CASE DIGEST: TAÑADA V.
TUVERA presidential decrees
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), petitioners, versus Hon.
Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, Hon.
Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
Melquiades P. de la Cruz, etc., et al., respondents.
No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they we to become effective and immediately upon their
approval.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not, that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith the
Official Gazette.
Issue:
Whether or not the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article 2
of the New Civil Code, on the necessity of publication for its effectivity.
Held:
The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case, but
the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall
be shortened or extended. The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
and executive orders promulgated by the
President. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
ARANETA vs. GATMAITAN G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957 (101
Phil 328)
Facts: Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places
migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur,
for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of
the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused
the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor
among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation
of trawls in San Miguel Bay. In response to these pleas, the President issued
Executive Order prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint
for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court
of First Instance praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries
from enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such
other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. The CFI declared the
Executive Order invalid; the injunction prayed for is ordered to issue;
Issue: Whether the EO Executive Orders are valid and does not encroach the
authority of the Legislature in the said Prohibition.
Held: Yes, EO Executive Orders are valid for having been issued by authority of the
Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act. The opinion
of the SC that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of
trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his
duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his
instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine
waters.
Under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to
regulate or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed. The President of the
Philippines exercise that same power and authority according to Section 10(1),
Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines which states that The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, and according to Section 63 of the Revised
Administrative Code which states that Administrative acts and commands of the
President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the
Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or
ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general
performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general
concern shall be made in executive orders, and Section 74 of the Revised
Administrative Code also provides that all executive functions of the government
of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments
subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters
of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper distribution of
the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned
to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a
chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall
assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under
his control and supervision.
For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be considered
the Department Head of the Executive Office.
(HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No.
164171, February 20, 2006)
CAN THE PRESIDENT VALIDLY BAN THE IMPORTATION OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES?
Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156), issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Arroyo) on 12 December 2002, imposes a ban on the importation of
used motor vehicles, with a few exceptions. The ban is part of several measures EO
156 adopts to “accelerate the sound development of the motor vehicle industry in
the Philippines.” In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on importation
under Article 2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned to rationalize the importation
of used motor vehicles and to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine motor
manufacturing firms to be globally competitive producers of completely build-up
units and their parts and components for the local and export markets.
EO 156 is assailed on the ground that it has no constitutional and statutory bases.
Q1: Is such ban on importation of used motor vehicles as embodied in Article 2,
Sec. 3.1 of EO 156 constitutional?
A1: Yes, it is constitutional because it is a valid exercise of a delegated police power.
Said EO 156 finds basis on Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that “the Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.”
This constitutional provision is implemented by certain legislations, namely: the
Tariff and Customs Code and Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment
Code of the Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President
Corazon C. Aquino. Under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the
President, in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national
security, to, inter alia, is expressly authorized to prohibit the importation of any
commodity as provided for under Section 401 thereof. And under Article 7,
paragraph 12 of the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines, the President is
empowered to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any
equipment or raw materials or finished products.
There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is
a reasonable exercise of police power. The deterioration of the local motor
manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor vehicles is an urgent
national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the
exercise of delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly proscribe
the importation of these vehicles.
Q2: Can the ban be applied against importations of used motor vehicles in the
Freeport (Subic Bay Freeport)?
A2: No. The subject matter of the laws (Tariff and Customs Code, Omnibus
Investment Code) authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of
used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156 cannot be applied against
the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some
extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is
actually the “customs territory” which is defined under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227, as follows: “the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic
Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other
national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect.”
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only
outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the
prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of
an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope,
as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but
also for being unreasonable.
As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or
harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The application of the law
should be consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat
lex, et cessat lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is not the
letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. To apply the proscription
to the Freeport would not serve the purpose of the EO. Instead of improving the
general economy of the country, the application of the importation ban in the
Freeport would subvert the avowed purpose of RA 7227 which is to create a market
that would draw investors and ultimately boost the national economy.
Grego v COMELEC (DIGEST)
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HUMBERTO
BASCO, respondents (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious
misconduct. Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second
District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed
office. After his term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However, he found
himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his
position.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective
position since he had been “removed from office as a result of an administrative
case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.
For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office
was again contested. In 1995, petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition
for disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected
councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates
who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office.
COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC
in dismissing the petition for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they
do not agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed resolution.
The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not override, but instead remain consistent
with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative
rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify,
the law. The law itself cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act
6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks
to implement, employed the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly
irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.
Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.
Luis K. Lokin, Jr.
vs.
Commission on Elections, et. al.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32. June 22, 2010Bersamin, J:
Topic:
Delegated power of administrative agencies. Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRRs) must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority
conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress, for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant
or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge,
alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot
engraft additional on-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the
Legislature.
Facts:
The Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups
duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their
intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
CIBAC submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be
chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The
nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination
were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3)
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. Prior to the
elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees, whereby it
withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane
R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus
included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales,and (3) Borje. Election results showed
that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on the
srcinal list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of
nominees and the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It
approved the amendment of the list of nominees with the new order. The
COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of
CIBAC. Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to
proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another
petition for certiorari assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it
expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates
the Party-List System Act.
Decision:
Yes. The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid.
Ratio:
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations
in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List
System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of Congress nor
issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers
and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941is clear and unambiguous and expresses a
single and definite meaning, there is no room for interpretation or construction but
only for application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of nominees and
alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to
the COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been
submitted to the COMELEC: (1) when the nominee dies; (2) when the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of
the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. Section 13
of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
when it provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party”
as statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to
expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain
consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it.
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the
law and the IRR, the law prevails. The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were
granted. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was declared invalid and of no effect to
the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of
a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES (ATIENZA)
Facts:
This is a petition to annul the decision of a RTC of Olongapo declaring
unconstitutional the EO 156 Art. 2 Sec. 3.1. The said executive issuance prohibits
the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport
Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject
to a few exceptions.
CA upheld the ruling of the RTC on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the
President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used
motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent
any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive
issuance, is void.
The petitioners argue that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant
to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application
should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free
flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and
taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of
goods and materials without restriction.
Issue: WON the EO is valid?
Held:
Partially Yes. It is valid insofar as it is outside the Freeport zone, but void if the
vehicles are within the Freeport zone.
According to the SC, Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
including the barangay.Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-
legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-
making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to
carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.17 To be valid,
an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the
following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.18
First requisite
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution through Congress’ delegation by law.
The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:
1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President, in the interest of
national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to, inter alia, prohibit
the importation of any commodity.
2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines that
empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of
any equipment or raw materials or finished products 3) Republic Act No. 8800,
otherwise known as the "Safeguard Measures Act" (SMA), ," Second requisite:
The general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires
previous notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself
requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as
determined at an appropriate investigation. This exception pertains to the issuance
of legislative rules. An interpretative rule, however, give no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed; and are designed merely to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A
legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
crafted to implement a primary legislation.
The SC adds that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the
law and substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must let
those who are going to be affected be heard and informed, before the issuance is
given the force and effect of law. In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a
legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments
intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of
a specified product. Third requisite
According to the petitioners, the purpose of the EO is for the domestic industry. EO
156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition
on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some
extent, a foreign territory. The domesticindustry which the EO seeks to protect is
actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227 Fourth requisite: This brings us to the fourth requisite. Rules
and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view.
The SC found no logic in the all-encompassing application of the assailed provision
to the Freeport which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor
vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be
prevented or remedied will not arise.
Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM) G.R. No. 175220 February
12, 2009
DELEGATION OF POWERS
TINGA, J.
potestas delegata non delegare potest This rule is based upon the ethical principle
that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately
upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.
XPNs: grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies
They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate
the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has
become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing
complexity and variety of public functions.
RTC: With respect to the subject guidelines, the trial court upheld their validity as
an exercise of police power, thus: The Petitioner’s submission that the subject
guidelines are oppressive and hence confiscatory of proprietary rights is likewise
viewed by this Court to be barren of factual and legal support. The horseracing
industry, needless to state, is imbued with public interest deserving of utmost
concern if not constant vigilance. The Petitioners do not dispute this. It is because
of this basic fact that respondents are expected to police the concerned individuals
and adopt measures that will promote and protect the interests of all the
stakeholders starting from the moneyed horseowners, gawking bettors down to
the lowly maintainers of the stables. This is a clear and valid exercise of police
power with the respondents acting for the State. Participation in the business of
horseracing is but a privilege; it is not a right. And no clear acquiescence to this
postulation can there be than the Petitioners' own undertaking to abide by the
rules and conditions issued and imposed by the respondents as specifically shown
by their contracts of lease with MCJI.
CA: The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The appellate court
upheld the authority of PHILRACOM to formulate guidelines since it is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction over and control of the horse-racing industry per Section 8 of
P.D. No. 8. The appellate court further pointed out that P.D. No. 420 also endows
PHILRACOM with the power to prescribe additional rules and regulations not
otherwise inconsistent with the said presidential decree and to perform such duties
and exercise all powers incidental or necessary to the accomplishment of its aims
and objectives. It similarly concluded that the petition for prohibition should be
dismissed on the ground of mootness in light of evidence indicating that petitioners
had already reconsidered their refusal to have their horses tested and had, in fact,
subsequently requested the administration of the test to the horses.
FACTS: In August 11, 2004, PHILRACOM issued a directive to the Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) directing them to
immediately come up with their respective Club’s House Rule to address Equine
Infectious Anemia (EIA) and to rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA. Said
directive was issue pursuant to A.O. No. 5 dated March 28, 1994 by the Dept. of
Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive,
or transport horses from any locality or place except when accompanied by a
certificate issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry.
In compliance with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses
stable in their establishments to submit the horses to blood sampling and
administration of the Coggins Test to determine whether they are afflicted with the
EIA virus. Subsequently, on September 17, 2004, PHILRACOM issued copies of the
guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA. (*w/c served as the 2nd
directive) Petitioners refused to comply with the directives. Despite resistance
from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The horses, whose owners refused
to comply were banned from the races, removed from the actual day of race,
prohibited from renewing their licenses and evicted from their stables.
The owners (petitioners) complained before the Office of the President which in
turn issued directive instructing PHILRACOM to investigate the matter.
Petitioners filed for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with the RTC. RTC
however dismissed their petition for injunction because: (1) The issue is already
moot since almost all racehorse owners complied with the directives. (2) It is a valid
exercise of police power. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE: W/N there is a valid delegation of legislative power to PHILRACOM
PETITIONER’s ARGUMENTS:
(1) They maintain that the assailed guidelines do not comply with due process
requirements. (2) No investigation or at least a summary proceeding was
conducted affording petitioners an opportunity to be heard. (3) Assailed guidelines
are ultra vires in that the sanctions imposed for refusing to submit to medical
examination are summary eviction from the stables or arbitrary banning of
participation in the races, notwithstanding the penalties prescribed in the contract
of lease. PHILRACOM’s ARGUMENTS:
PHILRACOM justified its right under the law to regulate horse racing. MJCI adds
that PHILRACOM need not delegate its rule-making power to the former since
MJCI’s right to formulate its internal rules is subsumed under the franchise granted
to it by the Congress.
PETITONER’s REPLY:
They raised the issue that PHILRACOM had unconstitutionally delegated its
rulemaking power to PRCI and MJCI in issuing the directive for them to come up
with club rules. They said that the power granted to PRCI and MJCI under their
respective franchises is limited to:
(1) The construction, operation and maintenance of race tracks; (2) The
establishment of branches for booking purposes;
(3) The conduct of horse races
RULING:
YES. The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines,
hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within
the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (4) It must be reasonable.
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances.
PHILRACOM’s authority drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the
presidential decree is valid. PHILRACOM did not exceed its authority. And the
issuances are fair and reasonable.
Regarding the first requisite, clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of
rulemaking power to PHILRACOM. Clearly too, for its part PHILRACOM has
exercised its rule-making power in a proper and reasonable manner. More
specifically, its discretion to rid the facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted
with EIA is aimed at preserving the security and integrity of horse races.
Petitioners also question the supposed delegation by PHILRACOM of its rule-
making powers to MJCI and PRCI.
There is no delegation of power to speak of between PHILRACOM, as the delegator
and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The PHILRACOM directive is merely instructive in
character. PHILRACOM had instructed PRCI and MJCI to “immediately come up
with Club’s House Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of horses
infected with EIA.” PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the racehorse
owners to submit blood samples and subject their race horses to blood testing.
Compliance with the PHILRACOM’s directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and
MJCI under Sections 11 of R.A. No. 7953 and Sections 1 and 2 of 8407.
As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated authority
of PHILRACOM but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress. As
justified by PRCI, “obeying the terms of the franchise and abiding by whatever rules
enacted by PHILRACOM is its duty.”
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to
PHILRACOM’s guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the
guidelines, that is, only after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins Test
was ordered. While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after
PHILRACOM’s directive, this circumstance does not render the directive nor the
guidelines void. The directive’s validity and effectivity are not dependent on any
supplemental guidelines. PHILRACOM has every right to issue directives to MJCI
and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without implementing
guidelines.
On publication: Petitioners also argue that PHILRACOM’s guidelines have no force
and effect for lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University of the
Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law. As a rule, the issuance of rules and
regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power
does not require notice and hearing, In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this
Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers
since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established
or ascertained.
The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it must be
within the limits of the powers granted to it. The administrative body may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating EIA.
These guidelines are in accord with PHILRACOM’s mandate under the law to
regulate the conduct of horse racing in the country.
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be
unreasonable or discriminatory. **In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCI’s
premises underwent the same procedure. The guidelines implemented were
undoubtedly reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought
to be accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with EIA.
**It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse
owners before the test was conducted. Those who failed to comply were
repeatedly warned of certain consequences and sanctions.
Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow respondents
to determine from time to time the eligibility of horses as race entries. The lease
contract executed between petitioner and MJC contains a proviso reserving the
right of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a particular
horse is a qualified horse. In addition, PHILRACOM’s rules and regulations on horse
racing provide that horses must be free from any contagious disease or illness in
order to be eligible as race entries.
All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of PHILRACOM in issuing
the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with
PHILRACOM’s directive.
Maceda vs. ERB192 SCRA 363Sarmiento
Facts:
1. Petroleum companies Caltex, Shell and Petron filed separate applications with
the Energy Regulatory Board for permission to increase the wholesale prices of
petroleum products, and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase
temporarily such prices pending further proceedings.
2. The Energy Regulatory Board, in a joint order granted provisional relief and
authorizes said applicants a provisional increase.
3. The petitioners, Senator Ernesto Maceda and Atty. Oliver Lozano submits that
the same was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Section 3,
paragraph (e), of Executive Order No. 172, and has been issued with grave abuse
of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
4. Hence, this petition praying for injunctive relief, to stop the Energy Regulatory
Board from implementing its order mandating a provisional increase in the prices
of petroleum and petroleum products.
Issue:
Whether or not the Order of the Energy Regulatory Board is valid?
Held:
YES. Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a
hearing, have overlooked the provisions of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172
which authorizes the Board to grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the
case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after
hearing, should the Board find that the documentary evidences substantially
support the provisional order. Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule
and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication
and notice to all affected parties.: section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not
negate each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board
may resort to one but not to both at the sometime. Section 3(e) outlines the
jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price
adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that,
however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally,
without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.
SEC vs GMA Network, Inc. 575 SCRA 113
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. GMA NETWORK, INC.,
respondent.
Facts: Petitioner GMA filed an application for various amendments to its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent SEC. The amendments include,
among others, the change in the corporate name of from "Republic Broadcasting
System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term
for another 50 years.
The petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and Legal Department a
separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term
(P1,212,200.00) The petitioner formally protested the assessment. SEC approved
the other amendments. (corporate name and the principal purpose)
The petitioner requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity
and propriety of the assessment. SEC, through Assoc. Commissioner Fe Eloisa C.
Gloria, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment.
An appeal was taken by the petitioner on the ground that the assessment is not in
accordance with law. SEC En Banc issued the assailed order dismissing the
petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit.
It filed an appeal with CA. GMA argued that its application for the extension of its
corporate term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of
incorporation. It further averred that the basis for the assessment is not valid. (SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994)
The MC cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This is an
implementation of the mandate of R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and
affects the public at large. It cannot be considered a mere internal rule or
regulation, nor an interpretation of the law.
The petition is denied.

CA agreed with the SEC’s submission that an extension of the corporate term is a
grant of a fresh license for a corporation. As such, it is not an ordinary amendment.
However, the CA ruled that the Memorandum Circular is invalid and ineffective for
not having been published in accordance with law.

Issue: Whether or not the Memorandum Circular (MC) is valid.

Held: GMA points out that the MC No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fees for
amended articles of incorporation where the amendment consists of extending the
term of corporate existence. The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only
to filing fees for articles of incorporation. Thus, the former circular should apply to
its case. Assuming that MC No. 2, Series of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that the
latter did not take effect for it was neither filed with the UP-Law Center nor
published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

R.A. No. 3531 provides SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it
assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of
an amended articles of incorporation for purposes of extending the term of
corporate existence.

R.A. No. 3531 provides a standard which should guide the SEC in fixing and
imposing its rates and fees. If such mandate were the only consideration, the Court
would have been inclined to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees
as outlined in the questioned MC.

However, we agree with the CA that the questioned MC is invalid as it was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Furthermore, it has not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the
Administrative Code of 1987.