2AC – Norms – Enforced

Robust norms restricting the use of force empirically prevent conflict escalation
among great powers
Vasquez 9 [John Thomas B. Mackie Scholar of International Relations and Professor of Political Science
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, PhD in Poli Sci from Syracuse University, “Peace,”
Chapter 8 in The War Puzzle Revisited, p 298-299, google books]
Wallensteen’s examination of the characteristics of particularist periods provides significant additional evidence that the steps-to-war analysis is on the right track.
Realist practices are associated with war, and peaceful systems are associated with an emphasis on other practices. Peaceful systems are exemplified by the use of
practices like buffer states, compensation, and concerts of power that bring major states together to form a network of institutions that provide governance for the
system. The creation of rules of the game that can handle certain kinds of issues – territorial and ideological questions – and/or keep them off
the agenda seems to be a crucial variable in producing peace.¶ Additional evidence on the import of rules and norms is provided in a
series of studies by Kegley and Raymond (1982, 1984, 1986, 1990) that are operationally more precise than
Wallensteen’s (1984) analysis. Kegley and Raymond provide evidence that when states accept norms, the incidence of war
and military confrontation is reduced. They find that peace is associated with periods in which alliance norms are considered binding and the
unilateral abrogation of commitments and treaties illegitimate. The rules imposed by the global political culture in these periods
result in fewer militarized disputes and wars between major states. In addition, the wars that occur are kept
at lower levels of severity, magnitude, and duration (i.e. they are limited wars).¶ Kegley and Raymond attempt to
measure the extent to which global cultural norms restrain major states by looking at whether international law and commentary on it sees treaties and alliances as
binding. They note that there have been two traditions in international law – pacta sunt servanda, which maintains that agreements are binding, and clausa rebus
sic stantibus, which says that treaties are signed “as matters stand” and that any change in circumstances since the treaty was signed permits a party to withdraw
unilaterally. One of the advantages the Kegley-Raymond studies have over Wallensteen (1984) is that they are able to develop reliable measures of the extent to
which in any given half-decade that tradition in international law emphasizes the rebus or pacta sunt servanda tradition. This indicator is important not only
because it focuses in on the question of unilateral actions, but because it can serve as an indicator of how well the peace system is working. The pacta sunt servanda
tradition implies a more constraining political system and robust institutional context which should provide an alternative to war. ¶ Kegley and Raymond (1982: 586)
find that in half-decades (from 1820 to 1914) when treaties are considered non-binding (rebus), wars between major states occur in every half-decade (100
percent), but when treaties are considered binding (pacta sunt servanda), wars between major states occur in only 50 percent of the half-decades. The Cramer’s V
for this relationship is .66. When the sample is expanded to include all states in the central system, Cramer’s V is 0.44, indicating that global norms have more
impact on preventing war between major states. Nevertheless, among central system states between 1820 and 1939, war occurred in 93 percent of the half-
decades where the rebus tradition dominated and in only 60 percent of the half-decades where the pacta sunt sevanda tradition dominated. ¶ In a subsequent
analysis of militarized disputes from 1820 to 1914, Kegley and Raymond (1984: 207-11) find that there is a
negative relationship between binding norms and the frequency and scope of disputes short of war. In
periods when the global culture accepts the pacta sunt servanda tradition as the norm, the number of military disputes goes down and the number of major states
involved in a dispute decreases. Although the relationship is of moderate strength, it is not eliminated by other variables, namely alliance flexibility. As Kegley and
Raymond (1984: 213) point out, this means “that inperiods when the opportunistic renunciation of commitments” is
condoned, militarized disputes are more likely to occur and to spread. The finding that norms can
reduce the frequency and scope of disputes is significant evidence that rules can permit actors to
successfully control and manage disputes so that they are not contagious and they do not escalate to
war. These findings are consistent with Wallensteen’s (1984) and suggest that one of the ways rules help prevent war is by reducing, limiting, and managing
disputes short of war.

Norm setting is effective---US can make the difference on drones

Zenko 13 [Micah, CFR Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, PhD in Political
Science from Brandeis University, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” CFR Special Report 65, January
2013]
how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states
History shows that

have—or have not—used them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new
technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers
and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a
strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not
hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed
even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the existence of an
reciprocally on U.S. drones furthered U.S. objectives. And

international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve Washington’s ability to apply
diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based in existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and
distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space.¶ In short, a world

characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would

undermine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human rights, and
strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted killings occur with
impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality.
Perhaps more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign

states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors would be
much more likely to use lethal force against the United States and its allies.

2AC – Norms – Instability

Drone norms solve global instability – American leadership is key
Roberts 13 [Kristen news editor for National Journal, master's in security studies from Georgetown
University, master's degree in journalism from Columbia University, March 21st, 2013, "When the
Whole World Has Drones," National Journal, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-
world-has-drones-20130321]
To implement this covert program, theadministration has adopted a tool that lowers the threshold for lethal
force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism use of drones to kill
people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has given
friends and foes a green light to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only
affect relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially
upset geopolitical order.¶ Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a
lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines
in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq
who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran,
Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan,
Yemen, and Afghanistan.¶ This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid
to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal
authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what
goes undiscussed is Washington’s
deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a
globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most
awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.

Drone Prolif Extensions

Drone Prolif Bad – Norms
Drone prolif makes escalation dramatically more likely and only U.S. norms solve.
Boyle 15 [Michael Boyle, Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, senior fellow at
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “THE RACE FOR DRONES”, FPRI E-Notes, January 2015,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/187861/boyle_on_drones.pdf]
The world is now approaching a similar point with drones as the race for this technology is resetting the
terms of global competition and quietly altering the rules of the game for many long-simmering
conflicts and rivalries. This is happening in part because few, if any, states will use drones in the way that the
United States currently does, as a way to ruthlessly target militant networks in ungoverned territories. Rather, the proliferation
of drones will also be accompanied by rapid adaption of drones to new, and perhaps unforeseen, civilian and
military uses, which will have three consequences for the international system. First, the proliferation of drones will reset
the rules and norms governing surveillance and reconnaissance and invite new counter-measures that may
paradoxically increase uncertainty between regional rivals over the long run. Second, as a lowcost, apparently
low-risk form of technology, drones will become increasingly useful to governments in testing the strategic
commitments and the nerves of their rivals. Even today, a number of governments and rebel groups facing regional rivalries
have started to use drones in ways that chip away at the foundations of previously stable deterrent relationships. Third, the worldwide
proliferation of drones in contested airspace, and the increasing risk that a drone will have an accident
with a civilian aircraft, multiplies the chances of a conflict spiral stemming from an accident or drone
misuse. Given these risks, it is in Washington’s interest to take a leading role in slowing the race for drones
and developing new legal, institutional and normative mechanisms to govern drone usage and sale in
the future

Drone Prolif Bad – Cover

Drone prolif is destabilizing – provides political cover for use of force that lowers the
threshold for aggression.
Horowitz et al 16 [Michael C. Horowitz Is Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate
Director of Perry World House At The University Of Pennsylvania, Sarah E. Kreps Is Associate Professor
Of Government At Cornell University, Matthew Fuhrmann Is Associate Professor Of Political Science At
Texas A&M University And Visiting Associate Professor At Stanford University’s Center For International
Security And Cooperation, "Separating Fact From Fiction In The Debate Over Drone Proliferation,"
International Security Volume 41, Number 2, Fall 2016,
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC_a_00257]
Lastly, drones might reduce the diplomatic fallout associated with the use of force. In particular, drones allow
the country flying them to maintain some semblance of diplomatic cover given that the pilots are thousands of miles away
rather than directly flying overhead. Although countries such as Pakistan sometimes publicly protest about drones
operating above their territory, such complaints are most likely displays of domestic political theater.71 As a number of
sources suggest, Pakistan has approved foreign drone strikes on its territory; indeed, the high frequency of such
strikes suggests that at least tacit approval would have been essential.72 Yet drones give the government
conducting the strikes greater plausible deniability than alternatives such as ground forces, which
require a considerable logistical footprint, or manned aircraft. The amount of diplomatic cover that drones provide obviously
has limits—a CH-4 with a Chinese flag painted on its side is still a Chinese military platform—but the belief that drones provide
some degree of diplomatic cover could make countries more likely to use them.

Drone Prolif Bad – AT: Surveillance Turn

Surveillance drones are net worse for stability – promotes opaque development and
information asymmetries.
Boyle 15 [Michael Boyle, Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, senior fellow at
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The Race for Drones”, Orbis Volume 59, Issue 1, Winter 2015,
Pages 76-94, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438714000763]
Over the long term, however, the positive effects of increased drone surveillance on deterrent relationships
are less clear. As the drone technology improves the flow of information about what other actors are
doing, there will be pressure for more aggressive (and risky) counter-measures designed to block the gaze
of drones, as well as calls for more aggressive operational security about controversial activities, such as building
nuclear programs. Today, most drones can be noticed when flying above targets and are countered by a
range of simple counter-attacks. States such as Israel have shot down drones, and a number of others have scrambled aircraft to
force drones to leave their airspace. Iran has also claimed to have shot down both the ScanEagle and RQ-170 U.S. drones and has even
displayed the wreckage for the international media. Potential American
rivals are considering new steps to ensure that
they can take to shoot drones from the sky if they are detected in their airspace. Russia has developed a new
model of its Tor M2 surface-to-air missile defense system, designed deliberately to shoot down drones.59 China has also developed a home-
made laser defense system capable of shooting down U.S. drones.60 Another response in the future might be the
development of counter-UAV operations in which drones are developed specifically for the purpose of detecting and destroying
other drones.61 A consequence of a proliferation of drones might be a dangerous sequence of UAV
operations and counter-UAV strikes by adversaries, thus, setting the stage for conflict spirals and
dangerous accidents.
Non-state actors also have devoted considerable efforts towards thwarting drones. The U.S Air Force has become concerned that states or
insurgents might hack drones or use lasers and dazzlers to blind drones in contested environments.62 Al Qaeda has established a cell of
engineers working on ways to jam or hijack American drones that target them.63 A recent publication by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
identified some low-tech countermeasures for drones, including jamming the frequency of drone use, using underground shelters, and even
burning tires to generate black smoke.64

Moreover, states
will not accept the widespread use of surveillance drones, and the corresponding loss of secrecy,
without a response. One way they may respond is to go further to ground to conceal their activities and to
adopt stronger countermeasures to block detection of their activities. Russia recently has fielded a Krasukha 4 radar system designed to block
surveillance of ground targets and emphasized that the system was capable of blocking both Global Hawk and Reaper drones.65 It is not hard
to imagine Iran or North Korea, for example, seeking to buy similar radar or laser defense capabilities to block U.S. surveillance drones. If that is
states may seek to build even more underground nuclear and military facilities to avoid
not possible, these
their gaze. The spread of surveillance drones—and the corresponding conclusion that one must assume everything is being
watched from the skies—paradoxically may lead these states to become more opaque, not less, due to aggressive
countermeasures and improved operational security over military bases and sensitive locations. If so, the race
for ever-more sophisticated surveillance drones may increase information asymmetries and generate
more uncertainty, possibly to the point of destabilizing standing deterrent relationships over the long run.

AT: Drone Prolif Inevitable

Drone prolif isn’t inevitable – even if people build them, they can’t use them
effectively without U.S. support
Zenko & Kreps 14 [Micah Zenko (Whitehead Senior Fellow on the US and Americas Programme at
Chatham House, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD from the Department of Politics
at Brandeis University) and Sarah Kreps (Professor of Government and Adjunct Professor of Law at
Cornell University), “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation”, CFR Center for Preventive Action, Council
Special Report No. 69 June 2014, https://cfrd8-
files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014/06/Limiting_Armed_Drone_Proliferation_CSR69.pdf]
Commercial drone applications advertised by companies such as Amazon give the illusion of a technology that is
ubiquitous and inevitable. If drone technology indeed diffuses easily, then efforts to control its spread—whether through tight export
controls or pressure on major producers to restrict drone transfers—are unnecessary and even misguided. In a world of rapid technology
diffusion, countries will inevitably acquire the technology, and the United States has financial incentives to generate the greatest market share
for its domestic industry. However,
there are high barriers to entry for some countries that wish to join the
armed drone market, which explain a low procurement rate despite the intrinsic advantages of drones
and countries’ stated ambitions to obtain them.
One factor is technological. Though rudimentary drones have existed for decades, there
is a qualitative difference between
earlier civilian and military surveillance models, and those used by the United States for strike missions.
Drone strikes conducted by the United States require actionable intelligence (from human, signal, and imagery
sources), sophisticated beyond line-of-sight communications, access to satellite bandwidth, and systems
engineering—from internal fire control to ground control stations—that are presently beyond the reach of most states.
Several countries with relatively advanced aerospace programs, including Russia, France, and Italy, have not been able to develop and deploy
these capabilities. Though it is unlikely that countries will indigenously develop capabilities equal to that of
the United States in the near term, most have the financial resources to purchase from the United
States or Israel—including Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and a desire to do so. Additionally,
many are able to purchase or manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited firepower,
which lack the additional system components required to carry out U.S. drone strikes, but can still have destabilizing effects.

Drone Proliferation Not Inevitable due to challenges of developing and implementing

drones
Gilli and Gilli 16[Andrea Gilli has a PhD in social and political science from the European University
Institute and is currently a researcher of military affairs at the NATO defense college. Mauro Gilli has a
PhD in political science from Northwestern University and is a researcher in military technology and
international security at the center for security studies of ETH Zurich. “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?
Industrial, Organizational and Infrastructural Constraints: Military Innovations and the Ecosystem
Challenge.”. February 25 , 2016. https://sci-
hub.tw/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425750]
Building on the intuition of Adner’s work in management, in this article we have argued that thediffusion of military innovations
depend on a country’s capacity to meet both platform and adoption challenges. We have tested our
argument on the diffusion of three types of UAVs. Our analysis questions the consensus among scholars and analysts on the
ease of building and employing drones, and hence on the apocalyptic views on the coming diffusion of drone warfare. Available data
shows, first, that even wealthy and advanced countries like the US and its NATO allies have struggled
and in some cases even failed in designing, developing and manufacturing the three types of UAVs we
have analyzed. Second, their employment has raised many salient challenges that these countries have
struggled to address – from bandwidth constraints to organizational and doctrinal challenges related to
the exploitation of real-time information in modern warfare. Since these countries possess the financial resources, some
of the most capable armed forces in the world and extensive experience, we conclude that poorer and less developed countries
are unlikely to fare any better in any of these two realms, and likely are going to experience even
more daunting problems. At the theoretical level, our analysis speaks not only to the case of drones but to
military innovations more in general. First, in contrast to the conventional view among IR scholars and consistent with the works
of Caverley, Gholz and Neuman, we have argued that designing, developing and manufacturing weapon systems poses
significant challenges and require highly specific industrial and scientific capabilities that cannot be
easily borrowed from other fields. Second, consistent with the work of Posen, we have argued that infrastructural support
plays a critical role in enabling or constraining the diffusion of some military innovations. Third, and consistent
with the works of Horowitz and Goldman, organizational factors can affect the adoption of some weapon systems,
ultimately slowing down their proliferation or compromising their operational effectiveness. In this respect,
however, our work suggests that accumulated experience, rather than penalizing incumbents, may represent a costly entry-barrier for
newcomers. These considerations have important implications for the broader research agenda on the diffusion of military innovations. In
particular, our work suggests that
the speed and width of diffusion of military innovations is a product of the
interaction between platform and adoption challenges – two aspects that the existing literature in IR
has significantly underestimated (by assuming that the imitation of military technology is relatively easy) or even neglected
(infrastructural requirements).

Drone Proliferation Not Inevitable – their evidence doesn’t take technological and
adaptation challenges into account
Gilli and Gilli 16[Andrea Gilli has a PhD in social and political science from the European University
Institute and is currently a researcher of military affairs at the NATO defense college. Mauro Gilli has a
PhD in political science from Northwestern University and is a researcher in military technology and
international security at the center for security studies of ETH Zurich. “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?
Industrial, Organizational and Infrastructural Constraints: Military Innovations and the Ecosystem
Challenge.”. February 25 , 2016. https://sci-
hub.tw/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425750]
According to a large and growing consensus among scholars and policymakers, unmanned autonomous
vehicles (UAVs) are facile to produce and inexpensive to purchase—two features that are allegedly
promoting their swift proliferation. As Shawn Brimley, Ben FitzGerald, and Ely Ratner stress, this is “not a future trend . . . [as
these] capabilities are being fielded—right now.” From Russia to Iran, from China to North Korea, to even groups like Hamas and Hezbollah,
many U.S. enemies and adversaries are in fact developing or employing various types of drones. From Russia to Iran, from China to North
Korea, to even groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, many U.S. enemies and adversaries are in fact developing or employing various types of
drones. Such developments deserve attention because of their potentially disruptive implications for international politics, as the spread of
drone warfare could redistribute military power at the global level and eventually promote instability and conflict. According to T. X. Hammes,
for instance, given “the low cost and wide dissemination of the knowledge, software, and hardware, we have to assume both state and non-
state actors will use [drones] against us.” The literature in International Relations (IR) theory widely supports these concerns. According
to
the mainstream academic view, military technology (the hardware) spreads easily and quickly, and
globalization—along with the information, communication, and technology (ICT) revolution—further accelerates and
facilitates this process. In this article we question this perspective. Drawing from the literature in management, we argue
that IR scholars have largely underestimated both the technological challenges of developing advanced
weapon systems (platform challenge) and the infrastructural support that they require (adoption
challenge)—ultimately downplaying the material obstacles to the proliferation of military technology.
Based on these intuitions, we develop a theoretical framework that explains why and when some military innovations spread quickly and/or
widely and why and when others do not.

Drone Proliferation Not Inevitable – UCAV adoption is too hard

Gilli and Gilli 16[Andrea Gilli has a PhD in social and political science from the European University
Institute and is currently a researcher of military affairs at the NATO defense college. Mauro Gilli has a
PhD in political science from Northwestern University and is a researcher in military technology and
international security at the center for security studies of ETH Zurich. “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?
Industrial, Organizational and Infrastructural Constraints: Military Innovations and the Ecosystem
Challenge.”. February 25 , 2016. https://sci-
hub.tw/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425750]
UCAVs raise three types of adoption challenges. First, like LAMs and ISR drones, in order to deliver a marked and enduring
combat advantage, they require modern battle-networks, C4 architectures, organizational codes, appropriate
bureaucratic structures, specific military doctrines, skilled personnel, and the support of other manned
combat aircrafts, among others. Second, UCAVs will be autonomous, not remotely controlled. This is going
to trigger some peculiar challenges. Specifically, autonomous systems must be capable of contextual decision-making since they
interact with a dynamic environment in a nondeterministic manner. Thus, traditional development and procurement
approaches, based on full-path regression, are unfit. Algorithms are in fact “only optimal for well understood or modeled
situations.” Significant progress in the discipline of human robotics interaction, and in the area of human-machine interfaces will be then
necessary to enable “the desired correct behavior” or predict “what will happen if the environment changes radically.” However, given the
width and depth of this challenge and of the fields entailed – spanning from “unmanned systems, human factors, psychology, cognitive science,
communication, human computer interaction, computer supported work groups and sociology” – the
organizational, technological
and financial challenges related to UCAVs are likely to be massive and hence unaffordable for possibly
most countries beside the US. Third, autonomous systems will not “achieve their full potential military
utility […] unless they can go where manned aircraft go with the same freedom of navigation,
responsiveness, and flexibility.” This requires countries to integrate their UCAVs fleet into their National
Airspace System (NAS) outside of restricted areas (like airbases) both at home and abroad. However, this casts a wide set of
challenges. In 2004, the Defense Science Board already highlighted the need of appropriate regulatory frameworks in this respect. Yet,
while the US unmanned fleets have continued to grow in this period, “efforts to achieve increasing
access to the NAS have not progressed to meet that demand.” Several reasons account for this delay. Primarily, onboard
anti-collision systems are lengthy, difficult and expensive to develop. Moreover, the organizational and financial
challenges of adapting mission planning and C3 systems to high intensity mixed fleet operations of
manned and unmanned UAVs are enormous. UCAVs, in comparison to remotely piloted vehicles, further
complicate this issue as they raise problems about control and responsibility. European countries have faced
similar obstacles in the integration of UAVs into their national air space. Poorer and less developed countries are unlikely
to fare any better given that they often experience safety problems even with traditional commercial aviation.

ECS – Escalates
Incidents escalate—drone crisis triggers US battle plans
Walker, 14 [1/9/14, Richard, Former NY News Producer, “U.S. Interventionism in Asia Could Spark War
With China”, https://americanfreepress.net/?p=14557]
A war with China is a real possibility. All it might take is the kind of near collision between United States and Chinese naval
vessels that happened recently in the East China Sea or a dog fight between Japanese and Chinese fighter planes in the
skies over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. It could also start with a confrontation between Philippine and Chinese vessels in energy-rich parts of the South China Sea now
claimed by Beijing. There have been many close calls lately as China begins to assert itself around the world, and most experts admit that once the genie is
out of the bottle it will be impossible to put it back in. This may have already occurred. In December 2012, Japan scrambled fighters after Chinese
surveillance planes were spotted over the Senkaku Islands, territory China has since declared a Chinese air defense zone. Japan has been concerned by China’s

use of drones close to its airspace and has vowed to retaliate by deploying U.S. made drones like the Global Kitty
Hawk it hopes to buy from Washington. China has been developing its own drones, most likely with
stolen U.S. technology. Some experts have forecast there will be a drone war in the region before long.
Since his inauguration, President Barack Obama, like his predecessor, George W. Bush, has paid little heed to China’s growing naval ambitions. He has ignored repeated warnings from allies
like India, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines and South Korea that the Chinese have been building a formidable military that has been shaped specifically to dominate the Western
Pacific. Hard Assets Alliance Neocons, who want America to continue to meddle around the world, issued warnings as far back as 2005 when Robert D. Kaplan wrote in The Atlantic Monthly
that if China moved into the Pacific it would encounter a “U.S. Navy and Air Force unwilling to budge from the coastal shelf of the Asian mainland,” resulting in a “replay of the decades-long
Cold War, with a center of gravity not in the heart of Europe but among Pacific atolls.” In AMERICAN FREE PRESS in 2007, this reporter wrote that China was not many years away from
challenging U.S. dominance in Asia. At the time, a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) task force had recommended the U.S. needed to “defeat China swiftly and decisively in any military
conflict.” The CFR recommended expanding U.S. forces into Asia and shifting the balance of its naval and maritime power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Globalists also wanted the U.S. to
“invest heavily in new technologies appropriate for a naval and air battle with the Chinese.” Since 2007, with an eye to defeating the U.S. in a war
in the region, China has greatly expanded its short-and medium-range ballistic missile arsenal, giving it
the capability to target all U.S. bases in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. It has also new
anti-ship missiles capable of destroying U.S. aircraft carriers. By using an overwhelming number of short-and medium-range missiles, the
Chinese could destroy U.S. bases and make resupply difficult in a future conflict. As the National Air Space Intelligence Center
has pointed out, “China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world.” A sign of how the U.S. might react in the

opening exchanges of a conflict was contained in a Pentagon document leaked to The Washington Post in 2012. It talked of a
plan that envisioned the U.S. destroying China’s surveillance and missile targeting capabilities “deep inside the country.” The plan talked of a “blinding

campaign” followed by a massive naval and air assault—the same “shock and awe” tactic used against Iraq, which resulted in scores of dead
civilians. The assumption here is that China would not go nuclear once the missiles started flying. The bottom line is this could be the

defining war of the 20th century if Washington refuses to bring U.S. troops and ships home and let Asia sort out its own troubles.

Goes nuclear rapidly

Ayson & Ball 14 [Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University & Desmond Ball
Head of the Strategic and Defense Study Center at the Research School of Pacific Studies at the
Australian National University. “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?” Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy pages 135-166 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2014.985441]
In the strategic relationship between Japan and China, however, there are problems at both the political
and military–technical levels. Firstly, there seems to be minimal political understanding of, or
commitment to, avoiding escalation. It is hard to tell whether Japan and China will see it as in their
political interests to constrain what begins as a minor conflict. These political obstacles increase the
pressure created by military considerations that encourage swift escalation, to the point at which even
nuclear options seem attractive. The close military links between Japan and the US would not
necessarily encourage restraint. It may be militarily logical for the US to place China in a position in
which further escalation seemed tempting, while it could be politically logical for Japan to create
conditions in which American action became more likely. An initial outbreak of hostilities between Japan
and China over the East China Sea could remain just that: a short, contained exchange of fire and a sobering lesson that encouraged much-
needed efforts to improve communication and recognise their common interest in avoiding conflict. But it might also veer out of
control before they had a chance to take preventative measures. The subsequent involvement of the
United States could lead to Asia's first serious war involving nuclear-armed states. And we have no
precedent to suggest how dangerous that would become.

It will escalate – domestic nationalism, no hotlines, denial of the dispute, history of

peace makes them unprepared
Ayson & Ball 14 [Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University & Desmond Ball
Head of the Strategic and Defense Study Center at the Research School of Pacific Studies at the
Australian National University. “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?” Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy pages 135-166 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2014.985441]
China's demonstration of its willingness and capacity to use force, albeit in modest doses, suggests that it might be expected to
escalate first. The fact that Beijing has an unconvincing claim in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute should not be a source of comfort because, as
Taylor Fravel observes, it is in such weak positions that the Chinese leadership has proven more likely to employ violence.20 And Japanese
escalation could not be ruled out if Tokyo saw China's actions as part of a new and more assertive
pattern of behaviour that signalled a commitment to upping the ante. In their contribution to these
judgements, political leaders on both sides would probably be unable to act with cool detachment, due to
domestic pressure from nationalists. Chinese analysts often explain to outsiders that measures overseas
governments characterise as too assertive are seen by these nationalists as too reserved. In any incident that
gains public attention, Beijing is compelled to strike a bargain between those internal and external expectations. A minor concession
designed to placate a domestic audience could easily be interpreted by Tokyo as serious escalation. There
is also the prospect of Japanese misjudgement of a similar kind. Tokyo's nationalisation of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu
Islands, in 2012, was partly an attempt to ward off even more provocative acts by nationalists. But this backfired.
Partially because of a deep distrust, it is possible that in a severe crisis, any use of the JSDF (even one designed to
lower the temperature) would be read as escalation. The political leaderships on both sides also face two
more problems that hinder their ability to effectively manage Sino-Japanese interaction. The first is that they
have lacked a strong pattern of contact at senior levels, especially between heads of government. At the
time of writing, speculation was growing that Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping would meet briefly at the November 2014 Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit, but this would have been the exception to what resembled a Chinese boycott. Japan
and China also
lack an emergency communication mechanism that would reduce the chances of a misunderstanding
between their armed forces in the event of a sudden, serious maritime crisis. In addition to the frequent external
calls for a system of this sort, Japan has continually supported the idea, only to be rebuffed by China. In September 2014, the two countries
agreed to resume discussions on the subject but, given
their level of distrust, there is no guarantee such a
mechanism will be used even if it is established. The first obstacle is partly the product of another
problem: the absence of an agreement that recognises the dangers in Sino-Japanese relations and the
urgent need for greater cooperation. In the evolving Cold War relationship between Washington and
Moscow, that need was most clearly illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, which helped create a
partnership based on, in Coral Bell's words, ‘consciousness between the dominant powers that they
have solid common interests as well as sharp conflicting interests’.21 The establishment of this political
consciousness was arguably more important than the installation of the famous hotline. In Bell's view,
some of the seeds of this approach were planted far earlier in the post-war period. The admission by the
two superpowers that their relationship was indeed adversarial had been brought home by the time
that the Truman Doctrine was announced, in 1947.22 However, the notion that there needed to be
some sort of adverse ‘partnership’ (a term taken from Marshall Shulman) would come as the crises they
were involved in grew more serious. China and Japan's frequent admonitions of each other (including their use of absurd Harry
Potter analogies) might suggest that the countries treat each other as adversaries.23 But there are at least two kinds of denial involved here.
The first has been Japan's official position that there is no dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. There
has been logic in this approach: acknowledging the existence of the disagreement (which everyone is aware of) would grant China a negotiation
position on the future sovereignty of the islands. The problem is that this stance also reduces
the scope for effective
cooperation, as it gives the impression that conflict resolution is unnecessary. This leaves Japan with a real
conundrum, reflected in recent criticism that the Abe government might concede too much ground if it finally acknowledges that China has a
different position.24 The second form of denial is China's avowed view that its rise avoids the tragedy of great-
power politics, which in the past has resulted in major conflict.25 This position is dangerous because it encourages the perception that
Beijing is free to commit itself to increasingly provocative actions without seriously risking confrontation. Both of these denial
hazards are exacerbated by the insufficient sense of danger in Beijing and Tokyo about the possibility of
an outbreak of violence. There is little sign that the neighbours have noticed the brink from which they need to step back. This
likely fosters excessive confidence that they can continue to taunt each other without coming to blows,
any threats of force are permitted and bluffs will not be called. Goldstein is right to be concerned about ‘indications that
Chinese analysts overestimate the ease with which military actions can be used to send signals, and … underestimate the escalation risks that
could result if the signalling action goes awry or is misunderstood.’26 In this context, the absence of a cautionary tale – a recent war or serious
crisis involving Asia's major powers – could prove to be a problem. These factors
might lead to escalation after the first
shots have been fired. A lack of effective communication at the political level would curtail leaders'
ability to coordinate a ceasefire. Their lack of trust would create suspicion that any stabilisation proposal
was a ruse. The lack of an informal tradition of recognising, let alone managing, their adversarial
partnership would also hinder political control of escalation. At this precarious point, other factors are likely
to kick in, further increasing the danger. There is almost no question that curbing domestic nationalism would
become an even greater challenge for leaders in both countries during the onset of even minor hostilities, and there is also a
possibility that one or both leaderships would be tempted to exploit a heightened crisis for domestic
reasons. An initial act of violence would put the other side under significant pressure to respond in kind
(at the very least).

Indo-Pak – Tensions High

Instability is high now – Pakistan shooting down a drone proves
Tribune 19 [Tribune, 1-1-2019, "Pakistan Army shoots down Indian spy drone over LoC,"
Express Tribune, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1879137/1-pak-army-shoots-indian-spy-drone-along-
loc/]
Pakistan Army shot down an Indian spy quadcopter flying over the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LoC) in Bagh Sector
on Tuesday, the chief military spokesperson said.

Major General Asif Ghafoor, the director general of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), released the picture of the quadcopter in a tweet
from his official Twitter handle.

“Not even a quadcopter will be allowed to cross [the] LoC, In Shaa Allah,” he wrote on the social networking site.
This is the first Indian spy quadcopter to have been downed for intruding into Pakistani airspace this
year. Last year, four such Indian drones had been shot down by Pakistani border guards.
The military spokesperson’s revelation came within minutes after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stepped up rhetoric against Pakistan in
an interview on New Year’s Day.
 Earlier in the day, the Foreign Office summoned a senior Indian diplomat to register a formal protest over the latest ceasefire violations by
Indian troops, which left a woman dead and caused injuries to many others.

“The Director General (SA & SAARC), Dr Mohammad Faisal, summoned the Indian acting deputy high commissioner and condemned the
unprovoked ceasefire violations by the Indian occupation forces along the LoC on 31st December 2018 in Athmuqam-Shahkot Sector,” read a
handout issued by the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Office said the Indian forces along the LoC and the Working Boundary were continuously
targeting populated areas with heavy weapons.
“In 2018, the Indian forces carried out more than 2,350 ceasefire violations along the LoC and the Working Boundary, resulting in the Shahadat
of 36 innocent civilians, while injuring 142 others,” it said.

“This unprecedented escalation in ceasefire violations by India is continuing from the year 2017, when the Indian
forces committed 1,970 ceasefire violations,” the statement added.

It went on to say that the

deliberate targeting of the populated areas was indeed deplorable and contrary to
human dignity, international human rights and humanitarian laws.
The ceasefire violations by India were a threat to regional peace and security and may lead to a
strategic miscalculation, the Foreign Office said, adding the director general urged the Indian side to respect the 2003 ceasefire
arrangement.

Indo-Pak – Impact
Indo Pak war causes extinction
Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security
Strategy in South Asia,” online:
http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased India-
Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out warthat could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the
past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely
belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces,
Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and
weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to
Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink.
However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical
nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more damage
was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving individual
commanders to respondin an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood
that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement
or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any suchconflict would likely continue to escalateuntil one side incurred
an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal. A nuclear conflict in the
subcontinentwould havedisastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology
professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussionsof a regional nuclear war. Their results are
strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the
Soviet Union wouldresult in acatastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter,which could very well place the survival of
the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and
Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely
targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties
could climb as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of
nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the
lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would
remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore,
these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s
ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead toglobal cooling by as much as 2.3
degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread
political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and
international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan, it
might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security
apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill
anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that couldquickly
escalate.

Autocracy – Impact
Autocratic spread causes the second cold war---extinction
Corr 17. (worked in military intelligence for five years, including on nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyber-
security, border security, and counter-insurgency. Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, and a
B.A. and M.A. in international relations from Yale University. The New Cold War: Democracy Vs.
Autocracy. May 21, 2017.https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/05/21/the-new-cold-war-
democracy-vs-autocracy/#5adab74c2fcd)
Over the past 8 days, North Korea successfully tested two nuclear-capable missiles, making a mockery of President Trump’s tough
approach on North Korea. He has meanwhile opened his arms of friendship to Russia and China, the biggest global
threats to democracy. His public excuse is the need to work with Russia on terrorism, and with China on North Korea. That help has not materialized, which will be a test of
Trump’s mettle. If he fails to take action against North Korea, and leaves his many concessions to China in place, he got played. The North Korean launches are the

latest in decades of events that show an animosity of authoritarian rulers toward democracies. Shortly after
the Soviet Union disintegrated in the 1990s, many U.S. analysts saw democracy and liberalism as
triumphant over autocracy, and even presaged the “end of history.” Russia and China were proceeding toward market liberalization
and democratization. The democratic peace would soon take hold and the world would evolve in a utopic manner ,

they thought. But that dream now seems far-flung, with low-grade Russian and Chinese offensives in Eastern

Europe and Asia respectively. These offensives are calibrated in such a manner as to make territorial
gains, while not provoking a military response. They utilize alliances with Iran and North Korea to encourage rogue state
action that distracts global public attention from Chinese and Russian territorial offenses. Conversely, the United States, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, the European Union and others are in a relatively loose alliance based on the common values
of democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech. But the alliance is divided by the strong
democratic desire for peace, and domestic elites with individual incentives to value trade and
investment over the defense of values like democracy. It is subject to free riding, which President Trump has successfully pushed, including at an
upcoming meeting in Brussels on May 25. What could be called an autocratic bloc is provoking, through territorial expansion and

destabilizing nuclear development, an interrelated set of conflicts developing in the direction of a New
Cold War between autocracies on one side, and democracies on the other. As with the old Cold War, the locus of
the conflict is everywhere, including the South China Sea, East China Sea, North Korean and Iranian nuclear and
ballistic missile development, the Russian occupation of Crimea in Ukraine, Russia’s attempt to reclaim influence in the former Soviet Union,
including through occupation of part of Georgia, China’s attempt to push the U.S. out of Asia and claim it as a sphere of influence, the Arctic,

space, undersea exploration, and Russian and Chinese attempts to influence politicians and even voting outcomes in democratic countries. To institutionalize its
growing power and leadership of autocratic countries, and many democratic hangers-on, China attempts to reform global governance not through democratization that might help countries
like Japan, India, Brazil and Germany to positions of greater influence in places like the U.N. Security Council, but to uniquely reflect and accommodate China’s own growing economic and
Democracies are being challenged worldwide by this autocratic bloc. If democracies do not have
military power.

a clear-eyed understanding of the threat, and a grand strategy to defeat or at least deflect the challenge, democracies
will be weakened in such a way as to make future challenges even more difficult to overcome. The
outcomes of the challenges that democracies face today will determine future outcomes, in a process
that is increasingly path dependent. Nowhere are the challenges and path dependence greater than in defending democratic voting processes from autocratic
 Decisions on
influence, and in defending front-line democratic territory in places like Eastern Europe, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Himalayas, and Taiwan.

defensive actions or inactions by allied democracies on these fields of economic, diplomatic, and military
battle will profoundly affect the future of democracy, peace, and stability for decades, if not centuries,
to come. Positive outcomes will require not just grand strategies by major powers, but comprehensive citizen involvement
by people of many nations who care about a future that is democratic and at peace.

Autocracy – Backsliding Impact

Democracy is declining---that causes global instability and structural violence.
Kurlantzick 13, Joshua Kurlantzick is Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR) and author of the book Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the
Worldwide Decline of Representative Government, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=174117
Over the past three years, the world’s imagination has been captured by the outbreak of political openings in some of the most repressive societies on earth. In
Myanmar - where only five years ago the military government ordered the shooting of Buddhist monks in the streets - the past two years have seen a formal
transition to a civilian government. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and potentially Syria, longtime
autocrats were toppled by popular
revolutions. Yet these events are a smokescreen. In reality democracy is actually going into reverse
worldwide. Democracy’s meltdown While some nations in Africa, the Arab world, and Asia have slightly opened up over the past two years,
countries that were once held up as examples of political change have experienced democratic
meltdowns. In its most recent annual international survey, Freedom House had found that global
freedom dropped in 2012 for the sixth year in a row. The same is likely to be true for 2013. At the same time,
most authoritarian nations have become more repressive. Freedom House noted that this was most pronounced among what it
calls the “middle ground” nations, a group of states located primarily in the developing world that have begun democratizing but are not solid democracies. This
truculence was only made stronger by the Arab Spring, which prompted autocratic regimes like China to crack down harder on their own populations, and resulted
in rollbacks in Arab countries themselves. Indeed, the International Federation for Human Rights - an organization that monitors abuses around the world - found in
its annual report that the Arab uprisings have had little impact on a dire, deteriorating climate for human rights defenders worldwide. Yet, democracy has,
in fact, been in hibernation since the turn of the century. According to Freedom House, the period between 2000 and 2005 was one in
which democracy gained little ground around the world, before sliding backward after the mid-2000s. “Since they were first issued in 1972, the findings in Freedom
in the World have conveyed a story of broad advances,” Freedom House has reported. “But freedom’s forward march peaked around the beginning of the [2000s].”
Don’t just take Freedom House’s word Even as some democrats were celebrating the Arab Spring, and hoping that, as in 1989, its revolutions might spread to other
parts of the world, a mountain of other evidence supported Freedom House’s gloomy conclusions. One
of the other most comprehensive
studies of global democracy, compiled by Germany’s Bertelsmann Foundation, uses data examining
democracies’ ability to function, manage government, and uphold freedoms, to produce its
Transformation Index. According to the most recent version the overall quality of democracy has
eroded throughout the developing world, whereas the key components of functioning democracies have
suffered qualitative erosion. These developments threaten to hollow out the quality and substance of
governance. Old-fashioned coups have also made a comeback. Between 2006 and 2013, the military grabbed power in Guinea, Honduras and Fiji, as well as
countless other states that were synonymous with coups in the 20th century. And where the military could not seize control by force – such as Ecuador, Mexico and
Pakistan – it nevertheless managed to restore its status as the central actor in political life. Across the Middle East, armed forces have also come to dominate the
Arab spring and summer, putting the lie to the idea that the uprisings were going to bring democracy to the region. Instead, in the Arab uprisings appear to be
entrenching the power of militaries in the region, most notably Egypt. Accordingly, the strengthening of military rule in many developing states has been disastrous
for reform, despite the militaries’ contention that they are the only institutions standing in the way of civil strife or Islamist rule. Indeed, human rights groups such
as Amnesty International found that, since the winter of 2010-2011, human rights abuses have actually increased in nearly every Middle Eastern state. Further
south Despite the fact that militaries could hardly be called agents of reform, in many developing nations they have quite often continued to receive support from
the middle classes. This is because they regard the armed forces as potential antidotes to a popular democracy that might empower the poor, the religious, and
less-educated. In my analysis of military coups in developing countries over the past twenty years, it was determined that middle classes men either agitated in
advance for the coup or used various outlets to voice support for the military in almost 50% of all cases. Moreover, opinion polls in many developing countries
suggest that not only is the quality of democracy declining but also that public perceptions of it are also deteriorating. The regular Afrobarometer survey, for
example, reveals declining levels of support for democracy throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa. It’s pretty much the same story in Central Asia. And
Latinobarometro polls show similar dissatisfaction with democracy across South and Central America. In states like Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru, an ever dwindling
majority of people think democracy is preferable to any other type of government. Instead, many Latin Americans now think that they do not even have a
functioning democracy. Compare and contrast The poor
health of democracy has inevitably impacted upon national and
international security. The renewed strength of authoritarian rule - including the many “elected
autocrats” who dominate what are nominally democracies - means that billions of people live under
repressive or pseudo-democratic hybrid regimes. Most (if not all) are deprived of the social, political, and
economic freedoms that most in the West take for granted. In the long run, authoritarian regimes also tend to be
more willing to engage in conflict than democratic states, and frequently use violence to repress their
populations. By contrast, democratic governments often make choices that foster broader development
and stability. Take child mortality, for instance – one of the best indicators of whether a country is prioritizing health care and social welfare.
Political scientists Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia have studied different types of regimes and rates of infant
mortality throughout the world in order to determine a governments’ specific focus on well-being.
They found that, almost without exception, democracies made more of their inhabitants better off than did
dictatorships. Perhaps then, it is not a surprise that, taken on average, residents of democracies live longer than those
living under authoritarian regimes.