The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that she ASIDE

ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the Information in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02,
should have been arraigned by the RTC. without prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court.

It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court
or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.[24] Considering that
the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's
arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a
valid Information filed with the RTC.

It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC
without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC
to rely on the case of People v. Cabale,[25] because the accused therein was in fact arraigned,
although the same was made only after the case was submitted for decision. In the similar
cases of People v. Atienza and Closa[26] and People v. Pangilinan,[27] the accused in the said
cases were also belatedly arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that the active
participation of the counsels of the accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-examine
the prosecution witnesses during trial without objecting on the ground that their clients had
not yet been arraigned, had the effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment.
Moreover, the accused in these cases did not object when they were belatedly arraigned.
The same, however, cannot be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment at all before
the RTC. On the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus,
there is nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact
that her client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[28] The
purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even
of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to
inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.[29] As an
indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or
brushed aside peremptorily.[30] Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of
the proceedings before the trial court.[31]

As a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that at all stages of the proceedings leading to
his trial and conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure
prescribed by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by the
Constitution.[32] In the same way that the reading of the Information to the accused during
arraignment is not a useless formality, so is the validity of the information being read not an
idle ceremony.[33]

Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law.[34] In all criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step procedure
required by the Rules.[35] The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in
taking the life or liberty except that of the guilty.[36]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Digos City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, are REVERSED and SET
CASE DIGEST: BRIG GEN. (RET.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General. when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved
the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as
housing projects.
AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12
individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the
agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the
individual vendors.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The
unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of
the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter.
Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale
became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which
includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner,
along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through
falsification of public documents.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found petitioner probably guilty of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.
THE Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 and 12 informations for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other
co-accused.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from
the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary,
stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral
deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject
property.
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). The OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-
OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman
Margarito Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the
recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final
disposition of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. It found that petitioner
indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and
various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign
ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price
of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed
for petitioner’s continued prosecution.
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of
prosecutors.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The
Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be
ventilated in the trial of the case.
ISSUE: Did the Sandiganbayan err in denying petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment
pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause against?
HELD: The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the immediate filing of
an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency
of a motion for reconsideration.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No.
15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a
finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7,
Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall
be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of
court in cases where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the
corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution
subject of the motion.
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the
filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused,
which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the
court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the
information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is
pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment
and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which
the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a formal
amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted. The petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on
amendment and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any
merit in this claim.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the
plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused [would] not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
[emphasis and underscore ours]
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is
more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since
the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended.22cralaw virtualaw library
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,23 we ruled that the change of the date of the commission of the
crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal amendment and would not prejudice the rights
of the accused because the nature of the offense of grave coercion would not be altered. In that case,
the difference in the date was only about two months and five days, which difference, we ruled, would
neither cause substantial prejudice nor cause surprise on the part of the accused.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense.24 The act may be alleged to
have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was
committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential
ingredient of the crime of homicide.
Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal amendment, we
proceed to the next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and
cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed.25 Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that
he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the
corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for
the first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending
on the nature of the imputed crime.26cralaw virtualaw library
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however,
we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their
very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or
information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of
defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the
date of the commission of the offense.
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules,
does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment,
that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been
attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have
conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new
offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the
amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month.
It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in
the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the
nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under
the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used
by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The
effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the prosecution has proven the
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence has been
successfully overcome.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting the petitioner
of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I.
Kummer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192898 : January 31, 2011
SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD,
PETITIONERS, VS. VICTOR ANG, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate
City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. Petitioners the
filed with the DOJ a motion for review.
On March 3, 2009 the prosecutor then filed the information with the MTcC who
later on ordered the petitioners to file their counter affidavit.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest [5]
praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the
pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ. The MTCC granted the
motion subject to par c, section 11 rule 116 and set their arraignment on
September 10, 2009.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided,
that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway,[10] the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with
the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the
petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed.
This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.

A petition for certiorari was then made to the RTC who held that the MTCC
judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of
one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with
the DOJ.

The petitioners then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari
essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only
a general rule.

Issue: WON the motion for review is a ground for suspension of arraignment.

Held:
Yes. SC granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for
review on certiorari.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition

which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;