Nat’l Land Titles and Deeds Registration Admin v.

CSC

April 7, 1993

G.R. No. 84301

(The Law on Public Officers, Civil Service Laws, Election Laws)

Petitioner: Nat’l Land Titles and Deeds Registration Admin (NALTDRA)

Respondent: CSC; Violeta Garcia

Ponente: Campos, Jr.

FACTS:

 Garcia was an LLB grad and a first grade civil service.

 She was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII.
 She was later appointed as Deputy Register of Deeds III, upon reclassification of the position.
 She was designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
 Executive Order No. 649 was enacted.
 It authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration, and it regionalized the offices of the registers therein.
 The law imposed a new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy
Register od Deeds II or higher.
 Garcia issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on temporary status for not being a member of the
Philippine Bar.
 Sec. of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of her services on the ground that she was receiving Bribe Money.
 Garcia appealed, but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on the ground that the
termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment.
 The CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be restored to her position.
 According to the CSC, under the vested right theory, the new requirement of the BAR membership will not
apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer position on or after Feb 9, 1981, the date the order took
effect.
 NALTDRA assailed the validity of the CSC Resolution

ISSUE: WON membership in the bar, which is a qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position
of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO. No. 649, Section 4, should be applied only to new applicants and not to those
who were already in service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of
the EO.

HELD: No. The requirement shall also apply to those already in service.

RATIO:

 EO No. 649, in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions:
 Section 8. Abolition of Existing Positions. All structural units in the LRC and in the registries of deeds, and all
positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the implementing order to be issued by the
president pursuant to the preceding par. The pertinent functions, applicable appropriations, records,
equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created.
 The law, therefore, mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the LRC is
deemed non-existent. This is NOT removal. Removal implied post subsists and one is merely separated
therefrom, while here, there is no position at all. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of.
 Abolition of office is valid if (1) carried out by a legitimate body and (2) done in good faith.
(1) LEGITIMATE BODY

 In this case, it was by LEGITIMATE BODY. There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid
reorganization in any branch/agency of gov’t under Sec 8, Article XVII of the 1973 Consti.
(2) GOOD FAITH

 Re: good faith, if the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or
powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it
 embraces all or some of the duties of the old office, it will be considered an abolition and creation of new one.
The same is true if the office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy, are given to an existing office.
 In this case, EO No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the LRC. The requirement
of Bar membership was imposed to meet changing circumstnaces and new developments. It was imposed
concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
 Re: “Vested right theory,” no such thing as a vested interest or estate in an office, except constitutional offices
which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure.

JUDGMENT: Garcia has no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. She cannot be reinstated
to her former position. CSC Resolution reinstating Garcia was set aside.
 Labo vs. COMELEC

Facts:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio
City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for
the same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the
ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.

On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on
May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from
promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May
11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on
appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he
wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review
with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to
proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to implement
its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already become final
and executory.Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards
the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has
already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy —

(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2. WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to
be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec
cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14,
1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992
and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired
finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.

Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner
Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is
an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the
electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next
highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that
he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office
of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification
does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.

Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as
SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of
Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon,
the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
 POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC Case Digest (G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700)

POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 221697
& 221698-700

THE PETITION:

The petition is composed of two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction assailing the following:

1. DECEMBER 1, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECOND DIVISION (Cancelled

petitioner’s certificate of candidacy);

2. DECEMBER 23, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

(Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration); and

3. DECEMBER 11, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

(Declared that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has
been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten 10 years and 11 months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
2016)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

September 3, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares

1968 (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar. Custody over petitioner
was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar and his wife.

September 6, Emiliano Militar reported and registered

1968 petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).

1973 When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity

spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces)
filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City.

May 13, 1974 The Poe spouses’ petition for adoption was
granted by the trial court and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe."

December 13, Having reached the age of 18, petitioner

1986 registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City.
April 4, 1988 Petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of
Foreign Affairs

1988-1991 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a

degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines but opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the U.S. in 1988.

Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston

College in Chestnuts Hill

July 27, 1991 Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.

Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in
San Juan City.

July 29, 1991 Desirous of being with her husband who was
then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to
the U.S.

April16, 1992 Petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian

Daniel

April 5, 1993 Renewed her Philippines passport.

May 19, 1998 Renewed her Philippines passport.

July 10, 1998 Petitioner gave birth to daughter Hanna

MacKenzie.

October 18, 2001 Petitioner became a naturalized American citizen

April 8, 2004 – Petitioner came back to the Philippines together

July 8, 2004 with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. It was
during this time that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter Anika.

December 13, Petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon

2004 – February learning of her father's deteriorating medical
3, 2005 condition who died shortly.

2005 Petitioner and husband began preparing for

their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools

May 24, 2005 Petitioner came home to the Philippines and

without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

March 2006 The petitioner's husband officially informed the

U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.
petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-
 square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City
where they built their family home.

July 7, 2006 Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.

July 18, 2006 The Bureau of Immigration acted favorably on

petitioner's petitions and declared that she is
deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.

August 31, 2006 Again, petitioner registered as a voter

of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. She also
secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport
bearing the No. XX4731999.

October 6, 2010 President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed

petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).

October 20, 2010 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an

"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City.

October 21, 2010 Petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the

Bureau of Immigration and took her oath of
office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then
on, petitioner stopped using her American
passport.

July 12, 2011 The petitioner executed before the Vice Consul
of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality
of the United States" and stated that she in the
Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July
1991 and from May 2005 to present.

December 9, The U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a

2011 "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.

October 2, 2012 The petitioner filed with the COMELEC her

Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for
the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6
years and 6 months" to the question "Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013."

October 15, 2015 Petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for
the May 2016 Elections.
 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

ISSUES:

1. With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her repatriation, is the petitioner a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines? YES TO BOTH.

2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as president? YES.
Did the petitioner commit material misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy? NO.

RATIONALE:

1. Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

ON BEING A FOUNDLING:

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than
sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are
Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the
total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country
was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino
was 99.83%.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.

 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical
chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% -
that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class
of human beings.

While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either.

ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in
the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act,
what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's ruling disregarded consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as follows:

…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-bom
Filipino.

Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson vs. HRET where
the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of
a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."

2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as president?

ON RESIDENCE

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years residence in the Philippines before the day of the
elections.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on
24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing
about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship
their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005
and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking
slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February
2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail
to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title
Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted
to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant
until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to
sell the family home).

The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay taken together, lead to no other conclusion that when she came
here on May 24 2005, her intention was to permanently abandon the United States. Petitioner also actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005.

ON MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her
2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six (6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in
her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November
2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as
false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012.

Her explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring
about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is strengthened by the change which the COMELEC itself
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016."
The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner.

CONCLUSION:

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016
National Elections.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83896
194 SCRA 317
February 22, 1991

Petitioner: Civil Liberties Union

Respondent: Executive Secretary

FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to hold other than their
government positions in addition to their primary positions.

 Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.

 Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor
of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2) positions
other than his primary position.
 Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a Secretary,
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as
a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

Constitutional provisions:

 Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their Deputies or
Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, directly or indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

 Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple
positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided by the
Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall
reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land.
Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF
Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to
immediately relinquish their offices and employment.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

 Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: 1987 Constitution; Supremacy of the Constitution (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty.
Usita)
 Statutory Construction: CH 11: Constitutional Construction (Textbook: Agpalo, Professor: Atty. Bathan)
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

NATURE:

These are petitions including:

1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively.

(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of
the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s) disqualification to run for
and hold public office

FACTS:

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of
the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy [7] for the position of President but
was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by
Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010
synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC
because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC),
in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding
that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by
former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second
highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and
praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:

No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual
or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent
and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language
of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of
the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
FALLO:

Petition is dismissed

ACHACOSO vs. MACARAIG (DIGEST)

September 19, 2019 by CaseDigestsPh

G.R. No. 93023 (1991)

Cruz, J.
Expiration of Term or Tenure

PARTIES:

Petitioner Tomas D. Achacoso

Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,

Respondents Labor Secretary Ruben Torres,
Ramon Sarmiento

SUMMARY:

Petitioner filed a courtesy resignation from his position as POEA Administrator and he was replaced by respondent
Sarmiento. He now claims that his courtesy resignation is actually involuntary thus there is violation of his security of
tenure. The Supreme Court did not agree. There was a certification from the CSC showing that petitioner has not
participated in a Career Executive Service Development Program (CESDP). Likewise, the certification showed that he is
not a CES eligible and that he was not appointed to a rank in the CES and is not therefore a member of the Career
Executive Service. The SC held that a person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.

DOCTRINES:

The term of a person appointed in an acting capacity is understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at
the pleasure of the appointing authority. When required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being
removed in violation of his security of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before
the expiration of his term. Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.

FACTS:

Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the POEA and assumed office on October 27, 1987.

On January 2, 1990, in compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to “all Department
Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads,” and other government officials, he filed a courtesy
resignation. This was accepted by the President “with deep regrets.”

The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge. He
protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary
but filed only in obedience to the President’s directive. Respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of
the POEA, vice the petitioner. Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked to vacate his
office. He filed an MR but this was denied.

In this petition for prohibition and mandamus, this Court is asked to annul the appointment of Sarmiento and to
prohibit the respondents from preventing the petitioner from discharging his duties as Administrator of the POEA.

Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure,
which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. Claiming to
have the rank of undersecretary, he says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree, which includes in the Career Service.

The Solicitor General concedes that the office of POEA Administrator is a career executive service position but submits
that the petitioner himself is not a career executive service official entitled to security of tenure. He offers the
certification from the CSC showing that the petitioner has not participated in a Career Executive Service Development
Program (CESDP) and is not a CES eligible. Likewise, he was not appointed to a rank in the CES and is not
therefore a member of the Career Executive Service.

ISSUE:

WON there is violation of petitioner’s security of tenure? (NO, there was no separation but a mere expiration of term
because his appointment was temporary in nature)

RATIO:

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his
appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule,
may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.

The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. The purpose of
an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person
to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.
The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority.

In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official relations known
in the law of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at the outset as without any fixity and
enduring at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

When required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of his security
of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term.

Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.

It should be obvious from all the above observations that the petitioner could have been validly replaced even if he
had not filed his courtesy resignation. We therefore do not have to rule on its legality.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Marohombsar vs CA
[G.R. No. 126481. February 18, 2000]
DR. EMILY M. MAROHOMBSAR, in her Official Capacity as President of the Mindanao State
University, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BILLANTE G. MARUHOM, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Billante S. Guinar-Mahurom was first appointed Technical Assistant in 1988 and the MSU Board of
Regents (BOR) confirmed her appointment per its Resolution No. 279, s. 1988. The position title was subsequently
reclassified and retitled to Executive Assistant II upon the effectivity of Republic Act 6758, otherwise known as the
Salary Standardization Law.

Since private respondent did not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility required of the position at that time,
she was only extended a temporary appointment as Executive Assistant II which was noted by the MSU Board of
Regents. Subsequently, upon acquiring Career Service Professional Eligibility, she was extended a permanent
appointment to the position of Executive Assistant II by then MSU President Ahmad E. Alonto, Jr. on May 3, 1991.

This appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12 on June 25,
1991. She assumed office and discharged the duties thereof, without any objection from the Board of Regents. When
MSU President Alonto was replaced by herein petitioner Dr. Emily M. Marohombsar on January 5, 1993, private
respondent continued her employment and received the corresponding salary and other benefits from the MSU until
she was summarily terminated on February 28, 1993.

The Civil Service Commission declared her termination as illegal and ordered the payment of all her back salaries and
other benefits due her from the date of her separation up to the date of her reinstatement in the service.
CA affirmed the CSC’s order.

ISSUE: W/N an ad interim appointment is terminable at any time and for any cause.

HELD: NO. An ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of
whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment
was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was
issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s appointment as
Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12.
Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary
appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are
permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them.] There is absolutely no showing that the
Board of Regents disapproved private respondent’s appointment. On the contrary, private respondent assumed the
position, discharged her duties and received the corresponding salary and benefits without objection from the MSU
Board of Regents from the date of her appointment on May 3, 1991 or for a period of almost two (2) years until her
dismissal effective February 28, 1993. It is worth mentioning that the MSU Code of Governance provides that “(n)o
payment of salary shall be effected unless approved by the Board of Regents.” [13] Considering that private respondent
was paid her corresponding salary and benefits for almost two (2) years from her appointment as Executive Assistant II
up to her termination, the Board of Regents may be deemed to have tacitly approved her appointment.
Based on the foregoing, private respondent holds an appointment under permanent status and thus enjoys security of
tenure as guaranteed by law.

[CASE DIGEST] Sarmiento v. Mison (G.R. No. 79974)

December 17, 1987 | 156 SCRA 549

Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla, petitioners

Salvador Mison, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, and Guillermo Carague, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, respondents

Commission on Appointments, intervenor

FACTS:

In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments. Herein petitioners, both of whom happened to be
lawyers and professors of constitutional law, filed the instant petition for prohibition on the ground that the
aforementioned appointment violated Section 16, Art. VII of the1987 Constitution. Petitioners argued that the
appointment of a bureau head should be subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments.

HELD:

No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the President is well within her authority
to appoint bureau heads without submitting such nominations before the Commission on Appointments. In its ruling,
the SC traced the history of the confirmatory powers of the Commission on Appointments (which is part of the
legislative department) vis-a-vis the appointment powers of the President.

 Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent or
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. As a result, the Commission became very powerful, eventually
transforming into a venue for horse-trading and similar malpractices.

 On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive
amendments, the 1973 Constitution placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check
on the part of the legislature.

Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers intended to strike a "middle ground" in order to
reconcile the extreme set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. As such, while the President may make
appointments to positions that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution also
grants her the power to make appointments on her own without the need for confirmation by the legislature.

Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution enumerates four groups of public officers:

 heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution;

 all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

 those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

 officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

According to the Court, only the presidential appointments of the first group of public officers are subject to the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. A review of the deliberations would show that bureau heads have
been deleted from the first group, precisely because they are lower in rank as compared to other officers enumerated
in the same group.

Therefore, Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.

CALDERON VS CARALE
Posted by kaye lee on 11:20 PM

208 SCRA 254

FACTS:

In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the
Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the
appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon
asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of
the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers
appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution
whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive
departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members
of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights).

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza

December 11, 2018

Political Law. Constitutional Commissions.

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza

G.R. No. 141141 | June 25, 2001

FACTS:

On November 5, 1997, administrative charges were brought against respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations
manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) for failure to prevent an
irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-officers during his. PAGCOR Board issued a
Resolution dismissing respondent on the grounds of dishonesty, grave misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and loss of confidence. Thus, respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission which
modified the said resolution finding respondent guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the resolution of the CSC and ordered reinstatement of respondent with payment of full backwages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is a confidential appointee or employee whose term had expired by reason of loss of
confidence.
HELD:

No. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 expressly
provides that all employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as “Confidential” appointee are
exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel
management policies set by the Board of Directors. The submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared
confidential appointees must be rejected. Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as
primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts, the true test being the nature of the position.

Although respondent’s position handles confidential matters such fact does not warrant the conclusion that his
position is primarily confidential in character. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary
confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.

Malaluan vs. COMELEC

G.R. # 120193

FACTS:

Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates. Private Respondent was
proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor against the Petitioner.

Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said
Municipality. The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which declared Private Respondent to be
the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary and
other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages.

Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said
damages have not been alleged and proved during trial. COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that
Private Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the
elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a
Usurper.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner acted as a Usurper?

HELD:

We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any
color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not
that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different
stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests.

We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had
discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.”