1
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
ITS ADMINISTRATOR WILSON UY, Complainant, v. ATTY.
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI III, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Complaint1 for disbarment directly filed
before this court by complainant Wilson Uy, the
designated administrator of the estate of Jose Uy. This
Complaint charges respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari,
III (Maghari) with engaging in deceitful conduct and
violating the Lawyer's Oath. Specifically, Maghari is
charged with the use of information that is false and/or
appropriated from other lawyers in signing certain
pleadings.2
On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a
Petition before the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court
praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate
of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. This
was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-241.3
Hofileña was initially designated administratrix.4 However,
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order designating
Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of
Jose Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other
children.5 In its Order6 dated June 9, 1998, the Regional
Trial Court designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose
Uy's estate.
Subsequently, Hofileña's claims in the settlement of Jose
Uy's estate were granted.7 Hence, she filed a Motion for
Execution8 dated September 14, 2007.
In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising
from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña
was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El
(Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these
proceedings (i.e., in the Comment dated May 27, 2009
filed before the Court of Appeals9), Atty. Natu-El indicated
the following details:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597010 (Emphasis supplied)
There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy
and the other heirs of Jose Uy.11 In the course of the
proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad
testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was
alleged to have been the treasurer of several businesses
owned by Jose Uy.12 In its Order13 dated April 20, 2010, the
Regional Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a
Subpoena ad Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy.
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel,
filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with
Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H.
Uy.14 In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the
following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied)
On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to
Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.16
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply17 to
Wilson Uy's Opposition. This Reply was dated December 8,
2010. In signing this Reply, Maghari indicated the following
details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied)
The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena
Uy's Motion to Quash.19 Thereafter, Maghari filed for
Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration20 dated July
15, 2011. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the
following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied)
As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied,22 Maghari
filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad
Testificandum23 dated March 8, 2012. In signing this
Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied)
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on
the details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion,
Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar
examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the
records of Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he
learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he has
signed and has been copying the professional details of
Atty. Natu-El.25cralawred
Wilson Uy then filed a Motion26 to declare Magdalena Uy
in indirect contempt (as by then she had still not complied
with the Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require
Maghari to explain why he had been usurping the
professional details of another lawyer.
In its Order27 dated February 16, 2012, the Regional Trial
Court declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt as
no verified petition asking that she be so cited had been
filed.28
On July 31, 2014, Wilson Uy filed before this court the
present Complaint for disbarment.29 Pointing to Maghari's
act of repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer's
professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari
violated the Lawyer's Oath and acted in a deceitful
manner.
In the Resolution30 dated November 12, 2014, this court
directed Maghari to file his Comment on Wilson Uy's
Complaint.
This court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
received Maghari's Comment31 on March 2, 2015.
For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty.
Pacifico M. Maghari, III engaged in unethical conduct and
of what proper penalty may be meted on him.
I Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad
Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant
entries indicated by complainant. However, he insists that
he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims that these
entries were mere overlooked errors:
For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion
or pleading had been printed and ready for signature, all
what [sic] he did after cursorily going over it was to affix
2
his signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name,
without giving any special or particular attention to details
as the "IBP, PTR, and MCLE Numbers", considering that
these are matters of record and are easily verifiable, thus
he gains nothing by "the usurpation of professional details
of another lawyer" and has no sinister motive or ill-
purpose in so doing[.]32
He attempts to diminish the significance of the dubious
entries and instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He
faults complainant for "nitpicking"33 and calls him a "sore
loser"34 and a "disgruntled litigant"35 who is merely
"making a mountain out of a molehill"36 and is predisposed
to "fault-finding."
He adds that "for the satisfaction of complainant,"37 he has
provided what are supposedly his correct professional
details:
2009
IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22, 2008 - Bacolod City
PTR No. 3408746 - Jan. 5, 2009 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762-Jan. 14, 2009
2010
IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City
PTR No. 3793872 - Jan. 4, 2010 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
2011
IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City
PTRNo. 4190929 - Jan. 4, 2011 - Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
2012
IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City
PTR No. 4631737 - Jan. 2, 2012 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14,
200938ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
II
hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress.
The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors
are manifest and respondent admits their existence. This
court would perhaps be well counseled to absolve
respondent of liability or let him get away with a
proverbial slap on the wrist if all that was involved were a
typographical error, or otherwise, an error or a handful of
errors made in an isolated instance or a few isolated

instances. So too, if the error pertained to only ' one of the
several pieces of information that lawyers are required to
indicate when signing pleadings.
None of these can be said of this case. Respondent did not
merely commit errors in good faith. The truth is far from it.
First, respondent violated clear legal requirements, and
indicated patently false information. Second, the way he
did so demonstrates that he did so knowingly. Third, he
did so repeatedly. Before our eyes is a pattern of deceit.
Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been
appropriated from another lawyer. Not only was he
deceitful; he was also larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of
usurping another lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly
changing information from one pleading to another
demonstrates the intent to mock and ridicule courts and
legal processes. Respondent toyed with the standards of
legal practice.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for
deceit as a ground for disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath
entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws and
legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a
lawyer to the best of one's capacity, and acting with
fidelity to both court and client:
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.
No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks
on complainant can negate the gravity of respondent's
actions. His insolent and mocking violation of statutory
and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to
society and to courts. His swiping of another lawyer's
information is a violation of his duties to the legal
profession. The unnecessary risks that he foiled on his
client as a possible result of deficiently signed pleadings
violate his duties to his client. Thus, respondent did not
only act in a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath
he took to be admitted into the legal profession; he also
violated every single chapter of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent
acted in a manner that is woefully unworthy of an officer
of the court. He was not even a good citizen. As
3
respondent has fallen short of the ethical standards
apropos to members of the legal profession, we find it
proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
III
The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the
significance of this requirement, and the consequences of
non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court:
Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must
be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating
in either case his address which should not be a post office
box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However,
the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading
in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a
change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty
formality nor even a mere means for identification.
Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a
positive declaration. In certifying through his or her
signature that he or she has read the pleading, that there
is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for
delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility,
and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component
of legal practice that this court has taken occasion to decry
the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him
that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under
the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal
work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively
for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but
cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of
Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly
proscribes.39 (Citations omitted)
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading
that failure to comply with this requirement reduces a
pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal
effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is
not only a matter of satisfying a duty to a court but is as
much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in
this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.
Apart from the signature itself, additional information is
required to be indicated as part of a counsel's signature:
(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's
address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,40 this court required all lawyers
to indicate their Roll of Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287,41 this court required the
inclusion of the "number and date of their official
receipt indicating payment of their annual membership
dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
current year"; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his
or her lifetime membership number;
(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local
Government Code,42 a lawyer must indicate his
professional tax receipt number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of a
counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption;
and
(6) This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required
the inclusion of a counsel's contact details.
As with the signature itself, these requirements are not
vain formalities.
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number,
professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number
is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal
practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have
satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage
in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily
verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact,
been admitted to the Philippine bar.45 With the
professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the
same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the
place where he or she principally discharges his or her
functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain
if the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer.
These pieces of information, in the words of Galicto v.
Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus
4
lawyers."46 Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that
proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a
revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to
local government units.
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or
exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only
for those who have complied with the recognized
mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,]
and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law."47
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact
details is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice.
These pieces of information aid in the service of court
processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due
process, and facilitate better representation of a client's
cause. In Juane v. Garcia,48 this court took occasion to
expound on the significance of putting on record a
counsel's address:
The time has come, we believe, for this Court to remind
the members of the Bar that it is their inescapable duty to
make of record their correct address in all cases in which
they are counsel for a suitor. For, instances there have
been in the past when, because of failure to inform the
court of the change of address, litigations were delayed.
And this, not to speak of inconvenience caused the other
parties and the court. Worse still, litigants have lost their
cases in court because of such negligence on the part of
their counsel. It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a
setback in a legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is
occasioned by his attorney's failure to receive notice
because the latter has changed the place of his law office
without giving the proper notice therefor. It is only when
some such situation comes about that the negligent
lawyer comes to realize the grave responsibility that he
has incurred both to his client and to the cause of justice.
It is then that the lawyer is reminded that in his oath of
office he solemnly declared that he "will conduct" himself
"as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion." Too late. Experience indeed is a good teacher.
To a lawyer, though, it could prove very expensive.49
These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not
mere markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard
them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in
place to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in
legal practice; it is to betray apathy for the ideals of the
legal profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of
the standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in
the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to
feign compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of
them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for
the profession that one brandishes.

IV
We underscore several facts. These demonstrate that
respondent acted in manifest bad faith, thereby exhibiting
a pattern of insubordination, dishonesty, deceit, and
intent to make a mockery of courts and legal processes.
In signing the Motion to Quash Subpoena ad
Testificandum with Altenative Motion to Cite the
Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy, respondent appropriated
four of the five details (i.e., IBP official receipt number,
professional tax receipt number, Roll of Attorneys number,
and MCLE compliance number) that Atty. Natu-el
indicated in the Comment dated May 27, 2009, which the
latter signed and filed before the Court of Appeals. Atty.
Natu-el's details are reproduced as follows:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597050 [Emphasis
supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The details that respondent indicated are reproduced as
follows:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBPO.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0951 (Emphasis supplied)
In signing the Reply dated December 8, 2010, respondent
used what was supposedly his correct IBP official receipt
number and professional tax receipt number:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0952 (Emphasis supplied)
The same pleading, however, still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll
of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number,
which respondent previously appropriated for himself.
In signing the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15,
2011, respondent used what was supposedly his correct
5
IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt
number. However, he still used Atty. Natu-el's Roll of
Attorneys number:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09 53(Emphasis supplied)
It was only in signing the Motion to Recall Subpoena ad
Testificandum54 dated March 8, 2012, that all the
professional details that respondent indicated are
supposedly his own:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B. C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. 111-0000762 1/14/09 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the
erroneous details he indicated on his pleadings are
products of mere inadvertence.
To begin with, details were copied from a pleading
submitted by another lawyer. These details somehow
found their way into respondent's own pleadings.
Certainly, these details could not have written themselves,
let alone transfer themselves from a pleading prepared by
one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone must
have actually performed the act of copying and
transferring; that is, someone must have intended to copy
and transfer them. Moreover, the person responsible for
this could have only been respondent or someone acting
under his instructions; the pleadings on which they were
transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were
modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and
professional tax receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-
el. The facts of modification and addition show active
human intervention to make something more out of
markings that could otherwise have simply been
reproduced.
Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from
Atty. Natu-el were discarded while some were retained.
The December 8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll
of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but
no longer his IBP official receipt number and professional
tax receipt number. The July 15, 2011 Motion for

Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE
compliance number. This gradual act of segregating
information—discarding some while retaining others, and
retaining less over time—reveals that the author of these
markings must have engaged in a willful exercise that
filtered those that were to be discarded from those that
were to be retained.
Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts.
Any claim that the error was committed by a secretary is
inconsequential. As this court has stated in Gutierrez v.
Zulueta:55
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the
effect that the failure is attributable to the negligence of
his secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible lawyer is
expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to
all the pleadings to be filed in court and he should not
delegate this responsibility, lock, stock and barrel, to his
office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible
members of the legal profession can avoid appropriate
disciplinary action by simply disavowing liability and
attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the
office secretary. Such situation will not be countenanced
by this Court.56
V or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable. . . ." It
In the first place, it is doubtful that respondent has
complied with the requirements of paying his dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, paying his annual
professional tax, and completing the necessary units for
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in the periods
concerned. To put it plainly, there would be no need for
him to use incorrect information if he had complied with
all pertinent regulations.
In his Comment, respondent provided what are
supposedly his correct professional details. We emphasize,
however, that he failed to attach to his Comment copies of
the pertinent official receipts, certifications, and other
supporting documents. All that he relies on is a self-serving
recital of numbers and dates. None but respondent,
himself, was in a better position to produce the
documents that could prove his claims. His failure to do so
is, at the very least, suspicious. It can very well mean that
they do not exist, or that he willfully desisted from
producing them. The latter would be more damaging to
respondent, as it calls into operation the basic
presumption "[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced."57
Even assuming that the details provided by respondent in
his Comment are correct, it still remains that he (1) used a
false IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt
number, Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance
number a total of seven (7) times; and (2) used another
lawyer's details seven (7) times.
6
In failing to accurately state his professional details,
respondent already committed punishable violations. An
isolated inaccuracy, regardless of the concerned lawyer's
lack of bad faith, already merits a penalty of relative
severity. In Bumactao v. Fano,58 respondent Atty. Restito
F. Fano was suspended from the practice of law for the
singular violation of indicating wrong MCLE compliance
details:
Here, it is established that respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano
falsely indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308". . . . .
The admitted falsity notwithstanding, respondent
endeavors to douse his culpability by shifting the blame to
the MCLE providers - PLM and IBP Quezon City Chapter —
and insisting that he acted in good faith. He likewise
attributes the indication of "MCLE Compliance No. III-
0018308" to his secretary / liaison, an "honest mistake . . .
because of the pressure of his many duties."
We are not impressed.
Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008, requires
"practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings
filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number
and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance
further provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records."
At the very least, respondent was negligent in failing to
monitor his own MCLE compliance. This is a sort of
negligence that is hardly excusable. As a member of the
legal profession, respondent ought to have known that
non-compliance would have resulted in the rendering
inutile of any pleading he may file before any tribunal. The
grave consequence of non-compliance notwithstanding,
respondent (by his own account) admits to having
complacently relied on the statements of MCLE providers.
His negligence, therefore risked harm not only upon
himself - he being now burdened with the present
complaint as a direct consequence - but worse, upon his
clients, the reliefs they seek through their pleadings being
possibly rendered inoperative.59
This court has never shied away from disciplining lawyers
who have willfully engaged in acts of deceit and falsehood.
In Flores v. Chua,60 respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua was
disbarred on this court's finding of "a habit, attitude, and
mindset not only to abuse one's legal knowledge or
training, but also to deliberately defy or ignore known
virtues and values which the legal profession demands
from its members."61 Atty. Enrique S. Chua was found to
have notarized a document that he knew to have been
falsified so as to make it appear that a person had
personally appeared before him; this was part of a bigger

design to defraud another.
In Nunga v. Viray,62 respondent Atty. Venancio Viray was
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years
after having been found to have notarized a document
despite the lapse of his commission as a notary public.
In Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Flores,63 respondent
Atty. Ernesto B. Flores was suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) years after being found to have falsely
stated that he did not pursue an appeal so as to absolve
himself of the charge of forum shopping when, in fact, he
had perfected an appeal.
Here, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 287, Section
139(e) of the Local Government Code, Bar Matter No.
1132, and Bar Matter No. 1922, a total of seven (7) times.
The sheer multiplicity of instances belies any claim that we
are only dealing with isolated errors. Regardless whether
isolated or manifold, these inaccuracies alone already
warrant disciplinary sanctions. However, as shall be
discussed, respondent also acted with dishonest, deceitful,
and even larcenous intent.
Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This
case is far from being a matter of clerical errors. He
willfully used false information. In so doing, he misled
courts, litigants—his own client included— professional
colleagues, and all others who may have relied on the
records and documents on which these false details
appear.
Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to
contain false information is a mockery of courts, chief of
which is this court, considering that this court is the author
of all but one of the regulations that respondent violated.
It is this court that requires respondent to indicate his Roll
of Attorneys number, IBP official receipt number, and
MCLE compliance number.
Having also violated a requirement spelled out in the Local
Government Code, respondent similarly made a mockery
of an act of the legislature.
Respondent's profligacy does not stop here. He also
appropriated for himself another lawyer's professional
details in seven (7) separate instances.
In seven distinct instances, respondent is accountable for
three constituent acts of larceny, taking, use, and
profiting.
Seven times, respondent took for himself professional
details that belonged to another. In these seven instances,
he used the same swiped details in his own pleadings. So
too, in these seven instances he personally benefited. In
these instances, respondent succeeded in making it
appear that he filed valid pleadings and avoided the fatal
7
consequences of a deficiently signed pleading. He was able
to pursue reliefs in court and carry on litigation that could
have been terminated as soon as his deficient pleadings
were recognized.
All these instances of falsity, dishonesty, and professional
larceny are similarly acts of deceit. In using false
information taken from another, respondent misled
courts, parties, and colleagues into believing that he was
faithfully, truthfully, and decently discharging his
functions.
Respondent's acts reek of malicious intent to deceive
courts. He was not only insubordinate and disobedient of
regulations; he was also dishonest, deceitful and
duplicitous. Worse, he was mocking and contemptuous.
VI
The totality of respondent's actions demonstrates a
degree of gravity that warrants suspension from the
practice of law for an extended period.
This case involves anything but trivial non-compliance. It is
much graver. The confluence of: (1) respondent's many
violations; (2) the sheer multiplicity of rules violated; (3)
the frequency—nay, pattern—of falsity and deceit; and (4)
his manifest intent to bring courts, legal processes, and
professional standards to disrepute brings to light a degree
of depravity that proves respondent worthy of being
sanctioned. Having flagrantly disobeyed, deceived, and
ridiculed courts, respondent rightly stands to be at the
receiving end of disciplinary action.
Respondent's circumstances are well within the grounds
for disciplining lawyers as specified by Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. His deception is well demonstrated.
He ran afoul of every single word, save perhaps his name,
in the Lawyer's Oath. Then again, it was his own signature,
his own name, that respondent Pacifico M. Maghari, III
had disgraced.
Respondent's acts also demonstrate a violation of every
single chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
pronounces a lawyer's foremost duty "to uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land V and promote
respect for law and legal processes" Rule 1.01 of the same
Code requires lawyers to "not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Per Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
"[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court" Rule 10.01 requires lawyers to "not do any
falsehood . . . or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Rule 10.03 imposes upon lawyers the duty of
faithfully "observ[ing] the rules of procedure [and] not

misusing] them to defeat the ends of justice." Canon 11
exhorts lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts."
Respondent did not merely violate a statute and the many
issuances of this court as regards the information that
members of the bar must indicate when they sign
pleadings. He did so in a manner that betrays intent to
make a mockery of courts, legal processes, and
professional standards. By his actions, respondent
ridiculed and toyed with the requirements imposed by
statute and by this court. He trampled upon professional
standards established not only by this court, in its capacity
as overseer of the legal profession, but by the Republic
itself, through a duly enacted statute. In so doing, he
violated his duty to society and to the courts.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
a lawyer to "conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues."
In appropriating information pertaining to his opposing
counsel, respondent did not only fail to observe common
courtesy. He encroached upon matters that, ultimately,
are personal to another. This encroachment is, therefore,
not only an act of trickery; it is also act of larceny. In so
doing, he violated his duty to the legal profession.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
imposes upon a lawyer "fidelity to the cause of his client,"
while Canon 18 requires a lawyer to "serve his client with
competence and diligence."
In using false information in his pleadings, respondent
unnecessarily put his own client at risk. Deficiencies in how
pleadings are signed can be fatal to a party's cause as
unsigned pleadings produce no legal effect. In so doing,
respondent violated his duty to his clients.
It is tempting to think that the only thing respondent did
was to deviate from required formalities. Respondent was,
himself, quite dismissive, stating that he did nothing more
than "cursorily [go] over . . . without giving any ... attention
to details . . . that. . . are matters of record and are easily
verifiable."64 It is equally tempting to think it would be
excessive of this court to engage in an overly rigid,
pedantic emphasis on formalistic niceties.
However, we have demonstrated that what can otherwise
be dismissed as empty formalities are, in fact, necessary
solemnities. They are not ends in themselves but crucial
means to enhance the integrity, competence and
credibility of the legal profession. They are vital to the
dispensation of justice. The significance of these
solemnities, along with the legal profession's "high
standard of legal proficiency, . . . morality, honesty,
integrity[,] and fair dealing[,]"65 put in contrast with how
respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of
8
the high standards that his profession demands,
demonstrates the propriety of momentarily suspending
respondent from engaging in legal practice.
It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery
and ridicule that he did of the very same badges—his place
in the Roll of Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated
Bar, his recognition as a practicing professional, his
continuing training and competence—that are emblematic
of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested such
contempt for these badges, we find that there is every
reason for preventing him, at least temporarily, from
engaging in the profession these badges signify.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III,
having clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct,
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years,
effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent
Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land
Registration Authority, Petitioner,
vs.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001
decision 1 and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent
Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter
fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil
Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of
some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent
justified its action with a claim of ownership over the
property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and
which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered
in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with
the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996,
Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task
Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of
Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its
ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered
by respondent’s titles was also found to be within Villamor
Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay
City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for
revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of
title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as
represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso
Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which
was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as
counsel for respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served
with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an
alias summons by publication against him on February 19,
1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents
relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements
or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare
defendants in default and other procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of
land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative
investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and
focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos.
135604, 135605 and 135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26,
1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos,
respondent’s former counsel. He testified that he
prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong.
The signature appearing above his name was not his. He
authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did
not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed
an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare
respondent in default, 2 predicated on its failure to file a
valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person
who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty.
Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was
effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3,
9
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it was a mere scrap of paper
and produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution
granting the Republic’s motion. 4 It found respondent’s
answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the
purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer
stricken from the records, declared respondent in default
and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which
it rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the
February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari 5 seeking to set aside
the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court.
Respondent contended that the trial court erred in
declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely
answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the
legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not
subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also
scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the
answer 6 and concluded that he assented to the signing of
the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly
cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence,
the appellate court granted respondent’s petition for
certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default
against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed
to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s
order which declared respondent in default for its failure
to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or
ratify another’s statement. 7 Where it appears that a party
clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the
statements of another, evidence of those statements is
admissible against him. 8 This is the essence of the
principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement
or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat
the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated
or implied by the other person. 9 By adoptive admission, a
third person’s statement becomes the admission of the
party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may
occur when a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement
made by another; 10
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of
another; 12
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised
by another but ignores further points which he or she has
heard the other make 13 or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by
another. 14
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty.
Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it
ever deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It
went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos’ testimony
as well as its implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact
was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could
not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading.
The fact that the person who signed it was neither known
to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was
immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore
a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must
be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a
counsel from giving a general authority for any person to
sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did.
The person who actually signed the pleading was of no
moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed
by another. This was similar to addressing an authorization
letter "to whom it may concern" such that any person
could act on it even if he or she was not known
beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he
never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as
counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These
circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or
ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in
its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s February
19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the
Court of Appeals as well as in the comment 15 and
memorandum it submitted to this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’
statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive admission
constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on
it.
10
Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one
that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel.
Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a
pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or
his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one
that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him
that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. 16 Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal
work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively
for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer 17 but
cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons, 18 something the law
strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty.
Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken
pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no
way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’
subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate
hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing
of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his
draft." We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving
statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given
blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The
trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was
invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned
pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and
the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex
parte.
 11

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It SO ORDERED.

maintains that even if it were true that its answer was
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere RENATO C. CORONA
technicality that could be set aside. Associate Justice

Procedural requirements which have often been WE CONCUR:

disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own
valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice.
REYNATO S. PUNO
To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness
Associate Justice
and injustice. 19
Chairperson

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Appeals 20 is relevant:

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus
[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the CANCIO C. GARCIA
Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the Associate Justice
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate ATTESTATION
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice. REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except
only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not CERTIFICATION
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and
case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
rules. consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts
committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for Chief Justice
his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May

31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Footnotes
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 1Penned by Associate Justice Bennie A. Adefuin-
resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
de la Cruz (now retired) and concurred in by
114 declaring respondent in default is
Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
hereby REINSTATED.
Josefina Guevara-Salonga of the Fifteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 35-43.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for 2 Id., pp. 62-64.
the commencement of disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional
3SEC. 3. Signature and address. – Every pleading
conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.
must be signed by
the party or counsel representing him, stating in

either case his new address which should not be
a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief
there is a good ground to support it; and that it
is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect.
However, the court may, in its discretion, allow
such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear
that the same was due to mere inadvertence
and not intended to delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a
pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to
promptly report to the court a change of his
address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action.
G.R. No. 204325, April 18, 2016
LYNMAN BACOLOR, JEFFREY R. GALURA, HELEN B.
TORRES, FRITZIE C. VELLEGAS, RAYMOND CANLAS AND
ZHEILA C. TORRES,*Petitioners, v. VL MAKABALI
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., ALEJANDRO S. MAKABALI,
MELCHOR CATAMBING AND DAX M.
TIDULA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Rules of procedure must be used to achieve speedy and
efficient administration of justice and not derail it. When
strict application of the rules on verification and non-
forum shopping will result in patent denial of substantial
justice, these rules may be construed liberally. After all,
the ends of justice are better served when cases are
determined on the merits, not on mere technicality.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the
Resolution2 dated July 12, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125333. The CA dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed therewith because of the
purported defective Verification/Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping with Undertaking appended to the Petition; and
of petitioners' violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court. Also challenged is, the CA Resolution3 dated
October 22, 2012 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Factual Antecedents
The case stemmed from an amended Complaint4 for illegal
dismissal and money claims filed by Drs. Lynman Bacolor
12
(Dr. Bacolor), Jeffrey R. Galura (Dr. Galura), Helen B. Torres
(Dr. Helen), Fritzie C. Villegas (Dr. Villegas), Raymond
Canlas (Dr. Canlas), Zheila C. Torres (Dr. Zheila) and Dax
Tidula (Dr. Tidula) against VL Makabali Hospital Inc. (the
Hospital), Alejandro S. Makabali, its owner and President,
and Melchor Catambing (Catambing), its Emergency Room
(ER) Manager.5
Allegedly, the Hospital engaged Drs. Bacolor, Galura,
Villegas and Canlas as resident physicians assigned in its ER
for one year, commencing October 2000 until October
2001. It engaged Drs. Helen and Zheila, also as ER resident
physicians, starting March 2001 until March 2002, and
January 2002 until January 2003, respectively. Despite the
expiration of their contracts, the Hospital continued to
employ Drs. Bacolor, Galura, Villegas, Canlas, Helen and
Zheila (petitioners).6
Petitioners stated that on May 3, 2006, Catambing and
one Dr. Lopez instructed them to resign, and re-apply to
the Hospital as resident physicians under a one-year fixed
term contract. They further alleged that Catambing and
Dr. Lopez later directed them to sign a. waiver and offered
them "gratitude" pay of P27,000.00 but they refused to
resign; and because of their refusal, respondents demoted
them as assistant physicians in the Operating-Room (OR)
of the Hospital.7
Additionally, petitioners insisted that to compel them to
resign, respondents issued notices to explain to Drs.
Bacolor, Galura, Helen, Villegas and Canlas. In particular,
Drs. Bacolor, Galura and Helen were charged with
dishonesty for allegedly directing patients to secure
laboratory examinations outside the Hospital; while Drs.
Villegas and Canlas were charged with violation of
timekeeping procedure and habitual violation of rules and
regulations.8
Consequently, petitioners filed a case for constructive
illegal dismissal against respondents. They argued that
despite their complaint, respondents still conducted an
administrative investigation against them.9 On June 30,
2006, Drs. Bacolor and Galura received notices of
termination from the Hospital.10
Petitioners contended that they were constructively
dismissed when respondents demoted them as assistant
physicians in the OR of the Hospital.11 They stated that
such demotion was neither necessary nor temporary, and
was arbitrarily done to force them to resign. They further
averred that Drs. Bacolor and Galura were actually illegally
dismissed after they were given respective notices of
termination.12
On the other hand, Dr. Tidula stated that the Hospital
engaged him as resident physician for a year commencing
on January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2001; the Hospital
renewed his contract for the year 2002 to 2003; and after

his contract expired, the Hospital continued to engage his
services.13
Dr. Tidula likewise alleged that in 2005, several resident
physicians in the Hospital resigned. As a result, the
remaining resident physicians were made to fill in their
duties. Allegedly, it was agreed upon that when a resident
doctor was absent, a reliever would take his place; and the
reliever's fee would be charged against the salary of the
absent doctor. Dr. Tidula claimed that the reliever shall
punch in the time card of the absent doctor for t
recording, accounting and expediency purposes. 14
Furthermore, Dr. Tidula asserted that in February 2006, Dr.
Amelita Lising (Dr. Lising), who was a resident physician,
went on leave. He averred that being the acting Chief
Resident, he implemented the agreement regarding the
designation of reliever. He stated that the relievers of Dr.
Lising were made to punch in and out her time card to
prove that they had taken her place; and they received
salary from that intended for Dr. Lising.15
Dr. Tidula narrated that on May 3, 2006, he and his fellow
residents were directed to resign with the promise that
they would be re-engaged under a fixed term of one year.
He averred that Catambing and Dr. Lopez also instructed
him and the other resident physicians to tender their
resignation and sign a waiver in favor of the Hospital. He
alleged that they were also offered P27,000.00 as financial
assistance; however, he and the other resident physicians
refused to resign.16
Additionally, Dr. Tidula alleged that on May 16, 2006, he
was ordered to report exclusively at the OR of the Hospital
as assistant physician; and this demotion was a result of
his refusal to resign. Consequently, he filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal against the Hospital.17
Later, Catambing gave Dr. Tidula a Notice18 of dismissal for
violation of timekeeping procedure. Dr. Tidula stated that
he inquired from Catambing why he was not given any
notice to explain. Purportedly, Catambing informed him
that a notice to explain was sent through a private courier.
Upon verification, Dr. Tidula discovered that the notice
was delivered to a person unknown to him. He informed
the Hospital about the matter but the Hospital insisted
that he was given the opportunity to explain and was
invited to an investigation, as such, the sanction against
him remains.19
Dr. Tidula argued that he was illegally dismissed since he
did not receive a notice to explain; and he did not violate
any of the company rules.20
For their part, respondents asserted that Drs. Tidula,
Bacolor and Galura were validly dismissed. In particular,
they alleged that Dr. Tidula violated timekeeping
procedure of the Hospital when he punched in Dr. Lising's
13
time card on February 2, 6, 10 and 12, 2006.21 On the
other hand Drs. Bacolor and Galura were found guilty of
referring patients to other clinics for laboratory
examination in February 2006.22
Moreover, respondents claimed that the Hospital did not
dismiss Drs. Helen, Villegas and Canlas; thus, they should
be dropped from the complaint. They added that Dr.
Zheila was never cited for any infraction but she
abandoned her work as she had been absent since July
2006.23
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On July 23, 2010, the LA rendered a Decision24 finding
respondents guilty of illegally dismissing petitioners and
Dr. Tidula, as well as ordering respondents to pay them
backwages from the time of their dismissal until finality of
the Decision, and separation pay. The LA also ordered the
Hospital to pay petitioners and Dr. Tidula moral damages
of P100,000.00 each and exemplary damages of
P100,000.00 each, and attorney's fees.
The Hospital appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).25cralawred
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On November 11, 2011, the NLRC reversed and set aside
the LA Decision and dismissed the complaints.26 It held
that there was no showing that petitioners and Dr. Tidula
were demoted, and that such demotion amounted to
constructive dismissal. It ruled that "it would be difficult to
discern the differences between the duties of a resident
and assistant physician, as both indubitably perform
doctor's duties."27 Also, the NLRC decreed that Dr. Zheila
did not even sign the verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping in this case.
Moreover, the NLRC gave credence to respondents'
position that Drs. Bacolor and Galura were validly
dismissed because they repeatedly referred patients to
another clinic for laboratory examinations. It ruled that
such was an act of deceit because the Hospital offered the
same services.
On April 18, 2012, the NLRC denied petitioners and Dr.
Tidula's motion for reconsideration.28
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC in giving due course to the appeal despite its
alleged lack of appeal bond; and in reversing the LA
Decision.
The Petition was accompanied by three separate
Verifications/Certificates of Non-Forum Shopping signed
by Drs. Galura, Bacolor and Helen.29 Atty. Carlos Raphael

N. Francisco executed and signed a Verification/Certificate
of Non-Forum Shopping with Undertaking in behalf of Drs.
Villegas, Canlas and Zheila.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 12, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Resolution,
the pertinent portions of which read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Petition for Certiorari contains the following
infirmities, hence is DISMISSED:
1. The Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
With Undertaking attached to the Petition is executed by
Atty. Carlos Raphael N. Francisco, allegedly [sic] counsel of
record of petitioners Fritzie C. Villegas, Raymond Canlas
and Zeila C. Torres, not by the three petitioners
themselves, in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, and the ruling in Far Eastern Shipping Company v.
Court of Appeals et al.
2. The Petition does not indicate in its title that Dax Tidula
is a party respondent, although in the portion entitled
'Parties' he is so named, and does not indicate the address
of Dax Tidula, all in violation of Rule 46, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 65 of the same Rules.
SO ORDERED.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 22, 2012, the CA denied petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.32
Aggrieved, petitioners filed this Petition raising the
following assignment of errors:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1 THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN THE COURT OF
APPEALS DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SEVERAL
OF THE PETITIONERS HAD VALIDLY EXECUTED
VERIFICATIONS AND CERTIFICATES OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING WHICH WERE ATTACHED TO SAID PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI;
2 THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN THE COURT OF
APPEALS DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PETITIONERS HAD SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH
THE RULES ON THE EXECUTION OF A VERIFICATION
AND CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING;
14
3 THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE-HONORABLE COURT WHEN THE COURT OF
APPEALS. DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
ONLY KNOWN ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT TIDULA WAS
INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
THAT RESPONDENT TIDULA, THROUGH HIS COUNSEL,
WAS SERVED WITH A COPY OF SUCH PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI;
4 THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE
BY THE NLRC IN NLRC CASE NO[.] RAB. III-06-10180-06
FROM THE ACCEPTED OR USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS THE COURT OF APPEALS ALLOWED
THE NLRC TO VIRTUALLY EXTEND THE PERIOD OF THE
RESPONDENT HOSPITAL TO FILE AN APPEAL FOR
ALMOST FOUR MONTHS FROM THE EXPIRATION OF
THE PERIOD TO FILE SUCH APPEAL;
5 THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE
BY THE NLRC IN NLRC CASE NO[.] RAB. 111-06-10180-
06 FROM THE ACCEPTED OR USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS THE COURT OF APPEALS
ALLOWED THE NLRC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO AN
APPEAL THAT WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME AND
TO MODIFY THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER
THAT WAS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY; and
6 THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE
BY THE NLRC IN NLRC CASE NO[.] RAB. III-06-10180-06
FROM THE ACCEPTED OR USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS THE COURT OF APPEALS TOLERATED
THE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BY
THE NLRC IN REVERSING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF
THE LABOR ARBITER DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH
REVERSAL IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AND BY THE APPLICABLE LAWS.33
Petitioners argue that the verifications executed by three
of the six petitioners and the verification executed by their
counsel constituted full compliance with the required
verification. They contended that the three petitioners
who made their verification are real parties-in-interest,
and their counsel who also verified the Petition had been
in possession of authentic and relevant records of the
case.
Also, petitioners posit that the failure of Drs. Villegas,
Canlas and Zheila to execute a certificate of non-forum
shopping should not have caused the dismissal of the
Petition for Certorari. They insist that under justifiable
circumstances, the signature of one of the petitioners in

the certificate against forum shopping substantially
complies with the rules. They further point out that all of
them share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action under the same set of facts.
Moreover, petitioners submit that they complied with
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. They contend that
they included Dr. Tidula in the Petition for Certiorari as
respondent because he remains interested in the reversal
of the NLRC Decision and Resolution. They add that from
the inception of the case, all pleadings had been coursed
through Dr. Tidula's counsel; and they are unaware of the
address of Dr. Tidula as he never indicated it in his position
paper. Hence, they maintain that it is fair that in the
present proceeding, any pleading intended for Dr. Tidula
be sent to his counsel.
In addition, petitioners state that the non-inclusion of Dr.
Tidula is not a fatal defect but a mere typographical error
which does not prejudice the rights of any party.
Finally, petitioners fault the CA in not finding that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Hospital's appeal despite its failure to post
appeal bond within the period to perfect an appeal. They
also maintain that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that they were not illegally dismissed
by respondents.
The Hospital, on the other hand, asserts that the CA
correctly dismissed the Petition because it was filed by a
counsel who had no authority from petitioners; and that
the Certificate against Forum Shopping attached thereto
was fatally defective. It also declares that the Petition
for Certiorari improperly impleaded Dr. Tidula as
respondent. Lastly, it contends that petitioners are not
entitled to money claims.
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
In Altres v. Empleo,34 the Court summarized the basic
tenets involving non-compliance with the requirements
on, or filing of defective verification and certificate against
forum shopping, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on
or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or
correction or act on the pleading if the attending
15
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance"
or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons".
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed
by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies
with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.
The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground
that the Verification/Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
executed by petitioners' counsel on behalf of Drs. Villegas,
Canlas and Zheila violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.35
As properly pointed out by the CA, the
Verification/Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping with
Undertaking executed by petitioners' counsel is not valid.
As stated in Altres, a certificate against forum shopping
must be signed by the party and in case his counsel signs
the same on his behalf, the counsel must be armed with a
special power of attorney. Since petitioners' counsel is not
shown to have been authorized by Drs. Villegas, Canlas
and Zheila to sign a certificate of non-forum shopping on
their behalf, the execution of said certificate by counsel
violates the foregoing rules.
Nonetheless, the CA failed to consider the concept of
"substantial compliance" to the requirements of
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, as it
has been shown that three of the six petitioners executed
their own verification and certificate against forum
shopping.

The verification of a pleading is a formal and not a
jurisdictional requirement. It is intended to assure that the
allegations in a pleading are true and correct. As such, the
court may order the correction of unverified pleadings, or
it may act on them and waive strict compliance with the
rules.36
The verification requirement is deemed substantially
complied with when a person who has sufficient
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification; and matters
alleged therein have been made in good faith or are true
and correct. Thus, there is substantial compliance if at
least one of the petitioners makes a proper verification.37
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,38 the signature of
one of three petitioners therein was considered
substantial compliance with the verification requirement.
The Court held that Fr. Tabora, the petitioner who signed
the verification, has sufficient knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the petition filed with the CA;
and his signature was ample assurance that the allegations
have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
In SKM Art Craft Corporation v. Bauca,39 the Court held
that the verification and certificate against forum shopping
signed by nine out of 23 respondents substantially
complied with the verification requirement since they
have common interest and cause of action. The Court
likewise stated that the apparent merit of the petition and
the conflicting findings, of the LA and the NLRC also
justified the decision of the CA to resolve the case on the
merits.
In this case, three out of six petitioners signed three
separate verifications appended to the Petition
for Certiorari. Their signatures are sufficient assurance that
the allegations in the Petition were made in good faith, or
are true and correct. Thus, there is substantial compliance
with the verification requirement.
On the other hand, as a rule, the certificate against forum
shopping must be signed by all plaintiffs or petitioners;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
situations, such as when the plaintiffs or petitioners share
a common interest and invoke a common cause of action
or defense, the signature of one of them in the certificate
against forum shopping is considered substantial
compliance with the rules.40cralawred
In Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission,41 47 out
of 88 petitioners signed the certificate against forum
shopping. The Court ruled that the petitioning employees
shared a common interest and cause of action when they
filed the case for illegal dismissal. The Court decreed ,that
when petitioners therein appealed to the CA, they pursued
16
the case as a collective body, invoking one argument in
support of their cause of action, which is, the illegal
dismissal purportedly committed by their employer when
union members resorted to strike due to the employer's
refusal to bargain with officers of the local chapter.
Furthermore, in Torres v. Specialized Packaging
Development Corp.,42 the Court allowed the relaxation of
the rules on submission. of certificate against forum
shopping. One of the compelling grounds for the
allowance of said certificate therein where only two of 25
petitioners signed the same was the "apparent merits of
the substantive aspects of the case." It noted that the
varying views of the LA and the NLRC give ample basis for
the necessity of a review on the merits and the outright
dismissal of the petition was prejudicial to the substantive
rights.
Here, three of six petitioners signed the certificate of non-
forum shopping. At the least, the CA could have ordered
that those who did not sign it be dropped as parties, but
not the outright dismissal of the Petition.
The Court, nevertheless, holds that there are justifiable
reasons for the relaxation of the rules on the filing of a
certificate of non-forum shopping and that the certificate
against forum shopping signed by three out of six
petitioners suffices.
Specifically, petitioners' cause of action revolves on the
same issue, that is, respondents illegally dismissed them
under similar circumstances. They were all resident
physicians who were purportedly 1) re-employed by the
Hospital even after the expiration of their respective one
year contracts; 2) forced to resign and offered to be re-
engaged as fixed term employees but declined; 3)
demoted; 4) accused of violations of the Hospital rules and
regulations; and, 5) dismissed.
Moreover, substantial justice dictates that the Petition
for Certiorari be given due course and be resolved on the
merits. This is especially so since the findings of the LA are
contrary to those of the NLRC,43 particularly on the issues
of whether respondents illegally dismissed petitioners and
of whether they were afforded due process of law.
The requirement of strict compliance with the rules on
filing of certificate against forum shopping highlights the
mandatory character of the submission of such certificate.
However, this mandatory requirement allows substantial
compliance provided that there are justifiable
circumstances for the relaxation of the rules.44
Furthermore, the CA dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari because it did not indicate in its title that Dr.
Tidula is a party respondent and the Petition did not state
Dr. Tidula's actual address. The CA held that these
omissions violate Section 3,45 Rule 46 of the Rules of Court,

in relation to Rule 65 thereof.
We do not agree.
Since Dr. Tidula was included as one of the respondents in
the body of the Petition, then the CA could have clarified
with petitioners the non-inclusion of Dr. Tidula in the title
and could have ordered the title rectified.
Likewise, the Court finds that the failure to state the
address of Dr. Tidula is insufficient to cause the dismissal
of the Petition. The lack of address of Dr. Tidula is not a
fatal defect as he had been represented by his counsel in
the case. The indication that the party "could be served
with process care of his counsel was substantial
compliance with the Rules." And, when a party has
appeared through counsel, service is to be made upon the
counsel, unless the court expressly orders that it be made
upon the party.46
In view of the foregoing, a remand of the case to the CA
for proper disposition on the merits is deemed
proper.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The July 42, 2012
and October 22, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 125333 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
[G.R. NO. 151413 : February 13, 2008]
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks the recall of the August 31, 2000
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
59778, which dismissed petitioner Cagayan Valley Drug
Corporation's Petition for Review of the April 26, 2000
Decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in C.T.A. Case
No. 5581 on the ground of defective verification and
certification against forum shopping.
The Facts
17
Petitioner, a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, is a duly licensed retailer of medicine and
other pharmaceutical products. It operates two
drugstores, one in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and the other in
Roxas, Isabela, under the name and style of "Mercury
Drug."
Petitioner alleged that in 1995, it granted 20% sales
discounts to qualified senior citizens on purchases of
medicine pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 74323 and its
implementing rules and regulations.
In compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94,
petitioner treated the 20% sales discounts granted to
qualified senior citizens in 1995 as deductions from the
gross sales in order to arrive at the net sales, instead of
treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of RA
7432.
On December 27, 1996, however, petitioner filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) a claim for tax refund/tax
credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it
granted to senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly
totaling to PhP 123,083 in accordance with Sec. 4 of RA
7432.
The BIR's inaction on petitioner's claim for refund/tax
credit compelled petitioner to file on March 18, 1998 a
Petition for Review before the CTA docketed as C.T.A. Case
No. 5581 in order to forestall the two-year prescriptive
period provided under Sec. 2304 of the 1977 Tax Code, as
amended. Thereafter, on March 31, 2000, petitioner
amended its Petition for Review .
The Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals
On April 26, 2000, the CTA rendered a Decision dismissing
the Petition for Review for lack of merit.5
The CTA sustained petitioner's contention that pursuant to
Sec. 4 of RA 7432, the 20% sales discounts petitioner
extended to qualified senior citizens in 1995 should be
treated as tax credit and not as deductions from the gross
sales as erroneously interpreted in RR 2-94. The CTA
reiterated its consistent holdings that RR 2-94 is an invalid
administrative interpretation of the law it purports to
implement as it contravenes and does not conform to the
standards RA 7432 prescribes.
Notwithstanding petitioner's entitlement to a tax credit
from the 20% sales discounts it extended to qualified
senior citizens in 1995, the CTA nonetheless dismissed
petitioner's action for refund or tax credit on account of
petitioner's net loss in 1995. First, the CTA rejected the
refund as it is clear that RA 7432 only grants the 20% sales
discounts extended to qualified senior citizens as tax credit

and not as tax refund. Second, in rejecting the tax credit,
the CTA reasoned that while petitioner may be qualified
for a tax credit, it cannot be so extended to petitioner on
account of its net loss in 1995.
The CTA ratiocinated that on matters of tax credit claim,
the government applies the amount determined to be
reimbursable after proper verification against any sum
that may be due and collectible from the taxpayer.
However, if no tax has been paid or if no amount is due
and collectible from the taxpayer, then a tax credit is
unavailing. Moreover, it held that before allowing recovery
for claims for a refund or tax credit, it must first be
established that there was an actual collection and receipt
by the government of the tax sought to be recovered. In
the instant case, the CTA found that petitioner did not pay
any tax by virtue of its net loss position in 1995.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied through the appellate tax court's June 30, 2000
Resolution.6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59778. On August 31, 2000,
the CA issued the assailed Resolution7 dismissing the
petition on procedural grounds. The CA held that the
person who signed the verification and certification of
absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J.
Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to adduce proof
that he was duly authorized by the board of directors to
do so.
As far as the CA was concerned, the main issue was
whether or not the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping signed by the President of petitioner is
sufficient compliance with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The verification and certification in question reads:
I, JACINTO J. CONCEPCION, of legal age with office address
at 2nd Floor, Mercury Drug Corporation, No. 7 Mercury
Ave, Bagumbayan, Quezon City, under oath, hereby state
that:
1. I am the President of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation,
Petitioner in the above-entitled case and am duly
authorized to sign this Verification and Certification of
Absence of Forum Shopping by the Board of Director.
xxx
The CA found no sufficient proof to show that Concepcion
was duly authorized by the Board of Directors of
18
petitioner. The appellate court anchored its disposition on
our ruling in Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (Premium), that "[i]n the absence of an authority
from the Board of Directors, no person, not even the
officers of the corporation, can validly bind the
corporation."8
Hence, we have this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises two issues: first, whether petitioner's
president can sign the subject verification and certification
sans the approval of its Board of Directors. And second,
whether the CTA committed reversible error in denying
and dismissing petitioner's action for refund or tax credit
in C.T.A. Case No. 5581.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Premium not applicable
As regards the first issue, we find the CA to have
erroneously relied on Premium. In said case, the issue
tackled was not on whether the president of Premium
Marble Resources, Inc. was authorized to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping, but
rather on which of the two sets of officers, both claiming
to be the legal board of directors of Premium, have the
authority to file the suit for and in behalf of the company.
The factual antecedents and issues in Premium are not on
all fours with the instant case and is, therefore, not
applicable.
With respect to an individual litigant, there is no question
that litigants must sign the sworn verification and
certification unless they execute a power of attorney
authorizing another person to sign it. With respect to a
juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on verification and Sec. 5,
Rule 7 on certification against forum shopping are silent as
to who the authorized signatory should be. Said rules do
not indicate if the submission of a board resolution
authorizing the officer or representative is necessary.
Corporate powers exercised through board of directors
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25
of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all
corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted,
and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from
its directors and officers and can only exercise its
corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it
is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely

exercise any corporate power pertaining to the
corporation without authority from the board of directors.
This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a
corporation.
In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the
authority of some corporate officers to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping.
In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we
recognized the authority of a general manager or acting
general manager to sign the verification and certificate
against forum shopping;9 in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the
validity of a verification signed by an "employment
specialist" who had not even presented any proof of her
authority to represent the company;10 in Novelty
Philippines, Inc., v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer
who signed the petition but did not attach the authority
from the company is authorized to sign the verification
and non-forum shopping certificate;11 and in Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources
International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the
Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company
can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum
shopping even without the submission of the board's
authorization.12
In sum, we have held that the following officials or
employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of
a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General
Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of
authorized signatories to the verification and certification
required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency
of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The
rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the
authority of corporate officers or representatives of the
corporation to sign the verification or certificate against
forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition."13
Authority from board of directors required
In Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines, we ruled that only
individuals vested with authority by a valid board
resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping
on behalf of a corporation. The action can be dismissed if
the certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof
of the signatory's authority.14 We believe that appending
the board resolution to the complaint or petition is the
better procedure to obviate any question on the authority
of the signatory to the verification and certification. The
19
required submission of the board resolution is grounded
on the basic precept that corporate powers are exercised
by the board of directors,15 and not solely by an officer of
the corporation. Hence, the power to sue and be sued in
any court or quasi-judicial tribunal is necessarily lodged
with the said board.
There is substantial compliance with Rule 7, Secs. 4 and 5
In the case at bar, we so hold that petitioner substantially
complied with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board
resolution has been submitted albeit belatedly by
petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling in Lepanto with the
rationale that the President of petitioner is in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in
the petition. Third, the President of petitioner has signed
the complaint before the CTA at the inception of this
judicial claim for refund or tax credit.
Consequently, the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 59778 ought
to be reinstated. However, in view of the enactment of RA
9282 which made the decisions of the CTA appealable to
this Court, we will directly resolve the second issue which
is a purely legal one.
Petitioner entitled to tax credit
The pith of the dispute between petitioner and
respondent is whether petitioner is entitled to a tax refund
or tax credit of 20% sales discount granted to senior
citizens under RA 7432 or whether the discount should be
treated as a deduction from gross income.
This issue is not new, as the Court has resolved several
cases involving the very same issue. In Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug
Corporation (Central Luzon),16 we held that private drug
companies are entitled to a tax credit for the 20% sales
discounts they granted to qualified senior citizens under
RA 7432 and nullified Secs. 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94.
In Bicolandia Drug Corporation (formerly Elmas Drug
Corporation) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,17 we
ruled that petitioner therein is entitled to a tax credit of
the "cost" or the full 20% sales discounts it granted
pursuant to RA 7432. In the related case of Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation,18 we
likewise ruled that respondent drug company was entitled
to a tax credit, and we struck down RR 2-94 to be null and
void for failing to conform with the law it sought to
implement.
A perusal of the April 26, 2000 CTA Decision shows that
the appellate tax court correctly ruled that the 20% sales
discounts petitioner granted to qualified senior citizens
should be deducted from petitioner's income tax due and
not from petitioner's gross sales as erroneously provided

in RR 2-94. However, the CTA erred in denying the tax
credit to petitioner on the ground that petitioner had
suffered net loss in 1995, and ruling that the tax credit is
unavailing.
Net loss in a taxable year does not preclude grant of tax
credit
It is true that petitioner did not pay any tax in 1995 since it
suffered a net loss for that taxable year. This fact,
however, without more, does not preclude petitioner from
availing of its statutory right to a tax credit for the 20%
sales discounts it granted to qualified senior citizens. The
law then applicable on this point is clear and without any
qualification. Sec. 4 (a) of RA 7432 pertinently provides:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. The senior citizens
shall be entitled to the following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to utilization of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of
medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.
(Emphasis ours.)
The fact that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1995 will not
make the tax credit due to petitioner unavailable. This is
the core issue resolved in Central Luzon, where we ruled
that the net loss for a taxable year does not bar the grant
of the tax credit to a taxpayer pursuant to RA 7432 and
that prior tax payments are not required for such grant.
We explained:
Although this tax credit benefit is available, it need not be
used by losing ventures, since there is no tax liability that
calls for its application. Neither can it be reduced to nil by
the quick yet callow stroke of an administrative pen,
simply because no reduction of taxes can instantly be
effected. By its nature, the tax credit may still be deducted
from a future, not a present, tax liability, without which it
does not have any use. x x x
xxx
While a tax liability is essential to the availment or use of
any tax credit, prior tax payments are not. On the contrary,
for the existence or grant solely of such credit, neither a
tax liability nor a prior tax payment is needed. The Tax
Code is in fact replete with provisions granting or
allowing tax credits, even though no taxes have been
previously paid.19
It is thus clear that petitioner is entitled to a tax credit for
the full 20% sales discounts it extended to qualified senior
20
citizens for taxable year 1995. Considering that the CTA
has not disallowed the PhP 123,083 sales discounts
petitioner claimed before the BIR and CTA, we are
constrained to grant them as tax credit in favor of
petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner's appeal before the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59778 must be granted, and, necessarily, the April
26, 2000 CTA Decision in C.T.A. Case No. 5581 reversed
and set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 31,
2000 CA Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 59778
is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The April 26, 2000 CTA
Decision in C.T.A. Case No. 5581 dismissing petitioner's
claim for tax credit is accordingly REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
is ORDERED to issue a Tax Credit Certificate in the name of
petitioner in the amount of PhP 123,083. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL
PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of
the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to
Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption. – The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter,
dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education
and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing
interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE
requirement program.The Court further Resolved, upon
the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education
and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the
bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately
preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the
case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records. The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days
after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation."
Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.
(adv216a)