632/1998

February 1998

Catastrophic Failures of Steel

Structures in Industry: Case Histories
By: B Hayes and R Phaal, TWI

Contents

• Executive Summary

• 1. Introduction

• 8. John Thompson Pressure Vessel

• 8.1 Summary Details
• 8.2 Background
• 8.3 Causes of Failure
• 8.4 Lessons Learnt
• 8.5 References

• 9. Cockenzie Power Station Boiler Drum

• 9.1 Summary Details
• 9.2 Background
• 9.3 Causes of Failure
• 9.4 Lessons Learnt
• 9.5 References

• 11. Robert Jenkins Pressure Vessel

• 11.1 Summary Details
• 11.2 Background
• 11.3 Causes of Failure
• 11.4 Lessons Learnt
• 11.5 References

• 14. Union Oil Amine Absorber Tower

• 14.1 Summary Details
• 14.2 Background
• 14.3 Causes of Failure
• 14.4 Lessons Learnt
• 14.5 References

• 16. Summary and Conclusions

• 17. Acknowledgements
Executive Summary
A series of fourteen case studies are described, where failure has occurred by fracture,
and the lessons which can be learnt from these failures are discussed.

Background

Fortunately, catastrophic structural failures are rare. However, when significant

structures such as pressure vessels, storage tanks, bridges or ships fail, the
ramifications can be extensive, in terms of human injury, together with loss of capital
revenue. In order to reduce the incidence of costly failures in the future, it is important
to learn from past events. These lessons are incorporated into industrial and national
codes of practice, and are valuable to practising engineers responsible for the
management of critical structural plant.

Objectives

• To describe the events relating to significant structural failures, together with

the associated failure investigations.
• To summarise the lessons which can be drawn from these failures.

Approach

This report describes a series of fourteen industrial failures, where the mechanism of
failure was by catastrophic fast fracture (for example, see Fig. 10 in main text).
Failure case studies are presented for six pressure vessels, three ships, two bridges,
two storage tanks and one offshore rig, in chronological order. For each case study,
the failure events are described, together with an account of the main contributing
factors and failure mechanisms. (Fracture mechanics analyses of the failures are not
included in this report, see TWI Members' Report 512). The lessons which can be
learnt from these failures are discussed.

Discussion

A range of issues have been identified which have contributed significantly to the
structural failures described in this report:

• Fracture toughness is of particular importance for welded fabrications, where

fracture toughness is dependent on chemical composition, microstructure, joint
configuration, loading rate and temperature. Low fracture toughness was a
factor which contributed to most of the failures which have been discussed in
this report.
• All of the failures which have been described in this report were associated
with welds. Weldments are associated with a higher risk of fracture due to the
combination of complex metallurgy, welding residual stresses, stress
concentrations and higher constraint associated with the joint configurations,
together with the inherent flaws which are present in all welds.
 • Many of the failures occurred at relatively low temperatures (-20 to 13°(C).
Ferritic steels undergo a transition from ductile behaviour at higher
temperatures to brittle behaviour at lower temperature.
• Many of the failures occurred during hydrotests.
• The environmental/service conditions to which critical structures are exposed
are important. These include any factors which could lead to embrittlement of
the component materials during its anticipated lifetime.
• The effective management of fracture control in critical structures implies an
ongoing commitment to effective maintenance, inspection and quality
assurance, with regard to issues relating to management of fracture risk.

Main conclusions

The lessons which are learnt from structural failures influence the industrial and
national codes of practice for design, fabrication and operation of critical plant.

Structural failures have also resulted in the development of 'fitness-for-purpose'

assessment methods, such as BSI PD 6493:1991 'Guidance on methods for assessing
the acceptability of flaws in fusion welded structures'. These methods are based on
fracture mechanics principles, and allow the significance of weld flaws to be assessed
in terms of structural integrity assessment. PD 6493-type methods are used
extensively, on an international basis, for many applications, including pressure
vessels, pipelines, storage tanks, ships, bridges, buildings and other structural
components.

Recommendations

In order to reduce the incidence of costly failures in the future, it is important to learn
from past events. These lessons need to be incorporated into industrial and national
codes of practice, and are valuable to practising engineers responsible for the
management of critical structural plant.

Top of page
 Catastrophic Failures of Steel
Structures in Industry: Case Histories
By: B Hayes and R Phaal

1. Introduction
Fortunately, catastrophic structural failures are rare. However, when significant
structures such as pressure vessels, pipelines, bridges or ships fail, the ramifications
can be extensive, in terms of human injury, together with loss of capital and revenue.
In order to reduce the incidence of costly failures in the future, it is important to learn
from past events. These lessons are incorporated into industrial and national codes of
practice, and are valuable to practising engineers responsible for the management of
critical structural plant.

This report describes a series of fourteen industrial failures, where the mechanism of
failure was by catastrophic fast fracture. Failure case studies are presented for six
pressure vessels, three ships, two bridges, two storage tanks and one offshore rig, in
chronological order. For each case study, the failure events are described, together
with an account of the main contributing factors and failure mechanisms. The lessons
which can be learnt from these failures are discussed.

For fracture mechanics analyses of some of the failures described in this report, the
reader is referred to Part III of the TWI Members' Report 512/1995 by Challenger,
Phaal and Garwood (see section 16 for full reference).
 8. John Thompson Pressure Vessel
8.1 Summary Details

Failed 18.2m long Cr-Mo-V steel pressure vessel, 150mm wall thickness
component:
Date: 22nd December 1965
Place: Wolverhampton
Conditions: Hydraulic proof test at 10°C
Failure mode: Brittle fracture initiating from pre-existing defects
Cause: Poor toughness and residual stresses due to inadequate heat
treatment
Consequences: One minor casualty; financial loss

8.2 Background

In December 1965 a large pressure vessel being

manufactured by John Thompson
(Wolverhampton) Limited for the ICI Immingham
plant fractured during a hydraulic test (see Fig.
10). Damage to the vessel was extensive with four
large pieces being thrown from the vessel. One of
Fig. John Thompson pressure these, weighing approximately 2 tonnes, went
10 vessel failure through the workshop wall and landed some 46m
away. One minor casualty was reported.

The vessel consisted of a plain shell of 1.7m inside diameter made from cylindrical
strakes of 150mm thick silicon killed Mn-Cr-Mo-V steel. The end closures were
forged, one end being a flange with a flat cover. The forging material was similar to
the shell steel, however, a higher carbon content of 0.2% was used in the flange
forging in order to meet the strength requirements in the thickest section. The forgings
were supplied in a normalised and tempered condition. The overall length of the
vessel was 18.2m and it weighed 167 tonnes. It had been destined for use as an
ammonia converter with a design pressure of 35N/mm2 at 120°C.

The proof test requirement was for 48N/mm2 gauge pressure at ambient temperature
(not less than 7°C) but the testing of the vessel was troubled by leaks from the bolted
flange joint and several re-pressurisations were required. At the first attainment of
34N/mm2 pressure, the vessel failed accompanied by 'a kind of dull thud'. No one
present noticed anything unusual before the failure. The ambient and water
temperatures at the time were determined to be less than 10°C.
The failure occurred at the flange end of the vessel. The flange forging was cracked
through in two locations, the first two shell strakes broke into several pieces and
cracking extended into the third strake.

8.3 Causes of Failure

Investigation revealed two fracture initiation sites. These were small pre-existing
cracks in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of the submerged arc weld joining the flange
end forging to the vessel shell. The cracks were located on the forging side of the
weld about 15mm below the outer surface in regions of segregation where the carbon
and alloying element contents were locally increased. This segregation would have
increased the susceptibility of the material to hydrogen cracking, the probable cause
of the original crack formation. The welding procedure was such that the preheat was
discontinued immediately on completion of the weld, thus not allowing the reduction
of hydrogen levels in the faster cooling surface regions.

The failure occurred by the extension of these pre-existing cracks into the adjacent
weld metal which had poor toughness properties due to inadequate heat treatment.
The toughness of the forging and shell plate, although meeting the requirements, was
not sufficient to arrest a running crack of size equal to the weld cross section. The
forged flange and first strake sub-assembly had been furnace post-weld heat treated.
The specified conditions were 620-660°C for six hours, however high hardnesses
measured on the casualty material indicated that the temperature of the sub-assembly
had not reached this level. The furnace temperature had been monitored by
pyrometers lowered from the roof. From subsequent temperature measurements made
on similar components in the furnace, it was estimated that the actual temperatures
achieved in the circumferential weld between the forging and the first strake were
between 520-610°C, depending on the position around the weld.

The Charpy V notch requirements for the forging, plate and weld metal were 38J
absorbed energy at +20°C. The weld metal did not meet these requirements and the
absorbed energies measured at +7°C were in the range 12-25J which was considered
the lower shelf for this material. Re-heat treating the casualty material at 650°C for
six hours considerably improved the Charpy properties of the weld metal but only at
temperatures of 20°C and above.

Residual stresses were also considered a contributory factor to crack initiation at the
relatively low applied stress level as the heat treatment conditions had not been
sufficient for full relief of the residual stresses.

Lessons learnt

The British Welding Research Association report of the investigation into this failure
proposed that fracture mechanics principles be used when setting fracture avoidance
criteria for thick high strength steels. It also recommended carrying out pressure tests
at temperatures above the ductile-brittle transition temperature of the vessel material
in order to reduce the risk of failure.
8.5 References

Author Title

Anon 'Brittle fracture of a thick walled pressure vessel'. BWRA Bulletin, Vol.7,
No.6, June 1966.

Top of page
 9. Cockenzie Power Station Boiler Drum
9.1 Summary Details

Failed 22.8m long, 140mm thick Mn-Cr-Mo-V steel power station boiler
component: drum
Date: 6 May 1966
Place: Cockenzie Power Station, Scotland
Conditions: Near full hydraulic test pressure (270 bar) at 7°C
Failure mode: Brittle fracture
Cause: Presence of significant defect, exact origin of which is unknown
Consequences: Financial penalties

9.2 Background

On the 6 May 1966, a boiler drum manufactured

by Babcock and Wilcox Ltd failed during
hydrotest at the Cockenzie Power Station in
Scotland (see Fig. 11). The boiler was at
approximately 270 bar gauge pressure, about 96%
of the full test pressure, when the failure occurred.
The ambient temperature was 7°C. One end of the
Fig. Cockenzie power station 22.8m long boiler drum split, with two
11 boiler drum failure longitudinal brittle fractures extending about
4.9m. The connecting pipework prevented the pieces of failed plate from being
thrown any distance and no one was injured.

The boiler drum was made of six cylindrical courses of 1.7m inside diameter,
fabricated in 140mm thick Mn-Cr-Mo-V steel (Ducol W30). The drumheads were
pressed from the same steel but slightly thicker (152mm). Production of the vessel
involved manufacturing two halves consisting of three courses plus drumhead each.
The two halves were furnace post-weld heat treated before being joined together. The
closing circumferential weld was then locally post-weld heat treated.

Each course had four set-through nozzle attachments which were welded by the
manual metal arc process. These welds were tested internally and externally using
magnetic particle inspection. One weld was found to contain a crack and, as the
associated nozzle was also found to be deeply seamed, the whole nozzle was replaced.
An angle bracket attachment close to the nozzle was cut down to a stub to improve
access during welding of the replacement nozzle and subsequently reattached. The
repair was carried out prior to the furnace post-weld heat treatment (PWHT).
The boiler drum was inspected during its fabrication by both the manufacturer and
independent insurance company surveyors, but no non-destructive testing was
performed after the final heat treatment. The manufacturers carried out an hydraulic
pressure test at 11/2 times the design pressure in June 1964 prior to delivery to the
power station in October 1964.

The first on-site pressure tests were undertaken in March 1966 once the boiler
erection was sufficiently advanced to allow it. Faulty welds in the superheater area
remote from the drum were found and repaired. The boiler was fully pressurised on 1
April and passed by the surveyors except for a number of tube defects. The boiler was
pressurised again on the 22 April to check that the repairs, which were not associated
with the drum, were satisfactory. The failure of the drum occurred during the final
pressure test on the 6 May.

9.3 Causes of Failure

The origin of the fracture was found to be a

330mm long surface breaking arrested brittle
crack with a maximum depth of approximately
90mm (see Fig. 12). The crack had originated in
the internal weld of the replacement nozzle and
extended into the plate between the nozzle and the
adjacent angle bracket. However, no defect was
found to explain the initiation of this brittle crack.
Fig. Cockenzie power station
The surfaces of the arrested brittle crack were
12 boiler drum (fracture
blackened and it was concluded that the crack had
face)
formed during the initial stage of the final PWHT,
as a crack of such dimensions would have been detected during prior inspection.

The parent material in the region of the failure had room temperature Charpy V notch
energies in the range 60-80J meeting the requirements of BS 1113-1958. Although it
was questioned whether this level of Charpy toughness was in fact sufficient, the
material had withstood several pressurisations in the presence of a significant crack.
There was no evidence of any crack extension during these earlier pressurisations.
The argument was made at the time of the investigation into the failure, that if the
pressure test had been conducted at a higher temperature, the failure may not have
occurred and the vessel would have entered service in a severely cracked condition.

The investigation into this failure also highlighted the importance of design details.
Two main negative effects could be associated with the proximity of the angle bracket
to the nozzle: the presence of complex residual stress and stress concentration
patterns, and the difficulty of inspection of such a configuration.

9.4 Lessons learnt

The finding that failure was initiated from a crack formed during PWHT was
instrumental in modification of standards to include mandatory non-destructive
testing after heat treatment. It was also recommended that the heating rates at the start
of stress relieving should be carefully controlled taking into account the shape and
thickness of the vessel although there was no evidence of excessive heating rates in
this case.

9.5 References

Author Title

Smith N and 'Failure in heavy pressure vessels during manufacture and

Hamilton I G hydraulic testing'. West of Scotland Iron and Steel Institute Journal,
Vol.7, 1968-69.

Anon 'Report on the brittle fracture of a high-pressure boiler drum at

Cockenzie Power Station'. Welding Research Abroad, Vol.XIII,
No.8, October 1967.

Top of page
 11. Robert Jenkins Pressure Vessel
11.1 Summary Details

Failed
component:
Date: 6 November 1970
Place: Rotherham
Conditions: Hydraulic proof test at 12°C
Failure mode: Brittle fracture
Cause: A liquation crack extended by hydrogen cracking to a critical size
Consequences: Loss of vessel; considerable damage to workshop due to release of
water

11.2 Background

A large pressure vessel manufactured for export by Robert

Jenkins and Co Ltd in Rotherham failed during pressure
testing at the company's works on the 6 November 1970
(see Fig. 15). At the time of failure, the water temperature
was approximately 12°C and the gauge pressure was 29 bar,
85% of the required value. The vessel had been under
pressurisation for 7 1/2 hours and contained 171,000 litres
of water which were released into the workshop causing
considerable damage.

The vessel was 34m long in two sections which were joined
Fig. Robert Jenkins by a flanged and bolted connection. One section was ~4.5m
15 Pressure vessel in diameter with a wall thickness of 41mm. The second
failure section, in which the failure occurred, was 2.7m in diameter
with a wall thickness of 28mm. The vessel was constructed
according to ASME Section VIII. The larger diameter section was post-weld heat
treated, while the failed section was in the as-welded condition.

The failure initiated in the vicinity of the fillet weld of a manhole compensating plate
on the main shell. The fracture, which was brittle, extended in two directions through
the strake containing the manhole into the adjacent strake on one side and the dished
end on the other before arresting. The overall length of the fracture was 4.3m with a
subsidiary crack of 1.5m long present on the other side of the manhole.

The vessel material was a C-Mn ASTM 515 Grade 70 (1967) steel for intermediate
and high temperature use produced in the UK to coarse grained practice and supplied
in the as-rolled condition. The yield strength of the material was in the region of
300N/mm2 and the Charpy properties of the strake in which the fracture initiated were
poor: 8-20J longitudinal and 11-14J transverse at 10°C with fracture appearances of at
least 90% crystallinity.

11.3 Causes of Failure

Examination of the fracture faces found evidence of an initial crack 115mm long at
the fillet weld toe of the compensating plate on the external surface of the shell. This
defect extended approximately halfway through the plate thickness. Fracture
mechanics analyses carried out as part of the failure investigation showed that the
applied stress intensity factor at the defect was close to the measured values of
fracture toughness obtained at 12°C.

The origin of the initiating defect was thought to be hydrogen cracking in the HAZ of
the fillet weld. Regions of martensite with hardnesses in the range 500-515 VPN were
found near the toe of the fillet weld. A hardness survey of the area of the toe of the
weld measured hardnesses from 393 to 496 VPN. (In comparison, the hardness of the
parent plate was 190 VPN). With a carbon content of 0.33%, the plate was considered
to be liable to hydrogen cracking in the high hardness regions. Although the
manufacturer's recommendations for drying the electrodes were followed (150°C for
1 hour), it was suggested by the investigators that this was insufficient given the
hardness levels present in the HAZ.

Tests on the failed plate showed the chemical composition in the initiation region to
be susceptible to liquation cracking. It was postulated that the initiating defect may
have formed as a liquation crack which extended by hydrogen cracking under the
conditions of high restraint and residual stresses present at the fillet weld toe.

An investigation was made into the effects of post-weld heat treatment on the welds in
the as-welded failed section of the pressure vessel. It was found that little
improvement in toughness properties was obtained in the range of temperatures
associated with hydrotesting although the peak welding residual stresses were reduced
which would be beneficial.

This failure arose from a material problem: the toughness of the parent plate was low
and it was susceptible to liquation cracking and formation of high hardness zones in
the HAZ, leading to probable hydrogen cracking. The selection of a fine grained steel
with superior toughness properties meeting specified levels would give greater
protection against this type of failure during hydrotest or during service should the
temperature be reduced below normal operating temperature.

11.4 Lessons learnt

The effect of temperature on material toughness is critical. Material selection should

take into account all possible service temperatures, including pressure testing
temperatures. The possibility of hydrogen cracking needs to be considered when
establishing welding procedures.
11.5 References

Author Title

Banks 'Pressure vessel failure during hydrotest'. Welding and Metal Fabrication,
B January 1973.

Top of page
 14. Union Oil Amine Absorber Tower
14.1 Summary Details

Failed 16.8m high monoethanolamine (MEA) absorber vessel

structure:
Date: 23 July 1984
Place: Lemont, Illinois, USA
Conditions: Normal operating conditions: 1.4N/mm2 °internal pressure, 38°C
Failure mode: Very low energy ductile failure (very little cleavage present)
Cause: Hydrogen induced heat affected zone (HAZ) cracks combined with
hydrogen embrittled material
Consequences: Loss of 17 lives; over $100 million of property damage

14.2 Background

On the evening of Monday 23 July 1984, the Union

Fig. Site of Union Oil amine
20 absorber tower failure
Oil Co refinery near Lemont, Illinois, USA was
seriously damaged by an explosion and fire.
Seventeen people working at the refinery were
killed and the property damage was estimated to be
over $100 million (see Fig. 20). The explosion was
caused by the ignition of a large cloud of flammable
gas (a mixture of propane and butane) which had
leaked from a ruptured amine-absorber pressure
vessel.

An operator working near the absorber tower noticed gas escaping from a horizontal
crack about 150mm long near the bottom of the vessel and tried to close off the main
inlet valve. The crack grew to 600mm and he initiated evacuation of the area. As the
company fire fighters arrived, the absorber tower cracked further and a large amount
of gas was released. The gas ignited in a massive explosion which sent the upper part
of the tower into the air, landing over a kilometre away. The explosion was felt over
20 kilometres away and the blaze which followed sent flames 150m into the sky.
 The absorber tower first went into service in 1970. It was a
cylindrical vessel 2.6m in diameter and of overall height
16.8m (see Fig. 21). The shell section consisted of six
courses of 25mm thick ASTM A516 Grade 70 steel. These
were joined by full penetration submerged arc welds in the
as-welded condition. The vessel, built to ASME Section
VIII, was designed to strip H2S from the propane/butane gas
mixture passing through it. Monoethanolamine (MEA) was
fed through the tower as part of this process. The operating
conditions were 1.4N/mm2 internal pressure at 38°C. The
environment in the tower was corrosive.

Soon after the amine absorber tower entered service,

hydrogen blisters were found in the lower two courses of the
shell and laminations were detected in the steel. The growth
of hydrogen blisters continued and in 1974 the second course
of the tower was replaced on site using manual metal arc
Fig. Union Oil amine welding with no preheat or post-weld heat-treatment
21 absorber tower (PWHT). In 1976 a Monel liner to reduce corrosion was
fitted in the bottom head and first course of the tower but it
did not cover the repair section.

14.3 Causes of Failure

The investigation into the failure found that the tower fractured at the circumferential
weld between the replacement ring and the lower course. Four large cracks in the heat
affected zone (HAZ) had been present prior to the failure, originating at the inner
surface of the tower and extending almost through the wall thickness. About 35% of
the vessel circumference was affected. The location of the first leak observed
corresponded to one of these HAZ cracks which was approximately 800mm long.

Microhardnesses measured in the HAZ near the surface exceeded 29 HRC and peak
hardnesses of 40 to 48 HRC were found near the fusion line. These facts, taken with
the in- section appearance of the pre-existing cracks (straight in the HAZ near the
surface and then zig-zagging through the base material at the limit of the HAZ),
pointed to the cracks initiating by hydrogen cracking and then progressing by
hydrogen-induced stepwise cracking (HISC). Tests according to a NACE standard
procedure confirmed that the material was susceptible to HISC.

The fracture ran around the HAZ of the circumferential weld at right angles to the
axial stress of 35N/mm2. The fact that this stress level was so low and the crack did
not change directions to run in a direction perpendicular to the higher hoop stress,
indicated very low toughness material in the HAZ. Charpy V notch tests of the
replacement course material and the weld between the replacement course and the
upper part of the tower showed the weld metal and HAZ to have superior notch
toughness to the base material. (20J transition temperatures: 0°C for parent plate, -
51°C for weld metal, -40°C for HAZ). Fracture toughness tests measuring crack tip
opening displacement (CTOD) in the HAZ material gave much greater critical CTOD
values than the applied CTOD in the tower at the time of failure, estimated ignoring
any residual stresses, as 0.064mm. Tests on hydrogen charged specimens did,
however, reveal much reduced CTOD fracture toughness values in the range of
approximately 0.070-0.080mm at 38°C. A later fracture mechanics assessment of the
tower found that when residual stresses were taken into account, failure was predicted
at the level of CTOD measured in non-hydrogen charged specimens.

Taking all of these findings into account, it can be concluded that this failure occurred
because the welding procedure used when replacing a section of the vessel caused the
formation of a hard microstructure in the HAZ of the weld. This hard region was
susceptible to hydrogen assisted cracking resulting in growth of large cracks in the
vessel. The uncracked material in the vicinity of the existing cracks had low
toughness due to hydrogen embrittlement and failed at the applied CTOD in the
vessel arising from the operating pressure and residual stresses associated with the
weld.

14.4 Lessons learnt

For operation in corrosive conditions, the control of weld properties is critical.

Welding procedures, particularly for field repair welds, need to be formulated to avoid
the formation of high hardness microstructures for service in hydrogen environments.
The significant contribution of welding residual stresses to the applied CTOD at a
flaw present in a structure must not be overlooked.

14.5 References

Author Title

McHenry H I, Read D 'Failure analysis of an amine-absorber pressure vessel'.

T and Shives T R Materials Performance, Vol.26, No.8, August 1987, pp.18-
24.

Anon 'Weld failure in pressure vessel generates revealing report'.

Welding Journal, 1 April 1984, pp.57-60.

Top of page
 16. Summary and Conclusions
A series of fourteen industrial failure case studies have been presented, including
pressure vessels, ships, bridges, storage tanks and an offshore rig. For each case study,
the failure events have been described, together with an account of the main
contributing factors and failure mechanisms, and the consequence of the failure.

A range of issues have been identified which have significantly contributed to the
structural failures described in this report:

i. Material properties The strength of a component is dictated by the geometry

of the structure, stresses within the structure, and the properties of the
materials which comprise the structure. Important material properties include
the yield and tensile strength of the material, together with fracture toughness.
Fracture toughness is of particular importance for welded fabrications, were
fracture toughness is dependent on microstructure, joint configuration, loading
rate and temperature. Low fracture toughness was a factor which contributed
to most of the failures which have been discussed in this report. Careful
consideration should be given to any factors which might reduce the fracture
toughness of the materials in critical structures, such as reductions in
temperature or strain ageing embrittlement (see Fawley and Ashland storage
tank failures, for instance).
ii. Welds

All of the failures which have been described in this report were associated
with defective welds. For fracture to occur, there must be a detrimental
combination of stresses, flaws and fracture toughness. Weldments are
associated with a higher risk of fracture due to the combination of complex
metallurgy, welding residual stresses and stress concentrations and higher
constraint associated with the joint configuration, together with the inherent
flaws which are present in all welds. To minimise the risk of fracture in
critical structural components, special consideration must be given to welding
during design, fabrication and operation. Additional consideration should be
given to repair welds, were control of the welding process and post-weld heat
treatment may be difficult. Attachment welds are also important, as running
fractures can progress into the main structure (for example, the Alexander L
Kieland platform and M V Kurdistan tanker).

iii. Temperature

Many of the failures occurred at relatively low temperatures (-20 to 13°C),

including the Hasselt and Kings bridges, Fawley and Ashland storage tanks,
Schenectady and M V Kurdistan tankers, Typpi Oy ammonia water coolers,
together with the Sizewell, John Thompson, Cockenzie and Robert Jenkins
pressure vessels. Ferritic steels undergo a transition from ductile behaviour at
higher temperatures to brittle behaviour at lower temperature. The decrease in
fracture toughness associate with this transition can be significant, over a
 fairly small temperature range. The absolute value of this fracture toughness
transition temperature varies, depending on the steel composition, joint
geometry, environment and loading rate. For these reasons, Charpy impact
energy requirements in fabrication codes are typically specified at specific
temperatures relative to the service temperature, to ensure that the material
toughness is sufficient.

iv. Proof testing

Many of the failures occurred during hydrotest, including the Fawley storage
tank and the Sizewell, John Thompson, Cockenzie and Robert Jenkins
pressure vessels. It could be maintained that these hydrotests were successful,
in that they prevented potential catastrophic failure in service. However,
hydrotest failures are expensive, and appropriate lessons must be learnt to
ensure procedures are modified to reduce this risk (i.e. restrictions on
minimum temperature for testing, maximum pressurisation rates, improved
inspection, etc., to facilitate repair prior to hydrotest). Nevertheless, as the
Typpi Oy failure demonstrated, the benefit of a proof test may be removed by
stress corrosion and other forms of crack extension in service.

v. Environment/service conditions

The environmental/service conditions to which critical structures are exposed

is important. This includes any factors which could lead to embrittlement of
the component during its anticipated lifetime (for example, the Union Oil
amine absorber tower and Typpi Oy ammonia plant water coolers, were
hydrogen embrittlement was a major contributing factor, and the Sizewell
pressure vessel and World Concord ship, where dynamic loading was
considered to be a factor.

vi. Maintenance/inspection/quality assurance

The effective management of fracture control in critical structures implies an

on-going commitment for effective maintenance, with regard to issues relating
to management of fracture risk (i.e. identification of critical components and
joints, regular inspection, etc.). Poor maintenance was identified as a major
contributing factor to the amine absorber pressure vessel failure. Particular
attention should be given to these issues if a change of service conditions of
life extension is planned.

Table 1 indicates which of these six factors played a role in each of the failure cases
described in this report.

The lessons which are learnt from structural failures influence the industrial and
national codes of practice for design, fabrication and operation of critical plant. For
instance, the amine absorber tower failure resulted in widespread changes to industrial
codes for plant maintenance, while the Cockenzie boiler drum failure resulted in the
requirement for inspection after post-weld heat treatment, and the specification of
minimum temperatures for hydrotesting. The failure of the Fawley storage tank, and
the Schenectady and World Concord tankers resulted in extensive research into
fracture mechanics, leading to the requirements for adequate notch toughness in
critical fabrications.

Structural failures have also resulted in the development of 'fitness-for-purpose'

assessment methods, such as BSI PD 6493:1991. These methods are based on fracture
mechanics principles, and allow the significance of weld flaws to be assessed in terms
of structural integrity assessment. PD 6493-type methods are used extensively, on an
international basis, for many applications, including pressure vessels, pipelines,
storage tanks, ships, bridges, buildings and other structural components.

16.1 References

Author Title

BSI PD 6493:1991: 'Guidance on methods for assessing the

acceptability of flaws in fusion welded structures', British
Standards Institution, London, 1991.

Challenger N V, "Appraisal of PD 6493:1991 fracture assessment procedures.

Phaal R and Part III: assessment of actual failures", TWI Research Report
Garwood S J 512/1995.

Table 1: Summary of factors contributing to failures

Failure Case Factors Contributing to Failure

Hasselt Bridge i, ii, iii

Schenectady T2 Tanker i, ii, iii

Fawley Crude Oil Storage Tank(s) i, ii, iii, iv

World Concord Tanker i, ii, iii, v

Kings Bridge i, ii, iii, vi

Sizewell Boiler ii, iii, iv, v

John Thompson Pressure Vessel i, ii, iii, iv

Cockenzie Power Station Boiler Drum ii, iv, vi

Typpi Oy Ammonia Plant Water Coolers i, ii, iii, v, vi

Robert Jenkins Pressure Vessel i, ii, iii, iv, v

MV Kurdistan Tanker i, ii, iii, v, vi

Alexander L Kielland Accommodation Platform ii, v, vi

Union Oil Amine Absorber Tower i, ii, v, vi

Ashland Storage Tank i, ii, iii

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 17. Acknowledgements
The work described in this report was carried out within the TWI Core Research
Programme, funded by the Industrial Members of TWI.

The photograph in Fig. 22 is reproduced courtesy of Battelle Memorial Institute and

Ashland Petroleum Company.