CARRIE BUCK, plaintiff vs.

BELL, Superintendent defendant

Ponente: Justice Holmes

FACTS: Petitioner alleged that there was an ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
the State of Virginia which affirmed a judgment ordering the Superintendent of the State Colony of
Epileptics and Feeble Minded to perform the operation of salpingectomy on Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in
error for the purpose of making her sterile. The operation of salpingectomy clearly comes within the
definition. It is a surgical operation consisting of the opening of the abdominal cavity and the cutting of
the Fallopian tubes with the result that sterility is produced.

An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924, recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful
safeguard.; that the sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females, by
salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the Commonwealth is
supporting in various institutions many defective persons who if now discharged would become a
menace but if incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting
with benefit to themselves and to society; and that experience has shown that heredity plays an
important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility. The statute then enacts that whenever the
superintendent of certain institutions including the above named State Colony shall be of opinion that
it is for the best interests of the patients and of society that an inmate under his care should be
sexually sterilized, he may have the operation performed upon any patient afflicted with hereditary
forms of insanity, imbecility, &c., on complying with the very careful provisions by which the act
protects the patients from possible abuse.

Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above mentioned
in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of
an illegitimate feeble minded child. She was eighteen years old at the time of the trial of her case in the
Circuit Court, in the latter part of 1924.

PLAINTIFF ARGUMENT: She contends that the operation of salpingectomy, as provided for in the Act of
Assembly, is illegal in that it violates her constitutional right of bodily integrity and is therefore
repugnant to the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also cited Munn v.
Illinois in defining the meaning of deprivation of live as it was determined by this Court as a deprivation
not only for life but whatever God has given everyone with live is protected by the provision in question.
They also cited Hurtado v. California wherein this Court also determined that The test of due process of
law is that the proceedings shall be legal, preserving the liberty of the citizen. The inherent right of
mankind to go through life without mutilation of organs of generation needs no constitutional
declaration. The Act denies to the plaintiff and other inmates of the state colony for epileptics and
feeble minded the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. "The mere
fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute of the reach of the equality clause.” And the
classification must be based upon some reasonable grounds in the light of the purpose sought to be
attained by the legislature and must not be an arbitrary selection.

DEFENDANT ARGUMENT: The act does not impose cruel and unusual punishment. A constitutional
provision prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment is directed against punishment of a
barbarous character, involving torture, such as drawing and quartering the culprit, burning at the stake,
cutting off the nose, ears or limbs, and the like, and such punishments as were regarded as cruel and
unusual at the time the Constitution was adopted. The Act is a valid exercise of the police power. The
courts generally are indisposed to suffer the police power to be impaired or defeated by constitutional
limitations. An exercise of the police power analogous to that of the statute here in question may be
found in the compulsory vaccination statutes; for there, as here, a surgical operation is required for the
protection of the individual and of society; and that requirement has been upheld when imposed upon
school children only, those at tending public institutions of learning, though not imposed upon the
public as a whole. The operation is not legally malum in se. It can only be illegal when performed
against the will or contrary to the interest of the patient. Who then is to consent or decide for this
appellant whether it be best for her to have this operation? She cannot determine the matter for
herself both because being not of full age her judgment is not to be accepted nor would it acquit the
surgeon, and because she is further incapacitated by congenital mental defect. The statute is part of a
general plan applicable to all feeble-minded. It may be sustained as based upon a reasonable
classification. In Virginia, marriage with the very class here involved, viz., feeble-minded inmates of state
institutions, is prohibited, and its consummation visited with heavy penalties of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying to the
plaintiff in error due process of law and equal protection of laws (YES) and (YES)

HELD: PETITION DISMISSED. JUDGMENT OF SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

VIRGINIA AFFIRMED.

Due Process:

The superintendent first presents a petition to the special board of directors of his hospital or colony,
stating the facts and the grounds for his opinion, verified by affidavit. Notice of the petition and of the
time and place of the hearing in the institution is to be served upon the inmate, and also upon his
guardian, and if there is no guardian the superintendent is to apply to the Circuit Court of the County to
appoint one. The evidence is all to be reduced to writing, and after the board has made its order for
or against the operation, the superintendent, or the inmate, or his guardian, may appeal to the Circuit
Court of the County. The Circuit Court may consider the record of the board and the evidence before it
and such other admissible evidence as may be offered, and may affirm, revise, or reverse the order of
the board and enter such order as it deems just. Finally any party may apply to the Supreme Court of
Appeals, which, if it grants the appeal, is to hear the case upon the record of the trial in the Circuit Court
and may enter such order as it thinks the Circuit Court should have entered. There can be no doubt that
so far as procedure is concerned the rights of the patient are most carefully considered, and as every
step in this case was taken in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after months of observation,
there is no doubt that in that respect the plaintiff in error has had due process of law.

Equal Protection of Laws:

In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the specific findings of the Court, obviously we
cannot say as matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they exist they justify the result. We
have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It
would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped
with incompetence. It is better for the entire world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.

INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT

430 U.S. 110 (1977)

SUMMARY: Petitioners, pupils in a Dade County, Fla., junior high school, filed this action in Federal
District Court for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against respondent school officials,
alleging that petitioners and other students had been subjected to disciplinary corporal punishment in
violation of their constitutional rights. The Florida statute then in effect authorized corporal punishment
after the teacher had consulted with the principal or teacher in charge of the school, specifying that the
punishment was not to be "degrading or unduly severe." A School Board regulation contained specific
directions and limitations, authorizing punishment administered to a recalcitrant student's buttocks with a
wooden paddle. The evidence showed that the paddling of petitioners was exceptionally harsh. The
District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint, finding no basis for constitutional
relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

FACTS: James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, both enrolled in the Charles R. Drew Junior High
School in Dade County, Fla., Ingraham in the eighth grade and Andrews in the ninth, filed the complaint
in this case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The complaint
contained three counts, each alleging a separate cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights,
under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981-1988. Counts one and two were individual actions for damages by Ingraham
and Andrews based on paddling incidents that allegedly occurred at Drew Junior High School. Count
three was a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief filed on behalf of all students in the Dade
County schools.

Because he was slow to respond to his teacher's instructions, Ingraham was subjected to more than 20
licks with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal's office. The paddling was so severe that
he suffered a hematoma requiring medical attention and keeping him out of school for several days.
Andrews was paddled several times for minor infractions. On two occasions, he was struck on his arms,
once depriving him of the full use of his arm for a week. The evidence showed that the paddling of
petitioners was exceptionally harsh. The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the
complaint, finding no basis for constitutional relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected
the petitioners' substantive contentions. The Eighth Amendment, in the court's view, was simply
inapplicable to corporal punishment in public schools.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the paddling of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment - NO
2. To the extent that paddling is constitutionally permissible, whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard. - NO

HELD:

1. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools.

The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those
convicted of crimes. We adhere to this longstanding limitation and hold that the Eighth Amendment does
not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools. The principal
concern of the American Framers appears to have been with the legislative definition of crimes and
punishments.

There is no need to wrench the Eighth Amendment from its historical context and extend it to public
school disciplinary practices. The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community
afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which that Amendment protects convicted
criminals. In virtually every community where corporal punishment is permitted in the schools, these
safeguards are reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law. Public school teachers and
administrators are privileged at common law to inflict only such corporal punishment as is reasonably
necessary for the proper education and discipline of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege
may result in both civil and criminal liability.

We conclude that when public school teachers or administrators impose disciplinary corporal punishment,
the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable. The pertinent constitutional question is whether the imposition is
consonant with the requirements of due process."

2. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require notice and
hearing prior to imposition of corporal punishment as that practice is authorized and
limited by the common law.

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law
Due process is required only when a decision of the State implicates an interest within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment. And "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place,
we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." It is fundamental that the state
cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance with due process of law.

Liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated where public school
authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately punish a child for misconduct by restraint
and infliction of appreciable physical pain. Freedom from bodily restraint and punishment is
within the liberty interest in personal security that has historically been protected from state
deprivation without due process of law.

Under the longstanding accommodation between the child's interest in personal security and the
traditional common law privilege, there can be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as the
corporal punishment remains within the limits of that privilege. The child nonetheless has a
strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and
provide for the resolution of disputed questions of justification.

The Florida scheme, considered in light of the openness of the school environment, affords
significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment of school children. The teacher and
principal must exercise prudence and restraint when they decide that corporal punishment is
necessary for disciplinary purposes. If the punishment is later found to be excessive, they may be
held liable in damages or be subject to criminal penalties. Where the State has thus preserved
what "has always been the law of the land," United States v. Barnett, the case for administrative
safeguards is significantly less compelling than it would otherwise be.

Imposing additional administrative safeguards as a constitutional requirement would significantly intrude

into the area of educational responsibility that lies primarily with the public school authorities. We
conclude that the Due Process Clause does not require notice and a hearing prior to the imposition of
corporal punishment in the public schools, as that practice is authorized and limited by the common law.

Prior procedural safeguards require a diversion of educational resources, and school authorities
may abandon corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure rather than incur the burdens of
complying with procedural requirements. The incremental benefit of invoking the Constitution to
impose prior notice and a hearing cannot justify the costs.

We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' evidence affords no basis for injunctive
relief, and that petitioners cannot recover damages on the basis of any Eighth Amendment or procedural
due process violation. AFFIRMED.
 Michael H. and Victoria D., appellants,
v. Gerald D., appellee.
491 US 110, June 15, 1989, Scalia, J.

The Due Process Clause affords only those protections so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to ranked as fundamental.
To provide protection to an adulterous natural father
is to deny protection to a marital father, and vice versa.
Facts:
In May 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided
with, appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth
certificate and has always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07%
probability that appellant Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was
Victoria's father. During Victoria's first three years, she and her mother resided at times with
Michael, who held her out as his own, at times with another man, and at times with Gerald,
with whom they have lived since June 1984.

In November 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish
his paternity and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem,
filed a cross-complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both
Michael and Gerald.

The court ultimately granted Gerald’s summary judgment on the ground that there were
no triable issues of fact as to paternity under Cal. Evid. Code § 621, which provides that a child
born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is
presumed to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the
husband or wife, and then only in limited circumstances. Moreover, the court denied Michael's
and Victoria's motions for visitation pending appeal under Cal. Civ. Code § 4601, which provides
that a court may, in its discretion, grant "reasonable visitation rights ... to any ... person having
an interest in the [child's] welfare."

The California Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting Michael's procedural and substantive
due process challenges to § 621 as well as Victoria's due process and equal protection claims.
The court also rejected Victoria's assertion of a right to continued visitation with Michael under
§ 4601, on the ground that California law denies visitation against the wishes of the mother to a
putative father who has been prevented by § 621 from establishing his paternity.

Issue:

Whether or not the procedural and substantive due process challenges of Michael H. to §
621 is impressed with merit.
Ruling:

NO. California Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed.

1. The § 621 presumption does not infringe upon the due process rights of a man wishing
to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man.
(a) Michael's contention that PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS requires that he be afforded an
opportunity to demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing fundamentally misconceives
the nature of § 621. Although phrased in terms of a presumption, § 621 expresses and
implements a substantive rule of law declaring it to be generally irrelevant for paternity
purposes whether a child conceived during, and born into, an existing marriage was begotten
by someone other than the husband and had a prior relationship with him, based on the state
legislature's determination as a matter of overriding social policy that the husband should be
held responsible for the child and that the integrity and privacy of the family unit should not
be impugned. Because Michael's complaint is that the statute categorically denies all men in his
circumstances an opportunity to establish their paternity, his challenge is not accurately viewed
as procedural.
(b) There is no merit to Michael's SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS claim that he has a
constitutionally protected "liberty" interest in the parental relationship he has established with
Victoria, and that protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital union is an insufficient state
interest to support termination of that relationship. Michael has failed to meet his burden of
proving that his claimed "liberty" interest is one so deeply imbedded within society's
traditions as to be a fundamental right. Not only has he failed to demonstrate that the interest
he seeks to vindicate has traditionally been accorded protection by society, but the common-
law presumption of legitimacy, and even modern statutory and decisional law, demonstrate
that society has historically protected, and continues to protect, the marital family against the
sort of claim Michael asserts.
2. The § 621 presumption does not infringe upon any constitutional right of a child to
maintain a relationship with her natural father. Victoria's assertion that she has a DUE
PROCESS right to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald is, at best, the
obverse of Michael's claim and fails for the same reasons. Nor is there any merit to her claim
that her equal protection rights have been violated because, unlike her mother and presumed
father, she had no opportunity to rebut the presumption of her legitimacy, since the State's
decision to treat her differently from her parents pursues the legitimate end of preventing the
disruption of an otherwise peaceful union by the rational means of not allowing anyone but
the husband or wife to contest legitimacy.

[Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer (2011)

Due process has two aspects and these are procedural and substantive.
 As a substantive requirement, it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws; because if all that the
due process clause required were proper procedure, then life, liberty, or property could be
destroyed arbitrarily when proper formalities are observed.
As a procedural requirement, it relates chiefly to the mode of procedure which
government agencies must follow in the enforcement and application of laws. It is a guarantee
of procedural fairness. Its essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a “law which hears
before it condemns.”+

WASHINGTON ET AL, petitioner v. GLUCKSBERG ET AL, respondent

521 SCRA 702, OCTOBER, 1996

Facts: Petitioners in this case are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. Respondents Harold
Glucksberg et al. are physicians who practice in Washington. These doctors occasionally treat terminally
ill, suffering patients, and declare that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for
Washington's assisted-suicide ban. In January 1994, respondents, along with three gravely ill,
pseudonymous plaintiffs who have since died and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that
counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide, sued in the United States District Court, seeking
a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994) is, on its face, unconstitutional. The plaintiffs
asserted "the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a
personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide."

The District Court agreed and concluded that Washington’s assisted-suicide ban is unconstitutional for it
places an undie burden on the exercise of constitutionally protected liberty interest, District Court also
stated that the said statute violated the Equal Protection Clause that all persons similarly situated must
be treated alike. A panel of the CA for the 9th Circuit reversed the decision and emphasized that for 205
years, no constitutional right relating to aiding in suicide has ever been upheld by a court of final
jurisdiction. 9th Circuit CA en banc reheard the case affirmed District Court’s decision that it is
unconstitutional and emphasized that "the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in
controlling the time and manner of one's death-that there is, in short, a constitutionally-recognized
'right to die.’" After "weighing and then balancing" this interest against Washington's various interests,
the court held that the State's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional "as applied to terminally ill
competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians."
However, the CA noted that “the equal protection” argument relied on by the District Court is not
insubstantial, so a petition for certiorari was granted.

Issues:

W/N Washington's prohibition against "causing" or "aiding" a suicide offends the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Held: NO. prohibition against aiding or causing a suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause. It is a
part of their history and common law that assistance in suicides is disapproved for over 700 years.
Rendering such assistance is still a crime in almost every State and that the said prohibition against
assisted suicide does not exclude those who were near death. Courts likewise lead to the decision that
the “right” to assistance in committing suicide that the respondents are asserting is not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Although Due Process sound in personal
autonomy, it does not follow that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected. The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues
to be one of the rejections of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to
conclude that the asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Likewise, Washington’s assisted-suicide ban implicates
several state interests, one of it is that, Washington has an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life, the State has an interest in preventing suicide and in studying, identifying, and treating its
causes.

The State's assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled,
and elderly people must be no less valued than the lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously
disabled person's suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as anyone else's
and insisted that all person’s lives from beginning to end, regardless of physical or mental condition, are
all under the full protection of the law. Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably
related to their promotion and protection.

The State also has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. In contrast
to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the integrity of the medical profession would not be
threatened in any way by physician-assisted suicide." Also, the State has an interest in protecting
vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and
mistakes. If physician-assisted suicide were permitted, many might resort to it to spare their families the
substantial financial burden of end of-life health-care costs.

We therefore hold that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994) does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, either on its face or "as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their
deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors”.

The decision of the en banc Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KANSAS v. HENDRICKS

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

No. 95-1649. Argued December 10, 1996 – Decided June 23, 1997
Facts:

Upon Leroy Hendrick’s release, the State of Kansas filed a petition under its “Sexually Violent Predator
Act” of 1994. The act establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due to a “mental
abnormality” or a “personality disorder,” are likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence.”
Kansas filed a petition under the Act in state court to commit respondent (and cross-petitioner) Hendricks,
who had a long history of sexually molesting children and was scheduled for release from prison. The
court reserved ruling on Hendricks’ challenge to the Act’s constitutionality, but granted his request for a
jury trial. After Hendricks testified that he agreed with the state physician’s diagnosis that he suffers from
pedophilia and is not cured and that he continues to harbor sexual desires for children that he cannot
control when he gets “stressed out,” the jury determined that he was a sexually violent predator. Finding
that pedophilia qualifies as a mental abnormality under the Act, the court ordered him committed. On
appeal, the State Supreme Court invalidated the Act on the ground that the precommitment condition of a
“mental abnormality” did not satisfy what it perceived to be the “substantive” due process requirement
that involuntary civil commitment must be predicated on a “mental illness” finding. It did not address
Hendricks’ ex post facto and double jeopardy claims.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts civil commitment provisions violate substantive due process requirements?

Held:

No, the definition of the word “mental abnormality” satisfies “substantive” due process
requirements. As mentioned in the case of Foucha v. Louisiana, liberty is not absolute. The court
recognized that an individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be
overridden even in the civil context. Accordingly, States have in certain narrow circumstances provided
for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose
a danger to the public health and safety.

The challenged Act unambiguously requires a finding of dangerousness either to one’s self or to others as
a prerequisite to involuntary confinement. Commitment proceedings can be initiated only when a
person “has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense,” and “suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence.” The act requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a
present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not
incapacitated.
From the years spanning from 1955 to the present, Henricks has been in and out of prison due to his
sexually violent behavior towards minors. These violent predatory acts range from indecent exposure,
lewdness involving young children, molesting both your boys and girls, and even to the point that he has
began to abuse his own stepdaughter and stepson, forcing them to engage in sexual activities with him
over a period of approximately four (4) years. Hendricks, even during his testimony, admitted that he had
repeatedly abused children whenever he was not confined and he points out that the triggering mechanism
to his violent acts are usually from when he gets stressed out. Hendricks adds that, even though that he
wishes to stop his sexually violent tendencies towards children, he stated that the only sure way of
keeping him from committing such acts from ever manifesting in the future was for him to die.

This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately
distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with
exclusively through criminal proceedings. Hendricks’ diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies as a
“mental abnormality” under the Act, thus plainly suffices for due process purposes.

The court holds that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act comports with due process requirements
and neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles nor constitutes an exercise in impermissible ex post
facto lawmaking. Accordingly, the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court is reversed.

It is so ordered.

LAWRENCE ET AL.,petitioner v. TEXAS,respondent

539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, June 26,2003

Facts:

On September 17, 1998, police officers in the Houston area responded to a reported
weapons disturbance at the apartment of John Geddes Lawrence, a medical technician. The
complaint came from a neighbour who told the police that, because of a domestic fight or a
robbery, there was a man with a gun “going crazy.” Police entered the unlocked apartment
with guns drawn. (The lack of a warrant did not figure in any of the subsequent litigation.)
Once in the apartment the police found Lawrence engaging in consensual sex with a
companion, Tyron Garner. Police arrested both men, held them in custody overnight, and
then charged them under a Texas criminal statute that forbade “deviate sexual intercourse”
between people of the same sex. They were tried, found guilty, and fined $200 each. The
neighbour, who had earlier been accused of harassing Lawrence and with whom Garner
was also romantically involved, later admitted that he had been lying, pleaded no contest to
charges of filing a false police report, and served 15 days in jail.
 The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, a national legal organization
dedicated to gay rights, took up Lawrence’s case and appealed it through the Texas court
system on the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (which prohibited the states from denying “to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”) and a similar clause of the Texas state
constitution. As expected, the plaintiffs lost at each stage, with the courts relying
on Bowers v. Hardwick. Lambda believed, however, that, after the Supreme Court’s
favourable opinion in Romer v. Evans (1996)—which voided an amendment to the
Colorado state constitution prohibiting laws barring discrimination against gays—there
was a good chance that Bowers would be overturned. The justices accepted the case on
December 2, 2002, and heard oral arguments on March 26, 2003.

Issue:
Did the Texas sodomy statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
and due process clauses?

Ruling:

YES. The Court held that the convictions under the Texas statute violated the two
men's vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the due process clause. It held that
the statute, although purporting to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act, sought
to control a personal relationship that was within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals. The Court further held that the stigma imposed by the statute
was not trivial and that the statute furthered no legitimate state interest that could justify
the statute's intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. As to the
applicability of Bowers v Hardwick in the present case, the Court held that the
aforementioned case was overruled, for among other reasons, the historical premises
relied upon in Bowers were not without doubt and, at the very least, were overstated.
According to the Court, the foundations of Bowers had subsequently sustained serious
erosion from more recent Supreme Court decisions, and criticism of Bowers by some
scholars and state courts had been substantial and continuing. More importantly, the Court
ruled that there had been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could
have counseled against overturning Bowers' holding once there were compelling reasons to
do so.

De La Cruz v Paras

GR No. L-42571-72

FACTS: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord.
No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred
that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go
out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due
hearing declaring that Ord 84. is a constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police
power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due
process.s

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

RULING: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited,
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with
the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by
Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

ELENA P. DYCAICO, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL

SECURITY COMMISSION, Respondents

G.R. No. 161357 November 30, 2005

An "irrebuttable presumption" and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable

presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause.

FACTS: Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed
data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from
the SSS. Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997. He continued to receive the monthly
pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997.

After Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s pension. Her
application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act)
No. 8282 or the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of
the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads:

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. – xxx (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries
as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. …

Records show that the Bonifacio was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was
cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application,
submitted marriage contract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his
retirement date; hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary. Petitioner filed with the SSC
a petition alleging that the denial of her survivor’s pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio
designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not
indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the
member to be entitled to the survivor’s pension. The SSS is legally bound to respect Bonifacio’s
designation of them as his
beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote social justice.

The SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the petitioner’s claim. The SSC refuted the
petitioner’s contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by citing the
definitions of "primary beneficiaries" and "dependents" in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under
paragraph (k) of the said provision, "primary beneficiaries" are "[t]he dependent spouse until he or she
remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children …"
Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines "dependents" as the following: "(1) [t]he
legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached
twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3)
[t]he parent who is receiving regular support from the member." Based on the foregoing, according to the
SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivor’s pension in one’s capacity as primary
beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the
deceased SSS member during his lifetime.

Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivor’s
pension are those who qualify as
such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the
legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary
beneficiary. The SSC further opined that Bonifacio’s designation of the petitioner as one of his primary
beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 is void, not only on moral considerations but also for
misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivor’s pension under Section
12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.

CA: Affirmed in toto. Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by the SSC, the CA
declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his
retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in
1980 is void. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution
dated December 15, 2003, the appellate court denied her motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282 violates the due process clauses of the Constitution.

HELD: YES, The proviso infringes the due process clause

The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the
due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the
retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be
heard. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a
fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the United States, this kind of presumption is
characterized as an "irrebuttable presumption" and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable
presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause.

In the petitioner’s case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got married in 1997, it was
merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they
had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest child was already twenty-
four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was
Bonifacio’s bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his
primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivor’s benefits, a property interest,
accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due process
require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was
contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivor’s pension accruing
upon his death. Hence, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) which deprives
the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to
be heard must be struck down.

Conclusion

Even as the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of
primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension is not substantially affected
since the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282:

(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and

(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.

In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children as follows:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is
congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally.

Lastly, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution
of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present their arguments on this issue
and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render
substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now, deserves to receive
forthwith the survivor’s pension accruing upon the death of her husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process of the Constitution.
The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivor’s pension
on the basis of this invalid proviso.

REPUBLIC V LIBERTY ALBIOS

707 SCRA 584

October 16, 2013

Facts:

Fringer who was an American citizen married Liberty Albios on Oct. 22, 2004 before Judge
Ofelia Calo of the MTC Branch 50, in Mandaluyong City, as evidenced by a marriage certificate.

Albios then filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the 6th of December 2006
stating that the marriage is void ab initio as they have never lived together as husband and wife
and that they had no intention of entering into a married state nor complying with their essential
marital obligations. The reason for their marriage is for Albios to acquire US citizenship and
agreed to pay Fringer a sum of $2000.

The courts tried to summon Fringer but to no avail leading to a decision of the RTC and CA
stating that the marriage is deemed void ab initio as they had no intention to comply with their
essential marital obligations.

Issue: W/N marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00 is void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent

Held:
No. Consent was present in both parties as Fringer and Albios agreed to enter into marriage.
They are well aware of the obligations required in entering the state of marriage as well as the
responding benefits and consequences that could arise from their fraudulent acts.

The acquisition by Fringer of the sum of $2000 and Albios acquiring an American citizenship
goes to show that consent was freely given. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage.

Obergefell, et al vs. Hodges

SC-USA No. 14-556

Decided: June 26, 2015

FACTS:

The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased. The
respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in question. The petitioners claim that
respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their
marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.

Issue:

(1) whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex;

(2) whether the fourteenth amendment requires a state to recognize the same-sex marriage licensed
and performed in a state which does not grant that right.
Ruling:

(1) Yes. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See,
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479,
484–486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. History and
tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. THE RIGHT TO MARRY
IS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

1. The right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.
2. The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals.
3. The right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related
rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.
4. Marriage is a keystone of the nation’s social order.

The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound
way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and
are not always co- extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.
Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal under- standings can reveal unjustified inequality
within fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has invoked
equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex- based inequality on marriage, see, e.g.,
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 460–461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and equality,
see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 120–121.

The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of
the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This dynamic also applies to
same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge
central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are
denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right.
Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and
continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians. Pp. 18–22.

The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to
marry.

(2) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same- sex marriages validly
performed out of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to
marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex
marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character. Pp. 27–28.

G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA LAWAGON, CRISPIN

ALCOMENDRAS, CORAZON SABINADA, VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, AND
LEDEVINA ADLAWAN, Petitioners, v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 189305

CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO BANANA

GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION (PBGEA), DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a
ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007.3 The ordinance took effect
on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.4 Pursuant to Section 5 of
the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et
al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. They alleged that
the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection
clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication
pursuant] to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). The residents living
within and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda,7 joined by other
residents of Davao City, submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance
of a Preliminary Injunction.9 The RTC granted their motion.

The RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC opined that the
City of Davao had validly exercised police power13 under the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code;14 that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application
because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;15 and that the
ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear
showing that it had violated the Constitution. However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the
3-month transition period under Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to
agree on an extended transition period.

The CA reversed the judgment of the RTC.22 It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void
and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive; found the three-month transition period
impractical and oppressive in view of the engineering and technical requirements of switching from
aerial spraying to truck-mounted boom spraying; and opined that the ban ran afoul with the Equal
Protection Clause inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinance - which defined the term aerial spraying -
did not make reasonable distinction between the hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid
substances that were being applied aerially; the different classes of pesticides or fungicides; and the
levels of concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and could enhance agricultural
production.
It ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural
plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property without due
process because the landowners were thereby compelled to cede portions of their property without
just compensation; that the exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because
there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the public welfare; and
that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional because of the absence of a
separability clause.

Issues:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection
grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in
imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5;
and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all
agricultural lands in Davao City.

Ruling: No. The Court denied the petition.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.108 In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.109chanrobleslaw

A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies
the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.111 The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.112chanrobleslaw

Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government's action.113 This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long
as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the
ordinance must survive a due process challenge.114chanrobleslaw

The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and oppressive
in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the ordinance. They allege
that three months will be inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and
effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the Black Sigatoka disease. We find for the
respondents.

The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three months
can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding
resources required therefor. To recall, even the RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-
shift to other modes of spraying within three months in view of the costly financial and civil works
required for the conversion.

This Court, therefore, finds Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 an invalid provision because the
compulsion thereunder to abandon aerial spraying within an impracticable period of "three (3) months
after the effectivity of this Ordinance" is "unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with."
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.117 As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation. The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,118 we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory
if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property.

An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation."

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive
use of land will require compensation under the takings clause.

The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial
spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting
of diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed
as confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to
compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive
uses of the land. The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived
of their landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the
areas to be identified as the buffer zones.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. In other word, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
Based on these parameters, we find for the respondents.

The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the Government for its
conduct is gauged by using the means-end test.125 This test requires analysis of: (1) the interests of
the public that generally require its exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2)
the means employed that are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.126 To determine the propriety of the classification, courts
resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.

The rational basis scrutiny demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.
In the intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and
must not depend on broad generalizations.131chanrobleslaw

The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.132chanrobleslaw

The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular, the petitioning residents of Davao City
argue that the CA erroneously applied the strict scrutiny approach when it declared that the ordinance
violated the Equal Protection Clause because the ban included all substances including water and
vitamins. The respondents agree with the CA, however, and add that the ordinance does not rest on a
valid distinction because it has lacked scientific basis and has ignored the classifications of pesticides
observed by the FPA. We partly agree with both parties.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies
herein. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07
(legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on purpose (elimination of the mischief).
The legislative classification found in Section 4 of the ordinance refers to "all agricultural entities"
within Davao City.

The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are aerial, truck-mounted
boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual spraying.140 However, Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes
the prohibition only against aerial spraying.
Does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.142 In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.143 A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.144chanrobleslaw

Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be "overinclusive" because its
impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of
individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law.146chanrobleslaw

It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective
of the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The
imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the
agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation
to the purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the
ordinance, seeks to address.

The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section 6 by virtue of its
requirement for the maintenance of the 30- meter buffer zone.

The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more burdensome to the small
agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding their
property; (2) that will have to be identified through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone
will have to be plotted in a survey plan for submission to the local government unit; and (4) will be
limited as to the crops that may be cultivated therein based on the mandate that the zone shall be
devoted to "diversified trees" taller than what are being grown therein.

Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural entities engaging in
organic farming, and' do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The classification
indisputably becomes arbitrary and whimsical. In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal
Protection Clause.

Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for
the investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the
affected individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not
only of banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper
the operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the
Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their production and harvest.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act

The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the jurisdiction of the FPA
under Presidential Decree No. 1144. To perform its mandate, it was given under Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1144 the following powers and functions with respect to pesticides and other
agricultural chemicals,

Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the usage and the
application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for human health and
environmental safety. This responsibility includes not only the identification of safe and unsafe
pesticides, but also the prescription of the safe modes of application in keeping with the standard of
good agricultural practices.

On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the local government units do not include
the regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.179 The non-inclusion should
preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City from enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07, for otherwise it
would be arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit the aerial application of pesticides in
derogation of the authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree No. 1144. In enacting
Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the City of Davao
performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao could act only as an agent
of Congress, and its every act should always conform to and reflect the will of its principal.180

It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the
laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide
application is universally held to be invalid.

Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated
authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also
for being an ultra vires act on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY ENJOINS respondent City
of Davao, and all persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its authority, from enforcing and
implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ petitioners v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents

G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

 The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, this
Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at
bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an “on-its-face”
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.

Facts: COMELEC Law Department filed two separate informations before the RTC Barauen,
Leyte against spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez for knowingly making false
or untruthful statement in their application for voter’s registration relative to their place of
residence and non– registration in other areas, which are violations of Sections 10(g) and (j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of RA 8189 or the Voter’s Registration Act, to wit:

SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. – xxx The application shall contain the following data: x
x x (g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration; x x x (j) A
statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;

SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under
this Act: x x x (j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

They indicated that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and
in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City.

Pending the above case, the spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against COMELEC,
on the ground, among others, of the unconstitutionality of Section 45(j) for being contrary to
the fair notice requirement Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
as such penal provision is vague on its face.

Issues: Whether or not the Section 45(j) of RA 8189 is unconstitutional for having uncertain
election prohibition.

Held: No, the Supreme Court held. Using the void for vagueness doctrine, it the law is said to be
facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. As structured, Section 45 of RA 8189 makes a recital of election
offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) clearly specifies that a violation of any of the
provisions of RA 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The
challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation and involves no guesswork.

Again, the void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an
“on-its-face” invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.

Indeed, an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of

parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute
a departure from the usual requirement of “actual case and controversy” and permit decisions
to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. The rule established in
our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE ANTONIO CARPIO ( Sec 45(j) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Section 45(j) "as applied" to them in a live
case under which they face prosecution. This is the traditional "as applied" approach in
challenging the constitutionality of any statute on any ground - whether absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. The "as
applied" approach embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. A petitioner may mount a "facial" challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the
assailed statute. To mount a "facial" challenge, a petitioner has only to show violation under
the assailed statute of the rights of third parties not before the court. This exception allowing
"facial" challenges, however, applies only to statutes involving free speech. The ground
allowed for a "facial" challenge is overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for
this exception allowing a "facial" challenge is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected
speech that comes from statutes violating free speech

The doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness, as devices to mount "facial" challenges to

penal or non-penal statutes violating free speech, ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT
PETITION for two reasons. First, petitioners here assert a violation of their own constitutional
rights, not the rights of third-parties. Second, the challenged statute - Section 45(j) of RA No.
8189, does not involve free speech. Thus, any invocation of the doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness to mount a "facial" challenge in the present case is grossly misplaced.

The present petition indisputably involves an "as applied" challenge to the

constitutionality of Section 45(j) of RA No. 8189. As an "as applied" challenge, petitioners may
raise any constitutional ground to strike down Section 45(j). In this "as applied" challenge,
petitioners may invoke the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to test the constitutionality of
Section 45(j).
 The threshold issue on the constitutionality of Section 45(j) now turns on three
tests: First, does Section 45(j) give "fair notice" or warning to ordinary citizens as to what is
criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct? Put differently, is Section 45(j) so vague that
ordinary citizens must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its
application? Second, is Section 45(j) so vague that it prescribes no ascertainable standard of
guilt to guide courts in judging those charged of its violation? Third, is Section 45(j) so vague
that law enforcers - the police and prosecutors - can arbitrarily or selectively enforce it?

If Section 45(j) meets all the three tests, it complies with the due process clause and is
therefore constitutional. If it fails any one of the three tests, then it is unconstitutional and the
two Informations against petitioners based on Section 45(j) should be quashed.

Under RA No. 8189, law enforcement officers have wide latitude to choose which
provisions of the law to consider a crime since there is no specific enumeration of provisions
falling under Section 45(j). Prosecutors can choose to prosecute only those who violate certain
provisions of RA No. 8189. Judges trying violators of the law have no ascertainable standard to
determine the guilt of a person accused of violating Section 45(j). There is no certainty which
provisions of RA No. 8189 fall under Section 45(j).

There is also no basis in the claim that any discussion on the possible provisions of RA
No. 8189 that may fall within the coverage of Section 45(j) constitutes a "facial" challenge on
such provisions of RA No. 8189. This is gross error. What is void for vagueness is the provision
"violation of any of the provisions of this Act," and not any of the unnamed provisions that
may be violated. No other provision in RA No. 8189 is being challenged as unconstitutional,
only Section 45(j). The provisions possibly falling within the coverage of Section 45(j) must be
discussed to illustrate that the ordinary citizen has no way of knowing with certitude what
provisions of RA No. 8189 fall within the coverage of Section 45(j). The discussion shows that
the ordinary citizen has no fair notice that these are the provisions falling within the coverage
of Section 45(j). What is being challenged is the constitutionality of Section 45(j), which is so
vague that it could cover any of the provisions of the law.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE TINGA ( Sec 45(j) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

Section 45(j) is vague. It does not provide "fair notice" to the citizenry and the standards for
enforcement and adjudication. In precise legal terms, I submit that Section 45(j) violates the
due process clause of the Constitution, and should accordingly be nullified.

Even though the "fair notice" rule is integral to due process itself, it finds realization in still
another provision of our Bill of Rights. Section 14(2), Article III assures that an accused is "to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." Both Justice Cruz and Fr.
Bernas acknowledge that this constitutional right extends not only to the criminal information
against the accused, but also to the language of the statute under which prosecution is pursued

A deeper analysis of the vagueness doctrine is in order.

Employing the terminology preferred by Collings, the vagueness doctrine is a specie of

"unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty
cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to
give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper
standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a
necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars
statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."

The inquiry into whether a criminal statute is "meaningfully precise" requires the affirmative
satisfaction of two criteria. First, does the statute fairly give notice to those it seeks to bind of
its strictures? Second, is the statute precise enough that it does not invite arbitrary and
discriminatory

The Court, this time and through this case, should reassert that the vagueness challenge is
viable against penal statutes. The vagueness challenge is a critical defense to all persons against
criminal laws that are arbitrarily drawn, formulated without thoughtful deliberation, or
designed to yield to the law enforcer the determination whether an offense has been
committed. Section 45(j) of Rep. Act 8189 is indeed a textbook example of a vague penal clause.
The ponencia submits that Section 45(j) does not suffer from the infirmity as it ostensibly
establishes that violation of any provision of Rep. Act No. 8189 is an election offense. I cannot
accept the proposition that the violation of just any provision of Rep. Act No. 8189, as Section
45(j) declares with minimal fanfare, constitutes an election offense punishable with up to six (6)
years of imprisonment.

Section 45(j) categorizes the violation of any provision of Rep. Act 8189 as an election offense,
thus effectively criminalizing such violations. Following Section 46 of the same law, any person
found guilty of an election offense "shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one
(1) year but not more than six (6) years."

Virtually all of the 52 provisions of Rep. Act 8189 define an act, establishes a policy, or imposes
a duty or obligation on a voter, election officer or a subdivision of government. Virtually all of
these provisions are susceptible to violation, the only qualifier being that they incorporate a
verb
Since it has been established that Section 45(j) infringes on procedural due process, the final
inquiry should be whether the nullification of Section 45(j) is warranted.

Given the problem of vagueness that attends to Section 45(j), is facial invalidation of the statute
warranted?

The practical value of facial invalidation in this case cannot be discounted. Unless Section 45(j)
is nullified, it may still be utilized as a means of criminal prosecution. Because there are dozens,
if not hundreds, of different contexts under which a criminal offense may carved out of Section
45(j), limiting the challenges to the provision to "as-applied" and its case-by-case method will
prove woefully inadequate in addressing the elemental lack of fair notice that plagues the
provision.

The very vagueness of Section 45(j) makes it an ideal vehicle for political harassment.

(SINAMA KO LANG BAKA TANUNGIN???)

I had proposed during deliberations the following definitions for usage in Philippine
jurisprudence:

As to standing

The ability of a petitioner to bring forth a suit challenging the constitutionality of an enactment
or provisions thereof, even if the petitioner has yet not been directly injured by the application
of the law in question, is referred to as a "facial challenge."

The ability of a petitioner to judicially challenge a law or provision of law that has been
specifically applied against the petitioner is referred to as an "as-applied challenge."

As to adjudication on the merits

The nullification on constitutional grounds by the courts of a provision of law, or even of the
entire statute altogether, is referred to as "facial invalidation."

The invalidation of the application of a provision of law or a statute only insofar as it applies to
the petitioner and others similarly situated, without need to nullify the law or provision thereof,
is referred to as "as-applied invalidation."

I submit that these terms provide a greater degree of clarity than simply using "facial challenge"
and "as-applied challenge." My subsequent discussion shall hence utilize such terms as well.
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Facts:

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by spouses Imbong, in their personal capacities
as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Learning
center, Inc.

In the recent years, the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception has
always been subject to debates. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the
subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. The clash between the
seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a
deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

The petitions show that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize
the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous
to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law
violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are
believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state
interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited
under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services
for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment.

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of
the practitioner’s services.

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor.

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague
because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from the people the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health
facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management prerogative
inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion
and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of
family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family
planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated
by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to
perform the service or procedure.

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.
 • The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers
devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.

Issues:

Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional:

1. Right to Life
2. Right to Health
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4. The Family
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6. Due Process
7. Equal Protection
8. Involuntary Servitude
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10. Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM

Ruling:

The Petitions were PARTIALLY GRANTED.

1. Right to Life - Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization. In answering
the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of
Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
 The Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins.

The moment of conception is reckoned from fertilization. The undeniable

conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
The RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or
device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH
Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear
because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind),
which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the
destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

2. Right to Health
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15,
Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied
with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of
the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician.

Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act
Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said
Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law. The Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.

3. Freedom of religion and Right to free speech

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality
in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
There are provisions in the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs
and convictions.
The establishment clause not only restricts what the government can do with
religion,but also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They
can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is
not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion.

4. The Family
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates
the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It
argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote
its solidarity and total development. The Court cannot but agree. The 1987 Constitution
is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In
fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family. The State cannot, without a
compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a
minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only
a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.

5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

The Court declines to rule on the constitutionality or validity of Section 14 of the
RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet
to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

6. Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus
violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l)
mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable
but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that
confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care
institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts
hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and
modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also
exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2). Finally, it is averred
that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

Section 4 of the RH law defines "public health service provider," as follows:

(1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and
devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion,
disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and
nursing care;
(2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a
midwife;
(3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or
(4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any
accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care
services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of
Health (DOH).
The right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive
health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the
providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes
health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect
information regarding reproductive health programs and services. The assailed provision
is hereby quoted as follows:
 SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or
intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of
legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
The word "incorrect" denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty,
morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. On the other hand, the
word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. Used
together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is
acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on
reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public
health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7. Equal Protection
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In
fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be
given priority in addressing the health development of the people. It should also be
noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit
to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion.

8. Involuntary Servitude
Involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion. Petitioners contend that Section 17 of
the RH law requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts
to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts
against their will. However, a reading of such provision reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro
bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed
should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service
they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
 bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to
be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in
the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have
the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall
under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as
"health products."

10. Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM

Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when
it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law. The LGUs are merely encouraged to provide these services
and is not mandatory. Hence, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments
can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.

G.R. 117040 January 27, 2000 EN BANC MENDOZA, J.

RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN

DEPARTMENT
STORE, respondent.

FACTS: Serrano was hired by Isetann Dept. Store as a security checker to

apprehend shoplifters. First hired on October 4, 1984 as a contractual employee
eventually becoming a regular employee six months later, on April 4, 1985. In 1988,
he became head of the Security Checkers of Isetann. Sometime in 1991, Isetann, in a
cost-cutting move, decided to phase out its entire security division and use the
services of an independent security agency instead. On October 11, 1991, Serrano
received a written notice informing him of his termination as Security Head, on the
same day, he was fired.
 Aggrieved, he filed a case for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salary, among
others, in the Labor Arbiter. One of his contentions, since he was notified and fired on
the same day, he was not afforded the right to due process. The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of Serrano, ordering to have him reinstated and his wages paid. Isetann
appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the previous ruling and Serrano be given
“separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, unpaid salary,
and proportionate 13th month pay.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was justified.

HELD: Yes. Although the Labor Code provides that a written notice be provided to the
worker at least one month before the termination of his employment, the Court gave
three (3) reasons why the violation of the notice requirement is not a violation of due
process.

1. “Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It

does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment
under the Labor Code.”

2. “...notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power
of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual...here the employee is not faced
with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice
before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge
against him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the
eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes
do exist justifying the termination of his employment.”

3. “The notice requirement under *the Labor Code+ cannot be considered a

requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be
entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.”

The Court further added that the consequences of violating the notice requirement
would only make the employer liable for damages, but the dismissal would not be rendered
void. They added, “The employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement does not
constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely
ineffectual.” The Court GRANTED the petition reiterating the above- stated ruling adding that
Serrano be paid “full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on October
11, 1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes final.”
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004

JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and
VICENTE ANGELES, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work. Thus, Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and payment of money claims. Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the
twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that
petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.

Issue: WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Held: Accordingly, petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned their employment
and were already working for another employer. To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the
existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination
of employment by the employer. After establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid
cause, we now determine if the procedures for dismissal were observed.

The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code:

Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination of employment, the
following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
1. A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and
giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
1. A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the
employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut
the evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s last known address.
Procedurally,
(1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two
written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before
terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or
an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to
dismiss; and
(2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity
of his separation.

From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived:

(1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under
Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed;
(2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed;
(3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and
(4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed.

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was
established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent,
however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last
known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately
for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice
requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance
with the procedural requirements of due process.
Petition denied. CA affirmed with modifications.