REGALIAN DOCTRINE:

> Generally, under this concept, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its
successors, the American Colonial Government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic

> In a broad sense, the term refers to royal rights, or those rights to which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives

> The theory of jure regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest

Carino vs Insular Govt 41 Phil 935

Political Law – Regalian Doctrine

Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare
land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The
State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs
Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian
doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived
upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection
against Spain it has apparently not been used by Cariño for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has
always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the
State remained the absolute owner.

II. LANDS

A. CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

1. AGRICULTURAL LANDS

CONCEPT:

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee. G.R. No. L-360
November 15, 1947

FACTS: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought
to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the
jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?

2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of this
Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the
Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private
only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said
two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens
except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.

DEFINITION

Mapa vs Insular GovernmentG.R. No. L-4195, Feb. 18, 1908

AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. – The phrase “agricultural public lands” defined by theact of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase
is also to be found in several sections of the Public LandAct (No. 926), means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
mineral nor timber lands.

Facts: - The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent,situated in Iloilo. - From the evidence adduced it
appears that the land in question is lowland, and has beeninterruptedly, for more than 20 years, in the possession of the petitioner
and hisancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and up to thepresent, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt
deposits. The witnesses declare the land isfar from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the said land.- The claim of the Atty.
General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural landsunless they are such by their nature. He claims that it is not an agricultural
land andtherefore, cannot be disposed of nor can be allowed for homestead.- Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the
Government has appealed. - A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below- The decision of the court was based upon Act
No. 926 Section 54, par. 6 which providesthat “ All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in theopen,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agriculturalpublic lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
under a bona fide claimof ownership except as against the Government, for a period of 10 years next precedingthe taking effect of this Act,
except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall beconclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Governmentgrant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to suchland under the provisions of this chapter.

Issue: Whether or not the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of Act. No.926

Ruling: Yes- The phrase “agricultural public lands” defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,which phrase is also to be found in several
section of the Public Land Act (No. 926),means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor timer lands

PRESUMPTION

RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

FACTS:Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to
obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as such.Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a
good title from the Spanish government. Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has been
seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the
entire tract of land?

HELD: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property,
sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a
man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest
fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of
the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the
Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence
will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked
for registration. Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.

OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS – ‘AGRICULTURAL’

PNR vs Del Valle

Facts: PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30. meters adjoining
one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to Legazpi.

Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of the track, not actually
occupied by the railroad track, after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years and under
conditions hereinbefore set forth. Bingabing, however, failed to take possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land,
had a house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.

Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the premises in the Court of First Instance of
Albay.

Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that the had been a tenant on the property for over twenty years; that he had been placed thereon
by the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the then Manila Railroad Company (now PNR); that he became the tenant of
Demetrio de Vera, Gomba's successor; that he is the tenant of Bingabing, having given the latter's share of 1/3 during the last two harvests; and
that the case is properly cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations.

While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR)
a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests.

Petitioners opposed and maintained that CAR has no jurisdiction over the case. CAR, nevertheless, resolved in favor of Doltz. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: W/N the land here involved an agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform
Code?

Ruling: NO. According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted
to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members
of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both."

It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to
agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture

Indeed, the land which adjoins the railroad track on both sides is part of PNR's right of way. That right of way is not limited to the particular
space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also includes the portions occupied by the telephone and telegraph posts. It extends to a
width of 30 meters which reasonably gives the train locomotive engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its switches ahead of him.
Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural activities.

Even on the assumption that the land is agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR prohibits the sublease of the premises. PNR's lessees
cannot give what they are not allowed to give. This ushers us to a principle shaped out by jurisprudence that the security of tenure guaranteed
by our tenancy law may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.

RA 6657 3C:

(c) Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.” [Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657]

The meaning of agricultural lands covered by the CARL was explained further by the DAR in its Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990,[12]
entitled “Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses,” issued pursuant to Section
49 of CARL, which we quote:

“x x x. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies,and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June
1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.”

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7881

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, ENTITLED "AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
SECTION 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Sec. 3. Definitions. — For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:

"(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical."

2. FOREST OR TIMBER LANDS

CONCEPT

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983 public domain, public forest land, Revised
Administrative Code OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS: These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the CA which declared the disputed property as forest land,
not subject to titling in favor of private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.

Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar
Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of
Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his
opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold
whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to
have said lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing
527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of
private persons for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. Another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot
No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the disputed
lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the
disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove
swamp”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.

RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its
being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin
forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as
testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was
only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same
could not be done because it was classified as “public forest.”

The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.
TONGSON vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY September 27, 1977G.R. No. L-34463

FACTS:This case started in the application for registration of title of a lot (Lot 855). Testimonial evidence shows that a parcel of land,to which
the subject lot belong, was under the exclusive possession of one Francisco Borja. Borja cut trees for firewood in the land. It was alleged that
the land at that time was a mangrove swamp. After subsequent transfers, a portion of the land was transferred to Santiago Bermejo. After
Santiago's death, Macario Bermejo, his heir and administrator, converted the land into a fishpond.

ISSUE: Whether or not a parcel of land,possessed as far as back as 1905, which has been alleged to be a mangrove swamp and converted into a
fishpond, is considered as part of the timber domain, and thus is not disposable and cannot be registered.

RULING: The possession of Borja and the subsequent owners was peaceful, continuous, open and adverse under claim of ownership for a
period of not less than 50 years. The application for registration must be granted. Besides, the definition of 'forestry' as including manglares
found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which are vested prior to its enactment. The applicable law is the Act of Congress
of July 1 1902. The Act classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are
not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries, or ordinary
farmlands. Therefore, mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress. So even if the subject
land was indeed a mangrove land, it still does not make it into an inalienable forest land.

Director of Forrestry vs VillarealGR No. L-32266

Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed the applicationfor registration of a parcel land classified
as mangrove swamps in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz withan area of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps, to the applicant Ruperto
Villareal. He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years. Both
parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent argued that mangrove swamp are agricultural land
but the petitioner contended that it is aforestall land therefore not disposable. The Court of the First Instance of Capiz however grants the
application of the respondent. The decision of the lower court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Hence the Director of Forestry
elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines hence they are not
alienable. The evidence presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the land, he only
presented tax declaration. Therefore the decision of theCourt of Appeals was set aside and the application for registration of title by the
respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Secretary of DENR vs Yap GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

FACTS: This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that
Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of
the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section
3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD: No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY

Director Of Lands V. CA (1984) G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

 Land situated in Obando, Bulacan

 May 10, 1976: The Valerianos claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through:
 inheritance - 1918; and
 purchase - May 2, 1958
 Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the
principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March
1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and
alienable portion of the public domain
 Land was found to be an Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-
spot inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part
of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. 2 houses of light materials were erected within the area for the
caretakers temporary dwelling.
 CA Affirmed RTC: in favor of the Valerianos

ISSUES:

 W/N the Courts can reclassify public land - NO

 W/N the Valerianos are entitled to judicial confirmation of title - NO

HELD: CA reverse

1. NO

 In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their
competence and jurisdiction
 The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts.
 In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.

2. NO

 Regalian doctrine: all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
 if land is w/in the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to
register it under the Torrens System
 Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership
 The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
 Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification
 In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give
serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.

PRESUMPTION BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL LAND AND TIMBER LAND

3. MINERAL LANDS

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43938 (April 15, 1988)

Facts: Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his own behalf and on behalf of his children. This application was
separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge Corporation (Atok). The petitioners claimed that they have
acquired the land from their parents and that they have been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground
that they have mineral claims covering the property and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner.

The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and recognized the claims of the
applicant but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their
mining claims.

Issue: Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.

Held: No, the CA was incorrect.

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make
any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He
cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he
destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the
dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace
above it up to a reasonable height.

The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.

In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and
completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it
did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who
were unlawfully occupying the surface.

4. NATIONAL PARK