A.C. No. 12121 (Formerly CBD Case No.

14-4322), June 27, 2018 - CELESTINO MALECDAN,

Complainant, v. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 12121 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322), June 27, 2018

CELESTINO MALECDAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed with the Office of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter (IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter) by Complainant Celestino
Malecdan (Malecdan) against Respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo (Atty. Baldo), for the latter's
alleged violation of Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508 (P.D. 1508), otherwise known as
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which prohibits. the participation of lawyers in the proceedings
before the Lupon:

SEC. 9. Appearance of parties in person. - In all proceedings provided for herein, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Factual Antecedents

Malecdan filed a letter of complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contract and Damages against spouses
James and Josephine Baldo, before the Lupon of Barangay Pico in La Trinidad, Benguet.

On August 14, 2014, Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel of spouses Baldo during the hearing on the
subject complaint before the Punong Barangay.2

On August 18, 2014, Malecdan filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before the IBP Baguio-Benguet
Chapter praying that proper sanctions be imposed on Atty. Baldo for violating Section 9 of P.D. 1508.

On August 20, 2014, the Committee on Ethics of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter furnished Atty.
Baldo with a copy of the complaint and set the case for a conciliation conference on September 12,
2014.3

On September 15, 2014, the Complaint was endorsed to the Committee on Bar Discipline-IBP (CBD-
IBP) by the Committee on Ethics of IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter after the parties failed to agree on a
settlement.4

The CBD-IBP thereafter issued an Order5 dated September 17, 2014, requiring Atty. Baldo to submit
a duly verified Answer, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.6

On January 14, 2015, the CBD-IBP issued a Notice7 setting the mandatory conference/hearing of the
subject complaint on February 18, 2015.8
On February 12, 2015, Malecdan filed his Mandatory Conference Brief.9

On February 23, 2015, the mandatory conference of the case was rescheduled to March 24, 2015
after Atty. Baldo failed to attend the same.10

In his Answer11 dated February 23, 2015, Atty. Baldo admitted that he was present during the
proceedings before the Punong Barangay. He explained that he was permitted by the parties to
participate in the said hearing, to wit:
1. The allegation in the complaint is admitted. However, the rest of the truth to the matter is
that, before entering the barangay session hall, respondent asked permission from the
officer-in-charge if he will be allowed that before any hearing be conducted, he and the
respondent in the said barangay case, his uncle, James Baldo, be allowed to talk to
complainant Celestino Malecdan as they may be able to amicably settle the matter on their
own, of which the officer in charge granted on the reason that the proceeding was still in
the dialogue stage;

2. Likewise, when he entered inside the barangay session hall where complainant and his companion,
Laila Alumno was waiting, respondent again asked permission from complainant and his
companion, Laila Alumno if the latter will allow the former to join them in the dialogue
with James Baldo as the parties may amicably settle the case on their own;

3. Since complainant already knew respondent as they had a previous meeting at the office of
complainant's lawyer, Atty. Melissa QuitanCorpuz concerning the same case against James Baldo,
complainant readily permitted and allowed that parties have a dialogue on their own with respondent
joining them and without the presence of any barangay officials.12 (Emphasis supplied)
In an Order13 dated March 24, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles gave Malecdan a
period of fifteen (15) days to file a supplemental complaint where he can incorporate other facts and
circumstances which he failed to indicate in his complaint. Atty. Baldo was likewise given a period of
fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the supplemental complaint within which to file his supplemental
answer should he wish to do so.14

On March 31, 2015, Malecdan filed his Verified Supplemental Complaint Affidavit,15 wherein he
insisted that he vehemently objected to the presence of Atty. Baldo during the proceedings before
the Punong Barangay, to wit:
2. Using his influence as a lawyer, Atty. Baldo prevailed upon the Punong Barangay and the
Barangay Secretary to let him participate in the barangay proceedings intended for the
settlement of our grievance against Spouses Josephine Baldo and James Baldo on August
14, 2014.

3. He did this over my vehement objections. I told him that he was not supposed to be there but
then he insisted. It even got to the point that we were already arguing out loud. I resented the fact
that he was there assisting and representing his clients, the Spouses Baldo while I was not
represented by counsel. We were in a situation that Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508
sought to prevent.16 (Emphasis supplied)
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Robles rendered a Report and
Recommendation17 on June 2, 2015, recommending that Atty. Baldo be given a warning.
Commissioner Robles found that the language of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is not that
definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers from appearing before the Lupon, nor is the language that
clear on the sanction imposable for such an appearance.18 Commissioner Robles reasoned that the
matter of appearance or non-appearance before the Lupon is clearly addressed to a lawyer's taste of
propriety:
x x x. The respondent ought to have known that his attendance thereat would have caused some
ruckus. That respondent chose to attend is some measure of his lack of propriety.
Although this Commission cannot legislate good taste or an acute sense of propriety, the Commission
can definitely remind the respondent that another act of insensitivity to the rules of good conduct will
court administrative sanctions.19
The dispositive portion of Commissioner Robles' Report and Recommendation reads as follows:
UPON THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo
be given a warning.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution21 reversing and setting aside the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead recommended that Atty.
Baldo be reprimanded, thus:
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", considering Respondent's appearance as counsel for Spouses James and Josephine Baldo
in a Katarungan[g] Pambarangay hearing, Thus, Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED.22 (Emphasis
in the original and italics omitted)
The Court's Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court upholds the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that the language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in
barring lawyers from appearing before the Lupon.

As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,23 Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal
confrontation of the parties because:
"x x x a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel
or representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable
settlement on the part of the disputants. In other words, the said procedure is deemed
conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level."

xxxx

"To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the
parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode
of dispute resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory
language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating that
'expressio unius est exclusio alterius', the express exceptions made regarding minors and
incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned."24 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
CANON 1 -
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. A lawyer, to
the best of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law: and thus, avoid any act or
omission that is contrary to the same.25 A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of
his character but it also inspires the public to likewise respect and obey the law.26 Rule 1.01, on the
other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or omission that is
contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law
is unlawful.27 Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the
concept is broad enough to include such element.28

Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong
Barangay in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in
connection with Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and
Josephine Baldo in a hearing before the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad
in Benguet.

All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is sufficient to support the allegations against
Atty. Baldo.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Simpson T. Baldo LIABLE for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 7593

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA LOZADA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled "Bobie Rose V. Frias
vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada"3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the
Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal
records.

SO ORDERED.4

On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration.5

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled "Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin
S. Feliciano, et al.," where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings
of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant
submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007,
wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial
proceedings.7

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of
law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for
two (2) years.

On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint against him.8

In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her
desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in
good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering
that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and
1aw p++i1

his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.10

On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.11

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-
CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.

On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months.

RULING

We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension.13

Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the
[legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill."14

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross- examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore,
the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law
in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada
cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her
husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within
the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her
husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither
did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand
her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should
not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
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be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15

Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino
culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so,
in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her
husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate
the severeness of her penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty.
Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing
their profession despite this court's previous order of suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty.
Lozada for representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is
intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power
to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to
frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a
less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista- Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section
27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of
law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of
this Decision to respondent’s record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we can determine
the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

A.C. No. 7325 January 21, 2015

DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol
for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation patents and transfer
certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership
and possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018
hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.

OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. As legal
heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square meters.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their respective names.

When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and titles were issued to
Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program,who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s
spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.

On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the
agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of
Appeals.

On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant," filed a motion for execution with
the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.5

On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and
Demolition6 which he signed as "Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela"7. Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging
that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the
counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion
because Efren had already been dead9 for more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a
certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented affidavits of
Efren’s widow10 and daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of rights and that the parcel of land
was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also stated that they werefamiliar with Efren’s signature. They
state that the signature inthe waiver was different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol
committed deceit and gross misconduct.

In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured evidence intothe
proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document denominated asWaiver of Rights where Efren waived all his
rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment in one of the cases12 in favor of
Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case13 for falsification of public document and use of falsified document
against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14

Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as "additional counsel". He said that he had
consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that
there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.

In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD)
found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not present credible
evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent
admitted that at the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not
explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof of the authority. However, there was insufficient
evidence to hold him liable for falsification.

The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that he was
counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus
recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to one year
suspension from the practice of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was denied.18

Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are required in
administrative cases.20
We adopt the findings of the IBP.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his
client, hence:

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney isrequired to authorize him to appear in court for his
client, butthe presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown,
require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contemptas an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions. (Emphases supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this Court said that while a lawyer is not required to
present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show suchauthorization, it is imperative that he
show his authority to act. Thus:

A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal
notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, [a]
court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the
client.22

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor
may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court.23 If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf
without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party
may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed
authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party toa case without authority, he may be
disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.25

We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-client relationship
terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.26

Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. The
records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication
that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority during the course of the proceedings.

However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of
Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have
informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-
interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.27

We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza28 where he stated:

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the adviceof his
counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than
conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As the
ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him – presented
or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have been
implicated."

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of zeal in the
discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign
an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in this
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case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to
submit evidence in his behalf.29

While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s liability under the present circumstances, we
would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an
attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his
clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.

This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court processes in
the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in
general as agents of the judicial system.

Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his representation. We also
observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracol's blatant disregard of his duties
as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his lawyer's oath and in violation of
Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from
the practice of law for a period of one year.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved,
the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
 holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
 many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the
term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to
interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important
to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
 MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than
ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing
Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as
well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties.
Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways,
at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the
nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context
or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of
the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates
of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff
large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of
the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved
in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC).
Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted
by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the
Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities;
and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational
entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing.
The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle
of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems
— physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation,
aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
 Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the
last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities.
And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he
must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp
not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines
in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in
its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
 In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction
with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A
good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse
open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums;
but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery."
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:
 It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person
is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of
its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination;
(2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-
3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is
the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from
my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on
the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse
the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer
is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her
beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging
on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on
the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court
deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue
to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon
the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he
must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to
ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S.
v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and
 files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing
law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if
ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind
of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in
its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must
know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of
law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out
of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to
say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer
whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the
law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and
was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over
the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other
positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to
grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission
on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if
the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and
finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner.
What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could
he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use
of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which,
under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the
laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm
or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of
legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901.
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not
he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for
the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be
more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to
several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing
deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the
broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an
answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

 Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead;
an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants
in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents
are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A
person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney."
A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and
integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to
him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or
medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated
in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing
State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice
of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental
and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess
the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on
the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court
deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue
to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon
the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he
must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to
ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S.
v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and
files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing
law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if
ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind
of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in
its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must
know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of
law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out
of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to
say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer
whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the
law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and
was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over
the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other
positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to
grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission
on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if
the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and
finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner.
What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could
he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

 a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use
of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which,
under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the
laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm
 or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of
legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901.
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not
he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for
the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be
more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to
several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing
deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the
broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an
answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead;
an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants
in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents
are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A
person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney."
A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and
integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to
him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or
medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated
in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing
State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice
of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental
and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess
the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered
mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above;
he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of
the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the
Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated
on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi
est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is
the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the
extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference
and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not
here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no
less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from
overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in response to the
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not
be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative matter,
not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion
of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of
indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting
opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with the
exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member
of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are
decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of
respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code
of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be
mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive
language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially
during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a
member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent
members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated
the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it
should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s
proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom
of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or
in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely
because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring
attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly
motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual
antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the
"Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the
Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence
and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and
humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party.4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility
of states to protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga
omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado
Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited
for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among
other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:

I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28,
2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005
AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR
DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A
STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of
(sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment for denying the Petition."8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1)
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape
as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C.
Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on
the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard
Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly
acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been
plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the
alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine
Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to
sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I
were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the
prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of
plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote
the Court, to wit:

Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the integrity of
my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the
possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Court’s
Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the
Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence
Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said
Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments
I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written
precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has
been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study
the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an
En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the
Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice
Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the
statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the
same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board
allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines College of
Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The
cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:

The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28 members of the
faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged
signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each
name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse
during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as
"comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as
from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the charge that an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have
been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine
Judicial System.

In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own.
In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and
expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing,
and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty,
pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial
decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws
by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely copied select
portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work.
Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now
becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision.
In the absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the thing
speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’
sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the effort
they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of
the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and
analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly
journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and
careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all
Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-
Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of
rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it
obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of
the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works
without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and
deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility
for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the
pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an
international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of
acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of
many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on
misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the
Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and
nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The
reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for
failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these
undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history
and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass
without sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the
significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world
who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief
and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct,
whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only
the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question.
The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of
sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the
establishment of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring
the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and
integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and
professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the
profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical
and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence
expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court
and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of
cases and the establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left
without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor
and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court
may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts
research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar
acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law
 (SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

Associate Dean and Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the alleged
plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I am writing to
you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing
the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken
almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International
Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the
substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of
referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to
the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the
opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary
international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the
‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law,
established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support –
as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable
Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty members with the letters
(SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said
Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty
Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty
members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members
appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of
the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty.
Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies
submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been formally
submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding the UP Law
Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse
during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible
act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the
said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners
[in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the
most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there
is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary
cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would
not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases
and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore
O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel
J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo,
Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio
G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos,
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina
D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010,
during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration
of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the following
pleadings:
 (1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen
Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules
1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation
to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same
charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation
of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance which was
signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance,
respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and
trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter
of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of
intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further,
respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment –
that respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the
Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the courts43 and of
tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their Statement,
respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and
credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the
Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the
highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures
enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in
law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1,
id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against
plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an
‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time
the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take
any action on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief
Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del
Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers
posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public
stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be
held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents’
charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of Regents
v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are
therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance
included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to
Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper
attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano
De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights
Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law" by
Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages
from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise spoken on
the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation
allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on July 30,
2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in
the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 8, 2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of Justice Del
Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The
Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges
Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the
Philippine Star on August 16, 2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions and the
charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
 (d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position that in
issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of the
Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally
protected in the exercise of free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v.
Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued in
the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of
the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university has the right and
responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as
to encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of
reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they
would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture
and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research
and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s
conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of the dissenting
opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench than by an
attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his
side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the
interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook
occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a
case.73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers of the
Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution, including its
conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law professors and officers of
the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in
the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings and
conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion of
a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for
 hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April
28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports and
submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who
were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed
a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the
Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and
conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and
hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best intentions to
protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her
deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that
academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools have the
freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who
may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these
matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic
freedom of the University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be
taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’ constitutional right to
freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public
morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered mail (the
Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the
Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the
first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the
sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and
that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good
faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in
a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following
authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in
American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor
entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that
"attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the
Statement."84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on
what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view that willful
and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the
opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in
the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this
Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as
one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss in correctly
assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends his
discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause
Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the
Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his submission of
a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement,
which he described as follows:

 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing
pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause
Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC.

 "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which reflects as signatories
the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring
Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of
Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of
Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

 "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves as the
official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members
who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I
above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other
members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since what Dean
Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents.
Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a draft
statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty members so
that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the
printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring
Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the process of convening
its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the faculty. Some
faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in the
College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for one reason or another,
 were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their
assurances that they would sign as soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long
enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for
posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in relation to significant public
issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the
first printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name.
Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-signatories in the
final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity
of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to
vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in
fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his
administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean
Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice
Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously
circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the
"(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the
phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her,
Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving
for the United States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely
accurate.91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed full
reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to
indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their signatures physically to
the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances
surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this was what actually
transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he
[Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally
agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign
the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he
was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try
to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to
teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to
sign.94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from Justice Mendoza
in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already
become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty.
By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former
Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95 (Emphases
supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he was one
of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that
the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was
explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him. However, his
name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity
II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his
cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice
Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a
true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in
all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the
Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its
signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in
the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by
analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a
person has participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which
members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or
had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02
for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law
faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that
he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by
transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the
hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management
Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case
and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction
for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common Compliance,
including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only
in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar;
but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the
UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e
subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes
that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School
Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful
enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere
of repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness
to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch
believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it
from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He
also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he
signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material issues to be
resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as Members
of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as
a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?

5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such
hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered
with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying
assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize
the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view
on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to
this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of
plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was
"[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the
Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain
those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive,
to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse
during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible
act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the
said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners
[in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the
most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there
is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary
cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would
not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases
and underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the right
to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not
only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded
the limits of fair comment and common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of
contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and
a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all
the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort
to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each
and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase
the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.117 (Emphases
supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question
were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and
resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice
can never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and
impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled
threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong
should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of
prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his
motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with
seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a
few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense
of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be
proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view of Justice
Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the
respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing
at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the following
principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound
to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re
Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is
the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which
those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by accusing
the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the
Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the
Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one
of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that

"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just
like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial authority.
However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must
conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the
legal authorities sustaining this view. To quote from that decision:
1aw phi 1

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves,
when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing
the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the
judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the
course of a politic

A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, Complainants, v. ATTY.

EDGAR R. NAVALES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated January 16, 2010 filed by complainants spouses
Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio (complainants) against respondent Atty. Edgar R.
Navales (respondent), praying that respondent be meted the appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for
failing to pay rent and to vacate the apartment he is leasing despite demands.
 The Facts

Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay
Paltok, SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to respondent under a Contract of Lease2 dated April
16, 2005. However, respondent violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he
failed to pay monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased
premises despite repeated oral and written demands.3 This prompted complainants to refer the
matter to barangay conciliation, where the parties agreed on an amicable settlement, whereby
respondent promised to pay complainants the amount of P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009 and to vacate
the leased premises on July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually reneged on his obligations under the
settlement agreement, constraining complainants to file an ejectment case4 against him before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed as Civil Case No.
09-39689. Further, complainants filed the instant case before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed to exemplify
honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to
complainants.5 chanroble slaw

Despite notices,6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the mandatory conference, and to
file his position paper.

Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision7 dated December 8, 2009 in the ejectment case
in favor of the complainants and, accordingly, ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises and
to pay complainants the following amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July
2009; (b) further rental payments of P8,000.00 per month starting August 17, 2009 until the actual
surrender of said premises to complainants; (c) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and (d)
cost of suit.8
chanrob leslaw

During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant City Public Prosecutor of
Quezon City.9 chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation10 dated February 8, 2011, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.11 It was found that respondent
displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts, as highlighted by his numerous
promises to pay which he eventually reneged on. In this light, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should be held administratively liable.12 chan robles law

In a Resolution13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution14 dated September
15, 2014 adopting and approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of
the IBP and, accordingly, meted respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely.

As per Registry Return Card No. 957,15 respondent received the Court's order of suspension on
October 16, 2014.16 Records are bereft of any showing that respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and, thus, the Court's order of suspension against him became final and executory.

Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension

On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a
Certification17 was issued by the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to
the present. In connection with this, the MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter18 dated September 8, 2015 to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), inquiring about the details of respondent's suspension from the
practice of law. In view of the foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the OBC for appropriate
action.19
chanrobles law

Despite due notice from the Court,20 respondent failed to file his comment to the aforementioned
Certification issued by MeTC-Br. 38.

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation21 dated February 10, 2016, the OBC recommended that
respondent be further suspended from the practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant
City Prosecutor for a period of six (6) months, thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1)
year, effective immediately.22 It found that since respondent received the order of suspension against
him on October 16, 2014 and did not move for its reconsideration, such order attained finality after
the lapse of 15 days therefrom. As such, he should have already served his suspension. In this
relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was holding a position .which requires him to
use and apply his knowledge in legal matters and practice of law, i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor, he
should have ceased and desisted from acting as such. However, as per the Certification dated
September 7, 2015 of the MeTC-Br. 38, respondent never complied with his order of suspension. In
view thereof, the OBC recommended to increase respondent's suspension from the practice of law
and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6)
months.23 chanrobles law

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the OBC and adopts
the same in its entirety.

It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such,
when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing
all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This
includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law. 24 The
practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic
of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.25 cralawred chan roble slaw

In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution26 dated September 15,
2014 suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and
executory fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus,
respondent should have already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However,
respondent never heeded the suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions
as an Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification27 issued by MeTC-
Br. 38 stating that respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since
September 2014 up to the present.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,28 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of
2010," provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit: ChanRoblesVi rtualawl ib rary
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial
prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry (a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be;

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of
such investigations he/she or any of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or
take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear
and testify under oath before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant
witness may be enforced by application to any trial court; and cralawlawlib rary

(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal
ordinances in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of
Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent's
continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of
the Court's order of suspension against him.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court and wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which
respondent is guilty of in this case - are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law, to wit: ChanRoblesVi rtualawl ib rary

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court, in Lingan v. Calubaquib,29Feliciano
v. Bautista-Lozada30 and Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya31 consistently imposed an additional six (6)-
month suspension from the practice of law to erring lawyers who practiced law despite being earlier
suspended. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it proper to mete the same penalty
to respondent in addition to the earlier six (6)-month suspension already imposed on him, as
recommended by the OBC. Thus, respondent's total period of suspension from the practice of law -
and necessarily, from the holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor as well - should be fixed at
one (1) year.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge
the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor
of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers
through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its
preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose
a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible."32 chanrobles law

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional
period of six (6) months from his original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year from
service of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

A.C. No. 11754

JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and
Salvador Villanueva v. Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law
Office through Atty. Era.2

On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and,
consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month
pay. More specifically, Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of ₱674,128
for the separation pay and full backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay.3 Bonifacio and the corporation
brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions were
decided against them.4

Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution5 was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of
Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was likewise issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 20087 and April 16,
20138 were later on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment
award plus interest and attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests
entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664.9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this
Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
years, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic] his file
in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.10

On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the
business establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He
attended the public auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same
day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees who
were there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but
eventually stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of pulling
out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with the negotiation in his law
office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went from ₱6 Million to
₱9 Million.11

As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's
business establishment together with their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out
the auctioned properties. This was evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant administrative
complaint.12

This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion.14

Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in
February and April, 2014 with regard to the subject labor case.15

On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.16

In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to what transpired on
November 28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present therein at that time.18 Hence, his
allegations of force, threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis.19 In his defense, Atty.
Era further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted
as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's
theory that with such SP A, he was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the
implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients
during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely
representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they
made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the parties were still on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have
their own computations, which they could respectively accept or otherwise.21

In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a
pleading considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was
prepared by Atty. Era. On the other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings.
There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading. Neither
the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era
was engaging in the practice of law during his suspension. According to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody,
not exclusively lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.

As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of the judgment by using force,
threat, and intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by
filing the following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case23 dated December 18, 2013,
acknowledging the full satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era and Bragas' clients to take
possession of the remaining machines in his business establishment; (2) a Manifestation24 dated March 12, 2014,
wherein complainant stated that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus
Motion with Entry of Appearance (Motion to Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case
and release of TRO Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion for Consignation with Motion to Lift Levy26 dated
October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the criminal case for
Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the Investigating
Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case and withdrawing
the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and Bragas with regard to the implementation of the said judgment,
complainant contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of the judgment was improperly
and unlawfully implemented.28

Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges against Attys. Era and Bragas
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.29

The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-27030 dated April 18, 2015 reversed and set
aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions:

RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty.
Diane Karen B. Bragas

RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
considering Atty. Era's continuedengagement in the practice of law during the period of his suspension by
admittedly participating in the negotiation for the payment of money judgment including pegging of interest he acted
as his clients advocate instead as an agent in view of the presence also of his client in the negotiation, for holding
office and admittedly summoned the complainant's children to determine the money judgment. Hence, Atty.
Edgardo O. Era is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.

RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.

In its Extended Resolution31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument that he
merely acted pursuant to an SP A given to him untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty.
Era the authority to appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did not include
the November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on behalf of his clients, the SP A
specifically stated that said payments should be made in the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus,
Atty. Era had no authority under the SP A to represent his clients during the November 28, 2013 auction and to pull
out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of the judgment award. At any rate, according to the Board,
Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated
Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.33

Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an
unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the
satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing.34

Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case were transmitted to this Court.

No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of June 29, 2017.

Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant administrative case, the issues being:
(1) Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another
disciplinary action against him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty.
Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against
her?

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.

Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".

On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on
point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of the said Decision, viz.:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).

xxxx

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
1âw phi 1

characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis supplied)

In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante,38We succinctly ruled that the term practice of law
implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose, such as identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating
oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.39

In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients
in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the
certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees present in the
premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should
be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's
children in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the
properties.40

It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be exclusively
for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its
Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and
consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award.41 Precisely, this is why his clients
chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising
from the labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era.42 Such trained legal mind is what his clients
were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter into
any amicable settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer.43 It could readily
be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus, We are one with the
Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the
practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as such SP A cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by
this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.

Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension

As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's Decision
dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November to December
2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.

Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27,44 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to
circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this
Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are called upon to obey court
orders and processes.45 Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes.46

This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in their practice despite being
suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R. Magat,47this Court suspended Atty. Magat from
the practice of law for practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension. Likewise in
another case, We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear language of this Court's
suspension order.48

In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully
disobeying the lawful order of this Court warranting the exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the
Board's recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension from the
practice of law, taking into account that this is his second infraction.

Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be reproved.

There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she
allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR,
specifically:

CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such
duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found
duly qualified in education and character.49

As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice
could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she
should have not participated to such transgression.

Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual
circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or
the law firm's clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the
one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.

Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation
of the CPR.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's
lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this Decision.
Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of
another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as members of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer suspended
from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring
the authority to practice law.

For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the practice of law.1

In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents
allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial
Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions,
and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years.

Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be disbarred, not merely
suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant
Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9

In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the
Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's
suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc
issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the.
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En
Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional
Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."11

Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include
his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to
prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not render advisory
opinions.13

On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan
alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.

Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's
suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a notary
public."15 According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16

Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a
member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of
law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director]
[during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."17 The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant
Lingan, should have ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant
Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter."18

This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and recommendation.19

In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the period of
suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to
file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that they desisted from
practicing law during the period of suspension.

On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as Regional
Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly]
disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on
Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final
and executory. "22

Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court require him to submit
a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from performing his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human Rights be
required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.

On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of law did not
include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his suspension from the
practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process
and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded."25

In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective motions to lift
order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and
the Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued
performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated
September 23, 2009 provides:

Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:

(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective motions to lift
relative to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and SUBMIT
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where they may
appear as counsel, stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law
during the entire period of their suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the
meantime;

(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on Human Rights [CHR]
stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of his functions for
the period stated in the order of suspension and disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;

(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of complainant against
them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)

In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift order of
suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing
his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he "perform[ed],
generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These managerial functions allegedly
included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional office and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress
of investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the
implementation of all other services and assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different
units at the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of
funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which
takes care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35

Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he
"faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of law]."36

The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the penalty
imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed
upon him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the
practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an
entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40

Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide
by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment,
complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification
from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he was suspended from office and desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director.

As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only
performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the
order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under the
landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position
of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by
Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.

With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional Director,
complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have followed the initial
resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this
court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on Human Right's resolution suspending him from
office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan
argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant
Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be disbarred.

On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to resume his
practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for issuance of a notarial
commission.

On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and recommendation
Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission
on Human Rights.49

In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga
"should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director] which
[required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform his
functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that
the Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also
recommended holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the
Commission on Human Right's filing of comment]."52

In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift
one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's claim that he
did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.

In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty.
Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional Director. The
Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not
[require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives
on [the] matter."56

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.

We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from the
practice of law for six months.

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v.
Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by
lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with power to investigate
"all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into regional offices with each
office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional
office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.

Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses,
and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"65

b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66

c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of the
legal officer or investigator;67

d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of action
and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68

e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or

subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and

f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.70

These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually
performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the
bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.

The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice
of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding.
The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has been
without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated
January 16, 2007:

WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his post, for
want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to the
investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all Regional Human Rights
Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into
effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga
in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City
for the period for which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not
violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission on
Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be
heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was also
immaterial. He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority to
1âwphi 1

practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.

All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law.
Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six
months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.

We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite lack.of authority to
practice law. 1âwphi1

We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering
its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission admonished
Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The
resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the
Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on
Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-
013.

The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is
totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and his Lawyer's oath.

The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of
his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to
secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the
rules and regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth by the Commission.

With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15
June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct of
an officer reposed with public trust.

This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having
contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a
privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of
the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude
from whatever privilege the Commission grants of every official and employee.

The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him pursuant to the
Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may
be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being served. This Commission is prevailed upon
that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring
public officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the
penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the
service.80 (Emphasis in the original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty.
Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its
officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the
privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest
degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga
shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service
on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the
Commission on Human Rights.

[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).

SYNOPSIS

For respondent’s stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since the latter’s constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a
resolution recommending the removal of respondent’s name from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to
Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the
obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court
Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that
this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member
of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay
membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as
 unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and
held as an inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of
Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained
of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An "Integrated Bar" is a State-

organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar
and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.

2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW
NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. The expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — The
Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The
Act’s avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order to promote the
general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
 5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES
REGARDING ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the
Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," (Sec. 5[5], Art. X,
1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.

6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER’S CONSTITUTIONAL

FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization
for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. —
There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.

9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE
SUPREME COURT. — The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty
that the power will not be misused or prostituted.

10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and a lawyer’s stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in violation of said Rule and By-
Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

RESOLUTION
 CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article
III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon’s comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent’s pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:chanroble s law lib rary

"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
‘Integrated Bar of the Philippines,’ composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: jgc:chan robles. com.ph
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but
is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise
of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of
the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, Et Al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.

". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
‘perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable’ . . ."
cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is
an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as
the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5
(5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

x x x

"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .",

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: jgc:chanrobles .com.p h

"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties.
If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. chanroble s.com. ph : virtual law l ibra ry

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) —
which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer s public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It
has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment
upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to
the Court the power to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in
the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014

AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the
latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her client purportedly to expedite the proceedings
of their case which was pending before the Court.

The Facts

Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his siblings engaged the
services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v.
Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The complainant claimed that sometime in
February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) from him to
expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as
evidenced by a contract.3

According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De
Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) from his sibling
Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of
their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the
complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007

Receipt

That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn shall result in the following:

1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;

2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be included in the Decision, the
300,000.00 shall be returned.

Signed

Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007

Receipt

The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the process before the courts. The
said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be reimbursed to her by her siblings
upon winning the case with finality.

Signed

Atty. Norlita De Taza6

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the Court had
already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was
still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found.7

Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He
also attached several affidavits and documents9 from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued
bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit10 which
was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks11 in her favor amounting to
₱481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.

Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit12 was attached to the complaint, averred that
Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for ₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank for
being drawn against a closed account.

Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,14 stating that Atty. De Taza owes her ₱29,560.39
and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.

On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed the Court that Atty. De Taza is planning to leave
the country as she was joining her husband in the United States of America (U.S.A.).

In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to file a Comment. However,
the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-
Moved". The Court then resolved by virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2, 2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s
office address at Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned unserved with the notation
"RTS-not connected."

It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant inform the Court of Atty. De
Taza’s new address, which the complainant faithfully complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s new address in the
U.S.A. The Court, in its Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of Court to resend a copy of the
Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using the latter’s U.S.A.
address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with the complaint was returned;
this time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20 dated September 9, 2009,
held that the said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having
waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they failed to appear. Thus, the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. The complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred that he
was already residing abroad and maintained that he had already submitted his documentary evidence at the time of
the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any position paper.

In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended
that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommendation in a Resolution24 dated
January 3, 2013, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of [P]800,000.00 to expedite the case pending in
the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.25 (Emphasis supplied)

The Issue

WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING BOUNCING

CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING
THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling

The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the accusations against her. Numerous
attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to defend herself from the complainant’s allegations, but all these
efforts were only met with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on her part to
evade her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the Court is concerned, all means were exhausted
to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment
will not be a hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.

The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by the Court to ascertain
whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court held in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action
Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)

"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required."29 Based on the documentary evidence
submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing
bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. The complainant even submitted a
document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case
filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a closed
account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting
when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar.
As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity
and fairness.

"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act
to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she
1âwphi 1

has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should
hold in high esteem."30

Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she had the gall to make it
appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in
exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money
from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when
she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.31 In this case, the purpose for which
Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made
in the first place.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of
the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.32

The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33 suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two
years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services,
Inc. v. Valerio,34 the same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring lawyer who issued worthless checks to
pay off her loan.

Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for four years was
the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him for the purported filing
of a petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to his client a copy of the petition with
stamped receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition was filed.

In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00 from the complainant to be put up as
injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was
handling the case. When the complainant verified this with the judge, the judge denied the respondent’s allegations.
The complainant later learned that the bond was also unnecessary, as the application for a writ was already denied
by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years.

"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."37 "The Judiciary has been besieged enough with
accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of
mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated."38

All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO YEARS
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's record
in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint against
respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential
lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be
made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00)
which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true
copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and
original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand
Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of
the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same
provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them, Atty.
Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court,
Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but denied that the
amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of
₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants fully
paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy
of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case
filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin
Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to
have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and despite
the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any
progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants
without a written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with modification the Report
and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to
the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital
that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot
despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when
he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. 1âwphi 1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the respondent; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,

vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed by
complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a spurious
court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured the services
of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and
Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was
eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of
evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the
same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked
for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not
produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly
as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan
handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal9 before the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed
complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing
the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of
the notice. Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and
requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9,
2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative
complaint for disbarment against respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was complainant’s failure to
timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal.
According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted
in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a
desperate litigant, he was blamed for the court’s unfavorable decision.16

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the
penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him.18

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-founded, observing
that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the
dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the
issues at hand.19

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s accusation that the spurious
November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to
fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it
appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan.20

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid
report and recommendation.21

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the
CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated on the
developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important information he may
have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to
decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will
minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client
in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep
in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is
expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the
right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to
the client’s cause.23

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of
complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such
dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add insult
to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way
beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment.24

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the November 9, 2007
Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due
course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant.
Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he
becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests with
utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to
conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep complainant in
the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross
Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in
Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest
1âw phi1

degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of
an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or
private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue
in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the status of their
respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court
suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal
of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who
consistently failed to update his client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.

However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by falsifying documents,
the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred
the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also, in
Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent court
decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e.,
complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for
failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge
his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal
profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his
client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule
1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this Court. Further, let copies of
this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who
had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the
courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the
complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar
who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel
for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the
RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned."2

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14, 2007,3 viz:

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was
not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province
as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge
which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted
this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition.
It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from
the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. Relative to the Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby
DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’sunethical
practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of
previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to
submit his comment.5

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007 order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and
impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest
issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly
dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid).8

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the administrative complaint
against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in
Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file
administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes
were issued adversely to him and his clients.9

In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and
recommendation:10

xxxx

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1)
Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3)
OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ.
These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the
complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in
cases that respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A.
Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic)
out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent.
The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to
secure a favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L.
Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was
handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-
6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala
ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant
Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this
ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca
Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as
third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A.
Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant
JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the
respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted
his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003
in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF
RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY
VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No.
XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-
Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the
case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia
Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18,
2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the
cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings,
although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining
to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation
against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the
rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case
resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All
these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a
member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the
Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against
respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation 11 finding Atty.
Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous
administrative and criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law
for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on
purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the
administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP
Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-
545.14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court
personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute
cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.15

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out
from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that
direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the
Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has
failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating
it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as
IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his
colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side.
He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor
harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that
the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney
constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members
of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false
or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must
not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’
propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is
equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He
disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid,
increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to
litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any
good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially
prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even
the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court
personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.23

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently
dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby
demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions have
been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for
review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order,
together with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then
constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course
indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issuesin
disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the
applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition
always gives the legal basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article VIII of the Constitution.
The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions withinthe constitutional
contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the
constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due course, with
the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the
petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions
raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion toinhibit in
order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has
recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being
purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.32

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno materiality to
the case.1âwphi1

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not
appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx
x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges
could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges
and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him
because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any
particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the
latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of
Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake
his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as
a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought
against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22
1avv phi 1

and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same
offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers
found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty.
Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice
of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.