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Similarities and Differences Between Left-Wing and

Right-Wing Radicals
Herbert McClosky and Dennis Chong
British Journal of Political Science / Volume 15 / Issue 03 / July 1985, pp 329 - 363
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400004221, Published online: 27 January 2009
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123400004221
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Herbert McClosky and Dennis Chong (1985). Similarities and Differences Between
Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals. British Journal of Political Science, 15, pp
329-363 doi:10.1017/S0007123400004221
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B.J.Pol.S. is, 329-363
Primed in Great Britain
Similarities and Differences Between Left-Wing

and Right-Wing Radicals
H E R B E R T McCLOSKYAND DENNIS CHQNG*
Political observers have for years argued about the proper location of the
radical left and the radical right on the familiar left-right (or liberal-
conservative) continuum. Although the conventional view holds that the two
camps diverge sharply and belong at opposite ends of the continuum, some
observers believe that they resemble each other so closely in certain crucial
political and psychological characteristics that to classify them at opposite
poles is grossly misleading.
Controversy over this issue was fuelled by the publication in 1950 of The
Authoritarian Personality.' The authors of that research believed, in effect,
that those who embraced the doctrines of the far right were likely to
score high on the F scale (their key measure of 'authoritarianism'), while
those who leaned to the ideological left were likely to score low. In their
relation to authoritarianism, in short, the two camps belonged at opposite
poles.
Critics of this conclusion and of the research on which it was based
complained that the F scale was obviously biased in identifying authoritarian-
ism as characteristic mainly of the right while failing to register the authoritar-
ianism of the left. Edward Shils, for example, argued in a well-known essay
that authoritarianism was not the exclusive property of the far right, but
mutatis mutandis was equally characteristic of the far left.2 Once one adjusts
for superficial differences, Shils contended, communists and other radicals of
the far left resemble right-wing radicals in zealotry, susceptibility to Man-
ichean interpretations of human events, implacable hatred of opponents,
intolerance toward dissenters and deviants, and an inclination to view public
affairs as the outcome of conspiracies and secret plots. According to Shils and
other critics, the radical left and the radical right may differ in their choice of
allies and enemies, and in their perceptions of certain institutions as hostile or
friendly, but they share a common style of political thought and employ
similar techniques of political engagement.
Shils's charge that the F scale revealed the authoritarianism of the right but
not of the left was echoed by other prominent critics. Milton Rokeach argued
(and sought to demonstrate through research) that the characteristics which
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
1
T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, The
Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).
2
Edward A. Shils, 'Authoritarianism: "Right" and "Left"' in Richard Christie and Marie
Jahoda, Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality (Glencoe, III.: Free
Press, 1954), pp. 24-9.
330 MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
most closely distinguished authoritarians of any ideological persuasion from

non-authoritarians were 'dogmatism' and what he called 'opinionation' -
complex styles of thinking marked by closed-mindedness, intolerance towards
those with whom one disagrees, reluctance to entertain new or conflicting
ideas, and a deep-seated unwillingness to alter one's system of beliefs in any
way.3 H. J. Eysenck4 concluded from his research on personality and ideology
that left-wing and right-wing radicals - or, more specifically, communists and
fascists - resembled each other in various ways, but were especially alike in
their 'tough-mindedness'. In Eysenck's view, it was this quality above all that
distinguished extremists of the left and right from the political moderates,
who were inclined to be more 'tender-minded'.
Despite such challenges, various investigators who worked with the F scale
continued to find, as Adorno et a I. had, that the right tended to score high (or
authoritarian) on the measure, while the left tended to score low. When
Roger Brown reviewed the state of the research on authoritarianism in 1965,
his verdict was that the proponents of left-wing authoritarianism had not
proved their case: 'My conclusion, then, is that it has not been demonstrated
that fascists and communists resemble one another in authoritarianism or in
any other dimension of ideology. No one thus far has shown that there is an
authoritarianism of the left.'5 Brown acknowledged, nevertheless, that 'the
impression persists that such a type exists and that some communists belong
to it.'
Stone, in updatiqg the review of the research on these questions, came to
an essentially similar conclusion.6 Examining studies by Barker, DiRenzo,
Hanson, Knutson, and Smithers and Lobley, and finding little convincing
support for the arguments made by Shils and other critics, Stone went so far
as to recommend that we not waste any more time searching for left-wing
authoritarianism.7
Why, then, in light of the uncertain results from available research should
one return to the inquiry and again raise the question of the possible parallels
between left-wing and right-wing radicals?
1
Milton Rokeach. The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, i960).
4
H. J. Eysenck. The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954).
5
Roger Brown. Social Psychology (New York: Free Press, 1965). p. 542.
6
W. F. Stone. 'The Myth of Left-Wing Authoritarianism'. Political Psychology, 11 (1980).
3-19. E. N. Barker, 'Authoritarianism of the Political Right. Center, and Left', Journal of Social
Issues, xix (1968). 63-74: G. J. DiRenzo. Personality, Power, and Politics (Notre Dame. Ind:
University of Notre Dame Press. 1967); D. J. Hanson. Dogmatism Among Authoritarians of
the Right and the Left'. Psychological Studies, xiv (1969). 12-21; J. N. Knutson. 'Psychological
Variables in Political Recruitment', mimeo (Berkeley, Calif.: The Wright Institute, 1974);
A. G. Smithers and D. M. Lobley. 'The Relationship Between Dogmatism and RadicalisnV
Conservatism', in H. J. Eysenck and G. D. Wilson, eds. The Psychological Basis of Ideology
(Lancaster: MPT Press, 1978), pp. 263-72.
7
For a critique of Stone, see Eysenck, 'Left-Wing Authoritarianism: Myth or Reality?', Politi-
cal Psychology, in (1982). 234-8; and for a comment on both Stone and Eysenck, see J. J.
Ray, 'Half of All Authoritarians Are Left-Wing: A Reply to Eysenck and Stone", Political Psycho-
logy, iv (1983), 139-43-
Left- Wing and Right- Wing Radicals 331
SIMILARITIES BET WEEN FAR-LEFT AND FAR-RIGHT REGIMES
One important reason, of course, is that the findings derived from the
available research studies, and especially those using the F scale, do not
correspond to what is obvious from even the most casual observation of actual
political regimes of the far left and far right. No particular expertise is
required to discern the striking similarities in political style, organization, and
practice among, on the one side, such left-wing dictatorships as the Soviet
Union, Communist China, East Germany, Cambodia under Pol Pot, Cuba
under Castro, Albania, Bulgaria, Ethiopia and Angola; and, on the other
side, such right-wing dictatorships as Fascist Italy, Spain under Franco, Nazi
Germany, Portugal under Salazar, Argentina (especially from 1976 to 1983),
Uruguay, Zaire and Chile under Pinochet. One can cite, in addition, a
number of highly repressive dictatorships in which left-wing and right-wing
elements (or at least left-wing and right-wing rhetoric) are so heavily
intermingled that even experts might find it difficult to decide whether to
place them on the left or the right. Possible examples include Ghana, Libya
under Khadaffi, Syria, Iraq and Iran under Khomeini.
Despite variations in the institutions, practices, and symbolic identifications
encountered among such regimes, the parallels among them - regardless of
their nominal ideological classifications-are so conspicuous that one can ignore
them only by a supreme effort of suspending disbelief. All of them are (or
were) severely repressive. All are (or were) single-party political dictatorships
- whether dominated by a strong man, a military junta, a party movement or
some other self-appointed oligarchy. All are essentially police states, relying
heavily on systematic coercion, surveillance, and the ruthless enforcement of
controls to maintain themselves in power. As one-party systems, all prohibit
legal opposition, employ 'managed' or rigged elections (if any), and crush
dissenters and potential critics through censorship, harassment, arrests and
killings. All deny elementary civil liberties — including freedom of speech,
press, association and assembly, as well as the rights of juridical defence, due
process and privacy. Although they differ somewhat in their reliance upon
developed ideologies, all set severe limits on the ideas that can legally be
disseminated and all strive to maintain, in effect, a single belief system and an
official orthodoxy. In varying degree, too, they all exhibit elements of an
apocalyptic, chiliastic perspective, as though they had been authorized to rule
by some higher power (secular or otherwise) in order to bring about the
salvation of mankind and the kingdom of heaven on earth. Even the most
pragmatic, self-aggrandizing military juntas are not entirely free from such
grandiose fantasies.8
" Many of the characteristics set out by Daniel J. Levinson. one of the authors of The
Authoritarian Personality, to describe authoritarianism of the right turn out to be equally
appropriate to a description of regimes of the far left. See his 'Conservatism and Radicialism". in
David L. Sills, ed.. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 12 (New York:
Macmillan. 1968). p. 27.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LEFT-WING AND RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS
Parallels between the left and the right can be discerned not only in the
comparisons of left-wing and right-wing regimes, but in the behaviour of
extreme movements of the left and right that have arisen in the United States
and other free nations. Both the far right and the far left (New Left as well as
Old) have obviously been marked by zeal, hostility to prevailing institutions
and unyielding intolerance towards ideas and beliefs they consider inimical.
Their antagonism is typically fierce not only towards political 'enemies' but
even towards rival groups with similar but not identical ideologies and
objectives. When Stalin, for example, proclaimed the theory of 'social
fascism', which held that the socialist movement was really a front for fascism,
American Communists eagerly embraced the doctrine and proceeded to
embellish it so as to distinguish themselves from the socialists whom they now
portrayed as enemies and traitors. As Max Schactman. a former Trotskyite
leader, observed:
Everything and everybody outside the Communist party was designated as a variety of
fascism. . . . Left-wing socialists, especially those with a friendly attitude toward the
Communists, could not deceive them for a minute; they were left 'Social Fascists' who
tried to hide their aid to fascism under the cunning pretense of being radical.
Anarchists and syndicalists . . . were designated henceforth as nothing but 'Anarcho-
Fascists' and 'Syndical-Fascists'. As forTrotskyists, it leaped to the eye that they were
nothing but Trotskyo-Fascists'. The closer any of these groupings were, or seemed to
be. to the Communist party, the more dangerous they were to it, and the more
ruthlessly they had to be opposed, denounced, and destroyed.9
Although the Trotskyites considered themselves 'defenders' of the Soviet
Union and the champions of its original revolutionary ideals, they were
denounced by the Communists as reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries - a
label that the Trotskyites, in turn, gleefully pinned on the Communists. Any
Communist party member suspected of sharing Trotsky's views or willing to
discuss matters with the Trotskyites (or, at a later point, the Maoists) was
summarily expelled. Meetings scheduled by Trotskyites were violently dis-
rupted by Communist mobs 'armed with lead pipes, blackjacks, clubs, knives,
and similar persuasive arguments'."1 A similar fate befell numerous socialist
gatherings in the course of this perverse Communist war on 'social fascism'.
Thus did the American Communists imitate and acquiesce in the factional
disputes of their Soviet totalitarian counterparts. Their clashes with the
Trotskyites and socialists testify not only to the idolatry with which they
viewed the Soviet leadership, but also to their refusal to tolerate dissenting
viewpoints and their eagerness to crush all individuals and groups who
deviated from the rigidly prescribed 'party line". Similar responses were
evident in the conduct of the Trotskyites, Maoists and other left revolutionar-
ies, then and now.
y
Max Schactman, Radicalism in the Thirties: The Trotskyist View', in R. J. Simon, ed.. As
We Saw the Thirties (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1967). pp. 12-13.
111
Schactman. Radicalism in the Thirties", pp. 12-13.
The virulence and intolerance exhibited towards each other by Stalinists,

Trotskyites and Maoists are legendary, but implacable hatreds and suspicions
towards opponents, critics and competitors, and even efforts to silence them,
can also be detected among New Left militants and right-wing radicals. Many
New Left activists, having suffered setbacks in their struggles against racial
bigotry, social inequality, and American involvement in Vietnam, and
frustrated in their efforts to transform or abolish existing institutions, were
gradually drawn into the political orbits of the old hard-core Marxist-Leninist
movements, in which context they increasingly exhibited the anti-intellectual-
ism, contempt for procedural rights and hostility towards democratic avenues
of change that have long marked the Old Left."
Many New Left radicals came to embrace the thesis of Herbert Marcuse (a
hero of the New Left) that the liberation of American society necessitated the
suppression of certain points of view considered unacceptable.12 A policy of
'repressive tolerance' required the silencing of individuals and groups whose
opinions on important social questions were, from the perspective of radical
left goals, egregious.
In keeping with these views, the New Left, like the more traditional
Marxist-Leninist movements and various movements on the right, took on an
increasingly strident, uncomprising, and repressive tone toward dissenting
viewpoints they deemed to be incorrect or even immoral.11 Hence they
'persistently shouted down or drowned out' opposition speakers, restricted
debate and ejected opponents from their own ranks. They 'howled down'
dissent, manipulated agendas and credentials 'to eliminate "undesirable
elements'", and, in imitation of the organizational style of the Old Left,
suppressed debate and smothered whatever remained of internal
democracy.14 Nor should one overlook the increasing use of violence against
external enemies, the fierce protest demonstrations, the 'trashings' and
destruction of property, and. of course, the growing reliance all over the
world on terrorism as an approved technique of political struggle. Bomb-
ings, hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations, robberies and random destruc-
tion, once regarded by revolutionary organizations as ineffectual tactics of
political struggle, have become fairly common in recent decades, and are
undertaken by militants on both the extreme left and the extreme right.
Hofstadter's description of the 'paranoid style', which he considered the
hallmark of right-wing radicals, also applies in certain key respects to
left-wing radicals, old-style and new.15 In our view, both extremes are
characterized by a tendency to view history as the product of malevolent,
" Peter Clecak. Radical Paradoxes (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
12
Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance', in R. P. Wolff el al.. A Critique of Pure Tolerance
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81-123.
" Nigel Young. An Infantile Disorder? The Crisis and Decline of the New Left (Boulder, Colo:
Westview Press. 1977). p. 341.
14
Young. An Infantile Disorder?, p. 342.
15
Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964).
conspiratorial forces. Though from different perspectives, they both see

America as being at the mercy of a rising tide of moral and spiritual
debauchery. Both tend to vilify the enemy as 'a kind of amoral superman:
sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving'; both hold a
Manichean and militant conception of politics as a struggle of 'whole worlds,
whole political orders, whole systems of human values';16 and both express an
apocalyptic sense of urgency about the need to act quickly and decisively to
halt the slide of a society growing increasingly degenerate.
THE R I G H T - W I N G B I A S OF T H E F S C A L E
In assessing the failure of the research findings on right-wing and left-wing

supporters to exhibit similarities in their attitudes towards democracy, one
should also keep in mind the obvious inappropriateness of the F scale (by far
the most frequently used measure of authoritarianism) as an instrument for
identifying the authoritarians of the left. Not only was the scale primarily
designed (as Levinson points out) to select right-wing authoritarians, but the
contents of the items employed in the scale unmistakably reflect or refer to
opinions, social outlooks, or target groups to which the right is prone to
respond approvingly and the left disapprovingly. Consider, for example, such
items as the following:
The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society
than the artist and the professor.
Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose
decisions he obeys without question.
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought
to get over them and settle down.
Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere
imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love,
gratitude and respect for his parents.
Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely
punished.
While supporters of the left will in some cases subscribe to items of this
type, it is plain that these and certain other items in the F scale will appeal far
more strongly to right-wing than to left-wing sympathizers. The measure, to
be sure, does contain a few items that might appeal to the left as well as the
right, but the scale, taken as a whole, is sharply slanted towards opinions and
values cherished by the right and rejected, for the most part, by the left.
Hence, a research finding showing that the right scores high on the F scale and
that the left scores low demonstrates little if anything about the autoritarian-
ism of the left.
16
Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, pp. 31-2, 29.
C O M P L I C A T I O N S A R I S I N G FROM S A M P L I N G BIAS
Comparisons of the left and right are further complicated by sampling bias. A
major difficulty here is that the supporters of the left - and especially the
hard-core left - almost invariably resist efforts to entice them to participate in
survey inquiries that probe into their opinions, attitudes, motivations,
affiliations or activities. Our own efforts over the years to persuade left-wing
militants to co-operate in the surveys we have conducted have largely proved
fruitless - an outcome which, to judge from the samples discussed in the
published research literature, has been shared, with perhaps a few possible
exceptions, by almost all other investigators doing survey research on far-left
radicals.17
Thus, of the American left-wing respondents typically surveyed (or other-
wise interviewed) by research investigators, few are hard-core revolutionaries
in the classical mould. Nearly all are college-educated, young (mainly
students, in fact), more intellectual than most, secular, cosmopolitan in
orientation, recently recruited and (very likely) transient radicals who
because of their location in the social structure have been repeatedly exposed
to the norms of the prevailing liberal democratic political culture - norms that
they are bound to have absorbed to some extent and still retain to some
degree. In their social characteristics and their relation to the existing political
culture, they differ in important ways from the respondents who turn up in
most surveys of the radical right - the latter being, on average, less educated,
older, more rural, more parochial, more religious and less intellectual. Most
left-wing survey respondents also differ from the hard-core revolutionaries of
the left in that the latter are likely to be older, no longer students, engaged in
political organizational work of some type, radicals of long standing and
deeply immersed in a Marxist-Leninist (or other revolutionary) subculture
that is profoundly antagonistic towards American mainstream values.
In short, the left-wing samples whose responses are reported in most of the
17
There have been, of course, some excellent studies of such radical organizations as the
American Communist party that draw primarily on historical and documentary materials, along,
perhaps, with the selective interviewing of certain individuals (often, former members). While
these studies are able to provide significant insights into the activities, social composition,
leadership, tactics, and historical development of certain radical movements, they do not sample
the responses of the membership as such and do not make it possible, for example, to compare
systematically the beliefs and values of supporters of the far left with those on the far right.
Examples of such studies include Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New
York: Viking Press, 1957), and American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York: Viking
Press, i960); Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1961); Harvey Klehr, Communist Cadre: The Social Background of the Ameri-
can Party Elite (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978), and The Heyday of American
Communism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Philip Selznick, Organizational Weapons:
A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952). Noteworthy studies
that involve some measure of interviewing party members (or former party members) are Gabriel
Almond. The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), and
Morris Ernst and David Loth, Report on the American Communist (New York: Henry Holt,
•952)-
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
available research cannot be assumed to be truly representative of the

hard-core revolutionary left, a circumstance that makes the reported com-
parisons between the radical left and radical right less revealing than they
might otherwise be. Given what one can intuitively observe about the conduct
of hard-core revolutionary activists (whether members of the Old Left or New
Left), one can only assume that surveys of a more representative sample of
such left-wing militants would reveal that, in their attitudes towards demo-
cracy and authoritarianism, they resemble the radical right more closely than
the available research has so far shown.
THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN LEFT AS A PERSECUTED MINORITY
One should keep in mind also that the portrait of the radical left that emerges
from a survey of its American supporters is strongly coloured by the way they
see themselves in relation to the political system. As an ineffectual revolution-
ary sect functioning in a society that is largely hostile to its values and
activities, the far left in the United States views itself as a beleaguered,
persecuted minority, as the actual or potential victims of surveillance,
censorship and repression. Unlike their left revolutionary confederates who
have seized power in other countries, and who retain it through ideological
manipulation, bureaucratic controls and crushing reliance on force, American
radicals are outsiders and deviants - victims (in their own eyes), rather than
persecutors, the targets rather than the perpetrators of repression. This view
of themselves as an oppressed political minority naturally inclines them to
express greater support than they otherwise might for the rights of speech,
assembly, publication and due process, especially when these rights are
perceived as affecting the treatment of left-wing radicals and the groups with
which they identify. As a deviant and beleaguered minority, they become
defenders of nonconformity, critics of 'police brutality', and champions of
free elections and the rights of opposition parties. Since one has reason to
believe that radical support for these and other democratic stands is largely
self-serving, motivated by the particular circumstances in which they function
(their revolutionary allies abroad, after all, overwhelmingly reject these
democratic stands when they are in power), any assessment of what American
left-wing radicals 'really' believe about democratic rights or authoritarian rule
cannot be reliably inferred from their public statements on human rights.
Such differences as one might encounter in comparing the views of the far left
and the far right with respect to, say, authoritarianism and civil liberties, are
doubtless, to some extent, spurious, the products of social location
and political expediency rather than principle or intellectual and moral
conviction.
HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES
We cannot claim in the present study to have overcome all of the difficulties
involved in comparing the motivations and beliefs of the far left and far right.
For example, although we have managed to collect excellent samples of

right-wing activists, we have not been able to enlist the co-operation of
hard-core left-wing organizations and their members in our surveys, and our
left-wing sympathizers' samples are therefore less 'pure' and less militant than
we would like. Nevertheless, we have been able to identify in each of several
of our national samples a small number of individuals who, by their embrace
of various left-wing beliefs and values and their rejection of right-wing beliefs
and values (as shown by their scores on carefully devised far-left and far-right
scales), can be classified with some confidence as sympathetic to the far left.
Their responses to various issue and attitude questions also correspond to
what we know from experience and intuitive observation about left-wing
beliefs on those questions. (A similar procedure, appropriately adjusted, was
used to select samples of the far right.) Other respondents can be (and have
been) classified as 'moderates', i.e., respondents who reject the views of both
the left and the right, and thus score Mow' on both the far-left and far-right
scales. Samples reflecting each of these ideological tendencies have been
drawn from our Opinions and Values survey (OVS 1976-77), our Civil
Liberties survey (CLS 1978-79), and our earlier survey of Political Affiliation
and Belief (PAB 1958).18
For reasons already stated, we expected to find that far-left and far-right
radicals, if properly screened and selected through appropriate procedures,
would resemble each other in a number of important ways having to do with
radical zeal, tactics, political style, and political and psychological inflexibil-
ity. We further expected them to exhibit distrust of democratic institutions
and practices and other key aspects of American society; to express reluct-
ance to grant civil liberties to critics and opponents; and to display intolerance
towards individuals and groups whose views conflict with their own. We also
anticipated, however, that, in the United States at least, the two extremes
would diverge on a number of ideological or programmatic values that
generally divide liberals from conservatives, including egalitarianism,
religion, chauvinism, ethnocentrism, tradition, law and order, and free
enterprise capitalism.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FAR-LEFT SCALES
The far-left scales employed in the present study were designed to locate
'hard-core' left-wing radicals whose beliefs comport with those held by the
18
The Civil Liberties study employed a national cross-section sample of 1,993 adult Americans
and 1,891 community leaders drawn from various vocations. The OVS study employed a national
cross-section of 938 respondents and a number of additional samples of opinion leaders drawn
from twenty-three national organizations, most of them strongly ideological and active in public
affairs. The PAB study utilized a national cross-section sample of 1,484 adults and 3,020 political
leaders who served as delegates to the 1956 Democratic and Republican conventions. For a fuller
description of the studies, see Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance: What
Americans Believe About Civil Liberties (New York: Basic Books, Russell Sage Foundation,
1983), pp. 25-31,467-73-
more militant revolutionaries of the past few decades. For example, the items
in the left-wing scale of the OVS survey express many of the standard radical
perspectives on American society, including the belief that unconventional or
illegal methods are necessary to put the country on the right course; that the
United States stands to benefit from the example provided by Communist
nations; that the American form of government is 'one of the worst' and is
'rotten to the core'; that the United States has systematically pursued a policy
of imperialism and world domination in the past quarter century; that
individual terrorist or guerrilla acts 'are often the only way an oppressed
group can win its rights'; that the best way to solve this country's problems 'is
to overturn the whole society from top to bottom'; and that violence will
probably be needed to change the system.19
These are strong statements, obviously extreme in the context of American
political discourse, as evidenced by the tiny proportions of respondents in our
various elite and mass samples who endorse the radical alternative included in
each of the items. In the present paper, we have focused only on respondents
from the elite samples in OVS, since these samples contain the most
ideologically intense and politically active individuals. Our purpose here was
to compare in the most meaningful way available to us the far left, the far
right and the political moderates. This was accomplished by including in the
far-left group all respondents who selected a radical response on at least eight
of the fourteen far-left scale items. Although it resulted in a smaller sample
than we desired, we chose a relatively high cut-off point in order to ensure
that we had identified respondents who actually endorsed significant aspects
of radical left ideology and who therefore were not simply 'relatively' left
within the context of the larger sample.2"
Our concern to obtain 'pure' samples had, however, to give way to a
measure of expediency when we selected a far-left group out of the Civil
Liberties survey. While the far-left scale from the Civil Liberties survey
includes some of the same items that are in the far-left scale of the Opinions
and Values survey, it also contains several items that are less extreme in their
radicalism. Furthermore, in order to acquire a sufficient number of cases for
analysis, we included in the far-left sample of the CLS all respondents who
19
For a full list of items in the far-left scale, see Appendix I.
20
It should be noted that all of the far-left respondents in the OVS and Civil Liberties surveys
scored "low" on the far-right scale: similarly, all of the far-right respondents in these two studies
scored low' on the far-left scale. In the PAB study, there were a small number of respondents
who scored 'high' on both the far-left and far-right scales. We have eliminated such respondents
by selecting out for purposes of analysis only those extreme believers who scored high on one of
the radicalism scales and low on the other. The reason for this was to screen out respondents
whose careless response tendencies led them to answer not only inconsistently but chaotically.
While there is, of course, a degree of overlap between the left and the right in certain of their
values, attitudes and tactical perspectives, we concluded, after inspection, that scoring high on
both scales was less a measure of a meaningful ideological statement than a sign of carelessness
and even mindlessness in response style. Hence we chose, though with some misgivings, to
exclude those respondents from the analysis.
Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals 339
chose the radical response to only six or more of the fourteen far-left items. In
addition, the far-left respondents in the CLS were drawn from the general
population sample, in contrast to the highly participant, elite respondents in
the OVS, who are actively involved in political advocacy and public affairs
and who, from all available evidence, are inclined to embrace political ideas
more intensely and to find ideological issues more salient than do respondents
in the general population. Hence, we have reason to believe that the far-left
sample in the CLS is less intensely radical and militant than the far-left sample
in the OVS study. These differences in the nature of the samples in the two
surveys should be kept in mind when interpreting the data to be presented
shortly, since, as a result, the degree of similarity between left-wing and
right-wing radicals will usually be smaller in the Civil Liberties survey than in
the OVS. Likewise, the contrast between the far-left respondents and the
moderates in the Civil Liberties survey will also be reduced.
The ten items chosen for the far-left scale in the Political Affiliation and
Belief survey closely resembled in content the items employed in OVS. They
differ in format, however, in that the PAB items are in the agree-disagree
form while the OVS (and CLS) items are of the sentence-completion/forced-
choice type (see Appendix I).
C O N S T R U C T I O N OF T H E F A R - R I G HT S C A L E S
Like the far-left scales, the OVS far-right scales are designed to select out
right-wing radicals among our samples of opinion leaders and activists, while
the CLS version serves the purpose of identifying sympathizers of the radical
right in the general population.
The OVS far-right scale consists of fourteen items which reflect many of the
standard views associated with the radical right, including such beliefs as the
following: 2 '
Communism is so evil that we should go to any length to destroy it.
The United States was meant to be a Christian nation.
Any American who shows disrespect for the flag should be turned over to patriots to
be taught a lesson.
An American who doesn't believe that this is the best country in the world doesn't
deserve to live here.
Most campus protests and anti-war demonstrations . . . are secretly organized by
foreign agents.
War is cruel, but it does teach people something about honor, loyalty, and courage.
A s these examples suggest, the items we designed for the far-right scale
were strongly flavoured and somewhat provocative in tone, on the assump-
tion that traditional conservatives but not right-wing radicals might be
deterred from endorsing them. Presumably, although conservatives share
many of the same values as the radical right (as our data show), they will be
less likely to approve of statements that are, so to speak, 'beyond the pale'.
21
For the full list of scale items, see A p p e n d i x II.
As in the classification of the far-left respondents, the choice of a cutting

point to decide who should be included among the far right involved a
balancing of practical criteria: one had to ensure not only that enough
respondents were included for purpose of analysis, but also that the right-
wing respondents, as classified by the far-right scale, were 'extreme' or
'radical' in their political beliefs. With these considerations in mind, we
decided that any respondent who endorsed ten or more of the fourteen items
belonged in the far-right group.
The nine-item far-right scale in the Civil Liberties study is very similar in
composition to the far-right scale in the Opinion and Values survey,
containing four of the same items. In classifying respondents in the Civil
Liberties survey, any person endorsing the right-wing alternative on at least
eight of the items was considered a supporter of the far right. The twelve
items in the far-right scale of the PAB survey also resemble in content the
items in OVS, though they were cast in the agree-disagree format.
In all of the subsequent tests, we also provide data on the responses of
political moderates, in addition to the data on the two radical camps. The
responses of the moderates provide us with a baseline against which to
evaluate the scores of right-wing and left-wing radicals.22
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FAR LEFT AND FAR RIGHT
There are many overt ways in which left-wing and right-wing politics stand in
sharp contrast to each other. The left harbours the notion that the people are
trapped by the oppressive., dehumanizing institutions of capitalist society, and
it plans to 'liberate' these people by making them aware of their impoverished
existence. The left, therefore, exhorts people to question their 'slavish'
acceptance of the status quo, to renounce their materialist aspirations, and to
become aware of their 'true' needs as opposed to the 'false consciousness' and
artificial desires created by a manipulative, profit-seeking, commercial cul-
ture.
As perceived by the right wing, the aspirations of the left constitute today's
reality and its nightmare, so to speak. Whereas the left's message is
liberation, the right's call is for control, self-abnegation and the reversal of
decadent trends. In contrast to the conservatives' respect and praise for the
existing social order, the extreme right repudiates many current practices and
seeks dramatic and often drastic measures to set society on a more acceptable
course.
The fundamental philosophical and programmatic differences between the
far left and far right are reflected in the scores of the two extreme camps on a
number of attitude measures reported in Figure i.33 For instance, on the
" In addition to the far-left and far-right scales, a number of scales were constructed to assess
responses to the dependent variables considered in this study. The findings on these scales,
and on some of the items they include, are presented below.
::(
We might observe, parenthetically, that the differences between the far left and far right on
these measures lend a degree of construct validity to the far-left and far-right scales and help to
clarify the appropriateness of the far-left and far-right responses.
OVS Scales
Conventionality Traditional family values Sexual freedom
(% High) (% High) (% High)
98
100 100 100
71 71 78
18
Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far

left right left right left right
(48)" (1,334) (151) (48) (1,334) (151) (48) (1,334) (151)
Racial equality Women's rights Welfare

98 92 98
100 100 100
72 69 67
1 1

(48) (1,334) (151) (48) (1,334) (151) (48) 11,334) (151)
PAB Scales
Business attitudes Chauvinism Religiosity
100 90- 100 100
43 42
34
16 19
11
0
(71) (1,592) (243) (71) (1,592) (243) (71) 11,592) (243)
• Sample size
Fig. I. Differences between the far left and the far right
'conventionality' scale, which assesses attitudes towards traditional practices

and customary forms of behaviour, 71 per cent of the far-right sample score
in the 'high' category, compared to 0 per cent of the far-left sample. The
sample of political moderates is the intermediate group, although it tends
to be closer to the far left than to the far right on this dimension.
The same pattern of responses turns up on the 'family values' scale, which
measures preference for either firm, authoritarian child-rearing practices or a
more democratic approach. Here the far right clearly leans in the direction of
strong parental control (71 per cent) while the overwhelming majority of the
far left (92 per cent) support an approach in which children are granted a
voice in family matters.
This sharp division between the left and the right also surfaces in their
responses to the measure of attitudes towards 'sexual freedom', which
includes questions on homosexuality, sexual content in movies, sex education
for schoolchildren and freedom of sexual conduct between adults. On this
dimension, there is a precipitous decline in support for sexual freedom as we
go from far left to far right on the ideological continuum. Ninety-eight per.
cent of the far-left group fall in the 'high support' category, compared with 78
per cent of the moderates, while, in stark contrast, none of the far-right
respondents can be found in the 'high' category.
As for racial equality and women's rights, the far left again stands in sharp
opposition to the far right, expressing greater support for both forms of
equality. The political moderates, as befits their label, fall towards the middle
of the distribution but, once again, hold attitudes which are somewhat closer
to the far left than to the far right.
In their attitudes towards social welfare policies, the contrast between
the far left and the far right, as one might expect, is almost total, with 98 per
cent of the far left expressing strong support as against a mere 1 per cent
of the far right. Similarly, on a measure assessing support for laissez-faire
economic practices, the left and right are almost 80 per cent apart in their
endorsement of these practices, with each group scoring in the expected
direction.
The marked contrast between left and right in their scores on social and
economic issues is repeated on measures of national chauvinism or super-
patriotism and religious devotion. Over 40 per cent of the far right score high
on the chauvinism scale, compared to only 2 per cent of the moderates and
none of the far left, with 'high' scores reflecting intolerance towards immi-
grants, inordinate concern over the potential contamination of America by
foreign ideas, fervent allegiance to the 'American way of life', and underlying
suspicions about the trustworthiness of America's allies.
Finally, the much higher scores of the far right on the religiosity measure
reflects their greater propensity to believe in the Bible as the word of God,
the second coming of Christ, the relationship between godlessness and social
disorder, and the importance of religious belief to the well-being of
society.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE FAR LEFT AND FAR RIGHT
The strength of these and other programmatic differences between the radical
left and radical right frequently act to obscure the characteristics that are
shared by the two camps. These similarities are essentially of two varieties.
Certain of them result from the mutual estrangement of the radical left and
right from the political mainstream, while others reflect the common political
and psychological style that infuses and colours right-wing and left-wing
rhetoric and activity. In the first category we would place the dissatisfaction of
the two camps with the status quo, their resentment towards mainstream
politicians and political practices, and their support of populist campaigns
that promise the return of political power to the 'masses' (so labelled by the
left) or the 'common people' (so labelled by the right). The characteristics in
the second category include intolerance of ambiguity, intolerance towards
political opponents, attraction to totalitarian measures and tactics, intoler-
ance of human frailty, and paranoid tendencies - including a belief in
conspiracy and feelings of persecution.
ESTRANGEMENT FROM GOVERNMENT

While the far left and far right disagree strongly about the proper role of
government in society, they share a common antipathy towards politicians as
well as towards the ways in which the government operates. As the Political
Affiliation and Belief data in Figure 2 reveal, radicals at either extreme are
more likely than political moderates to be cynical and suspicious about
politics. Both extreme groups also have less faith in the workings of
democracy. As their responses to the specific items in Table 1 indicate,
left-wing and right-wing radicals tend to believe that politicians covet public
office for reasons of personal gain rather than service to their constituents.
They are also more likely than moderates to believe that politicians conceal
their true aims and will tell voters anything that helps to get them elected.
Faith in democracy Faith in politics Faith in politicians

100 100 100

71 79
54
36 40
29 28
16 16

(71) (1,592) (243) (71) (1,592) (243) (71) (1,592) (243)
Fig. 2. Estrangement from politics (PAB scale scores)

TABLE I Estrangement from Politics (PAB)

Percentage agreeing
with each item
Item Far left Moderate Far right

No matter what the people think, a few
people will always run things anyway 29-2 19-7 5i-o
It seems to me that whoever you vote for.
things go on pretty much the same 192 145 3 6-6
The people who really 'run' the country
do not even get known to the voters 74-o 27-2 59-3
No politician dares tell the voters
exactly how he really feels 43-8 20-1 47'9
Politicians do not care much about what
they say, so long as they get elected 57-5 19-8 56-3
The best way to get elected is to put
on a good show 35-6 62-8
Most politicians are in politics for
what they can get out of it personally 40-0 21-8 50-0
Most political parties care only about
winning elections and nothing more 361 19-3
(72) (1.587) (243)
Furthermore, radicals are more inclined to believe that electoral outcomes

are meaningless, having little bearing on the policies subsequently pursued by
the victors.
Similar findings, reported in Table 2, turn up in the Opinions and Values
survey, although here the antagonism towards the government is clearly
stronger among the far left. Large majorities of the radical left, often
approaching unanimity, feel that government leaders cannot be taken at their
word, and that the government is unresponsive to the wishes and needs of the
people. Although the far right is also more disenchanted with government
than are the moderates, the degree of its alientation is less intense than that of
the radical left.
As their responses to the items in Table 2 indicate, the political cynicism of
the radical left and radical right goes beyond discontent with current office
holders to a more fundamental dissatisfaction with the system itself. It is
evident from Table 3A, for example, that both groups share a conspiratorial
interpretation of American politics. By large margins, left-wing and right-
wing radicals are more likely than moderates to believe that the important
political decisions are made in secret by people beyond the public eye, and
that people are duped into thinking that they govern themselves when, in
fact, 'they really don't'. By margins greater than two to one, the far left and
TABLE 2 Political Cynicism (OVS)

Percentage reading
down
Most of the things government leaders
tell us:
—Can't really be believed 917 26-8 47-0
—Are true 00 199 '5-9
(Decline to choose) 8-3 53-3 37-1
Most of the time our system of
government:
—Disregards what the people want 85-4 13-9 26-5
—Tries to do what the people want 00 52-5 52-3
(Decline to choose) 146 33-5 21-2
People with my point of view who

go to a government official with
a problem:
—Are not likely to be listened to 85-4 172 37-7
—Can expect a fair hearing 00 510 45-o
(Decline to choose) 14-6 3i-7 17-3
(N) (48) (1,334) (15O
TABLE 3A Paranoid Tendencies (PAB)

Percentage agreeing
with each item
We'd be much better off now if our
foreign affairs were conducted out
in the open, for all to see, rather
than secretly 66-7 51-7
Most of the news we get from the
press and the radio is deliberately
slanted to mislead us 600 16-4 31-8
I often feel that the really
important matters are decided
behind the scenes by people we never
even hear about 77-8 32-0 69-4
The people think they govern
themselves, but they really don't 54-8 n-2 51-5
(AQ (72) (1,576) (242)
TABLE 3B Paranoid Tendencies (PAH scale scores)

Percentage reading down
Score Far left Moderate Far right

Low 205 65 9 259
Middle 38-4 25-8 420
High 41 1 8-4 32-1
(N) (73) (1.592) (243)
far right are more likely than the political moderates to say that our foreign
policy is being 'secretly' formulated. Both are also far more likely than
moderates to assert that radio broadcasts and newspaper stories are 'deliber-
ately slanted' to deceive the public.
These political suspicions and conspiratorial notions seem to be manifesta-
tions of a more basic paranoid tendency which both camps exhibit in a variety
of contexts. Our data show that in everyday interpersonal matters, radicals at
both extremes strongly believe that they are not given their proper due and
that they are often mistreated and misunderstood by people. They are also
more prone to feel slighted and persecuted by others and to believe that few
people in the world can really be trusted 'when you get right down to it'.
On the overall 'paranoid tendencies' scale (see Table 3B), the similarity
between the radical right and radical left, and the contrast between the
moderates and both extremes, are high-lighted with striking clarity. Over 40
per cent of the far left and 32 per cent of the far right score 'high' on paranoid
tendencies, compared to only 8 per cent of the moderates.
CONFLICTING SOURCES OF POLITICAL DISENCHANTMENT
Despite the suspicions of both the left and right towards the government,
their anti-system responses are usually triggered by different issues. In
responding, for example, to a series of items concerning the influence of the
wealthy and powerful on the courts, the nation's laws, the newspapers and the
political parties, the far left was the most willing of the ideological groups to
condemn these institutions as pawns of the rich. None of this is surprising, of
course, since hostility to capitalist elites and the establishment has long been a
dominant feature of radical-left politics.
But the radical right is also disenchanted with these institutions, though for
different reasons. Its anger is detonated, not by the institutions' alleged
association with wealth or 'business', but by their supposed susceptibility to
the influence of an entrenched liberal establishment. In their view, govern-
ment offices, the press, the foundations and other powerful institutions are
overflowing with technocrats and academics trained at liberal colleges and
universities. These universities are also the 'farm system' that stocks the
judiciary and various other professions.
Thus, paradoxically, despite their patriotic fervour, spokesmen of the
radical right are profoundly antagonistic towards the status quo. They
continually lash out against what they consider to be the government's
conciliatory stance towards Communism, its support for welfare programmes
(which, in their view, rewards laziness and lack of initiative), its encourage-
ment of moral depravity (sexual licence, tolerance of abortion, homosexual-
ity, etc.), and its lenient treatment of criminals.
Both extremes also vilify the media for providing biased versions of
political and social reality, catering to special interests and collaborating with
government officials to mislead the public. However, whereas the left believes
the media to be the captives of the right and the servants of a reactionary
state, the right sees them as blatantly left-wing, purveyors of filth, porn-
ography, a decadent morality and bankrupt liberal or radical programmes.
Thus, the source of current right-wing anti-establishment rhetoric stems
from the right's conviction that the establishment perpetuates an immoral
leftist philosophy and not so much that it caters to corporate interests. Such
anti-corporate sentiments were far more prevalent in the populist movements
of, say, the People's party and Huey Long than in the current incarnation
of the radical right.
The different bases for radical-right and radical-left antagonism towards
American society is brought out dramatically by their responses to an item in
Table 4 which asks whether they believe the American system in recent years
has been drifting either 'to the right, toward fascism', or 'to the left, toward
communism'. Whereas political moderates tend to say that neither is the case,
large majorities of the far left and far right continually warn that the country
is moving towards the opposite political extreme. Thus, in contrast to a
judicious assessment that American society may have moved somewhat in
either a liberal or a conservative direction, the radicals of the left and right
insist on the more dire conclusion that America is approaching the abyss
represented by either communism or fascism - depending on the ideological
vantage point of the doomsayer. Such apocalyptic forebodings symbolize the
crude and indiscriminate political analysis habitual among extremists on both
sides. Witness, for example, the conviction on the far right that the
government is the pawn of the communists and the parallel conviction among
the far left that it is the pawn of the capitalists. Moreover, their eagerness to
label as 'fascist' or 'communist' any competing ideology or any social change
that departs from their programmatic goals is consistent with the findings
we shall present on their intolerance of ambiguity and their unbounded hosti-
lity towards opponents.
In Table 4, we see that the adherents of the radical right go so far as to
accuse liberals and left-wing radicals actually of having 'sold America out' to
the communists. They also protest that too much money is being spent on
social welfare programmes and not enough on military defence, whereas the
far left holds the contrary view. Similarly, the two camps also differ in
criticizing the government and the courts for being too hard, or too easy, on
lawbreakers and protesters.
TABLE 4 Sources of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Political Disaffection

(OVS)
Percentage reading
down

In recent years the American system has
been drifting
—To the right, toward fascism 8. -3 24-1 2-6
—To the left, toward communism 00 14-7 8.-5
(Decline to choose) i8-8 6l-2 '5-9
The spread of communism after
World War II
—Can't be blamed on any American
group in particular 70-8 77-i 4-6
—Was the fault of certain liberals
and left-wing radicals who sold
America out o-o 6-o 8q-4
Too much of our money is going for:

—Military defence 100-0 65-5 o-o
—Social welfare programs 00 14-2 97-4
One reason modern government has grown
so big and complicated is that:
—They do so many things that people
need and want 57-9 20
—They do things that people should
do for themselves 4-2 19-5 960
(Decline to choose) 22'6 2-0
54-2
In your opinion the courts are:
—Too hard 4-9 0-0
—Too easy on people who break 25-0
the law 8-3 366 980
In handling protest demonstrations,
the government has usually been:
—Too tough 896 42-7 0-7
—Too easy o-o 7-7 921
(Decline to choose) 10-4 496 7-3
(N) (48) (>-334) ('50
POPULISM
Elements of traditional populist mistrust of American institutions can also be

discerned in the rhetoric of both the far left and the far right. It is, however,
evident from the OVS data presented above that the populist suspicion of big
TABLE 5 Populism (PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item

The East has always had far too much
say about the affairs of this country 26-4 160 55-8
One of our main troubles is that
the big Wall Street money men still
have things too much their own way
in this country 904 290 17-7
We could probably solve most of our
big national problems if government
could actually be brought back to the
people at the grassroots 56-9 38-8 85 1
Most people know enough to be able
to hold down the job of a congressman 37-5 18-1 28'0
In the long run, I'll put my trust in
the 'simple down-to-earth' thinking
of ordinary people rather than
'the theories of experts and
intellectuals' 36-6 45-i 88'0
(N) (72) (1.583) (243)
business is more characteristic of the left wing than the right wing - a finding
corroborated by the PAB results presented in Table 5. On the other hand, the
right's populist fervour surfaces in its attacks on such favourite targets as
intellectuals, the (liberal) Eastern establishment, mainstream politics and
politicians, and big government in general.
Of particular note are the items in Table 5 that have to do with the special
virtues of the mythical common man and the superiority of 'grass roots'
government. Here we find that when populist sentiments exalting the
superiority of the average man are untainted by obvious ideological cues -
such as references to business or intellectuals which tend to polarize the left
and right - they tend to be endorsed by both the extreme right and extreme
left.
In contrast to the policies of the contemporary American right, both the
nineteenth-century populism of the People's party and Huey Long's iron-
fisted version of populist rule in the 1930s contained broad streaks of
economic liberalism. Unlike these earlier populist movements, the contem-
porary American right (with the exception of the George Wallace movement)
has few liberal economic planks. Indeed, the New Right calls, in effect, not
only for the abolition of the welfare state but for the virtual dismantling of
much of the governmental apparatus, with the exception of the police and the
defence establishment.
PAB OVS PAB

Intolerance of Intolerance of Psychological
ambiguity ambiguity rigidity
100 100 81 100

75
63
49
33 39
25 27
19
0 0 0
171) (1.592) (243) (48) (1.334) (151) (73) (1,592) (243)
Fig. 3. Intolerance of ambiguity and rigidity (scale scores)
Hence, the major focus of the contemporary far right - reminiscent of

certain strains of the populist tradition - is on the moral disintegration of
American society. Today, the far right sees this disintegration manifested in
the legalization of abortion, the prohibition of organized prayer in the public
schools, the weakening of patriotism, the increase in drug abuse, premarital
sexual activity, homosexuality, divorce and the alleged decline of family
values, and the proliferation of pornography.
INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY
Evidence from the OVS and PAB survey reveals that both left-wing and
right-wing extremists show high levels of intolerance of ambiguity and
psychological rigidity (see Figure 3). On these dimensions, both the far right
and far left are substantially more rigid and intolerant of ambiguity than the
moderates.
This finding is expressed with particular clarity in their responses to the
items in Table 6. Both the left and the right, for instance, are much more
likely than moderates to believe that in politics, there is no middle ground -
people are 'either with you or against you'. They prefer to take a stand on the
issues rather than to remain uncommitted, even if it means being wrong. They
tend to believe that there is only one answer to important social and
philosophical issues. And they are less willing to settle for compromises in the
political arena, as indicated by their greater tendency to agree to the
statement that 'in politics you should settle for nothing less than total
victory'.24
24
Further analysis shows that left radicals are also more intolerant of ambiguity than
conservatives. Liberals are the most tolerant of ambiguity, but it is the conservatives who rank
second. Nevertheless, liberals are considerably more tolerant of ambuiguity than conservatives
(39 per cent of the liberals in OVS score 'low' on the scale compared to only 19 per cent of the
conservatives).
TABLE 6 Intolerance of Ambiguity (OVS and PAB)

Percentage reading
down
On important public issues, I believe

you should:
—Always keep in mind that there is
more than one side to most issues 41-7 80-9 46-4
—Either be for them or against them
and not take a middle course 39-6 8-4 47-0
(Decline to choose) i8-7 10-7 6-6
Which is better:
—To remain undecided 20-8 44'5 28-5
—To take a stand on an issue even
if it's wrong 43-8 27-2 45-0
When it comes to the really important

questions about religion and philosophy
of life:
—It doesn't especially bother me
to leave them undecided 29-2 42-1 14-6
—A person must decide them, one
way or the other 58-3 373 79-5
In trying to accomplish anything in politics

you should:
—Settle for nothing less than
total victory 16-7 1-3 25-8
—Try to achieve the best possible
compromise 45-8 88'2 60-3
(Decline to choose) 37-5 io-5 13-9
(N for OVS items) (48) (i,334) (I5i:
People who say they are 'open-minded'

are just looking for an excuse to
avoid making up their minds 51-4 296 610
I believe that you're really for

something or against it, and
anything in between is just an
excuse to avoid the issue 61 1 389 77-8
People who try to steer a 'middle

course' are usually just afraid to
take a stand 63-0 24^8 53-9
(N for PAB items) (72) (1,584) (241)
352 MCCLOSKY A N D CHONG
TABLE 7 Tolerance of Left-Wing Expression (CLS and OVS)

Percentage reading
down

Protesters who mock the president by
wearing death masks at one of his
public speeches:
—Should have the right to
appear in any kind of
costume they want 47-4 52-3 105
—Should be removed from the
audience by the police 22-3 807
(N of CLS sample) (19) (197) (57)
When it comes to free speech, extremists:
—Should have the same rights as
everyone else 87-5 9'-3 39-1
—Should not be allowed to spread
their propaganda 0-0 o-8 44-4
'Crackpot' ideas:
—Have as much right to be heard
as sensible ideas 70-8 85-4 29-8
—Sometimes have to be censored
for the public good 8-3 5-7 57-o
(N of OVS sample) (48) (150
S U P P O R T FOR C I V I L L I B E R T I E S
While it is widely assumed that the left diverges sharply from the right in its
support of civil liberties, there are reasons, many of them already suggested,
to question this assumption. We have, for example, previously noted the far
left's arguments for 'repressive tolerance', which counsels intolerance to-
wards groups the far left regards as inimical to its cherished values. Hence, we
should expect the far left to parcel out tolerance in a very instrumental
fashion, supporting civil liberties for those with whom they agree or sym-
pathize, but not for those whose beliefs or conduct they regard as egregious.
These expectations are strongly borne out by the data. When we examine
the tolerance of left-wing radicals towards atheists, political 'extremists',
'crackpots', and critics of the government, we find that they are almost as
permissive as the moderates, while the radical right is the least tolerant. (See
Table 7 for examples.)
However, the far left is much less libertarian when confronted with groups
or individuals of whom it disapproves. This contrast is brought out, for
example, on items measuring support for academic freedom in the university.
TABLE 8 Tolerance of Right-Wing Expression (CLS)

Percentage of replies
to each item1
A humor magazine which ridicules or
makes fun of blacks, women, or other
minority groups:
—Should have the same right as
any other magazine to print
what it wants 42-1 73-0 40-4
—Should lose its mailing
privileges 368 6-6 33-3
(Decline to choose) H I 20-4 16-3
If the majority in a referendum votes
to stop publication of newspapers
that preach race hatred:
—No one, not even the majority
of voters, should have the
right to close down a newspaper 27-8 51-3 36-8
—Such newspapers should be
closed down 50-0 21-3 42-1
(Decline to choose) 22-2 27-4 211
The movie industry:
—Should be free to make movies
on any subject it chooses 632 7O9 15.8
—Should not be permitted to
make movies that offend certain
minorities or religious groups 36-8 6-6 49-1
(Decline to choose) OO 22-4 35-1
A group that wants to buy advertising
space in a newspaper to advocate war
against another country:
—Should have as much right to
buy advertising space as a
group that favors world peace 211 37'9 17-5
—Should be turned down by the
newspaper 68-4 31-3 70-2
(N) (19) (196) (57)
Asked whether one is ever justified in refusing to hire a professor because of

his 'unusual political beliefs', left radicals are more likely than any other
group to say such action cannot be justified. In this case, presumably, they
recognize that their own interests are likely to be at stake. In contrast, on the
issue of whether a university should refuse to hire a professor because 'he
believes certain races are inferior', radicals of the left and right are more
likely than the moderates to assert that such action 'may be necessary if his
views are really extreme'.
TABLE 9 Tolerance of Nazis and the Klan (CLS)

Percentage reading
down

When groups like the Nazis or other
extreme groups require police
protection at their rallies and
marches, the community should:
—Supply and pay for whatever
police protection is needed 26-3 27-2 17-5
—Prohibit such groups from
holding rallies because of the
costs and dangers involved 57-9 369 77-2
(Decline to choose) • 5-8 5-3
If some students at a college want
to form a 'Campus Nazi Club': 35-9
—They should be allowed to do so 211 7-0
—College officials should ban
such clubs from campus 68-4 38-5
33-8 89-5
(Decline to choose) 10-5 27-7 3'5
Should groups like the Nazis and
Ku Klux Klan be allowed to appear
on public television to state their
views?
—Yes, should be allowed no matter
who is offended 368 38-1 22-8
—No, because they would offend
certain racial or religious
groups 368 23-4 57-9
(AO 09) (195) (57)
As can be seen in Table 8, both the far left and the far right are much more
inclined than the moderates to allow a majority to close down newspapers
that preach race hatred; both are also far more willing than moderates to take
away the mailing privileges of a humorous magazine that makes fun of blacks,
women and other minorities; both would prevent film-makers from producing
films that offend minorities or religious groups, and both would prohibit a
group from purchasing advertising space in order to advocate war against a
foreign country.
Similarly, on a series of questions asked in the Civil Liberties survey
concerning the rights of Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan to appear on public
television, to establish a campus organization, to receive police protection for
a public rally, etc., the far left exhibits less tolerance than moderates. (See
Table 9.)
TABLE 10 Tolerance of Right-Wing Expression (OVS)

Percentage reading
down

If a speaker at a public meeting
begins to make racial slurs, the
audience should:
—Let him have his say and then
answer him 39-6 §4-3 70-2
—Stop him from speaking 39'6 4'3 15-2
Any television station that recommends
the use of military action against
demonstrators:
—Has a right to express its views
on public affairs 27-1 67•5 762
—Should have its licence taken away 37-5 11 •5 4-0
(Decline to choose) 35-4 21 •0 198
Meetings urging America to make war
against an enemy nation:
—Have as much right to be held as
meetings that support peace 43-8 85-8 74-8
—Are so inhuman that we should not
allow them to be held 22-9 2-8 99
(Decline to choose) 33-3 11-3 '5-3
A radio or TV station that always speaks
for the rich and powerful against the
poor and oppressed:
—Should have the right to favor or
oppose any group it chooses 4-2 23-2 25-5
—Should be required by law to
present a more balanced picture 77-1 58-7 497
(Decline to choose) i8- 7 18-1 25-1
(AQ (48) (1-334) (151)
A stronger test of left-wing and right-wing tolerance can be made by

examining several questions from the OVS survey of ideological elites. The
more hardcore radical left in this survey turns out to be the least tolerant of
the three groups when asked, for example, about a speaker who utters racial
slurs; a group which meets in order to urge America to go to war against
another country; a television station that advocates the use of the military to
combat demonstrators; and a radio or television station that favours the rich
and powerful at the expense of the poor and oppressed (see Table 10).
While we have focused attention in this section on the expediency of
left-wing support for freedom of expression, we should note that the right is
similarly partisan in its responses on issues that engage its bias. Witness, for
example, its responses to the items in Table 10, which show that, when
confronted with right-wing causes and groups, the far right may be as tolerant
as the moderates and more tolerant than the far left. Furthermore, the
supporters of the radical right are far more likely than the radical left (48 per
cent to 21 per cent) to permit an elected congressman to take office even if he
advocates violence against minorities. (Over 68 per cent of the left would
deny him the right to office.) Thus, despite its overall pattern of intolerance,
the far right exhibits a fair measure of tolerance on issues that clearly reflect
its ideological preferences. In this aspect, as in others, it resembles the far
left.
The bias with which the far left and far right apply the principle of tolerance
is neatly summed up by their responses to the question that appears in Table
11 on the principle which should guide the granting of free speech. On this
item we find that the political moderates, by a margin of approximately 30 per
cent, are more likely than either the far left or the far right to favour the
unconditional extension of free speech.
TABLE 11 Free Speech (CLS)
Percentage reading
down
Free speech should be granted:
—To everyone regardless of how 42-1 71 1 404
intolerant they are of other
people's opinions
—Only to people who are willing to 474 165 38-6
grant the same rights of free speech
to everyone else
(N) (19) (194) (57)
TOTALITARIANISM, AUTHORITARIANISM AND INTOLERANCE OF

HUMAN FRAILTY
The greater willingness of both extremes to trample on the rights of indivi-

duals in order to achieve their goals is further demonstrated in Table 12 by
their scores on a scale measuring support for totalitarian aims and tactics.
Almost 50 per cent of the far left and 60 per cent of the far right score 'middle'
or 'high' on this measure, compared to 23 per cent of the moderates. Their
responses to several of the items in Table 13 reveal the tough-minded and
ruthless attitudes of right-wing and left-wing extremists. For example, the two
radical camps are more likely than the moderates to endorse the use of unfair
and brutal methods to achieve what they perceive to be a higher purpose.
TABLE I 2 Totalitarianism (PAB scale scores)
Percentage reading
down

Low 54-8 765 39-5
Middle 35-6 21-5 42-8
High 9-6 1-9 17-7
(N) (73) (1.592) (243)
TABLE 13 Totalitarianism (PA B)

Percentage agreeing
with each item
We might as well make up our minds that
in order to make the world better a lot
of innocent people will have to suffer 26-0 19-2 37'3
To bring about great changes for the
benefit of mankind often requires
cruelty and even ruthlessness 26-4 12-6 23-6
Soft and idealistic people can never
be the doers of great events 26-8 13-8 58-4
Almost any unfairness or brutality
may have to be justified when some
great purpose is being carried out •5-3 13-7
The unhappiness of a few people simply
doesn't matter when it is a question
of a step forward for the majority
of the people 65-3 46-2 65-7
Sometimes, when a new society is in
its early stages, the masses have to
be ruled with an iron hand for their
own good 32-4 203 32-8
(73) (1.584) (241)
Both the left and the right express disdain for people whom they regard as
'soft and idealistic', showing a greater preference, relative to moderates, for
unsentimental leadership that deals strictly, and callously if necessary, with
the people being led. Left and right radicals are also more likely to agree to
statements that endorse intolerance of non-conformity and the prerogatives
of the majority to ignore the rights and concerns of the minority.
TABLE 14 Intolerance of Human Frailty (PAB)

Percentage agreeing
with each item
A person who lets himself be pushed
around has no right to expect
sympathy when things turn out
badly for him 58-3 43-9 81-4
A person's emotions should always
be held in check by the moral code 68-1 53-8 66-3
It's all right to have friends, but
you shouldn't let yourself get so
attached that you're always having
to do things for them 57-5 369 65-8
(N) (72) (1,567) (241)
TABLE 15 F-A uthoritarianism(PAB Scale Scores)

Percentage reading
down

Low 54-8 68-5 12-3
Middle 39-7 27-8 49-8
High 5-5 3-7 37-9
(73) (243)
The self-professed toughness of the extreme left and right is further

elucidated by their responses to a set of items measuring 'intolerance of
human frailty'. (See Table 14.) Although the differences are not large, they
reveal the willingness of the two extreme camps to forsake personal
friendships in the service of 'truth' or 'greatness' and to assume an unyielding,
aggressive and emotionally detached posture.
When we turn to the F scale, the most familiar measure of authoritarian-
ism, the left, for reasons we discussed earlier, do not score very high in
comparison to the far right, although they do register a slightly higher score
than the political moderates. As can be seen in Table 15, almost 38 per cent of
the far right score 'high' on the F scale compared to fewer than 6 per cent of
the far left.
An examination of specific F-scale items in Table 16 indicates that the
far-left supporters respond more favourably to some items than others,
depending on the explicit content of the items. Certain of the items reflect
TABLE 16 F- Authoritarianism (PAB items)
Percentage agreeing
with each item

Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks
on children, deserve more than mere
imprisonment; such criminals ought
to be publicly whipped, or worse 31-5 33-9 72-0
Most people don't realize how much
our lives are controlled by plots
hatched in secret places 59-7 25-1 67-8
Young people sometimes get rebellious
ideas, but as they grow up they
ought to get over them and settle
down 47-2 585 893
People can be divided into two
distinct classes: the weak and
the strong 30-1 192 56-4
There is hardly anything lower than
a person who does not feel a great
love, gratitude, and respect for
his parents 57-1 562 830
Obedience and respect for authority
are the most important virtues children
should learn 47-2 517 818
(AO (7i) (1-579) (243)
values that have a transparently greater appeal to adherents of the far right
than of the far left. Among these are items pertaining to the treatment of
perpetrators of sex crimes, the need for young people to control their
rebellious ideas, the great virtue of expressing 'love, gratitude, and respect
for one's parents', and the paramount importance of instilling in children
obedience and respect for authority. Given the values reflected in these
statements, it is not a surprise that left-wing respondents are the least likely to
agree with them. On the other hand, when the content of the F-scale items
reflects intolerance of ambiguity or a suspicion of conspiracies, we again find
that the far left and far right, in their responses to these items, are
significantly more authoritarian than the moderates.
SUMMARY
Although some scholars have argued that authoritarianism is characteristic

only of the right and not of the left, persuasive reasons exist for doubting this
36O MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
claim. Intuitive observation of left-wing and right-wing regimes as well as

radical political movements of the left and right reveals striking parallels in
their styles of political engagement, their reliance upon force, their disdain
for democratic ideals and practices and their violations of civil liberties. In
addition, systematic inquiry into the similarities and differences between
far-left and far-right radicals in the United States has been hampered by
various methodological difficulties. One can. list, among these, such problems
as the obvious inappropriateness of the F scale (owing to its strong right-wing
content) as a measure for identifying left-wing authoritarians; the difficulty of
obtaining adequate samples of true believers of the extreme left and right; the
self-image of the American left as a persecuted minority which, for reasons of
self-interest, spuriously inflates the degree of support expressed by its
members for individual rights and liberties; and the exposure of both extreme
camps to the liberal democratic values dominating American political culture,
which unmistakably colours their political rhetoric.
We have reason to think that a similar study conducted in some - perhaps
many - European countries would reveal even greater similarities between
the far left and far right than we have turned up in the United States. Unlike
the United States, which has enjoyed a strong liberal democratic tradition
that has served to weaken and soften the intensity of its radical movements, a
number of European countries, less wedded to liberal democratic principles,
have developed a more vigorous, less diluted tradition of radical politics.
These nations have long had to contend with powerful extremist movements
actively and significantly engaged in the political struggles of their respective
nations. The radical movements of Europe have been more extreme and
zealous - more unequivocally revolutionary and reactionary- than the radical
movements of the United States. The sustained confrontation of these
extremist movements, in our view, is likely to have intensified the authorita-
rian propensities of each.
In the present article, through a series of surveys in which we have tried to
identify, as best we can, supporters of the far left and far right, we have
systematically compared the two camps on a variety of political and psycholo-
gical characteristics. We find, in keeping with the conventional view, that the
far left and the far right stand at opposite ends of the familiar left-right
continuum on many issues of public policy, political philosophy and personal
belief. They hold sharply contrasting views on questions of law and order,
foreign policy, social welfare, economic equality, racial equality, women's
rights, sexual freedom, patriotism, social conventions, religion, family values
and orientations towards business, labour and private enterprise.
Nevertheless, while the two camps embrace different programmatic beliefs,
both are deeply estranged from certain features of American society and
highly critical of what they perceive as the spiritual and moral degeneration of
American institutions. Both view American society as dominated by conspir-
atorial forces that are working to defeat their respective ideological aims.
The degree of their alienation is intensified by the zealous and unyielding
manner in which they hold their beliefs. Both camps possess an inflexible
psychological and political style characterized by the tendency to view social
and political affairs in crude, unambiguous and stereotypical terms. They see
political life as a conflict between 'us' and 'them', a struggle between good
and evil played out on a battleground where compromise amounts to
capitulation and the goal is total victory.
The far left and the far right also resemble each other in the way they
pursue their political goals. Both are disposed to censor their opponents, to
deal harshly with enemies, to sacrifice the well-being even of the innocent in
order to serve a 'higher purpose", and to use cruel tactics if necessary to
'persuade' society of the wisdom of their objectives. Both tend to support (or
oppose) civil liberties in a highly partisan and self-serving fashion, supporting
freedom for themselves and for the groups and causes they favour while
seeking to withhold it from enemies and advocates of causes they dislike.
In sum, when the views of the far left and far right are evaluated against the
standard left-right ideological dimension, they can appropriately be classified
at opposite ends of the political spectrum. But when the two camps are
evaluated on questions of political and psychological style, the treatment
of political opponents, and the tactics that they are willing to employ to achieve
their ends, they display many parallels that can rightly be labelled authori-
tarian.
APPENDIX I25
Far-Left Scale
The communist countries will go down in history as:
(A) countries that reached a new and higher stage of progress;
(B) dictatorships that crushed human freedom.
When black militant groups use violence to achieve their goals:
(A) they deserve our support considering the way blacks have been treated;
(B) they should be arrested.
Education in America mainly aims:
(A) to help keep the mass of people under control;
(B) to teach people of all groups to read, write, and get ahead.
The sacrifices made by the people in the communist countries:
(A) are necessary and will benefit the people in the long run;
(B) are not really in the people's interests.
If the police are harder on radicals than on other groups:
(A) the radicals are entitled to use violence to strike back;
(B) their actions should be brought to the attention of the courts.
Individual terrorist or guerrilla acts:
(A) are often the only way an oppressed group can win its rights;
(B) are morally wrong and never do much good anyway.
23
Each of the items on the Far-Left and Far-Right scales also contains the response alternatives
'Neither' and 'Undecided'. To conserve space in the tables presented in this article, we have
combined these responses into a single 'Decline to choose' category.
The best way to solve this country's problems and make life better for the American
people is to:
(A) overturn the whole society from top to bottom;
(B) work within the system and try to reform it.
The welfare of mankind can best be served:
(A) by establishing a government controlled by the working class;
(B) by improving our present government.
Which is the better way to bring about necessary changes in society?
(A) by demonstrating in the streets and disrupting the system;
(B) through the election process.
The American form of government is:
(A) one of the worst;
(B) one of the best.
The use of violence to try to change the system:
(A) is often the only way to get results;
(B) usually hurts the cause more than it helps.
American foreign policy for the past twenty-five years has shown that we are:
(A) an imperialist and warlike country trying to dominate the world;
(B) a country sincerely trying to defend the free world against aggression.
The Americans who put this country down:
(A) have seen through the fine words to the rotten core;
(B) forget how well it compares to other countries.
Far-Right Scale
Most campus protests and antiwar demonstrations:
(A) are started by Americans who want to express their feelings and frustrations;
(B) are secretly organized by foreign agents.
An American who doesn't believe that this is the best country in the world:
(A) has a right to his opinion;
(B) doesn't deserve to live here.
Books that preach the overthrow of the government should be:
(A) made available by the library, just like any other book;
(B) banned from the library.
Any American who shows disrespect for the flag:
(A) has the right to think what he pleases;
(B) should be turned over to patriots to be taught a lesson.
The most important values children should learn are:
(A) independence and self-reliance;
(B) love and respect for their parents.
The employment of radicals by newspapers and TV:
(A) is their right as Americans;
(B) should be forbidden.
If a foreign country is strongly opposed to our way of life:
(A) we should still trade and try to get along with them;
(B) we should refuse to trade with them.
2
" Seefn. 25.
As a political system, communism:
(A) has become so well established that we must learn to get along with it;
(B) is so evil we should go to any lengths to destroy it.
These days:
(A) people have healthier and more relaxed ideas about sex;
(B) there is too much sexual freedom and loose living.
How would you feel if the United States were to lose its role as a leader among
nations?
(A) I doubt it would bother me much;
(B) I would consider it tragic and humiliating.
Which of these comes closer to what you believe?
(A) There is little or nothing to be said in favor of war;
(B) War is cruel but it does teach people something about honor, loyalty, and
courage.
Liberalism differs from communism:
(A) in many ways, but especially in liberalism's concern for freedom;
(B) hardly at all.
Censoring obscene books:
(A) is an old-fashioned idea that no longer makes sense;
(B) is necessary to protect community standards.
The United States was meant to be:
(A) a country made up of many races, religions, and nationalities;
(B) a Christian nation.

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Similarities and Differences Between Left-Wing and

Herbert McClosky and Dennis Chong

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Similarities and Differences Between Left-Wing

most closely distinguished authoritarians of any ideological persuasion from

SIMILARITIES BET WEEN FAR-LEFT AND FAR-RIGHT REGIMES

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LEFT-WING AND RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS

The virulence and intolerance exhibited towards each other by Stalinists,

conspiratorial forces. Though from different perspectives, they both see

In assessing the failure of the research findings on right-wing and left-wing

available research cannot be assumed to be truly representative of the

THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN LEFT AS A PERSECUTED MINORITY

HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES

For example, although we have managed to collect excellent samples of

CONSTRUCTION OF THE FAR-LEFT SCALES

As in the classification of the far-left respondents, the choice of a cutting

Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far

Racial equality Women's rights Welfare

Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far

100 90- 100 100

'conventionality' scale, which assesses attitudes towards traditional practices

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE FAR LEFT AND FAR RIGHT

ESTRANGEMENT FROM GOVERNMENT

Faith in democracy Faith in politics Faith in politicians

100 100 100

Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far

Fig. 2. Estrangement from politics (PAB scale scores)

TABLE I Estrangement from Politics (PAB)

Item Far left Moderate Far right

Furthermore, radicals are more inclined to believe that electoral outcomes

TABLE 2 Political Cynicism (OVS)

People with my point of view who

TABLE 3A Paranoid Tendencies (PAB)

TABLE 3B Paranoid Tendencies (PAH scale scores)

Score Far left Moderate Far right

CONFLICTING SOURCES OF POLITICAL DISENCHANTMENT

TABLE 4 Sources of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Political Disaffection

Item Far left Moderate Far right

Too much of our money is going for:

Elements of traditional populist mistrust of American institutions can also be

TABLE 5 Populism (PAB)

Item Far left Moderate Far right

PAB OVS PAB

100 100 81 100

Fig. 3. Intolerance of ambiguity and rigidity (scale scores)

Hence, the major focus of the contemporary far right - reminiscent of

TABLE 6 Intolerance of Ambiguity (OVS and PAB)

Item Far left Moderate Far right

On important public issues, I believe

When it comes to the really important

In trying to accomplish anything in politics

People who say they are 'open-minded'

I believe that you're really for

People who try to steer a 'middle

TABLE 7 Tolerance of Left-Wing Expression (CLS and OVS)

Item Far left Moderate Far right

(N of OVS sample) (48) (150