I.

Cometa vs. Court of Appeals

GR No 141855
February 6, 2001

Challenged in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 25, 19991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48277,
entitled “Zacarias Cometa, et al. v. Hon. Perfecto Laggui, et al.,” and the
Resolution dated January 27, 20002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS
1. On July 2, 1976, the quondam Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 153
at Makati rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 17585 for Damages, entitled “Jose
Franco v. Zacarias Cometa,” awarding to herein private respondent Jose Franco, the
sum of P57,396.85.4

2. The judgment became final on March 9, 1978.

Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued. Pursuant
thereto, the sheriff levied on execution three (3) commercial lots of petitioner
Zacarias Cometa5 located at Guadalupe, Makati.

3. On November 17, 1981, Herco Realty &

Agricultural Development Corporation (Herco) filed Civil
Case No. 43846 with the same CFI Rizal, Branch 15, to
annul the levy on execution and sale at public auction of
the real properties.

4. The complaint alleged that the

ownership of the lots had been transferred by Cometa to
Herco before the execution sale.

5. It assailed the validity of the levy and sale on the ground that the sheriff, in
disregard of the proper procedural practice, immediately proceeded against Cometa’s
real properties without first exhausting his personal properties; that the lots
were sold en masse and not by parcel; and that the said properties which are
commercial lots situated in Guadalupe, Makati, and are conservatively valued at
P500,000.00, were sold only for P57,396.85, the amount of the judgment.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners can still redeem the properties subject of this
litigation.

RULING
The Supreme Court, through Justice YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., ruled on the negative.

Paraphrasing what we trenchantly pointed out in Hermoso v. CA, we test a law by its
result. A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice. The Supreme
Court has uniformly ruled that redemption from execution sales under ordinary
judgments pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court should be made
within twelve (12) months from the registration of the same x x x.” Following the
Rule of Statutory Construction, we test a law by its result. The Court has no
alternative but to apply Section of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the letter.
There are laws which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular sense because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply
them in servile subservience to their language. More explicitly— "xxx we interpret
and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. As judges, we are
not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. “Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of the
law,” so we were warned, by Justice Holmes again, “where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them.” While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the
will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to the “the
spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the lawmaker’s will." Stated differently,
the legal perspective within which the right to redeem can still be availed of or
not must be viewed in the light of the dictum that the policy of the law is to aid
rather than defeat the right of redemption. In short, the statute, being remedial,
is to be construed liberally to effectuate the remedy and carry out its evident
spirit and purpose.

Applying the law on the facts of the case, the Court allowed parties in several
cases to perfect their right of redemption even beyond the period prescribed
therefor. In short, since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must
always be avoided. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 25, 1999, which affirmed the trial court’s denial of
petitioners’ right of redemption, as well as the subsequent Resolution dated
January 27, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 48227 entitled “Zacarias Cometa, et al. v. Hon.
Pedro Laggui, et al.” are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and another one hereby rendered
ordering respondent Jose Franco to accept the tender of redemption made by
petitioners and to deliver the proper certificate of redemption to the latter.

II.
Tan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
GR No 136368
January 16, 2002

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
15, 19981 and its Resolution dated
November 9, 19982 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP-41738.

FACTS
1. On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and
Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same
contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1)
year within which to redeem or repurchase the property.

2. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on

January 4, 1988. On May 2, 1988, Tan’s heirs (JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C. Tan), filed before the Regional
Trial Court at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of
instrument. Docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. 19049- 88, the complaint alleged that, while
Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their
real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.
3. On June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered
judgment finding for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff and the Magdangals appealed to this
Court in CAG. R. CV No. 33657.

ISSUE
Whether the rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the
trial court by the petitioner.

RULING
The Supreme Court, through Justice PUNO, J., held that Section 1, Rule 39 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case
as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, applying the law on the facts of the case, petitioner has the right to
redeem the subject the manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the
change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the
petitioner which is already vested. The petitioner fought to recover this lot from
1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of the
period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be
changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of
redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated July 15, 1998 and its Resolution dated
November 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled and
set aside. The Orders dated June 10, 1996 and July 24,
1996 of the RTC of Davao City, 11th Judicial Region,
Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88 are reinstated. No
costs.

III.
Bernabe vs. Alejo
G.R. No. 140500
January 21, 2002

Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision3 in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution4 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the
two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109)
concerning
the same case.

FACTS
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of
twenty-three (23) years, herein Carolina Alejo, plaintiff-appellant. The son was
born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on
August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year,
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf
of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given
his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is
now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

ISSUE
Whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article
285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family
Code.

RULING
The Supreme Court, through Justice PANGANIBAN, J., held on the affirmative.

A vested right is defined as “one which is absolute,

complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency x x x.”11 Respondent however contends that the filing of an
action for recognition is procedural in nature and that “as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.” Recently, in Fabian v.
Desierto,15 the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive: “[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing
an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.”

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article

285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file
his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age.
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action
for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the

assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

IV.
Adasa vs. Abalos
G.R. No. 168617
February 19, 2007.

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, filed by petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa, seeks to
nullify and set aside the 21 July 2004 Decision1 and 10
June 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76396 which nullified the Resolutions of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). The Resolutions of the DOJ
reversed and set aside the Resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City, which found on
reinvestigation probable cause against petitioner, and
directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to withdraw the
information for Estafa against petitioner.

FACTS
1. The instant case emanated from the two complaint's affidavits filed by
respondent Cecille S. Abalos on 18 January 2001 before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City, against petitioner for Estafa.

2. Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit,

received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without
respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter,
petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks.

3. On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner and
ordering the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of
Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Article 315 in relation to
Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

4. Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001, and the DOJ reversed and set aside the 30
August 2001 resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and
directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.

5. Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a Petition for

Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE
Whether the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the order of the trial court
dismissing the subject criminal case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the
DOJ did not render the petition moot and academic.

RULING
The Supreme Court, through Justice CHICO-NAZARIO, J., ruled that it is more
appropriate to rule that the nullity of the trial court’s order dismissing the case
is
grounded on the court’s total lack of independent
assessment of the motion to dismiss filed by the
prosecution and not because said order relied upon a void
resolution of the Secretary.

As held in Soberano v. People, the court is therefore deemed to have deferred to

the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. It is the duty of the
trial judge to make an independent assessment and finding of the evidence, it not
being sufficient for the valid exercise of judicial discretion to merely accept the
prosecutor’s word for its sufficiency or insufficiency. Ihat it is more appropriate
to rule that the nullity of the trial court’s order dismissing the case is grounded
on the court’s total lack of independent assessment of the motion to dismiss filed
by the prosecution and not because said order relied upon a void resolution of the
Secretary. Regardless of whether the recommendation of the Secretary is valid or
not, it is the absence of the judge’s own valuation of the issue posed before
him/her that makes an order void. It is the duty of the trial judge to make an
independent assessment and finding of the evidence, it not being sufficient for the
valid exercise of judicial discretion to merely accept the prosecutor’s word for
its sufficiency or insufficiency. Without such finding, the order of the court
denying or granting the motion to dismiss is void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated 21 July 2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

V.
Corpuz vs. People
G.R. No. 180016
April 29, 2014

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari,

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5,
2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision dated March 22, 2007
and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b)
of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met
at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime
in 1990.

Private complainant was then engaged in the

business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached
him on May 2, 1991 at the same
casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis.

Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the

following items: an 18k diamond ring
necklace and another men’s bracelet,
evidenced by a receipt of even date.
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
period of 60 days.
for men; a woman’s bracelet; one (1) men’s
with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit
unsold, to return the same items, within a

The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry.
When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no
avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa. After
trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the Information. The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the
appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE
Whether either branch violated the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in
a manner amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULING
The Supreme Court, through Justice PERALTA, J., held that the primordial duty of
the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.

The penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under

Presidential Decree No. 1689 (PD 1689) is, however, an
altogether different matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315
of the Code by adding a new mode of committing estafa47
and imposing the penalty of “life imprisonment to death” or “reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.” Unlike Article
315, PD 1689 does not calibrate the duration of the maximum range of imprisonment
on a fixed time-to-peso ratio (1 year for every P10,000 in excess of P22,000), but
rather provides a
straight maximum penalty of death or reclusion perpetua. The Court should apply the
law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when
the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy
away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the
Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. Even if the imposable
penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action.
Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter,
it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched
upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari

dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby
DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City,
finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prisión correccional, as
minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as maximum.

VI.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. Cortes
G.R. No. 200103.
April 23, 2014.

This case concerns the validity of appointment by the

Commission En Banc where the appointee is the daughter
of one of the Commissioners.

FACTS
1. On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued Resolution A
2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of
Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent Maricelle M.
Cortes.

2. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of

respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested
the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the
respondent’s appointment.

3. In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal

Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G. Lamorena rendered
an opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment is not
covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing
authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality
distinct and separate from its members.

4. On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the

CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing
that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid
because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. Respondent Cortes
appealed the ruling of Director Cornelio but the same was denied on September 30,
2008.

5. On August 16, 2010, respondent Cortes filed a Petition

for Review with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA rendered its Decision granting the petition
and nullified Resolution of CSC no 10-0370 dated March 2, 2010 and 10-1396 dated
July 12, 2010. The CA also ordered that Cortes be reinstated to her position as IO
V in the CHR.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the
appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR is
not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.

RULING
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Supreme Court, through Justice ABAD, J., held that nepotism is defined as an
appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2)
recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that
respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of
consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of
Commissioner Mallari.By way of exception, the following
shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons
employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3)
physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.2 In the present case, however, the
appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does
not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated
January 10, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 115380 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated March 2,
2010 affirming the CSC-NCR Decision dated September 30,
2008 invalidating