compulsion in religion : Truth stands out clear from Error " ( Qur ' an 2 : 256 ) .
540 MUHAMMAD SAMMAK

Islam , on one hand , does not differentiate ethnically between Arabs

and non - Arabs . On the other hand , as I stated before , it recognizes both
Judaism and Christianity , which are grounded in the Abrahamic faith , as
having the same roots as Islam itself . It is the nature of these teachings and ,
further , tolerance in Islam that allowed ethnic and religious minorities to
survive , flourish , and preserve their communities throughout the ages of
Islamic rule .
Yet , this multiplicity changed from an advantageous to a catastrophic
feature . Foreign intervention , European in the first place , used minorities
during the dark ages of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Islam
and its teachings , in order to fulfill the ambition of conquering and domi¬
nating the Middle East . The more minorities were mistreated , the more
they turned to the outside , hoping to put an end to their sufferings . Subse¬
quently , they were even more subject to being used by the outside .
Mistreating minorities was , and still is , the master key for foreign in¬
tervention . History shows clearly how European , and later American , mis¬
sionaries used Christianity to engage non - Muslim minorities with Western
interests . This process took place at a time when the Western Church itself
was under heavy attack and threatened by isolation from public life . The
suffering of minorities has been used in political bargaining . Defending
their rights and interests was not , at any time , a European religious or hu¬
man goal .
Many examples feature Arab non - Muslim communities , particularly
the Copts of Egypt and the Maronites of Lebanon . Since the early 1950s ,
Israel has worked to create a Christian mini - state in Lebanon , or even a
part of Lebanon , with the hope that this religious non - Muslim state can be
used as a leverage to encourage other religious and ethnic communities to
follow . By doing that , Israel could lay down the foundation of its strategic
project to divide the Arab nation into multiple ethnic and religious micro -
states .
The contradictions between Israel , as a closed Jewish ethnic state , and
Lebanon , a multi - religious state , were very obvious . They were at the heart
of the bloody crisis , which erupted in Lebanon in 1975 and remained until
1989 . Because Lebanese religious leaders were aware of this fact , they
kept a distance between themselves and local fighting militias , which were
financed from outside Lebanon . They never approved military actions by
any side , and they never accepted to bless the warlords . When the national
entente - the 1989 Ta ' if Accord - was approved by members of the Leba¬
nese Parliament , the credibility of religious leaders was needed mostly as a
lever to help implement the entente . This credibility is still needed and
 RELIGION AND POLITICS : THE CASE OF LEBANON 541

looked upon to overcome difficulties faced in the continuous process of

reconciliation , in order to implement the national entente .

This is not an easy task . Lebanon as a state and an entity is based on a

formula of coexistence . This is a formula of human entente , which unites

the Lebanese of 18 religious communities . It was expressed in the National

Pact of 1943 and the Document of National Entente of 1989 , as well as

embodied in the Constitution ( 1990 ) , which states in its preamble : " There

is no legitimacy for any authority that contradicts the charter of co¬

existence [ mithaq al - aysh al - mushtarak ] . " This charter provides the scope

for all citizens to fulfill themselves completely , in authentic diversity and

harmonious integration , within the framework of a unified state based on

Law and Order .

In order to enhance this process , a Islamic - Christian National Dialo¬

gue Committee was formed in August 1993 . The aim of this committee is
to

" preempt any imbalance which might endanger the coexistence of Chris¬
tians and Muslims in Lebanon , to propose solutions and treatments to
prevent events abroad which have sectarian or confessional dimensions
from being reflected on the unity of the Lebanese , to emphasize a civic
spirit , work to bury sectarian fanaticism , endeavour to rewrite the history
of unified Lebanon in a way that accords with these trends , and create a
permanent dialogue between the state and the people , and between Leba¬
nese themselves ( Christians and Muslims of different denominations ) by
organizing seminars and holding joint conferences , as well as through the
information media . This is so that Lebanon may occupy its forward posi¬
tion in the dialogue that is going on between the shores of the Mediterra¬
nean , between the Islamic and Western worlds , and between North and
South ." 1

When committee members talk about Muslim - Christian dialogue in Leba¬

non , we realize that there are special characteristics , from which every na¬

tion or community can and should learn :

1. A dialogue means searching for truth in the point of view of the other .

Truth is not one - sided . To believe that you are right does not mean

that the other is necessarily wrong .

2 . There are many forms of dialogue :

1 Islamic - Christian National Dialogue Committee , Unified Working Paper [ 1995 ] , on¬
line version at http :/ / www . a -zero . com . lb / bckground . html .
542 MUHAMMAD SAMMAK

2 . 1 . Dialogue of life , meaning to take care of the other , to understand

his /her background , to recognize his /her special characteristics , and
then to build a common life on the basis of intermingled interests .
2 . 2 . Dialogue of action , meaning to work together socially , economically ,

and educationally . This helps in building relations on the basis of in¬

termingled interests .
2 . 3 . Dialogue of discussion , not with the intention to unite religion but to

make it transparent to others and to reveal common factors in morals ,

as well as ethics .
2 .4 . Dialogue of experience , including religious experience , not with the

intention to worship God like the others but to realize that it is possi¬
ble to worship God , the same God , differently .

Religious and national education should focus on the necessity of disen¬

gaging historical conflicts and religious ethics , day - to - day politics and ev¬
erlasting foundations of common belief .
We believe that Lebanon can play a constructive role in this domain .
We do not want our country to be simply one in the total number of Arab
countries . Lebanon is , at the core of its being , a message of tolerance , mu¬
tual respect , and coexistence between 18 Christian and Muslim confes¬
sions . Any harm to this message , from within or outside , is a danger to the
human message , a danger to humanity . This message is needed not only to
safeguard Lebanese national unity but also as a base for Arab Muslim -
Christian dialogue , which , in its turn , forms the axis for better international
Christian - Muslim understanding .
The future of humanity should not be based on the conflict of civiliza¬
tions but rather on the complementary dialogue of civilizations , the core of
which is based on the monolithic messages of God , primarily Islam and
Christianity . I like to conclude with a verse from the Holy Qur ' an :

"O mankind ! We created you from a single (pair ) of male and female ,
and made you into nations and tribes , that ye may know each other ( not
that ye may despise [ each other ] ) . Verily the most honoured of you in the
sight of Allah is ( he who is ) the most righteous of you . And Allah has full
knowledge and is well acquainted ( with all things ) " ( Qur ' an 49 : 13 ) .

In our global village , lessons should be drawn as quickly as possible from

the experiences of others , whether positive or negative , from Lebanon to
Bosnia , from Afghanistan to Somalia , from Finland to South Africa , from
North Ireland to the Basque in Spain . Consequently , we should be able to
accept the challenge of answering this question :
 RELIGION AND POLITICS : THE CASE OF LEBANON
543

Do we want to make a point , or do we want to make a difference ? If it

is a point that we want to score , no one is perfect . If it is a difference we
want to make , at least a difference for peace and living together , then we
should remember what the sages taught , that peace , i . e . , prosperity and de¬
velopment , means never having it all your own way .
 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS
ON THE DIALOGUE
BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ,
OR PLEADING FOR A REORIENTATION
OF THE INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE
Dieter Senghaas

The following observations on the dialogue between Christians and Mus¬

lims , or between Western modernism and Islam , will probably appear un¬

timely , in the sense of Friedrich Nietzsche , who first coined the term Un -

zeitgemafie Betrachtungen , " against the time and thus to the time and ,

hopefully , in favor of a coming time " 1. This reflection was first inspired by

the observation that the marginal utility of the dialogue in question , as can

be observed in countries like Germany , is declining . If , initially , that dia¬

logue provided new information and stimulated new findings and insights ,

it has meanwhile become so routine that it is almost impossible to generate

any new points of view either analytically or practically .

Furthermore , a curious role game can be observed in the course of this

dialogue . On the whole , the Muslim participants are not hard - line repre¬

sentatives of orthodox Islam , be it in the traditionalist , Islamist , integra -

tionalist or fundamentalist sense ( all of which are often hard to differenti¬

ate ) . Whether believers or non - believers , they are , as a rule , representatives

of a " modern Islam " ( whatever that may mean exactly ) . Nevertheless - and

it can only be explained in group - dynamic terms - it is precisely these

" modernists " who in dialogues with Westerners get caught up in a position

in which their philosophical arguments are roughly consistent with the

same Islamist arguments which they would tend to resist in local political

discussions , particularly since they themselves are often the target of Is¬

lamist propaganda .

Western participants of the dialogue are often characterized by their

naive criticism of modernism , of which they grudgingly consider them -

1 Friedrich Nietzsche , " Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fur das Leben " , in : idem ,
Werke , ed . Karl Schlechta , vol . 1 , Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft ,
1963 , 210 .
 DIETER SENGHAAS
546

selves to be the result . Their criticism is naive because they are often un¬

aware - or do not want to become aware - of its implications .

Thus , two " dialogue partners " come together , the one side - the Mus¬

lims - appealing for understanding for points of view which cannot be

their own ( if one reads their statements , they indeed are not their own ) , and

the other side - the " good - willed Westerners " - with not much more to

offer than self - accusations . A dialogue such as this , intellectually ex¬

hausted and at a dead - end holds no promise for the future apart from its

routine continuation and its repetitiveness .

Are there any ways out of this situation , and could the concentration on

specific central themes help ?

1 . The realistic reconstruction by Westerners of their

own historical development

In the usual dialogues between Christians and Muslims , or between West¬

erners and people from the Muslim world ( and from other cultures ) , there

is a lack of feeling for the historical dimension of the development of the

West . In actual fact , the history of the Western world is only mentioned

with reference to colonialization and imperialism - which are , of course ,

fully justified to condemn . As a rule , however , the West is discussed as if

the product of its development , " modernism " , is the belated and conclusive

result of an initial " modernism project " . This " project " is implied to be

authentically Western , as if its course was predestined by cultural genes or

chromosomes , so to say , and had gradually unfolded , accelerated by occa¬

sional genetic transitions ( such as revolutions ) , but otherwise inevitable in

its development . Discourse on some central aspects of the Western world ,

as Westerners themselves see it today - rationalism , secularism , individu¬

alization and so on - is to a great extent molded by such assumptions as

these .

In reality , all the essential characteristics of today 's Western world are

much more the product of highly contradictory and conflict - ridden devel¬

opment processes than of a self - developed product predetermined by cul¬

tural genes . Not only were the paths of development within Europe very

varied ( with North - South and East - West divisions as well as many divid¬

ing lines within those regions ) ; furthermore , within each single develop¬

ment path the historical outcome of each process was always dependent on

factors which were by no means identical . The decisive factors were vari -
 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS
547

ous configurations of political , social , economic and cultural groups and

their corresponding intellectual currents .2

The development of Europe involved - in some of its parts earlier than

in others - a historically unprecedented political , social , economic and

cultural transformation . Traditional societies were modernized ; illiterate

societies with people living on the verge of subsistence became societies

with competent , self - conscious urban populations who became aware of

their new interests and identities and then became politically active and

organized . This reconstruction was like a prolonged period of emancipa¬

tion , which even in the West is still not complete today . 3 Above all , it was

never an automatic process . Furthermore , the liberation of the people from

their intellectual self - bondage only became relatively stable where there

was reliable support from materially and / or institutionally secure groups .

This substantial history of European paths of development was shaped

by power groups , each with varying degrees of effectiveness . The landed

gentry , the peasantry , the Church and the monarchy set the stage initially ;

the bourgeoisie , the proletariat and the new middle class were relatively

later products of the reconstruction process . Nothing was certain from the

outset - neither basic liberties and human rights nor the constitutional

state , neither democratization nor the emancipation of women , neither the

orientation to rationalism nor the assumption that conflicts were legitimate

and " only " needed constructive processing , and so on . It would also be

wrong to assume that European development was equal to a triumphal

march of the modernists and that the traditionalists had only ever been on

the retreat , fighting battles that they had lost from the outset .

Some of what are regarded as western achievements are only fairly re¬

cent and some even very recent . In 1215 , the year of the Magna Carta (a

document fundamental to the development of Europe ) , individual protec¬

tive rights were established , but not in today ' s sense . It was rather a ques¬

tion of defending the ancient feudal rights of English barons against the

arrogant power of one who had dared to establish himself as the supreme

head of the state by military means . 4 It took centuries and many changes

before the socio - political constellation of that year - King John versus the

2 Dieter Senghaas , The European Experience : A Historical Critique of Development

Theory, tr . K .H . Kimmig , Leamington Spa , Warwickshire / Dover , NH , USA : Berg
Publishers , 1985 . This book is now available in Arabic translation : Urubba : durus wa
namadhij , Damascus : Publications of the Ministry of Culture and Education ( = Socio¬
logical Studies Series ; 22 ) , 1996 .
3 On this topic see now Ulrich Beck et al . , Reflexive Modernisierung : Eine Kontroverse ,
Frankfurt /M . : Suhrkamp , 1996 .
4 S . G .R .C . Davis , Magna Carta , 7th ed ., London : The British Library , 1992 .
548 DIETER SENGHAAS

English barons , who felt their status threatened - was replaced by the line¬
up we know today - the constitutional state and citizens with legally guar¬
anteed individual protective rights . The separation of State and Church
familiar today was hardly derived from the biblical recommendation to
" render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar ' s and to God the things that

are God ' s . " The secular state was by no means the inevitable result of
European culture ; on the contrary , this type of state had to be secured in
the face of immense resistance , as is revealed for instance by the fact that
the Lutheran Church only made peace with the secular state after World
War II , and the Catholic Church did not do so until after the second Vati¬
can Council in the 1960s . 5 The fact that women ' s emancipation was a late
result and not an early phenomenon of modernism hardly needs pointing
out , as it is made obvious by current discussions . There are a number of
further examples of this kind . 6
The point , then , is that the " development of Europe " , " modernism " , or
simply " the West " must be thought of in its real historical context , that is ,
in the context of far - reaching conflicts between existing and newly devel¬
oping power groups , of progressive and reactionaiy developments , but also
of many unavoidable compromises between collective actors who were not
strong enough to gain hegemonic victories single - handedly . They therefore
had to channel developments towards constitutional arrangements in the
sense of checks and balances , i . e . , power control and the distribution of
force - and in the majority of cases they did this reluctantly , or contre
cceur . While the intercultural dialogue today is emphatically marked by a
kind of "profile essentialism " - in that the West is assumed to have certain
distinctive inherent or " eternal " features - the rediscovery of the real his¬
tory of modernism could be helpful to Westerners in adjusting their own
image of the West . It could also help Western participants of intellectual
debates with , other cultures to avoid falling into the similar trap of making
profile - essentialist projections . 7 People fall into this trap in almost every
intercultural dialogue .
A second recommendation may also be useful :

5 On this topic see most recently Hans Maier , Wie universal sind die Menschenrechte ?
Freiburg/ Br . : Herder , 1997 .
6 For example , within the Western world before World War I there existed only three
countries with unlimited universal suffrage , and suffrage for women has been essen¬
tially an achievement of this century .
7 See Hella Mandt , " Die offene Gesellschafit und die Wurzeln des zeitgenossischen
Fundamentalismus " , Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 4 ( 1993 ) 2 , 175 - 96 .
 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS
549

2 . Calling for a realistic inside view of Islam

One of the fateful aspects of current Christian - Muslim dialogues is its fixa¬
tion on " Islamic Fundamentalism " . It is remarkable that almost without

exception the term " Islamic Fundamentalism " is strongly criticized , but

that the dialogues are still saturated by this terminology . Evidently neither

the term nor the phenomenon itself can be avoided . Criticism of the term ,

however , often also leads to the denial of its actual existence , or it is sim¬

ply retermed as " Islamism " or " Integrism " .

Regardless of the terminology , the debate itself remains utterly frag¬

mentary . This can be illustrated by the simple fact that the very people

who most strongly criticize the term " fundamentalism " and regard it as the

source of a new enemy image have as yet done nothing towards document¬

ing the whole spectrum of thought in the Islamic world . 8 Why are so many

conferences held on the issue of " fundamentalism " ( always with the best

of intentions and always with a similar criticism of the concept ) , and why

no dialogue with the representatives of a modern , democratic form of Is¬

lam on their own visions ?

These representatives of modern Islam see themselves faced with a re¬

ality that traditionalists and fundamentalists are evading in their own spe¬

cific ways . Islamic societies are also in a dramatic process of reconstruc¬

tion - a social change sweeping across all fields of society , economy and

culture . New social classes are forming ; society and the economy are be¬

coming more diverse ; the level of competence of the population is increas¬

ing . This growing social , economic and cultural complexity raises the

question of how the vast diversity of interests and identities arising from it

can be handled politically . 9 Traditionalists have one or another variation on

the old order in mind , thereby living under the illusionary assumption that

the political order of the ancien regime could even survive the circum¬

stances of a changing society . Fundamentalists ( which do exist , regardless

of whether the term is appropriate or not ) use the social illnesses resulting

from the modernization process as a justification for their Machiavellian

strategy of seizing power . Their response to growing complexity is - as is

generally typical for fundamentalists - relatively simple : to overcome it by

8 In German publications , there is one favorable exception to be mentioned here :

Andreas Meier , Der politische Auftrag des Islam : Programme und Kritik zwischen
Fundamentalismus und Reformen . Originalstimmen aus der islamischen Welt ,
Wuppertal : Hammer , 1994 .
9 This is the basic issue which my most recent book deals with : Dieter Senghaas ,
Zivilisierung wider Willen : Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst , Frankfurt/M . :
Suhrkamp , 1998 .
 DIETER SENGHAAS
550

one or other of the variants of despotic and totalitarian reduction of com¬

plexity . 10
It goes without saying that such tactics are being discussed within Is¬
lamic societies , and political struggles for and against them are in progress .
A conflict such as this is - as was no different in Europe in the past - part
of the transition process , but this is no reason for holding a distorted or
pseudo - dialogue about it .
An intellectual debate should instead deal intensively with the concepts
of the democratic representatives of the Islamic world ; not because it is
presumed that they are the " better Muslims " , but primarily out of simple
curiosity . How do writers , scientists , politicians , the representatives of
social and especially religious groups envisage a desirable political consti¬
tution for their increasingly complex societies ? It is clear that ancient texts
can offer no inspiration , not even the Qur ' an . Like all comparable texts , the
Qur ' an ( and subsequent texts based on it ) was also an integral part of tradi¬
tional society . Whatever ideas existed about order in this type of society ,
they can never be realistic or sophisticated enough for a modern society or
one in the process of modernization . In other words , ancient texts can still
- perhaps especially today - inspire individuals to virtuous behavior , but
cannot be used as a source for drafting an ideal or viable , modern social or
economic system . As it is , a modern social order cannot be intrinsically
virtuous . Should one want to make it virtuous , then one would be pleading
for despotism - even if it were in the name of a republic of virtues .
It is therefore extremely fascinating to inquire as to what constructive
ideas are being considered in other cultures such as the Islamic one , on
how to cope with this objective complexity of problems . It has already
been explained that Europe needed centuries to come to terms with it in its
own way . As a rule , people from the Islamic world who are abreast with
current social developments and thinking hard on the question are not
likely to dispose of clear - cut solutions . However , their thoughts and pro¬
posals for a solution are of great significance to those directly experiencing
the changes , as they offer desirable options that flow into the political de¬
bate . An appraisal of forward - looking thinking in the Islamic world ( and
elsewhere ) by first simply acknowledging its existence , making transla¬
tions and organizing dialogues , is much more promising for the future than
a continuation of distorted debates on fundamentalism .
In fact , in view of the situation explained at the beginning , there is a
clear need to stop holding conferences on Islamic fundamentalism , not

10 Bassam Tibi , Der religiose Fundamentalismus im Ubergang zum 21 . Jahrhundert ,

Mannheim : BI - Taschenbuchverlag , 1995 .
 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS 551

because the phenomenon of political fundamentalism does not exist within

the Islamic world ( on the contrary ! ) , but rather because this fixation leads
the dialogue astray , and , as we have seen , forces the Islamic representa¬
tives into difficult roles , and also because it gives rise to a curious picture
of Islam in the West : Fundamentalism is on the one hand often trivialized ,
on the other it is often exaggerated , but endeavors towards modernizing
Islam are completely overlooked . It is vitally important to hold discussions
with theorists and political power groups who are struggling to establish
future - orientated policies which do not insinuate or even stage - manage
regressive solutions - vitally important for us , but also for the democratic
Islamic representatives from the Islamic world . Redirecting the debate in
this way also means avoiding the danger of unwittingly becoming the
pawn of fundamentalists . What is more , conditions for a new dialogue are
not unfavorable , as we shall see below .
Contrary to common assumptions , there is at present no potentially ex¬
plosive line of conflict between the Islamic world and the West - neither
the beginnings of one nor a developing one , not to mention a nascent pha¬
langeal confrontation . 11 Of the conflicts that do exist , some are moderate ,
some are sporadic build - ups , and some really severe conflicts in Arabic -
Islamic countries or within the Islamic world as a whole . These are in fact
modernization conflicts , similar to those which took place in Europe from
the 16th to the 20th century , albeit under different circumstances and with
a different cultural profile . Within these current local conflicts , the Islamic -
Christian component hardly plays more than a marginal role if one
disregards the Coptic Christians in Egypt , the Sudan , the Lebanon and the
Philippines ( which is nevertheless over 90 percent Christian ) . As a rule ,
the conflicts are focused on political conflicts within the respective Islam
community , which seldom functions like an " ummah " In general , the con¬
flicts between secular Western states and the Islamic minorities within
Western societies have also remained marginal . So , as already stated , the
starting position is quite favorable !
This basic situation , both here and in Islamic countries , must be em¬
phasized because here in the West the theory of " the demonization of
Islam" is gaining in popularity , and , moreover , is helping to renew the fixa¬
tion on a supposed " Occident - Orient conflict " . This is particularly often
expressed by the very people who are endeavoring to promote a dialogue
with Muslims . At the same time it is often claimed that this new enemy
image is a Machiavellian fabrication to replace the old concept of the

11 Dieter Senghaas , "A Clash of Civilizations - An Idee fixe ? " Journal of Peace Re¬
search 35 ( 1998 ) 1 , 127 - 32 .
552 DIETER SENGHAAS

communist enemy . The lack of influence that the demonization of commu¬

nism has had since the 1960s , and even during the so - called " Second Cold
War " in the late 1970s and early 1980s has been overlooked . That is why ,
when the East - West Conflict ended in 1898 / 90 , there was neither among
the elites nor among the masses any evidence that an enemy image had
disappeared . By then , the demonization of communism , dating from the
fifties and sixties , had only marginal significance . There was therefore no
demand for a substitute . The demonization of a new enemy side , i . e . , sub¬
stituting Islam for Communism , is to a large extent imagined . A realistic
concept of Islam , however , cannot be formed if people here in the West
see themselves confronted with a fantasized enemy image and not with the
realities of Islam ( or , to put it more correctly , the different forms of Is¬
lam ) . 12

3 . Looking beyond the Christian - Muslim dialogue

Nevertheless , the Christian - Muslim dialogue still urgently needs a broader

horizon . The following four observations may be of use here .
Firstly , if Muslims around the world are threatened today , then it is not
within the Islamic - Christian sphere , but in Hindu majority communities ,
i . e . , in India . There , where Muslims represent a " minority " of 120 million

people , many of the types of conflict are taking place , which are abstractly
imagined in Christian - Islamic regions . The extent of conflict there is of
considerable significance , as it is possible that it could spread to epidemic
proportions without any chance of controlling it . The conflict is already
influencing local political contexts ( " communalism " ) , and in parts escalat¬
ing with deplorable intensity . All the essential elements of ethno - political
conflict can be observed here . Both sides are disputing each others right to
exist , and the idealization of each group is followed by the identification of
its enemy . The greater the extent of such psychodynamic demarcations ,
i . e . , the more autistic the conflict becomes , the greater the endeavors of

each side to symbolically redefine its collective identity , for instance by

creating a myth about its origins and history . 13 At the same time , the power
strategists are using such ethno - political symbolizations to encourage
ethno - political awareness even where it previously had not existed . " Imag -

12 In that respect a German book edited by Gemot Rotter , Die Welten des Islam : Neun -
undzwanzig Vorschlage , das Unvertraute zu verstehen , Frankfurt / M . : Fischer , 1993 , is
quite illuminating .

13 Ernst Pulsfort , Was ist los in der indischen Welt ? Das Drama auf dem indischen Sub -
kontinent , Freiburg : Herder , 1993 .
 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS 553

ined communities " turn into militarized conflict parties defining them¬

selves in ethno - political terms . 14

Attention should be drawn to the escalating conflict between Hindus

and Muslims because it is a real and not an imagined one , and it also has

international implications with the threat of conventional and possibly

even nuclear war between India and Pakistan . In addition , it is worth point¬

ing out that this is a clash between two very different cosmologies . The

differences between Hinduism and Islam are far greater than those between

Islam and Christianity . The conflict is also disastrous insofar as it is being

carried out by grass - roots movements ( as is the conflict between Hindus

and Sikhs ) . Those manipulating events from the top would not succeed

without the astonishingly diverse response from below , and as Hindus ,

Muslims and Sikhs , but also the politically less influential Christians ,

Buddhists , Parsees and Jainists , have no alternative but to maintain their

old forms of local coexistence or to find new ones , events in India are of

the utmost exemplary significance . Up until now the secular state left be¬

hind by the old colonial power provided a framework within which this

coexistence was organized . If this is questioned , what will replace it ? A

hegemonic solution ( " Hindustan " ) would be catastrophic and would mean
wide - scale civil war . 15

Secondly , looking beyond the horizons of ones most immediate problems

also means perceiving real lines of conflict where Muslims and Christians

only play a marginal role , in other words where other communities are fight¬

ing each other . What is pushing them into these conflicts ? The conflict that

has escalated in Sri Lanka between Buddhist Singhalese and Hindu Tamils

could be cited as an example here . What can be learned from it ?

Again , the initial circumstances of the conflict are comparable with

those of other ethno - political conflicts . The astonishing fact here , though ,

is that the clash involves two parties both of whose cosmological back¬

grounds are based more emphatically than almost any other in the world

on non - violence . In particular , a militant , political form of Buddhism must

really appear to be a contradiction in terms . The conflict in Sri Lanka is

therefore an example of the extent to which even cosmologies that origi¬

nally embodied the precept of restraint in cases of conflict can be used as

intellectual weapons . The causes , which are all too readily assigned in such

conflicts , must especially be reconsidered in the light of the Sri Lankan

14 Thomas Meyer , Identitats - Wahn : Die Politisiemng des kulturellen Unterschieds ,

Berlin : Aufbau , 1997 .

15 Amartya Sen , " The Threats to Secular India " , New York Review of Books , April 8,
1993 , 26 - 32 .
 DIETER SENGHAAS
554

situation . Did such conflicts begin as clashes between cosmologies , cul¬

tures and / or religions , rooted in a sense in the different sources and origins
of the respective cultures ? Or are they not rather a case of modern devel¬
opment conflicts with identifiable modern interest groups ? There are , for
instance , old elites being pushed aside ( a modern phenomenon ! ) ; newly
arising elites confronting the power assertions of the post - colonial elites
who they regard as Westernized , corrupt state officials who have secured
all the privileges for themselves ; new professionals ( often engineers and
scientists ) who find their access to elitist positions blocked and often act as
the spearhead of fundamentalist movements ; marginal groups in urban
centers used as a reserve of unsuccessful candidates for the elite classes ,
and so on . 16
Thirdly , the variable meaning of cultural values in the development
process also becomes clear if one takes a comparative look at Eastern Asia .
This is a cultural region that in recent times can be regarded to a large de¬
gree as Europe ' s successor in economic , social , and also political terms .
The reasons for this do not primarily lie in Confucianism , and certainly not
in neo - Confucianism , which is now nothing more than one of many intel¬
lectual trends . The real reason for this ' succession ' is that over the past few
decades and for reasons , which can all be named , a successful economic
modernization process has taken place in Eastern Asia , which has since
then led to a modern social structure . 17 The complete range of aspects that
generally make up such a structure can be seen more and more clearly in
Eastern Asia : a quantitative reduction of the peasantry ; an increase in pri¬
vate businesses detaching themselves from state administration , but still
remaining connected to it ( the MITI 18 Syndrome ) ; a growing class of
wage - earners whose political influence increases to the degree that the
demand for them exceeds supply ; a striving middle class ; an increasingly
self - conscious intelligentsia . These social classes in Eastern Asia are today
demanding , even fighting for their right to participate in making political
opinions and decisions , and they are succeeding at a much faster rate than
their European predecessors did because the momentum of the reconstruc¬
tion process of these societies is much greater than that of the relatively
drawn - out process in European societies , and because their political en -

16 On this phenomenon see Martin E . Marty and R . Scott Appleby , eds ., Fundamental¬
isms Observed , Chicago : Chicago University Press , 1991 .

17 Ulrich Menzel , In der Nachfolge Europas : Autozentrierte Entwicklung in den

ostasiatischen Schwellenlandern Siidkorea und Taiwan , Munchen : Simon and
Magiera , 1985 .

18 MITI : Ministry of International Trade and Industry ( Japan ).

 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS 555

deavors to gain powerful positions are backed by increasing economic

weight . 19
The pluralization of political systems which can be observed in Eastern
Asia today , especially in Taiwan and South Korea , is thus a political re¬
flection of the institutional adaptation of old autocratic and despotic re¬
gimes to an increasingly complex socio - economic and cultural reality .20 As
in European history , this adaptation is no easy process , but heavily ridden
with conflict . Here , too , its direction is not linear , but irregular , although
its prospects are good because it was preceded by a regrouping of the old
societies into strong new socio - economic groups . This basic fact of socio¬
economic restructuring is not affected by the present " Asian crisis " .
At the same time , the current debate on so - called " Asian values " which
can be followed in Eastern Asia , particularly in Singapore ( South - East
Asia ) , should not be misinterpreted . The " Asian values " proclaimed today
are similar to the old European values of the past . Unity , harmony and
consensus are preferred to pluralism ; majority voting and the protection of
minorities are declared alien ; discipline is more highly rated than liberty ,
which is regarded as selfish ; the group , in particular the family , is put in a
higher category than the individual , duty higher than rights , authority or the
rule of the wise men ( " gurucracy " ) higher than parliamentarianism and consti¬
tutionalism . Power is restrained not by its distribution , but by ethical practices ,
which in turn are sanctified , by traditions and conventions . The good ruler
at the state level is likened to a good family father . If he proves to be a
tyrant , then resistance is conceivable and legitimate - at an abstract level ,
but only there . The political philosophy of " Asian values " places " stability
first and democracy later ! " This was also the philosophy of the early Euro¬
pean rulers , and echoes of it can be perceived in Europe even today .
While such concepts , as already stated , are familiar to European his¬
tory - and , in point of fact , completely concurrent with " Islamic values " -
they have in Eastern Asia ( and , meanwhile , in South - East Asia , too ) a spe¬
cific power - ideological function . They are the typical expression of a le¬
gitimation crisis of outdated authoritarian regimes in economically rela¬
tively successful countries . " Asian values " serve to ward off the political
demands of the new social classes , especially the new middle class and the
wage earners . In China they have the additional function of justifying the

19 Ulrich Menzel and Dieter Senghaas , Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt : Eine
Bestandsaufnahme , Frankfurt /M . : Suhrkamp 1986 , pt . II .
20 Dieter Senghaas , " On Asian and Other Values " , in : Kim Dae -jung Peace Foundation ,
ed . , Democratization and Regional Cooperation in Asia , Seoul : Kim Dae -jung Peace
Foundation , 1996 , 67 - 81 .
 DIETER SENGHAAS
556

continued existence of the Communist Party 's monopoly rights . " Asian

values " are thus an expression of neo - authoritarianism , promulgated when

the outdated authoritarianism of the autocratic regime , i . e . , the develop¬

ment dictatorships , is called into question by society .21

However , although " Asian values " are propagated , they are also a sign

of retreat . They serve as the ideological spearhead against demands for

further democratization from new social groups who also want an active

role in political development . In all probability , these values will have no

future in Eastern Asia because , in contrast to Third World countries , the

demands of a growing number of upwardly mobile social groups are based

on a diversified economy . The new demands are therefore not formulated

in the abstract context of basic liberties or human rights , but are bolstered

by economic and social conditions .

Fourthly , the process in Eastern Asia is interesting because it contrasts

strikingly with the history of Realsozialismus , or Really Existing Social¬

ism . Really existing socialism was also a development program with auto¬

cratic devices . The concentration of power , the monopoly rights of one

party , the Gleichschaltung ( bringing into line ) of society , economy and

culture were not interpreted as the expression of totalitarianism , but the

epitome of progressive development policy in the construction of socialist

societies . The aim was to produce " Socialist Man " , or , still better , " Soviet

Man " . Republik , das ist nicht viel , Sozialismus ist das Ziel ("A republic

alone is not enough ; the real aim is socialism " ) , was an old slogan even
within socialist movements in the West .

Why did really existing socialism fail , and why is Eastern Asia so suc¬

cessful ? There are many reasons , but in the context of this discussion there

is one of decisive interest . In terms of social statistics , really existing so¬

cialism undoubtedly led to the modernization of societies : The illiterate

learned to read and write , peasants became urbanites with new and varied

professions ; upward social mobility was possible everywhere . However ,

the rulers of really existing socialism were under the illusion that upwardly

mobile , intelligent and competent people could still be treated like chil¬

dren . The discrepancy between professional competency and political in -

fantilization , aggravated by the dramatic consequences of economic

mismanagement , was overcome by repression for a long time . However , as

had been predicted at an early stage , it inevitably led , in the absence of

21 On China see Dieter Senghaas , " Wie geht es mit China weiter ? " Leviathan 24 ( 1996 )
1 , 78 - 92 .
 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS 557

structural reforms , to revolutionary transformations , which might even

have resulted in a short - lived victory for the counterrevolution . 22

The whole course of events is instructive for the dialogue discussed

here . Firstly , it contrasts strikingly with developments in Eastern Asia , but

the similarity of some variants of Islamic fundamentalism to the ideology

of really existing socialism are also obvious , for instance in its high regard

for the concentration of power , the concept of an homogeneous moral

community as the fundamental principle in politics , society , economy and

culture , and the proposition that not the reprehensible bourgeois values of

the West but their own , " authentic " values should be achieved . Unfortu¬

nately , even the now bygone discussion on bourgeois Western human

rights versus socialist human rights is being repeated , except that now " Is¬

lamic " or , particularly in China , " Asian " human rights have taken the place

of " socialist human rights " . However , while socialist human rights were

originally proclaimed to maintain the status quo and to ward off the claims

to power of new social groups and in particular a pluralistic democratiza¬

tion process , " Islamic values " are as a rule propagated for the purpose of

gaining power . Once gained , these values would be functionalized by

power to the same purpose as they were under really existing socialism -

they would be transformed into a power ideology .

To sum up , one can see that for various reasons it would be useful to

look beyond the horizon of current Christian - Muslim dialogues . One could
learn that the real threat to Muslims lies somewhere other than in their

relations to the West , and above all in their own societies , and in Hindu

regions of India . One could also see that exactly the same conflicts in

which Muslim societies are struggling and suffering today are also taking

place in non - Islamic regions , and even in places where non - violence ( in

principle ) is part of the traditional cultural message . What unites the Is¬

lamic societies and these societies is the breakdown in their post - colonial

development , in other words , a crisis of development . In Eastern Asia ,

where the crisis could be averted as a result of cleverly managed develop¬

ment policy , there are in consequence no signs of phenomena such as fun¬

damentalism . Rather , what one sees is a drive towards socio - economic

modernization followed by a thrust towards political modernization in the

shape of democratization and the establishment of constitutional states .

Muslims who regard " the West " as " rotten " could learn a lot from this

process , and even historically unaware Westerners could discover in it

aspects which roughly compare with their own history . Unfortunately , in

22 Senghaas , The European Experience [ fh . 2 ] , ch . 6 .

558 DIETER SENGHAAS

the course of its development , really existing socialism missed the chance
of political modernization and collapsed as a result .
These and other lessons have not yet been considered in the dialogue
under discussion here , and they could be of great use , especially in view of
the following final remarks .

4 . The message of modernism - a proposal

The term modernism can evoke many associations : scientification , technol¬

ogy , rationalism , individualization and so on . If one wishes , one can also as¬
sociate the complete range of social diseases and pathologies with the term , as
happens in most Christian - Muslim dialogues - alienation , loss of collective
moral standards , sexual permissiveness and lasciviousness , postmodern " any¬
thing goes " mentality , crime and so on . The extreme of criticism and self -
accusations is the theory of modernity as " modern fundamentalism " . 23
The latter theory , in particular , misjudges the fact that modernism always
evolved from criticism and self- criticism . Seen as a whole ( and not just selec¬
tively) , modernism in its tendency can be compared to an anti - fundamentalist
program . It began with criticism of the feudal order , and in the past few dec¬
ades it has arrived at the last variant of self- criticism - post - modernism , which
however would be misunderstood if it were not attributed to modernism
itself . 24 Down the centuries in - between events gave rise to a wave - like
pattern of developments . The Enlightenment provoked Romanticism , Im¬
pressionism prompted Expressionism , individualism gave rise to commu¬
nitarian counter - movements , capitalism led to socialism , the Liberalist
constitutional state gave way to the constitutional welfare state . Neither
was modernism ever satisfied with itself , beginning exclusively and with a
restricted scope , then gradually broadening out and becoming more and
more comprehensive . While it originally involved a few members of the
educated and the propertied classes , " the People " only became the uphold¬
ers and beneficiaries of modernism as a result of a continuous process of
modernization . Only very recently was modernism correctly , if a little
belatedly , revealed by feminists to be an all - male process , with the conse¬
quence that even with regard to gender relations , modernism is now
gradually becoming more inclusive . The diversity of modernism is its very
attractiveness - its movements , counter - movements and its radiation .

23 A controversy in that respect can be found in Sybille Fritsch - Oppermann , ed ., Funda -

mentalismus der Moderne ? Christen und Muslime im Dialog , Loccum : Protokolle der
Evangelischen Akademie , 1996 .
24 Wolfgang Welsch , Unsere postmoderne Moderne , 4th ed . , Berlin : Akademie Verlag ,
1993 .
 SOME UNTIMELY REFLECTIONS 559

There is one little - known consequence of these facts . Because modernism

is in many ways equal to an emancipation process , the growing plurality of
identities and interests , of self- images and world - views has always been its
inevitable result . However , where social mobility and political awareness and
involvement are allowed , and where plurality is no longer a novel , elitist phe¬
nomenon , but has turned into a mass phenomenon of divided and riven socie¬
ties , one is forced to consider the question of coexistence . How is it possible ,
under such circumstances , to establish modalities for the constructive man¬
agement of conflict that , despite the existing plurality , allow reliable , non¬
violent agreements in the public arena ? For in borderline cases , unhindered
pluralism without institutional safeguards , i . e . , without a recognized and
accepted legal framework , can mean civil war . 25
Although unintentional for a long time , European modernism was like
an incessant struggle over the normative , procedural , material and psycho¬
logical preconditions for successful coexistence . It is a history of many
failures , but at the same time it is also the history of the democratic consti¬
tutional state that was never linear in its development and was never an
automatic process with a fixed purpose . In this process political innova¬
tions occurred , like for example institutionally secured protective rights
and basic individual liberties , the division of power , a public order based
on political pluralism , and so on . None of these experiences can be passed
on easily or even through missionizing to the rest of the world . Yet they
remain an available asset .
For the problems of coexistence are developing in the rest of the world at an
increasing rate and often in a much more potentially explosive combination than
in Europe ' s own past . The growing numbers of civil wars prove this fact . No
society in the world in the throes of modernization can evade the question of
coexistence . The assumption of homogeneous collectives , as in the case of the
" ummah " or other similar concepts , is a misjudgment or suppression of the
problem and heavily burdens the task of overcoming it . Furthermore , in many
parts of the world politicization is intensifying without the corresponding
institutional mechanisms to soften its effects . In many other parts of the
world , the material basis , which has always been necessary for such mecha¬
nisms , is shrinking . The potential for political conflict is therefore extremely
explosive , and the temptation to evade the problem in such circumstances
by simple , fundamentalist means such as despotism or dictatorship is great .
Europe has experienced much suffering in this respect in the past , and a lot
of useful lessons could be learned from that experience , too .

25 On this problem see the contributions in Dieter Senghaas , ed . , Den Frieden denken :
Sivispacem , para pacem , Frankfurt / M . : Suhrkamp , 1995 .
 CONTRIBUTORS

Mario Apostolov ( Ph .D . 1999 , Geneva , Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes

Internationales , IUHEI ) is an official at the United Nations Economic Commis -
sion for Europe ( UNECE ) in Geneva . His publications include Religious Minori -
ties , Nation States , and Security : Five Cases from the Balkans and the Eastern
Mediterranean ( Aldershot , UK , 2001 ) and Contemporary Dimensions of the
Frontier between Christianity and Islam ( Geneva , 1998 ) .

Jan Assmann ( Dr . phil . 1965 , Dr . phil . habil . 1971 , Heidelberg ) is professor

of egyptology at the University of Heidelberg . His books include The Search for
God in Ancient Egypt ( Ithaca , NY , 2001 ) , Herrschaft und Heil : Politische Theo¬
logie in Altägypten , Israel und Europa ( München , 2000 ) , Moses the Egyptian :
The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism ( Cambridge , MA , 1997 ) , and Das
kulturelle Gedächtnis . Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen
Hochkulturen ( München , 1992 ) .

Petra Bauerle , M . A . , is a research assistant at the Arnold - Bergstraesser -

Institut für kulturwissenschaftliche Forschung , Freiburg /Br . , and co - author of A
Date with Democracy : Palestinians on Society and Politics ( Freiburg /Br . , 1996 ) .

Olivier Christin ( Dr d ' Etat 1995 , Paris I ) is professor of modern history at

the Universite Louis Lumiere Lyon II , and a member of the Institut Universitaire
de France . He has written on the Reformation and the visual arts , as well as on the
history of religious wars in Europe . His publications include Une revolution sym -
bolique : L ' iconoclasme huguenot et la reconstruction catholique ( Paris , 1991 )
and La paix de religion : L 'autonomisation de la raison politique au XVIe siede
( Paris , 1997 ) .

Habiba Djahnine is an Algerian writer and feminist . A founding member of

the " Association pour l ' emancipation de la femme " in Algiers ( 1989 ) , she is liv -
ing in exile in France since 1995 . She co - authored ABCDaire des luttes des
femmes en Algerie ( Tizi - Ouzou , 1990 ) and Moi , toute femme ( Tizi - Ouzou , 1991 ) ,
both edited by the association " Cri de femme " ( Tighri N 'tmettouth , Tizi - Ouzou ) .

john J . Donohue SJ ( Ph .D . 1966 , Harvard ) is a Jesuit priest , director of the

Centre d ' Etudes pour le Monde Arabe Moderne ( CEMAM ) and professor of his¬
tory and translation at the Universite Saint - Joseph , Beirut . He wrote The Buway-
hid Dynasty in Baghdad ( Leiden , in press ) and Muslim - Christian Relations : Dia -
562 contributors

logue in Lebanon ( Washington , DC , 1996 ) , co - authored Islam in Transition ( New

York , 1982 ) and co - edited Faith , Power , and Violence : Muslims and Christians in
a Plural Society , Past and Present ( Rome , 1998 ).

Julia Eckert ( Dr . phil . 2000 , Berlin , Freie Universität ) is a Senior Re -

searcher at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology , Department for
Legal Anthropology , Halle / Saale . Her books include Shivsena and the Politics of
Violence ( New Delhi , forthcoming ) and Das unabhängige Usbekistan : Auf dem

Weg von Marx zu Timur ( Münster , 1996 ).

Haldun Gulalp ( Ph . D . 1991 , Binghamton , State University of New York ) is

associate professor of sociology at Bogazicji Üniversitesi , Istanbul . He is the au -
thor of numerous research articles on social theory and political Islam in modern
Turkey .

Theodor Hanf ( Dr . phil . 1966 , Freiburg / Br . ) is co - director of the Arnold -

Bergstraesser - Institut für kulturwissenschafitliche Forschung , Freiburg /Br . , and
director of the UNESCO ' s International Center of Human Sciences in Byblos ,
Lebanon . His publications include Georgia lurching to Democracy : From
Agnostic Tolerance to Pious Jacobinism ( co - author , Baden - Baden , 2000 ) , Dea -

ling with Difference : Religion , Ethnicity , and Politics ( editor , Baden - Baden ,

1999 ) , A Date with Democracy : Palestinians on Society and Politics ( co - author ,

Freiburg /Br . , 1996 ), Koexistenz im Krieg : Staatszerfall und Entstehen einer Nati¬
on im Libanon ( Baden - Baden , 1990 ) , La societe de concordance ( co - editor , Bei¬
rut , 1986 ) , and Erziehungswesen in Gesellschaft und Politik des Libanon ( Biele¬
feld , 1969 ) .

Mäher Jarrar ( Dr . phil . 1989 , Tübingen ) , is associate professor in the De¬

partment of Cultural Studies and Arabic and Near Eastern Languages at the
American University of Beirut . His publications include Myths , Historical Arche -
types and Symbolic Figures in Arabic Literature ( co - editor , Beirut / Stuttgart ,

1999 ) and Die Prophetenbiographie im islamischen Spanien ( Frankfurt / M .,

1986 ).

Aida Kanafani - Zahar ( Ph . D . 1979 , Austin , Texas ) is a CNRS research fel -

low at the Institut de Recherche sur les Societes Contemporaines ( IRESCO ) , Pa¬
ris , Groupe de Sociologie des Religions et de la La 'icite ( GSRL ) . Her books in¬
clude : Le mouton et le mürier : Rituel du sacrifice dans la montagne libanaise
( Paris , 1999 ) , Müne , la conservation alimentaire traditionnelle au Liban ( Paris ,

1994 ) , and Aesthetics and ritual in the United Arab Emirates : The Anthropology

of Food and Personal Adornment among Arabian Women ( Beirut , 1983 ).

Wajih Kawtharani ( Doctorat 1974 , Paris I ) is professor of history at the

Lebanese University , Beirut . His books include : Tärlkh wa - madärisuhu fi al-
gharb wa - inda al - ' arab ( Beirut , 2001 ) , al - Dhäkirah wa - al - tärikh fi al - qarn al -
 contributors
563

Hshrin al - tawil ( Beirut , 2000 ), and al - Sultah wa - al - mujtama ' wa - al - amal al -

siyäsi : min tärikh al - wiläyah al - ' uthmäniyyah fiBiläd al - Shäm ( Beirut , 1988 ).

As cad e . khairallah ( Ph .D . 1972 , Princeton ) is professor of Arabic Litera -

ture at the American University of Beirut and the author of Love , Madness , and

Poetry : An Interpretation of the Magnün Legend ( Beirut / Wiesbaden , 1980 ).

samir Khalaf ( Ph .D . 1964 , Princeton ) is professor of sociology and chair of

the Center for Behavioral Research at the American University of Beirut . He is

the author of numerous studies on social processes and civil strife in Lebanon ,

most notably Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon ( New York , 2002 ) , Cultural

Resistance ( London , 2001 ) , Beirut Reclaimed ( Beirut , 1993 ) , Besieged and Si -

lenced ( Oxford , 1989 ) , Lebanon 's Predicament ( New York , 1987 ) , Persistence

and Change in 19th - century Lebanon ( Beirut , 1979 ) , and Hamra of Beirut ( co -

author , Leiden , 1973 ).

Tarif Khalidi ( Ph . D . 1970 , Chicago ) was Sir Thomas Adams professor of

Arabic , director of the Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies , and fellow

of King ' s College at Cambridge University , UK . Since 2002 he is professor of

Islamic and Arabic Studies at the American University of Beirut . He wrote The

Muslim Jesus ( Cambridge , MA , 2001 ) , Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical

Period ( Cambridge , UK , 1994 ) , and Classical Arab Islam : the Culture and Heri -

tage of the Golden Age ( Princeton , NJ , 1985 ).

Elias Khoury is a Lebanese literary critic , novelist , and play - writer . Since

1992 , he is editor - in - chief of the weekly Supplement ( Mulhaq ) of al - Nahär , Bei¬

rut . His poetic works have been translated into many languages , among them Der

geheimnisvolle Brief ( München , 2000 ) , The Kingdom of Strangers ( Fayetteville ,

AR , 1996 ) , The Journey ofLittle Ghandi ( Minneapolis , MN , 1993 ) , Un parfum de

paradis ( Paris , 1992 ) , and Little Mountain ( Minneapolis , MN , 1989 ).

Hans Gerhard Kippenberg ( Dr . theol . 1969 , Göttingen , Habilitation 1975 ,

Berlin , Freie Universität ) is professor of comparative religion at the University of

Bremen and a fellow at the Max - Weber - Kolleg , Erfurt . His publications include :

Discovering Religious History in the Modern Age ( Princeton , NJ , 2002 ) , Max

Webers " Religionssystematik " ( co - editor , Tübingen , 2001 ) , Secrecy and Con -

cealment ( co - editor , Leiden , 1995 ) , Lokale Religionsgeschichte ( co - editor , Mar -

burg / L . , 1995 ) , and Die vorderasiatischen Erlösungsreligionen in ihrem Zusam¬

menhang mit der antiken Stadtherrschaft ( Frankfurt / M . , 1991 ).

Karl - Josef Kuschel ( Dr . theol . 1977 , Habilitation 1989 , Tübingen ) is pro¬

fessor in the Faculty of Catholic Theology at Tübingen University and teaches

theology of culture and interreligious dialogue . He is the author of many books on

intercultural and interreligious dialogue , among them The Poet as Mirror : Human

Nature , God and Jesus in Twentieth - Century Literature ( London , 1999 ), Vom

Streit zum Wettstreit der Religionen : Lessing und die Herausforderung des Islam
564 contributors

( Düsseldorf , 1998 ), and Abraham : Sign ofHope forJews , Christians and Muslims
(New York , 1995 ) . He is also the co - editor of In Search of Universal Values
( London , 2001 ) , and A global Ethic : The Declaration of the Parliament of the

World 's Religions (New York , 1993 ) .

ussama makdisi ( Ph . D . 1997 , Princeton ) is assistant professor of history at
Rice University , Houston , Texas . He is the author of The Culture of Sectarianism :
Community, History , and Violence in Nineteenth - Century Ottoman Lebanon
( Berkeley , CA , 2000 ) .

Chibli Mallat ( Ph .D . 1990 , University of London ) is Jean Monnet profes¬

sor for European Law and director of the Centre d ' Etudes sur l ' Union Europenne
( CEUE ) at the Universite Saint - Joseph , Beirut . He is also the principal of Mallat

Law Offices . He is the author of numerous books , among them al -Dimüqrätiyyah

ß Amirikä ( Beirut , 2001 ) , al - Ri'äsah al - lubnäniyyah bayna al - ams wa - al - ghad
( Beirut , 1998 ) , The Middle East into the 21st Century ( Berkshire , UK , 1996 ) , and

The Renewal of Islamic Law : Muhamad Baqer as - Sadr, Najaf and the Shi ' i In¬
ternational ( Cambridge , 1993 ) .
Saoud El - Maoula ( Doctorat 1984 , Paris IV ) is professor of political and re -
ligious sociology of the Middle East at the Lebanese University , Beirut . He is a
founding member of the Groupe Arabe de Dialogue Islamo - Chretien and head of
the Dialogue Forum at the Universite Saint - Joseph , Beirut . Between 1993 and
2000 he represented the Shiite Islamic Supreme Council on the Islamic - Christian
National Dialogue Committee . His books include Min Hasan al -Bannä ilä hizb
al - wasat : al - harakah al - islämiyyah wa - qadäyä al - irhäb wa - al - tä 'ißyyah ( Beirut ,

2000 ) , Kharlf al - Umam al - Muttahidah : qadäyä dawliyyah ( Beirut , 1999 ) , and al-
Hiwär al - islänüal - masihi : daghürat al - mughämarah ( Beirut , 1996 ) .
Antoine Nasri Messarra ( Dr d ' Etat 1982 , Strasbourg ) is professor at the
Lebanese University , Beirut , and president of the Lebanese Political Science As¬
sociation . He is also research coordinator of the Lebanese Foundation for Perma¬
nent Civil Peace and coordinated the multilateral research and educational pro -
grams " La generation de la releve " and " Observatoire de la democratie au Liban " .
His publications include Le pacte libanais : le message d ' universalite et ses
contraintes ( Beirut , 1997 ) ; Theorie generale du Systeme politique libanais ( Paris -
Beirut , 1994 ) , La generation de la releve , 5 vols . ( co - editor , Beirut , 1990 - 2000 ) ,
La societe de concordance ( co - editor , Beirut , 1986 ) , and Le modele politique
libanais et sa survie ( Beirut , 1983 ) .
youssef Mouawad ( Doctorat 1975 , Paris ) is a lawyer and professor of busi -
ness law at the Lebanese American University , Beirut . He is the author of Laws of
Lebanese Corporations ( Beirut , 1992 ) as well as of numerous research articles on
the modern history of Lebanon .
 contributors
565

Angelika Neuwirth ( Dr . phil . 1972 , Göttingen , Habilitation 1977 ,

München ) is chair professor of Arabic Studies at the Free University of Berlin and
a former director of the Orient Institute of the German Oriental Association

( 1994 - 1999 ) in Beirut and Istanbul . Her publications include Crisis and Memory

( co - editor , Beirut / Würzburg , 2001 ) , Myths , Historical Archetypes and Symbolic

Figures in Arabic Literature ( co - editor , Beirut / Stuttgart , 1999 ) , Baalbek : Image

and Monument , 1898 - 1998 ( co - editor , Beirut / Stuttgart , 1998 ) , and Studien zur

Komposition der mekkanischen Suren ( Berlin - New York , 1981 ).

Elizabeth Picard ( Doctorat 1985 , Habilitation 1993 , Paris , Institut d ' Etudes

Politiques ) is research director at the Institut de Recherches et d ' Etudes sur le

Monde Arabe et Musulman ( IREMAM ) , Aix - en - Provence , and a former director

of the Centre d ' Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen - Orient Contemporain

( CERMOC ) , Beirut and Amman ( 1997 - 2000 ) . She wrote Lebanon : A Shattered

Country ( New York , 1996 , rev . ed . 2002 ) and edited La question kurde ( Brüssels ,

1991 ) and La nouvelle dynamique au Moyen - Orient ( Paris , 1993 ).

Andreas Rieck ( Dr . phil . 1983 , Hamburg ) is resident representative of the

Hanns - Seidel Foundation in Islamabad , Pakistan . Numerous publications on po -

litical and religious developments in Lebanon , Iran , Pakistan and Afghanistan .

sofia A . Saadeh ( Ph .D . 1974 , Harvard ) is an advisor to the Deputy Prime

Minister of Lebanon , Mr . Issam Fares . Her books include The Social Structure of

Lebanon : Democracy or Servitude ( Beirut , 1993 ) , and Antun Saadeh and Democ -

racy in Geographie Syria ( London , 2000 ).

Muhammad Sammak is the representative of Dar al - Fatwa on the Islamic -

Christian National Dialogue Committee and the Committee ' s General Secretary

( with Emir Hares Chehab ) . He is an advisor to the Prime Minister of Lebanon ,

Mr . Rafik al - Hariri . His publications include al - Istighläl al - dinifi al - sirä ' al - siyäsi

( Beirut , 2000 ) , Muqaddimah ilä al - hiwär al - islämi al - masihi ( Beirut , 1998 ) , al -

Sahyüniyyah al - masihiyyah ( Beirut , 1993 ) , and al - Irhäb wa - al J unf al - siyäsi ( Bei¬

rut , 1987 ).

Ridwan al - Sayyid ( Dr . phil . 1977 , Tübingen ) is professor of Islamic Studies

at the Lebanese University , Beirut , and co - editor of al - Ijtihäd , Beirut . His books

include Azmat al -fikr al - siyäsi al - arabi ( Beirut / Damascus , 2000 ) , Siyäsiyät al -

isläm al - mu 'äsir : muräja 'ät wa - mutäba ' ät ( Beirut , 1997 ) , al - Shürä bayna al - nass

wa - al - tajribah al - tärikhiyyah ( Abu Dhabi , 1997 ) , and Die Revolte des Ibn As 'at

und die Koranleser ( Freiburg / Br . , 1977 ).

Thomas Scheffler ( Dr . phil . 1993 , Berlin , Freie Universität ) is a research

fellow of the German Research Council ( DFG ) at the Political Science Depart¬

ment of the Free University of Berlin . He wrote Ethnisch - religiöse Konflikte und

gesellschaftliche Integration im Vorderen und Mittleren Orient ( Berlin , 1985 , 2nd ed .

1990 ) and Die SPD und der Algerienkrieg 1954 - 1962 ( Berlin , 1995 ) , edited Ethni -
 contributors
566

zität und Gewalt ( Hamburg , 1991 ) and Fritz Steppat , Islam als Partner ( Bei¬
rut/Würzburg , 2001 ) , and co - edited Baalbek : Image and Monument , 1898 - 1998
( Beirut / Stuttgart , 1998 ) .

Samir Seikaly ( Ph . D . 1967 , SOAS , University of London ) is professor in

the Department of History and Archaeology at the American University of Beirut .
Numerous publications on Arab intellectual life during the nahdah and on the rise
of Arab nationalism . He co - edited Quest for Understanding : Arabic and Islamic
Studies in Memory of Malcolm Kerr ( Beirut , 1991 ) .

Dieter Senghaas ( Dr . phil . 1967 , Frankfurt / M . ) is professor of social sci -

ence and director of the Institute for International and Intercultural Studies ( InllS )
at the University of Bremen . In 1987 he received the International Peace Research
Award . His most recent books include The Clash Within Civilizations ( London ,
2002 ) , Frieden machen ( editor , Frankfurt / M . , 1997 ) , Den Frieden denken ( editor ,
Frankfurt / M . , 1995 ) , Wohin driftet die Welt ? ( Frankfurt / M . , 1994 ) , and Friedens¬
projekt Europa ( Frankfurt / M . , 1992 ) .

Peter van der Veer ( Ph .D . 1986 , Utrecht ) is professor of comparative relig -

ion and director of the Research Center for Religion and Society at the University
of Amsterdam and co - director of the International Institute for the Study of Islam
in the Modern World ( ISIM ) , Leiden . His publications include Imperial Encoun -
ters ( Princeton , NJ , 2001 ) , Nation and Religion ( co - editor , Princeton , NJ , 1999 ) ,
Conversion to Modernities ( editor , New York , 1996 ) , Religious Nationalism
( Berkeley , CA , 1994 ) , Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament ( co - editor ,

Philadelphia , PA , 1993 ) , and Gods on Barth ( London , 1988 ) .

Edgard Weber ( Dr d ' Etat 1989 , Paris , Sorbonne ) is professor of Arab stu¬
dies and director of the Centre d ' Etudes du Monde Arabe et de l ' Asie ( CEMAA )
at the Universite de Toulouse - Le Mirail . His books include L 'univers romanesque
de Rachid El -Daif et la guerre du Liban ( Paris , 2001 ) , Petit dictionnaire de My¬
thologie arabe ( Paris , 1996 ) , L 'Islam sunnite contemporain ( Turnhout , 1993 ) ,
L 'Islam en France , ou , La paix sainte ( co - author , Paris , 1992 ) , and Croisade
d 'hier , djihäd d 'aujourd 'hui ( co - author , Paris , 1981 ) .

Sami Zubaida ( M . A . , Leicester ) is reader in sociology at Birkbeck College ,

University of London , and a research associate of the Centre for Near and Middle
Eastern Studies at SOAS . His publications include Culinary Cultures of the Mid¬
dle East ( co - editor , London , 1994 , 2nd ed . 2000 ) , Islam , the People and the State
( London , 1998 , 2nd ed . 1993 ) and Mass Culture , Populär Culture , and Social Life

in the Middle East ( co - editor , Boulder , CO , 1987 ) .

 INDEX

Aaron 89 Aley {'Älayh ) 195

' Abbäs , Ihsän 485 Algeria 11 , 129f . , 261 - 70
Abbasids 127 , 142f . All b . Abi Tälib 105 , 115 , 160
Abdallah , Halim 445 Ali , Mehmet ( Muhammad 'Ali ) 183
Abdallah Pasha 183 Almoravids 143

Abd al - Qädir b . Muhyi al - Din 130 Amal 299 , 330

cAbd al - Karim , Muhammad b . 171 Amarna 42

Abduh , Muhammad 132 Ammärah , Muhammad 523

Abdullah , Muhammad Salim ( Mu¬ Amnesia see Forgetting
hammad Salim 'Abdallah ) 517f . Amrb . al - cÄs 105 , 115
Abraham 73 , 457f . , 404 , 497 - 519 Amr b . Dinar 124

cAbs , Michel 477 , 525 , 527 Anabaptists 121 , 354

Absolutism XIII Anderson , Benedict 230f .
Abü Dharr al - Ghifari 505 Ankara 275

Abu Bakr 105 , 155 Antioch 100 , 481 , 485

Abü Dä ' üd al - Sijistänl 139 Antün , Fand 419
Abü Hanlfah , al - Nu ' män b . Thäbit Aoun [ 'A \ vn \ , Michel 471 f .
126 , 128 , 135 , 141 - 44 , 161 Apocalypticism 3 , 91 - 99
Abü Tammäm Hablb b . Aws 420 Apostates 103 , 105 , 106
Abü ' Ubayd al - Qäsim b . Salläm 141 Armenians 23 , 393 , 464
Abu Yüsuf Y a ' qüb 128 , 142 Arnold , Matthew 424
al - Ädäb ( journal ) 176 casabiyyah 1
Adam 75 , 457 Asad , Talal 238
Adana 203 , 205 Ash carites 505

cAdud al - Dawlah , Abü Shujä ' Fannä Ashqäbäd 347

Khusraw 145 Äshürä ' see Day of Atonement
Afghanistan 11 , 264 , 333 - 49 , 499 , Asmar , Michel 20
542 Asöra see Day of Atonement
Ahab ( King of Israel ) 89 Assmann , Aleida 37
ahl al - dhimmah see dhimnü Assmann , Jan 58
ahl al - kitäb 137 , 457 Assyria 87 , 90
Ahmad Khän , Sayyid 131 f . Assyrians ( Nestorians ) 459 - 60
Ahmedabad 233 , 370 Ata ' b . Abi Rabbäh 124

Akarli , Engin 190f . Atatürk , Mustafa Kemal 251 , 273 -

Akhenaten 41 f . 81 , 464
Albania 250f . Augsburg 9 , 354 , 359f .
Aleppo 458 Augustine ( Aurelius Augustinus )
Alevis 464 119 , 238
Alexandria 100 Auschwitz 34
568 INDEX

Avicenna see Ibn SInä Bhamdün 20 , 205 , 207

al - cAwwä , Muhammad Sallm 522f . , Bhivandi 366f . , 377
531 Bible 49 - 82 , 139 , 415 , 493 , see also
cAwwäd , Bülus 199 , 204f . , 207 Torah
al - Awzä % Abü cAmr cAbd al - Rah - Old Testament :
män 125 Genesis [ 1 ] 73 ; [ 1 : 1 - 14 ] 71 ; [ 22 :
Ayodhyä 367 , 372 , 377 1 - 19 ] 72
Ayoub , Mahmoud ( Mahmüd Ayyüb ) Exodus [ 12 : 1 - 12 ] 61 , 71 ; [ 12 : 3 ]
515 64 , 67 ; [ 12 : 8 ] 69 ; [ 12 : 21 ] 62 ,
Ayyubids 145 67 ; [ 12 : 21 - 51 ] 66 , 71 ; [ 12 : 23 ,
al - Azhar 463 29 ] 67 ; [ 12 : 24 - 26 ] 67 ; [ 13 : 8 ]
al - Azm , Sädiq 177 70 ; [ 13 : 20 - 15 : 20 ] [ 19 : 6 ] 44 ;
al - Azmeh , Aziz { 'Azlz al - Azmah ) 52 [ 21 - 52 ] 61
Numbers [ 28 : 16 - 25 ] 67 , [ 25 : 1 - 16 ]
Ba ' abdä 207 89
Babylon 88 , 90 Deuteronomy 36 - 41 , 46f . , 85 - 90 ,
Badr ( Battie of) 64 , 75 , 79 91 , 96 , 101 , [ 2 : 34 - 35 ] 86 ; [ 3 : 6 -
Bagdad 147 7 ] 86 ; [ 4 : 2 ] 38 ; [ 4 : 9 ] 36 ; [ 5ff . ]
al - Bähill , Qutaybah b . Muslim 124 88 ; [ 6 : 10 - 12 ] 37 ; [ 6 : 20 ] 69 ; [ 7 :
Bakrb . Wä ' il 113 3 - 4 ] 89 ; [ 8 : 11 - 14 ] 37 ; [ 12 :2 - 3 ]
Bakunin , Mikhail 2 , 9 86 ; [ 12 - 26 ] 87 ; [ 13 : 13 - 18 ]
Balamand 22 89f . ; [ 20 : 10 - 18 ] 85f . , 139 ; [ 26 :
Balkanization 15f. , 246 5 - 9 ] 70 ; [ 32 ] 38 ; [ 30 : 15 - 19 ]
Balkans 168 , 245 - 59 , 308 - 11 , 427f . , 47 ; [ 32 : 21 - 25 ] 92 ; [ 32 : 35 , 41 ]
460 , 465 92 ; [ 32 : 41 - 43 ] 92
Bämiyän 347 Joshua [ 5 :2 ] 68 ; [ 5 :2 - 6 : 1 ] 61 , 67 ;
al - Bannä ' , Hasan 522 [ 5 : 10 - 6 : 1 ] 71 ; [ 5 : 11 ] 68 ; [ 6 : 21 ]
Barcelona Conference ( 1995 ) 25 86 ; [ 8 : 26 - 29 ]
St . Bartholomew ( Massacre ) 357f . 1 Samuel [ 15 :3 ] 86 ; [ 22 : 19 ] 86
Basques 542 1 Kings [ 17 : 8 - 18 : 1 ] 72
Bataille , Georges 240 2 Kings [ 4 : 8 - 38 ] 72 ; [ 22 - 23 ] 40
Battie of the Camel 105 Job 90
al - Bayhaql , Abü Bakr 147 Psalms 123 , [ 51 ] 46 ; [ 81 ] 72 ;
Batna (Bätinah ) 264 [ 119 : 19 ] 39 , 46
Begin , Menahem 502 Proverbs [ 25 : 21 - 22 ] 92
Beirut 17 , 19 , 21f„ 24f „ 27 , 175 - Ecclesiastes 90
178 , 195 , 198 , 202f . , 207f . , 211 , Isaiah [ 60 : 1 - 17 ] 71 ; [ 61 : 1 - 10 ] 72 ;
290 , 320 , 327 , 331 , 403 , 412 , 472 [ 61 : 10 - 62 : 6 ] 72 ; [ 63 : lb - 645b ]
Belgium 15 72
Bell , J . Bowyer 284 , 294f . Jeremiah [ 31 : 31 - 34 ] 72
Ben Bella , Ahmed (Ahmad b . Ballä ) Daniel [ 3 : 1 - 88 ] 72
269 Jonah [ 1 - 4 ] 71
Benedict XV ( Pope ) 204f . , 207 Zephaniah [ 3 : 8 - 16 ] 71
Benhadj , Ali { 'Allb . Häjj ) 262 , 264 New Testament :
Bendjedid , Chadli ( Shädhili b . Matthew [ 1 : 1 ] 513 ; [ 5 : 39 , 43 - 48 ]
Jadld ) 263 91 ; [ 6 : 10 ] 90 ; [ 10 : 34 - 36 ] 93 ;
Berbers 143 , 266 [ 13 : 24 - 30 ] XIII ; [ 13 : 49 - 50 ]
Berlin 27 , 207 92 ; [ 18 : 20 ] 489 , 493 ; [ 22 : 21 ]
Bernstein , Richard 34 - 36 91 ; [ 24 :6 - 8 , 29 , 37 - 41 ] 91 ,
Bhagalpur 229 , 231 , 242 [ 26 : 52 ] 91 ; [ 28 : 1 - 20 ] 71 - 73
 INDEX
569

Mark [9 : 1] 91 ; [ 10 :25 ] 92 ; [ 12 : Burckhardt , Jacob 6f .

17 ] 91 ; [ 12 : 31 ] 91 ; [ 13 : 7 - 27 ] Burkert , Walter 301
91 ; [ 16 : 16 ] 92 burqä ' 341
Luke [ 6 :24 - 25 ] 92 ; [ 6 :27 - 36 ] 91 ; al - Bustäni , Butrus 211 - 215
[ 11 : 52 ] 92 ; [ 14 : 11 ] 92 ; [ 14 :26 ] Byzantine Empire 125 - 27
93 ; [ 20 : 25 ] 91 ; [ 22 : 36 - 37 ] 93
John [ 1 : 1 - 17 ] 74 , 420 , 483 ; [ 1: Cairo 145 , 458
18 ] 39f . , [ 4 : 12 ] 39 ; [ 18 : 36 ] 91 ; Caliphate 129f . , 15 lf .
[ 20 : 19 - 31 ] 63 Canaanites 87f . , 219
Acts [ 1 : 1 - 8 ] 73 f. Carter , Jimmy 502f .
Romans [ 6 :3 - 12 ] 72 ; [ 12 : 14 ] 91 ; Cenacle Libanais {al - nadwah al - lub -
[ 12 : 19 ] 91 f . , [ 12 :20 ] 91f . ; näniyyah ) 20f .
[ 13 : 1 - 7 ] 91 Chechnya 11 , 428
2 Corinthians [ 5 : 7 ] 39 Chicago 506
Ephesians [ 6 : 1 ] 91 ; [ 6 : 11 - 17 ] 94 Chiha ( Shihä ) , Michel 15
Philippians [ 3 :20 ] 91 China 499 ,' 555
Colossians [ 1 :20 ] 489 , 490 ; [3 : Christ see Jesus

18 , 20 ] 91 Ciller , Tansu 272

Titus [ 3 : 1 ] 91 Civil Status 416 - 18 , 449 - 56
James [ 5 : 1 ] 92 Clastres , Pierre 322 , 328
1 Peter [ 2 : 13 - 14 ] 91 ; [ 3 : 1 ] 91 Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum

2 Peter [ 3 : 10 ] 91 Orientalium ( CCEO ) 417f .

1 John [ 4 : 12 ] 39f . Codex Iuris Canonici ( CIC ) 417f .
Revelation [ 6 - 11 , 16 , 18 , 21 : 1 ] 91 Cold War 4

al - Bishri , Täriq 523 , 531 Collier , Paul 84

Bkirkl 193 ', 207 , 451 Confucianism 554
Blood 407 - 10 Constantinople 247 , 531 , see also
Blumenberg , Hans 313 Istanbul

Bodin , Jean 9 Copts 461 - 63 , 540 , 551

Bombay 241 , 365 - 89 Corm , Georges 15f . , 245
Le Bon , Gustave 4 Cortes , Donoso 8
Bonald , Louis de 8 Cosmology 83 , 553
Book of the Law see Deuteronomy Covenant theology 38 , 46f . , 88 - 90 ,
12 - 26 96 , 99 - 101 , 152
Bosnia 11 , 245 - 59 , 308 - 10 , 317f ., Croatia 247

448 , 519 , 535 , 542 Courbage , Youssef 467f .

Boucebci , Mahfoud ( Mahfüd Büsab - Crimea 129

si ) 267 Crusades 128 , 145f ., 159 , 167 - 73 ,

Boumedienne , Houari ( Hawwärl 308 , 331 , 521
Bümadyan ) 263 Cyprus 11 , 199
Bouyali , Moustapha ( Mustafa Bü -
ya ' li ) 264 al - Da ' If , Rashid 421 f .
Braudel , Fernand 168f . Damascus 170 , 195 , 204 , 209 , 458
Brzezinski , Zbigniew 5 där al - harb 123 - 33 , 137 , 140 , 172 ,
Buddhism 40 , 83f . , 553 530

bughät 105 där al - isläm 123 - 33 , 137 , 140 , 172

Buwärij 413 f. där al - kufr 128
Buyids 143 da 'wah 126 , 151 - 53 , 532
Bukhärä 145 David ( King of Israel ) 88
al - Bukhäri , Muhammad b . Ismä ' il 139 Davos 506
 INDEX
570

Day of Atonement ( 'ÄshüräAsöra , Exodus 36 , 61f . , 64 , 68 - 70 , 72 , 79

Yöm Kippür ) 64 , 302 , 330 , 41 lf . see also Bible

Demirel , Süleyman 273

Democratic Left Party ( Demokratik Fadlalläh , al - Sayyid Muhammad
Sol Partisi ) 274 Husayn ( Ayatulläh ) 22 , 305 - 07
Demography 467 - 68 Färüq ( King of Egypt ) 463
Derrida , Jacques 35f . , 232 , 235 , 317 al - FärüqT , Ismä ' Il 522
Deuteronomic History 85 - 90 Fatimids 143 f .
dhimmi t ahl al - dhimmah 102 , 103f ., Fatri 411

106 , 128 , 151 , 153 , 161 , 193 - 210 , Fawaz , Leila 181
458 , 491 , 530f . Faysal b . al - Husayn al - Häshimi 209
Dhimmitude 193 - 210 , 530 al - Fazäri , Abü Ishäq 125
Dialogue 18 - 24 , 27 , 112 , 359 , 383 , Feasts ( religious ) 49 - 82 , 405 - 15
384f . , 416 , 521 - 33 , 535 - 43 , 545 - Ferdinand I ( King of Castile ) 143
59 FFS ( Front des forces socialistes ,
Dilipak , Abdurrahman 278 jabhat al - quwä al - ishtiräkiyyah )
DImän 200 - 03 266

al - Dimashqi , Abü Zur ' ah 127 Finland 542

Disease 43f . , 371 , 376 fiqh 528

Dome of the Rock 100 FIS ( Front islamique du salut , al -
Dönme 464 jabhah al - islämiyyah li - l - inqädh )
Dostum , Abdul Rashid ( 'Abd al - 261 - 70

RashldDüstuiri ) 343 , 345 fitnah 101 , 102 , 121

Douglas , Mary 46 FLN ( Front de liberation national ,
Drewermann , Eugen 83 jabhat al - tahrlr al - watani ) 265f .
Druzes 23 , 179 - 191 Florence 510

Dumont , Louis 16 Food 406 - 10 , 415

Dürkheim , Emile 240 , 302 Forgetting 40 - 44 , 230f . , 265 , 270
Durränl , Ahmad Shäh 337 Foucault , Michel 217 , 237
al - DuwayhT , Jabbür 421 f . France XIII , 201 , 208 , 257 , 292 ,
321 , 353 - 63 , 426 , 502
Easter 60 - 64 , 70 - 75 Frazer , James George 4 , 301 f .
Ecevit , Bülent 274 Frederick II ( Holy Roman emperor )
Edde ( Iddah ) , Raymond 449 , 452 145

Egypt 36 - 46 , 147 , 177 , 183f . , 459 , French Revolution lf . , 8

461 - 65 , 551 Freud , Sigmund 4 , 31 - 48 , 100 , 423
Ehden ( Ihdin ) 419 , 422 Fu ' äd ( King of Egypt ) 462
Elias , Saint ( Mär Ilyäs ) 410 - 12 , 415 Fu ' äd Pasha 188 - 90

Enlightenment 2 , 12 al - Fudayl b . (Iyäd 124 - 26

Erbakan , Necmettin 272f . , 278 Fukuyama , Francis 11
Erdogan , Tayyip 278f . furqän 64
Eschatology 4f . , 90 - 102
Etchegaray , Roger ( cardinal ) 472 Galtung , Johan 83
Eucharist 63 , 81 Garaudy , Roger 24
Europe 8f . , 353 - 63 , 465f ., 497 , Gehlen , Arnold 5
547f . , 555 Gellner , Ernest 286
European Union IX , 25 Gemayel , Amin ( Amin al - Jumayyil )
Eusebius of Caesarea 44 471
Eve 89 George , Stefan 39
Evil 3 , 92 - 95 , 98 , 99f . Georgia 391 - 400
 INDEX
571

Germany 208 , 359 , 497 , 502f . , 519 Harbi , Mohamed ( Muhammad Har -
Gadhafi , Moammer ( Mu ' ammar al - bi ) 261 , 265
Qadhdhäfi ) 304 Harfüsh , Ibrählm 193 , 202 , 208
Ghaith , Bahjat 454 al - Hariri , Rafiq 473 - 74
Ghänim , Sulaymän 454 Härün al - Rashid ( 5th Abbasid
al - Ghazäli , Abü Hamid Muhammad caliph ) 142
( d . 1111 ) 147 ' Harvey , David 217f .
al - Ghazäli , Muhammad (d . 1997 ) Hasenclever , Andreas 503f .
522 , 531 Hattin 145

Ghandi , Mahatma 423 Hegel , Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1

al - Ghannüshl , Räshid 523 , 531 Heine , Heinrich 2
GIA ( Groupes islamiques armes ) Hekmatyar , Gulbuddin ( Gulbuddin
264f . Hikmatyär ) , 335 , 338 , 340
Girard , Rene 9 , 67 , 301 , 330 Henri IV ( King of France ) 358
Goethe , Johann Wolfgang von 420f . Herat ( Hardt ) 349
Le Goff , Jacques 167 herem 86 - 90 , 91
Golgotha 486 Herzog , Roman 505 f.
Goldziher , Ignaz 104 Hindu - Muslim Relations 13 , 17 ,
Gospels see Bible 229 - 42 , 2911 , 365 - 89 , 552f .
Gouraud , Henri 170 Hiwär (Journal ) 176
Graham , William 5lf . , 57 Hizbullah ( Hizb Alläh ) 299 , 304 - 08 ,
Greeks 90 , 247 , 460 , 464 - 65 330

Greenberg , Irving 515f . hijrah 98 , 123 , 129f . , 335

Gülhane ( Gülkhäne ) Decree 184 Hobbes , Thomas 6, 9, 17 , 313f .,
Guilt 31 , 44 - 47 376 , 423
Hoffman , Bruce 317f .
Habib , Gabriel 527 d ' Holbach , Thierry baron 44
Habibi , Emile (7m (7 Hablbi ) 211 - 21 Holocaust 37

Haddäd , Gregoire 22 Holy Roman Empire of German Na¬

iadith 57 , 136 - 63 , 154 , 157 , 159 tion 357
Haifa 221 Honigsheim , Paul 83
al - Hajjäj b . Yüsuf , Abü Muhammad L ' Hospital , Michel de 359 , 361
il3 Hourani , Albert 181
al - Häkim bi - Amr Alläh ( 6th Fatimid Hraoui , Elias (Ilyäs al - Hiräwi ) 23 ,
caliph ) 14 453
Hakkäri 459 Hsoun ( Hsün ) 401 - 18
al - Halabl , ' Abbäs 477 , 525 , 527 Hülägü b . Toluy 146
Halbwachs , Maurice 37 , 59 , 229 Huntington , Samuel P. 10 , 179f .,
al - Halläj , Abü Mughith al - Husayn b . 309f . , 498 - 500
Mansür 493 Hus , Jan 536
Hamädah , Marwän 450 Husayn , cÄdil 523
Hamdane , Khalil ( Khalll Hamdän ) Husaynb . cAli 160 , 306 , 330
269 Huwaydl , Fahmi 523
Hamdanids 143 al - Huwayyik , Ilyäs 193 - 210
Hammurabi 424
Hamzahb . ; Abd al - Muttalib 160 Ibn ' Abbäs , ^Abdallah 539
HanafT school 141 - 43 , 464 Ibn Ab ! al - Dam , Shihäb al - DIn Ibrä¬
Hanbali school 145 - 47 hlm 428

Hanf , Theodor 285 , 289f . , 294 Ibn ' ArabI , Muhy ! al - DIn Abü ' Abd¬
Haqqi Bey , Ismä ' Il 207 allah Muhammad 489
572 INDEX

Ibn Battah , "Ubayd Alläh 145 Ismä ' Ilites 106 , 162
Ibn Hanbai , Ahmad 135 , 146 Israel ( ancient ) 36 - 48 , 85 - 90
Ibn Hazm , Abü Muhammad ' Ali 148 Israel ( modern ) 218 - 27 , 329f . , 462 ,
Ibn Hishäm , Abü Muhammad cAbd 465 , 473 , 515 , 540
al - Malik 12, 11 Istanbul 204 , 207f . , 275
Ibn Hudhayl , Abü al - Hasan ' Ali
148 , 159 jähiliyyah 64 , 104 , 122
Ibn Ishäq , Muhammad 138 Jähiz 114
Ibn Jurayj al - Makkl 124 Jaläl al - Dawlah , Abü Tähir 147
Ibn Kathlr , cImäd al - DIn Ismail 147 Jaläläbäd 341
Ibn Khaldün , Wall al - DIn ; Abd al - Jamal Pasha ( Cemal Pa§a ) 193 - 210
Rahmän 7 , 147 , 323 Java 129
Ibn ai - Khatlb , Abü ' Abdallah Mu¬ al - Jawziyyah see Ibn Qayyim al -
hammad 144 , 148 Jawziyyah
Ibn Mäjah , Abü ' Abdallah Muham¬ Jbeil {Jubayl , Byblos ) 401 - 18
mad 139 Jerusalem 75 , 87 , 100f . , 145f.
Ibn al - Mubärak , Abdallah 125 , 126 , Jesus 35 , 60 , 63 , 80 , 92f . , 457 , 538
141 Jews 50 , 137f„ 217 - 27 , 308 , 372 ,
Ibn Qayyim al - Jawziyyah , Shams al - 403 , 457 - 65 , 468
DIn Abü Bakr Muhammad 147 Jezebel 89
Ibn Qudämah al - Maqdisi , Muwaffaq jihäd 50 , 101f. , 123 - 33 , 135 - 63 ,
al - DIn 145f„ 149f . , 152 , 154 - 156 , 167 - 73 , 263f . , 261 - 70 , 330 , 334f . ,
160 488 , 521 , 532
Ibn Qutaybah , Abü Muhammad al-Jihäd al - Isläml ( Lebanon ) 305 ,
' Abdalläh 155 329
Ibn SInä , Abü CA1I al - Husayn b . jizyah 102 , 104 , 140f . , 153 , 458
cAbdalläh 143 , 505 John the Baptist 35
Ibn Taymiyyah , Taql al - DIn Ahmad John Paul II ( Pope ) 471 - 80 , 516
146 , 150 , 153f . , 158 , 160 Johnston , Douglas 502
Ibrähim b . Adham 125 Josephus , Flavius 43
Ibrahim Pasha 184 , 320 Josiah ( King of Judah ) 87
Iconoclasm 43 Joumblatt (Janbulät ) , Bashir 182
'id al - adhä 406f . , 411 Joumblatt {Janbulät ) , Kamäl 423
Td al -fitr 79 , 406 , 411 Jung , Carl Gustav 4
Idel , Moshe 52
Idolatry 42 - 44 Kabul 338 - 49
ijtihäd 130f. , 532 , 538 Jcaläm 528
India 16 , 129f. , 229 - 42 , 552f . Kandil , Fuad {Fu 'äd Qandll ) 517
al - ' Imäd , Mustafa 201 Kant , Immanuel 315
India 11 , 129f„ 229 - 42 , 291f „ 365 - Karbalä ' ( Battie of) 160 , 302 , 306 ,
89 , 423 330
Indonesia 11 , 428 , 443 Kashmir 11
InterAction Council 508f. Kasllk 331
Intermarriage 416 - 18 , 453 - 55 Katä 'ib 296f . , 326
Iran 499 , 502 , 531 Kavak <; i , Merve 271 , 275
Iraq 325 , 428 , 460f . , 463 , 499 Kazan , Elia 210
Ireland 11 , 294f . , 465 , 535 , 542 Kauffmann , Jean - Paul 303f .
irjüi ' 105 Kayhän 307
Ismail , Adel ( 'Ädil Ismä 'll) 171f. Kemalism 276 - 281 , 325
Ismä ' Il Khän ( Herat ) 339 al - Khadir ( al - Khidr ) 411
 INDEX
573

al - Khäl , Yüsuf 177 Lepanto ( Naupactos ) 169

al - Khalil b . Ishäq 144 Levinson , Nathan Peter 513
kharäj 141 Lewis , Bernard 179 , 329
Kharijites 109 - 22 , 142 , 144 , 162 Libya 129 , 304
KhätamI , Muhammad 505f . Lijphart , Arend 15 , 257f .
khatt - i humäyün 459 Lincoln , Bruce 97
Khäzin family 185f . , 202 Lisän al - Häl ( newspaper ) 482
Khodr , Georges ( Jürj Khudr ) 21 , Liturgy 53 - 82 , 85
481 - 95 Lotman , Juri 218 , 220
Khoury , Elias ( Ilyäs Khüri ) 220 , Lutfi al - Sayyid , Ahmad 465f .
223 - 27 Luther , Martin 536
al - Khü 'i , al - Sayyid Abü al - Qäsim
al - Müsawi ( Ayatulläh ) 407f . Madani , Abassi ( 'Abbäsi Madäni )
Khuräsän 125 , 141 f . 264

Khüri , cAbdallah 203f . Maghreb 464 ( see also Algeria )

al - Khüri , Bishära 449 Magna Carta 547
Khüri , Shukralläh 200 al - Mahdi , Abü ' Abdalläh Muham¬
Kisrawän 185 , 188 , 205f . mad ( 3rd Abbasid caliph ) 142
kitmän 303 Mahmüd b . Sebüktigin ( 3rd Ghazna -
Korea 555 wid sultan ) 145
Kosovo 11 , 191 , 248 , 250 , 253 , Maimonides 42f .
427f . Maistre , Joseph de 8
Kothari , Rajni 235f . , 372 Malay Archipelago 129
Krain , Matthew 84 Mälikb . Anas 124 - 26 , 135 , 144
Küguk Kaynarca ( Treaty of ) 129 Mäliki school 129 , 144f .
Küng , Hans 11 f . , 514 Mallat , Chibli {Stabil al - Mallät ,
Kurds 280 , 464 , 499 1875 - 1961 ) 419f . , 422
Mamluks 147 , 458
Lacocque , Andre 56 Mandela , Nelson 447
Lapide , Pinchas 513 Manetho 43

Last Judgement 91 - 93 , 98f . , 105 , al - Mansür , Abü Ja cfar ' Abdallah

120 ( 2nd Abbasid caliph ) 142
Law 14 , 16 - 18 , 44 , 85 - 90 , 99f . , 102 - El - Maoula , Saoud ( Sa ' üd al - Mawla )
05 , 135 - 63 , 194f ., 229 , 315 , 477 , 525 , 527
333f ., 353 - 63 , 373 - 76 , 416 - 18 , Marcus , Abraham 458
424 - 30 , 449 - 56 , 457f „ 462 , 529f ., Maronites 179 - 91 , 193 - 210 , 256 ,
531 f . , 539 , 547f . 331 , 402 - 18 , 453f . , 540
laylat al - qadr 78f . Marriage 416 - 18 , 453 - 55
Lazar ( Prince of Serbia ) 309f . Marx , Karl 1 , 8 , 230 , 290 , 423
Lebanese Forces ( al - quwät al - lubnä - Mary ( Virgin ) 407 , 410 - 12 , 415 , 538
niyyah ) 331 maslahah 148

Lebanon 14 - 27 , 220 , 223f ., 245f ., Massignon , Louis 514

255 , 256 , 257f ., 283 , 286 - 91 , Mas ' üd , Ahmad Shäh 335 - 349
295 - 99 , 303 - 08 , 317f ., 319 - 32 , Mauss , Marcel 241
391 - 400 , 401 - 18 , 426 , 428 , 431 - Mawäqif ( j ournal ) 176
48 , 449 - 56 , 461 , 463f . , 468 , 502 , al - Mäwardi , Abü al - Hasan cAli 147 ,
521 - 33 , 535 - 43 , 551 , see also 155 - 57 , 159
Mount Lebanon al - Mawdüd ! , Abü al - A ' lä 133
Lebanonization 15f . , 19 , 27 Maysalün 170
Lefebvre , Henri 217 Mazär - i Sharif 345 , 347 , 349
574 INDEX

MDA ( Mouvement pour la demo - muslimin 531

) 264 ,
cratie en Algerie , al - harakah min al - Mutanabbl , Abü al - Tayyib 420
ajl al - dimüqratiyyah ß al -Jazä 'ir) mutasarrifiyyah 176 , 190 , 193 - 210
269
Mead , George H . 313 Nagorno - Karabakh 11
Mecca 98 , 100 , 138 Nafir Süriyyah (Journal ) 211 - 15
Medians 90 al - Nahär ( newspaper ) 27 , 482
Mediation 365 - 89 nahdah 162 , 172 , 176
Medina 98 , 150 , 529f . , 531f . Nahr al - Mawt 472
Medina , Constitution of 529f . , 53lf . Nantes , Edict of XIII , 353 , 356 , 359 -
Mediterranean 168f . , 245 , 323 62
Memory 6 , 31 , 36 - 40 , 49f . , 58f . , 60 - Napoleon 170
82 , 85 , 229 - 42 , 405 , 410 - 13 al - Nasä ' T, Abü cAbd al - Rahmän Ah¬
Messianism 9f . , 304 mad 139
Metn 207 National Committee for Christian -
Millet system 247f . , 450 , 457 - 59 , Muslim Dialogue ( al - lajnah al-
460 , 462 wataniyyah al - islämiyyah al - ma -
Milosevic , Slobodan 250 slhiyyah li- l- hiwär , Lebanon )
Minassä , Camille 477 , 525 , 527 477 , 525 - 28 , 5 -40
Mishän411 National Pact ( 1943 ) 522 , 540
Mitchell , Timothy 235 Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetgi
MITI Syndrome 553 Halk Partisi ) 274f .
Mnemotechnique 37 - 44 , 54 Nestorians 459
Moab 36 Netherlands 15 , 357 , 359
Mohalla Committees 365 - 89 Nicaragua 502
Mongols Höf . Niebuhr , Reinhold 3
Monotheism 31 - 48 Nietzsche , Friedrich 1 , 38f . , 545
Moses 31 - 48 , 66 , 76f . , 87f . , 538 Nigeria 11 , 516
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi ) Nirenberg , David 13
273 Nizäm al - Mulk 147
Moubarac , Youakim ( Yuwakvn Mu¬ Nora , Pierre 229f .
barak ) 514 Normative in Version 43
Mount Lebanon 176 , 179 - 91 , 193 - Noth , Martin 87
210 , 211 - 215 , 287 , 320f . , 401 - 18 Nouar , Farida Lahrech (.Faridah
Mount Sinai 36 , 493 Lahrish Nuwwär ) 267
Mu ' äwiyah b . Abi Sufyän 105 , 115 , Nür al - DIn Mahmüd b . Zanki 145
127
Muhammad ( The Prophet ) 76 , 98 , Ohannes Kuyumjian Pasha 198
120 , 124 , 128 , 136f. , 140 , 142 , Özal , Turgut 273
145 , 150 , 152 , 154f. , 159 , 161 , Old Testament see Bible
457 , 538 Optimistic religions 83 , 99
Muhammad V Abü Abdallah (Nas - Origen 94
rid King of Granada ) 148 Osarsiph 43
Muhammad ' Ali see Ali , Mehmet Otto , Rudolf 311 f.
Muharram 302 , 379 Ottoman Empire 129f . , 169f. , 176 ,
Müräd , Niqülä 184f. 180 - 91 , 193 - 210 , 245 - 59 , 286f . ,
musälahah XII 309 , 321 , 323 , 457 - 59 , 500
al - Müsawi , Husayn 307 Orthodox Church 53 - 55 , 61 , 63f . ,
Muslim b . al - Hajjäj 139 70 - 75 , 247 - 50 , 309f . , 397 , 481 -
Muslim Brothers ( al - ikhwän al - 95
 INDEX
575

Pakistan 334 - 37 , 345f ., 391 - 400 , 110 ] 100 , 152 ; [ 3 : 121 - 25 ] 138 ;
423 , 553 [ 3 : 139 ] 98 ; [ 3 : 145 ] 99 ; [ 3 : 148 ]
Palestine / Palestinians 11 , 139 - 75 , 100 ; [ 3 : 151 ] 159 ; [ 3 : 157 ] 99 ;
217 - 27 , 296 - 99 , 326 , 391 - 400 [ 3 : 161 ] 161 ; [ 3 : 163 ] 159 ; [ 3 :
Pandey , Gyanendra 229 , 231 , 242 194 ] 159
Parliament of the World ' s Religions al - Nisä ' [ 4 :3 ] 418 ; [ 4 :36 ] 104 ; [ 4 :
506 - 08 74 ] 159 ; [ 4 : 75 ] 104 ; [ 4 : 86 ]
Pashtuns 336 - 49 105 ; [ 4 : 92 ] 105 ; [ 4 :93 ] 104 ;
Pashtünwali 333 [ 4 : 129 ] 418 ; [ 4 : 135 ] 99 ;
Passover 60 - 64 , 66 - 70 , 79 al - Mä ' idah [ 5 :2 ] 104 ; [ 5 : 32 ] 104 ;
Paul ( apostle ) 94 , 490 [ 5 : 33 ] 100 ; [ 5 :45 ] 104 ; [ 5 :48 ]
Pec 248f . 539 ; [ 5 : 51 ] 491 ; [ 5 : 56 ] 100 ;
Pessimistic religions 83 , 90 , 95 - 97 [ 5 :69 ] 103 ; [ 5 : 82 ] 538
Peter ( apostle ) 94 al -An 'äm [ 6 : 59 ] 99 ; [ 6 : 151 ] 151 ,
Philippines 11 , 502 , 551 153 ; [ 6 : 164 ] 99
Phinehas 89 al - A 'räf [l : m \ 99
Pilgrimage 124 al - Anßl [ 8 : 1 ] 138 , 161 ; [ 8 : 15 - 16 ]
Pinochet , Augusto 427 158 ; [ 8 :26 - 46 ] 76f . ; [ 8 :27 ] 76 ;
Political religion 3f . , 9f . [ 8 :28 ] 99 ; [ 8 :29 ] 65 , 76 ; [ 8 : 39 ]
Polytheism 33 , 43 , 87 , 89 , 103 , 153 76 , 100 , 102 ; [ 8 :41 ] 65 , 76 ,
Protestantism , Protestants 2 , 7 , 23 , 161 ; [ 8 : 60 - 61 ] 102 ; [ 8 : 66 ]
277 , 353 - 63 , 393 157f .

Proudhon , Pierre - Joseph lf . al - Tawbah [ 9 : 5 ] 102 , 154 ; [ 9 : 11 ]

Pufendorf , Samuel 314 158 ; [ 9 :21 - 22 , 24 , 38 , 72 , 111 ]
Purity 46f . , 407 - 10 99 ; [ 9 :29 ] 102 , 153 ; [ 9 : 33 ]
123f .; [ 9 : 51 ] 99 ; [ 9 : 58 ] 138 ;
al - Qädisiyyah ( Battie of ) 124 [ 9 : 60 ] 104 ; [ 9 : 69 - 70 ] 100 ; [ 9 :
al - Qä ' im bi - Amr Alläh ( 26th Abbas - 81 ] 138 ; [ 9 : 89 - 112 ] 159 ; [9 :
id caliph ) 143 121 ] 159 ; [ 9 : 122 ] 159
Qandahär334 , 336 Yünus [ 10 : 99 ] 539
al - Qaradäwi , Yüsuf 523 , 531 al - Nahl [ 16 : 125 ] XIII ; [ 16 : 126 ]
Qarmates 143 104

Qartabä411
Bani Isrä 'il [ 17 : 15 ] 99 ; [ 17 : 33 ]
qasldah 176f . 102 , 151 , 153
al - Qasimi , ' Abdallah 177 Tä - Hä [ 20 : 131 ] 99
al - Qayrawäni , Ibn Abi Zayd 143f . al - Änbiyä ' [ 21 : 54 ] 159 ; [ 21 : 105 ]
al - Qudüri , Abü al - Husayn Ahmad 100 , 123 ; [ 21 : 107 ] 101 ; [ 21 :
143 , 157 109 ] 99
Qur 'än 49 - 82 , 120 , 136 - 63 , 269 , al - Hajj [ 22 : 34 ] 407 ; [ 22 : 39 - 40 ]
407 , 415 , 457 , 493 , 550 i38 ; [ 22 :40 ] 100 ; [ 22 : 57 ] 159
al - Baqarah [ 2 : 62 ] 103 ; [ 2 : 139 ] al - Nür [ 24 : 11 ] 99
100 ; [ 2 : 185 ] 64f . ; [ 2 : 186 ] 65 ; al - Furqän [ 25 : 58 ] 151 , 153
[ 2 : 190 - 93 ] 102 ; [ 2 : 191 ] 153 ; al - Rüm [ 30 : 8 ] 99
[ 2 :205 ] 155 ; [ 2 :207 ] 159 ; [ 2 : al - Sajdah [ 32 : 5 ] 99
215 ] 159 ; [ 2 :217 ] 100 , 138 ; [ 2 : al - Ahzäb [ 33 : 17 ] 158 ; [ 33 : 27 ]
255 ] 99 ; [ 2 :256 ] 104 , 539 ; [2 : 161

261 - 81 ] 104 ; [ 2 :269 , 272 ] 99 ; al - Saba ' [ 34 :28 ] 123

[ 2 :286 ] 99 Fätir [ 35 : 18 ] 99
Äl <Imrän [ 3 :55 ] 100 ; [ 3 : 56 ] 100 ; al - Säffat [ 37 : 112 ] 411
[ 3 : 103 ] 104 ; [ 3 : 104 ] 123 ; [ 3 : al - Zumar [ 39 : 3 ] 138 ; [ 39 : 7 ] 99
576 INDEX

Ghäfir [40 : 39 ] 99 ; [ 40 : 51 ] 100 RCD ( Rassemblement pour la cul -

Fussilat [ 41 : 34 ] 105 ture et Ia democratie , al - ijtimä '
al - Shürä [ 42 : 13 ] 539 ; [ 42 : 40 , 43 ] min ajl al - thaqäfah wa - 'l- dimü -
105 qratiyyah ) 266
al -Ahqäf [ 46 : 3 ] 99 Recitation 53f . , 56 , 59
Muhammad [ 47 :4 ] 154 ; [ 47 : 7 ] Religious wars ( Europe ) 8f . , 313f . ,
ioo
353 - 63
al -Fath [ 48 : 15 ] 161 ; [ 48 : 19 ] 161 ; Renan , Ernest 230
[ 48 :20 ] 161
Republican People ' s Party ( Cumhur -
al -Hujurät [ 49 :9 - 10 ] 105 ; [ 49 : 10 ] iyet HalkPartisi ) 273f .
i04 , 489 ; [ 49 : 11 ] 105 ; [ 49 : 13 ]
Ricoeur , Paul 32
Ridä , Rashld 132
104 , 542 ; [ 49 : 12 ] 105 ; [ 49 : 16 ]
99 ; [ 49 : 17 ] 99 ;
Rittberger , Volker 503f .
al - Dhäriyät [ 51 : 56 ] 99 Rivet , Daniel 170f.
al -Najm [ 53 : 38 ] 99 Romans 90 , 94
al - Hadid [ 57 : 20 ] 99 ; [ 57 : 22 ] 99 Rome 427 , 516
al -Mujädilah [ 58 : 7 ] 99 Rousseau , Jean - Jacques 314f .
al - Hashr [ 59 :2 ] 138 ; [ 59 : 6 ] 138 ; Rummel , Rudolph J . 84
[ 59 : 6 - 8 ] 161 Rushdie , Salman 231
al - Saff [ 61 : 10 - 12 ] 159 ; [ 61 : 12 ] Rustum , Asad 181
99 ; [ 61 : 12 - 13 ] 100 ; [ 61 : 14 ] Ryan , Stephen 258
100 Rwanda 427
al - Taghäbun [ 64 : 11 ] 99
al -Mullc [ 67 : 3 - 4 ] 99 ; [ 67 : 25 - 26 ] Sa cd b . Abi Waqqäs 124
99 Sabians 103
al -Ma 'ärij [ 70 :4 ] 99 ; [ 70 : 8f . ] 98 Sacrifice 60 - 75 , 80 , 406 - 10
al -Mudaththir [ 74 : 42 - 44 ] 104 ; Sadä al - Shamäl (Journal ) 419
[ 76 : 3 ] 539 al - Sädät , Anwar 462 , 502
al -Näzi 'ät [ 79 : 25 ] 100 al - Sadr , Müsä 21 , 304 - 06 , 489 , 494 ,
al - Takwir [ 81 : 1 ] 98 523f .
al -Fajr [ 89 : 18 ] 104 ; [ 89 : 21 ] 98 ; Safawids 106
[ 89 : 30 - 34 ] 104 Sa ' Id b . \ Abd al - ' AzIz 127
al - Duhä [ 93 :4 ] 99 Said , Edward 218f . , 226f .
al - Tiri [ 95 :3 ] 65 Sa ' Idb . al - Musayyab 124
al - Qadr [ 97 ] 78 , 81 ; [ 97 : 1 - 5 ] 78 Saida ( Saydä , Sidon ) 181
al - Qäri 'ah [ 101 : 5 ] 98 sakinah 493
al - Mä 'ün [ 107 : 1 - 3 ] 104 Saladin ( Saläh al -Din al -Ayyübf)
Qur ' änic chant ( tajwid ) 53f . , 56 145 , 170
Quraysh 113 Salmänyän , Jean 477 , 525 , 527
Qurnat Shahwän 207 al - Sammäk , Muhammad 473 , 477 ,
Qutaybah b . Muslim al - Bähili see 525 , 527
al - Bähili salafiyyah 129
Qutb , Sayyid 133 Sampson , Cynthia 502
al - San cänI , Abd al - Razzäq 124
Rabbani , Burhänuddin 335 - 49 Saqr , Yüsuf 198
Radhakrishnan , Sarvepalli 239 Sarajevo 448 , 519
Ramadän 64f . , 75 - 79 , 81 Sawfar 200 , 203 , 207
Ranke , Leopold von 6 Schleiermacher , Friedrich 301 , 311
Rapoport , David C . 303 Schmidt , Helmut 508
Razzia 136 , 140 Schmitt , Carl 2 , 9 , 13 , 356 , 363 , 482
 INDEX
577

Scriptures see Bible , Qur ' än , Torah Soviet Union 334f . , 342 , 499
respectively Spain 13 , 128f . , 143 , 144 , 148 , 168 ,
Sellin , Ernst 35 292

Serbia 247 , 248 - 50 , 252f . , 308 - 10 Srikrishna Commission 368 - 71 ,

Sermon 57f . , 298 373 - 76 , 388
Seurat , Michel 329 Sri Lanka 11 , 553
Sfeir , Nasrallah {Mär Nasralläh But - Stark , Rodney 107
rus Sufayr , Maronite Patriarch ) Sudan 11 , 551
453 ' al - Sulh , Riyäd 449
al - ShäfTI , Abü ' Abdallah Muham¬ Swidler , Leonard 11
mad b . Idris 126 , 128 , 135 , 147 Switzerland 15 , 354
Shäfi cT school 147 - 49 Syncretism 381 , 384
Shafiq , Munir 523 Syria 126f . , 128 , 188f . , 211 - 15 , 325 ,
shahld 158 - 60 , 330 411 , 458 , 461 , 463f „ 474 , 499 ,
Shährn , Tänyüs 183 - 187 , 191 527

Shammas , Anton (Antün Shammäs )

217 - 27 al - Tabari , Abü Ja ' far Muhammad b .
Shams al - DIn , Muhammad Mahd ! Jarir 123

473 - 74 , 522 , 524 , ' 531 täghüt 263

sharTah 132 , 333f . , 338 , 340 , 346 , al - Tahtäwi , Rifa cah Räfi ' 132
528 Tä ' if Agreement ( 1989 ) 16 , 289 ,
al - Shätibl , Abü Ishäq 132 449 , 479 , 527 , 536 , 540
Shawäyyä 411 ta ' ifiyyah 181 , 212
al - Shaybäni , Muhammad b . al - Taiwan 555

Hasan 128 , 142 Tajikistan 11

Shibli , Butrus 194 - 96 , 202 - 05 , Taliban ( tälibän ) 333 - 49
Shibli , Michel 194 Talmud i39
Shihäb , Bashir 182f . Tanzimät 183 - 191 , 459
Shihäb , Härith 477 , 525 , 527 Taoism 83f .

al - Shihäbl , Haydar Ahmad 183 taqiyyah 303

Shiites 23 , i46f . , 16Ö , 162 , 301 - 18 , al - Tarlq (Journal ) 176
329f . , 402 - 18 Tarsüs 126

Shi 'r (Journal ) 176 tasämuh XII - XIII

Shivsena 367 - 89 Tenbruck , Friedrich H . 316
Shüf187 , 412 Tertullian 44 , 92
Sicily 128 Thackeray , Bai 371f . , 373 , 389
al - Sijistänl see Abü Dä ' üd al - Thamüd 120

Sijistäni al - Thawri , Sufyän 124f .

Siffin ( Battie of ) 105 Theoclasm 41

Siker , Jeffrey S . 514 Theodoretus 44

Simmel , Georg 8 Tibet 11 , 428

Sin 45 - 47 , 72 , 99f . , 115 , 117 , 119 Tillich , Paul 3
Smith , Jonathan Z . 316 Timor 427

Smith , William Robertson 4 , 240 , al - Tirmidh !, Abü Tsä Muhammad

302 139

Solomon ( King of Israel ) 89 , 100 Tito , Josip Broz 252

Somalia 542 Tlemcen ( Talamsän )
Sorel , Georges 2 Toleration XII - XIII , 13 , 87 , 107 ,
South Africa 22 , 391 - 400 , 447 , 502 , 181f . , 239 , 270 , 315 , 317 , 353 - 63 ,
540 372 , 379 - 85
578 INDEX

Tocqueville , Alexis de 7 , 538 Walser , Martin 34

Torah 37f . , 49 - 82 , see also Bible Walzer , Michael 219
Trauma 32 - 35 , 40 - 44 watan 212 - 15
Tripoli ( Taräbulus , Lebanon ) 195 , Weber , Max 2 , 8 , 312 , 425
329 , 422 Weifare Party (Refah Partisi ) 271 -
True Path Party (Dogruyol Partisi ) 81
272 f. Westphalia ( Peace of) 353 , 361
Tueni , Ghassan ( Ghassän TuwaynT) Wiesel , Elie 513
24 , 27 Wuthnow , Robert 11
Tughril Beg 143 , 147 Wycliffe , John 536
Tully , Mark 233
al - Tünisi , Khayr al - Din 132 Yahweh 85 , 88f.
Tüqän , Fadwä 78 Yahyä b . Adam 141
al - Turäbi , Hasan 523 , 531 Yäqüt b . cAbdalläh , Abu Abdallah
Turkey 11 , ' 196 , 271 - 281 , 325 , 464 , 146
499 , 531 Yathrib see Medina
Yazld I b . Mu cäwiyah 127
Uhud ( Battie of ) 160 Yehoshua , Abraham B . 225
cUmar I b . al - Khattäb 105 , 124 , 142 , Yerushalmi , Yosef Hayim 34 , 49f . ,
146 , 155 54f „ 68
cUmar II b . cAbd al - Aziz 142 Yöm Kippür see Day of Atonement
cUmar , ( Mullah ) Muhammad 334f . , Yugoslavia 251f . , 253f . , 256 - 58 ,
337 , 340 , 343f . , 347 427 , 447
Umayyads 109 , 126f . , 143 Yüsuf b . Tashfin 148
ummah 99 , 101 , 105 , 107 , 121 , 123 ,
137 , 148 , 162 , 251 , 255 , 522 , Zaghlül , Sa cd 461
531 , 551 Zahle ( Zahlah ) 205f .
UNO (United Nations Organization ) Zghorta ( Zghurtä ) 419 , 421 f.
19 , 130 Zionism 218f .
UNESCO ( United Nations Educa - Zwingli , Ulrich 536
tional , Scientific and Cultural Or¬
ganization ) 431
USA ( United States of America )
315f .
Usämah b . Munqidh 131
' Uthmän b . Affan 56 , 105

Varshney , Ashutosh 13
Vatican Council , Second 548
Vietnam 502
VHP ( Vishwa Hindu Parishad ,
World Hindu Council ) 367
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi ) 271 - 81
Voegelin , Eric 3f.
Volney , Constantin - Frangois de
Chasseboeuf, comte de 209f .

Wach , Joachim 312

Wädi Shahrür413
Wafd party 461 , 463
Thomas Scheffler
Dr . phil . ( Berlin 1993 ) . Rockefeiler Visiting Fellow ( 2001 / 2002 ) at
the Joan B . Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the Uni -
versity of Notre Dame , Indiana , and research fellow of the German
Research Council ( DFG ) at the Political Science Department of the
Free University of Berlin ( since 2000 ) . From 1996 to 1999 senior re¬
search fellow at the German Orient Institute , Beirut .

Main publications : Ethnisch - religiöse Konflikte und gesellschaftliche

Integration im Vorderen und Mittleren Orient ( Berlin 1985 , 2nd . ed .
1990 ) , Die SPD und der Algerienkrieg 1954 - 1962 ( Berlin 1995 ) ,
Ethnizität und Gewalt ( editor, Hamburg 1991 ) , Fritz Steppat , Islam
als Partner ( editor, Beirut/Würzburg 2001 , BTS 78 ) , Baalbeck : Im¬
age and Monument , 1898 - 1998 ( co - editor with Helene Sader and
Angelika Neuwirth , Beirut / Stuttgart 1998 , BTS 69 ) .