[G.R. No. L-3246. November 29, 1950.] municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay.
t, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month’s stay or rather on
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, Defendant-Appellant.
Luis Contreras, for Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; REQUISITES. — In order that a
person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be
exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason of discernment and freedom of the will
at the time of committing the crime.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of
killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
3. ID.; ID.; FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. —
Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding i his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in
either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code and the fact that the accused evidently
killed his wife in a fit of jealousy, he is, likewise entitled to the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the
same article — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation.
4. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
composed only two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusion perpetua to death. Altho the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, article 63 of
the said code is the one applicable and must be applied.
5. id.; id.; attention OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE INVITED TO THE CASE. — When the court believes that the
appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, i
his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to the death or otherwise apply
executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of
parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there
they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same
December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia Agricola was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The
accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and
stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage
resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her
on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who
came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and
testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he
admitted that he killed his wife. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement
he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother
Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had
become indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded
guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea
of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where
Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an
insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow
prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refuse to take
a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus
with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell
was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his
liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined
to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who
examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility
and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote
Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to
43:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
46 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of
the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act
should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.
"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equalled to imbecility or insanity.
1

"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant
had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime,
it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary,
and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the
basis of his mental. condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved."cralaw virtua1aw library
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States v. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote
the following syllabus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was moved
by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in
confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense
of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental
condition produced by remorse."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the
evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as
to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his
work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take
violent measures to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that
in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions
were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the
following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said
that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was
living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the
house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused
and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple and
even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife
after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for
hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she had betrayed him.
Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to
hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the
trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble
and expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent on proving it. At
least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in
the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore decline to find
the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded
warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9
of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would
diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the
same article, — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first
we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for
the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion
perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which
contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one
of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present
case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand,
article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible
penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is
the one applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Guevara (10 Phil. 37),
involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which
corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said
the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"And even though this court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a
qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be
reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80
above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64
of the Rev. Penal Code). (Decision of September 30, 1879.)
"Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which, under the
law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of
the Penal Code; and.
"Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed
with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of
the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Then, in the case of People v. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming
the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous
mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of
article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as
requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we
respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after
appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement."cralaw virtua1aw library
2
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court physical condition of appellant.4 He was later returned to the custody of the court for trial and was arraigned on
with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has April 27, 1988. 5
undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
The material and established facts of this case, as well as the points in dispute between the parties, having been
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and
succinctly but thoroughly summarized by the Solicitor General, we are minded to quote at length therefrom.
believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the
Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetuato death or
otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit. On the night of February 13, 1987, Armando Frias, while on duty as member of the
Integrated National Police of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, received a report that there was a
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur. victim of a crime in the clinic of Dr. Padlan in the poblacion. He proceeded to the clinic and
found the victim lying down with her head bleeding. He asked her how she felt and when
Padilla, J., I concur in the result. she replied that she was weak, he took her ante-mortem statement (TSN, November 4,
1988, pp. 3-5). The victim, Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that she was raped
and struck with a stone by Juanita Aquino, appellant herein. Frias took down her
statement which was duly witnessed by attending physician Dr. Padlan and Capt. Eddie
G.R. No. 87084 June 27, 1990 Ramos. The written statement was also thumbmarked by Carmelita Morado (TSN, pp. 3-5,
8, 10, November 4, 1988, Armando Frias). Pat. Jaime Datuin and Pat. Renato Solomon
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-apellee, were also among the people who were present when Frias took the statement of the
vs. victim. After the victim gave her statement she shouted that she be taken to the hospital
JUANITO Q. AQUINO, accused-appellant. because she was weak. (Id., p. 9). Carmelita Morado was taken to the Virgen Milagrosa
Medical Center in San Carlos City and admitted at 11:35 p.m. of that same evening in
serious condition. Dr. Saturnino Posadas, director of said Medical Center, testified that
REGALADO, J.:
Carmelita Morado sustained the following injuries;

In the criminal justice systems of modem civilized nations, insanity is invariably recognized as a valid defense
1. lacerated wound about 10 cm. at the front of the head;
against punishment for crime. The proverbial bone of contention, however, is in the ascertainment of the
veracity of the claimed affliction and the determination of the degree of mental aberration, as a ground for
acquittal or a basis for extenuation of criminal liability. We have such a situation before us in the present 2. skull fracture located on the front portion of the skull;
appeal.
3. hemorrhage or bleeding on the left eye;
Appellant Juanito Q. Aquino was charged with rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch 57 in San CARLOS City, Pangasinan, under the following information, to wit: 4. laceration of the brain;

That an or about the 13th day of February, 1987, in the evening in barangay Poblacion, * 5. laceration perineum; (sic)
province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one 6. laceration of the urethal (sic)
Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen', against her will, and on the on thereof the said
accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike her with the use of (TSN pp. 2-3. November 18, 1988; Dr. Saturnino Posadas; Medico
stone which directly cause (sic) the death of Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen' to the Legal Certificate, Exhibit 'C')
damage and prejudice of her heirs.

She died the following morning before surgical operations could be performed (TSN, p. 4
Contrary to Art. 335 in relation to Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 1 November 18, 1988, Dr. Saturnino Posadas).

In a motion dated June 26, 1987, counsel for appellant moved for the indefinite suspension of the trial and asked A team of police officers was sent out to arrest Juanita Aquino. He was found and arrested
for the commitment of the accused to the National Mental Hospital. 2 In its order dated July 1, 1987, the trial inside the town auditorium at around 11:00 that same evening of February 13, 1987
court granted the motion and held in abeyance the arraignment of the accused and the trial of the case. 3 On attending a Valentine dance (TSN, pp. 7-8, September 15, 1988).
January 26, 1988, the National Center for Mental Health submitted the clinical case report on the mental and

3
Appellant was detained at the municipal jail in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. However, it was
only on February 17, 1987 that the statement of appellant was taken as the police officers
waited for the parents of appellant (TSN, pp. 3, 13-14, August 24, 1988).
Before appellant's interrogation begun, he was asked if he had a lawyer. As he had none,
Armando Frias and the Station Commander Captain Ramos fetched Atty. Liliosa Rosario of
the Citizens Legal Assistance Office to assist appellant during the investigation. Atty.
Rosario, upon arrival at the office of Frias where the investigation was to take place,
interviewed appellant (supra at pp. 14-16).
At the start of the investigation, Armando Frias informed appellant of his constitutional
rights, of his right to remain silent and to counsel. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Rosario
throughout the investigation (TSN, p. 10, August 23, 1988; p. 18, August 24, 1988). After
appellant signed his statement, Frias took appellant and his counsel to the office of Judge
Juan C. Austria, of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, who called the Interpreter and the
Clerk of Court to read the statement and translate the same to appellant to ensure that
appellant understood what was written. Judge Austria made appellant sign the statement
in his presence (TSN, pp. 21-23, August 24, 1988).
However, after the complaint was filed but before appellant could be arraigned, a Motion
to Commit appellant to the National Center for Mental Health, as earlier mentioned, was
filed by appellant's counsel as appellant was allegedly manifesting unstable behavior with
fits of violence. Appellant was duly committed sometime in July, 1987. He was released in
1988 whereupon he was duly arraigned. Appellant pleaded 'not guilty' and put up the
defense of insanity.
To prove insanity, appellant presented Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a psychiatrist at the
National Center for Mental Health who was in charge of the pavilion where appellant was
committed. After Juanita Aquino was admitted to the mental hospital in July 1987, he
conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations and found him to be suffering
from mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder with psychosis (TSN, pp. 4-
5, 7, May 23, 1988). Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when appellant Juanita Aquino
committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of mind (supra at pp. 15-16).
Patricio Aquino, appellant's father, also testified that his son was already mentally HI even
when he was still young. Appellant was suspended from school because he was very
playful, overactive and naughty especially with his classmates (TSN, p. 4, May 24, 1988);
that appellant was cruel to his brothers and sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he
sold for a low sum, wandered sometimes naked, and oftentimes not coming home for
extended periods of time (supra at pp. 5, 8). Appellant was previously confined at the
Mental Hospital in 1985 when he was caught wandering around naked (supra at p. 10).
Sgt. Raymundo Lomboy, the police officer charged with appellant's custody and who
transferred appellant for commitment to the National Center for Mental Health, recalled
that while appellant was in his custody, appellant acted abnormally by singing, shouting,
dancing and generally disturbing the other inmates (TSN, p. 7, July 21, 1988). After
appellant was treated and released from the National Center for Mental Health, he acted
queerly by singing and shouting whenever he failed to drink his medicine (supra at p. 15).
Appellant himself was also presented as witness, the doctor having certified that he could
withstand trial. However, the gist of appellants' testimony was to deny any knowledge of
the crime, the persons, things and events connected with it. He admitted he knew that he
has some mental illness and had undergone treatment like electric shock (TSN, pp. 5-7, 18-
19, July 14, 1988).
On the other hand, the prosecution presented an array of witnesses to prove that
appellant was lucid before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with
discernment.
Armando Frias testified that from the time of appellant's arrest and during the
investigation, appellant acted normally, and gave responsive answers to all the questions
propounded to him (TSN, pp. 5, 9, 13-15 August 23, 1988). Frias knew appellant even prior
to the incident because he worked as a laborer in the construction of the theatre in the
town proper. He believed appellant to be normal.
Angel Baysic, another member of the Integrated National Police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan
whose house is located near the theatre being constructed, also knew appellant who
worked there as a laborer and sometimes cooked the laborer's meals. Baysic became
closely acquainted with appellant and sometimes they drank together with other laborers
after work. During these times, he observed appellant to act normally and was responsive
to conversation (TSN, pp. 4-7, September 6, 1988).
Carlos Sabangon, one of the police officers who arrested appellant at the town
auditorium, testified that when appellant was arrested during the valentine dance, he was
appropriately dressed and behaved normally and in fact was just about to sit down after
dancing when they arrived to arrest him (TSN, pp. 8-9, 17 September 15, 1988).
Eduardo Fernandez, a jail guard, was one on duty when appellant escaped from prison on
May 3, 1987. While appellant was confined in the provincial jail, Fernandez did not
observe any queer behavior from appellant (TSN, pp. 34- 35, 41, 43, September 15,
1988). 6
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its verdict convicting appellant of the crime of rape with
homicide and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P35,000.00 as damages. 7
Appellant, through counsel, manifested his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals. 8The case was, however, brought to us for review, with appellant taking the court below to task on the
following assignment of errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE AC, CUSED-APPELLANT INSANE AT THE
TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME;
4
 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE MEDICAL
FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AS TO THE INSANITY OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT;
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 9
The controversy boils down into one issue, that is, whether or not appellant, who has invoked insanity as his
defense, has overcome the presumption of sanity.
Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed in the first instance upon
the presumption that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act was committed. The presumption is
always in favor of sanity and the burden of proof of insanity is on the defense.10 The basis for the presumption of
sanity is well explained by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Davis vs, United States, 11 in
this wise: "If that presumption were not indulged, the government would always be under the necessity of
adducing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused. But a requirement of that character would seriously
delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime and in most cases be unnecessary.
Consequently, the law presumes that everyone charged with crime is sane and thus, supplies in the first instance
the required proof of capacity to commit crime."
As we have done in a prior case, for purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it is well to restate and keep in
mind certain basic principles in law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him; that a
felonious or criminal act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with
freedom, intelligence and malice because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary; that one of the causes
which will overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which event the actor is
exempt from criminal liability as provided for in Article 12, Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 12
It will readily be observed that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant clearly reveals how the crime
charged against him was perpetrated. This confession is, however, being assailed as inadmissible in evidence on
the ground that it was executed without the assistance of counsel engaged by appellant himself, and that he did
not understand nor was he informed of his constitutional rights. 13
We do not agree with this submission. The extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. Atty. Liliosa
Rosario, a lawyer from the then Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), assisted appellant when he was placed
under custodial investigation. The same lawyer represented him during the early part of the trial. In People vs.
Layuso, 14we strongly denounced the widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the right to
counsel provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the
ascertainment of truth. As explained in Gamboa vs.Cruz, etc., 15 the person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips
of persons undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense.
The presence and assistance of Atty. Liliosa Rosario adequately precluded the possibility of extracting from
appellant any false or coerced confession or admission. Furthermore, it was shown that the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant was explained to him in his dialect when he was brought before Judge Juan C.
Austria where such confession was subscribed and sworn to by appellant. 16 The records also show that the
validity of the extrajudicial confession is not being questioned. Only the reliability of its contents is being placed
in doubt, ostensibly because of the main submission of the defense that appellant was insane when the crime
was committed. 17 Moreover, the CLAO attorney would not have affixed her signature in the extrajudicial
confession had she known of any legal infirmity in its execution.
Coming now to his principal submission, appellant relies heavily on the clinical case report regarding his mental
and physical condition. He stresses in his brief that the testimony of Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, Physician-In-Charge,
Male Court Case Pavilion of the National Center for Mental Health, has explicitly shown that appellant was
supposedly insane immediately before, during and after the commission of the crime and that the evidence
adduced explicate that the mental illness of appellant is incurable and that he has no lucid intervals. 18 He
explains that the normal appearance and behavior of appellant while testifying in court is not surprising. He says
that it is due to the fact that, during that time, he was undergoing medical treatment and his mental condition
during the trial of the case where he had been regularly taking medicine should not be confused with his mental
status at the time of the commission of the offense.19
Appellant is clutching at straws of argument, a clear indicium of a dearth in plausible explanations. Nor was the
trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate his demeanor on the witness stand, including his
manner of testifying and the answers he also gave in his extrajudicial confession, the least bit impressed by
appellant's defense of insanity as vividly explained in his decision. And well must it be so, for the rule is that
insanity must be positively proven. The presumption, we repeat, is in favor of sanity. The rule has consistently
been that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing that fact rests upon him. 20
Now, it has long been settled that the period to which an inquiry into the mental state of the accused should be
directed is that transpiring immediately before and/or at the very moment of the act or acts under
prosecution. 21 In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because
there is complete absence of the power to discern, or there is total deprivation of the freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon whoever invokes
insanity as an exempting circumstance and must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 22
Insanity itself is a condition, not a thing. It is not susceptible of the usual means of proof and to this fact is due
the unusual difficulty of making proof of its existence and measuring its effect, when once proven to exist. As no
man can look into the mind of another, the state of such mind can only be measured as the same is reflected in
the actions of the body it is created to govern. Thus, we have held that mind can only be known by outward acts.
Thereby we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 23 In interpreting these physical manifestations, scientific
knowledge and experience have been resorted to by our judicial agencies.
The records indubitably disclose that appellant sexually abused the victim. After consummating his lustful desire,
he violently struck the victim on the head with a stone for fear that the victim would report him, and thereafter
he left her in the belief that she was already dead.24 The victim did not immediately die. In the clinic of Dr.
Serafin Padlan in the poblacion, Pat. Armando Friars saw the victim with her head bleeding. He took the
statement of the victim in the local dialect. 25 Thereafter, he translated the statement to English and reduced it
into writing. 26 The statement disclosed the Identity of appellant. That same evening, the victim was still brought
5
to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center where she was treated. She was serious but still conscious, and was able
to narrate to Dr. Saturnino Posadas what happened to her. She died the following morning. 27
The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane immediately before or at the very moment the crime
was committed is too nebulous and conjectural to be convincing. While Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez of the National
Center for Mental Health described the mental illness of the accused as "organic mental disorder with
psychosis" 28 he admitted that a person suffering from insanity may know that what he is doing is wrong. 29 The
same witness also testified that there is no possibility of appellant having lucid intervals, 30 but he, however, also
observed that the mental illness of appellant came on and off. 31
The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his admission to the mental
institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of
marijuana before the commission of the crime. 32 This admission substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial
confession that he was under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the
occasion thereof, killed her. 33 It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some form of mental
illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him
to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any
intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies. The annals of crime are replete
with documented records, and we are not without our share in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been
feigned and invoked to provide a defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution.
One more thing. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on appellant. In a judgment of
conviction for a felony, the court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty, which in this case should
be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment, since under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code
the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties, unlike
those generally provided for crimes in special laws.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the principal penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, and
the reduction of the civil indemnity to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the judgment of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is
designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason. Thus,
when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong,
he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the accused,
invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG in an
Information 1 which reads:
That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M.
MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2
inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es)
lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing
upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep,
located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the
apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.
Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not
guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his
client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the
accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the
same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial.
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his
illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the
NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him. 3
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence on
his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter LILIFER
MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally married and their
union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He was
employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed there for
nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a hardware
store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. 4
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of
Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with
their eight child and was about to give birth. 5
6
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of
another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the
accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise. 6
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying
inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged
into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by
Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house
holding a bolo. She scampered for safety. 7
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice
anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness.
Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her. 8
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the
hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.
He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment. 9
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared that the
accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three (3)
medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first medical
report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis, classified as
schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by impaired
fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and
judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity to
attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during
which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness
may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already
suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. 1
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia.
After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27,
1996, 14 showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused
was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial. 15
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he
committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is
of the view that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the
commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on
record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was
suspended or abolished at the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby
sentences the accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his
criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that fateful
day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the
testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes — he may be violent and destructive, or
very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife
and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did not
seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is
peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would have
appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already
suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The defense posits that his
mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started through 16
years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-law for his
family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle.
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful
day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his
wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he
committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth child
three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind
would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the
faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or
culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by
7
punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior
and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. 18
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional
test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of
insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was
wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to
moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen 19 as follows: A kills B knowing
that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to
obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a crime if
the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely to intellectual
reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may know in his
mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions. 20 M'Naghten was
condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only
affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient, including his will and
emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does not solely determine
man's conduct. 21
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of
the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent
himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what he was
doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from controlling his
conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there are mental
illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and
wrong. 22 This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is too
restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires
absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of
criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is
difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. 2
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." 24 Critics of this test argued that it gave too much
protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond
reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental disease
leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent on the
testimonies of experts. 25
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal
Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person is
not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 26 Still, this test has
been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be
differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient. 27 Objections were
also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of punishment. 28
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation. It
enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law applicable in all federal
courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to prove
lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited the
scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of
accused found to be insane. 29
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. 30
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires
opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness
who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the
accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 31 The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with
which he is charged. 32
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to
the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis. 3 Symptomatically,
schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of
impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations. In the most
disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious
thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social customs are disregarded. 34 During
the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness,
hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear
"far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little concern about the realities of
life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolerable lack of self-respect. He
withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself from painful relationships. There is
shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes
neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced
by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of
increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain
a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The
schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may
appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. 36
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the
record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to
that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
8
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. 37 Hence the importance of adducing
proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the
appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity
after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 38
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at
the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of
unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the
appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact
that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife
does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of
his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the
appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the
appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest
reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent on
his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure,
there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and
prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the appellant's
mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her house, she did
not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was
suffering from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime
but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried
on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on
the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As the appellant, in the case at bar, failed
to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained to
affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 219113
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
ROLAND MIRAÑA Y ALCARAZ, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
On automatic review before this Court is the 7 August 2014 Decision1 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 06183, which affirmed the 11 April 2013 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
30 (RTC), of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case No. T-3231 finding accused-appellant Roland
Miraña y Alcaraz (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and thereby
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information3 which reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2008 at around 6:30 o'clock in the morning in Barangay San Ramon,
Municipality of Lagonoy, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a bolo, with intent to kill and with abuse of superior
strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack one Dominga
Agnas V da. De Globo, a seventythree year old woman, on the different parts of her body, resulting [in] her
death to the prejudice of her heirs.
The crime is committed with the attendant qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
When arraigned on 21 January 2009, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. In view of accused-
appellant's admission that he caused the victim's death, a reverse trial ensued.4
Version of the Prosecution
Dominga Agnas Vda. de Globo (the victim) was a 73-year-old widow and resident of Barangay San Ramon,
Lagonoy, Camarines Sur. She was also known as "May Inggay" by her relatives and neighbors. She lived on her
own but prior to her death, she frequently slept at the house of Alberto Mirafia (Alberto), her first cousin,
because accused-appellant had been harassing her, such as by throwing stones at her. The victim believed that
accused-appellant was threatening her because she once reprimanded him after she caught him stealing fruits
from her property.5
On 16 June 2008, when Alberto returned home from attending a fiesta, he found the victim in his house,
trembling while praying. She told Alberto that she was scared because accused-appellant had chased her with a
bolo. Alberto invited her to sleep in his house and advised her to report the incident to the barangay. The victim,
however, rejected the idea because accused-appellant was her relative. Thereafter, the victim left Alberto's
house and proceeded to her brother's house. After relating the incident to her brother, she was once again
advised not to go back to her house and to report the incident to the barangay. Unfortunately, the victim did not
heed the advice. She then returned to her house to await the call of her son, who was working abroad.6
9
Between 6 o'clock to 6:30 in the morning of 17 June 2008, Armando Orce (Armando), the victim's neighbor, was
at the coconut plantation near his house when he heard a woman cry out followed by a loud cry of a man.
Believing that the sounds emanated from his house, Armando immediately ran in that direction. As he came
near his house, he saw a woman lying on her side on the ground in front of the door to his house. Armando
recognized the woman as the victim. He also saw accused-appellant's father crying at the back of their house
facing the accused-appellant.7
PO3 Bobby Corono (PO3 Corona), together with two (2) other police officers, responded to a call about the
incident. Upon arrival at the place of the incident, PO3 Corono saw the body of the victim lying on the ground.
Accused-appellant approached PO3 Corono and admitted he was responsible for the victim's death. He then
pointed to a bolo and said that he used it to hack the victim and washed it afterward. PO3 Corono thereafter
arrested accused-appellant and brought him to the police station along with the bolo as evidence.8
Ramiro9 Globo10 (Ramiro), the victim's son, flew back to the Philippines when he found out about his mother's
death. He visited the mental hospital where accused-appellant was committed. When asked what he did to
Ramiro's mother, accused-appellant replied that he killed her.
Accused-appellant was initially charged with homicide but, upon a Motion to Remand Case to Prosecution Office
for Reinvestigation, the information for homicide was withdrawn. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur issued a resolution which ordered that a new information for murder be filed against accused-
appellant.
On 20 June 2008, an order for the immediate transfer of the accused to the Bicol Medical Center Mental
Hospital was issued based on the report that he was being violent to himself and to others at the jail.
Version of the Defense
In the morning of 17 June 2008, Imelda Miraña (Imelda) found out that her son, accused-appellant, had killed
the victim.
Imelda did not know of any personal enmity between accused-appellant and the victim prior to the incident. She
noticed, however, that her son started exhibiting odd behavior after the latter's nose was bitten by a cousin.
Accused-appellant would smile without anyone in front of him; he would call a chicken late at night; and would
keep on saying to himself that the victim was a witch. After the incident, she observed that accused-appellant
just sat inside their house, staring blankly. 11
A few nights before the incident, Mercy Delfino (Mercy), accused-appellant's sister, noticed that her brother
kept smiling and could not sleep, and kept on saying that the victim was a witch. He even claimed that he saw
the witch in their own backyard. 12
During trial, accused-appellant claimed not to know or recall the events surrounding the incident, the identity of
the victim, and his confinement and treatment at the mental hospital. 13
The RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled that accused-appellant was not able to prove his defense of insanity, holding that "while the
purported behavior of accused-appellant would suggest an abnormal mental condition, it cannot however be
equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern, to accept insanity." It thereafter
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime to murder, in
consideration of the fact that the victim was a 73-year-old unarmed woman as against a male assailant in his
early twenties. The dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Roland Mirafia y Alcaraz GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment [sic] of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, accused is hereby ordered
to pay the surviving heir of the victim the amount of ₱75,000.00 for the civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 for moral
damages, ₱73,397.95 as actual damages as evidenced by the receipts, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In addition, pursuant to prevailing circumstances, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annumshall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of the judgment until fully paid (People vs.
Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013).
The accused having been under preventive imprisonment he is entitled to the full credit of his confinement if he
abide of [sic] the rules and regulations imposed therein otherwise he shall only be entitled to four-fifth [sic]
while serving under preventive detention pending trial of this case.
Accused-appellant appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant, with modification as to the award of damages. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the 11 April 2013
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 in Criminal Case No. T-3231 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for- parole. In addition to other damages awarded by the trial court, Accused-
Appellant is ordered to pay moral damages in the reduced amount of ₱50,000.00.
The CA agreed with the RTC that accused-appellant failed to overcome the presumption of sanity; and his bizarre
acts prior to the incident cannot be considered insanity for the purpose of exonerating him because not every
aberration of the mind constitutes insanity.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT INSANITY COULD BE APPRECIATED IN ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S FAVOR IN ORDER TO
EXCULPATE HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
10
THE COURT'S RULING
The Court finds no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the matter of accused-appellant's
insanity, but finds that he should only be liable for homicide.
The defense failed to prove
accused-appellant's insanity at
the time of the commission of the
crime.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession or avoidance because an accused invoking it admits to
have committed the crime but claims that he should not be criminally liable therefor because of insanity, which
is an exempting circumstance.14 Consequently, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to
be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt. 15
However, an accused invoking the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear
and convincing evidence16 because every person is presumed sane. 17
For the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused was completely deprived of
intelligence, 18which must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the
offense with which he is charged. 19
Since the state of a person's mind can only be judged by his behaviour, establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, or
who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the
accused, or who is qualified as an expert, sue as a psychiatrist.20
Taken against the standard of clear and convincing evidence, the proof proffered by the defense fails to pass
muster.
The defense argues that the exempting circumstance of insanity has been sufficiently proven through the
testimonies of Imelda and Mercy, accused-appellant's mother and sister, respectively, as well as the testimony
of Dr. Imelda C. Escuadera (Dr. Escuadera), a psychiatrist.
Imelda and Mercy testified that accused-appellant believed that the victim was a witch and that in the days prior
to the incident, accused-appellant was behaving oddly, such as smiling to himself and calling a chicken late at
night. Their testimonies, however, fail to shed light on accused-appellant's mental condition immediately before,
during, and immediately after he committed the crime.
Moreover, unusual behaviors such as smiling to oneself and calling a chicken late at night are not proof of a
complete absence of intelligence, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity.21 The Court has held that "the prevalent meaning of the word 'crazy' is not synonymous with the legal
terms 'insane,' 'non compos mentis,' 'unsound mind,' 'idiot,' or 'lunatic.' The popular conception of the word
'crazy' is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy
manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."22 In order to be exempt from
criminal liability, the accused must be so insane as to be incapable of criminal intent. 23
The defense also argues that Dr. Escuadera's testimony during the hearing to determine accused-appellant's
fitness to stand trial sufficiently points to his insanity at the time he committed the crime. Dr. Escuadera testified
she conducted a psychiatric interview with accused-appellant on 21 July 2009, and that her findings, embodied
in a Mental Status Examination Report, showed she deemed accused-appellant fit for trial; and that accused-
appellant had a history of mental illness, which she identified as schizoprenia.24
At the outset, it must be pointed out that Dr. Escuadera's testimony was presented primarily to prove that
accused-appellant was already fit to stand trial. In fact, she was not the one who conducted the initial
examination on accused-appellant upon the latter's commitment to a mental hospital. The one who did so, a Dr.
Chona Belmonte (Dr. Belmonte), was not presented as witness. More importantly, Dr. Escuadera's testimony on
accused-appellant's previous mental illness does not specifically pertain to the time of the commission of the
crime. Even her medical report on accused-appellant's mental status, for the purpose of determining his fitness
to stand trial, is bereft of any indication that he was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the
time he mortally hacked the victim.
Vague references to his history of mental illness and subsequent diagnosis of schizophrenia do not satisfy the
quantum of proof required to exempt accused-appellant from ·criminal liability, especially since the defense
failed to establish that accused-appellant's mental ailments, if such was the case, related to the time of the
commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant's actuations immediately after the incident also negate a complete absence of intelligence or
discernment when he killed the victim. As testified to by PO3 Corono, accused-appellant approached the police
officers when they arrived at the crime scene, told them that he was responsible for hacking the victim, pointed
to the bolo he used, and indicated that he had already washed the weapon.25 That accused-appellant had the
foresight to wash the bolo after killing the victim and, thereafter, the consciousness to decide to confess to the
authorities what he had done upon their arrival, suggest that accused-appellant was capable of discernment
during the time of the incident.
It is clear from the foregoing circumstances that the defense failed to prove accused-appellant's insanity at the
time of the commission of the crime with the requisite quantum of proof. Consequently, accused-appellant's
conviction must be upheld.
Abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated,
such that accused-appellant can only be
held liable for homicide,
not murder.
This Court finds that the conviction of the accused-appellant for murder is flawed because of the erroneous
appreciation of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. The Court finds that the presence of this
circumstance in the commission of the crime was not sufficiently proven.
In concluding that such circumstance existed, both the RTC and the CA primarily took into account the gender
and age of the victim, a 73-yearold female, and the accused-appellant, a male in his early twenties. The Court
finds that this is insufficient to conclude the presence of abuse of superior strength.
11
It has been stressed that for abuse of superior strength to be properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
it must be shown that the advantage of superior strength was purposely and consciously sought by the
assailant, viz:
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons
who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victims. The evidence must establish that
the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of the aggravating circumstance depends
on the age, size, and strength of the parties. 26 (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the prosecution failed to proffer evidence that accused-appellant purposely sought such
advantage. The testimonies of the witnesses, on the whole, do not establish that accused-appellant made any
conscious effort to use his age, size, or strength to facilitate the commission of the crime, as in fact the notorious
disparity of these factors between the victim and the accused-appellant was not even clearly shown.
What is only certain herein is that the accused-appellant killed the victim, and the exempting circumstance of
insanity cannot be appreciated in his favor.
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is obliged to rule out abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance. There being no other circumstance alleged and proven to qualify the crime to murder, accused-
appellant can only be liable for homicide.
As to the award of damages, there is also a need to modify the same, in conformity with People v.
Jugueta, 27 where the Court laid down the rule that in crimes where the death of the victim resulted and the
penalty is divisible, such as in homicide, the damages awarded should be ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. This is apart from the proven actual damages, which the trial court found to
amount to ₱73,397.95 undisputed by accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the 7 August 2014 Decision of the Comi of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 06183 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant Roland Mirafia y Alcaraz is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and is hereby
sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one ( 1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts: ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱73,397.95 as actual damages. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the information, as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of killing
Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with
premeditation shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said
Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The
motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared his plans to take the
deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards
secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and
costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important facts. The
accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro
Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant
took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at
work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a stream to see
how the alteration which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other
side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met
the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-
harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to
hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a
young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a short distance from the
shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the
question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There
is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point.
The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild
chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused, however, testified that he did not invite the
deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga
tree "trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is
unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as follows:
12
 And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens were to
be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would
have something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot
him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the
place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I went back toward the
malecon, where my companions were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my
shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my companions were working; and I called
Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he
is my friend and besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he
and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found
in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The
defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left his
laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the
laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way toward
the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and
removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the
body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow
laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the
witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused,
who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That
evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon
grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place where it
had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the
well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because he
was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do so.
The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the
body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the deceased had
been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity
and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have been no
motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden
quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man
were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall
appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without
liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in
case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident
while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417;
Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875;
U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any
question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all
suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the
burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not
the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is
relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State
must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must
show that it was an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case
was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must
be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its
equivalent) which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it
must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from custody
ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
13
 G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004 Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball court. He was
nonplussed when he looked at the person driving the motorcycle and recognized the appellant. Ricardo knew
that the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
Ong-ong had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the roof.
vs.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw Vincent and
Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo
magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down from the
DECISION
roof.6 Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellant's
shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol7 towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent
was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting appellant abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.8
PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando of murder for the killing of eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. while the
latter was flying his kite on top of a roof. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty.
Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw blood on the latter's head. Whilcon retreated
and left his friend.9 The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in a waiting tricycle
The accusatory portion of the Information charging the appellant with murder reads: and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival.

That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and brought to the hospital. They rushed to
intent to kill, by means of treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, the hospital, only to see their son's already lifeless body. The appellant was nowhere to be found.
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, by then and there, shooting
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted
him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which
an autopsy where he made the following findings:
was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
offended party.
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
2
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-lateral aspect.
Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest wall, right side.

Case for the Prosecution3
Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro. The family lived at
Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Vincent, nicknamed "Hataw," was a grade three pupil
whose education was sponsored by the Spouses Petinato, an American couple, through an educational
foundation.4
Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly ovaloid, with irregular edges, abrasion collar
widest postero-inferiorly, located at the head, left parietal area, 9.0 cms. above and 8.0 cms. behind
the left external auditory meatus, directed forward upward and from left to right, involving the scalp,
fracturing the left parietal bone (punched-in), lacerating the left and right cerebral hemispheres of
the brain, fracturing the right parietal bone (punched-out), lacerating the scalp, making an Exit
wound, 3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with everted and irregular edges, 12.0 cms. above and 2.0 cms. in front
of the right external auditory meatus.

The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG)
Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid, extensive, bilateral.
based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, but was on detached service with the Motorcycle Unit of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play
outside. She agreed.5 Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on Visceral organs, congested.
top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro. Beside
this carinderiawas a basketball court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, nicknamed
Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested food particles.
L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.
14
 CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD.10
Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the left
upper back portion of the head (above the level of the left ear)11 and exited to the right side.12 Dr. Baluyot signed
Vincent's certificate of death.13
At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector Abelardo P. Aquino proceeded to the scene of the
shooting but failed to find the victim and the appellant. They proceeded to the Quezon City General Hospital
where they heard that the victim had died. They returned to the crime scene and recovered an empty shell from
a .45 caliber gun.14
On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the MMDA Motorcycle Unit to which the appellant was
assigned on detached service, reported to the Sangandaan Police Station that the appellant had not reported for
duty.15 At 2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998, Police Senior Superintendent Alfonso Nalangan, the Regional
Director of the PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the appellant to the Sangandaan Police Station together with his .45
caliber pistol bearing Serial No. AOC-38701.16
Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was brought to the Department of Justice where he was
enrolled under its Witness Protection Program. He gave his sworn statement to NBI Special Agent Roberto
Divinagracia on September 29, 1998.17 On the same date, P/Insp. Abelardo Aquino wrote the Chief of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic examination of the .45 caliber pistol with Serial
No. AOC-38701 and the empty shell of a .45 caliber gun found at the scene of the shooting.18 Before noon on
September 30, 1998, Divinagracia arrived at the station and turned over two witnesses, Raymond Castro and
Ricardo Salvo. He also turned over the witnesses' sworn statements.19 On October 2, 1998, on orders of the
police station commander,20 Pajarillo took pictures of the crime scene, including the carinderia and the roof with
a bullet hole as part of the office filing.21 He did not inform the prosecution that he took such pictures, nor did he
furnish it with copies thereof. However, the appellant's counsel learned of the existence of the said pictures.
On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98 stating that:
FINDINGS:
Microscopic examination and comparison of the specimen marked "FAP" revealed the
same individual characteristics with cartridge cases fired from the above-mentioned
firearm.
CONCLUSION:
The specimen marked "FAP" was fired from the above-mentioned caliber .45 Thompson
Auto Ordnance pistol with serial number AOC-38701.22
Vincent's family suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. As evidenced by receipts, they spent P49,174
for the funeral.23
Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Macario
Ortiz, a resident of Sitio San Jose, Quezon City, asked for police assistance; Macario's brother-in-law was drunk
and armed with a knife, and was creating trouble in their house. The appellant's house was located along a
narrow alley (eskinita) perpendicular to the main road. It was 200 meters away from Macario's
house.24 Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45 service revolver, cocked it, put the safety lock in place
and tucked the gun at his right waistline. He brought out his motorcycle from the garage and slowly negotiated
the bumpy alley leading to the main road. Macario, who was waiting for him at the main road, called his
attention to his revolver which was about to fall off from his waist. The appellant got distracted and brought his
motorcycle to the right side of the road, near the abandoned carinderia where he stopped. As he stepped his
right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the appellant lost his balance and slipped to the right. At
this point, the revolver fell to the ground near his foot and suddenly went off. Bystanders shouted, "Ano yon,
ano yon, mukhang may tinamaan." He picked up his gun and examined it. He put the safety latch back on and
tucked it at his right waistline. He then told Macario to wait for a while to check if somebody was really hit. He
went near the abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to the ground. He picked up the bloodied child,
boarded him on a tricycle on queue and instructed its driver, Boy Candaje, to bring the boy to the hospital.25 On
board the tricycle were Jeffrey Dalansay and Milbert Doring.
The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's house in Caloocan City but did not inform her
of the incident. He then called his superior officer, Major Isidro Suyo, at the Base 103, located at Roces Avenue,
Quezon City. The appellant informed Major Suyo that he met an accident; that his gun fell and fired; and, that
the bullet accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that he might not be able to report for work that day
and the following day. He assured his superior that he would surrender later. He then went to Valenzuela City to
the house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam, who was a motorcycle unit cop. The appellant stayed there for three
days. He also visited friends during that time.
On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and surrendered his .45 caliber pistol. Major Suyo
accompanied and turned over the appellant to the commanding officer at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The
appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug test. He stated that the results of the drug test were negative. The
appellant was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for investigation.26 The pictures27 of the crime
scene were given to him by Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, shown in one of the pictures pointing to a bullet hole.
The appellant's testimony was corroborated in pari materia by Macario Ortiz.
Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent's thirteen-year-old playmate, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998,
he was playing basketball at Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball court along the road beside the chapel. With
him were Ricardo, Puti and Nono. Vincent was on the rooftop of the carinderia with Whilcon. While Puti was
shooting the ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo ran beside the chapel near the basketball court. He
looked back towards the basketball court and saw the appellant, about 15 meters away from the canal, holding
the prostrate and bloodied Vincent. He did not see the appellant shoot Vincent. He did not report what he saw
to the police authorities. He was ordered by his father to testify for the appellant. He also testified that his
mother was related to Daniel, the appellant's brother.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder, qualified by
treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the appellant
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of the
15
 aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14,
Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of
P49,174.00, as actual damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages; P25,000.00, as exemplary damages;
and, P50,000.00, as death indemnity.
The accused is to pay the costs.
The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. "R") of the accused, shall remain under the custody of the
Court and shall be disposed of in accordance with the existing rules and regulations upon the finality
of this decision.28
The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:
1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO RELEVANT PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED COULD HAVE ALTERED THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE
COURT AND THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF JUDGING AND ADVOCACY,
AND GOING INTO THE REALM OF SPECULATION, PATENTLY DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND PARTIALITY.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF RICARDO SALVO,
ALLEGED PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS WANTING IN PROBABILITY, AS IT IS
CONTRARY TO THE COMMON EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND.
4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING EXCULPATORY AND
INCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION BY ACCUSED.29
The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the physical evidence, viz., the hole
found on the rooftop of the carinderia where Vincent was when he was shot. The appellant contends that the
picture30taken on October 2, 1998 by no less than SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of the principal witnesses of the
prosecution, and the pictures31 showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing to a hole on the roof buttress the
defense of the appellant that the shooting was accidental. The appellant maintains that his service revolver fell
to the ground, hit a hard object, and as the barrel of the gun was pointed to an oblique direction, it fired, hitting
the victim who was on the rooftop. The bullet hit the back portion of the victim's head, before exiting and hitting
the rooftop. The appellant posits that the pictures belie Ricardo's testimony that he deliberately shot the victim,
and, instead, complements Dr. Baluyot's testimony that the gunshot wound came from somewhere behind the
victim, somewhere lower than the point of entrance. The appellant invokes P/Insp. Mario Prado's testimony that
if a gun hits the ground in an oblique position, the gun will fire and the bullet will exit in the same position as the
gun, that is, also in an oblique position.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the contention of the appellant is based on
speculations and surmises, the factual basis for his conclusion not having been proven by competent and
credible evidence. There is no evidence on record that the hole shown in the pictures32 was caused by a bullet
from a .45 caliber pistol. The appellant did not present Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, who was shown in the
pictures, to testify on the matter. The appellant failed to prove that any slug was found on the rooftop or under
the roof which came from the appellant's .45 caliber pistol. According to the Solicitor General, the pictures relied
upon by the appellant cannot overcome the positive and straightforward testimony of the young eyewitness
Ricardo Salvo.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability
is a factual issue. The appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his affirmative
defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going off, the bullet hitting the victim without
his fault or intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads –
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused. For the
accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it.34 An accident is
an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our
will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences." If the consequences are plainly foreseeable,
it will be a case of negligence.
In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court held that an accident is a fortuitive circumstance,
event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
happens. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand without which such
other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the
other.36 In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice.37 The appellant must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the prosecution because by admitting having caused the death of the victim, he can no
longer be acquitted.
In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense.
16
First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor the pictures
showing the hole on the roof of the carinderia38 to prove that he shot the victim accidentally. However, when
the investigating prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions on the appellant relating to the pictures, the
latter refused to answer. This can be gleaned from the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, thus:
Classificatory questions were propounded on the respondent but were refused to be answered. This
certainly led the undersigned to cast doubt on respondent's allegations. The defenses set forth by the
respondent are evidentiary in character and best appreciated in a full-blown trial; and that the same
is not sufficient to overcome probable cause.39
Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim.40 There is no evidence showing that the
gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the position of the gun
when it fell from the appellant's waist.
Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the appellant testified that the chamber of his pistol
was loaded with bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his right waistline.41 He also testified that the gun's
safety lock was on. He was asked if the gun would fire if the hammer is moved backward with the safety lock in
place, and the appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the trigger, the gun would not fire:
Q Is this your service firearm?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you went out of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at that time when you tucked the gun in your
waistline?
A The hammer was cocked like this.
COURT:
Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved backwards near the safety grip.
ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY:
Admitted, Your Honor.
ATTY. PEREZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the barrel of the gun and then the hammer is
moved backwards and therefore it is open, that means that if you pull the trigger, the bullet will fire
because the hammer will move forward and then hit the base of the bullet?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came out?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You did not place the safety lock before you went out of your house?
A I safety (sic) it, sir.
Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was on a safety lock?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun, point it upwards.
(witness did as instructed)
It is now on a safety locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?
(witness did as instructed)
A It will not, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the parties)
Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused pulled the trigger, the hammer did not
move forward?
PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:
Admitted, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the trigger many times, a bullet will not come out
from the muzzle of the gun because the hammer is on a safety locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the hammer of the gun is like this and therefore it is
open but it is on a safety lock, there is space between the safety grip which is found below the
hammer, there is a space, is it not?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like this.
The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to demonstrate.
(to the witness)
You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if you want but do not remove the safety
lock.
(witness did as instructed)
The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not touch the hammer even if the hammer is
cocked.42
Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself proved that the defense proffered by the
appellant was incredible. This can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court:
3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it as providential, when the counsel of the
accused was holding the gun in a cocked position and the safety lock put in place, the gun
accidentally dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom and the gun did not fire and neither
was the safety lock moved to its unlock position to cause the hammer of the gun to move forward.
The safety lock of the gun remained in the same position as it was when it dropped on the floor.43
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service firearm. He hid from the
investigating police officers and concealed himself in the house of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in Valenzuela
City, and transferred from one house to another for three days to prevent his arrest:
Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September 26, 1998?
A No, Your Honor.
Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?
A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo, Your Honor.
Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?
A Because at that time I was already confused and did not know what to do, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of Valenzuela?
A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.
17
 Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence of PO3 Lam for three days? deliberate and intentional act, contrary to accused's claim, that it happened outside the sway of his
A Yes, sir. will.45
Q Why instead of going home to your residence at Bahay Toro?
A Because I am worried, sir.
It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
COURT: (to the witness)
witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies
Q So what did you do for three days in the house of PO3 Lam?
are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, as the trial judge was in a better
A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and in the evening, I go back to the house of
position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses as they testified.46 We have carefully reviewed
PO3 Lam, Your Honor.
the records of the case and found no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court.
Q So if you were able to visit your friends on September 27 or 28, 1998 and then returned to the
house of PO3 Lam in the evening, why did you not go to Major Suyo or to your 103 Base?
A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling Major Suyo. The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo deserves credence. He testified in a positive and
Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame, Quezon City? straightforward manner, which testimony had the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Even as he was subjected to a
A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor. grueling cross-examination by the appellant's counsel, he never wavered in his testimony. He positively
Q What is the connection of you having money to that of informing your officer that you will identified the appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the latter deliberately aimed his gun and shot
surrender? the victim. The relevant portions of his testimony are quoted:
A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will already be detained and that I will have no
money to spend. Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, do you remember of any unusual incident
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) which took place?
Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to Sept. 29, 1998, you did not even visit your A: Yes, sir.
family in Barangay Bahay Toro? Q: What was that unusual incident?
A No, sir. A: When Vincent was shot, sir.
COURT: (to the witness) Q: Who shot Vincent?
Q Did you send somebody to visit your family? A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir.
A No, Your Honor. …
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by Fallorina?
Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of Vincent? A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir.
A I was not able to do that, sir. Q: Was there any companion of Vincent?
Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy. Bahay Toro? A: Yes, sir.
A No sir, because I already brought the child to the hospital.44 Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that you saw him and Fallorina shot him?
A: "Nakatalikod po siya."
The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that the death of the victim was accidental and …
that he was not negligent. Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the figure of a certain Jeffrey and you and his
tricycle? Why did you include this drawing?
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial court in its decision on this matter: A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was boarded to and brought to the hospital.
(Witness referring to Exhibit O-11)
Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle?
The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a policeman, that the victim was accidentally shot
A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir.
was his failure to surrender himself and his gun immediately after the incident. As a police officer, it is
Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked as Exhibit O-7. Why did you include the
hard to believe that he would choose to flee and keep himself out of sight for about three (3) days if
motorcycle?
he indeed was not at fault. It is beyond human comprehension that a policeman, who professes
A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at that time.
innocence would come out into the open only three (3) days from the incident and claim that the
COURT: (to the witness)
victim was accidentally shot. Human behavior dictates, especially when the accused is a policeman,
Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the motorcycle was moving?
that when one is innocent of some acts or when one is in the performance of a lawful act but causes
A: It was stationary, your Honor.
injury to another without fault or negligence, he would, at the first moment, surrender to the
Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to Fallorina before you saw him shot the boy?
authorities and give an account of the accident. His failure to do so would invite suspicion and
…
whatever account or statement he would give later on becomes doubtful.
A: He came from their house, Your Honor.
Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand Fallorina?
For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was accidentally shot is odious, if not, an insult to A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your Honor.
human intelligence; it is incredible and unbelievable, and more of a fantasy than a reality. It was a …
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

18
Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was Buddha still there? Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?
A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir. A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.
(Witness is pointing to a place near the canal already marked as Exhibit O-14). Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun?
Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now seated. Can you tell the Court how far where A: I do not know anymore.47
(sic) you from Fallorina at that time of the shooting? The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine, his act was
COURT: deliberate and intentional.
Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that the distance pointed to by the witness is more or
less 7 meters.
It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the Information as witnesses for the prosecution, only
…
Ricardo Salvo remained steadfast after he was brought under the Witness Protection Program of the
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Department of Justice. He explained that the reason why he testified for the prosecution, despite the fact that
Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent, can you tell that?
the appellant was a policeman, was because he pitied the victim's mother who was always crying,48 unable to
COURT: (to the witness)
obtain justice for her son. We find no ill motive why Ricardo would falsely testify against the appellant. It was
Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the boy at that time the body (sic) was shot?
only his purest intention of ferreting out the truth in this incident and that justice be done to the victim.49 Hence,
COURT:
the testimony of Ricardo is entitled to full faith and credence.
10 meters more or less?
…
Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina before the incident? The Crime Committed by the Appellant
A: More or less two years, sir.
Q: Why do you know him? We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar, especially on Sundays, sir. qualified by treachery. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot intentionally while his back was
… turned against the appellant. The little boy was merely flying his kite and was ready to get down from the roof
Q: How many shots did you hear? when the appellant fired a shot directed at him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
A: Only one, sir. on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part.50 Nonetheless, Vincent was an eleven-
Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina? year-old boy. He could not possibly put up a defense against the appellant, a police officer who was armed with
A: Yes, sir. a gun. It is not so much as to put emphasis on the age of the victim, rather it is more of a description of the
Q: What was that gun? young victim's state of helplessness.51 Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected
A: .45 cal., sir. to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.52 The abuse of superior
Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.? strength as alleged in the Information is already absorbed by treachery and need not be considered as a
A: No, sir. separate aggravating circumstance.53
Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.?
A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the movies, sir.
Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for two (2) years and you saw him shot Vincent We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position in
on September 26, 1998 at around 2:30 in the afternoon. Please look around the courtroom now and this case. We reverse the trial court on this score.
point at the person of PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina?
CT. INTERPRETER: There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used his service firearm, the .45 caliber pistol,
Witness is pointing to a male person the one seated at the back of the lady and wearing a yellow shirt in shooting the victim. However, there is no evidence on record that the appellant took advantage of his position
and maong pants and when asked of his name, he stated his name as Ferdinand Fallorina. as a policeman when he shot the victim.54 The shooting occurred only when the appellant saw the victim on the
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating abuse of public position against the appellant.
Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard utterances at that time that he shot the victim?
…
A: Yes, sir. The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
Q: What was that? voluntary surrender. Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused spontaneously and made
A: "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsisibaba diyan!" in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
… because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his
Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof, what search and capture.55
about Fallorina, what did he do?
A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he went at the back of the karinderia where In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City, and even
Vincent fell, Your Honor. moved from one house to another for three days. The appellant was a policeman who swore to obey the law. He
Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what did he do? made it difficult for his brother-officers to arrest him and terminate their investigation. It was only after the
A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor. lapse of three days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm.

19
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there
is no modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amount of P49,174 as actual
damages; P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga
and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with tile crime of Robbery with Double Rape, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of
Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard
Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe, who are still at large, armed with firearms,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to
gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their purpose, did then
and there were Ifully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and
intimidation upon the person of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the
members of his fully and on the occasion hereof, while they were made lying flat on the
floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry away, without the consent of said Elias
Monge, owner thereof, of the following properties, to wit:
One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00
Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00
Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00
One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00
One One caserola 15.00
Two pieces of pillow case 12.00
Two cans of rice 70.00
One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00
TOTAL P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner
thereof in the aforementioned amount. That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed
accused with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a
virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a plea of
not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion of which read:
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape,
penalized by Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby
sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the maximum penalty provided by law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been
established beyond reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of
ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal
is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS
of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor,
in view of the aggravating circumstances present.
Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally
Elias Monge in the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment, In addition,
Eustaquio Loreno shall indemnify Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of
P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment.
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each. 2
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas follows:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located
at barrio Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely:
20
Monica Monge, single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old,
were preparing to attend the dance to be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they
had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the diaper of
baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other occupants
present in the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then
13 years old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco
Fable. Cristina was then vacationing at her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo
Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM:
pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
AM).
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house,
Francisco Fable saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near,
he heard one of them call Elias Monge saving that there was a letter from the chief hepe).
Fable called Elias Monge who was in the sala, informing him that there was a letter from
the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes and the other in dark sweater. came
up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed
to him the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark
sweater to come inside the sala. The other man in red clothes posted himself near the
post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9,
tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his
daughter, Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and
Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused Monica to run to her mother,
seized with fear, informing her what she came to know about camme visitors. Cristina
Morgagor came attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she was held back by
the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make any scandal.
kitchen Elias Monge turned to look at him the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him,
and ordered all those inside the on the floor (pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for a glass of
water arid the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but Mario did not obey
and instead went to the sala Hence, fabie himself outside inside the house to the the glass
of water. But, as he went inside the sala, he noticed the man in red clothes following him.
As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red clothes poked his gun on Fabie's
back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he wish pushed to go inside the
sala. Once inside the sala, which Aras lighted, Fable saw and recognized the man in red
clothes these to Estaquio loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and
Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the
companions of the man in dark sweater. All tile occupants of the house were ordered by
the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor
(pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29,
1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on the floor.
Loreno tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan)
and got the ropes with which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands
together behind their backs. Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go
downstairs and drive the barking dog away. Loreno held Fable and brought him downstairs
to drive the barking dog away (pp, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to
focus on the person of Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as
one of the visitors who remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his
flashlight on the face of Fable, and seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side
of his rib which caused him to fall on the ground. Marantal kicked Fable who managed to
roll on his side and was hit on his left thigh. After a while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from
the ground, and brought am back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn,
Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica
Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but
she was then still tied, Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of
her piggy bank savings. She said there was none. He ransacked the room but found none.
The man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica
resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her
struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then made her he on the floor near the
bed. After undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling and
shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She could not do anything to stop him
from consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he was through with her, she
noticed blood in her private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM
pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and the
struggle she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly
pointed his gun at them, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live, Then Loreno
brought Beata Monge first to the masters room and then to the teacher's room. During
these two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the aparador and the trunk
respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents, which he brought to the sala,
holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied. All the things he got from the two rooms
were poured on the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 17-19, tsn,
Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge
whose hair was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the
floor of the sala. He reached for a can of pineapple j nice from the aparador and the sala
and drank its contents. Not long thereafter, he turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and
he dragged her to the room which was then rented by school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who
was then in Naga City). Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs
on her but she resisted and struggled although her hands were still tied behind her back.
He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye which caused her to lose consciousness. He then
21
proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she regained consciousness, the man in dark
sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her (p. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp.
11-12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's room, a
third man entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a
mat. Loreno found instead a piece of lawanit with which they covered their victims. The
third man proceeded to the kitchen, and when he returned to the sala, he was bringing
along some rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and he asked from Elias Monge for a
cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and told him to get it from his pocket as he was still tied.
Reacting to Monge's reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his breast and solar
plexus which caused him to fall on the floor. Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to
accompany him to the house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the balcony, Elias Monge
protested and refused to accompany Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck,
pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along.
loreno desisted from his plan to go to the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not
recognize the Identities of both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the
man in dark sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying
to kiss her and touch her private parts. One of the malefactors on the ground called those
upstairs to hurry because a man was approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge
and told her to return to the sala to breastfeed her daughter who was continuously crying.
Thereafter, the malefactors went down from the house one by one, bringing along all the
things they robbed from their victims. The man in dark sweater returned to the sala and
touched the thighs of Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her shorts, and he told
them not to tell anybody what happened to them, otherwise he will kill them. And then all
the malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct.
29, 1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near the fence
of the house calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias Monge replied from
upstairs that he was not feeling well, and Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to
untie himself, and then he also untied the others. Fable then revealed to him that earlier
when he had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and recognized Jimmy Marantal as
among those left on the ground as lookout for the group that had just robbed them.
Cristina and Monica Monge also told their father that they were abused by the man in
dark sweater when they were brought inside the rooms. For the rest of the night, they
remained on guard and could hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 10-11,
tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following
personal properties: jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three bets,
P200.00; one caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00;
one camera, P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500,00; and
several others, all in the total of P10,305.00, more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22,
1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married a
member of the youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias
Monge had already known Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter
used to place bobby traps in his (Monge's) place to catch pigs, during which occasions
Loreno usually slept in his house, Monica Monge and Cristina Monge also had already
known Loreno because his daughter married a neighbor near their house. Monica often
saw Loreno traverse the playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School where he was
studying. Fable had also known Jimmy Marantal because the latter often attended dances
held by the barrio youth organization, and he (Marantal) even married one of its
members, He had engaged Marantal in conversations many times p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979
AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct.
18-1979 AM pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful
evening, Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape
incident at the PC detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk there. So he
proceeded to the PC headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan
which were used by the malefactors in tying him and his family during the robbery-rape
incident. He was given a written recommendation from the PC to the hospital with
instructions to have himself and his daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina
Monge was informed that there was no need for her to submit for physical examination
because she was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC
Company, stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-
rape incident. He was informed by Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was
robbed and his two daughters were raped by the robbers in the evening of January 7,
1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was able to Identify two of the robbers,
mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection
of the place on that same day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up
Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and brought them to the PC camp. At the PC camp
on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly Identified upon confrontation as two of
the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his daughters Monica and Cristina
Monge, and their helper Fable. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to give
their written statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written statements
of Elias Monge, Francisco Fable, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-
rape incident. Upon being Identified both said suspects told their victims ff they could just
talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge replied that what they did that evening was an
oppression (kaapihan) against him and his family, The two suspects retorted that it was up
to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12,
tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
22
 Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga
City, examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's result was
negative. But the doctor found him to have sustained an external injury which he classified
as "resolving hematoma, right cestal region" a close wound, already spread out but and
the process of healing, located on the right side of the middle portion of the thorax. He
gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to stop the bleeding as there was still
slight bleeding and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the corresponding medical
certificate to Elias Monge (Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital examined
Monica Monge on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body,
but examining her hymen, she found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at
3:00 and 9:00 o'clock locations and, inserting her index finger inside her patient's sex
orifice, lt easily admitted her forefinger. She had the patient's vagina smeared for
spermatozoa but none was found after laboratory examination The doctor observed that
the lacerations did not reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated
portions were still reddish and slightly swollen. The doctor opined that the lacerations
could have been caused by the forcible penetration of a male's penis into the patient's
vagina. The doctor further expeled that the laceration of the hymen heals after five days.
She also expeled that male spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for 72
hours. She stated that, admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse,
any sperm must have already disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January
10, 1978 which was already beyond 72 hours since she was raped in the evening of
January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted that
they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man
wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army (NPA),
operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed.
We, however, find the contention untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the act is
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-10),
showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against Elias
Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of
having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in
dark sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed
the gun to the victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct.
30, 1979 PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno
positioned himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater
delivered the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he
immediately positioned himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which
showed his voluntary participation in the criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the
hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he
got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where
she was earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to
point his gun to the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if
they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master's
room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the
contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat
and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina
Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to
kiss and touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the flashlight of
Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his flashlight on the
approaching Fable. Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to the
ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the fact that Fable had recognized him and the blows
which he gave to Fable who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his
presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica
Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions
who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective means
and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing that Jimmy Marantal
raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts,
though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of
interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without
the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the
accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of interest,
which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of
actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been establish, all the
23
conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by more than three
persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of band,
nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But, for
lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
accused cused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. With costs
against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19133 November 27, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIX MAGPANTAY, and EUGENIO ALCARAZ, accused-appellants.
Pascual G. Mier as counsel de officio for accused-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, in its Criminal Case No. R-1788, for
multiple murder, sentencing the accused, Arnulfo Estabaya, to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and imposing
on the other accused, Felix Magpantay and Eugenio Alcaraz, the death penalty, ordering them to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of each of the ten deceased persons named in the information the sum of P6,000.00, and to
pay the proportionate costs. The dispositive portion of the decision states, in addition to the foregoing, that "the
penalties herein imposed are subject to the provision of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in case of
commutation of penalties", and that the accused shall be credited with one-half of their respective preventive,
imprisonment.
The indictment, under date of 19 January 1960, to which these three, accused pleaded guilty, charges them as
follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1959, at 7:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in the barrio
of Villapagasa, municipality of Bongabon, province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Felix Magpantay, Arnulfo Estabaya,
Eugenio Alcaraz and Catalino Fajardo, all provided with unlicensed carbine rifles, caliber .30
conspiring and confederating together, mutually helping one another and acting in common accord,
with treachery and evident premeditation and the decided purpose to kill, taking advantage of the
darkness of the night and their superior strength, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously waylaid,
ambushed, attacked, assaulted and shot Lope Cadacio, Emilio Claveria, Doroteo Malabanan, Albino
Sarian, Rosendo Raes, Ignacio Francisco, Hermogena Atilano, Catalino Gervacio, Filomeno Macalalad
and Alejandro Fernandez with their said carbine rifles, while the victims were riding in a passenger
jeep bearing Plate No. TPU-14016, and inflicting upon them several gunshot wounds in the different
parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.
That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the generic
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength,
are present.
Contrary to law.
The fourth accused Catalino Fajardo having pleaded not guilty, the decision under review was rendered with
respect only to those named heretofore. The judgment considered two aggravating circumstances, those of
evident premeditation and superior strength, as present in the commission of the crime; Arnulfo Estabaya was,
however, credited with two mitigating circumstances, those of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, while
Magpantay and Alcaraz were credited with one mitigating circumstance, that of having pleaded guilty.
In addition to their plea of guilty, each of the three accused, Magpantay, Alcaraz and Estabaya, insists on the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Magpantay claims, in addition thereto, lack of instruction.
Estabaya adduced no evidence when the fiscal admitted that his surrender was voluntary.
In support of their claim for additional mitigation, Magpantay and Alcaraz declared that, after committing the
crime, at about 7:30 in the evening of 2 June 1959 they went, for the purpose of surrendering, to a certain Labo,
a former barrio lieutenant of Villapagasa. They met him at about ten o'clock that same night. Labo refused to
accept their surrender because he was no longer the incumbent official of the barrio; whereupon, Magpantay
requested him to send word to the municipal mayor, Angel Rodriguez.
The accused then proceeded to barrio Rosacara, but the barrio lieutenant there also refused to accept their
surrender on the ground that the crime was committed outside his territory. Magpantay requested him to fetch
the mayor. The trio then proceeded to barrio Sapang Dagat, and from there Catalino Fajardo (this co-accused
had been with Magpantay and Alcaraz) prepared a letter to PC Sgt. Araman.
From Villapagasa to the poblacion of Bongabon is a distance of about 13 kilometers; Rosacara is farther by some
kilometers. The route taken by the accused from the scene of the crime was away from the poblacion and
towards the mountains. On the second day of the incident, the accused had been informed that PC soldiers had
been issued orders to kill at sight.
Mayor Rodriguez of Bongabon was informed of Magpantay's desire to surrender to him at about seven o'clock in
the morning of 10 June 1959. He reported the matter to the PC detachment in Sumagui and to Colonel Ver. That
same morning Magpantay, in tears and without a firearm, surrendered to the mayor in a sitio of Villapagasa,
about two kilometers inland from Liberty Sawmill. Therefore, the mayor delivered custody of Magpantay to
Colonel Ver at the sawmill where he had waited, as pre-arranged with the mayor.
Sgt. Araman, P.C., received Fajardo's note of surrender on the 11th of June, referred it to the provincial
commander, contacted Fajardo and Alcaraz on the 12th, slept with them that same night, and on the following
morning, on their way to the poblacion, the sergeant delivered the accused to his superiors. The accused then
handed over their carbines.
24
Testifying in rebuttal for the prosecution, Sgt. Exequiel Martinez asserted that civilians had informed the PC of
the whereabouts of the accused and that the area was cordoned with 160 soldiers. Said witness opined that this
contingent provided no means of escape to the accused. When and how the area was cordoned was not
touched upon, nor did he explain how escape had become impossible. Nor was it established that the accused
knew of their alleged encirclement and that it prompted them to surrender in earnest.
We agree with herein appellants Alcaraz and Magpantay that the court below should have appreciated in their
favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Not only was there failure to prove that they felt that
they had no other alternative course; but the fact that the PC authorities had waited at a designated place for
the mayor to bring Magpantay down shows that they conformed to his offer of voluntary surrender — PC
Colonel Ver waited at the sawmill to receive the surrenderee and not to capture him. The same thing can be said
of appellant Alcaraz, because the PC had prior knowledge of his offer to surrender when, on receipt of Fajardo's
letter, Sgt. Araman referred it to the provincial commander; nor can it be contended that the PC officers and
men affected a capture when they met Sgt. Araman and accused Alcaraz and Fajardo, already peacefully on their
way to the poblacion.
The flight of the accused from the scene of their crime to the mountains cannot be taken as belying their bona
fideintention to surrender, because the evidence is unrebutted that they did earlier take steps to surrender.
After committing the crime, they defied no law or agent of authority, and when they did surrender, they did so
with meekness and repentance. Appellant Alcaraz, undisarmed, slept with Sgt. Araman in an isolated place; had
he been wanting in sincerity, Alcaraz, together with Fajardo, could easily have overpowered the sergeant, but
did not do so. On the following morning, when the trio met the constabulary men on the way to the poblacion,
Alcaraz surrendered himself and his rifle without any trouble.
We find no particular reason, however, to disturb the trial court's rejection of Magpantay's alleged lack of
instruction as a mitigating circumstance. His answers to the questions propounded to him show that he
understood the significance of his acts, notwithstanding his illiteracy (People vs. Ripas, et al., L-6246, May 26,
1954; Peo. vs. Sari, L-7169, May 30, 1956).
The narration of the commission of the crime in the information avers five (5) circumstances which may qualify
or aggravate the crime, namely, treachery, evident premeditation, superior strength, nocturnity, and band.
However, in the succeeding paragraph, it specifies only the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the generic
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, without alleging anew the other
circumstances. In view thereof, the Solicitor General believes that only evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength should be taken into account in determining the penalty to be imposed, "since the view more
favorable to the accused is that they had in mind" these two aggravating circumstances, which were reiterated
by the fiscal in the paragraph following the narration of the commission of the crime "presumably for emphasis
or clarification". To this view we agree. This separate specification certainly could her misled the accused and
diverted their attention from the other aggravating circumstances included in the detailing of the crime. Under
the circumstances, appellants in all probability pleaded guilty upon the estimation that the two aggravating
circumstances stressed in the last portion of the information could be, and were, neutralized by their voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty. The doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused, considering that they were in
no way to blame for the ambiguous terms in which the information is couched.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is affirmed, in so far as it finds the accused guilty often (10) separate
murders, and modified by declaring that the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and superior Strength
were balanced by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. Consequently the
penalty should be that of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) for each offense, to be successively served up to
the maximum limit of forty (40) years' imprisonment provided by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
The solidary civil indemnity of P6,000.00 for each one of the ten persons slaughtered, payable to the respective
heirs, is also affirmed. Each appellant shall pay one fourth of the costs.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-54901 November 24, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO ABUEG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Alberto B. Maguigad for accused-appellant.
ALAMPAY, J.:
In Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-Cavite of the former Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District of Metro Manila
(Pasig) Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San Pedro were accused of the crime of robbery with homicide, alleged to
have been committed as follows:
That on or about November 1, 1973 in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed respectively, with a deadly weapon known as "chaco" and a piece of wood,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, by means of
violence and intimidation and force upon things, assault, attack and thrust the door of the
house where Marciana Maraya and Diosdado Maraya were then living, with the piece of
wood, one of the accused was then conveniently provided, hitting Marciana Maraya on
her body thereby causing her instantaneous death, and once inside, with intent of gain
and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously break and smash the cabinet (aparador), and take, steal, rob and carry away
pants, shirts and baby dresses with a total value of Three Hundred and Ninety Three
(P393.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency belonging to Diosdado Maraya, thereby resulting to
the damage and prejudice of said Diosdado Maraya and of the heirs of Marciana Maraya
in the aforementioned amount.
Contrary to law.
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the aforestated offense and the case proceeded to
trial.
25
The prosecution evidence, as synthesized by the trial court and substantially adopted in the People's Brief,
disclose the following:
On November 1, 1973, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, Diosdado Maraya, his
mother, Marciana Maraya and his cousin Norberto Alcaraz were in the house at Biak-na-
Bato, Rosario, Cavite. They were eating "kalamay" (rice cake) as it was All Saint's Day.
Momentarily, two persons whom they recognized as the accused Ricardo Abueg and
Deogracias San Pedro unexpectedly entered the door of their house. Inside, Abueg asked
the occupants if he could partake in eating "kalamay." Norberto Alcaraz answered that he
could do so (pp. 3-5, tsn, April 23, 1975). While Diosdado Maraya was serving them with
coffee, Abueg suddenly hit Norberto Alcaraz twice with a "chaco" on the head and on the
eyebrow and blood oozed there from. Because the tie of the "chaco" was disengaged,
Abueg and San Pedro retreated and left (pp. 3-7, tsn., February 17, 1975; pp. 4-9, tsn.,
On the other hand, the version of the incident as submitted by the two accused, is as follows:
April 23, 1975).
Minutes later, Abueg and San Pedro returned. While Marciana Maraya was closing the
door of the house, Abueg speared the door with a piece of wood about one (1) arm long
and hit Marciana Maraya on the chest. Abueg struck the door again. When it opened, he
and San Pedro entered. Carrying the piece of wood he used in striking the door, Abueg
struck the plates and glasses on the table. He also struck Norberto Alcaraz on the forearm
and then destroyed the cabinet (aparador). There upon, Abueg demanded for money but
he was told by the wife of Diosdado Maraya that they had none since her husband was
jobless (pp. 8-12, tsn, February 17, 1975; pp. 9-12, tsn, April 15, 1975). After destroying
the cabinet, San Pedro took theclothes inside. Thereafter, Abueg and San Pedro left (pp.
14-18, tsn, Ibid; p. 19, tsn, Ibid).
The victim was brought to the Maternity Hospital in Rosario, Cavite where she was
pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 15-16, tsn, February 17, 1975). Dr. Nieto Salvador, NBI
medico-legal officer, conducted postmortem examination on the cadaver of the victim.
Based on the examination he conducted, Dr. Salvador found the victim suffered fractured
rib son the left chest. He testified that there was a complete fracture of the sternum
resulting in the extensive contusion of the base of the heart. The Necropsy Report issued
by Dr. Nieto Salvador shows that the cause of death of Marciana Maraya was due to
"shock and traumatic (Exh. "C", p. 126, Rec., pp. 34-36, tsn, April 3, 1975).
Upon being informed of the incident, a team of policemen led by Pat. Wilfredo Perrera
repaired to the scene of the crime at about 10:00 o'clock that same evening of November
1, 1973. At the crime scene, the policemen noticed that the door of the house was
punctured. Pat. Herrera made an inquiry from the children of the victim and he was told
that their mother was speared with a piece of wood by Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San
Pedro (pp. 4-7, tsn, July 1, 1975).
The policemen hunted for the two suspects. They later spotted Abueg and San Pedro at
the road talking with each other. They apprehended the two and brought them before the
family of the victim who confirmed that they were the ones who speared the victim to
death. Sgt. Rodel Hernandez found two (2) pieces of wood (Exhs. "D", 7 "D-1 ") at the
crime scene. Then they brought Abueg and San Pedro along with Diosdado Maraya and
Norberto Alcaraz to the Municipal Building for investigation (pp. 11-13, tsn, July 1, 1975).
At the police precinct, Pat. Joaquin Vargas, Jr. of the Rosario Police, conducted an
investigation on the suspects, Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San Pedro. He also
investigated the witnesses, Diosdado Maraya and Norberto Alcaraz, and took their
respective statements (Exhs. "D" & "D-1 ", pp. 6-7, Rec.; pp. 6-10, tsn, April 29, 1975).
During the investigation, Maraya and Alcaraz Identified the two (2) pieces of wood (Exhs.
"D" & "D-1") and the "chaco" (Exhs. "E" & "E-1") as the weapons used by Abueg and San
Pedro in assaulting them. They also Identified therein the pieces of clothes taken by the
accused as theirs (pp. 34-38, tsn., April 29, 1975). Pat. Vargas prepared criminal complaint
for robbery with homicide (Exh. "F") against Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San Pedro and
flied the same with the Municipal Court of Rosario, Cavite (pp. 18-20, tsn, Ibid).
On November 1, 1973 at about 10:30 P.M., the two accused, Ricardo Abueg and
Deogracias San Pedro, though uninvited, went inside the residence of Diosdado Maraya
which is also the residence of Marciana Maraya. It was Ricardo Abueg who went ahead
while Deogracias San Pedro was left behind near the doorway. As is the usual custom,
being All Soul's day, the Maraya family have prepared a "kalamay" (powdered rice cake
cooked in coconut milk and sugar). Upon seeing the "kalamay," Ricardo Abueg asked the
occupants of the house if he could partake of the same to which he was told that he could
do so. Whereupon, Ricardo Abueg stepped out of the house in order to invite Deogracias
San Pedro to join him. The latter readily accepted the invitation and went inside.
Suddenly and for no reason at all, Deogracias San Pedro hit Norberto Alcaraz (cousin of
Diosdado Maraya) with a "chaco" (a two-piece club linked at the mid-section with a string
used in Martial Arts) hitting said Norberto Alcaraz on the head. As soon as Alcaraz was hit
on the head, San Pedro ran away leaving behind Ricardo Abueg. It was perhaps due to the
poor lighting (perok-perok lamps were used) and the suddenness of the attack that
prompted Alcaraz and Maraya to conclude that it was Abueg who did the act. As a result,
both Maraya and Alcaraz ganged up at Ricardo Abueg. It should be mentioned that when
San Pedro hit Alcaraz with the "chaco," the other part of the chaco was disengaged and
was lying on the floor. It was this part of the "chaco" that was not recovered anymore. As
Ricardo Abueg proved to be no match to the committed strength of Alcaraz and Maraya,
the former retreated and ran out of the house. As soon as Abueg was outside of the
house, he saw San Pedro still holding the other portion of the "chaco." It was this portion
that Abueg grabbed from San Pedro. Abueg went back to the house and hit Norberto
Alcaraz after which he ran away.
As the duo started to leave the vicinity, Alcaraz and Maraya started to shout unprintable
words at San Pedro and Abueg. Angered by the invectives hurled upon them, Abueg and
San Pedro took pieces of wood from a fence nearby and returned to the Maraya
residence. As the door was already closed when they returned, they rammed the door
panel several times unaware that behind the door was Marciana. After the door was
rammed several times by both the herein accused, a hole was created and in the process,
Marciana Maraya who must have been standing behind the door, was pierced with a piece
of wood. She fell to the floor. Thereupon, the door was forced open and both Abueg and
San Pedro were once more able to gain entrance. Once inside, and probably bereft of
26
 reason due to excessive drinking, the two accused began smashing the wooden cabinet
(aparador) with the pieces of wood they have previously used in ramming the door. The
wooden cabinet was broken and according to Norberto Alcaraz, it was San Pedro alone
who took some clothes from said cabinet.
Immediately thereafter, both accused ran out of the house. Some hours thereafter, both
accused were arrested by Pat. Wilfredo Pereyna of the Rosario Police Force and both were
booked for implication for the death of Marciana Maraya and for robbery for having
allegedly carted away some clothes belonging to Diosdado Maraya. (Appellant's Brief, pp.
3-5)
After trial, the court below rendered on March 23, 1976 judgment finding the accused Ricardo Abueg and
Deogracias San Pedro guilty as charged. The dispositive part of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Ricardo Abueg and Deogracia San Pedro, both guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under Art. 293 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Sec. 1, Art. 294 thereof, as charged in the information,
the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to pay the amount of
P393.00 and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00); to pay moral damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
as exemplary damages and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
However, pursuant to Section 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, considering that
accused Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San Pedro were both 19 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime, the execution of their sentence is suspended and said
accused are ordered confined at the Camp Sampaguita Youth Center, New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa, Rizal. If said accused violate any of the rules and regulations of said
institution, or if their continued stay in the training institution is inadvisable, the Court
shall order the Director or any of his duly authorized representatives to produce the
bodies of said accused before this Court for them to serve their sentence. (Rollo, pp. 13-
14)
From the case records, it appears that on June 4, 1977, Ricardo Abueg, escaped from the Youth Rehabilitation
Center of the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila but was recaptured. On June 28, 1977, Ricardo
Abueg was returned to the committing court. The judgment of conviction rendered against him in the subject
criminal case was then pronounced and the trial court further ordered the transfer of Ricardo Abueg from the
Rehabilitation Center to the Death Row of the New Bilibid Prison (Tsn, p. 69, Hearing of June 28, 1977)
There cords indicate that Deogracias San Pedro, the other accused in this case, was also returned to the trial
court on June 28, 1977. However, in his case, no pronouncement of the judgment against him was made by the
trial judge because after interrogation it was shown that he had not participated nor was involved in the escape
of his co-accused, Ricardo Abueg. The records also disclose that subsequently, the mo tion of the counsel of
Deogracias San Pedro that custody of said accused be given to the latter's parents, without prejudice to further
interviews being made by the probation officers,was granted by the trial judge on October 19, 1977 (Case
Records, pp. 382-383).
The present case is before this Court by way of an automatic review of the judgment of conviction rendered
against Abueg and the penalty imposed on him. Ricardo Abueg attributes to the trial court the commission of
the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT CONSPIRACY HAS NOT BEEN DULY
ESTABLISHED;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONVICTING THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE ONLY, IT APPEARING THAT THIS IS THE ONLY CRIME, IF AT ALL, WHICH WAS
DULY ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE APPELLANT;
III. ASSUMING GRATIA ARGUMENTI, THAT ROBBERY WHICH HOMICIDE HAS IN FACT BEEN
COMMITTED AND ITS COMMISSION DULY ESTABLISHED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF: (1) THAT THE OFFENDER
(APPELLANT) HAD NO INTENTIONTO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED;
(2) THAT THE OFFENDER (APPELLANT) IS SUFFERING FROM A MENTAL DEFECT AS WOULD
DIMINISH HIS WILL-POWER IN METING OUT THE PROPER PENALTY.
Appellant does not deny that he should be responsible for the death of Marciana Maraya. In fact, in his
handwritten letter sent to this Court on August 24, 1981 (p. 80, Rollo) from the New Bilibid Prison, he admitted
that the killing of Maraya was accidental as he was not aware that the victim was behind the lawanit door when
he speared the same. He claims that at most he should be convicted of homicide only and not robbery with
homicide since it was his co-accused Deogracias San Pedro alone who took the clothes and the conspiracy to
take the same was not duly established. Appellant argues that he returned to the victim's house, armed with a
piece of wood to get even with Norberto Alcaraz and Diosdado Maraya who beat him but that there was no
previous plan or agreement to commit a robbery.
Appellant's claim of absence of conspiracy is without merit. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it
may be inferred from acts of assailants. Appellant and Deogracias San Pedro went back to the house of the
victim each carrying a piece of wood. With these, they struck the lawanit door with the wood hitting Marciana
Maraya inside who was closing the door. Upon gaining entrance, they destroyed the wooden cabinet and
obviously for the purpose of taking the things therein. In the Statement of Facts appearing in Appellant's Brief,
We find the following.
... Once inside, and probably bereft of reason due to excessive drinking, the two accused
began smashing the wooden cabinet (aparador) with the pieces of wood they have
previously used in ramming the door. The wooden cabinet was broken and according to
Norberto Alcaraz, it was San Pedro alone who took some clothes from said cabinet.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-5).
The fact that the two assailants destroyed the wooden cabinet was attested to by Norberto Alcaraz when he
testified:
FISCAL SALCEDO:
27
 Q What other things in the house was hit by this piece of wood
which was used by Ricardo Abueg in hitting the house?
A Glasses and plates.
Q What else?
A The aparador. They used the piece of wood in hitting the
aparador.
Q As a result what happened to the aparador?
A The door of the aparador was destroyed.
Q After the door of the aparador was destroyed what happened?
A After the door of the aparador was destroyed Deogracias San
Pedro took the clothes.
Q And after those clothes were taken by Deogracias San Pedro what
happened next?
A After he has taken the clothes they left.
Q Who left?
A The two Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San Pedro. (Tsn, April 23,
1975, pp. 17-19)
Appellant's claim that he had no previous knowledge that San Pedro would steal the clothes is belied by his
admission that he demanded money from the Marayas and even threatened them with death if they would not
give their money. Appellant testified, thus:
COURT—
Q By the way, is it not a fact that you and Deogracias San Pedro
ransacked the house of Diosdado Maraya?
A We did not ransack the house. They were the ones who gave the
clothes to us.
Q What is the logical reason why the clothes were given to you?
A Because clothes could be sold there on relief.
Q Is it not a fact that you asked money?
A I was just threatening them. I am just motioning as if I have a gun
so that they will give us.
Q What did you say when you threaten them?
A I said putang ina ninyo, pahingi ng pera.
Q What else?
A They answered they have no money and they would borrow
money. I said if you will not give money I will kill you (witness
making a gesture as if to point something). Then when they did not
give money, Deogracias San Pedro said I sigui patayin mo na
William.
Q What did you do?
A So they gave the clothes.
Q When they gave the clothes, what did they say?
A When the clothes were given to me, we ran to the sea.
(pp. 58-60, tsn, September 4, 1975)
The acts of the two accused in destroying the cabinet for the obvious purpose of taking the contents therein
show a continuity of criminal design. Although no previous agreement to commit the robbery has been proven,
such is not essential. It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. The
tacit and spontaneous cooperation and coordination by the two accused in breaking the cabinet show the
existence of a conspiracy. This is bolstered by the fact that appellant did not even prevent San Pedro from
stealing the clothes and running away with the same.
To at least mitigate his criminal liability, the appellant now claims that he is suffering from a mental defect as
shown by the psychological report, dated September 26, 1976 of Nieto Latorre Vitto, Guidance Psychologist &
Acting Social Welfare Analyst, Bureau of Your Welfare, Department of Social Services & Development (p. 267,
Records). It is stated therein that in the test administered by her, appellant "yielded I.Q.'.s of 68, 68, 66 for the
verbal performance and full scale, respectively, and which classified him in the mentally defective group."
The psychological examinations were conducted on September 26, 1976 while appellant was already detained at
the New Bilibid Prison, about three years after the crime was committed on November 1, 1973. In going over the
records of the case,We find that when appellant testified on September 4, 1975, which was almost two years
after the commission of the crime, he was able to narrate clearly and accurately the incidents that took place. He
was able to recall the place where he and Deogracias San Pedro went before and after the incident. He even
remembered the name of Pat.Wilfredo Perrera as the policeman who arrested him as well as the time of his
arrest. Appellant likewise recalled that they were confined at the Municipal Jail of Rosario, Cavite for two
months and two weeks; thereafter, they were transferred to Trece Martires (pp. 14-57, tsn, September 4, 1975).
Considering appellant's ability to narrate vividly the details of how the crime was committed and the other
incidents that transpired thereafter, his assertion that he is mentally defective must fail.
Aside from this consideration, it is shown that Dr. Romeo Y. Tating, Chief, Neuro-Psychiatrist Service of the
National Bureau of Investigation conducted a psychiatric evaluation of the appellant when the latter was
detained at Camp Sampaguita Youth Rehabilitation Center, New Bilibid Prison. His findings on appellant's
physical and neurological examinations submitted to the court on February 10, 1977, place Ricardo Abueg within
normal limits (pp. 286-287, Records).
Finally, appellant argues that he had no intention to commit so grave, a wrong as that committed because the
intention of the two accused in ramming the door with pieces of wood was but to force it open, and they did not
know that Marciana Maraya was behind the door. As this may well be, We are disposed to agree that under the
given facts of this case, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong may be
appreciated in appellant's favor. It has not been satisfactorily established that in forcing entrance through the
door which was then closed, with the use of pieces of wood, the two accused were aware that Marciana Maraya
was behind the door and would be hurt. Even as they sought to enter the house to retaliate against the male
occupants or commit robbery, there is no clear showing that they ever desired to kill Marciana Maraya. In People
vs. Gardon, et al., 104 Phil. 371, it was held that, "Considering however the circumstances under which the crime
was committed wherein it does not appear that appellants have deliberately intended to harm their victims
though incidentally two of them laid hands on some who apparently wanted to prevent their flight,..., the
application of the imprisonment would be commensurate to the crime committed ... "Article 13, par. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when he executes
or commits the criminal act (People vs. Boyles, 11 SCRA 88). As the attendant circumstances in this case indicate
that the death of Marciana Maraya was not deliberately intended, the penalty that was imposed by the trial
court on the accused-appellant may be lessened.
Nevertheless, Ricardo Abueg remains liable for the crime of robbery with homicide because it is enough that a
homicide result by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. Even assuming that the two accused, as alleged
by them, only sought to wreak vengeance on the male persons inside the house of the Marayas, this does not
exclude the fact that they went further and proceeded to rob the said family.
28
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court below is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as to the penalty imposed
on the accused-appellant Ricardo Abueg, which is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua but the indemnity to be
paid to the heirs of Marciana Maraya is, however, increased to Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103613 February 23, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C. TANGAN, respondents.
x------------------x
G.R. No. 105830 February 23, 2001
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard
heading south. He had just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the same time,
Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard
with his uncle, Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan.
Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path.
Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso, slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and
overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to
overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed
down to make a U-tum. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also
stopped his car and got out. As the Mirandas got near Tangan's car, Generoso loudly retorted, " Putang ina mo,
bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko?" Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Tangari pointed his
hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, "Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang
pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With this, Tangan went to his car and got
his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat. The subsequent events per account of the parties' respective
witnesses were conflicting:
According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel
Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to
intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again
the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter but
because the arm of the accused was extended, the muzzle of the gun reached to about more or less
one foot away from the body of Generoso Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda
causing the latter to fall and while still conscious, Generoso Miranda told Manuel Miranda, his uncle,
to get the gun. Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling,
Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a
man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda
who was able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the name of Nelson Pante
claimed that after the gun was taken by the accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to
grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying
to wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused.
According to the accused, he lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as
soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.1
After the gun went off, Tangan ran away. Meanwhile, Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel,
looked for the gun and ran after Tangan, joining the mob that had already pursued him. Tangan found a
policeman who allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just
shot his nephew. Then he went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, later identified as Mary
Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought
to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the
way.1âwphi1.nêt
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.2 After a reinvestigation,
however, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm,3 and he was separately
charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.4 On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in
the homicide case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various
grounds. The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.5 On
November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered.6
During the trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following: that the amount of P126,000.00
was incurred for the funeral and burial expenses of the victim;7 that P74,625.00 was incurred for attorneys fees;
and that the heirs of Generoso suffered moral damages, the amount of which is left for the courts to determine.
After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his
favor; consequently, the trial court ordered him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim.8 Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and was
allowed bail in the homicide case.
Private complainants, the heirs of Generoso Miranda, filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 102677, challenging the civil aspect of the court a quo's decision, but the same was dismissed for being
premature. On the other hand, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the
trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00.10 His subsequent motion for reconsideration
and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals.11
The office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No.103613, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals
and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment be modified by convicting accused-appellant of
homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.12 Subsequently, the Office of the
Solicitor General, this time acting for public respondent Court of Appeals, filed a motion for extension to file
29
comment to its own petition for certiorari.13 Discovering its glaring error, the Office of the Solicitor General later
withdrew its motion for extension of time.14 Tangan filed a Reply asking that the case be submitted for
decision.15
Meanwhile, Tangan filed a separate petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 105830.16 Since the
petition for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General remained unresolved, the two cases were consolidated.17 The
Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation in G.R. No. 105830, asking that it be ex6used from filing a
comment to Tangan's petition for review, in order to avoid taking contradictory positions.18
In the recent case of People v. Velasco and Galvez,19 we held that the prosecution cannot avail of the remedies
of special civil action on certiorari, petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in criminal cases. Previous to that,
we categorically ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be used by the State in a criminal case to correct a lower
court's factual findings or evaluation of the evidence.20
Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is clear:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted,
or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other fom1al charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which, necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of
the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a pleas was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the
offended party, except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment,
he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
Based on the foregoing, the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that no mitigating
circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant and that the penalty imposed on him be
correspondingly increased, constitutes a violation of Tangan's right against double jeopardy and should be
dismissed.
We now come to the petition for review filed by Tangan. It is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan
did not invoke self-defense but claimed that Generoso was accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving self-
defense,21 which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not come into play. Although Tangan must prove
his defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence,22 the burden of proving the commission of the
crime remained in the prosecution.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation to Article 11 (1), of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to
exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the
burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused.23 In order that it may be
successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present,
particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.24 Unlawful aggression by itself or in
combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the
unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete,25 because if there is nothing to
prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis.26
There is no question that the bullet which hit the victim was fired from the caliber. 38, which was issued to
Tangan by the Philippine Navy. The cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the
abdomen, caused by the bullet fired from a gun of the said caliber. The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot
the victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance of about one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that
when he grappled with Generoso and Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and
accidentally fired, hitting the victim.
When the testimonies of witnesses in open court are conflicting in substantial points, the calibration of the
records on appeal becomes difficult. It is the word of one party against the word of the other. The reviewing
30
tribunal relies on the cold and mute pages of the records, unlike the trial court which had the unique
opportunity of observing first-hand that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment on
the stand while testifying.27 The trial court's assessments of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight
and respect on appeal and is binding on this Court,28 particularly when it has not been adequately demonstrated
that significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded by the court below
which, if considered, might affect the outcome hereof.29 The rationale for this has been adequately explained in
that,
The trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, and carriage and mien.30
Equally, when a person fabricates a story, he usually adopts a simple account because a complex one might lead
to entanglement from which he may find it hard to extricate himself. Along the same line, the experience of the
courts and the general observations of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties
are such that if a witness delivers in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to
fall into fatal inconsistencies to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the
falsity of his message.31 Aside from this, it is not also unusual that the witness may have been coached before he
is called to the stand to testify.
Somewhere along the painstaking review of the evidence on record, one version rings the semblance of truth,
not necessarily because it is the absolute truth, but simply because it is the best approximation of the truth
based on the declarations of witnesses as corroborated by material evidence. Perforce, the other version must
be rejected. Truth and falsehood, it has been well said, are not always opposed to each other like black and
white, but oftentimes, and by design, are made to resemble each other so as to be hardly
distinguishable.32 Thus, after analyzing the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court found that:
When the accused took the gun from his car and when he tried to get out of the car and the two
Mirandas saw the accused already holding the gun, they started to grapple for the possession of the
gun that it went off hitting Generoso Miranda at the stomach. The court believes that contrary to the
testimony of the accused, he never lost possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to
the ground, it will not first explode or if it did, somebody is not holding the same, the trajectory of the
bullet would not be perpendicular or horizontal.33
The Court of Appeals agreed -
The finding of the lower court that Generoso Miranda III was shot while the accused and the
Mirandas were grappling for the possession of the gun immediately after the accused had taken his
gun from inside his car and before the three allegedly fell to the ground behind the car of the accused
is borne out by the record. The court also agrees with the court below that it was the accused-
appellant who shot and killed Generoso Miranda III. If the accused-appellant did not shoot Generoso
III during the scuffle, he would have claimed accidental killing by alleging that his gun exploded during
the scuffle instead of falsely testifying that he and the Mirandas fell to the ground behind his car and
the gun exploded in the possession of Manuel Miranda. The theory of the prosecution that the
shooting took place while the three were grappling for the possession of the gun beside the car of
appellant is completely in harmony with the findings and testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the
relative position of the three and the precarious nearness of the victim when accused-appellant
pulled the trigger of his gun. Dr. Ibarrola explained that the gun was about two (2) inches from the
entrance wound and that its position was almost perpendicular when it was fired. It was in fact the
closeness of the Mirandas vis-à-vis appellant during the scuffle for the gun that the accused-appellant
was compelled to pull the trigger in answer to the instinct of self-preservation.34
No convincing reason appears for the Court to depart from these factual findings, the same being ably supported
by the evidence on record. In violent deaths caused by gunshot wounds, the medical report or the autopsy on
the cadaver of the victim must as much as possible narrate the observations on the wounds examined. It is
material in determining the truthfulness of the events narrated by the witnesses presented. It is not enough that
the witness looks credible and assumes that he indeed witnessed the criminal act. His narration must be
substantiated by the physical evidence available to the court.
The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2
inches but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the point of exit and the trajectory transit of the wound,
the victim and the alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of the gun
was almost perpendicular when fired.35 These findings disprove Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver
is not prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and
pressure was exerted on the trigger. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the
trigger to fire the revolver.36
Having established that the shooting was not accidental, the next issue to be resolved is whether Tangan acted
in incomplete self-defense. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person
defending himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.37 Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and
invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as
unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault.38 There being no lawful aggression on the part
of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun,
but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the
victim but simply to retain possession of his gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result
of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to kill, does not absolve him from
culpability. Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act.
He brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may be taken from him, he
fired and fled.
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not supported
by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one
who provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating
to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite
provocation for the other party to act violently.
The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation
under Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 6,39 have no factual basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete
self-defense is different from sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense,
it pertains to its absence on the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it
pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party. Besides, only one mitigating circumstance can arise
31
out of one and the same act.40 Assuming for the sake of argument that the blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or
overtaking can be considered as acts of provocation, the same were not sufficient. The word "sufficient" means
adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its
gravity.41 Moreover, Generoso's act of asking for an explanation from Tangan was not sufficient provocation for
him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso.42
For the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, it is required that (1) there be an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.43
In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted upon an impulse for there was no sudden and
unexpected occurrence which wuld have created such condition in his mind to shoot the victim. Assuming that
his path was suddenly blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no longer be treated as a
startling occurrence, precisely because he had already passed them and was already the one blocking their path.
Tangan's acts were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation can arise.
With respect to the penalty, under the laws then existing, homicide was penalized with reclusion temporal,44 but
if the homicide was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty shall be death.45 The death
penalty, however, cannot be imposed on Tangan because in the meantime, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the
imposition of death penalty; and although it was later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of the death
penalty is unfavorable to him. Previously the accused may be prosecuted for two crimes: (1) homicide or murder
under the Revised Penal Code and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. 1866.46
P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294,47 which provides that if an unlicensed firearm is used in murder or
homicide, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and no longer
considered as a separate offense,48 which means that only one offense shall be punished - murder or homicide.
However, this law cannot apply retroactively because it will result in the imposition on Tangan of the maximum
period of the penalty. Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,49 the
aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information. Being favorable, this new rule can be given
retroactive effect as they are applicable to pending cases.50 In any case, Tangan was acquitted of the illegal
possession case.
Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is composed of three periods, and there is neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall be applied. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law,
the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may be
properly imposed, which in this case is reclusion temporal medium with an imprisonment range of from fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be the next lower degree which is prision mayor with a range of from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.51 Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly increased by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in line with
jurisprudence.52 Moral damages are awarded in criminal cases involving injuries if supported by evidence on
record,53 but the stipulation of the parties in this case substitutes for the necessity of evidence in support
thereof. Though not awarded below, the victim's heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 which is considered reasonable considering the pain and anguish brought by his death.54
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as funeral
and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125867 May 31, 2000
BENJAMIN RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.
Petitioner BENJAMIN RIVERA was charged with murder for having allegedly shot to death one Renato U.
Camacho with a handgun the killing being qualified by treachery. 1
On 20 February 1992 the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender being appreciated in his favor and sentenced him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum. The court a quo further ordered petitioner to indemnify the heirs of Camacho
in the amount of P50,000.00 for his death, P30,000.00 for moral damages, and P9,770.00 for actual damages. 2
The evidence shows that on 18 January 1989 between seven o'clock and eight o'clock in the evening Renato U.
Camacho together with Leonora Rudio, Merle Fernandez and Rosario Olipas was playing mahjong in a hovel in
front of the house of a certain Tomasa Rivera at West Poblacion, Natividad, Pangasinan. Suddenly a gun was
fired hitting Camacho on the head. Instantaneously he slumped dead.
During the time that the victim Renato U. Camacho was playing mahjong, his wife Jenny Camacho was talking
with a certain Alejandria Reinoso and the latter's son in front of their house when Jenny saw petitioner Benjamin
Rivera and a companion known only as Babay pass by. Knowing petitioner, she asked him where he was going,
but Rivera replied that he was going to heaven. Jenny said that she was going too far, but he simply laughed it
off and proceeded to his mother's place where mahjong was being played. According to Jenny, she saw
petitioner converse with her late husband for about five (5) minutes in a house in front of Tomasa Rivera's
house. Then Jenny brought her children home afterwhich he returned to Mrs. Reinoso's house.
32
After conversing with Mrs. Reinoso for about thirty (30) minutes, Jenny walked over to the hovel where her
husband was playing mahjong. The place was lighted with a fluorescent lamp. Some fifteen (15) meters away
from where she stood Jenny saw petitioner at the window of his mother's house aiming a short gun at the
mahjong players. Before she could shout the gun went off. Shocked, Jenny rushed home as she was very
nervous.
About thirty (30) minutes later, a policeman by the name of Lando Arciaga went to her house and told her that
her husband was shot in the head. Upon hearing this Jenny collapsed. She regained consciousness only after
thirty (30) minutes. According to Jenny, before the fatal incident her husband had told her that if anything
should happen to him it must be petitioner who should be held responsible as he (petitioner) suspected him of
having stolen his goat. 3
Rosario Olipas, one of those playing mahjong with the victim when he was shot, testified that petitioner and a
companion, known to her only as Babay, arrived at Tomasa Rivera's house between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock
in the evening. An argument ensued between Renato Camacho and petitioner who was charging the former with
having stolen his goat. Of course, Renato denied the accusation and proceeded to play mahjong. Petitioner then
went inside the house and drank beer with his companion Babay. As described by Rosario, a wall made of hollow
blocks with a window separated the place where petitioner was drinking and the hovel where mahjong was
being played. Suddenly, according to Rosario she heard a gunshot so she covered her ears. Then she saw the
victim, Renato Camacho, slump on top of the mahjong table with blood oozing from his head. 4
Lourdes Camacho, mother of Renato, testified that petitioner was her neighbor at Poblacion West, Natividad,
Pangasinan; between 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 18 January 1989, while she was in her house, she
heard a gunshot; shortly after, she was informed by policemen that her son had been killed; she immediately
informed the policemen that it was petitioner who killed her son because three (3) days before his death he told
her that petitioner suspected him of having taken his goat, and finally, that there was a time when petitioner
fired his gun near her house at a nearly dawn although she did not report the matter to the police authorities as
she thought that as barangay councilman he was authorized after all to carry a gun.
Dr. Perfecto Tabangin, Municipal Health Officer of Natividad, Pangasinan, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver
of Renato Camacho. He issued a medico-legal report reflecting his findings that (a) the body was in a state
of rigor mortis and (b) presence of gunshot wound at the right occipital region penetrating the skull, shattering
the brain tissue exiting over the left occipital region.5
Petitioner interposed alibi in his defense. He alleged that the whole morning of 18 January 1989 he was in
Barangay Cacandiungan, Natividad, Pangasinan, three (3) kilometers away from the scene of the crime,
preparing his field to be planted with onions and that in the evening he watched over his sick daughter whom he
brought to the doctor the following day.
But the trial court was not persuaded by the defense. It disregarded its version and convicted petitioner as
charged.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the trial court notwithstanding the manifestation
and motion of the Solicitor General recommending acquittal in view of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which he perceived to be "highly improbable and nebulous." Hence this petition for review
on certiorari assailing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses for reasons summarized as follows: (a) the
medico-legal finding that the trajectory of the bullet was straight was contradictory to the testimony of witness
Jenny Camacho that "the assailant was at the place where the elevation was higher than her height;" 6 (b) the
immediate reaction of Jenny Camacho, who was the wife of the victim, in fleeing after the gunfire, instead of
finding out if her husband was all right, describing it as an unnatural behavior of a wife who allegedly had been
told by her husband prior to his murder that petitioner had evil designs against him; (c) the mahjong players
present at the scene of the crime failed to identify petitioner as the assailant; (d) the testimony of witness Jenny
Camacho that on the right side of the victim was Sulpicio Rivera was inconsistent with her claim that the
assailant was positioned at the right side of the victim because then it would be Sulpicio Rivera who would have
been hit and not the victim; and, (e) witness Jenny Camacho failed to immediately give her statement
concerning the participation of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime; hence, the recommendation of the
Solicitor General that he be acquitted. 7
We disagree. The unbending jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of
witnesses, especially if affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal. We are not convinced that the prosecution witnesses falsely testified against
petitioner as no evil motives were attributed to them. Further, the detailed testimony of eyewitness Jenny
Camacho acquires greater weight and credibility against the mere alibi of petitioner, especially because her
testimony jibed with the autopsy findings. 8 The testimonies of prosecution witnesses, in the absence of any
showing of improper motives on their part, must be accorded full faith and credit.
The alibi of petitioner Rivera, corroborated by his wife, brother and sister, that he was working in the field in
Barangay Cacandiungan, Natividad, Pangasinan, on 18 January 1989 when the crime was committed, cannot
prosper. The element of physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene at the time of the perpetration
of the crime does not obtain. 9 As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner admitted that the distance
between his farm in Barangay Cacandiungan and his own house, which was only 200 meters away from the
scene of the crime, could be travelled by walking in less than an hour; 10 in fact, it could have been traversed in
less than ten (10) minutes! We have ruled time and again that where the distance did not render it impossible
for the accused to be at the scene of the crime, the defense of alibi must preclude the possibility that petitioner
could have been physically present at the place of the crime at or about the time of its commission. Further, the
alibi and denial of petitioner cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear
identification of him as having been physically present at the scene of the crime and killing his victim. 11
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as alleged by petitioner refer to minor and
trivial matters which only serve to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses because they
erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimonies. 12 His allegation that the medico-legal finding that the straight
trajectory of the bullet contradicted the testimony of Jenny Camacho that the assailant was positioned in a
higher level than the victim cannot be given credence. In his cross-examination, Dr. Tabangin explained that it
was possible that the entrance and exit wounds would be at the same level even if the assailant's position was
higher than that of the victim because there could be diversion of the bullet upon hitting the skull which is
hard. 1
Moreover, the behavior of Jenny Camacho in running towards her house instead of ensuring that her husband
was safe, and in failing to immediately charge petitioner with the crime, cannot taint her credibility as a witness.
Jenny testified that when informed of her husband's death, she lost consciousness. Witnesses of startling
occurrences react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with strange, startling or frightful experience. 14 The
workings of human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently — some
may shout, some may faint and others may be shocked into insensibility. 15 Further, it is settled that delay or
vacillation in reporting a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness and render her
testimony unworthy. 16
33
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
consistent, in accord with one another, and were given in simple, straightforward manner, mentioning details of
the incident that could not have been merely concocted. As long as the witnesses concur on material points,
slight deviations in their recollection of details will not detract from the essential veracity of their assertions. 17
The trial court correctly ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. The suddenness of the shooting without
any provocation on the part of the victim who was innocently playing mahjong and totally unaware of the
impending attack upon him who was unarmed, demonstrates the treacherous nature of the attack.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated in favor of petitioner. The records
show that when the Information was filed after the preliminary investigation, he voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the trial court and posted his bailbond before he could be arrested. 18 In People v.
Yeda 19 and People v. Turalba, 20 it was held that when after the commission of the crime and the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, the accused presented himself in the municipal building to post the bond for his temporary
release, voluntary surrender is mitigating. The fact that the order of arrest had already been issued is no bar to
the consideration of the circumstances because the law does not require that the surrender be prior to the order
of arrest.
The crime of murder was committed on 18 January 1989, prior to the effectivity of RA 7659 on 31 December
1993, which penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. At the time the crime was committed, the
penalty for murder was still reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Where there was one mitigating
circumstance, the imposable penalty would be in the minimum period, i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum sentence shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period and the minimum shall be taken from the next lower penalty, which is prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal medium. Hence, the trial court correctly sentenced petitioner to a minimum of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum to seventeen (17) years four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
The award by the trial court of civil indemnity for death in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages of
P50,000.00 and P9,770.00 actual damages to the heirs of victim Renato U. Camacho, which was not objected to
nor questioned by petitioner in his petition, is binding and conclusive upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1996 affirming that of
the trial court finding petitioner BENJAMIN RIVERA guilty of Murder qualified by treachery but mitigated by
voluntary surrender, and sentencing him to a minimum of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, and further ordering him to pay the heirs of Renato U. Camacho the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death, another P50,000.00 for moral damages and P9,770.00 for actual
damages, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Benjamin Rivera.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134373. February 28, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CASTANITO GANO Y SAGUYONG a.k.a JERRY PEREZ, ALLAN PEREZ, ALLAN SAGUYONG and JERRY
GANO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
With blood and gore akin to the butchery of swine in slaughterhouses Castanito Gano mercilessly hacked his
three (3) victims and robbed them of their few earthly possessions. But, as may be gleaned from the theories of
the parties, the core issue now before us is whether the three (3) killings should be appreciated as separate
aggravating circumstances to warrant the imposition of the penalty of death.
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, convicting CASTANITO
GANO Y SAGUYONG of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of each of the three (3) victims the amount of P50,000.00 or
a total of P150,000.00, and to pay the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
Upon arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano made a qualified admission by admitting the killing of the three
(3) victims but denying the charge of robbery. Considering that what is charged is a complex crime with a single
penalty imposed under Art. 294 of The Revised Penal Code, the accused with the assistance of his counsel
entered a plea of not guilty.
On 27 December 1994 ALBERTO MARBELLA bade farewell to his wife Conchita and daughter Angelica who were
staying with his parents-in-law in Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal, before boarding a bus for Polangui, Albay. Three
(3) days later, or on 30 December 1994, he learned from his sister Araceli Marbella through a long distance
telephone call that his wife and parents-in-law Ponciano Salen and Anicia Salen were brutally murdered. When
he learned about the distressing news, he wasted no time in returning to Manila on 1 January 1995.
Accompanied by his sister Araceli, Alberto immediately went to the San Mateo Police Station where a certain
Major Santos told him that the cadaver of the victims had already been brought to Camp Crame for autopsy.
Upon advice of Major Santos, he and Araceli went to the Santiago Funeral Parlor which was in charge of the
funeral arrangements but were informed that the victims' bodies would be lying in state at the residence of the
Salens, his parents-in-law, in Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal.
From the police investigator and kibitzers Alberto learned that Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Perez, a former
employee of Alberto's father-in-law in the latter’s bakery, was tagged as the culprit in the "massacre" of his
family. He also discovered upon inspection of his household, particularly the drawers where their valuables were
kept, that several items were missing, particularly, (a) about P30,000.00 in different denominations representing
their revolving capital in their sari-sari store; (b) two (2) pieces of gold bracelets valued at about P2,000.00
owned by his wife Conchita and daughter Angelica; and, (c) two (2) wristwatches also owned by Conchita.
According to Alberto, Angelica told him she saw the accused grab the money from her mother. Alberto identified
the articles recovered from the accused Castanito Gano upon the latter's apprehension by the authorities. They
included (a) a Mickey Mouse watch marked Exh. "A;" (b) a Citizen gold watch marked Exh. "B;" (c) Conchita's
34
leather wallet marked Exh. "C;" and, (d) an envelop containing peso bills amounting to P1,590.00, marked Exh.
"D."
Senior Inspector Ernesto Garcia testified that at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 31 December 1994 his
office received a report of a "massacre" at the Salen residence in Gen. Luna St., Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal.
Forthwith, he together with two (2) other police officers proceeded to the crime scene. There they found on the
ground floor the prostrate body of Ponciano Salen. Before he could make any further investigation, Garcia was
informed by a relative of the victim of the identity of the suspect. This prompted him and his companions to
proceed to the domestic airport for the possible arrest of the accused.
At the airport, the group coordinated with the Philippine Airlines (PAL) ticketing office to verify whether a certain
passenger using the name Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Gano or Jerry Perez or several other known aliases of the
suspect was booked on a flight for Agusan del Sur. As the process of verification was taking much of their time,
they decided to leave for the North Harbor which was also a possible escape route of the accused. Along the way
they would call up the PAL ticketing office every now and then for the result of the verification, while also
keeping the San Mateo police updated on the progress of their pursuit operation. A lucky break came when the
PAL ticketing office called them and confirmed the presence of one Jerry Perez on board the plane bound for
Butuan City.
Since there was no direct flight from Manila to Butuan City, Sr. Inspector Garcia together with SPO1 Juanito Justo
and SPO1 Joselito Guillermo boarded a plane for Cebu and from there took a connecting flight to Butuan City.
When they alighted at the airport they were met by a certain Sgt. Matty who informed them that he and his men
had already arrested the suspect. Senior Inspector
Garcia and his companions then proceeded to the Western Police District of Butuan City where they found
Castanito Gano being detained. SPO2 Domingo Martin Lucero, the police officer who actually arrested the
accused at the airport, informed Sr. Inspector Garcia and his group about the items found in the possession of
the accused, which consisted of two (2) wristwatches and some cash. At the trial Sr. Inspector Garcia disclosed
that on their way back to Manila the accused confessed to him his responsibility for the triple killing and the
robbery.
Marlyn Candido, live-in partner of the accused, affirmed the contents of her affidavit regarding particularly her
positive identification of the bloodstained garments worn by the accused on 30 December 1994. She likewise
confirmed that her live-in partner was using the aliases of Jerry Perez, Allan Perez, 1 Allan Saguyong and Jerry
Gano.
SPO2 Richard Salvador testified on the recovery of the stolen items from the person of the accused. Salvador
explained that the stolen articles were recovered from the accused Castanito Gano when the latter was
apprehended in Butuan City by the team of PO Martin Lucero who turned them over to SPO1 Juanito Justo.
SPO2 Salvador’s investigation at the scene of the crime showed that the cabinet where the asported items,
specifically the wristwatches, jewelry, wallet and cash were supposedly kept, showed signs of having been
forcibly opened. He learned later from the victims’ relatives that the stolen goods were taken from the cabinet.
According to witness Salvador, the accused Castanito Gano admitted the killings before many people, including
members of the press, and other police officers when he arrived at the San Mateo Police Station. 2
Angelica Marbella, four (4) years old, the only living witness to the killing of her mother and grandparents,
categorically stated that the accused, known to her as Allan, perpetrated the gruesome killings. She likewise
pointed to the accused as the one who stole the money from the drawer of her mother, her Mickey
Mouse watch and other valuables. She also identified her set of bloodstained garments presented in evidence
and explained that the bloodstains came from her "Mommy."
On cross-examination, Angelica reiterated her earlier testimony that the accused Allan was the author of the
crime and that she was certain about it because she saw the whole incident. Although she mentioned earlier
that the accused struck her relatives with a piece of wood she readily identified a bolo as the object used by the
culprit in killing her mother and grandparents.
Accused Castanito Gano, testifying as his only witness for himself, narrated that he was arrested at the Butuan
airport by a team led by one SPO2 Lucero. He claimed that he was not only searched without any warrant by the
arresting police officers but the search itself yielded nothing except a wad of bank notes which he claimed to be
his remaining cash after buying his plane ticket. He averred that the money he had left was part of his salary and
his winnings from jueteng. He recalled that at the Manila Domestic Terminal he was asked questions by several
people, including members of the media, regarding the charges against him and he answered them without a
lawyer assisting him.
Castanito denied having robbed the victims of their valuables and insisted that he saw the alleged stolen items
for the first time only during the trial. He belied the claim by the prosecution that he forcibly opened the lockers
or drawers of the victims to steal; in fact, the drawers were still intact and in good condition when he left the
Salen residence. He expressed remorse for having killed the victims when he said, "I am sorry now, but at the
time I did not know how I felt," and then again in response to the question on whether he was admitting the
crime, he said,"Inamin ko yoon pagpatay parang hindi ko ano ang pangyayaring iyon, parang pansandalian na
lang, parang wala ako sa sarili ko noon, parang sunod-sunuran na lang ako sa ginawa ko sa mga araw na iyon
pero, parang hindi ko matandaan kung ano ang nangyari sa sarili ko noon nagawa ko yoon ganoon."

Eduardo Zulueta, a relative of the victims, explained that he was with the responding policemen at the initial
SPO Domingo Lucero testified on rebuttal that when they were informed by Col. Maralit as to the presence of
investigation conducted at the scene of the crime when they found the mangled bodies of the three (3) victims
the suspect using the name Jerry Perez on board one of the planes bound for Butuan, he dispatched a team to
soaked in their own blood. The lifeless body of Ponciano Salen (Exh. "Y," "Y-1," "Z" and "Z-1") was found at the
Bacasi Butuan airport to arrest the suspect. Coordinating with the PAL manager who forthwith confirmed their
dirty kitchen while that of Anicia Salen (Exh. "W," "W-1" and "T") was inside a room on the second floor. Outside
information, the arresting officers boarded the plane that had just landed and accosted a passenger who when
the other room in the same floor was the body of Conchita Marbella (Exh. "S," "S-1," "X" and "X-1"). Eduardo
asked identified himself as Jerry Perez. The group then invited the suspect to the office of the Airport Manager.
first learned about the identity of the suspect when he and the police investigators were told by Angelica,
When asked why he was being brought to the office, the suspect replied that he knew the reason for his
daughter of Conchita, that Castanito perpetrated the carnage. Eduardo recalled that at around 8:00 in the
detention and thereafter admitted that he was responsible for the death of the Salen family. When SPO Lucero
morning of 31 December, the day following the incident, he noticed Angelica standing alone in the terrace of
asked the suspect to open his bag, he (SPO Lucero) saw among the clothes a white envelope containing cash in
their house. This made him wonder why the bakery was not yet open although it was already late in the day. He
different denominations. His search of the person of the suspect also yielded a leather wallet with the brand
also noticed bloodstains on the dress of Angelica (Exh. "GG" and "GG-1") which she said came from the body of
name Grand Royale, and a plastic purse which contained a Citizen watch. The suspect was also found to be
her mother Conchita.

35
wearing a Mickey Mouse wristwatch. According to SPO Lucero, after he made a receipt of the recovered items, A: Yes, sir.
he turned them over to Police Inspector Ernesto Garcia of the San Mateo police force. Q: And what else did Alan get if any?
A: Mickey Mouse, ring, earrings, sir.
Q: Who owns the Mickey Mouse?
Accused Castanito Gano clarified on sur-rebuttal that contrary to the declarations of SPO Lucero, he did not
A: That is mine, sir.
voluntarily offer the contents of his bag but were in fact taken by the apprehending officers. He was not sure
May we make it of record that she pointed to herself when we propounded that question.
whether the alleged stolen items were found in his bag but one thing he was certain of, the arresting officers did
Q: Madam Witness, I am showing to (you) a Mickey Mouse, kindly go over the same and tell this
not find anything when they searched his body.
Honorable Court if this is the same Mickey Mouse that you are (sic) referring to earlier which was
owned by you?
Giving full credence to the testimony of minor Angelica Marbella, the trial court convicted the accused of the A: Yes, sir.
crime of robbery with homicide. In imposing the death penalty on the accused, the trial court appreciated the Q: At this point, may we make it on record that the child instinctively got the watch from the Court
mitigating circumstance of "admitting the crime" as well as two (2) aggravating circumstances based on the personnel demonstrating that she is familiar and that she is the owner of the said watch. The said
number of victims killed. 3 watch was earlier marked as Exhibit “A.”
Q: Madam Witness, where were you when the accused killed your mother and also your
In this automatic review, the accused staunchly rejects his conviction for robbery with homicide and insists that grandparents?
the prosecution failed to prove that he committed robbery. In other words, he claims that he should only be A: I was in our house, sir.
convicted of homicide, and not robbery with homicide, the latter being a more serious offense. Q: And where were you also when the accused got the items?
We will go to another point. Were you also inside the house when Alan, the accused in this case got
the cash and other jewelry?
The accused draws attention to his testimony where he categorically declared that the only item recovered from A: Yes, sir. 5
him by the police officers was the remainder of his salary and what he won from jueteng, and that he saw the We are of the opinion however that with the exception of the Mickey Mouse watch, the other items, i.e., cash,
alleged stolen valuables for the first time during the trial. Moreover, he contends that the allegation of SPO2 wallet, Citizen watch and bracelets recovered from the accused, have not been established to be the fruits of the
Lucero that he (accused) voluntarily surrendered the stolen items is contrary to normal human behavior. 4 crime since the ownership of the same or the fact that they were stolen by him has not been satisfactorily
established. This notwithstanding, the charge of robbery must be sustained as the taking by the accused of
From the evidence, accused Castanito Gano is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged. Angelica’s Mickey Mouse watch was sufficiently proved.

Angelica, in her innocence and guileless narration of the incident of 30 December 1994, ineluctably showed that Accused Castanito Gano killed three (3) persons by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The question that
the accused not only mercilessly slaughtered the victims but also took their personal belongings, particularly needs to be resolved is whether the multiplicity of homicides could be appreciated as an aggravating
her Mickey Mouse watch for no other purpose than gain. Her testimony leaves no doubt as to this fact - circumstance. For sometime, this ticklish issue has been the subject of conflicting views by this Court when it
held in some cases that the additional rapes/homicides 6 committed on the occasion of robbery would not
increase the penalty, while in other cases it ruled that the multiplicity of rapes/ homicides committed could be
Fiscal Capellan: appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 7 But in People v. Regala 8 this Court spoke with finality on the
matter -
Q: Madam witness, do you know the person depicted in this picture?
A: Yes, sir. It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered
Q: Who is he? as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised
A: Alan, sir. Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating
Q: Do you know Alan? circumstances where there is specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him? I will just withdraw that question. Is he good?
A: No, sir. It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery)
Q: Why Madam Witness? would result in an “anomalous situation” where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with
Fiscal Capellan: At any rate, her answer was no. May we go to another point? one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the
Q: Is he the one who killed your mother? legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its
A: Yes, sir. terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.
Q: How about your grandparents?
A: Yes, sir. This case is singular in its barbarity and nauseating in the manner with which the accused, bolo in hand,
Q: And Madam Witness, is he also the one who took the money from the drawer of your mother? butchered his preys. Notwithstanding the viciousness with which he perpetrated the offense, we are constrained
A: Yes, sir. to apply the principle laid down in People v. Regala, and accordingly, the two (2) other killings contrary to the
Q: And were you able to witness that? ruling of the trial court, should not be appreciated as aggravating circumstances.
36
Incidentally, we also examined the possibility of appreciating dwelling as a generic aggravating circumstance, but
the attempt was again thwarted by a recent amendment to Secs. 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000 -
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in the terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
Pursuant to the aforequoted amended provisions, the Rules now require that the information or complaint
allege not only the qualifying but the aggravating circumstances as well, otherwise, the same cannot be properly
appreciated. Guided by the consecrated rule that when a penal statute, substantive and remedial or procedural,
is favorable to the accused, the courts shall give it a retroactive application and so we must in this case as the
Information does not allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.
With respect to the mitigating circumstance, we note that the trial court considered the admission by the
accused of the killings as a mitigating circumstance, presumably referring to voluntary confession as provided
under Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding his denial of the charge of robbery. In effect,
therefore, the accused was merely confessing to the crime of homicide but not to robbery with homicide, a
considerably graver offense. But we note that for voluntary confession to be appreciated as an extenuating
circumstance, the same must not only be made unconditionally but the accused must admit to the offense
charged, i.e., robbery with homicide in the present case, and not to either robbery or homicide only. Hence, if
the voluntary confession is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating.
Any person found guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of person shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on the occasion of robbery the crime of homicide shall
have been committed. 9 For reasons earlier discussed, the trial court erred in appreciating the two (2) killings as
aggravating circumstances and the voluntary confession as a mitigating circumstance. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code dictates that the lesser penalty, or
only reclusion perpetua, be imposed. We affirm the award of P50,000.00 or a total of P150,000.00 for the three
(3) homicides as death indemnity. In consonance with Art. 2219, par. (1), in relation to Art. 2206, of the Civil
Code, an award of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of each of the three (3) victims for moral damages would be
reasonable. 10
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, finding accused CASTANITO GANO Y
SAGUYONG, a.k.a Jerry Perez, Allan Perez, Allan Saguyong and Jerry Gano guilty of Robbery with Homicide is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty therefor is lowered to reclusion perpetua, and the FURTHER
MODIFICATION that the accused is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as
moral damages, or P100,000.00 to the legal heirs of each of the three (3) victims Conchita Marbella, Ponciano
Salen and Anicia Salen, or a total of P300,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the "battered
woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not
entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected
attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis" she
suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered
that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has
already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic
Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a
generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
37
 "The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband,
with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose,
[causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its
sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in]
laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface
of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial
hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997.6 In
due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's
younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and
Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with
their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary.
They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before
reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel,
Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until
9:00 in the evening for the masiaorunner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his
way home passing the side of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill
you' to which Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben
alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was
always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about
fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy
check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie
Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc
when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag,
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty
(50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus
to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating
from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the
stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him,
Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the
kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went
inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless
body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries
at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of
Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the
dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station
at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas' rented house. Together
with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and
went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a
bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in
one corner at the side of an aparadora metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one
and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The
bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside
at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the
presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases,
38
 Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the
Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death
was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed
fracture of the occipital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she
got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a
payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at
Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas'
house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She
allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping
knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant,
Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her
around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home,
Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding
her by the neck, and told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the
key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of
Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his
nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the
bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly
'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage,
Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to the
Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie
Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang;
they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their
relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's brother,
Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently,
soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and
Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come
home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic
holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood.
Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness.
In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid
again and saw blood from Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic
reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married
in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage went along,
Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's
two sons, there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a
table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck
Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and
also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the
couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as
'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we collected our
salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which
they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they
bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking
with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the masiao
game because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the
ushers and runners so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he
heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is
used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently
overheard by him was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me
when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas
admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he
once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her
and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been
quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only
one (1) year.
39
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual
drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed,
and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben
would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said
after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic
said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and
violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on
November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help
and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a
choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the
same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he
heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the
window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling with
each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic
Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the
children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00
the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel,
Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew
them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic
confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he
went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody
would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became drunk,
he would go to our house and he will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me,
'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben
'would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the
witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also
said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the
afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They
searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She
accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house 'because she
might be battered by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening,
Miss Arano said that 'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk
'because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she
heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in
the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time
when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the
couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said
Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a
knife and 'showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic
shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic's house
on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel,
Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr.
Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical
injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS
Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.'
xxx xxx xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23)
separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos
Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical
injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the
injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified
to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime
or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that
about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought
his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told
Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed 'that they might
have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who
began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at
the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was
born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben
was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
40
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the
bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his
testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone
in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias 'Marvelous
Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of
her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not
know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded by Ben on her
wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and
dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the
foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution
witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time
of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases,
such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the
police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer and
neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his
back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the
head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2
or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the
crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with
the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September
1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding
Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24
January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had
prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the
Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief
Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court
on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-
opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only
qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as
culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating
with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivic's
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90)
days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L.
Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic
Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999,
but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own
private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she
was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of
Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and was the counseling
psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the
Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the
U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of
41
the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of xxx xxx xxx
Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a
member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved
opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-
in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about
confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation
Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs.
which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the
Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on
imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'
battered women as this is the first case of that nature.

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about
500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all "Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity
of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.' or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought
of herself as a victim.
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of psychological abuse,
verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.' xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly
of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that
they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally
and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion of
himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very
hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot
of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The
batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them
feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so 'there is a
lot of modeling of aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her
husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes
her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs
for the sake of the children.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and
testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board
of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of
psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the
Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After
that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna
Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo
Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City
Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy
from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in international congresses. He also
authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was likewise
published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on
a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he
published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology
deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a
bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in
psychiatry.

"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical violence on both of
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed
them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not
Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty
consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,'
thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of
the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization on the
victim and even death on the victim.'

42
his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office
in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is
physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and
physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it
were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the
suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable,
and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher
sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness, such as the
deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally
'internalizes what is around him within the environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is
very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong façade 'but in it
there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one
who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the
individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves,
and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate
surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to
weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left
on her but to act decisively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two
(2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as
a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her
husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we
are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic.
It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-
experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was more
subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the
predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor.
Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened
trial a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that
appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed --
lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse;
and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion, remanding the case
to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman
syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as
to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
43
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical
psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their
testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court
before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the
evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married
and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and
unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and
further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her subsequent
apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the
existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic
Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in
defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the
principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of
material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case. In any event, we will now
briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the
evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona
summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and
of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page
discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may
not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that
he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The Information
had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were
held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his
judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him,
much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case
should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married,
despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the
marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of
marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased spouse --
attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to these testimonies.
Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when
there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact
made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no
proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made
through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether by a gunshot or
by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution,
"[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is
unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death." Determining
which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
44
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel
defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-
defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-
defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the
death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence
at the time.
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home,
the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence,"27 which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or,
at least, nonviolent) phase.28

Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children. As correctly
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or
elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind,
public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be
present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from
abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence
presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to
exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory" and passive
testify.
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.

Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her
subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn
child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final
resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the
verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension
and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the
more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive.
Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering
incident.29

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The
battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control;
only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion,
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her
and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and
unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed
that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-
defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defense.22 At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly
remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the
batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is
The Battered Woman Syndrome
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent
bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in
Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil
the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing
syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has
behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for
been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time."24
her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally,
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."25
only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of
remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.

45
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this phase, she A Three times a week.
and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32
that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her
without the other.31 foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
History of Abuse
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
in the Present Case
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She herself A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye.
described her heart-rending experience as follows: Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R)
"ATTY. TABUCANON breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa? 3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a 4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
behavior of habitual drinker. 5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel. 6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending
In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you? physician: Dr. Canora.
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that
bed and sometimes beat me. correct?
Q How many times did this happen? A Yes, sir.
A Several times already. Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
Q What did you do when these things happen to you? A Yes, sir.
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other. Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home? mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me. A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force
Q What will happen when he follow you? is applied.
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
said 'sorry'. A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
husband, were you able to see a doctor? A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning
A Yes, sir. there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
Q Who are these doctors? Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q What did she tell you?
Q Who inflicted these injuries? A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that
A Of course my husband. it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa? Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
[Court] /to the witness ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said? Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of
A Everytime he got drunk. November, 1995 when this incident happened?
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, A As per record, yes.
after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence? Q What was the date?
A Everytime he got drunk. A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week? Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?

46
 A Yes, sir. Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant? house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did
A Yes, sir. sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy … and I heard
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she? something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben
A Eight (8) months pregnant. showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for
unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might
some other findings?
hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days? On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the
A One day. couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out
Q Where? of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx xxx xxx "ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant. A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded
What is this all about? the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a was his father, then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was
record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from
times. school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q For what? Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Tension headache. A Yes, sir.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension? Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
emotional in nature. A Yes, sir.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature? Q Did you come back to your house?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line A Yes, sir.
of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
all comes from the domestic problem. A Bilwang.
Q You mean problem in her household? Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Probably. A Renting.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor? Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
unfortunately does not response to the medication. Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused? A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120. had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my
Q Is this considered hypertension? cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again
A Yes, sir, severe. last year.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure? Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34 A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, A Yes, 8 months.
confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35 Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.

47
Q Was the baby subsequently born? Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
A Yes, sir. COURT INTERPRETER:
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time? The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front
A Marie Bianca. neck)
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband? A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
A Yes, sir. ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q What time? Q Where did he bring you?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior. A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition? 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior. Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
Q What was he yelling all about? A Yes, sir.
A His usual attitude when he got drunk. Q What is there in the drawer?
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any? A I was aware that it was a gun.
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him. COURT INTERPRETER:
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know? (At this juncture the witness started crying).
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might ATTY. TABUCANON:
be overly drunk and he would beat me again. Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any? A Yes, sir.
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
and he switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children were because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches
there.' At that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the
angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was
antenna wire to stop me from watching television. about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that
Q What did he do with the bolo? very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V. moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire? COURT INTERPRETER:
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was
already holding the bolo.
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually? xxx xxx xxx
A For chopping meat. ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo? Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room. A Outside.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you? Q In what part of the house?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside. A Dining.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you? Q Where were the children during that time?
A I screamed for help and then he left. A My children were already asleep.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside? Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going? Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3
A Outside perhaps to drink more. inches long, how does it look like?
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time? A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
A I packed all his clothes. Q Is it a flexible blade?
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes? A It's a cutter.
A I wanted him to leave us. Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions? A Yes, because he once used it to me.
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then Q How did he do it?
he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck. A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
48
 A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in
understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about
seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's term
describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering
emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and
to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the
bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas,
drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will
trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the
reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was
carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because
she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day
out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put
forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three
hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information
were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the
case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of
battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of
battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her
husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the
first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-
defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a
disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and
so she became an abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and that is why it
happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that
she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all
about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is
to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can
exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the
data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the
first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy --
until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x
x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his wife.
The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically
abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a
painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree].
They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the Report,
"[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed
of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x
x."43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant Marivic
Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary,
reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has
aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it?
The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of
requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why
does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted
with the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.'"44
49
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary,
reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings
may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience.
Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a
significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in
which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act
decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape."46 In her
years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered
women are in greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a very low opinion
of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would
happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[;
that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an abusive
partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the violence, that she
has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope
for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits
involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes
within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got
involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would
sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a
form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered
persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute
battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the
expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x
the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect."52
53
A study conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that "even if a
person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that
situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as "learned helplessness."
"[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions
concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may
seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that
nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her
partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape.55 Battered women feel
unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a shelter is available, she
stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears
that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to
the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the
battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential
characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a
quohow the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building
phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However,
that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at
least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic
normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation
from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned
that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she
was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-
being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did
both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly
and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able
to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually
evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse.
They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of
actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had
related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be
appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the
battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
50
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state
of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense60 -- she must have actually feared imminent harm
from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real
threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer
in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past violent
incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then,
the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is
already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by
installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior
to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger.66Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the absence of
such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.68 Thus,
Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that would
alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her
criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any
issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation
Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced
with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight
of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her
abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on
her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pain taking,
repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged administration
of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering.
Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and
the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social
support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury
to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate
this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation
therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very
susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
51
 Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a
severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most
[acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer
than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you
become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical
one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is
how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her
mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in "cumulative
provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis,"
and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that
diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her
acts.There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 974and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor
and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is
present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance,
the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by
Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had
kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life
was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of
both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even
though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her,
she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were
about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the
weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within
which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony80 that with
"neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot
control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of
nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances,
must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her
normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation --
did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by
the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior
to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by
her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally
produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might
make.81 In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as
the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the
appreciation of evidence.82Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself.83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon
appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been
found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how
and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the
following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
52
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you? A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the
COURT: other room.
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front
neck)
Q What else happened?
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was
ATTY. TABUCANON:
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was
Q Where did he bring you?
frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that
COURT INTERPRETER:
'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q What is there in the drawer?
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on myself and I
COURT INTERPRETER
felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
him.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
COURT
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
/to Atty. Tabucanon
A Yes, sir.
Q You shot him?
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the victim's
because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches
position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the
about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that
assailant.85
very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been
consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from
COURT INTERPRETER
any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of
any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the
xxx xxx xxx
crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3
Proper Penalty
inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade? The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
A It's a cutter. two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges? commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph
A Yes, because he once used it to me. 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two
Q How did he do it? mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other
A He wanted to cut my throat. modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense.90 Under the
Q With the same blade? Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion
xxx xxx xxx temporal.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty
A Yes, because I smashed him.
of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion
Q What happened?
53
temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already
served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.91

Epilogue

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to
analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the
theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of
the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the
intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it
in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law,
jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code.
Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there
being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the
offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the
director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that
she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

54