ADJUDICATORY POWERS

 Generally
o Determinative or adjudicatory powers
o Determination of the administrative agencies of the rights and duties of specific individuals
as contrasted with rule-making powers which involve determinations of the broadest sense
involving persons generally than specially
o The function of any particular act must be either administrative or judicial and there can in
reality be no middle or halfway ground between them
o Still, administrative, agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial
system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals
 Distinguished from judicial power
o Function is primarily administrative, the true rule is that where the function of the agency is
primarily administrative and the power to hear and determine controversies is granted as an
incident to the administrative duty, the power is administrative
o Function is primarily to decide questions on legal rights, Where the duty is primarily to
decide questions of legal rights between private parties with respect to the matter in
controversy, such decision being the primary object and not merely incidental to regulation
or some other administrative function, the question raised is judicial involving the exercise
of judicial function
 Extent of quasi-judicial powers of administrative agencies
o Jurisdiction limited, only those which need special competence and experience has been
recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character
o Extent of powers depends on the enabling law, In other words, the extent to which an
administrative agency may exercise such powers depend largely, if not wholly, on the
provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original
jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied
o Split jurisdiction not favored, the rule is that when an administrative body or agency is
conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining
to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction
 a complaint for specific performance and annulment of mortgage and damages filed
by a buyer of subdivision lots against the mortgagee, though involving title to,
possession of, or interest in, real estate was held well within the jurisdiction of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
o Grant of particular power must be found in law itself,
o General policy to uphold exercise, It is the general policy of the courts to sustain the
decision of administrative authorities not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and even expertise in the laws they
are entrusted to enforce. A court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin
such act which is within the latter's prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority,
it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction
 Not quasi-judicial if it involves pure questions of law, where there is no question of
fact nor matters requiring technological knowledge and experience
 A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over
certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.
 Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the
courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the
 exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact
 It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. That issuing the order to vacate was the most effective way of stopping any
illegal trading in petroleum products is no excuse for deviation from this rule
 Distinguished from investigative powers
o One inquires to learn and obtain information while the other settles the issues on the merits
 Distinguished from the rule-making power
o Adjudicatory actions enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts while quasi-
legislation look to the future and challenges exiting conditions
o Adjudicatory function applies to named persons or specific situations while the other lays
down general regulations that affect classes of persons or situations
 However, even though action is evidenced by a rule, it may still constitute
adjudication
 Thus, apart from the question of establishing procedural rules, an agency such as a
licensing board, may lay down general substantive regulations setting forth factors,
the existence of which will lead it to refuse to grant permit or license
o It is essential that in exercising quasi-judicial powers prior notice and hearing is observed
while such is not essential for the validity of rules and regulations PROMULGATED since
there are no facts that have to be ascertained
 Nature of particular acts
o Licensing, enabling, or approving, is either administrative or quasi-judicial
 Discretionary refusal of a license, NOT MADE on conflicting evidence or after a
hearing, is not a quasi-judicial act for procedural purposes
 or procedural purposes, an administrative action is not a purely administrative act if it
is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency
 Where a statute empowers an agency to revoke a license for non- compliance
with or violation of agency regulations, the administrative act is of a judicial
nature
o Fixing rates and charges, may be either quasi legislative or quasi-judicial in nature
 QL if it is meant to apply to all enterprises and when prior notice and hearing is not a
requirement except when legislature demand it to be so
 QJ when the rules and rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party based
upon a finding of fact
 As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of
such rates
 But an administrative agency may be empowered by law to approve
provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities
without a hearing
 A rate- fixing order, temporary or provisional though it may be, is not exempt
from the procedural requirements of notice and hearing WHEN prescribed by
statute, as well as the requirement of reasonableness
 In any case, the rates must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature. Even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied
o Miscellaneous acts, among the acts held, for various purposes, to be administrative or NOT
judicial are:
 Auditing accounts of a receiver of public moneys
 Determinations of the Civil Service Commission in respect of classification and grading
of positions in the civil service
 Passing upon a petition to call an election
 The function of draft boards
 Investigation for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of a tax return
 The parole of prisoners, at least so long as the duration of the sentence is not
affected, and the revocation of parole
 The transfer of prisoners from one place of imprisonment to another
 Making a preliminary finding of probable cause for the arrest of an accused
 The initial determination of whether certain things constitute public nuisances
 Closing and taking charge of banks found to be insolvent or unsafe and assessment of
their stockholders
 Determination whether or not there had been a violation of the terms of collective
bargaining agreement
 The issuance of a warrant of distraint or levy in tax cases and certain other
administrative enforcement devices
 Deportation of alien
o Classification of Adjudicatory Powers
 Enabling powers, characterized by the grant or denial of permit or authorization
 Directing powers, illustrated by corrective powers and powers of abstract
determination such as definition-valuation, classification, and fact finding
 Dispensing Powers, exemplified by the authority to exempt from or relax a general
prohibition, or authority to relieve from an affirmative duty
 licensing power sets or assumes a standard, while the dispensing power
sanctions a deviation from a standard
 In the absence of express grant of authority a commission may not relieve a
common carrier subject to its supervision from an affirmative duty imposed by
law
 Summary powers, used to designate administrative power to apply compulsion or
force against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial
warrant to authorize such action
 They involve direct administrative action taken without notice and hearing
 Abatement of nuisance, summary restraint or levy of property of delinquent
taxpayers
 In the absence of a statutory grant of power, administrative agencies generally
may not themselves enforce their determinations, at least not by direct and
positive action and such powers are not lightly to be implied
 Equitable Powers, an administrative tribunal having power to determine the law upon
a particular state of facts has the right to, and must, consider and make proper
application of the rules of equity
 Sometimes, statutes expressly confer upon administrative agencies certain
powers equitable in their nature, such as power to appoint a receiver or power
to issue "injunctions"
  In certain situations, particular administrative agencies are expressly given
power to determine what is "fair and equitable" and equitable principles are
necessarily applied in their decisions

Santiago, Jr. v Bautista

Facts:

Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school
named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was
then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was
constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the
"honor students" of its graduating class.

Respondents, as members of the above-named committee, deliberated and

finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first,
second and third honors, respectively.

The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but
three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by
his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of
honor students".

They prayed the court to set aside the final list of honor students for that school
year 1964-1965 and to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally
publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils. The lower court denied the prayer
for injunction and granted the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor is
the tribunal contemplated in Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

No, the Committee is not the tribunal contemplated in Rule 65, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court.

In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any

tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial
function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers.

In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this

jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:

(1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property
and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and
determination of their respective rights and obligations.
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have
the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. (judicial power)

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power
which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or
executive department.

There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating
them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that
they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse
still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions
of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in
the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the
performance of that committee's duties.

The judgment is affirmed.

Monetary Board vs Philippine Veterans Bank

Facts:

Respondent devised a program by charging a premium in the form of a higher

fee known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from said borrowers resulting to the
creation of a Special Trust Funds. The fees charged against the borrowers were
credited to the respective trust funds, which would be used to fully pay the
outstanding obligation of the borrowers in case of death.

On April 30, 2002, an examination was conducted by the Supervision and

Examination Department (SED) II of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). It found
that respondent’s collection of premiums from the proceeds of various salary and
pension loans of borrowers to guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated
Section 54 of RA No. 8791 which states that banks shall not directly engage in
insurance business as insurer.

Respondent then discontinued the collection of the fees for the CRF. On
September 16, 2005, petitioners issued Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 1139
directing respondent to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF in the
amount of P144,713,224.54 and to preserve the records of borrowers who were
deducted CRFs from their loan proceeds pending resolution or ruling of the Office of
the General Counsel of the BSP.

Respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief in the RTC from the resolution
which the trial court dismissed. Upon the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the
trial court granted the relief. Petitioners now claim that the trial court erred in taking
cognizance of the petition since the subject matter was issued by the MB in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.
Issue: Whether or not the Monetary Board has jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case.

Ruling:

Yes, the Monetary Board has jurisdiction.

The authority of the petitioners to issue the questioned MB Resolution

emanated from its powers under Section 37 of RA No. 7653 and Section 66 of RA
No. 8791 to impose, at its discretion, administrative sanctions, upon any bank for
violation of any banking law.

The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the
character of its determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may be
imposed upon erring banks, as an exercise of quasi-judicial function, have been
recognized by this Court in the case of United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon,
Inc. where it held:
The BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and
a body corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to
provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It has
the power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey
the subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel
presentation of books, records and others, needed in its examination, to
impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order.
Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that
the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining
whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-
banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must
conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same.

Petition is granted.

Antipolo Realty v NHA

Facts:

Respondent Yuson acquired rights to Lot No. 15, Block IV of the

Ponderosa Heights Subdivision, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment from one Jose
Hernando who acquired prospective and beneficial ownership from petitioner
Antipolo Realty Corporation.

However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project

in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr.
Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including,
the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling
due thereafter.
 On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to
private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the
subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment
of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15.

In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated

its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing
the decision rendered by the NHA on 25 October 1976 declaring Antipolo Realty
to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant
to the Contract to Sell.

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly

installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo
Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture
of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.

Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public
respondent NHA who ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under
certain conditions.

Issue: Whether or not the NHA has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case.

Ruling:

Yes, NHA has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an

administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under
such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is
that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights
thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our
regular courts.

Presidential Decree No. 1344 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial
dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite
specific terms:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate

trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:

xxB. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-
division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
 C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (emphasis
supplied.)

Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain

specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two
years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not
entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner
could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments
made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the
general Civil Law, in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private
respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the
contract and receive reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal
interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend
payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had
fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding
that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in
favor of petitioner.

Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or
act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract
to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical
consequence of the NHA's correct ruling.

Petition is dismissed.

Boiser v CA
FACTS: The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and
other municipalities in the province of Bohol. Sometime in August, 1965, the
petitioner Premiere and PLDT entered into a contract denominated as
"Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with
long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT
relay station in Mandaue City. The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in
Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of
the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the
obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by PLDT, provide relay
switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required
standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement.

Without any prior notice to the petitioner, PLDT issued a "circuit authorization order"
to its co- respondents to terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the
facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers
that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited " Interconnecting Agreement."
Premiere, therefore, filed civil case at RTC Cebu,for injunction and damages. RTC
issued TRO. Respondent filed certiorari at CA contending that its NTC and not RTC
Cebu who has jurisdiction over case. Hearing as regards the injunction was set by
CA. The petitioner countered by filing this petition contending that CA has no
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case.

ISSUE : Whether it is RTC or NTC who has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING : It is the RTC of Cebu. Paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting and Operating

Agreement between PLDT and Premiere provides that violation of any of the
conditions or terms of said agreement shall constitute sufficient cause for the
severance of connection with (30) days advance notice given in writing by either
party unless such violation creates manifest hazard to life, property or to facilities of
transmission and reception in which event severance may be made without notice.
Section 2 provides that if either company defaults or violates in their obligations such
default or violation continues for thirty (30) days after written notice thereof, the
other company may terminate the Agreement forthwith by written notice.

Therefore, even granting that there was default on the part of the petitioner, the 30-
day requisite notice should have been followed. Whether or not the requirement was
followed calls for the presentation of evidence before the proper tribunal.

The second authority for disconnection cited by PLDT is the NTC decision which refers
to outstanding accounts of PAPTELCO members, in which Premiere is included,
representing PLDT's unremitted shares for domestic long distance and overseas calls,
which provides that 60 days prior notice must be given before disconnection may be
effected. There is, therefore, more than ample basis for the Cebu RTC to assume
jurisdiction.

NTC has no jurisdiction to settle breach of contract cases.

What Premiere filed in RTC Cebu pertains to breach of contract. There is nothing in
the NTC's powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much
less to award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private
respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate
to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice
provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they were, this question is
one which should be clarified in the civil case for breach of contract. Clearly,
therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve
"a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would
necessary affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated.

NTC being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such
jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon
it by statute'. The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of
any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an issue involving breach of
contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

Taule v. CA

FACTS : The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,

composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association
of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac,
Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election
of its officers. Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule and others.

Despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the election proceeded where
petitioner was chosen as one of the Board of Directors. Election of officers followed
where petitioner was elected President of the FABC.

On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a

letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting
the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner Ruperto Taule filed
his comment denying the alleged irregularities. Respondent Secretary issued a
resolution nullifying the said election and ordering a new one to be
conducted.Petitioner filed MR but was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE : WON respondent Secretary Santos or the COMELEC has jurisdiction to

entertain said election protest.

RULING : NO. It is the RTC who has jurisdiction.

COMELEC has no jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of
which are determined through the will of the electorate. Specifically, the term
"election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes which do not characterize the election of officers in the
Katipunan ng mga barangay. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests
over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of
popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted
upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan
ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative
of the Katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their
own respective organization

SILG Santos also has no jurisdiction

There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and
regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. Likewise, under
Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, ** the
respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations
and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local
government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance
thereof by said units." Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided
in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Thus, DILG Circular No.
89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making power
conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law. However, he has no
power to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently declare an election
null and void.

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,

administrative agencies are bereft of quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes
reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is
essential to give validity to their determinations. There is neither a statutory nor
constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon
the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election
protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay.

President has only the Supervisory power, not Power of Control over the
local government.

Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the

exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by
the President through the Secretary of Local
Government.

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an

officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or
neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President
cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within
the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the
power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining
authority over such body.

Hence, respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity
of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary will in
effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere
in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay
as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest
autonomy may be achieved.

Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations
and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
"monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. This is
compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments
which as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with
local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government.

The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which
states that "whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election
shall be declared null and void by the Department of Local Government and an
election shall conduct and being invoked by the Solicitor General cannot be applied.
DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections
of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws, including
circulars and regulations cannot be applied retrospectively.
Moreover, such provision is null and void for having been issued in excess of the
respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot
confer jurisdiction upon itself.

Recourse are the ordinary Courts

The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest
involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts.
The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.
Governor has the personality to file the protest. As presiding officer of the sagguniang
panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the election of the officers
of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If the
president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and
is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of the sanggunian
may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent
governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers
of the FABC.

The election, nevertheless, is null and void.

The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section
2.4 of DLG Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or
the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a
quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-
President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the
Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear
violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On this ground, the elections should
be nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary

dated August 4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction. The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989
is hereby annulled. A new election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to
be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio
as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is
declared null and void for it not in accordance with what is stated in the law.

Davao New Town Development Corp. v COSLAP

Facts: Subject of the instant petition is a huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849
hectares situated at Sto. Niño, Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger
landholding belonging to the late Roman Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged the
property to the Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after emerging as the
highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its ownership over the
property. Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison property for
distribution to the beneficiaries of the CARP. Among the beneficiaries were herein
private respondents.

PBC Bank filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. The Provincial
Adjudicator rendered a decision finding that the Cuison property was not agricultural
land and, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARP, nullifying the compulsory
acquisition proceedings with the same. After reinstatement of the Bank’s title over
the Cuison property, herein petitioner Davao New Town Development Corporation
acquired the property and caused the titling of the property under its name. On
appeal, DARAB partially affirmed Provincial Adjudicator’s decision. Upon MR, it was
still denied.

Herein private respondents, referred their complaint with another agency, this time,
COSLAP (Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems). COSLAP issued the
assailed Resolution declaring that the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator as not
binding upon the Republic and private respondents who were not impleaded in said
case. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON COSLAP has jurisdiction on the said case.

RULING : NO. The jurisdiction is with DARAB.

COSLAP was created by virtue of E.O. No. 561. Its forerunner was the Presidential
Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP). Administrative agencies, like the
COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are
specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. Under the instances when
COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or
lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the
government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation
grant. The Cuison property is private property, having been registered under the
Torrens system in the name of petitioner. Thus, the government has no more control
or jurisdiction over it. The parties claiming the Cuison property are herein petitioner
and private respondents. None of them is a squatter, patent lease agreement holder,
government reservation grantee, public land claimant or. occupant, or a member of
any cultural minority. The dispute between the parties was not critical and explosive
in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which
required immediate action.

It is true that under paragraph 2(e) of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP may assume
jurisdiction over complaints involving "other similar land problems of grave urgency."
Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same kind as clear as those specifically mentioned. In the instant case,
the dispute is between parties claiming to be agrarian reform beneficiaries and a
private property owner over a parcel of land which does not form part of the public
domain. Clearly, the instant dispute cannot be characterized to be of the same kind
as those enumerated under paragraph 2(a) to (d) of E.O. No. 561.

COSLAP also points out that by petitioner’s own admission in its motion to dismiss,
the Cuison property is not agricultural land covered by agrarian reform laws; thus,
COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a
case. It is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or
tribunal. It is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense
contained in the answer. Thus, it is the allegations in private respondents’ complaint
questioning the validity of the cancellation of their CLOAs which effectively
characterized the dispute to be within the competence of the DAR to the exclusion of
respondent COSLAP.

Jurisdiction was on DARAB

There is no dispute that the issue of the validity of the cancellation of private
respondents’ CLOAs is within the competence of the DAR. As provided by Section 50
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the
DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes
properly cognizable by the DAR. Neither R.A. No. 6657 nor E.O. No. 561 creating the
COSLAP vests the latter and the DAR concurrent jurisdiction in respect to disputes
concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws.

Instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred
private respondents’ complaint to the DAR or DARAB, where another case involving
the same parties, the same property and the same issues was pending on appeal.
COSLAP is not empowered to review decisions of the DARAB or the Provincial
Adjudicator or any other quasi-judicial agency for that matter. COSLAP cannot
arrogate the duty of directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOAs of private respondents
because the same falls within the competence of the DAR subject to the appellate
review of the Court of Appeals.

COSLAP exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of the government’s

title over the Cuison property. Well-settled is the rule that a torrens title, as a rule,
is conclusive and indefeasible. Such certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding.
COSLAP directed the Register of Deeds to reinstate the certificate of title on the
Cuison property in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, ordering the alteration
of the petitioner’s certificate of title. COSLAP has no authority to order such.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.

Additional info lang:

Forum-shopping

By reason of the ambiguous terminology employed in E.O. No. 561, the power to assume jurisdiction granted to the
COSLAP provides an ideal breeding ground for forum-shopping. There is forum-shopping when the actions involve
the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances.

Private respondents’ complaint before the COSLAP questioned the validity of the cancellation of the compulsory
acquisition of the Cuison property, private respondents’ CLOAs and the government’s certificate of title over the
property on the ground that the real parties in interest were not impleaded in the proceedings before the Provincial
Adjudicator and the DARAB. Private respondents had previously raised the same issue when it filed the second DARAB
case before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator whose decision thereon is presently on appeal before the DARAB.
There is no question that private respondents are guilty of forum
shopping.

Procedural: On instant petition to SC of a decision by an administrative agency.

The Court is not unmindful that appeals from the COSLAP may not be brought directly before the Court in view of
Rule 45, Section 1 but must be elevated to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the
same manner that orders, resolutions or decisions of other quasi-judicial agencies are directly appealable to the
Court of Appeals. However, if a decision is rendered without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity, the same may be
attacked anytime. This is the same in this case. The Court has given due course to petitions for certiorari although
appeal is the proper remedy where the equities of the case warranted such action, mindful that dismissals based on
technicalities are looked upon with disfavor.

American Tobacco Co. v Director of Patents

FACTS : In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners

challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, promulgated by the
Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of
said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing
of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding
instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of
adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of
registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. In
accordance with the said Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of
petitioners' cases to hearing officers Attys. Amando Marquez and the other
respondents herein.

Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their
cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the
law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. Said objections
were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus,
to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu
of the hearing officers.

ISSUE : WON the Director of Patents may delegate the hearing of the petitioner’s
cases to his hearing officers.

RULING : YES. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to

obtain the assistance of qualified officers or employees of other departments when
deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office. Section
78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the
Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." It has been
held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration
of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed
necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an
adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express
provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision
either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so
far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of
such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive
interpretation of the Act.

In view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each
and every case pending in his Office would leave him little time to attend to his other
duties. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This
sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of
organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their
attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and
their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far
less important matters of detail." Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to
decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not
preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision
of the administrative agency will be made.

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and
discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the
basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by
law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that
the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision
in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence
in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial
are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the
officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It
is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the
purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the
determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them."

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the
myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on
the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of
Patents.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioners.

SOJ v Lantion
FACTS: President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the
Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where
it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped and others.
Then SOJ Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the "RP-US Extradition Treaty”, concurred by the Senate, by way of
Resolution No. 11. DOJ received from the DFA U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing
a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida charging Jimenez with
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US and Attempt to evade or defeat
tax, among others.

Private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or

access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy
of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request. DOJ denied the
foregoing requests stating that: 1) It is only after the filing of the petition for
extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court
with said copies; 2) The formal request for extradition of the United States contains
grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered
by strict secrecy rules under United States law; and 3) DOJ is not in a position to
hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.

Consequently, Jimenez filed with the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region a
petition against the SOJ, SFA and Director of NBI, for mandamus (to compel herein
petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, among others;
and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request. RTC
upheld the petition. Hence, this instant proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. WON SOJ acted within his authority (no)
2. WON Jimenez is entitled to the right of notice and hearing? (yes)

RULING:

1. SOJ exceeded in his authority

Extradition Process
1) The Extradition Request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State,
addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs with attached documets;
2) SFA (Secretartof Foreign Affairs) determines the request is politically motivated,
or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military
penal legislation; or if it is sufficient in form and substance;
3) Being sufficient, SFA sends request to SOJ who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
4) The lawyer designated shall then file a written extradition petition with the proper
regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration.
5) RTC judge, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable,
issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition or issue a warrant of arrest if necessary.
6) The Extradition Hearing shall be conducted. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the
court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor
upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition.
7) Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final
and immediately executory.

The foregoing indicates that it is the SFA who is authorized to evaluate the extradition
papers, to assure their sufficiency. It is only when it is sufficient where SFA shall
forward it to SOJ. The Secretary of Justice only has the ministerial duty of filing the
extradition papers.

However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that
there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while
it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the DFA, it was forwarded to
DOJ without the DFA discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents. DFA merely acts as a post office, for which reason he
simply forwarded the request to the DOJ. Thereafter, DOJ took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out
whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the
RP-US Extradition Treaty. Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent
insisted on his abovementioned requests.

2. We will first talk about the differences between: Investigatory or

Inquisitorial vs Quasi-judicial Power
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a
class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage,
the executive authority has the power to make a technical assessment of the paper’s
sufficiency; outrightly deny the request; and make a determination if it
is politically motivated, or a military offense. Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.

A quasi-judicial proceeding involves: 1) taking and evaluation of evidence; 2)

determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and 3) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved.

Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one

or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to
exercise its quasi-judicial authority. The power of investigation consists in gathering,
organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Evaluation process of extradition partakes a criminal investigation. Private
respondent is entitled to rights available to those under criminal prosecutions.
The Evaluation process in extradition is akin to an administrative agency conducting
an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since
such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately,
the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. This is a "tool" for criminal law
enforcement. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of
a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to
a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights
that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, such as the right to counsel
and the right against self-incrimination.

Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which

requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal. In a preliminary investigation which is
an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents,
and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten
days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine
all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

Exemptions to rights to notice and hearing. When it is not applicable.

1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B.P.Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or
theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate
threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person
sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the
respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later
time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them
had not been claimed.

The evaluation process is not one of the exemptions to the twin rights.

There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of

criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender
of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Here, the
"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat
of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even
during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed
under the treaty and the implementing law. The
prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest. The basic principles of
administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. This Court
will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement
of a law or treaty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. SO
ORDERED

Philippine Lawyer’s Association v Agrava (Director of the Philippines Patent

Office)
FACTS: Respondent issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent
law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the
circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. Hence,
petitioner filed this petition contending that one who has passed the bar examinations
and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office without need of another examination.

ISSUE : WON respondent has the authority to conduct such examination.

RULING : NO. It is the Supreme Court who has the exclusive and constitutional
power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines and to any
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before
any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.

Practice before patent office involves a practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law.

Such is true in Patent Office. In the first place, although the transaction of business
in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and
legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with
the law of evidence and procedure. Its provisions involve the applications of laws,
legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

Nature of the Director of Patents’ job proves that practice in Patent Office
involves practice of law

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practicing before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and
documents.

US Patent Law is different from Philippines’

While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which
showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,
our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not
been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to
prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and
to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his
bureau. Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear
provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and
pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said
Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus BIR and Customs,
where the business in the same area are more or less complicated, may not also
require that any lawyer practicing before them or otherwise transacting business with
them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit
to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Darab v. Lubrica

Facts: This case is an appeal for certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, granting
the respondent’s petition for prohibition and the Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Federico Suntay filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation against the DAR, DAR Region
IV Director and the Land Bank of the Philipines for his land which was valuated by the land Bank as
P4,251,141.68, which, according to Suntay was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of land
without due process of law.

The RARAD ruled in favor of Suntay and ordered that Land Bank pay the P157,541,951.30 as just
compensation. Consequently, Land Bank filed a petition to the RTC praying that just compensation be
declared at P4,251,141.68. The Court dismissed the petition for failure to pay the docket fees within the
reglementary period.

While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon motion of
Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order declaring its Decision as final and executory after noting that Land
Bank’s petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the fifteen-day
reglementary period in violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. The RARAD
issued a Writ of Execution, directing the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its Decision.

Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further
proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which confers
adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals granted Lubrica’s prayer for a temporary restraining order. This
notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, directing RARAD not to implement its
Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a comment on Lubrica’s
petition for prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because DARAB was a mere formal party and could
file a comment only when specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court also ruled that
DARAB’s exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It
rejected DARAB’s contention that the issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and
functional supervision over the RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually enjoining
DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal.

Issue: WON the DARAB has jurisdiction over DSCA No. 0252.

Held: This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over
Land Bank’s petition for certiorari.

Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter
of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is never
derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred
on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such
power are expressly designated.

The quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined
in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such
agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question
that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR is in the nature of a limited and special
jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DAR’s competence and
field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not
have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers
inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited
jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in
R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.

Garcia v Molina
FACTS:

Respondents Molina and Velasco received 2 separate Memoranda from Garcia

charging them with grave misconduct (i.e. helping and leading concerted protest
activities against the GSIS management and continuously performing said acts
despite of the warning) and gross insubordination. These acts were committed in
open betrayal of the confidential natue of their positions and in outright defiance of
the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. Eventually, petitioner ordered
their suspensive suspension for 90 days without pay. Then, the committee was
constituted to investigate the charges against respondents.

Respondents denied the charges against them and expressed their opposition to
petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge.

Respondents filed with the CSC an Urgent Petition to lift Preventive Suspension Order
contending that petitioner could not act as the complainant prosecutor and judge at
the same time and filed a petition to transfer investigation to CSC but these were
unresolved.Then they filed a special civil action for ceritiorari and prohibition with
prayer for TRO which were granted. The CA declared null and void the charges against
them for lack of preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
RULING:

CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees.
Additionally, under Section 37 of PD 807 (Civil Service Decree of the PH), heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities are given the authority to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction.

GSIS also has been granted with similar powers by the GSIS Act of 1997. By this
legal provision, petitioner as President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the
authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnel for cause. But, this power must be exercised in accordance with the CS
Rules on Administrative cases:

1) Filing of a written complaint

2) Submission of a Counter-Affidavit/Comment

3) Conduct of a preliminary investigation—involves the ex parte examination of

the documents submitted by the parties

4) Submission of an Investigation Report

5) Issuance of a formal charge—absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall

be dismissed.

In this case, the memoranda were the formal charges against them but there was no
preliminary or fact-finding investigation. The rules provide that upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, counter-affidavit/comment shall
be issued. The use of the word “shall” shows that It is mandatory to conduct the said
investigation prior to the issuance of the charge.
The same rule applies even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself,
such as in this case. He could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of
immediately issuing formal charges. In effect, the formal charges are void ab initio.

Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent, the proceedings are not
exempt from basic principles such as the right to due process in investigations and
hearings. Due process in admin proceedings may include:

1. The right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which

may affect a respondent’s legal rights;

2. Real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to

present his witnesses and evidence and to defend his rights

3. Tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction

4. A finding of said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted

for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.

Furthermore, there was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation when they
failed to file it to the GSIS. It is a well-settled rule that a decision rendered without
due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally
by means of separate action or by resisting such decision. Though they failed it to
raise before the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, they still questioned the
validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges against them for lack
of preliminary investigation, Thus, there is no waiver to speak of.

Ang Tibay v CIR

Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies
the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a
number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU
while no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off.
NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB
won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor
General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
RULING:
Yes. In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al, the Supreme
Court had occasion to point out that the although the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.
In this case the records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents
obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so
inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court
of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include
books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible
but already existing), hence, the NLU should be granted new trial to comply with due
process.

Danan v Aspillera

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses were holders of a certificate of public convenience for the

installation, maintenance, and operation of a 4-ton ice plant in Orion, Bataan, issued
to them by the Public Service Commission in 1958, which ice plant was acquired by
purchase from third persons. However the certificate was cancelled and revoked due
to abandonment or non-operation.

When the Commission granted Cortisan & Co. Inc a certificate of public convenience
to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant in the same municipality, the petitioners
failed to appear for the trial because of an accident. Petitioners filed a joint motions
for reconsideration were denied. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: W/N the Commission violated due process when it cancelled the certificate
of petitioner.

RULING:

The act of revoking the Certificate without giving the operator previous notice and
opportunity to explain their side violates the due process clause of the Constitution,
the express provisions of Section 16 (n) of the Public Services Act. The Public Service
Commission is an agency of the government and should at all times, maintain a due
regard for the rights of the parties litigant. Also, the Commissioners (not judges in
the true sense) would do well to ponder the implications of Article 32 of the NCC on
the individual responsibility of public officers and employees who impair a person’s
right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Nonetheless, said
petition is denied as it was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Montoya v Varilla

National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 10443 on 9 September
1998 dropping Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), from the rolls,
effective 15 August 1998, for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course
(LEEC). He had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days, from 23
January 1998 to 31 March 1998.
Four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), explaining
that on 22 January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave
Form approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already been
forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not approved. Montoya averred
that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from arthritis
with on and off symptoms of severe body pain. Montoya attached to his Motion a certification
simply dated 1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and authenticated by Police Chief
Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD. The Special Order 990 was
cancelled.

Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police
Superintendent, and based on his findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision4 on 23
June 2000 dismissing Montoya from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to
AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a copy of said Decision on 20 July 2000.

Montoya filed a motion. Montoya’s Petition/Motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a
disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional
director may only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).

Montoya next filed before the RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging lack of
due process considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing
Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The Summary
Hearing Officer in the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal
from police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC, without even looking into his side
of the controversy.

On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its Decision6 granting Montoya’s appeal and
ordering his reinstatement. The NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision
reinstating Montoya in the police service.

On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the other police personnel9 reinstated in the service by
RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before the DILG an
Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional Director. On 10
November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an Order denying the appeal of the NCR
Regional Director.10 The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed the Order
dated 10 November 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 23
March 2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et al.,
without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the CSC.

ISSUES:

WON the right to due process of petitioner was violated.

HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.17

Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips down administrative due process to its most fundamental
nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural
requirements. In particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution
of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and
to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.18

Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by
procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence
is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings.19 In the
application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous
notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.20

In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the
very beginning when these were conducted without due notice to him. The NCR Regional
Director, through Manere, never contested the fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his
investigation without giving notice to Montoya. Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the
hearings, present written or oral arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was completely
deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges against him and was
irrefragably denied due process.

Consequently, the Decision dated 23 June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya
from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the latter’s due process.

WON there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court’s judicial power can be sought.30 The administrative agency concerned is in the best position
to correct any previous error committed in its forum.31

Montoya’s reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is misplaced, for said
doctrine does not find application in the instant case. The doctrine intends to preclude premature
resort from a quasi-judicial administrative body to the court. Such is not the situation in this case.
Montoya is questioning the supposed premature resort of the NCR Regional Director from the
decision of the DILG Secretary to the CSC, instead of to the Office of the President; obviously, he
is challenging the resort from one administrative body to another.

Furthermore, Montoya’s assertion that DILG Secretary Lina’s decision should have first been
appealed to the Office of the President before the CSC is baseless.

PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and supervision of the DILG,32 which, in turn,
is under the administrative control and supervision of the CSC.

It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 that the decision of the
Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party
may then appeal to the DILG Secretary. In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable
decision, his decision may be appealed to the CSC

Fabella v CA:

FACTS:

DECS Secretary Cario issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who
participated in the protest direted to demand payment of 13th month differentials,
clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress. Cario then filed
administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees who are teachers of the
Mandaluyong HS. The charge sheets required them to explain in writing why they
should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil
service laws and regulations.

The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the RTC charging the committee appointed
by Secretary Cario but this was denied. The amended complaint for certiorari and
mandamus ( alleging that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse
of discretion since its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them
by requiring them to prove their innocence.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondents
were denied due process of law

RULING:

No. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:

1. The right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent’s legal rights;
2. Real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present his
witnesses and evidence and to defend his rights

3. Tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person

charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;

4. A finding of said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for

consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.

Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers covers provides that the committee to
hear these teachers should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization
and a supervisor of the division. Section 8 provides different rights the teachers are entitled to as
safeguards at each stage of any disciplinary procedure.

However, in this case, the committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges did
not include a representative of the local or in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers’ organization thereby making them incompetent and the proceeding undertaken by them
are void.

Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teacher’s organizations does not ipso
facto make them authorized representatives of the contemplated organizations (It was argued
that there was compliance since the said teachers were members of various committees are
members of teacher federation in Quezon city)

Erlinda Pefianco v. Maria Luisa Moral

Facts:
The petitioner Secretary Erlinda Pefianco of Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify through a petition for review the decision of CA
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the Former DECS Secretary Ricardo
Gloria for denying reconsideration thereof.

Former DECS Secretary Gloria filed a complaint which charged respondent Maria
Luisa Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vault of the
Filipiniana and Asian Division of the National Library which were under her control
and supervision as Division Chief. The DECS Secretary found respondent guilty of
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service after conducting several hearings on the complaint. She was ordered
dismissed from the government service.

Respondent did not appeal the judgment but she filed a petition for production of the
DECS investigation committee report, which was, however, denied. She reiterated
her request but likewise denied. She then filed an action for mandamus and injunction
before the regular courts against Sec. Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of
the DECS investigation committee. Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus
case for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion.

Thus, he elevated the case to the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion, which was
dismissed as well for lack of merit. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the CA. Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda Pefianco who was
thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to
file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss
W/N CA erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying the motion to dismiss.

HELD:
First Issue:
YES. The challenged order of the trial court falls short of the requirements prescribed
in Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure (Mandatorily requires that the resolution
on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly stat the reasons therefor). The
Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating
the basis by petitioner’s motion to dismiss was being denied.

What is Mandamus?

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when

refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. "Purely
ministerial" are acts to be performed in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority
without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. While the discretion of a Constitutional
Commission cannot be controlled by mandamus . . . . the court can
decide whether the duty is discretionary or ministerial . . . . (taken from
the order aforementioned)

The SC cannot discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion on mandamus vis-
à-vis the ground relied upon by the petitioner in her motion to dismiss. It only
confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the
proper subject of her motion for reconsideration.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for
reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its
act or orders. The rule is not absolute and is subject to exceptions. Thus, when the
act or order of the of the lower court is patent nullity for failure to comply with a
mandatory provision of the Rules, in this case, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with and aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower court
directly on certiorari.
Second Issue:
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone
to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The writ will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his
duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
In this case, respondent’s petition for mandamus failed to demonstrate that she has
a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.
Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented
the DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no
useful purpose now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation
report.

Ruiz v. Drilon stated that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled

to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to
the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against
her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had
been accorded these rights.

Investigation Report is an internal and confidential matter and be released

only after perfection of appeal to CSC

The Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the
Decision itself . . . . [t]he report is an internal communication between the
Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until
the latter had already read and used the same in making his own determination of
the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the Decision he may
make.

The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part — although
not controlling — of the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected
by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission
may all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the
CSC. In the latter appellate tribunal, the respondent's counsel may be allowed to read
and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and
exhaustive appellant's Brief Memorandum.

More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and
conclusion of law upon which respondent's removal from office was grounded. This
resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further
remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be
prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

NOTE: There is no law which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent
with a copy of the investigation report. A respondent in an administrative case is not
entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against him.

Winston Garcia v. Mario Molina

FACTS :
This case settles two consolidated petitions filed by Winston Garcia (petitioner)
against Molina and Velasco.
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate
Memoranda from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct. They were also
accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving his
office without informing his supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination
for persistently disregarding petitioner’s instructions that Velasco should report to the
petitioner’s office. Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner
ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days without pay,
effective immediately.
Respondents filed with Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift
Preventive Suspension Order. Respondents contended that the acts they allegedly
committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave misconduct. Consistent with their
stand that petitioner could not act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the
same time, respondents filed with CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to this
Commission. GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to submit to the jurisdiction of
the investigating committee and required them to appear at the schedule hearing.
CSC failed to resolve respondents’ motions to lift preventive suspension order and to
transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC. Respondents filed with the CA a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO).
CA favored respondents perpetually restraining Garcia from hearing and investigating
the administrative case against petitioners, without prejudice to pursuing the same
with the CSC. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile CSC denied respondents motion for being moot and academic. It,
however, thru an obiter dictum, ruled on the requested transfer of the investigation
from the GSIS to the CSC, denying the same for lack of merit. CSC concluded that
the fact that the GSIS acted as the complainant and prosecutor and eventually the
judge does not mean that impartiality in the resolution of the case will no longer be
served.
Herein respondents appealed to CA where it favored the respondents. Hence, the
second petition.
ISSUE : WON respondent is denied of due process of law.

RULING : YES. The petitions, hence, are without merit.

CSC jurisdiction on GOCCs
The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like
the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the
civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and
regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and general terms and
conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary
cases against erring employees.
As for the GSIS, Section 45, Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise known as the GSIS
Act of 1997, gave petitioner, as President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested
the authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnel for cause. However, such power is not without limitations for it must be
exercised in accordance with Civil Service rules.
Procedure in issuing charge against erring employee
1) The complaint. A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be
given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant. Except when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative complaint
may be filed at anytime with the Commission, proper heads of departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities.
2) The Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in
form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of
to submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.
3) Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation involves the ex parte
examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and the person
complained of, as well as documents readily available from other government offices.
4) Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation, the investigating officer shall submit the investigation report and the
complete records of the case to the disciplining authority.
5) Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established during the investigation, a
formal charge shall be issued by the disciplining authority. A formal investigation shall
follow. In the absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be dismissed.
In this case it is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to respondents
were the formal charges against them. It is likewise undisputed that the formal
charges were issued without preliminary or fact-finding investigation as shown above.
To comply with such requirement, petitioner could have issued a memorandum
requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. The filing by petitioner of
formal charges against the respondents without complying with the
mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents the
opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due process. Hence, the
formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at any
time.
Considering that respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal
charges that we now declare null and void, then their preventive suspension is
likewise null and void.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. Where the denial of the fundamental right
to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings.
4 cardinal rights in administrative proceedings
Due process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the
following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent's legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 157383 is DENIED while
the petition in G.R. No. 174137 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
This petition is filed by the Petitioner Pollution Ajudication Board (Board) asking SC
to review the Decision and Resolution of CA. In that Decision and Resolution, the CA
reversed an order of the RTC dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation’s (Solar) petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved
in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with unthreatened wastewater which were
being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros
River.
Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and
desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were
discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The order was based on findings of several inspections of
Solar's plant, finding that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational
and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of
which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-
Tinejeros River.
Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution
Adjudication Board for a temporary operation. However, Solar went to the RTC for
certiorari and preliminary injunction against the Board but the same was dismissed.
On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded
the case for further proceedings.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Sec. 7(a), it has legal authority to
issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is
prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater,
the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the
NPCC (now, the Board.) Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board’s
own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal and plant life” and argued that there were no findings that Solar’s wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE:
WON the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and Writ
of Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation

RULING:

Yes. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease
and desist orders. An ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board
(a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat
to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever
such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On
the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex
parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the
wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect
of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the
Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is
prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where,
however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of
allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte
basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved
presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or
plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given
time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste
discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life public health, safety
or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted
and promulgated in the exercise of that persuasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection
of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power.

It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of procedural due

process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power.
Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public
hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis
of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really
all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that
we have here.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the
questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities.
Since we have concluded that Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the
lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed
Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an
appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in
A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated
22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial
court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of
Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of
Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Arsenio Lumiqued v. Hon. Apolonio Exevea

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner praying for the
reversal of the Investigating Committee’s report recommending the dismissal or
removal from office of Former Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform – Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) Arsenio Lumiqued (deceased),
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate criminal charges against him.

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the RD of DAR-CAR until President Ramos dismissed him
thru AO No. 52.. In view of Lumiqued's death, his heirs instituted this petition for
certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of 3 complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier
and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the
DAR. The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department
of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. DOJ created a committee to investigate the
complaints against Lumiqued. The investigating committee accordingly issued a
subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit. Lumiqued, however,
filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending
actual receipt of two of private respondent's complaints. The committee granted the
motion and gave him a five-day extension.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted but Lumiqued was not
assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to enable
him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution, finding Lumiqued liable for
Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and recommended Lumiqued's dismissal.
Acting on the report, former Justice Secretary Drilon adopted the same. Then
President FVR himself issued A.O. No. 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and
other benefits. Appeal was denied. On second MR, he alleged being denied the
constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. Before the motion is resolved,
Lumiqued died. Secretary Quisumbing denied the second MR. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE : WON Sec Lumiqued was denied due process for committee’s failure to
inform him of his right to counsel during the hearing.

RULING : NO. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is
in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused
during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked
or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings. The
investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of determining if he
could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against
him.

While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer
the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system, conducting criminal investigations is not
its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions as may be provided
by law," prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created here was duty-bound to conduct
the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.

A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,

irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent
himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated
with counsel. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-
criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings.

Administrative Due Process

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral
arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable
aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law,
for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED
and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Eduardo Prangan v. National Labors Relations Commission

FACTS:
Private respondent Masagana Security Services Corporation, a corporation engaged
in providing security services to its client, hired petitioner Eduardo Prangan as one of
its security guards and assigned at Cat House Bar and Restaurant. Petitioner filed a
complaint against private respondent for underpayment of wages, and others. Private
respondent, in its position paper, rejected petitioners claim alleging it merely acted
as an agent of the latter in securing his employment at the Cat House Bar and
Restaurant. Thus, the liability for the claims of the petitioner should be charged to
Cat House Bar and its owner, being his direct employer.
Labor Arbiter brushed aside the private respondents contention that it was merely
an agent of the petitioner but ruled that petitioner only worked for 4 hours basing on
the daily time record presented. Petitioner appealed to NLRC contending that the
Labor Arbiter erred in concluding that he only worked for four hours and not twelve
hours a day. Evidently, the shorter work hours resulted in a lower monetary award
by the Labor Arbiter. NLRC dismissed his appeal for failure to file the same within
ten-day reglementary period. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE : WON decision was supported by ample evidence showing that
petitioner indeed worked for only four hours and not twelve hours a day.
RULING : NO. While, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC,
particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded with
respect even finality if supported by substantial evidence, the Court is not precluded
from making its own independent evaluation of facts in the absence of such quantum
of evidence. We have defined substantial evidence as such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
 In the instant petition, the daily time records cannot be considered substantial
evidence as to conclude that petitioner only worked for four hours. As petitioners
employer, private respondent has unlimited access to all relevant documents and
records on the hours of work of the petitioner. Yet, even as it insists that petitioner
only worked for four hours and not twelve, no employment contract, payroll, notice
of assignment or posting, cash voucher or any other convincing evidence which may
attest to the actual hours of work of the petitioner were even presented. Instead,
what the private respondent offered as evidence were only petitioners daily time
record, which the latter categorically denied ever accomplishing, much less signing.
Another consideration which militates against private respondents claim is the
fact that in the personnel data sheet of the petitioner, duly signed by the former’s
operation manager, it shows on its face that the latters hours of work are from 7:00
p.m. to 7:00 a.m. or twelve hours a day. Hence, private respondent is estopped from
assailing the contents of its own documents. Further, the attendance sheets of Cat
House Bar and Restaurant showed that petitioner worked from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m. daily, documents which were never repudiated by the private respondent.
As is well-settled, if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
employee.Since it is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and
his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writings should be resolved in the formers favor
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision of the NLRC dated July 31, 1996 is hereby
VACATED.Whatever money claims due to the petitioner shall be computed on the
basis of a twelve-hour daily work schedule. For this purpose, the case is hereby
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for immediate recomputation of said claims in
accordance with the foregoing findings. No costs. SO ORDERED.

X. Decision, Appeal and Judicial Review

Gaudencio Demaisip v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
· On December 4, 1936, Gaudencio Demaisip filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo
praying that judgment be rendered:
o Ordering the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to execute
a contract of lease of 3 lots of Dumangas Cadastre, to issue the
corresponding fishpond permit, and to order the Secretary not to
entertain the lease application of Luis Buenaflor
o Declaring null and void all actions of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources with respect to the lease application of Luis Buenaflor
o Ordering Buenaflor to vacate the lands in question and deliver possession
to him
 o Ordering the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo to prosecute Buenaflor for violation
of the Forestry Law and regulations pertaining thereto
o Ordering both defendants to pay him, jointly and severally, damages.
·The trial court dismissed the complaint on 2 grounds:
o Complaint is in reality a petition for mandamus;
o Plaintiff did not exhaust all available remedies before resorting to court
action
Plaintiff appealed to the CA
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo
Plaintiff filed a petition for review.
CA facts (affirmed to be correct by the SC):
o First applicant for a fishpond permit was Geronimo Destacamento on April
1, 1927 which expired on Dec. 31, 1930 for failure to make any
improvements and to pay the rentals.
o Before he died in 1928, Destacamento without the knowledge and
consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale in favor of
Serafin Villanueva, an illegal act which is contrary to the rules of the
permit granted to him.
o Director of Forestry, notwithstanding the existence of the deed,
requested Serafin Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit. Villanueva
neglected and failed to file his application for a fishpond permit, as a
result, no permit was granted to him before the expiration of the permit
of late Destacamento.
o In 1935, Gaudencio Demaisip filed with the Fish and Game Administration
a fishpond permit application of the aforementioned lots, with an area
of 13.9859 hectares of public mangrove forest land in Iloilo.
o On March 6, 1936, Demaisip complied with all the pre-requisites
necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit.
o On March 19, 1936, when the fishpond permit was ready to be issued to
Demaisip, Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in
question in favor of defendant Luis Buenaflor; in the same month,
Buenaflor started to occupy the lands and introduced improvements
thereon which included a dam. An investigation was conducted by the
Fish and Game Administration, the dam deprives other fishponds leased
from the government of fresh and flowing water and was illegally
constructed for violating a rule of that Office prohibiting introduction to
any improvements on the land applied for before the issuance of a
permit.
o On May 1936, or 7 months after Demaisip filed an application, that
Buenaflor also filed his application for the area in question
o Director of Fish and Game Administration was called upon to decide who
of the conflicting claimants – Luis Buenaflor or Gaudencio Demaisip –
had a better right to be regarded as he lessee of the land.
o Director of Fish and Game Administration decided: Buenaflor’s application
be rejected; the dam constructed be opened; improvements on the area
be forfeited in favor of the Government; all the application of Demaisip
be given due course upon payment of additional rental.
 o Buenaflor appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
where it reversed the decision and awarded the right of lease to
Buenaflor. Basis of the Secretary’s decision was not known.

Issue:
· WON CA erred in holding the present action partakes of the nature of a petition
for mandamus to be verified as required by Sec. 3, Rule 67, ROC.
· WON plaintiff need to exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to
court action.

Ruling:
First Issue:
· Yes.
· The claim is meritorious for it appears that the case was filed on December 4,
1936 and at the time the procedural law in force was Act 190 because the ROC
took effect only on July 1, 1940, and it is well-settled that the formal as well
as substantial requisites of a pleading are governed by the law prevailing at
the time of its filing. SC found the claim that the present action is not one for
mandamus but an ordinary action wherein several reliefs are prayed for
concerning the lease of certain lots, and since it is not one for mandamus, it is
unnecessary to state in the complaint that the plaintiff has no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to entitle him to relief as
required in special civil actions.
· The plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary to the President
of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and
Game Administration, and ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should
be dined and that of defendant Buenaflor be given due course upon compliance
of the requirements, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking
court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely
an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the
Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is
disapproved by the latter.
Second Issue:
· No.
· It is therefore incorrect to say that the plaintiff’s action should not be
entertained because he has failed to exhaust first all the administrative
remedies available to him. Citing Diego v. CA:

o "Upon examination of the Record on Appeal, however, we note that this

defense was not interposed in the court of 􏰀rst instance. Perhaps
because the pleader knew courts had entertained civil actions of this
nature against the Secretary of Agriculture and/or subordinate officers,
even if complainants had not previously taken the matter up to the Chief
Executive; and perhaps because such defense might only be valid in
special civil actions — this is not one — wherein the petitioner must
allege and prove that 'he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.'"
(Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956;
Emphasis supplied)
· As to whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has not
acted properly or has abused his discretion in reversing the decision of the Director
of Fish and Game Administration, SC said that they are not in the position to pass
judgment on the actuation of the official for they do not have the copy of his
decision. SC agreed with the Solicitor General saying that to make an accurate
findings of grave abuse of discretion because the decision of the Secretary
reversing the decision of the Director had not been reconstituted and appended to
the record of the case. To rule if he committed grave abuse of discretion, without
knowing his reasons for reversing the decision of the Director would be tantamount
to deciding the case against said official without giving him his day in court.