50

JESUS C. BALMADRID and MILA C. BALMADRID, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Facts:

Charged with violating Section 3(e) of Repsublic Act No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were private individuals-petitioners Jesus and
Mila Balmadrid and public officials Maximo Binos and Teodulo Alcantara.

That during the period July to November 1979 in the Province of Catanduanes, Philippines the
accused Maximo S. Binos and Teodulo B. Alcantara being then the Superintendent and
Cashier, respectively, of the Catanduanes Agricultural and Industrial College (CAIC),
a Government-owned institution of learning, taking unusual and undue advantage of their
respective positions as such for personal benefit and advantage for themselves in the
performance of their official duties and functions with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
intent to gain, breach of trust and or with abuse of confidence, falsify documents by
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with a common purpose and
design did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the preparation,
issuance and encashment of four (4) checks of the CAIC payable to Mila C. Balmadrid, in
payment of ghost and/or fictitious deliveries of supplies and materials purportedly for the use
of said institution, when in truth and in fact, no such deliveries of supplies and materials were
ever made in said college, to the damage and prejudice of said college in the amount of
P9,200.00 and the accused Mila C. Balmadrid, Jesus C. Balmadrid, Jose P. Concepcion and
Juan G. Atencia, are private persons and in their desire to conceal and/or justify such fictitious
transactions, between ECBAL ENTERPRISES and CAIC for the purchase of supplies and
materials, falsified public documents which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
aforesaid college in the amount of NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P9,200.00).

Issue: Whether or not Petitioners, being private persons, were improperly charged and
convicted without authority of law and in clear violation of their constitutional right to due
process.

Ruling:
The first assigned error lacks merit. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and
civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law. In case private individuals are charged
as co-principals, accomplices or accesories with the public officers or employees, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.

Private persons may be charged together with public officers to avoid repeated and
unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against conspirators in different venues,
especially if the issues involved are the same. It follows therefore that if a private person may
be tried jointly with public officers, he may also be convicted jointly with them, as in the case
of the present petitioners.

Petitioners' contention that the information failed to show that they are charged in conspiracy
with their co-accused public officers holds no water. The allegations in the information clearly
show the commission of a series of acts, ranging from its inception through the issuance by
Binos and Alcantara of officially-issued CAIC checks for non- existent, fictitious or ghost
purchases of school supplies and construction materials from Ecbal Enterprises up to the
irregular and/or improper delivery of supplies and construction materials, to CAIC from Hi-
Tone Construction and the illegal and criminal acts of petitioners to give a semblance of
regularity to the transaction. The crime, therefore, charged and penalized, is not the singular
or individual act of issuing CAIC checks in payment of a civil obligation. Rather, it involves the
entire spectrum ranging from their issuance up to and including the falsification of public
documents to simulate or justify a transaction which was initially intended to give the spouses
Balmadrid unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in Binos' and Alcantara's discharge
of their official duties, which were committed with manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
thus causing undue injury to the CAIC. From the very nature and essence of the act penalized
under Section 3, paragraph (e), conspiracy necessarily enters into the picture and its
commission attributable to two or more persons acting in conspiracy.

52

MAYOR ARNULFO NATIVIDAD, Petitioner, v. HON. AUGUSTO N. FELIX, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 64, Tarlac, Tarlac and HON. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF TARLAC, Respondents.

Facts:
whether or not the provincial prosecutor of Tarlac has authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the offense allegedly committed by herein petitioner who is a Municipal Mayor.

The Philippine National Police (PNP), responding to a letter requested the Tarlac Provincial
Prosecutor to investigate petitioner, the Municipal Mayor of Ramos, Tarlac, for the death of
Severino Aquino at the Ramos Police Station Consequently, a subpoena was issued requiring
petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withhold the issuance of the warrant of arrest
and to dismiss the case. In the alternative, petitioner asked that the case be remanded for
further preliminary investigation proceedings.

Sensing an alleged partiality on the part of the provincial prosecutor, petitioner wrote the
Secretary of Justice requesting that his preliminary investigation be conducted in Manila. This
request was denied subsequently on August 18, 1993.

Petitioner moved to remand his case for preliminary investigation with motion to quash
warrant alleging that there was no preliminary investigation and contending that respondent
judge had no jurisdiction over the case because it was the Ombudsman and not the Provincial
Prosecutor who had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioner vigorously
contended that the proper court which had jurisdiction over the case was the Sandiganbayan
and not respondent judge.

Based on Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), petitioner
contends that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for the alleged murder of Severino Aquino.

Issue:

whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
amended information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing petitioner's arrest.

Ruling:

two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in
relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.

Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been
met, 18 the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees
must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Now we cannot accept petitioner's specious argument that the alleged offense was committed
in performance of the mayor's responsibility to maintain peace and order on the pretext that
the victim, a robbery and NPA suspect, was under investigation at the time when he was
allegedly killed at the police

station. By no stretch of the imagination or logic, can we construe that the alleged act falls
under any of the functions of the municipal mayor as enumerated under Sec. 444 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 or implied therefrom. thus, petitioner cannot disregard the
authority of the provincial prosecutor in conducting a preliminary investigation of his alleged
criminal acts.s

53

[ GR No. 90591, Nov 21, 1990 ] 191 SCRA 545

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO v. MANUEL C. DOMINGO

Facts:

that on the morning of April 23, 1988, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, a group then
riding in a Toyota Corolla car were ambushed by the group of Governor Deloso and his escorts,
numbering more or less fifteen (15). Initial witnesses positively identified the military/police
escorts of Governor Deloso. The above escorts were already charged of Multiple Murder before
the Regional Staff Judge Advocate (RSJA), Regional Command (RECOM).

Governor Deloso filed a motion to dismiss to dismiss the case on the grounds that:

1) The Office of the Special Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;

2) The said office is without authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case;
and

3) The preliminary investigation of Governor Deloso was prohibited by law in view of the
Barangay Elections.

Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order denying Governor
Deloso's motion to dismiss. Deloso filed this petition for certiorari, reiterating the grounds of
his motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the petition the petition for certiorari on the grounds specified above
is meritorious.

Ruling:

the Court finds the petition to be without merit.

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and
to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman is also
empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take
appropriate action against a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution".

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to
it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the
prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers.

The murder of three persons is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly
committed by the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale
of the Ombudsman's investigative authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit.

54

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA v. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER

Facts:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing
the preventive suspension of petitioners, Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III Et.
Al. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with
the Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue:

Whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

Ruling:

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

"Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not
a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites
therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the

appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In
order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the
Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such
investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the
danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the
intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when
the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to
perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said
statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that
will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

55

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Ombudsman, respondent.

Facts:

Pres. Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the
preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting *the Committee for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1988. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final
Report. Among the Committee's recommendations was "the prosecution by the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules
on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to
Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract
that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude
audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said
contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law."

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public
officer because: THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICE.

Issue:

We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.

The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as "protectors of the people,"
who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations." Among the awesome powers, functions, and
duties vested by the Constitution upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate. any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."

Substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770 (Sections 13 and 15 (1))

The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13.

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers
are. However, provided in the jurisprudence of Machem

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position,
scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.

Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner,
as its Chair, is a public officer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

57

OSCAR G. RARO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (Second Division), THE

HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts:

An information was filed with the Sandiganbayan accusing petitioner with violation of Section
3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 committed as follows:

the above named accused, a public officer being then the Corporate Secretary and Acting
Department Manager of the Special Projects Department of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), San Marcelino, Malate, Metro Manila, tasked to monitor and
oversee the Small Town Lottery Experimental Project of the PCSO in certain areas including
Camarines Norte, taking advantage of his said public position and while in the performance
of his official duties as such, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally demand
and receive on four different occasions the amount totaling to (P116,799.99) from Mr. Luis
"Bing" F. Abaño.

Issue: whether or not the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation erroneously
and irregularly.

Ruling:

No, the preliminary investigation was not erroneously and irregularly conducted.

Petitioner contends the fact that the complaint filed by Abaño against him was subscribed to
before an ordinary notary public and that the sworn statements of witnesses against him were
sworn to before a provincial fiscal, not deputized by the Ombudsman.

The referral of the complaint to the NBI does not mean that the Ombudsman abdicated its
constitutional and statutory duty to conduct preliminary investigations.

Thus, by referring Abano’s complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby delegate
the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case to that investigative bureau. What
was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation
still to be conducted by the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman’s failure to personally administer oath to the complainant does not mean
that the Ombudsman did not personally determine the existence of probable cause to warrant
the filing of an information.

Neither did the Sandiganbayan violate petitioner’s right to due process of law by its failure to
personally examine the complainant before it issued the warrant of arrest. In a preliminary
examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a court is not required to review in detail
the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. What is required is that the judge
"personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in
determining probable cause."

In the absence of evidence that the Sandiganbayan did not personally evaluate the necessary
records of the case, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of its official business shall
stand.