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COMPLETE ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST EPA PASCUAL 17-18
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A.1 BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES,
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO
HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P.
AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
CENTER andCHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
FACTS | PUNO, J.:
 Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a Nati
onal Computerized Identification Reference System,"
was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12,
1996.
 Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate
A.O. No. 308 on several grounds.
- One of them is that: The establishment of a National
Computerized Identification Reference
System requires a legislative act.
- The issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers
of congress.
- Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue.
- He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
a) it is a usurpation of the power of the Congress to
legislate;
b) that the budget allocated for implementing the law is
an unconstitutional usurpation of the right of the
Congress to appropriate public funds for
expenditure; and
c) it impermissibly intrudes the citizenry’s protected
zone of privacy.
RESPONDENT’S COUNTER-ARGUMENT
a) it’s not a justiciable case that would warrant a
judicial review
b) that A.O. No. 308 was issued within the
executive and administrative rights of the President;
c) the funds necessary for the implementation may be
sourced from the budgets of the concerned
agencies; and
d) the law protects the individual’s interest in privacy.
ISSUE:
1) WON the implementation of AO 308 is within the power
of the President in exercise of administrative power?
(nope)
2) WON AO violates the people’s right to privacy (yes)
RULING: AO 308 declared unconstitutional
I.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
As a Senator, petitioner Ople is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issuance of Administrative Order No. 308 is a usurpation
of legislative power.
 As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise
the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar.
 More specifically, respondents aver that Ople has no
legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These
submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear.
 Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate.
As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance
of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the GSIS, petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds
and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No.
308.
II.
 Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the
power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O.
No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
- Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not
to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line
between the power of the Legislature to make laws
and the power of the Executive to execute laws will
disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot
be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be
given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
 Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their
original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested
this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant
of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive
 The executive power is vested in the President. It is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.
- He represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over
the executive department, bureaus and offices. This
means that he has the authority to assume directly
the functions of the executive department, bureau
and office, or interfere with the discretion of its
officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general
peace and public order. Thus, he is
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granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge
his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs
 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of
his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
Administrative Order No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
 Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No.
308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order. An administrative
order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation
of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy.
 Under the Admin Code of 1987 an administrative order
is:
"Sec.3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders."
 An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative policy.
Argument that Administrative Order No. 308 implements
the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987
rejected.
 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements
the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
 The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance” and “embodies changes in
administrative structures and procedures designed to
serve the people.”
 The Admin Code contains provisions on the
organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government, the organization and administration of
departments, bureaus and offices under the executive
branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as
well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative
agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.
 It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308
merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. As
said administrative order redefines the parameters
of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the
State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be
evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
 This is contrary to the established approach defining the
traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well
stated by Fisher: "Many regulations however, bear directly
on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must
be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are
not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to
prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of
power to make laws."
III.
Administrative Order No. 308 cannot pass constitutional
muster as an administrative legislation because facially
it violates the right to privacy.
 Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster
as an administrative legislation because facially it
violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is
the “right to be let alone.”
 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the US
SC gave more substance to the right of privacy when it
ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation.
- The right of association contained in the penumbra
of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
- The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers `in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy.
- The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the `right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.'
- The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment.
- The Ninth Amendment provides: `The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.'"
Sa Constitution natin the zones of privacy can be found in
Sections 1, 2, 3 (privacy of communication), 6 (liberty of
abode), 8 (associate), 17 (against self-incrimination) of the
Bill of Rights.
(The following paragraphs were copied from the digest of
Quilala, Katrina Chloie 1B since this portion is not so relevant
to the subject matter)
 The Supreme Court prescind from the premise that the
right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308
is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to
provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
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misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It
is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But
what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness,
the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger.
 The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
"common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application
designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas
for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone
for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference
System will contribute to the "generation of population
data for development planning." This is an admission
that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
for the generation of other data with remote relation to
the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government
the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN .
 It is plain and the Supreme Court hold that A.O. No. 308
falls short of assuring that personal information which will
be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere
with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing
expeditions" by government authorities and evade the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics
and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can
be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very
abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent
 The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a
comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual
and transmit it over a national network is one of the most
graphic threats of the computer revolution. The computer
is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on
individuals out of information given at different times and
for varied purposes. It can continue adding to the stored
data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of
stored date is simple. When information of a privileged
character finds its way into the computer, it can be
extracted together with other data on the subject. Once
extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any
person. The end of privacy begins.
 Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn,
the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the
right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again,
we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The
Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother
the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather
wait for the fire that could consume them.
Any law or order that invades individual privacy will be
subjected by the Court to strict scrutiny.
 In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right
to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service
and the common good.
- It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused
and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that
any law or order that invades individual privacy will
be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.
- The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe
v. Mutuc, to wit:
"The concept of limited government has always included
the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual-- has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces
of a technological age-- industrialization, urbanization, and
organization-- operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
A2 G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012.*
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS–INVESTIGATIVE and ADJUDICATORY
DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA,
in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex
officio member of the Monetary Board, respondents.
FACTS:
 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. 12
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft
and corruption, among others, against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President.
 Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the
authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government and any of its agencies or instrumentalities
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Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. – After
completing its investigation or hearing, the Commission en banc
shall submit its report and recommendations to the President.
The report and recommendations shall state, among others, the
factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty
recommend to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
 On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Aquino III
issued E.O. 13, abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its
newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD).
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and
advocacy to fight and eradicate corruption in the different
departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies
and instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of
streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote
economy and efficiency in government;
WHEREAS, Section 7 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that the President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices;
WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of
Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) provides
for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, PD 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the
President of the Philippines to Reorganize the National
Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the
President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the National
Government and may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group,
consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies,
instrumentalities and units of the National Government, as well
as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their powers,
functions and authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of RA 9970
(General Appropriations Act of 2010) authorizes the
President of the Philippines to direct changes in the
organizational units or key positions in any department or
agency;
SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In addition to the Legal and
Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division shall be created.
The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall
perform powers, functions and duties mentioned in Section 2 hereof,
of PAGC.
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the
recommending authority to the President, thru the Executive
Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report and
recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of
ODESLA.
SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of
PAGC. The personnel who may be affected by the abolition of the
PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under
existing laws if applicable. The Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) is hereby ordered to release the necessary
funds for the benefits of the employees.
SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the
Functions, Positions, Personnel, Assets and Liabilities of PAGC. The
winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final disposition
or transfer of their functions, positions, personnel, assets and
liabilities as may be necessary, shall be in accordance with the
applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
the President) dated March 15, 2002. The winding up shall be
implemented not later than 31 December 2010.
The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the
Department of Budget and Management, shall ensure the smooth
and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and winding-up
of the activities of PAGC.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules,
regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby
revoked or modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
 On April 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar
Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the
LWUA Board of Trustees, which arose from the
purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
 Pichay received an Order signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents
to submit their respective written explanations under
oath.
- In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting
that a case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B.
Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed
as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before
the Office of the Ombudsman.
PICHAY’S CONTENTION: Assails constitutionality
 Petitioner asseverates that the President is not
authorized under any existing law to create the IAD-
ODESLA
INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUES:
1) E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the
legislature to create a public office
2) E.O 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the
legislature to appropriate funds
3) EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of
congress to delegate quasi-judicial powers to
administrative agencies
4) EO 13 is unconstitutional for encroaching upon the
powers of the ombudsman
5) EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of
due process
6) EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause.
RULING:
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize
the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Sec. 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the
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offices under him in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency
 E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for
such purpose: (SECTION 31)
1) Restructure the internal organization of the OP
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
2) Transfer any function under the OP to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
to the OP from other Departments and Agencies;
and
3) Transfer any agency under the OP to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer agencies
to the OP from other departments or agencies.
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, the Court
affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive
department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue
of E.O. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987
Domingo v. Zamora, the Court gave the rationale behind the
President's continuing authority in this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office
of the President is the command post of the President.
The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing “delegated legislative
authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O.
292;
- Generally, this authority to implement organizational
changes is limited to transferring either an office or a
function from the OP to another Department or
Agency, and the other way around.
 Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual
freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the
OP Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of
units, apart from the less drastic move of
transferring functions and offices from one unit to
another.
The distinction between the allowable organizational
actions under Sec. 31(1) on the one hand and Sec. 31 (2)
and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees’ tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the
executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292.
- When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was
composed of a Chairman and 2 Commissioners who
held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
respectively, and was placed directly “under the
OP.”
- On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the
functions of the PAGC have now been transferred,
is an office within the OP Proper.
 Since both of these offices belong to the OP Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New,
Separate and Distinct Office
 The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of
a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft
body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which
is an existing office within the OP Proper.
- The reorganization required no more than a mere
alteration of the administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the establishment of a 3rd
division—the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division—through which ODESLA could take on
the additional functions it has been tasked to
discharge under EO 13.
- In Canonizado v. Aguirre,We ruled that –
Reorganization takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the
lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them. It involves a reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
 A reorganization is said to be carried out in good
faith if it is done for purposes of economy and
efficiency.
- A valid reorganization must not only be exercised
through legitimate authority but must also be
pursued in good faith.
- It appears in this case that the streamlining of
functions within the OP Proper was pursued with
such purposes in mind.
- In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for
the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and
promoting economy and efficiency in the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the
reorganization is shown by the fact that while
Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for
the PAGC’s operation in the 2010 annual budget, no
separate or added funding of such a considerable
amount was ever required after the transfer of the
PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to
appropriate public funds.
 In the chief executive dwell the powers to run
government. Placed upon him is the power to
recommend the budget necessary for the operation of
the Government, which implies that he has the
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necessary authority to evaluate and determine the
structure that each government agency in the executive
department would need to operate in the most
economical and efficient manner.
 Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A.
9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the
President’s authority to "direct changes in the
organizational units or key positions in any
department or agency." The aforecited provision, often
and consistently included in the general appropriations
laws, recognizes the extent of the President’s power to
reorganize the executive offices and agencies under
him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and
realigning appropriations for that purpose."
- Thus, while there may be no specific amount
earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total
amount appropriated by Congress in the annual
budget for the OP, the necessary funds for the
IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the
President's own office budget without
committing any illegal appropriation. After all,
there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to
appropriate funds when the President simply
allocates the existing funds previously appropriated
by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
 IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body to the President, not having the power to settle
controversies and adjudicate cases.
- Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to
“investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government” and to “submit its report and
recommendations to the President.”
- Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
- The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers
and duties of the Ombudsman
 Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an
administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,
petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from
proceeding with its investigation.
 The Ombudsman’s authority to investigate both
elective and appointive officials in the government,
extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies.
- The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at
any time, take over the investigation being
conducted by another investigatory agency.
EO 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process
and the Equal Protection of the Laws.
 The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government;
- It is embraced under the due process concept and
simply requires that, in the application of the law, “all
persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.”
 The equal protection clause, however, is not
absolute but subject to reasonable classification so
that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions
may be treated differently from each other
Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the corollary
authority to investigate such public officials and look
into their conduct in office.
 Presidential appointees come under the direct
disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds
from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a
contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is
lodged in the same authority on which the power to
appoint is vested.
 Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-
level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he
comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President,
who is well within his right to order an investigation into
matters that require his informed decision.
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process, which simply
means having the opportunity to explain one’s side
 Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to
explain his side and present evidence, the requirements
of due process are satisfactorily complied with because
what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard. The records show that petitioner was issued
an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation
under oath with respect to the charge of grave
misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit
his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent
claim of denial of due process.
A3 G.R. No. 164196. June 22, 2007.*
CONSTANTINO T. GUMARU, petitioner, vs. QUIRINO
STATE COLLEGE, respondent.
FACTS:
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COMPLETE ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST EPA PASCUAL 17-18
 C.T. Gumaru Construction and Quirino State College, an
educational institution organized and existing under BP
440 through its president, Julian Alvarez, entered into an
Agreement for the construction of the state colleges
building in Diffun, Quirino Province.
- Construction was done in stages and was covered
by supplemental agreements, because funding
depended on the state colleges annual budget
allocation and fund releases from the government.
 Constantino T. Gumaru, owner and proprietor of
C.T. Gumaru Construction, filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC of Quezon City against the
state college and Julian A. Alvarez, asking for
1) P368,493.35, the expected profits which he
would have realized from the construction of an
unfinished portion of the project which was
allegedly awarded by the defendants to another
contractor in violation of his preferential right to
finish the project;
2) P592,136.51, the escalation costs of construction
materials and supplies;
3) P50,000.00, the value of plaintiffs bodega allegedly
demolished by the defendants;
4) P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of litigation
 Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao, purportedly acting as counsel
for the defendants, moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of improper venue. The motion was
denied. Defendants were directed to file an answer.
When they failed to answer within the prescribed period,
they were declared in default and plaintiff was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.
RTC: decided the case in favor of the plaintiff
 Defendants failed to appeal from the decision. The
decision became final and executory, and plaintiff moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution which was issued
directing the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff
of Quirino Province to seize the personal properties or, if
insufficient, the real properties of the defendants to
satisfy the judgment awards. The awards amounted
to P1,739,725.30, inclusive of interests and sheriffs fees.
 OSG entered its appearance for the first time as counsel
for the defendants. At the same time, it filed a Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution on the following grounds:
a) defendants were not duly represented in court, since
the OSG was not notified of the proceedings;
b) writs of execution may not be issued against
government funds and properties to satisfy court
judgments.
 Meanwhile, a Sheriffs Notice of Levy and Auction Sale
was issued against 2 parcels of land in the name
of Quirino State College
 OSG reiterated its plea for the
quashal of the writ of execution and asked the court to
take judicial notice of SC Administrative Circular No.
10-2000 as well as COA Resolution No. 2000-366
which finally adjudged plaintiff liable to the state college
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
for P4,681,670.00 in overpayments, and liquidated
damages for delay in the construction of the college
building.
RTC denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.
- Without ruling on the issue of the defendants
alleged lack of legal representation, the court
ruled that the properties of the state college may
be seized under the writ of execution, since it is
an incorporated agency of the government given
specific powers to sue and be sued.
- A separate appropriation to satisfy the judgment
awards was not considered necessary, because the
state colleges charter provides that funds for the
construction and repair of its buildings, machinery,
equipment, and facilities shall be taken from its
annual appropriation.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari before CA - granted the
petition.
- Although the funds and properties of government
agencies with personalities separate and distinct
from the government are not exempt from
execution or garnishment, the rule does not
apply where the incorporated government
agency concerned is performing a vital
governmental function, like herein state college.
- In such cases, the money claim should be filed first
with the COA as provided in Presidential Decree No.
1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1) WON respondent state college was properly represented
before the trial court;
2) if in the negative, whether the lack of proper legal
representation was enough to nullify the proceedings;
and
3) WON the properties of respondent state college may be
seized under the writ of execution issued by the trial
court.
RULING:
ON THE ISSUE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of EO 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987
 Under the foregoing, the OSG is mandated to act as the
law office of the government, its agencies,
instrumentalities, officials and agents in any litigation or
proceeding requiring the services of a lawyer. With
respect to GOCCs, the OSG shall act as counsel only
when authorized by the President or by the head of
the office concerned.
 The principal law office of GOCCs, as provided in
Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV, of
the Administrative Code of 1987 is the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).
The term “chartered institution” includes the state
universities and colleges and the monetary authority of
the State;
 In the case at bar, respondent state college is
classified under the Code as a chartered institution
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COMPLETE ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST EPA PASCUAL 17-18
(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges and the monetary authority of the State.
 as opposed to a GOCC defined in the following segment
(13) A GOCC refers to any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the Government directly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as
in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
51% of its capital stock:
Provided, That GOCC may be further categorized by the
DBM, the CSC, and the COA for purposes of the exercise
and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
 Therefore, the proper statutory counsel of
respondent state college is the OSG. Legal
representation by Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao, a private
lawyer, was clearly improper.
In Gonzales v. Chavez, we traced the statutory origins of the
OSG and ruled that its mandate to act as the principal law
office of the government is compulsory
The intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated
official, the Solicitor General, the unequivocal mandate to
appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread
out in the laws creating the office is the discernible
intent which may be gathered from the term shall,
which is invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901)
to the more recent EO 292 (1987).
Under the principles of statutory construction, so
familiar even to law students, the term shall is nothing if
not mandatory
Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline
employment, a fiscal or prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General in the case at bar, cannot refuse to perform his
functions without violating his oath of office—refusal to
perform the duty is compellable by a writ of mandamus.
 The Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the
government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and
agents without a just and valid reason.
 He should not desist from appearing before the Court
even in those cases where his opinions may be
inconsistent with the government or any of its agents he
is expected to represent. As in the case of fiscals or
prosecutors, bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility
do not constitute legal and valid excuses for inhibition.
 On the other hand, government agencies were
admonished not to reject the services of the Solicitor
General, or otherwise fail or refuse to forward the papers
of a case to the OSG for appropriate action. Actions filed
in the name of the Republic that are not initiated by the
OSG will be summarily dismissed. Moreover, the fee of
the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government
in lieu of the OSG or the OGCC is the personal liability of
the government official who hired his services without
the prior written conformity of the OSG or the OGCC, as
the case may be.
We explained the rationale for the compulsory nature of the
OSGs mandate, in this wise:
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
The rationale is not difficult to comprehend. Sound government
operations require consistency in legal policies and practices
among the instrumentalities of the State.
Sound management policies require that the governments approach
to legal problems and policies formulated on legal issues be
harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency. The government
owes it to its officials and their respective offices, the political units at
different levels, the public and the various sectors, local and
international, that have dealings with it, to assure them of a degree of
certitude and predictability in matters of legal import.
From the historical and statutory perspectives it is beyond cavil that it
is the Solicitor General who has been conferred the singular honor
and privilege of being the principal law officer and legal defender of
the Government. One would be hard put to name a single legal group
or law firm that can match the expertise, experience, resources, staff
and prestige of the OSG which were painstakingly built up for almost
a century.
Endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of
virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may be
expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client
agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such
objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the panoply that
is the forest and not just the individual trees. Not merely will it strive
for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow interests of the client
office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the sovereign which
it is committed to serve
The Solicitor General is thus expected to be the official
who would best uphold and protect the legal interests of
the government. His non-representation of the
government is dangerous and should not be allowed.
The legality of legal representation can be raised and
questioned at any stage of the proceedings; While it may
be argued that the officials of respondent state college
should have informed the OSG of the suit filed against
the state college, and that it was their fault or negligence
that the OSG was not informed in the first place, it is
settled, however, that the principle of estoppel does not
operate against the government for the act of its agents
or their inaction.
 The magnitude of the non-representation by the OSG is
nowhere more apparent than in the case at bar. Instead
of having been represented by an “official learned in
the law” who will “promote and protect the public
weal” taking into consideration the “vast concerns of the
sovereign which it is committed to serve,” Quirino state
college was instead represented by a private lawyer who
made no move to protect its interests except to file a
motion to dismiss the complaint filed against the state
college, which was eventually denied by the trial court.
 Clear, therefore, was the utter failure of justice insofar as
respondent state college is concerned. It was as if it was
not represented by counsel at all. While it may be argued
that the officials of respondent state college should have
informed the OSG of the suit filed against the state
college, and that it was their fault or negligence that the
OSG was not informed in the first place, it is settled,
however, that the principle of estoppel does not
operate against the government for the act of its
agents or their inaction. The State has to protect its
interests and cannot be bound by, or estopped by the
9|Page
COMPLETE ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST EPA PASCUAL 17-18
mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, much
more, non-suited as a result thereof. The legality of legal
representation can be raised and questioned at any
stage of the proceedings.
 The circumstances of this case, therefore, justify the
nullification of the proceedings before the trial court, and
the writ of execution issued as a consequence thereof.
The state college should be given the opportunity to
present its defenses with the benefit of its statutory
counsel, the OSG. A new trial would best serve the
interests of justice. With this disquisition, discussion of
the other issues is not necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. This case
is REMANDED to the trial court for trial anew, with the OSG
appearing as counsel for respondent Quirino State College.
A.4 G.R. No. 187257
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) as the PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE,
and the NATIONAL POWER BOARD, Petitioners
vs. HON. LUISITO G. CORTEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 84, Quezon City, ABNER P. ELERIA, MELITO B.
LUPANGCO, NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION
(NECU), and NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION
(NEWU), Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187776
ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management and member of the
Board of Directors of the National Power
Corporation, Petitioners,
vs. HON. LUISITO G. CORTEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 84, Quezon City, ABNER P. ELERIA, MELITO B.
LUPANGCO, NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION
and NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS
UNION, Respondents.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
 The implementation of RA 6758 resulted in the
integration of all allowances previously received,
including COLA and Amelioration Allowance, into the
basic standardized salary.
 When a government entity ceases to be covered by RA
6758, the new position classification and compensation
plan must also include all allowances previously received
in the basic salary, in line with the principle of non-
diminution of pay.
 NAPOCOR was created under CA 120 as a GOCC.
Under the law, its National Power Board was authorized
to fix the compensation of its officers and employees.
 In 1976, a salary standardization and compensation plan
for public employees, including that of government-
owned and controlled corporations, was enacted through
Presidential Decree No. 985.6 The Decree likewise
provided that notwithstanding the standardization and
compensation plan, additional incentives may be
established by government-owned and controlled
corporations from their corporate funds.7 Pursuant to the
Decree, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Letter of Implementation No. 97,8 granting additional
financial incentives to employees of government-owned
and controlled corporation performing critical functions,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
among which was NAPOCOR.9 The additional incentives
included COLA and AA.10
 On August 21, 1989, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 6758, or the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, to standardize compensation
and benefits of public employees, effective July 1,
1989.11 The law applied to all positions, whether
appointive or elective, including those in government-
owned and controlled corporations.12The law also
provided that all allowances and other additional
compensation not otherwise stated "shall be deemed
included"13 in the prescribed standardized salary rates.
 Existing additional compensation of any national
government official or employee paid from local funds of
a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic
salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by
the National Government.
 On October 2, 1989, the Department of Budget and
Management issued Corporate Compensation Circular
No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10),14 which provided for the
integration of COLA, AA, and other allowances into the
standardized salaries of public employees effective
November 1, 1989.15
 On August 12, 1998, this Court promulgated De Jesus v.
Commission on Audit,19 which found DBM-CCC No. 10
ineffective for lack of publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation.20 Thus, the circular
only became effective on March 16, 1999.21
 In Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired
After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit,22 this Court
recognized that the ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10
from July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999 created a "legal
limbo" wherein the COLA and AA were "not effectively
integrated into the standardized salaries." 23 Hence,
during the period of the legal limbo, affected employees
would be entitled to receive the two allowances.
 On December 28, 2007, Abner P. Eleria, president of
NECU, and Melito B. Lupanggo, president of NEWU,
filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, praying that
NAPOCOR be ordered to release the COLA and AA due
them.25 NECU and NEWU filed their Motion for Leave of
Court to file a Petition-in-Intervention, which was granted
by the trial court on March 14, 2008.26 The trial court
consolidated the petitions and treated them as a class
suit.27
 On May 28, 2007, the Committee issued a Certification
that the COLA and AA were not integrated into the
salaries of NAPOCOR employees hired from July 1,
1989 to March 16, 1999.31 NAPOCOR "thereafter
referred the matter to the Department of Budget and
Management[.]"32
 On September 18, 2007, then Secretary of Budget and
Management Rolando Andaya, Jr. (Secretary Andaya,
Jr.) wrote a letter to NAPOCOR stating that the
determination of whether the COLA and AA were
factually integrated rested with it since the payment of
the allowances did not require the prior approval of the
Budget and Management Secretary.33
 NECU and NEWU again requested the release of their
COLA and AA pursuant to Secretary Andaya, Jr.'s letter.
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NAPOCOR again referred the matter to the Committee
for further study. Due to the continued refusal of
NAPOCOR to release the allowances, NECU and
NEWU were constrained to file the Petition for
Mandamus.34
 In its Consolidated Comment before the trial court, the
Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of NAPOCOR,
alleged that the Notice of Position Allocation and Salary
Adjustment (NPASA) of employees should be examined
to find out if the COLA and AA were nevertheless
integrated into the salaries despite the ineffectivity of
DBM-CCC No. 10. The affected employees must also
show that they suffered a diminution of pay as a result of
its implementation. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise pointed out that the COLA and AA were not
among those allowances specifically excluded in Section
12 of Republic Act No. 6758 and thus were deemed to
have been included in the standardized salary rates.35
 The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Omnibus
Motion seeking to withdraw its appearance as counsel
for NAPOCOR and asking for leave to intervene as the
People's Tribune. The Motion stated that the position
taken by NAPOCOR ran counter to the Office of the
Solicitor General's stand that the COLA and AA were
already integrated into the standardized salaries.37
 The Department of Budget and Management likewise
submitted a Supplemental Comment to the trial court,
arguing that the COLA and AA were already integrated
into the standardized salary rates, as shown in their
Notice of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment. 38 It
further posited that De Jesus only applied in instances
where the integration of allowance was by "mere legal
fiction"39 and that Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 was similarly
inapplicable since there was already a factual integration
of allowances.40 It likewise pointed out that the new
compensation plan for NAPOCOR employees did not
include the grant of additional COLA and AA and that the
2008 General Appropriations Act prohibited the use of
savings for additional COLA and AA.41 It maintained that
the test to the entitlement of additional allowances was
whether there was a diminution of pay as a result of the
law's implementation and that mandamus only lied
"where there is a clear legal right sought to be
enforced."42
RTC: in favor of NECU and NEWU. According to the trial
court, the determination of whether the COLA and AA had
been factually integrated was already resolved when the
NAPOCOR Committee certified that the COLA and AA of the
employees from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993 were not
factually integrated into their standardized salaries.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Solicitor General, acting as the
People's Tribune filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
(With Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction).
ISSUES:
Procedural
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Notice of Appeal filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General as the People's Tribune.
Substantive
Whether the COLA and AA were already deemed factually
integrated into the standardized salaries pursuant to Section
12 of Republic Act No. 6758.
RULING:
I
Generally, the Office of the Solicitor General "represent[s] the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers."119
The exception to this rule is when it acts as the "People's
Tribune." As such, it represents the best interests of the
State, and may take an adverse position from the
government agency under litigation. In Pimentel, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections:120
True, the Solicitor General is mandated to represent the
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. However, the
Solicitor General may, as it has in instances take a position
adverse and contrary to that of the Government on the
reasoning that it is incumbent upon him to present to the
court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest
of the government although it may run counter to a client's
position.
II
COLA and AA are already deemed integrated into the
standardized salaries of the NAPOCOR employees from July
1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.
The integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is
not repugnant to the law. Gutierrez, et al. v. Department of
Budget and Management, et al.175 explains:
COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse
expenses incurred by officials and employees of the government in
the performance of their official functions. It is not payment in
consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. As defined, cost of
living refers to "the level of prices relating to a range of everyday
items" or "the cost of purchasing those goods and services which are
included in an accepted standard level of consumption." Based on
this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to cover increases in the
cost of living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the
standardized salary rates.176
Thus, it would be incongruous to grant any alleged back pay
of COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993,
when the NAPOCOR officers and employees have already
received such allowances for this period. The grant would be
tantamount to additional compensation, which is proscribed
by Section 8, Article IX (B) of the Constitution:
SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from
any foreign government.
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Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double,
or indirect compensation.
Mandamus cannot lie to compel the performance of an
unconstitutional act. The Regional Trial Court clearly acted in
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the back payment, to
the affected NAPOCOR officers and employees, the COLA
and AA for the period of July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
are GRANTED.
A.5 G.R. No. 198146
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
 Petitioner Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM) is a GOCC created
under RA 9136, also known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Section 50 of RA
9136 states that the principal purpose of PSALM is to
manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of
the National Power Corporation (NPC) generation
assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the
objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and
stranded contract costs in an optimal manner.
 PSALM conducted public biddings for the privatization of
the Pantabangan-Masiway Hydroelectric Power Plant
(Pantabangan-Masiway Plant) and Magat Hydroelectric
Power Plant (Magat Plant) on 8 September 2006 and 14
December 2006, respectively. First Gen Hydropower
Corporation with its $129 Million bid and SN Aboitiz
Power Corporation with its $530 Million bid were the
winning bidders for the PantabanganMasiway Plant and
Magat Plant, respectively. NPC received a letter dated
14 August 2007 from the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) demanding immediate payment of
₱3,813,080,472 deficiency value-added tax (VAT) for the
sale of the Pantabangan-Masiway Plant and Magat
Plant. The NPC indorsed BIR's demand letter to PSALM.
 BIR, NPC, and PSALM executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA). In compliance with the MOA, PSALM
remitted under protest to the BIR the amount of ₱3, 813,
080, 472, representing the total basic VAT due.
 On 21 September 2007, PSALM filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for the
adjudication of the dispute with the BIR to resolve the
issue of whether the sale of the power plants should be
subject to VAT.
 On 13 March 2008, the DOJ ruled in favor of PSALM
 When petitioner was created under Section 49 of R.A.
No. 9136, for the principal purpose to manage the
orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable
assets, IPP contracts with the objective of liquidating all
NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in
an optimal manner, there was, by operation of law, the
transfer of ownership of NPC assets. Such transfer of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
ownership was not carried out in the ordinary course of
transfer which must be accorded with the required
elements present for a valid transfer, but in this case, in
accordance with the mandate of the law, that is, EPIRA.
Thus, respondent cannot assert that it was NPC who
was the actual seller of the Pantabangan-Masiway :md
Magat Power Plants, because at the time of selling the
aforesaid power plants, the owner then was already the
petitioner and not the NPC. Consequently, petitioner
cannot also be considered a successor-in-· interest of
NPC.
Since it was petitioner who sold the Pantabangan-
Masiway and Magat Power Plants and not the NPC,
through a competitive and public bidding to the private
entities, Section 24(A) of R.A. No. 9337 cannot be
applied to the instant case. Neither the grant of
exemption and revocation of the tax exemption accorded
to the NPC, be also affected to petitioner.
Clearly, the disposition of Pantabangan-Masiway and
Magat Power Plants was not in the regular conduct or
pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity, but was
effected by the mandate of the EPIRA upon petitioner to
direct the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of
NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable
assets, and IPP contracts, and afterward, to liquidate the
outstanding obligations of the NPC.
 Privatization sale of the Pantabangan Masiway and
Magat Power Plants, done in accordance with the
mandate of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Respondent
is directed to refund the amount of ₱3,813,080,472.00
remitted under protest by petitioner to respondent.
 The BIR moved for reconsideration, alleging that the
DOJ had no jurisdiction since the dispute involved tax
laws administered by the BIR and therefore within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Furthermore, the BIR stated that the sale of the subject
power plants by PSALM to private entities is in the
course of trade or business, as contemplated under
Section 105 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1997, which covers incidental transactions.
Thus, the sale is subject to VAT. On 14 January 2009,
the DOJ denied BIR's Motion for Reconsideration.
 On 7 April 2009, the BIR Commissioner (Commissioner
of Internal Revenue) filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, seeking to set aside the DOJ's
decision for lack of jurisdiction.
CA RULING:
 The Court of Appeals held that the petition filed by
PSALM with the DOJ was really a protest against the
assessment of deficiency VAT, which under Section 204
of the NIRC of 1997 is within the authority of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to resolve. The
objective of PSALMs was to recover the amount paid
under protest.
 Citing Section 4 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended by
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8424 (RA 8424) and
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), the Court
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of Appeals ruled that the CIR is the proper body to
resolve cases involving disputed assessments, refunds
of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the
BIR. The Court of Appeals stressed that jurisdiction is
conferred by law or by the Constitution; the parties, such
as in this case, cannot agree or stipulate on it by
conferring jurisdiction in a body that has none.
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter which is neither
subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the
parties therefore cannot be waived.
CA found that DOJ secretary GADALEJ.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction
over the case. (YES)
2. Sale of power plants is subject to VAT?(no)
RULING
Ruling 1. We find that the DOJ is vested by law with
jurisdiction over this case. This case involves a dispute
between PSALM and NPC, which are both wholly
government owned corporations, and the BIR, a government
office, over the imposition of VAT on the sale of the two
power plants. There is no question that original jurisdiction is
with the CIR, who issues the preliminary and the final tax
assessments. However, if the government entity disputes the
tax assessment, the dispute is already between the BIR
(represented by the CIR) and another government entity, in
this case, the petitioner PSALM. Under Presidential Decree
No. 242 (PD 242), all disputes and claims solely between
government agencies and offices, including government-
owned or controlled· corporations, shall be
administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary
of Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government
Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues and
government agencies involved. Secretary of Justice who
has jurisdiction. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of PD 242 read:
Section 1. Provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all
disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of
the National Government, including constitutional offices or
agencies, arising from the interpretation and application of
statutes, contracts or agreements, shall henceforth be
administratively settled or adjudicated as provided
hereinafter: Provided, That, this shall not apply to cases already
pending in court at the time of the effectivity of this decree.
Section 2. In all cases involving only questions of law, the
same shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the
Secretary of Justice, as Attorney General and ex officio adviser of
all government owned or controlled corporations and entities, in
consonance with Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. His
ruling or determination of the question in each case shall be
conclusive and binding upon all the parties concerned.
Section 3. Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only
factual issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by:
(a) The Solicitor General, with respect to disputes or claims
[or] controversies between or among the departments,
bureaus, offices and other agencies of the National
Government;
(b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to
disputes or claims or controversies between or among the
government-owned or controlled corporations or entities
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
being served by the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel; and
(c) The Secretary of Justice, with respect to all other
disputes or claims or controversies which do not fall under
the categories mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).
The law is clear and covers "all disputes, claims and
controversies solely between or among the departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
National Government, including constitutional offices or
agencies arising from the interpretation and application
of statutes, contracts or agreements." When the law says
"all disputes, claims and controversies solely" among
government agencies, the law means all, without exception.
The purpose of PD 242 is to provide for a speedy and
efficient administrative settlement or adjudication of
disputes between government offices or agencies under
the Executive branch, as well as to filter cases to lessen
the clogged dockets of the courts.
As explained by the Court in Philippine Veterans Investment
Development Corp. (PHIVIDEC) v. Judge Velez
PD 242 is only applicable to disputes, claims, and
controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and where
no private party is involved. In other words, PD 242 will only apply
when all the parties involved are purely government offices and
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Since this case is a dispute between PSALM arid NPC, both
government owned and controlled corporations, and the BIR,
a National Government office, PD 242 clearly applies and the
Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction over this case.
This case is different from the case of Philippine National Oil
Company v. Court of Appeals, (PNOC v. CA) which involves
not only the BIR (a government bureau) and the PNOC and
PNB (both GOCC), but also respondent Tirso Savellano, a
private citizen. Clearly, PD 242 is not applicable to the case
of PNOCv.CA. Even the ponencia in PNOC v. CA stated that
the dispute in that case is not covered by PD 242, thus:
While the BIR is obviously a government bureau, and
both PNOC and PNB are government-owned and
controlled corporations, respondent Savellano is a
private. citizen.
It is only proper that intra-governmental disputes be settled
administratively since the opposing government offices,
agencies and instrumentalities are all under the
President's executive control and supervision.Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution states unequivocally that: "The
President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed."
In Carpio v. Executive Secretary, the Court expounded on the
President's control over all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices, thus:
"the President's power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department. "
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This power of control vested by the Constitution in the
President cannot be diminished by law. As held in Rufino v.
Endriga, Congress cannot by law deprive the President of his
power of control, thus:
If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain
subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the
Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional
power of control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the
Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the
Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial
branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower
courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court.
This constitutional power of control of the President
cannot be diminished by the CTA. Thus, if two executive
offices or agencies cannot agree, it is only proper and
logical that the President, as the sole Executive who
under the Constitution has control over both offices or
agencies in dispute, should resolve the dispute instead
of the courts. The judiciary should not intrude in this
executive function of determining which is correct
between the opposing government offices or agencies,
which are both under the sole control of the President.
Under his constitutional power of control, the President
decides the dispute between the two executive offices.
The judiciary cannot substitute its decision over that of
the President. Only after the President has decided or
settled the dispute can the courts' jurisdiction be invoked.
Until such time, the judiciary should not interfere since the
issue is not yet ripe for judicial adjudication. Otherwise, the
judiciary would infringe on the President's exercise of his
constitutional power of control over all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is mandated that where a
remedy before an administrative body is provided by
statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
prior to bringing an action in court in order to give the
administrative body every opportunity to decide a matter
that comes within its jurisdiction.37 A litigant cannot go to
court without first pursuing his administrative remedies;
otherwise, his action is premature and his case is not ripe for
judicial determination.38 PD 242 (now Chapter 14, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292), provides for such administrative
remedy.
The rationale of the doctrine of exhaustion. of administrative
remedies was aptly explained by the Court in Universal
Robina Corp. (Corn Division) v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority:
In requiring parties to exhaust administrative remedies before
pursuing action in a court, the doctrine prevents overworked
courts from considering issues when remedies are available
through administrative channels.42Furthermore, the doctrine
endorses a more economical and less formal means of
resolving disputes,43 and promotes efficiency since disputes
and claims are generally resolved more quickly and
economically through administrative proceedings rather than
through court litigations.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under the 1997 NIRC, the
dispute between the parties is within the authority of the CIR
to resolve. (Section 4)
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
The first paragraph of Section 4 of the 1997 NIRC provides
that the power of the CIR to interpret the NIRC provisions
and other tax laws is subject to review by the Secretary of
Finance, who is the alter ego of the President. Thus, the
constitutional power of control of the President over all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices is still
preserved. The President's power of control, which cannot be
limited or withdrawn by Congress, means the power of the
President to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside the judgment or
action of a subordinate in the performance of his duties.
The second paragraph of Section 4 of the 1997 NIRC,
providing for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA
as regards the CIR's decisions on matters involving disputed
assessments, refunds in internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under NIRC, is in conflict with PD 242. Under
PD 242, all disputes and claims solely between government
agencies and offices, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be administratively settled or
adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General,
or the Government Corporate Counsel, depending on the
issues and government agencies involved.
To harmonize Section 4 of the 1997 NIRC with PD 242, the
following interpretation should be adopted: (1) As
regards private entities and the BIR, the power to decide
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by
the. BIR is vested in the CIR subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, in accordance with Section
4 of the NIRC; and (2) Where the disputing parties are all
public entities (covers disputes between the BIR and other
government entities), the case shall be governed by PD 242.
PD 242 is a special law that applies only to disputes
involving solely government offices, agencies, or
instrumentalities. (special law prevails over general law)
Under the Administrative code (EO 292)
Since the amount involved in this case is more than one
million pesos, the DOJ Secretary's decision may be appealed
to the Office of the President in accordance with Section 70,
Chapter 14, Book IV of EO 292 and Section 552 of PD 242. If
the appeal to the Office of the President is denied, the
aggrieved party can still appeal to the Court of Appeals under
Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.53 However, in order not to further delay the
disposition of this case, the Court resolves to decide the
substantive issue raised in the petition.
Ruling 2. Under Section 50 of the EPIRA law, PSALM's
principal purpose is to manage the orderly sale, disposition,
and privatization of the NPC generation assets, real estate
and other disposable assets, and IPP contracts with the
objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and
stranded contract costs in an optimal manner.
PSALM asserts that the privatization of NPC assets, such as
the sale of the Pantabangan-Masiway and Magat Power
Plants, is pursuant to PSALM's mandate under the EPIRA
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law and is not conducted in the course of trade or business.
PSALM cited the 13 May 2002 BIR Ruling No. 020- 02, that
PSALM' s sale of assets is not conducted in pursuit of any
commercial or profitable activity as to fall within the ambit of a
VAT-able transaction under Sections 105 and 106 of the
NIRC.
Privatization of assets by PSALM is not subject to VAT the
same will be considered an isolated ,transaction, which
will therefore not be subject to VAT. (BIR Ruling No. 113-
98 dated July 23, 1998)
Since PSALM is not a successor-in-interest of NPC, the
repeal by RA 9337 of NPC's VAT exemption does not
affect PSALM.
EPIRA LAW. SEC. 50. Purpose and Objective, Domicile and Term of
Existence. - The principal purpose of the PSALM Corp. is to
manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
IPP contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial
obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner.
it is very clear that the sale of the power plants was an
exercise of a governmental function mandated by law for
the primary purpose of privatizing NPC assets in
accordance with the guidelines imposed by the EPIRA
law.
The CIR alleges that the sale made by NPC and/or its
successors-in-interest of the power plants is an incidental
transaction which should be subject to VAT. This is
erroneous. As previously discussed, the power plants are
already owned by PSALM, not NPC. Under the EPIRA law,
the ownership of these power plants was transferred to
PSALM for sale, disposition, and privatization in order to
liquidate all NPC financial obligations. Unlike the Mindanao
II case, the power plants in this case were not previously
used in PSALM's business. The power plants, which were
previously owned by NPC were transferred to PSALM for the
specific purpose of privatizing such assets. The sale of the
power plants cannot be considered as an incidental
transaction made in the course of NPC's or PSALM's
business. Therefore, the sale of the power plants should not
be subject to VAT.
Hence, we agree with the Decisions dated 13 March 2008
and 14 January 2009 of the Secretary of Justice in OSJ Case
No. 2007-3 that it was erroneous for the BIR to hold PSALM
liable for deficiency VAT in the amount of ₱3,813,080,472 for
the sale of the Pantabangan-Masiway and Magat Power
Plants. The ₱3,813,080,472 deficiency VAT remitted by
PSALM under protest should therefore be refunded to
PSALM.
However, to give effect to Section 70, Chapter 14, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987 on appeals from decisions of
the Secretary of Justice, the BIR is given an opportunity to
appeal the Decisions dated 13 March 2008 and 14 January
2009 of the Secretary of Justice to the Office of the President
within 10 days from finality of this Decision.
A.6 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS
CITY OF PASAY
G.R. NO. 163072
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
FACTS:
 Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
operates and administers the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex under Executive Order No. 903
(EO 903), otherwise known as the Revised Charter of
the Manila International Airport Authority. EO 903 was
issued on 21 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Under Sections 3 and 22 of EO 903,
approximately 600 hectares of land, including the
runways, the airport tower, and other airport buildings,
were transferred to MIAA. The NAIA Complex is located
along the border between Pasay City and Parañaque
City.
 On 28 August 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real
Property Tax Delinquency from the City of Pasay for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real property tax
delinquency for its real properties located in NAIA
Complex, Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City (NAIA
Pasay properties).
 On 24 August 2001, the City of Pasay, through its City
Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy for
the NAIA Pasay properties. MIAA received the notices
and warrants of levy on 28 August 2001. Thereafter, the
City Mayor of Pasay threatened to sell at public auction
the NAIA Pasay properties if the delinquent real property
taxes remain unpaid.
 On 29 October 2001, MIAA filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for prohibition and injunction with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. The petition sought to enjoin the City of Pasay
from imposing real property taxes on, levying against,
and auctioning for public sale the NAIA Pasay
properties.
 On 30 October 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and upheld the power of the City of Pasay to
impose and collect realty taxes on the NAIA Pasay
properties. MIAA filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this petition.
CA Ruling - held that Sections 193 and 234 of Republic Act
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, which took effect
on 1 January 1992, withdrew the exemption from payment of
real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered
under Republic Act No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions. Since MIAA is a
government-owned corporation, it follows that its tax
exemption under Section 21 of EO 903 has been withdrawn
upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE: whether the NAIA Pasay properties of MIAA are
exempt from real property tax
HELD: The petition is meritorious
 In ruling that MIAA is not exempt from paying real
property tax, the Court of Appeals cited Sections 193
and 234 of the Local Government Code which read:
SECTION 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. –
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or
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controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock
and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The
following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use
thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise to a
taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit or religious
cemeteries and all lands, buildings and improvements actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and
exclusively used by local water districts and government owned
or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution
of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as
provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and
environment protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of
real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed
by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all
government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
The Court of Appeals held that as a government-owned
corporation, MIAA’s tax exemption under Section 21 of EO
903 has already been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code in 1992.
In MIAAvs Court of Appeals, this Court already resolved the
issue of whether the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are
exempt from tax under existing laws. The only difference
between the 2006 MIAA case and this case is that the 2006
MIAA case involved airport lands and buildings located in
Parañaque City while this case involved airport lands and
buildings located in Pasay City.
In this case, the Court held that MIAA is not a government-
owned or controlled corporation under Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it
is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.
Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled
corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet the test of
economic viability. MIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers and performing essential
public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a
government instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind
of tax by local governments under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code. The exception to the exemption in
Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA because MIAA is not
a taxable entity under the Local Government Code. Such
exception applies only if the beneficial use of real property
owned by the Republic is given to a taxable entity. Finally,
the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties
devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the
State or the Republic.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
The definition of "instrumentality" under Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
uses the phrase "includes x x x government-owned or
controlled corporations" which means that a government
"instrumentality" may or may not be a "government-
owned or controlled corporation." Obviously, the term
government "instrumentality" is broader than the term
"government-owned or controlled corporation." Section 2(10)
provides:
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
The term "GOCC" has a separate definition under Section
2(13)8 of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987:
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any
agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51)
percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or
controlled corporations may further be categorized by the department
of Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on
Audit for the purpose of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such
corporations.
The fact that two terms have separate definitions means that
while a government "instrumentality" may include a
"government-owned or controlled corporation," there may be
a government "instrumentality" that will not qualify as a
"government-owned or controlled corporation."
A close scrutiny of the definition of "government-owned or
controlled corporation" in Section 2(13) will show that MIAA
would not fall under such definition. MIAA is a government
"instrumentality" that does not qualify as a "government-
owned or controlled corporation."
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no
members. Section 87 of the Corporation Code defines a non-
stock corporation as "one where no part of its income is
distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or
officers."
A non-stock corporation must have members. Even if we
assume that the Government is considered as the sole
member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock
corporation. Non-stock corporations cannot distribute any
part of their income to their members. Section 11 of the MIAA
Charter mandates MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross
operating income to the National Treasury. This prevents
MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality,
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the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate
powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the
governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority
and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA
exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order."
Thus, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but a government instrumentality which is exempt
from any kind of tax from the local governments. Indeed, the
exercise of the taxing power of local government units is
subject to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the
Local Government Code.10 Under Section 133(o)11 of the
Local Government Code, local government units have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the national government like
the MIAA. Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property tax
for the NAIA Pasay properties.
Furthermore, the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are
properties of public dominion intended for public use, and as
such are exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a)
of the Local Government Code. However, under the same
provision, if MIAA leases its real property to a taxable person,
the specific property leased becomes subject to real property
tax.12 In this case, only those portions of the NAIA Pasay
properties which are leased to taxable persons like private
parties are subject to real property tax by the City of Pasay.
C POWERS OF ADMIN AGENCIES
C1. QUASI-LEGISATIVE POWER
C1.1 Metropolitan bank and trust company v National
Wage and Productivity Commission
G.R. NO. 144322
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS
On October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board, Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
(RTWPB), by virtue of Republic Act No. 6727 (R.A. No.
6727), otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization
Act,[2] issued Wage Order No. R02-03 (Wage Order), as
follows:
Section 1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all
employees/workers in the private sector throughout
Region II, regardless of the status of employment are
granted an across-the-board increase of P15.00 daily.
Per Section 13 of the Wage Order, any party aggrieved by
the Wage Order may file an appeal with the National Wages
and Productivity Commission (NWPC) through the RTWPB
within 10 calendar days from the publication of the Wage
Order.
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC, the Bankers Council for
Personnel Management (BCPM), on behalf of its member-
banks, requested for a ruling on the eligibility of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
establishments with head offices outside Region II to seek
exemption from the coverage of the Wage Order since its
member-banks are already paying more than the prevailing
minimum wage rate in the National Capital Region (NCR),
which is their principal place of business.
NWPC stated that the member-banks of BCPM are covered
by the Wage Order and do not fall under the exemptible
categories listed under the Wage Order. Petitioner sought for
interpretation of the applicability of said Wage Order. [10] The
NWPC referred petitioners inquiry to the RTWPB.
RTWPB clarified that the Wage Order covers all private
establishments situated in Region II, regardless of the
voluntary adoption by said establishments of the wage orders
established in Metro Manila and irrespective of the amounts
already paid by the petitioner
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
the CA seeking nullification of the Wage Order on grounds
that the RTWPB acted without authority.
respondents filed their Comment praying that the petition
should be dismissed outright for petitioners procedural
lapses; that certiorari and prohibition are unavailing since
petitioner failed to avail of the remedy of appeal prescribed
by the Wage Order; that the Wage Order has long been in
effect; and that the issuance of the Wage Order was
performed in the exercise of a purely administrative function.
CA rendered its Decision denying the petition. The appellate
court held that a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued
since implementation of the Wage Order had long
become fait accompli
ISSUE
whether Wage Order No. R02-03 is void and of no legal
effect
RULING
In the issuance of the assailed Wage Order,
respondent RTWPB did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial
capacity, or ministerial capacity. It was in the nature of
subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of
delegated power under R.A. No. 6727. It was issued in the
exercise of quasi-legislative power. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is exercised by administrative agencies
through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of
the great branches of the government.]
The Court finds that Section 1, Wage Order No. R02-03 is
void insofar as it grants a wage increase to employees
earning more than the minimum wage rate; and pursuant to
the separability clause of the Wage Order, Section 1 is
declared valid with respect to employees earning the
prevailing minimum wage rate.
Prior to the passage of the Wage Order, the daily
minimum wage rates in Region II was set at P104.00 for the
Province of Isabela, P103.00 for the Province of
Cagayan, P101.00 for the Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
and P100.00 for the Provinces of Quirino and
Batanes.[54] Only employees earning the above-stated
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minimum wage rates are entitled to the P15.00 mandated
increase under the Wage Order.
The powers of NWPC are enumerated in ART. 121.
Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission
shall have the following powers and functions: (d) To review
regional wage levels set by the Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Boards to determine if these are
in accordance with prescribed guidelines and national
development plans; (f) To review plans and programs of the
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to
determine whether these are consistent with national
development plans; (g) To exercise technical and
administrative supervision over the Regional Tripartite Wages
and Productivity Boards.
R.A. No. 6727 declared it a policy of the State to rationalize
the fixing of minimum wages and to promote productivity-
improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent
standard of living for the workers and their families; to
guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production; to enhance employment generation in the
countryside through industrial dispersal; and to allow
business and industry reasonable returns on investment,
expansion and growth.
In line with its declared policy, R.A. No. 6727 created the
NWPC, vested with the power to prescribe rules and
guidelines for the determination of appropriate minimum
wage and productivity measures at the regional, provincial or
industry levels; and authorized the RTWPB to determine and
fix the minimum wage rates applicable in their respective
regions, provinces, or industries therein and issue the
corresponding wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued
by the NWPC. Pursuant to its wage fixing authority, the
RTWPB may issue wage orders which set the daily minimum
wage rates, based on the standards or criteria set by Article
124 of the Labor Code.
The Court declared that there are two ways of fixing the
minimum wage: the "floor-wage" method and the "salary-
ceiling" method. The "floor-wage" method involves the fixing
of a determinate amount to be added to the prevailing
statutory minimum wage rates. On the other hand, in the
"salary-ceiling" method, the wage adjustment was to be
applied to employees receiving a certain denominated salary
ceiling. In other words, workers already being paid more than
the existing minimum wage (up to a certain amount stated in
the Wage Order) are also to be given a wage increase.
In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the
minimum wage rate by the "floor-wage method" or the
"salary-ceiling method" in issuing the Wage Order. The
RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range to which a wage
adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an
across-the-board wage increase of P15.00 to all employees
and workers of Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded
its authority by extending the coverage of the Wage Order to
wage earners receiving more than the prevailing minimum
wage rate, without a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly
pointed out by the OSG, the Wage Order granted additional
benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
WHEREFORE, the petition
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42240
is MODIFIED. Section 1 of Wage Order No. R02-03 issued
on October 17, 1995 by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board for Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan is
declared VALID insofar as the mandated increase applies to
employees earning the prevailing minimum wage rate at the
time of the passage of the Wage Order and VOID with
respect to its application to employees receiving more than
the prevailing minimum wage rate at the time of the passage
of the Wage Order.
C1.2 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
vs. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, G.R. No. 179579
SERENO, J
FACTS:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner
of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum,
for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the
following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and
(3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive
list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity
descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these
factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or
feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat
was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper
procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review
Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release
of the articles that were the subject of protest required the
importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential.
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on
19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Pinas City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation
on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in
transit from China. Respondent contended that CMO 27-
2003 was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior
notice, and publication or registration with the University of
the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation
summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite
having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to
the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to
pay 133% more than was proper.
The trial court declared the CMO invalid and of
no force and effect. The trial court found that petitioners had
not followed the basic requirements of hearing and
publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003.
ISSUES:
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WON CMO 27-2003 is VOID for:
1.) Failing to comply with publication requirements 2.) It
violates equal protection clause and 3.) Being issued beyond
CoC’s authority
RULING:
YES
1.)PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS
Considering that the questioned regulation would
affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained
above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with
the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date
of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of
any sanction against any party of persons.
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not
otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views
prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order
shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two
(2) weeks before the first hearing thereon (3) In case of
opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the
other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance
to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that
new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
Because petitioners failed to follow the
requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative
Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
2.) VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
The equal protection clause means that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes
in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee
of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a
reasonable classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class.
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet
these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat
is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which
country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers
excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade
wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade
wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the
other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003
have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to
pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The
regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to
respondent only, but even to the state.
3.) ISSUED BEYOND COC’s AUTHORITY
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went
beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs
officers duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and
Customs Law, as amended, which mandates that the
customs officer must first assess and determine the
classification of the imported article before tariff may be
imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified
the article even before the customs officer had the chance to
examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs
Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer
required the customs officers prior examination and
assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which
are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should
be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by law.
In summary, petitioners violated respondents
right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when
they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated
respondents right to equal protection of laws when they
provided for an unreasonable classification in the application
of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of
Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority
when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer
to examine and assess imported articles.
C1.3 G.R. No. 126594. September 5, 1997.*
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
COURT OF APPEALS; Honorable Judge GUILLERMO L.
LOJA, SR., the Presiding Judge of Branch 26 of the RTC
of Manila; and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
THE CASE:
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 In a petition for review on certiorari Imelda R. Marcos
prays this Court to set aside the CA decision, as well as
its resolution denying her MR of the judgment in said
case.
 Preliminary, her motion for extension of time to file this
petition was denied for non-compliance with Revised
Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 19-91 because the
affidavit of service was not signed by the affiant, and
the registry receipt proving service of a copy of said
motion to the Solicitor General was not attached
thereto. Hence, the petition subsequently filed by her
was dismissed for having been filed out of time in this
Courts resolution of November 27, 1996.
 Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, explaining the
cause for the procedural lapses and contending that, on
the merits, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
offenses charged; that no offenses actually charged or
that the facts alleged do not constitute the imputed
offenses; and, consequently, that the court a quo gravely
abused its discretion in denying the motion to quash.
 Considering the number of criminal cases filed against
Imelda Marcos, relief from which is sought in the petition
at bar and the issues wherein may possibly be raised
again in other cases of a similar nature, the Court
resolved on Feb. 24, 1997 to require the Solicitor
General to comment thereon, in order that the
adjudication of petitioners plaints may not go off only on
procedural points. In due time, such comment was filed,
albeit in abbreviated form, the Solicitor General correctly
pointing out that all the substantive issues now being
raised before us had also been extensively argued in
and resolved by respondent appellate court.
 Indeed, an overall review of the allegations in the
present petition reveals that the same are merely a
rehash of those already submitted to respondent
court and that this petition is apparently a reprise of
the certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 filed in
the Court of Appeals.
 For facility of presentation, therefore, we need merely to
reproduce herein the findings in the assailed decision of
respondent appellate court, which are fully sustained by
the records, excluding therefrom those cases pertaining
to CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 (except when involved in the
narration of the antecedents of this case) which was
jointly resolved by it but from which no appeals or other
recourse was taken by the petitioners therein.
 We accordingly give credit to respondent court and
adopt its recital of the antecedents of the instant petition,
to wit:
 In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, petitioner Marcos assails the
Order which denied her Motion to Quash the 8
informations filed against her in the consolidated
Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 91-101739 and the
other fourteen (14) informations filed against her,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Benedicto and Rivera in the consolidated Criminal Case
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101892, and Order dated August
30, 1994 which denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
 On October 21, 1983, pursuant to Monetary Board
Resolution Nos. 1632 and 1718, the Central Bank (CB)
of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
issued Circular No. 960.
- The circular, which consolidated the various rules
and regulations promulgated by the CB concerning
foreign exchange non-trade transactions including
those on gold and silver,
o prohibits in its Section 4 residents,
firms, association, or corporations from
maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without prior authorization from
the CB or without being permitted by CB
regulations; and
o requires in Section 10 thereof all residents
who habitually earn or receive foreign
exchange from invisibles locally or from
abroad to submit reports of such
earnings or receipts in prescribed form
with the proper CB department and to
register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the CB within 90 days
from October 21, 1983.
o Violation of the provisions of the circular is
punishable as a criminal offense under
Section 34 of R.A. No.265, as amended
(the Central Bank Act).
 On December 20, 1991 or nearly 6 years after the 1986
EDSA Revolution which toppled the Marcos regime,
Marcos was, for allegedly opening and maintaining
foreign exchange accounts abroad on various dates
from 1968 to 1991 without prior authorization from
the CB or otherwise allowed by CB regulations,
charged with violating Section 4 of CB Circular 960
before the RTC of Manila in eight (8) essentially
identically worded informations docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 91-101732 to 101739, one of which reads as
follows:
 That from 1968 to June 6, 1991, both dates
inclusive, the Marcos in conspiracy with her late
husband wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously open
and maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad,
particularly in Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) in
Geneva, Switzerland, in the name of Maler
Establishment, later transformed into Maler
Foundation, which was organized by their
dummies, nominees, fronts, agents or duly
appointed administrators among them Jean Louis
Sunier who received instructions from the accused
and her husband who signed with their alias JOHN
LEWIS in order to maintain two accounts, one of
which is Account No. 98929 NY under Maler II with
a balance of SF 16,195,258.00, without prior
permission from the Central Bank of the Philippines,
and such act of maintaining foreign account abroad
was not permitted under Central Bank regulations.
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 The wordings of the other 7 informations differed only in
the dates of commission of the offense charged, the
name/s of the dummy/dummies, the balance of the
foreign exchange accounts maintained abroad and the
name/s of the foreign bank/s where such accounts were
maintained.
 Likewise, for allegedly failing to submit a report of their
foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or to
register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the
CB within the period mandated by Section 10 of CB
Circular No. 960, Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera were
similarly indicted on December 27, 1991 for violation of
Section 10, CB Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34
of the Central Bank Act in 5 informations filed with the
RTC of Manila which were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 91-101879 91-101883.
 On the same date, nine (9) more informations essentially
charging the same offense were filed with the RTC of
Manila, but this time only against Marcos and Benedicto,
which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101884
to 91-101892. One of the informations reads:
 That from September 21, 1983 up to December 26,
1985, both dates inclusive, and for sometime thereafter,
all accused, conspiring and confederating with one
another and with the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, all residing and/or doing business in Manila,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, and assisted by their foreign agent or attorney-in-
fact Stephen G. Cattaui, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in the
prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign
Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90
days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being
residents habitually/customarily earning,
acquiring/receiving foreign exchange from whatever
source or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite
the fact that they actually earned interests regularly for
their investment of FIFTEEN MILLION ($15-million)
DOLLARS, U.S. Currency, in Philippine-issued dollar-
denominated treasury notes with floating rates and in
bearer form, in the name of Banque de Paris et des
Pays-Bas (also known as Banque Paribas) in Geneva,
Switzerland but which was transferred on May 17, 1984
to Lombard, Odier et Cie, a bank also in Geneva, for the
account of COGES 00777 being managed by Mr.
Stephane Cattaui for the marcoses who also arranged
the said investment of $15-million through respondents
Roberto S. Benedicto and Hector T. Rivera by using the
Royal Traders Bank in Manila as the custodian of the
said dollar-denominated treasury notes, which earned,
acquired or received for the accused Imelda Romualdez
Marcos and her late husband an interest of $13,229.16
for delay (December 16-19, 1995) plus redemption of
$15-million which was remitted to Lombard, Odier et Cie
through Chicago International Banking Corporation in
New York, United States of America, for the credit of
said Account COGES 00777 of the Marcoses for further
investment outside the Philippines without first complying
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
with the reporting/registering requirements of the Central
Bank.
 On January 3, 1992, eleven (11) more informations for
alleged violation of the aforesaid Section 10, CB Circular
960 were filed against Marcos and Benedicto with the
same court which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
92-101959 to 92-101969.
FACTS:
All these 33 cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the
RTC of Manila presided by herein public respondent Judge
Loja, Sr.
 Marcos was arraigned on February 12, 1992 while
Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned on February 28,
1994.
 During the pendency of these cases, CB Circular No.
1318 (Revised Manual of Rules and Regulations
Governing Non-Trade Foreign Exchange
Transactions)
- repeals insofar as inconsistent therewith all existing
provisions of CB Circular No. 960, among other
circulars
 and CB Circular No. 1353 (Further Liberalizing
Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued by the
CB.
- repeals all the provisions of Chapter X of CB
Circular No. 1318 only insofar as they are
inconsistent therewith.
 Both circulars, however, contain a saving clause
excepting from the circular pending criminal actions
involving violations of CB Circular No. 960 and CB
Circular No. 1318.
 Invoking the abovementioned repeal as one of her
grounds, Marcos filed a Motion to Quash seeking the
dismissal of the cases or the quashal of the informations
filed against her. Respondent People of the Philippines
opposed the same on June 2, 1994.
 Petitioners Marcos aforesaid motion was denied by the
trial court in an order dated June 9, 1994 and her motion
for reconsideration was likewise repudiated in an order
of August 30, 1994. She then filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with CA ascribing abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent trial judge. What transpired there
is best taken from the account thereof in the following
portion of the impugned decision of respondent appellate
court.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, Marcos relied on two grounds in
taking respondent court to task, to wit:
1) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the
offenses charged;
2) respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying her Motion to Quash.
MARCOS ARGUMENT:
1st ground:
Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the cases as the
informations clearly allege that the acts complained of were
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committed outside Philippine territory, and that her
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was
violated, the saving clause contained in CB Circular No. 1318
which repealed CB Circular No. 960 being patently
discriminatory as it was purposedly designed to preserve the
criminal cases lodged against her and her co-accused.
2nd ground:
Marcos argues that the facts alleged in the informations,
even if true, do not constitute offenses and that in any event
the offenses charged have disappeared due to repeal.
 The saving clause (Section 111, Chapter X) of CB
Circular No. 1318 is invalid since the Monetary Board
has no authority to except therefrom pending criminal
prosecutions, the power being purely legislative and is
not expressly granted in its charter;
- that even assuming ad arguendo that the Monetary
Board has the power, the same is still invalid for
being an encroachment and an invalid delegation
thereof, the power to declare what constitutes a
crime and how it should be punished being vested
solely and exclusively in the legislature;
- that even further assuming that there is no invalid
delegation of power to incorporate the saving
clause, it is still invalid for being ultra vires as it is
not germane to the object and purpose of the
Central Bank Act which is to stabilize the monetary
system; and in any event, even if the power is
unquestioned, the clause is still invalid for being
violative of the equal protection of the law clause of
the constitution, it having been designed solely for
the purpose of preserving the criminal cases against
her and her co-accused.
 As regards the assertion that the facts alleged in the
informations do not constitute an offense, Marcos
contends that since the allegations unequivocally state
that foreign foundations or trust, not the Marcoses,
opened and maintained the subject Swiss accounts and
earned and received the interest therefrom, she has no
duty to report any earnings and if at all, she was a mere
beneficiary of the foreign foundations or trusts; and
that the acts having been committed abroad, they are
beyond the jurisdiction of respondent court.
MARCOS DO NOT DISPUTE:
 The validity of CB Circular No. 960, the law under which
they are being prosecuted, and of CB Circular Nos. 1318
and 1353 which they allege repealed CB Circular No.
960, nor do they challenge the authority of the Monetary
Board to issue them.
 That violation of Section 4 and 10 of CB Circular No.
960, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 4. Foreign exchange retention abroad. No
person shall promote, finance, enter into or
participate in any foreign exchange transactions
where the foreign exchange involved is paid,
retained, delivered or transferred abroad while the
corresponding pesos are paid for or are received in
the Philippines, except when specifically authorized
by the Central Bank or otherwise allowed under
Central Bank regulations.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Residents, firms, associations, or corporations
unless otherwise permitted under CB regulations
are prohibited from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad
SEC. 10. Reports of foreign exchange
earners. All resident persons who
habitually/customarily earn, acquire, or receive
foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from
abroad, shall submit reports in the prescribed form
of such earnings, acquisition or receipts with the
appropriate CB department. Those required to
submit reports under this section shall include, but
need not necessarily be limited to the following:
Residents, firms or establishments
habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or
receiving foreign exchange from sales of
merchandise, services or from whatever
source shall register with the Foreign
Exchange Department of the Central Bank
within 90 days from the date of this
Circular.
is punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34
of the Central Bank Act the pertinent portion of
which provides:
SEC. 34 Proceedings upon violation of laws and
regulations. -- Whenever any person or entity
wilfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule
or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, the
person or persons responsible for such violation
shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more
than five years
 In CA, however, it was Marcos insistent position that
violations of CB Circular No. 960, specifically Sections 4
and 10 thereof, ceased to be punishable upon the
issuance in 1992 of CB Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353, on
the theory that the latter circulars completely repealed
the former, and that the reservations made in each of the
repealing clauses of the latter circulars are invalid. She
now reiterates the same contentions before us.
- Respondent appellate court rejected her thesis
on this score; we are sufficiently persuaded to
do likewise.
RULING:
 The saving clause in CB Circular No. 1318, which
petitioner questions, provides:
SEC. 111. Repealing Clause. All existing provisions of
Circulars 363, 960 and 1028, including amendments thereto,
with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of
Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules
and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with
or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that
regulations, violations of which are the subject of
pending actions or investigations, shall not be
considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or
investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to
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such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern
 The assailed saving clause in CB Circular No. 1353 is as
follows:
SEC. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. All
the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318
insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to
the provisions of this circular, shall remain in full force
and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on
non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has
been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular,
violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall not be considered repealed
insofar as such pending actions or investigations
are concerned, it being understood that as to such
pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time of the cause of action accrued shall
govern
 We agree with CA that such amendments and saving
clauses are valid and were authorized enactments
under a delegated power of the Monetary Board.
- Section 14 of the Central Bank Act expressly
grants the Monetary Board the power to
“prepare and issue rules and regulations
necessary for the effective discharge of the
responsibilities and exercise of the powers
assigned to the Monetary Board and to the
Central Bank under this Act,” and to report the
same thereafter to the President and Congress.
- In fact, this power of subordinate legislation and its
validity was admitted by petitioner in the respondent
appellate court.
 It cannot be plausibly claimed that there was undue
delegation of legislative power in this particular instance
since it was the Central Bank itself which defined the
offense and provided the penalty therefor.
- Administrative bodies have the authority to
issue administrative regulations which are penal
in nature where the law itself makes the violation
of the administrative regulation punishable and
provides for its penalty.
- This is still the rule on the matter and, in the instant
case, the Central Bank Act defined the offense and
its penalty while the questioned circular merely
spelled out the details of the offense. Ironically,
petitioner concedes the greater power of the Board
to repeal CB Circular No. 960 through CB Circular
No. 1318, yet she inexplicably questions the lesser
and incidental power to provide for saving clauses
therein.
 Petitioner’s argument that the saving clauses are not
germane to the purposes of the Central Bank Act, and
consequently ultra vires, has been roundly confuted by
CA.
- If, as she claims, one of the objectives of that law is
to stabilize the monetary system, that is precisely
why Congress punished as criminal offenses the
violations of the issuances of the Monetary Board
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
necessary for the effective discharge of its
responsibilities, and to carry out which the Board
deemed it necessary to provide for the challenged
saving clauses.
- The saving clauses were dictated by the need to
continue the prosecution of those who had
already committed acts of monetary
destabilization
- The opposite view posited by petitioner would result
in an absurdity.
 Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are
discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her
co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal
argument since they are unwarranted conjectures
belied by even the text of the circulars alone.
 HENCE, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioners
claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of
the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to
pursue such objection, she may always adduce
additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that
is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present
posture.
 Lastly, there is no need for us to tarry on petitioners
hypothesis that the acts charged in the questioned
informations were committed by foreign agents or
juridical persons outside Philippine territory and that, she
being supposedly a mere beneficiary, this scenario
divests the trial court of jurisdiction over her insofar as
the violations resulting from such acts abroad are
concerned. This is too simplistic an argument because it
would have the Court assume that she only had a
passive participation thereon or, if she is to be believed,
none at all.
 That is why CA decided to just graciously quote, in
refutation of such imposition on judicial credulity, the
perceptively succinct observation of respondent trial
judge, to wit:
- In no uncertain terms, the corresponding
informations clearly state that the accused,
in conspiracy with the late president, opened and
maintained foreign accounts abroad in the name of
foundations organized by their dummies. The same
observation holds true in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
101879-92 where the accused and her co-accused
are charged (with) violation of section 10, CB
Circular 960. As easily gleaned therefrom, (the)
criminal informations are not only sufficient but clear
in alleging that the accused earned foreign
exchange without proper reporting therof although
camouflaged in the name of foundations.
 Accused’s contention that the acts charged were
committed by persons or agents who managed said
foundation outside the country and therefore beyond the
jurisdiction of this court is misplaced argument. As
already stated and discussed, it is the accused who (was
alleged to have) maintained foreign accounts and earned
foreign exchange abroad camouflaged in the name of
foreign agents and/or foundations but neither obtained
authority to do so nor reported the earnings to the
Central Bank.
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WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the
challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
C1.4 Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v DFA
G.R. No. 152214 September 19, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case in
this wise:
On September 16, 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon,
a native of Lemery, Batangas and an overseas
Filipino worker, died of acute cardiac arrest while
asleep at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile
Processing Factory in South Korea. Informed
thereof, the Philippine Overseas Labor Office
(POLO) at South Korea immediately relayed the
incident to the Philippine Embassy in South Korea.
Forthwith, the [Labor] Attaché of the Philippine
Embassy dispatched a letter to Eleuterio N.
Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA).
Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data
base, it was discovered that Manny Razon was
recruited and deployed by petitioner Equi-Asia
Placement, Inc., and was sent to South Korea on
April 3, 2000 to work-train at Yeongjin Machinery,
Inc. Thereupon, POEA addressed the herein first
assailed telegram-directive dated September 22,
2000 to the President/General Manager of the
petitioner. We quote the telegram:
"PLEASE PROVIDE PTA [Prepaid Ticket
Advice] FOR THE REPATRIATION OF
REMAINS AND BELONGINGS OF OFW
MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER
REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE EMBASSY,
KOREA, YOU CAN COORDINATE WITH
YOUR FOREIGN EMPLOYER AND TO
ISSUE:
WAD/OWWA (MLA) AS REGARDS TO
THIS MATTER. YOU ARE GIVEN TWO (2)
DAYS FROM RECEIPT HEREOF WITHIN
WHICH TO PROVIDE SAID TICKET AND
ASSISTANCE, KINDLY SUBMIT YOUR
REPORT TO ASSISTANCE AND
WELFARE DIVISION (AWD), 2/F POEA,
FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CONSTRAIN
US TO IMPOSE APPROPRIATE
SANCTION UNDER OUR RULES"
On September 27, 2000, petitioner wrote back
Director Ricardo R. Casco, thus:
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
"In connection with your fax letter dated
September 26, 2000, re: the repatriation of
the remains of the deceased, ex-trainee
(OFW) MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON,
please be informed that the provisions of
Section 53 as well as, and in relation to,
Section 55 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 on the matters covering the following:
1. The responsibility of the agency
to advance the cost of plane fare
without prior determination of the
cause of the deceased worker's
termination.
2. The recovery of the same costs
from the estate of the dead worker
before the NLRC.
3. The action to be imposed by
POEA for non-compliance
therewith within 48 hours are
violative of due process and/or the
principle on due delegation of
power.
This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042
clearly contemplates prior notice and
hearing before responsibility thereunder
could be established against the agency
that sets up the defense of sole fault – in
avoidance of said responsibility -. Besides,
the sections in question unduly grant the
powers to require advance payment of the
plane fare, to impose the corresponding
penalty of suspension in case of non-
compliance therewith, within 48 hours and
to recover said advance payment from the
dead worker's estate upon the return of his
remains to the country before the NLRC,
when the law itself does not expressly
provide for the grant of such powers.
"WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 52, 53,
54 AND 55 OF THE OMNIBUS RULES
AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING
THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND
OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995
(R.A. 8042), ISSUED BY DFA AND POEA,
WHICH POEA SUMMARILY ORDERED
THE HEREIN PETITIONER TO COMPLY
VIZ-A-VIZ THE PAYMENT IN ADVANCE
OF THE EXPENSES FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS OF A
DECEASED WORKER-TRAINEE WHO,
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, HAS NO
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EXISTING EMPLOYMENT
(DISPATCHING) CONTRACT WITH
EITHER SAID PETITIONER OR HIS
FOREIGN PRINCIPAL AND NO VALID
VISA OR IS NOT WORKING WITH THE
FOREIGN PRINCIPAL TO WHICH
PETITIONER DEPLOYED HIM, IS
ILLEGAL AND/OR VIOLATIVE OF DUE
PROCESS SUCH THAT POEA ACTED
WITHOUT [OR IN] EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION AND/OR IN GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING
SAID ORDER TO PAY SAID
EXPENSES."2
CA: DENIED. The Court of Appeals ruled that the POEA did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its directives to
petitioner were issued pursuant to existing laws and
regulations.
At the center of this petition are the following provisions of the
omnibus rules:
Section 52. Primary Responsibility for
Repatriation. – The repatriation of the worker, or
his/her remains, and the transport of his/her
personal effects shall be the primary responsibility of
the principal or agency which recruited or deployed
him/her abroad. All costs attendant thereto shall be
borne by the principal or the agency concerned.
Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. – The primary
responsibility to repatriate entails the obligation on
the part of principal or agency to advance the cost of
plane fare and to immediately repatriate the worker
should the need for it arise, without a prior
determination of the cause of the termination of the
worker's employment. However, after the worker
has returned to the country, the principal or agency
may recover the cost of repatriation from the worker
if the termination of employment was due solely to
his/her fault.
Every contract for overseas employment shall
provide for the primary responsibility of agency to
advance the cost of plane fare, and the obligation of
the worker to refund the cost thereof in case his/her
fault is determined by the Labor Arbiter.
Section 54. Repatriation Procedure. – When a need
for repatriation arises and the foreign employer fails
to provide for it cost, the responsible personnel at
site shall simultaneously notify OWWA and the
POEA of such need. The POEA shall notify the
agency concerned of the need for repatriation. The
agency shall provide the plane ticket or the prepaid
ticket advice (PTA) to the Filipinos Resource Center
or to the appropriate Philippine Embassy; and notify
POEA of such compliance. The POEA shall inform
OWWA of the action of the agency.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. – If the
employment agency fails to provide the ticket or
PTA within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the
POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or
impose such sanctions as it may deem necessary.
Upon notice from the POEA, OWWA shall advance
the costs of repatriation with recourse to the agency
or principal. The administrative sanction shall not be
lifted until the agency reimburses the OWWA of the
cost of repatriation with legal interest.
Said provisions, on the other hand, are supposed to
implement Section 15 of Republic Act No. 80429 which
provides:
SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency
Repatriation Fund. – The repatriation of the worker
and the transport of his personal belongings shall be
the primary responsibility of the agency which,
recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs
attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or
charged to the agency concerned and/or its
principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and
transport of the personal belongings of a deceased
worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne
by the principal and/or the local agency. However, in
cases where the termination of employment is due
solely to the fault of the worker, the
principal/employer or agency shall not in any
manner be responsible for the repatriation of the
former and/or his belongings.
It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested
with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-
judicial.13 In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,14 we
discussed the nature of these powers to be –
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an
administrative body adjudicates the rights of
persons before it, in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law. The determination of facts and
the applicable law, as basis for official action and
the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for
the performance of this function. On these
considerations, it is elementary that due process
requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be
observed. These requirements include prior notice
and hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is
exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the
separation of the great branches of the government.
Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party,
as elements of due process, are not required since
there is no determination of past events or facts that
have to be established or ascertained. As a general
rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
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validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern
future conduct.
In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the
Omnibus Rules. However, these rules were clearly
promulgated by respondents Department of Foreign Affairs
and Department of Labor and Employment in the exercise of
their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus,
mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an original
action for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial
acts are proper subjects thereof. If only for these, the petition
deserves outright dismissal.
It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the
face of increasing complexity of modern life. Given the
volume and variety of interactions involving the members of
today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate
laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life.
Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the
principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to
their specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its
policies.15 All that is required for the valid exercise of this
power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by the law. 16 Under the first test or
the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it.17 The second test or the sufficient
standard test, mandates that there should be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.18
We resolve that the questioned provisions of the Omnibus
Rules meet these requirements.
As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the
past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and
welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 20
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
C1.5 GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD, Respondent.
FACTS:
GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF
television station, EMC Channel 27.
On January 7, 2000, MTRCB issued an order of suspension
against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of
PD 198
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum
Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998 which provided for
the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit
from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order
and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had
complied with the suspension order by going off the air since
midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest
which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect,
denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-
protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which
was dismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision.
The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB
was affirmed in toto.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review
the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by
television and
(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was
enforceable and binding on petitioner.
RULING:
Section 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen,
review and examine all motion pictures, television programs
including publicity materials. This power of prior review is
highlighted in its Rules and Regulations, particularly Section
7 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No
motion picture, television program or related publicity material
shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed,
sold, leased, exhibited or broadcasted by television without
prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion
picture, television program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of review
are those expressly mentioned in Section 7, such as (1)
television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or departments and agencies, and (2)
newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for
the movie, "Muro Ami." In adopting this finding, we hold that
"Muro Ami: The Making," did not fall under any of the
exemptions and was therefore within the power of review of
MTRCB.
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On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The
Making" was a public affairs program. Even if that were so,
our resolution of this issue would not change.
This Court has already ruled that a public affairs program --
described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between
pure television news and news-related commentaries,
analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within the
MTRCB’s power of review. Clearly, "Muro Ami: The Making"
(which petitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was
well within the purview of MTRCB’s power of prior
review.
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject
program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis
of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The
Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof,
expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of
the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not
published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not
be enforced.
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the
penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting
programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been
registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the
same is yet to be effective. It is thus unenforceable since it
has not been filed in the ONAR. Consequently, petitioner
was not bound by said circular and should not have been
meted the sanction provided thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
18, 2001, insofar as it affirmed the public respondent Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board’s jurisdiction
over "Muro Ami: The Making," is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued against
petitioner GMA Network, Inc. pursuant to Memorandum
Circular No. 98-17 is hereby declared null and void.
C1.6. GMA NETWORK VS NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. NO 192128
FACTS:
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (GMA), formerly known as
Republic Broadcasting System, Inc., is a Filipino-owned
domestic corporation engaged in the business of radio and
television broadcasting as a grantee of a legislative franchise
by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7252 enacted on March
20, 1992, to construct, install, operate and maintain radio and
television broadcasting stations in the Philippines for a period
of 25 years. Respondent National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) is the government agency that exercises
jurisdiction over the supervision, adjudication and control of
all telecommunications and broadcast services in the country.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Following the enactment of R.A. No. 7252 and pursuant to
Section 3 thereof, GMA filed before the NTC three (3)
applications for Certificate of Public Convenience. Pending
the resolution of these applications, NTC granted GMA three
Provisional Authorities ([PA]) to install, operate and maintain
DXRC-AM broadcasting station and DXLA-TV Station both in
Zamboanga City and a VHF-TV station in Dumaguete City.
The said [PAs] were issued on and valid until the following
dates:
DATE ISSUED VALID UNTIL
VHF-TV September 16, 1996
November 16, 1998
DXRC-AM September 9, 1996
June 9, 1998
DXLA-TV January 27, 1997 July
27, 1998
Upon the lapse of their respective expiration dates, the [PAs]
were not renewed and it took 4-5 years before GMA was able
to file Ex-Parte Motions for Renewal of Provisional Authority -
on September 29, 2003 for VHF-TV in BMC Case No. 91-336
and on September 3, 2003 for DXLA-TV in NTC Case No.
96-038. For its DXRC-AM broadcasting station, it filed an Ex-
Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC) in BMC Case No. 93-499 on September
13, 2002.
Before acting on the motions in BMC Case No. 91-336 and
NTC Case No. 96-038, the NTC scheduled the cases for
clarificatory hearing and directed GMA to explain why it
should not be administratively sanctioned for late filing and/or
for operating with an expired [PA] No similar action was taken
in BMC Case No. 93-499.
GMA filed two separate pleadings entitled Compliance
containing substantially the same declarations in BMC Case
No. 91-336 and NTC Case No. 96-038. GMA explained that
its failure to renew the [PAs] on time was not done with
deliberate intent but due to pure inadvertence in the
maintenance of its records and confusion in the turn-over of
documents from its previous handling lawyers. The delay was
also allegedly caused by the economic crisis that hit. the
Philippines in 1998 and the consequent downturn in the
broadcast industry which adversely affected GMA's
expansion plans and existing projects. GMA also alleged that
it can no longer be sanctioned for the late filing of the Motions
because its violation already prescribed pursuant to Sec. 28,
Chapter IV of Commonwealth Act No. 146 (C.A. No. 146) or
the Public Service Act.
In an Order dated May 25, 2009 in NTC Case No. 96-038,
NTC issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) for the
operation of GMA's DXLA-TV Station in Zamboanga City.
With respect to BMC Case Nos. 93-499 and 91-336, NTC
issued Orders dated January 11, 2007 and February 26,
2009 respectively renewing GMA's [PA] to install, operate
and maintain DXRC-AM broadcasting station in Zamboanga
City and VHF-TV Station in Dumaguete City.
The three Orders also fined GMA for operating with an
expired [PA] at the rate of Php 200 per day of violation for
DXRC-AM and P100 per day of violation for VHF-TV and
DXLA-TV computed from the date of expiration of [PA] until
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the date of filing of the Motions for Renewal of Provisional
Authority/Issuance of CPC. The aggregate amount of the fine
imposed for the three stations was Php 674,600.00.
The NTC partly granted GMA's motions for partial
reconsideration by reducing the rate of the fine to Php 50 per
day of violation for each of the three stations. In BMC Case
No. 93-499, the NTC Order was dated August 4, 2009. In
BMC Case No. 91-336, the NTC Order was dated July 17,
2009. In NTC Case No. 96-038, the Order was dated August
4, 2009. The total reduced fine for all the stations was Php
259,450.00.
Dissatisfied, GMA interposed the herein consolidated
Petitions for Review respectively docketed as C.A. G.R. SP.
No. 110148 assailing NTC Orders dated January 11, 2007
and August 4, 2009 in BMC Case No. 93-499; C.A. G.R. SP.
No. 109954 assailing NTC Orders dated February 26, 2009
and July 17, 2009 in BMC Case No. 91-336; and C.A. G.R.
SP. No. 110145 assailing NTC Orders dated May 25, 2009
and August 4, 2009 in NTC Case No. 96-038.
CA dismissed the petitions. The NTC proceedings in
Sambrano and in the instant case are both administrative in
nature as they involve the NTC's exercise of its regulatory
powers over public service operators. Both cases entailed
an examination of a public service operator's licenses and
permits, the certificate of public convenience of PRBI and, in
the present case, petitioner GMA's provisional authority to
maintain and operate the subject broadcasting stations.
Thus, the pronouncement in Sambrano in so far as Section
28 is concerned, is squarely applicable in the instant
controversy. Hence, petitioner GMA cannot avoid payment of
the fine, as the 60-day prescriptive period under Sec. 28 is
available as a defense only in criminal or penal proceedings
not in purely administrative proceedings, as in the case at
bench.
In the present case, the fine imposed on GMA pursuant to
Section 21 is an administrative fine because, as stated
above, it involved the NTC's regulatory and supervisory
powers over GMA's legislative franchise. The determinant
factor in the application of Section 28 is the nature of the
proceedings and the forum which imposed the fine and
not the nature of the statute imposing it. The Orders
imposing the fine stemmed from GMA's Ex-Parte Motions to
Renew Provisional Authority and Certificate of Public
Convenience and not from any criminal complaint or
information seeking to prosecute GMA for violation of the
penal provisions of the Public Service Law, specifically
Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26 thereof.
We thus concur with the NTC in that the monetary fine
imposed under Section 21 of the Public Service Act is an
administrative sanction imposed by the NTC on a service
provider on the latter's violation or failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of its authorization, or any other order,
decision or regulation. On the other hand, the P25,000.00
fine specified under Section 23 is a penal sanction imposed
by the courts in addition to imprisonment of the responsible
officer of the service provider when it fails to perform, commit,
or do any act or thing forbidden or prohibited or shall neglect,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
fail or omit to do or perform any act or thing required by the
Public Service Act to be done or performed.
ISSUES:
1. WON GMA violated Section 21 of the Public Service
Act
2. WON the prescription set forth in Sec. 28 of the
Public Service Act applies to administrative
proceedings for violations of orders, decisions and
regulations of respondent NTC or the terms and
conditions of the certificate issued by the latter; and
3. Whether the P25,000.00 limit set under Section 23
of the Public Service Act shall apply to the fines that
may be imposed by respondent NTC under Section
21.
HELD: THE PETITION IS DENIED
The Sambrano case, cited by petitioner GMA, has already
settled that the 60-day prescriptive period under Section 28
of the Public Service Act can be availed of as a defense only
in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter IV thereof and not
in proceedings pertaining to the regulatory or administrative
powers of the NTC over a public service utility's observance
of the terms and conditions of its Provisional Authority:
This Court has already held, in Collector of Internal
Revenue el al. vs. Buan,; and Sambrano vs. Public
Service Commission, that the 60-day prescriptive
period fixed by section 28 of the Public Service Law
is available as a defense only in criminal or penal
proceedings filed under Chapter IV of the Act.
Consequently, the Public Service Commission is
not barred from receiving evidence of the
prescribed violations for the purpose of determining
whether an operator has or has not faithfully kept
the conditions of his certificate of permit, whether
he failed or not to render the services he is required
to furnish to the customers, and whether or not the
infractions are sufficient cause to cancel or modify
the certificate. Proceedings of this kind are held
primarily to ensure adequate and efficient service as
well as to protect the public against the operator's
malfeasances or abuses; they are not penal in
character. True, the cancellation of the certificates may
mean for an operator actual financial hardship; yet the
latter is merely incidental to the protection of the
traveling public. Hence, in refusing to admit evidence of
prescribed violations as part of the complainant's case
against the Philippine Rabbit Lines for a modification or
cancellation of the latter's permit, we hold that the
Commission committed error.
In Globe Telecom, Inc. v. The National
Telecommunications Commission, the Court ruled that the
NTC's imposition of a fine pursuant to Section 21 of the
Public Service Act is made in an administrative proceeding,
and thus, must comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing. The same ruling also categorized the fine imposed
under Section 21 as a sanction, regulatory and punitive in
character, viz.:
Section 21 requires notice and hearing
because fine is a sanction, regulatory and even
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punitive in character. Indeed, the requirement is the
essence of due process. Notice and hearing are the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to
which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The
right is guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does
not need legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation
of the requirement serves merely to enhance the
fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is
essential to due process and its non-observance will, as
a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings.
In citing Section 21 as the basis of the fine, NTC
effectively concedes the necessity of prior notice and
hearing. Yet the agency contends that the sanction was
justified by arguing that when it took cognizance of
Smart's complaint for interconnection, "it may very well
look into the issue of whether the parties had the
requisite authority to operate such services." As a result,
both parties were sufficiently notified that this was a
matter that NTC could look into in the course of the
proceedings. The parties subsequently attended at least
five hearings presided by NTC.
That particular argument of the NTC has been
previously disposed of. But it is essential to emphasize
the need for a hearing before a fine may be imposed,
as it is clearly a punitive measure undertaken by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Inherently, notice and hearing are
indispensable for the valid exercise by an administrative
agency of its quasi-judicial functions.
Contrary to the position taken by petitioner GMA, the
P25,000.00 limit provided under Section 23 does not also
apply in this case. Section 23 of the Public Service Act
provides:
Sec. 23. Any public service corporation that shall
perform, commit, or do any act or thing herein forbidden
or prohibited or shall neglect, fail, or omit to do or
perform any act or thing herein required to be done or
performed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
twenty-five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not
exceeding five years, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
The case of GMA Network, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission (GMA Network)
pertaining to petitioner GMA's failure to renew its Provisional
Authority to operate a radio station in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, is illustrative:
The argument is untenable.
The applicable provision is Section 21 of the Public
Service Act as it specifically governs the NTC's
imposition of a fine not exceeding P200.00 per day for
every day during which the public service utility's
violation or non-compliance with the terms and
conditions of the certificate/s issued by the NTC
continues. On the other hand, Section 23 of the Public
Service Act deals with a public service
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
corporation's performance, commission or doing of
any forbidden or prohibited act under the same law,
as well as its neglect, failure or omission to do or
perform an act or thing required thereunder. As
earlier mentioned, the proceedings under Section 23
pertain to criminal proceedings conducted in court,
whereby the fine imposed, if so determined, is made in
the court's discretion, whereas Section 21 pertains to
administrative proceedings conducted by the NTC
on the grounds stated thereunder. As the present
case evidently involves the latter violation, Section 21
and not Section 23 of the Public Service Act applies.
Thus, finding that the fine imposed by the NTC at the
reduced rate of P50.00 per day is consistent with the
P200.00 per day limitation under Section 21 of the
Public Service Act, the fine of P76,500.00 for GMA's
failure to comply with the terms and conditions of its PA
for a period of 1,521 days was proper. The
conscionability of the amount imposed should not be at
issue as it is the law itself which had provided the
allowable threshold for the amount therefor.
The Court sees no reason here to deviate from the
unequivocal clarifications made in GMA Network. The Court
has held that the respondent NTC, being the government
agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under its special and technical forte and possessing the
necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, is
in the best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and
guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded
great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies
of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of
power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
In fine, the Court agrees with respondent NTC that,
notwithstanding the temporary permits issued in its favor,
petitioner GMA was operating on an expired Provisional
Authority, in violation of Section 21 of the Public Service Act.
C2. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
C2.1DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, petitioner, vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and
IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS
[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of
HealthNational Capital Region (hereinafter DOH-NCR). They
held various positions as follows: [Respondent] Priscilla B.
Camposano (hereinafter Camposano) was the Finance and
Management Officer II, [Respondent] Imelda Q. Agusin
(hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and [Respondent]
Enrique L. Perez (hereinafter Perez) was the Acting Supply
Officer III.
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some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint
before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis
(hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III
Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged
anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of
Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic
Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.
August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an
investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending
the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-
respondents.
Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the
[respondents] and their co-respondents for Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On
October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres
issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298)
creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the
administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees.
The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on October
26, 1996.
On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the
investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a
resolution on January 23, 1998 disposing [respondents] case
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission
finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D.
Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q.
Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting
Supply Officer III, all of the Department of Health
National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged
and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V.
Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the
government service be imposed thereon. SO
ORDERED.
On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative
Order No. 390 (hereinafter AO 390)] that reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr.
Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty as charged
and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the Penalty of
dismissal from the service. The records of the case with
respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary
Carmencita N. Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate
action.
Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued
an Order disposing of the case against [respondents] and
[Horacio Cabrera]. They were dismissed from the service.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
On May 28, 1998 [respondents] filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Order and the same was denied.
On July 17, 1998, [respondents] filed their appeal with the
CSC. The appeal was denied by the CSC on May 21, 1999.
Horacio Cabrera filed a separate appeal with the CSC which
was denied on August 17, 1999. [Respondents] motion for
reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999. While
Cabreras motion for reconsideration was denied on January
27, 2000. [Respondents], however, received the resolution
denying their motion for reconsideration on November 2001.
Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to [the CA] the
CSCs resolutions ahead of [respondents]. The petition of
Cabrera was granted [by the CA] in a decision dated October
15, 2001 with a dispositive portion which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are
hereby SET ASIDE.
Horacio Cabrera is exonerated of the administrative charges
against him. The Civil Service Commission is hereby
ORDERED
Decision of the CA: The appellate court held that the
PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained
only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had
no power to investigate the charges against
respondents.[6] Moreover, in simply and completely relying on
the PCAGCs findings, the secretary of health failed to comply
with administrative due process.[7]
ISSUE WON PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate
anomalous transactions involving the respondents
WON decision of the Health Secretary is valid
RULING
Executive Order (EO) No. 151 granted the PCAGC the
jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints against
presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and
corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is
evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate
charges against presidential, not non-presidential,
appointees.
More pointedly, Section 3 states that the Commission
shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints
involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner
against presidential appointees x x x. We quote the pertinent
provisions below:
Section 3. Jurisdiction. The Commission shall have
jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft
and corruption filed in any form or manner
against presidential appointees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations. (emphasis
supplied)
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On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach,
respondents claim that the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction
over them, because they were not presidential appointees.
The Court notes, however, that respondents were not
investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was
authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated
October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee
to look into the administrative charges filed against Director
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D.
Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez.
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has
the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.[13] With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such
validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used
the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard
to cases involving non-presidential appointees was rectified
in Executive Order No. 12,[14] which created the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Non-presidential appointees
who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may have been
involved with a presidential appointee, may now be
investigated by the PAGC.
Validity of Health Secretarys Decision
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department
secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and
employees under the formers jurisdiction. [16] Thus, the health
secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.
Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda
Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line
with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive directly
dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized
the health secretarys disciplinary authority over respondents
when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against them for
the secretarys appropriate action.[18]
As a matter of administrative procedure, a department
secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report
the facts from which a decision may be based. [19] In the
present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to
investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their
authority was limited to conducting investigations and
preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to
impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who
had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be
observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support
itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must
have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts
of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the
views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved.
The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process
had not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from
the health secretarys Order dismissing the respondents
His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 390 dated [A]pril 20, 1998, resolving
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr.
Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty as charged and,
as recommended by the Presidential Commission Against
Graft and Corruption, is meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service. The records of the case with respect to the other
respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N.
Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action.
The Presidents endorsement of the records of the case
for the appropriate action of the health secretary[25] did not
constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of
respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of
Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding
and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.
By the same token, the Constitution grants the Supreme
Court disciplinary authority over all lower court justices and
judges, as well as judicial employees and lawyers. While the
investigation of administrative complaints is delegated usually
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the Court nonetheless
makes its own judgments of the cases when sanctions are
imposed. It does not merely adopt or solely rely on the
recommendations of the OCA or the IBP.
Inasmuch as the health secretarys twin Orders were
patently void for want of due process, the CA did not err in
refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGCs (or the Ad Hoc
Committees) recommendations. Such a discussion should
have been made by the health secretary before it could be
passed upon by the CA.
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In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor
General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges
and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service.
Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of
respondents, but solely due process.
In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism
that the end does not justify the means. Guilt cannot be
pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first
observed. This is the essence of fairness and the rule of law
in a democracy.
G.R. No. 170146. June 8, 2011.*
C2.2. HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President,
HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC),
petitioners, vs. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR,
respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
 This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our
Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the
October 19, 2005 CA decision and reinstating the
Decision dated March 23, 2004 of the OP in O.P. Case
No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent
administratively liable for failure to declare in his
2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SSAL) 2 expensive cars registered in his
name, in violation of Section 7, RA3019 in relation to
Section 8 (A) of RA 6713.
 The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC),
including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from
service on respondent, with all accessory penalties.
ISSUES:
 The motion is anchored on the following grounds:
1. Respondent was subjected to 2
administrative/criminal Investigations equivalently
resulting in violation of his constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
2. Who to follow between conflicting decisions of 2
government agencies involving the same facts and
issues affecting the rights of the Respondent.
3. Respondents constitutional right to due process was
violated.
4. Penalties prescribed by the Honorable Court is too
harsh and severe on the alleged offense
committed/omitted
RULING:
1. Court finds it bereft of merit.
Respondent asserts: since the PAGC charge involving non-
declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the
subject of investigation by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-04-
0568-LSC, along with the criminal complaint for unexplained
wealth, the former can no longer be pursued without violating
the rule on double jeopardy.
The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation
does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary
investigation not being part of the trial.
 Double jeopardy attaches only:
1) upon a valid indictment,
2) before a competent court,
3) after arraignment,
4) when a valid plea has been entered,
5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
 We have held that none of these requisites applies
where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary
investigation of the same criminal offense against
the respondent public officer.
2. Argument is untenable.
Respondent asserts: Office of the Ombudsman as a
constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No.
6770, has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, as against the PAGC which is not a
constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP.Under said
law, it is the Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the government, such
as herein respondent.
The same wrongful act committed by the public officer
can subject him to civil, administrative and criminal
liabilities;
 We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan: [I]t is a basic
principle of the law on public officers that a public official
or employee is under a 3-fold responsibility for
violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission.
 This simply means that a public officer may be held
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act
results in damages to an individual, the public officer
may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If
the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring
officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation
may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or
other administrative sanctions. This administrative
liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil
liabilities. (Italics in the original.)
 Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose
institution of an administrative proceeding against
the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from
administrative liability.
- Res judicata did not set in because there is no
identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision
of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal
complaint cannot be considered a valid and final
judgment. On the criminal complaint, the
Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and
file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.
In the analogous case of Montemayor v. Bundalian, this
Court ruled
- Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the
dismissal of similar charges against him before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against
him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be

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sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not
operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of
this review.
- The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
Respondent argues: Ombudsman who has primary
jurisdiction over the administrative complaint filed against
him. Notwithstanding the consolidation of the administrative
offense (non-declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal
complaints for unexplained wealth (Section 8 of RA 3019)
and also for perjury (Article 183, RPC, as amended) before
the Office of the Ombudsman, respondents objection on
jurisdictional grounds cannot be sustained
A presidential appointee is under the disciplinary
authority of the Office of the President (OP)
 EO 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the PAGC which
was granted the authority to investigate presidential and
also non-presidential employees “who may have acted in
conspiracy or may have been involved with a
presidential appointee or ranking officer mentioned.” On
this score, we do not agree with respondent that the
PAGC should have deferred to the Ombudsman
instead of proceeding with the administrative
complaint in view of the pendency of his petition for
certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGC’s
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance
of the parties but continues until the case is terminated
 It may be recalled that at the time respondent was
directed to submit his counter-affidavit under the
Ombudsman’s Order dated March 19, 2004, the PAGC
investigation had long commenced and in fact, the
PAGC issued an order directing respondent to file his
counter-affidavit/verified answer as early as May 19,
2003.
 The rule is that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a
court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its
own jurisdiction.
- having already taken cognizance of the
complaint against the respondent involving non-
declaration in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn
Statements of Assets and Liabilities (SSALs),
the PAGC thus retained jurisdiction over
respondent’s administrative case
notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a
supplemental complaint before the Ombudsman
charging him with the same violation.
3. We find no merit in his reiteration of the alleged gross
violation of his right to due process
The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met. What is offensive to due
process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
 This Court has repeatedly stressed that parties who
choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to
answer charges against them cannot complain of a
denial of due process. Having persisted in his refusal
to file his pleadings and evidence before the PAGC,
respondent cannot validly claim that his right to due
process was violated.
J. BERSAMIN’S DISSENT: He concurred with the CAs
finding that respondents right to due process was violated
by the unilateral investigation conducted by the PAGC which
did not furnish the respondent with a copy of the prejudicial
PAGC resolution. The dissent also agreed with the CAs
observation that there was a rush on the part of the PAGC
to find the respondent guilty of the charge. This was
supposedly manifested in the issuance by the PAGC of its
resolution even without taking into consideration any
explanation and refutation of the charges that he might make,
and even before the CA could finally resolve his suit to
challenge the PAGCs jurisdiction to investigate him. On the
other hand, the dissent proposed that the non-submission
by respondent of his counter-affidavit or verified answer
as directed by the PAGC should not be taken against
him. Respondents refusal was not motivated by bad faith,
considering his firm belief that PAGC did not have jurisdiction
to administratively or disciplinarily investigate him. – WE DO
NOT AGREE WITH THIS
 Records reveal that on August 26, 2003, the CA already
rendered a decision dismissing respondents petition
challenging the jurisdiction of the PAGC. Respondents
MR was likewise denied by the CA.
 Upon elevation to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari (G.R. No. 160443), the petition suffered the
same fate. Under the First Divisions Resolution, the
petition was denied for failure of the petitioner
(respondent) to show that the CA committed any
reversible error in the assailed decision and
resolution. Said resolution became final and executory
on April 27, 2004.
 Thus, at the time respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit before the Ombudsman on May 21, 2004, there
was already a final resolution of his petition
challenging the PAGCs investigative authority
 On the other hand, the PAGC submitted to the OP
its September 1, 2003 resolution finding respondent
guilty as charged and recommending that he be
dismissed from the service, after the expiration of the 60-
day temporary restraining order by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 77285.
 The OP rendered its Decision adopting the PAGCs
findings and recommendation on March 23, 2004.As
thus shown, a period of 10 months had elapsed from the
time respondent was directed to file his counter-affidavit
or verified answer to the administrative complaint filed
against him, up to the rendition of the OPs decision. It
cannot therefore be said that the PAGC and OP
proceeded with undue haste in determining
respondents administrative guilt.
J. BERSAMIN DISSENT: assails the OPs complete reliance
on the PAGCs findings and recommendation which
constituted a gross violation of administrative due
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process as set forth in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations. Among others, it is required that The tribunal or
any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
- Justice Bersamin thus concludes that the OP should
have itself reviewed and appreciated the evidence
presented and independently considered the facts
and the law of the controversy. I
- t was also pointed out that the OPs statement that
the respondents arguments in his Motion for
Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To Admit
Explanation/Refutation of Complaint were a mere
reiteration of matters previously considered, was
a patent untruth. – WE DISAGREE!
The OP decision, after quoting verbatim the findings and
recommendation of the PAGC, adopted the same with a brief
statement preceding the dispositive portion:
After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully
agrees with the recommendation of PAGC and the legal
premises as well as the factual findings that hold it
together. Respondent failed to disclose in his 2001 and
2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the
prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in
relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded
ample opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let
the opportunity pass by.
 The relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above
disquisition adopting fully the findings and
recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating
authority. It is rather the fact that the OP is not a court
but an administrative body determining the liability of
respondent who was administratively charged, in the
exercise of its disciplinary authority over presidential
appointees.
 In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, this Court ruled
The rights of parties in an administrative
proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the
decision rendered by the OP incorporating the
findings and conclusions of an administrative body,
for as long as the constitutional requirement of due
process has been satisfied.
Since respondent repeatedly refused to answer the
administrative charge against him despite notice and warning
by the PAGC, he submitted his evidence only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the OP, attaching the
same to his motion for reconsideration.
 That the OP denied the motion by sustaining the
PAGC findings without any separate discussion of
respondent’s arguments and belatedly submitted
evidence only meant that the OP found the same
lacking in merit and insufficient to overturn its ruling
on respondent’s administrative liability
4. We maintain that the penalty of dismissal from the
service is justified as no acceptable explanation was
given for the non-declaration of the two expensive cars
in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL.
 Pursuant to Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No.
6713, any violation of the law “proven in a proper
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause
for removal or dismissal of a public official or
employee, even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.”
 Respondent’s deliberate attempt to evade the
mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired during the
period covered was evident when he first claimed that
the vehicles were lumped under the entry
“Machineries/Equipment” or still mortgaged, and later
averred that these were already sold by the end of the
year covered and the proceeds already spent. Under this
scheme, respondent would have acquired as many
assets never to be declared at anytime.
 Such act erodes the function of requiring accuracy of
entries in the SSAL which must be a true and detailed
statement. It undermines the SSAL as “the means to
achieve the policy of accountability of all public officers
and employees in the government” through which “the
public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a
public official; [as] a valid check and balance mechanism
to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.”
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
C2.3 G.R. No. 140079. March 31, 2005
AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
respondents.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio was formerly an
Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.
 City Prosecutors office of Pasay City recommended that
Samalio be prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and
Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the
Sandiganbayan under the following facts:
- Ms. Weng Sai Qin arrived at the NAIA from Saipan. Ms.
Weng, a Chinese, was holding a Uruguayan passport,
immigration officer suspected that the formers passport
was fake. Ms. Weng was taken out of the queue and
brought to Respondent who was the duty intelligence
officer. Sensing a demand for money in exchange for her
passport, Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front of
Respondent. The money was grabbed by Respondent.
Shortly, her passport was returned and she was allowed to
leave. When Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she
discovered that it did not bear an immigration arrival
stamp. Thereafter, Ms. Weng complained against
Respondent.
- Indorsement communication to the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID), former NAIA General Manager
Gen. Cunanan enclosed a copy of the aforesaid City
Prosecutors Resolution. Reacting, then BID Commissioner
Respicio, issued Personnel Order No. 93-179-93
commencing an administrative case against petitioner
Augusto R. Samalio for Violation of CSMC No. 46, Rule 2,
Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties,
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, requiring petitioner to submit his answer to the
charges together with supporting statements and
documents, and WON he elects a formal investigation if his
answer is not considered satisfactory. In the same
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Personnel Order, Samalio was preventively suspended for
a period of 90 days as the charge sheet against him
involves dishonesty, oppression and misconduct.
Forthwith, petitioner attempted the lifting of his preventive
suspension. It was struck down.
- Later on, petitioner submitted an answer denying the
charges and expressly electing a formal investigation if
such answer be not found to be satisfactory. The answer
was found to be unsatisfactory so the case was set for
formal hearing before the Board of Discipline of BID.
- respondent was allowed to file a motion to dismiss with the
Special Prosecutor designated given time to comment
thereon. When the dismissal motion was filed, assigned
Special Prosecutor Edmund F. Macaraig interposed no
objection thereto. Notwithstanding, the case was not
dismissed and instead, the Special Prosecutor was given
five (5) days to inform the Board whether or not he intends
to present additional witnesses.
DID Commissioner: issued Personnel Order No. 93-428
reorganizing the Board of Discipline and this case was assigned to a
new Board presided by Atty. Kalaw.
Special Prosecutor Edmund F. Macaraig, moved that Samalios
Motion to Dismiss be denied and that the case be considered
submitted for resolution based on the records. The hearing officer
denied Samalios Motion to Dismiss but granted his
Comment/Manifestation explaining his absence during the February
6, 1995 hearing and requesting that the case be set anew on
February 22, 1995.
BID Acting Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag, issued the decision
finding Augusto R. Samalio guilty of the charges and was ordered
dismissed from service.
- In the 1st Indorsement former Justice Secretary Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. confirmed the penalty of dismissal from
service of Augusto R. Samalio.
Civil Service Commission: Issued Resolution No. 974501
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the decisions of
Acting Commissioner Liwag and Secretary Guingona. Similarly, the
attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in Civil Service
Resolution No. 981925.
In the meantime, on June 13, 1994, during the pendency of the
instant administrative case, Augusto R. Samalio was convicted of the
crime of Robbery, as defined in Articles 293 and 294, paragraph 5 of
the RPC and was sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty of 4
Months and 1 Day of Arresto Mayor to 4 Years, 2 Months and 11
Days of Prision Correccional and to indemnify complainant Weng Sai
Qin the amount of US $500.00 and to pay the costs. Samalio did not
appeal the conviction and instead applied for and was granted
probation by the Sandiganbayan for 2 years
CA: dismissed the petition for review on the correctness and
validity of CSC Resolution Nos. 974501 and 981925and
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 he was not accorded due process
 CA failed to consider the proper effects of his discharge
under probation
 he was deprived of due process
 no witness or evidence was presented against him
 CA erred in the interpretation of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court and that there was no hearing
conducted on his case.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
RULING:
The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the “rule on former testimony,” in
deciding petitioner’s administrative case.
 The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied
suppletorily to the rules of procedure of
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial
powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the
rules of procedure of the administrative agency
concerned.
 The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every
litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may
be applied to proceedings before an administrative body
with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and
valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing
the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and
adjudication of cases before it.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied:
a) the witness is dead or unable to testify;
- In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in
the administrative proceedings before the BID
because she left the country on February 6, 1993 or
even before the administrative complaint against
petitioner was instituted.
b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the
same interests;
- Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai
Qin was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679
c) the former case involved the same subject as that in
the present case, although on different causes of
action;
- Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679, a case which
sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution
No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the City
Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, the very same resolution
used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the
administrative complaint.
d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former
trial is the same issue involved in the present case
- Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was the same
issue in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner
extorted money from Weng Sai Qin
e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross
examine the witness in the former case.
- Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-
examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and
vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan
 Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the
rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47,
Rule 130, were satisfied.
 Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed
no error when they applied it and took cognizance of the
former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan
Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted
Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties
of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law.
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 Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, subject to the observance
of fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in justiciable cases presented before them.
 In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense.
Petitioner’s assertion that there was no hearing (that he was
deprived of the opportunity to be heard) is likewise without
merit. Apparently, petitioner’s concept of the opportunity to be
heard is the opportunity to ventilate one’s side in a formal
hearing where he can have a face-to-face confrontation with
the complainant.
 It is well-settled that, in administrative cases, the
requirement of notice and hearing does not connote
full adversarial proceedings
- Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice.
- Where opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process.
- A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and
in all instances essential.
- The requirements are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand.
 The standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.
 In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits
or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as
affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.
 In this case, petitioner was heard through the various
pleadings which he filed with the Board of Discipline of
the BID when he filed his answer and two motions to
dismiss, as well as other motions and papers. He was
also able to participate in all stages of the administrative
proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the CSC by
way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
 And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
 Denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioner himself admits that he filed a motion for
reconsideration[24] of the decision of the BID which
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
was confirmed by the Secretary of Justice. He also
admits that he filed a motion for
reconsideration[25] with the CSC. Hence, by his own
admission, petitioners protestations that he had
been deprived of due process must necessarily fail.
To suspend” means “to stop temporarily; to
discontinue” or “to cause to be intermitted or
interrupted.”
 The records of this case show that petitioner was
granted probation in an order dated December 12, 1992
of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
 He was dismissed from the service in the decision dated
July 25, 1996 of the BID Commissioner.
 Since the grant of probation was granted long before the
administrative case was decided, the probation could not
have possibly suspended the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal from the service in the administrative case
since there was no administrative penalty that could
have been interrupted by the probation at the time it was
granted. Indeed, petitioner’s discharge on probation
could not have restored or reinstated him to his
employment in government service since he had not
been yet been dismissed therefrom at the time of his
discharge.
Probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case,
not its administrative dimension.
 Even if dismissal had been one of the accessory
penalties of the principal penalty imposed upon petitioner
in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case
had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not have
been suspended by the grant of probation.
 As petitioner himself contends, the criminal action is
separate and distinct from the administrative case. And,
if only for that reason, so is administrative liability
separate and distinct from penal liability. Hence,
probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case, not
its administrative dimension.
C2.4 Iglesias v Ombudsman
G.R. No. 180745, August 30, 2017
LEONEN, J.:
Petitioner Iglesias was employed as Acting District Collector
by the Bureau of Customs on October 1, 2002. She was
assigned at the Port of San Fernando, La Union by
Commissioner Antonio Bernardo.9
On January 28, 2004, the Department of Finance, through
Atty. Leon L. Acuña (Atty. Acuña) and Troy Francis C.
Pizarro (Pizarro), filed a Complaint-Affidavit10 against Iglesias
before the Office of the Ombudsman.11 Atty. Acuña and
Pizarro claimed that Iglesias failed to file her Statements of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) prior to the year
2000.12
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They also alleged that Iglesias made false entries in her
2000, 2001, and 2002 SALNs with respect to two (2) real
properties in Quezon City and Pangasinan. The Quezon City
property's tax declarations revealed that Iglesias purchased
the property on August 1, 1996 from the spouses Rosario
and Elpidio Ablang. Likewise, the Pangasinan property's
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued by virtue of a deed of
sale showing that she purchased a portion of this property
from Marina Lopez de Joya (Marina). However, in her
SALNs, Iglesias indicated that these properties were
acquired through inheritance.13
Atty. Acuña and Pizarro also discovered three (3) real
properties in Pangasinan under Iglesias' name that were not
declared in her SALNs.14 They further asserted that Iglesias
acquired several real and personal properties from 1999 to
2002 amounting to P15,230,000.00, which was
disproportionate to her lawful source of income. They
contended that the following properties were unlawfully
acquired.
Finally, Atty. Acuña and Pizarro averred that Iglesias made
false representations when she dechtred in her letter to then
President Gloria Macapagat-Arroyo that she was taking up
Masters in Customs Administration, instead of Masters in
Management.17 They also alleged that Iglesias falsified her
Personal Data Sheet when she antedated its execution.
Iglesias countered that she did not falsify the mode of
acquisition of the Pangasinan and Quezon City properties in
her SALNs.28 Iglesias and her sister, Rosario de Joya-Ablang
(Rosario), inherited the Quezon City property from their
parents.29 She "merely bought out her sister's share of their
joint inherited property[.]"30 Regarding the Pangasinan
property, Iglesias reasoned that she acquired the property
through purchase and donation when her mother, Marina,
sold it to her for an amount well below its true value. 31
Iglesias explained that she did not declare the three (3)
Pangasinan properties because these were classified as
public lands and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources had yet to award the properties to her. She
contended that she was merely considered an applicant for
the grant of the public lands.32
Iglesias argued that her educational attainment was correctly
stated in her resume. She initially took up a master's degree
in Customs Administration but was not able to finish the
degree and eventually shifted to Management. 35 Lastly, the
false date on her Personal Data Sheet was a typographical
error.36
She claimed that the allegations against her were false and
baseless and that Atty. Acuña and Pizarro should be held
"criminally liable for malicious prosecution" and "for making
untruthful statements under oath in their Complaint-
Affidavit."37
On April 15, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon issued an Order39 in connection with the administrative
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
case, preventively suspending Iglesias for six (6) months
while the investigation was ongoing.40
Prosecution Officer Reñido found that Atty. Acuña and
Pizarro did not conduct an intensive investigation before they
filed the complaint against Iglesias,44 who was able to submit
authentic copies of her filed SALNs from 1989 to 1999.45
He gave merit to Iglesias' explanation that the Quezon City
and Pangasinan properties were part of her inheritance from
her parents Since Iglesias inherited a great portion of the
Quezon City property from her parent, she did not err in
declaring the property as acquired through
inheritance.46 Meanwhile, the Pangasinan property was
intended to be donated to Iglesias by her mother. They relied
on the credibility of the lawyer who made a deed of sale
instead of a deed of donation to facilitate the transaction.47
Prosecution Officer Reñido held that Iglesias was correct in
not declaring the three (3) Pangasinan properties in her
SALNs, as she had not yet acquired them, On the alleged
illegally acquired properties, he stated that Iglesias "was able
to shed light on how she was able to lawfully acquire [these]
assets."49
On the allegation that Iglesias falsified her educational
attainment, Prosecution Officer Reñido ruled that Iglesias had
sufficiently proven that she shifted to Management upon
learning that the Civil Service Commission did not require a
specific geme of a master's degree.50 He also found that the
alleged falsification of Iglesias' Personal Data Sheet was a
mere typographical error.51
Prosecution Officer Reñido recommended the dismissal of
both cases.52 Likewise, he recommended that the preventive
suspension be lifted upon the Joint Resolution's approval.53
Director Emilio A. Gonzalez III of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution.
However, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C.
Fernandez recommended its disapproval.54
On February 7, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution55 reviewing the October 12, 2004 Joint
Resolution. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Ombudsman
Marcelo) held that Iglesias failed to justify the substantial
increase in her net worth. In just one (1) year, her net worth
as declared in her SALN increased from P245,000.00 in 1989
to P1,685,000.00 in 1990.56
In examining Iglesias' SALNs, Ombudsman Marcelo found
that she obtained housing loans of P14,000,000.00 in 1994,
P26,000,000.00 in 1998, and P29,000,000.00 in
1999.58 Since the housing loans were not supported by
evidence, Ombudsman Marcelo considered them "spurious
or non-existent, meant only to cover up the rapidly increasing
assets of [Iglesias]."59
According to Ombudsman Marcelo, Iglesias also falsified her
Personal Data Sheet "when she denied having any criminal
charges ever filed against her . . . despite evidence to the
contrary."60 Iglesias had two (2) pending estafa cases and
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three (3) dismissed cases before the lower courts, as stated
in the National Bureau of Investigation's May 22, 2001
Certification.61 She likewise committed falsification when she
did not declare the true value of the Pampanga property and
reported its worth at only P50,000.00.62
Ombudsman Marcelo held that the acts of Iglesias constitute
dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal
from service under Rule IV, Section 52(A) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in relation
to Book V, Sections 9 and 22 of the Administrative Code of
1987.64
The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, Respondent ALBERTA DE JOYA-IGLESIAS
is hereby found guilty of the administrative offense of
DISHONESTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Thus, she is
ordered DISMISSED from the service, with cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification for reemployment in the government
service.
Moreover, sufficient probable cause exists to hold respondent
ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS liable for violation of Art. 171
(Falsification) and Art. 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Iglesias appealed the February 7, 2005 Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman and the February 21, 2005 Joint
Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
before the Court of Appeals.68
Iglesias argued that she was denied administrative due
process. She claimed that there was failure to meet the
substantial evidence requirement in administrative
proceedings.69 Further, she asserted that her defense of
denial and the presence of mitigating circumstances should
have been considered by the Office of the Ombudsman and
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. 70
Petitioner alleges that respondent Tan took her place as
Acting District Collector during her preventive suspension.
However, after the termination of her six (6)-month
suspension, she was not automatically reinstated to her
position and respondent Tan was confirmed as Acting District
Collector. Petitioner claims that she was demoted as Deputy
Collector for Operations without due process.79
Petitioner argues that she was not given an opportunity to
refute the new accusations and charges against her which
were not stated in the Complaint-Affidavit. Her filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration did "not address the fact that she
was never informed of the true allegations against
her."84 Thus, she claims that "her right to be informed of the
accusations against her and to be afforded with due process
of law has been violated."85
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of
administrative due process when the Resolution dismissing
her appeal was based on allegations that were not contained
in the Complaint.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Petitioner's contention has no merit.
Administrative due process demands that the party being
charged is given an opportunity to be heard. 106 Due process
is complied with "if the party who is properly notified of
allegations against him or her is given an opportunity to
defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such
defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own
independent conclusions."107
In F/O Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:108
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
o£portunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.109
An important component of due process is the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against
him or her.110 A proper appraisal of the accusations would
give the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for his
or her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be
undermined.111
This Court finds that there was a violation of due process with
respect to the other charges which were not in the original
complaint. This Court sternly reminds the Ombudsman that
he cannot add new findings which were not part of the
original complaint. To do so would violate the right of the
accused to due process.
However, there were charges in the original complaint which
should prosper. A reading of the Office of the Ombudsman
Resolution reveals that she was dismissed from service not
solely on the irregularities found in her 1989 to 1999 SALNs
but also because of anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002
SALNs, which she was informed of and was given the
opportunity to refute.
Even if the findings in relation to petitioner's 1989 to 1999
SALNs were disregarded, petitioner would still be liable for
the discrepancies in her 2000 to 2002 SALNs. These
discrepancies were stated in the Complaint Affidavit and
were given clarification by petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit
and Position Paper. Moreover, she was able to move for
reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman February 7,
2005 Resolution. These circumstances preclude petitioner
from claiming that she was denied her right to due process.
On a final note, this Court endeavors to strike a balance
between the accountability of public officers as a result of
public office being a privilege, on the one hand, and their
right to privacy as protected in the Bill of Rights, on the other.
Although this Court has held that the requirement of
submitting a SALN does not violate the right to privacy of
public officers, it does not mean that they should completely
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COMPLETE ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST EPA PASCUAL 17-18
shed this right. Therefore, minor or explainable errors in the
SALN, which cannot be related to an attempt to conceal illicit
activities, should not be punishable. This Court may relax the
rule on strictly complying with the SALN in cases where
minor errors were committed since these may simply be used
to harass and obstruct public officers in the performance of
their duties. However, the errors in this case were so
substantial and glaring that they should not escape
prosecution.
Petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias
is GUILTY of DISHONESTY and GRAVEMISCONDUCT bas
ed on the anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002 Statements of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth. Thus, she
is DISMISSED from service, which includes the accessory
penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave
credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification for re-
employment in the government service.
C2.5 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. DAMAYAN NG PUROK 14, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
o Respondent Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc., is a registered
non-stock, non-profit corporation existing under
Philippine laws. Its members are residents of Purok 14,
Zone 3B, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. They are
claiming an area that forms part of a vast tract of land
segregated from Fort Bonifacio which was declared
open for disposition by Presidential proclamation
o Petitioner is represented herein by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Housing Administration (AFPHA), an
unincorporated office within the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), organized pursuant to GHO General
Order No. 91 dated February 27, 1979.
o Damayan filed a complaint before the COSLAP, alleging
that petitioner herein had encroached upon an area
comprising 10,600 square meters of Lot 1, SWO-13-
00258, in Barangay Signal Village.
COSLAP declared, among others, some 98,207 square
meters of the contested lot as part of Barangay Signal Village
and generally not available for government projects.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this resolution, but
COSLAP denied its motion
CA dismissed it in a decision promulgated on March 15,
2000, for being the wrong mode of appeal, thus:
Both Executive Order No. 561, Creating the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems, and the Rules of
Procedure adopted and promulgated by COSLAP explicitly
provides that the mode of appeal from the final order,
decision or resolution of the Commission shall be appealable
by certiorari only to the Supreme Court.
Thus, under par. 4, Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, an
appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
ISSUE: To which court should the decision of the COSLAP
be appealed?
RULING:
In Henry Sy v. Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems and Femina Mina, G.R. No. 140903, , we have
ruled squarely on that question. Private respondent Mina had
bought parcels of land that she discovered were occupied by
entities claiming to be owners thereof, including the mall
called SM Fairview. She filed a complaint before the
COSLAP, which in turn summoned Henry Sy as manager of
SM Fairview. The latters counsel, through a Special
Appearance, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The motion was denied, prompting Sy to file
before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, based on Section 3 (2) of EO
No. 561, the law creating COSLAP
As held in Sy v. Commission, aforecited, the appeal
from the orders, resolutions or decisions of COSLAP shall be
taken to the Court of Appeals, under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. We declared:
It is readily apparent that appeals from the COSLAP may not be
brought directly before us in view of Rule 45, Section 1. Likewise, if a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy, the
Court of Appeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the
doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot be doubted
that the COSLAP is among those quasi-judicial agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions.
No convincing reason exists why appeals from the COSLAP should
be treated differently from other quasi-judicial agencies whose
orders, resolutions or decision are directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is not
exclusive. In that sense, Section 3 (2) of E.O. No. 561 declaring that
the COSLAPs orders, resolutions or decisions are
appealable exclusively to this Court is erroneous in the light of
Section 1, Rule 45 and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, supra.
As with other administrative agencies discharging quasi-
judicial functions, recourse must first be had through the
Court of Appeals. There is nothing novel or objectionable to
this, for as we emphasized in Fabian,
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of
creating a new right of appeal because such power of the
Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate
courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power.
Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested
right because the parties have still a remedy and still a
competent tribunal to administer that remedy.
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Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes
involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are
procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into
effect or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was
declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals
in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
In other words, all appeals from orders, resolutions or
decisions of public respondent (COSLAP) shall be taken to
the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Accordingly, we rule that the appellate court erred in its
assailed decision dismissing the petition by herein petitioner
against respondent Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc. Petitioner
properly brought its petition to the Court of Appeals seeking a
review of a resolution of COSLAP as a quasi-judicial agency.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated March 14, 2000, denying the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 49274, and its resolution dated
May 9, 2000, denying the motion for reconsideration, are
SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to take
cognizance of the petition for review filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines for resolution without further
delay.
C2.6 PHILLIPS SEAFOD CORP VS THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS
G.R. NO 175787
FACTS:
Petitioner Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation is a
domestic corporation engaged in the export of processed
crabmeat and other seafood products. Petitioner was
incorporated on 20 October 1992 and registered under its
previous corporate name of Phillips Seafood Masbate, Inc.
On 08 January 1993, petitioner registered with respondent
Bureau of Investments (BOI) as an existing and expansion
producer of soft shell crabs and other seafood products, on a
non-pioneer status under Certificate of Registration No. EP
93-219. Petitioner’s plant was situated in Piña, Masbate,
while its administrative office was then located in Cebu City
before it was subsequently relocated to Calong-Calong,
Airport Subdivision, Bacolod City.
Petitioner was granted an Income Tax Holiday (ITH) for six
(6) years beginning July 1993 to July 1999, for locating in a
less-developed area in accordance with Article 40 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 226, otherwise known as The
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
Petitioner used to supply semi-processed raw materials to
Phillips Seafood (Phils.), Inc. (PSPI), an affiliate corporation
also engaged in the export of seafood products, before the
latter’s closure due to financial difficulties. On 21 July 1997,
petitioner acquired the right to use the canning facility of
PSPI in Bacolod City during the temporary suspension of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
PSPI’s operations. Unable to recover from its financial
reverses, PSPI eventually stopped operations.
On 14 December 1998, petitioner acquired the title to the
plant, facilities, equipment and other assets belonging to
PSPI, including its picking facilities in Cebu City. In October
1999, petitioner relocated its plant and office in Bacolod City
to Barangay Banica, Roxas City. Petitioner informed
respondent BOI of said transfer.8 Petitioner also filed with
respondent BOI an application for registration of its new plant
having an expanded capacity of 155,205 kilograms a year.
In a letter dated 18 November 1999, respondent BOI
informed petitioner that the latter’s ITH under Certificate of
Registration No. EP 93-219 would be extended until 12
August 2000, pursuant to Article 39 (a) (1) (ii) of Executive
Order No. 226.
On 06 January 2000, respondent BOI granted petitioner’s
application for registration of its new plant in Roxas City
under Certificate of Registration No. VI EP 2000-002.
Petitioner’s registration was categorized as a new producer
on a non-pioneer status with an ITH for four years beginning
January 2000. On 22 June 2000, respondent BOI approved
the registration of petitioner as a "New Producer of
Processed Fish" under another Certificate of Registration No.
XI EP 2000-74 with an ITH for four years beginning April
2000.
On 04 May 2000, petitioner filed with respondent BOI an
application for an ITH for taxable year 1999 under Certificate
of Registration No. EP 93-219. It filed another application for
an ITH for the year 2000 under Certificate of Registration No.
VI EP 2000-002 covering its crabmeat products and under
Certificate of Registration No. XI EP 20000-74 covering its
processed fish products. Petitioner changed its corporate
name from PS-Masbate to its current name of Phillips
Seafood (Philippines) Corporation, which was approved by
respondent BOI on 16 February 2001.
In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI
informed petitioner that the ITH previously granted would be
applicable only to the period from 13 August 1999 to 21
October 1999 or before petitioner’s transfer to a "not less-
developed area." Petitioner wrote respondent BOI requesting
for a reconsideration of its decision.
On 03 May 2004, petitioner received by fax BOI’s letter
denying its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner elevated the
matter to the Office of the President, which dismissed
petitioner’s appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in a
Decision dated 22 September 2004. The Office of the
President likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in an Order dated 14 March 2005. Petitioner
received a copy of the order on 01 April 2005.
On 05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals, questioning the dismissal of its appeal
before the Office of the President. The petition argued that
the executive power of control over the acts of officials under
the Office of the President is superior to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over decisions of quasi-
judicial agencies under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
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After respondent BOI filed its comment on the petition,
petitioner filed an omnibus motion asking for leave to file an
amended petition to counter the issues raised in the
comment for the first time and to suspend the period for filing
a reply.
CA - rendered the first assailed resolution denying
petitioner’s omnibus motion and dismissing its petition for
review. The appellate court denied petitioner’s omnibus
motion on the ground that the same was filed with intent to
delay the case. Simultaneously, the appellate court
dismissed the petition for review for having been filed out of
time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of the
President instead of filing a Rule 43 petition to the Court of
Appeals within the reglementary period. On 24 November
2006, the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed
resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
(1) petitioner’s omnibus motion asking for the amendment of
its petition for review was filed to avoid the multiplicity of
suits;
(2) the executive power of control over the acts of department
secretaries must not be rendered illusory by rules of
procedure; and
(3) petitioner is entitled to the ITH
HELD:
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent
right – it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and,
therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. It
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provisions of the law. Thus, in
determining the appellate procedure governing administrative
agencies exercising quasi-judicial or regulatory functions
such as respondent BOI, a perusal of the legislative
enactments creating them is imperative.
The BOI was created by virtue of E.O. No. 226 at the time
when then President Corazon Aquino was exercising
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Investments Acts of 1987, laid down the powers and duties of
respondent both as a policy-making body and a regulatory
agency tasked with facilitating the growth of investment in the
country. Article 7, E.O. No. 226 directs respondent to act as a
collegial body when exercising its duties and powers. In
addition to its administrative or policy-making and regulatory
functions, the BOI is also empowered to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the provisions of E.O. No. 226.
As a policy-making body, the BOI is charged with the duties,
among others, of preparing an annual investment priorities
plan that gives incentives to specific activities, of
recommending to the Bureau of Immigration the entry of
foreign nationals for employment purposes, and of inspecting
registered enterprises for compliance purposes. Among the
regulatory functions of the BOI are the processing of
applications for registration, the cancellation of registration or
suspension of the enjoyment of certain incentives under E.O.
No. 226, and the resolution of controversies arising from the
implementation of E.O. No. 226. There is no doubt that the
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
resolution of petitioner’s claim that it is entitled to the ITH in
the instant case calls for the exercise of the BOI’s regulatory
functions.
E.O. No. 226 also provides for various remedies from the
action or decision of the BOI, depending on the nature of the
controversy. These remedies, which are interspersed among
the provisions of E.O. No. 226, are as follows:
Art. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board. — The
Board shall be responsible for the regulation and
promotion of investments in the Philippines. x x x
The presence of four (4) governors shall constitute a
quorum and the affirmative vote of four (4)
governors in a meeting validly held shall be
necessary to exercise its powers and perform its
duties, which shall be as follows:
(4) After due hearing, decide controversies
concerning the implementation of the relevant books
of this Code that may arise between registered
enterprises or investors therein and government
agencies, within thirty (30) days after the
controversy has been submitted for decision:
Provided, That the investor or the registered
enterprise may appeal the decision of the Board
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to the
President;
Art. 36. Appeal from Board’s Decision. — Any order
or decision of the Board shall be final and executory
after thirty (30) days from its promulgation. Within
the said period of thirty (30) days, said order or
decision may be appealed to the Office of the
President. Where an appeal has been filed, said
order or decision shall be final and executory ninety
(90) days after the perfection of the appeal, unless
reversed.
Art. 50. Cause for Cancellation of Certificate of
Authority or Payment of Fine. — A violation of any of
the requirements set forth in Article 49 of the terms
and conditions which the Board may impose shall
be sufficient cause to cancel the certificate of
authority issued pursuant to this Book and/or subject
firms to the payment of fines in accordance with the
rules and regulations issued by the Board: x x
x Provided, further, That where the issuance of said
license has been irregular or contrary to law, any
person adversely affected thereby may file an action
with the Regional Trial Court where said alien or
foreign business organization resides or has its
principal office to cancel said license. In such cases,
no injunction shall issue without notice and hearing;
and appeals and other proceedings for review
shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
Art. 82. Judicial Relief. — All orders or decisions of
the Board in cases involving the provisions of this
Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal
from the order or decision of the Board by the party
adversely affected shall stay such order or
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decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the order or decision.
E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from
an action or decision of the BOI, depending on the nature of
the controversy. One mode is to elevate an appeal to the
Office of the President when the action or decision pertains to
either of these two instances: first, in the decisions of the BOI
over controversies concerning the implementation of the
relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between
registered enterprises or investors and government agencies
under Article 7; and second, in an action of the BOI over
applications for registration under the investment priorities
plan under Article 36.
Another mode of review is to elevate the matter directly to
judicial tribunals. For instance, under Article 50, E.O. No.
226, a party adversely affected by the issuance of a license
to do business in favor of an alien or a foreign firm may file
with the proper Regional Trial Court an action to cancel said
license. Then, there is Article 82, E.O. No. 226, which, in its
broad phraseology, authorizes the direct appeal to the
Supreme Court from any order or decision of respondent BOI
"involving the provisions of E.O. No. 226."
E.O. No. 226 contains no provision specifically governing the
remedy of a party whose application for an ITH has been
denied by the BOI in the same manner that Articles 7 and 36
thereof allow recourse to the Office of the President in certain
instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is the
catch-all provision allowing the appeal to the courts from all
other decisions of respondent BOI involving the other
provisions of E.O. No. 226. The intendment of the law is
undoubtedly to afford immediate judicial relief from the
decision of respondent BOI, save in cases mentioned under
Articles 7 and 36.
In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes
respondent BOI as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose
judgments or final orders are appealable to the Court of
Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in
Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies.
Thus, petitioner should have immediately elevated to the
Court of Appeals the denial by respondent BOI of its
application for an ITH. From the letter dated 09 October
2003 of respondent BOI, which informed petitioner that its
ITH would be extended only from 13 August 1999 to 21
October 1999, petitioner appealed to the Office of the
President, a recourse that is not sanctioned by either the
Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987.
Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to
justify its appeal to the Office of the President. Article 36,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
along with Article 7, which allows recourse to the Office of the
President, applies to specific instances, namely,
controversies between a registered enterprise and a
government agency and decisions concerning the
registration of an enterprise, respectively. Expresio unius
est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that
other controversies outside of its purview, including
petitioner’s entitlement to an ITH, can invoke only the
appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the
instant case, the denial of petitioner’s application for an ITH is
not within the cases where the law expressly provides for
appellate recourse to the Office of the President. That being
the case, petitioner should have elevated its appeal to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
The executive power of control over the acts of department
secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the
"power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter."
Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the
structure of the executive branch of government, and the
corresponding degrees of administrative control and
supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It
may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate
procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in
nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court’s rule-
making power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the
Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning the procedure in all courts.
Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly
recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office
of the President from the decisions of executive departments
and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order
issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to
the Office of the President when there is a special law that
provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case,
the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly
allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of
respondent BOI involving petitioner’s application for an ITH.
E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail
over A.O. No. 18.
C2,7. G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of
SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS
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June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA)
awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which
are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The
award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.1 By
virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975,
the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA is
the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children:
Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent)
and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
predeceased her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera
died on October 27, 1971.
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child
of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative,
being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita
Herrera.
The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages of
the document with the said document having 2 pages in total.
Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark above her name in
the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page
of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case
for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the
then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan,
Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for
annulment
Decision in Case (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication)
was rendered and the deed was declared null and void.
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of
Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with
the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a
copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother.
Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado, protested the application.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right
to purchase the lots in question.
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the
President. The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of
the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987.
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs
executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved
by the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in
favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued
in their favor. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera
directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises
that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the
President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent
Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a
Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of
Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her
forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-
raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-
adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the
other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of
Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by
laches and that the decision of the Office of the President
was already final and executory. They also contended that
the transfer of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid
as the same was supported by a consideration and that
Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of her
own money. Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of
the property was by mere tolerance and that they had been
paying taxes thereon.
RTC dismissed case for lack of jurisdiction. CA reversed the
RTC decision. Case was remanded to RTC
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition
of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held
that the said document must first be submitted to probate
before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their
respective motions for reconsideration which were both
denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca
Herrera was denied admission by the appellate court in a
Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of
the brief submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-
nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court,
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in
awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld
the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not
an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of
whether it was a valid will must first be determined by
probate.
ISSUE
WON administrative res judicata has set in the case?
RULING
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court
decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of
administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
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competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers
and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments
of courts having general judicial powers . . . It has been
declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested
with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen
is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a
certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence were already
mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to
apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing
the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to
allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon
whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers
will always be subject to true judicial power—that which is
held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that
power of adjudication of an administrative agency for the
"formulation of a final order." This function applies to the
actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative
officers or bodies who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and
to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However,
administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their
strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes
the three great powers into its three (3) branches—the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department
is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere.
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own
fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the
judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Courts have an
expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution
of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article
VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other
branches of government committed an act that falls under the
category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 where it is therein provided that
the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals)
shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of
the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution…" and contends that the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the
NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its
decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of
the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case
has already been settled in the decision of the Court of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and
executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated
October 10, 1989). We find no reason to disturb this ruling.
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The
system of judicial review should not be misused and abused
to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. The
appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which
must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.
2nd ruling
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the
NHA.31That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an
evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by
Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera
was then applying to purchase the same before it."32
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the
effectivity of the said document commences at the time of
death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling
ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such
period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers
and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are
transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil
Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will
or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her
interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing
Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita
Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified
nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both
parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became
transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by
operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not
a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by
virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution
by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially
paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to
the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing
Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in
Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
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C.3.1 FACT FINDING INVESTIGATIVE, LICENSING AND
RATE-FIXING POWERS
ATTY. ODCHIGUE-BONDOC v. TAN TIONG BIO
G.R. No. 186652 | August 30, 2017
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
• Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment
payments of a 683-square-meter lot in the Manila
Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf
& Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but
Fil-Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the lot,
despite repeated demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed
the demand for the refund of the purchase price.
• Tan Tiong Bio, later learning that the lot sold to him was
inexistent, filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate
officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice
Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner) and other employees.
• In her Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Odchigue-Bondoc alleged
that, inter alia,
xxx
5. I had no participation at all in the acts or
transactions alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit. As a
Corporate Secretary, I have never been involved in
the management and day-to-day operations of [Fil-
Estate]. x x x
7. x x x. Tan Tiong Bio alleges:
The letter showed that the request was
approved by Atty. Odchigue-Bondoc, provided
that the transfer fee was paid, and that there be
payment of full downpayment, with the balance
payable in two years.
8) The handwritten approval and endorsement,
however, are not mine. I have never transacted,
either directly or indirectly, with Mrs. Ona or Tan
Tiong Bio. x x x
• On the basis of Atty. Odchigue-Bondoc above-quoted
allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, Tan Tiong Bio filed a
complaint for Perjury against petitioner, which was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, and denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
• On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there
was no showing of any reversible error.
• Tan Tiong Bio motion for reconsideration having been
denied, he filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which, by Decision set aside the DOJ Secretarys
Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents
petition for review without therein expressing clearly and
distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
• Atty. Odchigue-Bondoc Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied by the appellate court, she filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT/S:
• Petitioner asserts that the requirement in Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of
justice;
In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna:
The constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or
rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ; and that
Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows the DOJ to
dismiss a petition for review motu proprio, and the use of the
word outright in the DOJ Resolution simply means altogether,
entirely or openly.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT/S:
• Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is
not limited to courts.
In Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto,
As it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as
well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these
tribunals.
Citing Adasa v. Abalos,
The DOJ muddled the distinction between Sections 7 and 12
of the NPS Rule on Appeal and that an outright dismissal is
not allowed since the DOJ must set the reasons why it finds
no reversible error in an assailed resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice.
YES.
HELD:
• A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding since the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
x x x [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to
enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
[prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said
to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
[prosecutor].
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• A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative
or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining
information on what future action of a judicial nature may be
taken.
Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, in fact iterates that even the
action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a
quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend
to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
• Tan Tiong Bo posits, however, that Balangauan finds no
application in the present case for, as the Supreme Court
stated, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution
by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved [the therein]
respondent[s] . . . motion for reconsideration. Respondents
position fails.
• Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended
resolution in resolving the therein respondents motion for
reconsideration is immaterial. The extended resolution
did not detract from settling that the DOJ is not a
quasi-judicial body.
• Respondents citation of Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans is misplaced as the
Ombudsman dismissed the therein subject complaint prior
to any preliminary investigation.
• Respecting the action of the Secretary of Justice on
respondents petition for review under Section 12 of the
NPS Rule on Appeal, respondent posits that outright
dismissal is not sanctioned thereunder but under Section 7.
Tan Tiong Bo positions similarly fails.
• That the DOJ Secretary used the word outright in
dismissing respondents petition for review under Section 12
of the Rule which reads:
SEC. 12. Disposition of the appeal.The Secretary may
reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may,
motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for
review on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(a) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
x x x x motu proprio does not dent his action. To be sure,
the word outright was merely used in conjunction with the
motu proprio action.
• Section 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the
outright dismissal of a petition for review. These are:
(a) when the petition is patently without merit;
(b) when the petition is manifestly intended for delay;
(c) when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration; and
(d) when the accused has already been arraigned in court.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
• When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition
for review does not suffer any of the infirmities laid down in
Section 7, it can decide what action to take (i.e., reverse,
modify, affirm or dismiss the appeal altogether),
conformably with Section 12. In other words, Sections 7
and 12 are part of a two-step approach in the DOJ
Secretarys review power.
• As for respondents reliance on Adasa, it too fails for, unlike
in the case of Adasa, herein petitioner has not been
arraigned as in fact no Information has been filed against
her.
C3.2 G.R. No. 187317. April 11, 2013
CARLITO C. ENCINAS, petitioner, vs. PO1 ALFREDO P.
AGUSTIN, JR. and PO1 JOEL S.
CAUBANG, respondents.
FACTS:
 Respondents Agustin and Caubang were then both holding
positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija.
- They claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m.,
petitioner who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva
Ecija informed them that unless they gave him P5,000,
they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan
City and transferred to far-flung areas.
 Agustin would supposedly be transferred to the Cuyapo Fire
Station (Cuyapo), and Caubang to Talugtug Fire Station
(Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay
petitioner.
- respondents came up short and managed to give only
P2,000, prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with
the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the
balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively
reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo
and Talugtug, respectively
 Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed
with the BFP - BFP Complaint for illegal transfer of
personnel under RA 6975 or the DILG Act of 1990. The
record is not clear as to why this Complaint was later docketed
by the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of RA3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The BFP Complaint
provides in pertinent part:
- Encinas relieved us from our present assignment and
transferred us to different far places without any cause and
due process of law based from the BFP Manual (RA6975)
- The reason why he relieved us was due to our failure to
give the money he was asking from both of us in the
amount of P5,000 in exchange for our present assignment
to be retained.
 On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts,
respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field
Office in Cabanatuan City, CSCRO Complaint
- This time, they accused petitioner of violation of Section
4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The relevant portion of the CSCRO Complaint provides:
6. That we executed this affidavit to file a complaint
against C. Insp. Carlito C. Encinas BFP for violation
of Section 4 (C) R.A. 6713, that is "Justness and
sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act
with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor
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and the underprivileged. They shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest."
- The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the
above-quoted provision as Section 4(c), but it should be
denoted as Section 4(A)(c).
 On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was
conducted in connection with his alleged extortion activities,
petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service. He was required to file an answer within 5 days from
notice. The Formal Charge specifically reads in part:
- Although it was not specifically mentioned in the records,
the offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service can be found in
Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Book V, respectively, of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The record does not indicate
whether petitioner was formally charged with violation of
R.A. No. 6713.
BFP Complaint
Answer to the BFP Complaint: petitioner claimed that in an alleged
Confidential Report, no copy of which was attached to the record, the
investigating body recommended that charges against him be
dropped for insufficiency of evidence. Instead, it recommended
that respondents be charged with conducting unauthorized fire
safety inspection and engaging in the sale of fire extinguishers,
both in violation of the rules.
 It appears on record that the Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the
BFP issued a Resolution recommending that the administrative
complaint against petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
 The IAS ruled that the reassignment of respondents was within
the ambit of authority of the head of office. Thus, said
reassignment may have been ordered as long as the exigencies
of the service so required. The Resolution dated 05 July 2005
states in pertinent part:
- The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit
of authority, CSC Resolution No. 93402 the commission
ruled as follows:
- "That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office
of the duly authority representative when the exigencies
of the service so require but subject to the condition
that there will be no reduction in rank, status or salary,
further on Bongbong vs Paracaldo the SC ruled held that
"on general principle petitioner may be transferred as to
the exigencies of the service require".
- WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office (IAS) most
respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint
against C/INSP CARLITO ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence.
CSCRO Complaint
Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service:
- petitioner claimed that the CSCRO Complaint was an
offshoot of the reassignment of respondents.
- He alleged that they were reassigned after it was
discovered that they had conducted a fire safety inspection
of establishments within Nueva Ecija without any mission
order.
- In relation to this operation, they supposedly sold fire
extinguishers to the owners of the establishments they had
inspected.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
- He cited the alleged Confidential Report in which the
investigating body recommended the dropping of charges
against him.
- He further added that, in view of his exemplary and faithful
service, the then-incumbent governor even requested the
continuance of his stint as Provincial Fire Marshall of
Nueva Ecija.
 In his Position Paper, petitioner claimed that respondents'
transfer had been made in compliance with the directive of
Supt. Supt. Tutaan and pursuant to law.
CSCRO Ruling: finding petitioner administratively liable
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from
service.
 The CSCRO ruled that respondents, through their respective
testimonies, were able to establish the fact that petitioner
demanded from them the amount of P5,000 in exchange for
their non-reassignment to far-flung fire stations.
 The fact that they did not present any document to show that
petitioner received P2,000 did not preclude a finding of
administrative liability.
 The consistency of their oral testimonies already constituted
substantial evidence. Granting that they committed illegal acts
prior to their reassignment, this allegation nevertheless did not
rebut their claims that petitioner had extorted money from them.
The admission of Supt. Tutaan that he gave instructions for their
reassignment did not disprove the accusation of extortion, but
merely established that there was indeed an order to reassign
them.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration - DENIED
 He argued that the Sworn Statements of his witnesses should
have been given weight instead of respondents' testimonies.
 He explained that Mrs. Calanoc, owner of Reynand Gas Dealer,
confirmed that respondents had conducted a physical
inspection of her establishment, after which they recommended
that she pay conveyance permit fees as a requisite for the
issuance of a Fire Safety Certificate.
 Also, Carlito Umali confirmed that he had indeed accompanied
petitioner when the latter investigated the Complaint filed by
Mrs. Calanoc against respondents.
 Furthermore, Myrna Villanueva the owner of the house where
respondents supposedly paid petitioner P2,000 claimed that she
did not know them personally or recall either petitioner or
respondents ever visiting her house.
 Likewise, Supt. Tutaan confirmed that he had instructed
petitioner to cause the transfer of respondents.
 The latter also argued that the BFP Complaint had already been
dismissed by virtue of the Confidential Report, and that the
dismissal had already served as a bar to the further prosecution
of any administrative charge against him.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an Appeal Memorandum with the
CSC main office. In his Appeal, he argued that respondents
were guilty of forum-shopping for having filed 2 separate
administrative Complaints before the CSCRO on the one
hand, and before the BFP/DILG on the other. 36 Petitioner
argued that respondents failed to attach a certificate of non-
forum shopping to either Complaint.37Moreover, the CSCRO
should not have entertained the Complaint filed before it,
considering that it already knew of the then-pending
investigation conducted by the BFP/DILG.
CSC Ruling – DENIED
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 Petitioner's appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its
Resolution No. 080941. It ruled that there was no forum-
shopping committed by respondents, and that substantial
evidence existed to hold petitioner administratively liable for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
 The CSC explained that the CSCRO Complaint was for violation
of R.A. No. 6713, while the BFP Complaint was for violation of
R.A. No. 6975.
 It further ruled that, although both Complaints were anchored on
a similar set of facts, there was no identity of causes of action:
thus, even if they were successively filed before different fora,
no forum-shopping existed.
 Although an investigation was then ongoing at the BFP when
the CSCRO took cognizance of the case, no forum-shopping
resulted. A perusal of the proceedings conducted at the BFP
shows that only a preliminary investigation was initiated by the
IAS-BFP, a fact-finding committee that recommended the
dismissal of the case, which was accordingly approved by the
fire director. The approval of this recommendation cannot be
regarded as one based on merits. Otherwise, it would bar the
filing of another case, particularly, with the CSCRO.
 With regard to petitioner's administrative liability, the CSC found
that because of the nature of the case extortion of money hardly
any documentary evidence could be gathered to prove the act
complained of. As expected, the CSCRO based its findings on
the written and oral testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses, as well as on the circumstances surrounding the
incident. Respondents clearly established that petitioner had
demanded P5,000 in exchange for their reassignment.
 The CSC further ruled that it was contrary to human nature for
respondents, who were merely rank-and-file employees, to
impute such a grave act to their boss. Their disparity in rank
would show that respondents could not have fabricated their
charges. It further ruled that the withdrawal of the complaint
would not result in their outright dismissal or absolve the person
complained of from administrative liability.
Petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA.
 His main argument was that the CSC erred in not dismissing
respondents' Complaint despite the absence of a certification of
non-forum shopping and respondent's actual forum-shopping,
as well as the lack of substantial evidence to hold him
administratively liable.
 In his Rule 43 Petition, petitioner claimed that a certificate of
non-forum shopping attached to a complaint is a mandatory
requirement as stated in Section 8, Rule I of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases. He argued that the causes of action in
the two Complaints were similar. With regard to the proceedings
before the CSC, aside from respondents' sole charge of
violation of R.A. No. 6713, also included were charges of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service. Petitioner reasoned that the additional
offenses charged were equivalent to a violation of R.A. No.
6975, so the issues investigated were substantially the same.
 In relation to his administrative liability, petitioner argued that
the testimonies of respondents should not be given weight, as
their credibility had been rendered questionable by their
dismissal from the service. Also, they had already withdrawn
their Complaints against him, as stated in their Affidavit of
Desistance (Affidavit), in which they admitted that the cases
were filed out of a misapprehension of facts and a
misunderstanding between the parties.
 Significantly, respondent Caubang denounced the supposed
execution of the Affidavit. He claimed that he did not sign it, and
that his purported signature therein was a forgery.
CA Ruling – DENIED
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
 The CA ruled that it was not the letter-complaint filed by
respondents that commenced the administrative proceedings
against petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge filed by Atty.
Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint merely triggered the
CSCRO's fact-finding investigation. Considering that the
Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, it
need not contain a certification of non-forum-shopping.
 The CA similarly ruled that respondents' act of simultaneously
filing Complaints against petitioner both at the CSC and the
BFP did not constitute forum-shopping. While it was conceded
that the two Complaints were founded on the same set of facts
involving the same parties, they were nonetheless based on
different causes of action more specifically, the BFP Complaint
was for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC
Complaint was for violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6713.
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
 With regard to the administrative liability of petitioner, the CA
found that substantial evidence supported the CSC's
findings.68 It likewise ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses
of petitioner were incompetent and immaterial, as these could
prove something else entirely, but did not disprove petitioner's
extortion. Also, the withdrawal of a complaint does not result in
outright dismissal or discharge a person from any administrative
liability.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration: DENIED
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping
– (NO)
(2) Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence
exists to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service. (CA correct that there is substantial evidence)
I. Respondents are NOT guilty of forum-shopping
 Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another.
 In Yu v. Lim, 631 SCRA 172 (2010), this Court
enumerated the requisites of forum-shopping as follows:
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.
 Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions;
2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars
in the two cases, such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a
subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
1) the former judgment must be final;
2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
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4) there must be between the first and the second
actions
- identity of parties,
- identity of subject matter, and
- identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the
merits “when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of
formal, technical or dilatory objections”; or when the
judgment is rendered “after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point”
 In this case, there is no “judgment on the merits” in
contemplation of the definition above.
 The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution
dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding
investigation for purposes of determining whether a
formal charge for an administrative offense should be
filed.
 Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were
determined therein with finality.
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
 The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers.
 Administrative powers here refer to those purely
administrative in nature, as opposed to
administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-
judicial character.
 In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding
involves
a) taking and evaluating evidence;
b) determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and
c) rendering an order or decision supported by the
facts proved.
 The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a
determination, with respect to the matter in controversy,
of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of
the contending parties are; and based thereon and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights
and obligations of the parties
- In Bedol v. Commission on Elections, this Court
declared:
- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on
the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in
a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
 Test for determining whether an administrative body
is exercising judicial or merely investigatory
functions:
- adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the parties.
- Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to
evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency
based on the facts and circumstances presented to
it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a
final pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment
 In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the
BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely
administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding
investigation for purposes of determining whether a
formal charge for an administrative offense should be
filed against petitioner.
 It can be gleaned from the Resolution itself that the
purpose of the BFP proceedings was to determine
whether there was sufficient ground to warrant the filing
of an appropriate administrative offense against
petitioner.
 In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public
prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he
thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers.
Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of
an administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities of persons or
entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to
require the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of
witnesses, and production of documents.
- This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication
which signifies the exercise of power and authority
to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of
concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of
investigatory powers which sets a public prosecutor
apart from the court.
Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers
in the conduct of a preliminary investigation to determine
whether, based on the evidence presented, further action
should be taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in
court
 The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) exercised its
investigative or fact-finding function to determine
whether, based on the facts and the evidence
presented, further administrative action—in the form
of a formal charge—should be taken against
petitioner.
 In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the
rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
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Findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be
interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the former, or unless
the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.
 These factual findings carry even more weight when
affirmed by the CA, in which case they are accorded not
only great respect, but even finality.
 These findings are binding upon this Court, unless it is
shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily
disregarded or misapprehended evidence before the
latter to such an extent as to compel a contrary
conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated.
 This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a
trier of facts. By reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling
under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to
pass judgment on those matters.
Even convicted criminals are not excluded from
testifying as long as, having organs of sense, they “can
perceive and perceiving can make known their
perceptions to others.”
 We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from
the service would not suffice to discredit them as
witnesses. In People v. Dominguez, this Court had
occasion to rule that even a prior criminal conviction
does not by itself suffice to discredit a witness; the
testimony of that witness must be assayed and
scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimonies of
other witnesses must be examined for their relevance
and credibility.
 In Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, this Court echoed its
previous pronouncement that even convicted criminals
are not excluded from testifying as long as, having
organs of sense, they “can perceive and perceiving can
make known their perceptions to others.”
The subsequent desistance by respondents does not
free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an
administrative proceeding is to protect the public service
based on the time-honored principle that a public office
is a public trust.
 Even assuming that an Affidavit of Desistance was
indeed executed by respondents, petitioner is still not
exonerated from liability.
 The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an
administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its
resolution.
 Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates
the personal injury of the parties and does not
extend to erase the offense that may have been
committed against the public service.
 A complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance against a
public servant of whatever rank cannot be withdrawn at
any time for whatever reason by a complainant, as a
withdrawal would be “anathema to the preservation of
the faith and confidence of the citizenry in their
government, its agencies and instrumentalities.”
Administrative proceedings “should not be made to
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who
are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.”
Petitioner’s act of demanding money from respondents
in exchange for their non-reassignment constitutes
grave misconduct.
 We have defined grave misconduct as follows:
- Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, such as
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence.
 Furthermore, petitioner’s acts likewise constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
 In Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, this Court
elaborated on the specific acts that constitute the grave
offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, considering that no concrete description is
provided under the Civil Service Law and, rules. The
Court outlined therein following acts: misappropriation of
public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report
back to work without prior notice, failure to keep in safety
public records and property, making false entries in
public documents, and falsification of court orders.
Grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal even for the first offense; On the other hand,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is
likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty
of suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the
first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
 As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a
grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first
offense. The penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service and bar from taking civil service
examinations.
C3. Remolona v CSC
G.R. No. 137473 August 2, 2001
PUNO, J.:
Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the
Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon,
while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa
Elementary School.
In a letter3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America,
District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service
eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of
81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board
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for Teachers.4 Mr. America likewise disclosed that he
received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning
for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the
teacher's board examinations. --
On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director
Bella Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs.
Remolona's eligibility, after verification from the Register of
Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed
"that Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing
examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10,
1989 does not include the name of Remolona. Furthermore,
Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating
belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the
examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%." 5
During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G.
Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City,
Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a
written statement of facts6 regarding the issuance of the
questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona, which is
summarized in the Memorandum7 submitted by Director
Pasion as follows:
"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September,
1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit Bus from
Sta. Cruz, Laguna on his way to San Pablo City, he
met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin (this is how it
sounded) who happened to be sitting beside him;
3.2 That a conversation broke out between them
until he was able to confide his problem to Atty.
Salupadin about his wife having difficulty in
acquiring an eligibility;
3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as
working at the Batasan, offered his help for a fee of
P3,000.00;
3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan
where he gave the amount of P2,000.00,
requirements, application form and picture of his
wife;
3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around
1:00 P.M., they met again at the Batasan where he
handed to Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00
plus P500.00 bonus who in turn handed to him the
Report of Rating of one Nery C. Remolona with a
passing grade, then they parted;
3.6 That sometime in the last week of September,
he showed the Report of Rating to the District
Supervisor, Francisco America who informed her
(sic) that there was no vacancy;
3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to
Dr. Magsino in writing . . . that Mr. America is asking
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
for money in exchange for the appointment of his
wife but failed to make good his promise. He
attached the corroborating affidavits of Mesdames
Carmelinda Pradillada and Rosemarie P. Romantico
and Nery C. Remolona x x x;
3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able
to get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each plus bonus
of Nery C. Remolona;
3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he
felt that Mr. America would verify the authenticity of
his wife's Report of Rating, he burned the original."
Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in
acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no
knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted
them to be together. Based on the foregoing, Director Pasion
recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative
action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona
from any liability since it has not been shown that she willfully
participated in the commission of the offense.
Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed
against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and Atty.
Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification
and dishonesty.8 A formal hearing ensued wherein the parties
presented their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC
Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued a Memorandum
dated February 14, 19959 recommending that the spouses
Estelito and Nery Remolona be found guilty as charged and
be meted the corresponding penalty.
Said recommendation was adopted by the CSG which issued
Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20, 1995, finding the
spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and
imposing the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory
penalties. In its Resolution No. 96551011 dated August 27,
1996, the CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed
by the spouses Remolona, absolved Nery Remolona from
liability .
The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service
employee can be dismissed from the government service for
an offense which is not work-related or which is not
connected with the performance of his official duty.
Remolona likewise imputes a violation of his right to due
process during the preliminary investigation because he was
not assisted by counsel. He claims that the extra-judicial
admission allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because
he was merely made to sign a blank form. He also avers that
his motion for new trial should be granted on the ground that
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing
of the case before the Regional Office of the CSC was not
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Finally, he pleads that the
penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits is too harsh
considering the nature of the offense for which he was
convicted, the length of his service in government, that this is
his first offense, and the fact that no damage was caused to
the government.
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The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial
confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted by
counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12
paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
deserves scant consideration.
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime
in the investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The
investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining
the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence
sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the
CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably
guilty thereof and should be administratively charged.
Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such
investigation may be used as evidence to justify his
dismissal.
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-
judicial admission and that he merely signed a blank form
cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high
position in government as Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon
and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in his actions
especially where he is being administratively charged with a
grave offense which carries the penalty of dismissal from
service.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave
offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in
order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged.
The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in
office.
The general rule is that where the findings of the
administrative body are amply supported by substantial
evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but
also finality, and are binding on this Court. 16 It is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the
sufficiency of evidence.17 Thus, when confronted with
conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the
administrative agency concerned in the exercise of discretion
to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of
the evidence received.18 The rule, therefore, is that courts of
justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the
latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or
when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner
such that their action may amount to an excess of
jurisdiction.19
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
C3.4 Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs Defensor
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center
(NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
FACTS:
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.
(Association) is a homeowners association from the West
Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio
F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal
capacity and on behalf of the association.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the
National Government Center Administration Committee
(Committee)
At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was
composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the
National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez,
Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor
(PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City,
Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante
Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH).
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of
presidential issuances authorized the creation and
development of what is now known as the National
Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in
Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440
hectares as a national government site to be known as the
NGC
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of
the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No.
1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the
portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage
of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos
issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993,
authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion
to maximize the number of families who can effectively
become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing
program
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On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed
into law R.A. No. 9207.
Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end,
lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.
SEC. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of
the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents.
Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by
excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side
and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and
declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents
on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in
1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east
side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and
occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further,
That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed,
drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
SEC. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of
the National Government Center Site for Local Government or
Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and
Religious Purposes. Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area
for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved
for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only
those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or
structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition
program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further,
That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in
favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used
as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the
reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot
allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be
based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of
effectivity of this Act
OSG’s CONTENTION: argues that petitioner Association
cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and
Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right over the
NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the maximum
lot area that may be awarded to a resident-beneficiary of the
NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price
escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who fails to
execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period. Also,
the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the
duly recognized peoples organization in the NGC and since
petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot question
the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
ISSUE:
Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No.
9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and
void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
RULING:
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue
of locus standi. The petition does not merit dismissal on that
ground.
There are, however, other procedural impediments to the
granting of the instant petition. The OSG claims that the
instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy
because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function
Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for
prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed
outright, the OSG contends. For their part, respondent Mayor
of Quezon City and respondent NHA contend that petitioners
violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant
petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals,
which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for
prohibition.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need
not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of
the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No.
9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the
ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the
statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the
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exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to
assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
so warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, the Court said that it will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A
perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling,
special or important reasons to warrant the Courts taking cognizance
of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any
reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity
of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution, the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus,
following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition
should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to
assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess
of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to
keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order
to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,
or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing
or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial
court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule
or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due
process requirement is deemed complied with. That there is
observance of more than the minimum requirements of due
process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a ground
to invalidate the same.
In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural
deficiencies.
C4 OTHER POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
C4.1 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LISTANA
G.R. NO. 152611
FACTS:
Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land
containing an area of 246.0561 hectares, located in
Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered to sell
the said land to the government, through the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03,
which was however
rejected by the respondent. Hence, the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon
commenced summary administrative proceedings to
determine the just compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing
computation, the prior valuation made by the Land Bank of
the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the
amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND
25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of
240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is
hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the
manner provided for by law.
Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD
directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent
the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner
provided by law.
On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for
Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank
failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18,
1999. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply
with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed
a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch
52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the
determination of just compensation, as provided for in
Section 16 (f) of the CARL.
On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting
the Motion for Contempt, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for
contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as
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Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect
contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he
complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14,
1998.
Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforequoted Order, which was however denied by the
PARAD on September 20, 2000. Thus, petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to
appeal the decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule
XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure.
On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the
petition for the determination of just compensation filed by
petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated October 25, 2000.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was
likewise denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan
denied due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and
ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the
payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to
respondent. On January 3, 2001, he directed the issuance of
an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. On
January 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent
Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its
stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its
order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final
termination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon
upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied. Responded filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the CA in which the decision of the RTC was nullified
ISSUES:
1. WON the special civil action for certiorari to nullify
the injunction issued by the Trial Court is improper
2. WON the order for the arrest of petitioner’s
manager, Mr. Lorayes, by the PARAD, was valid?
HELD:
1. Petitioner’s submission is untenable. Generally, injunction
is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s
substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself
but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.
Thus, it has been held that an order granting a writ of
preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. As
distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. Clearly, the
grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
interlocutory order, hence, unappealable. Therefore,
respondent’s special civil action for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals was the correct remedy under the circumstances.
Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
2.
Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in pertinent part:
Section 2. Indirect Contempt. – The Board or any of
its members or its Adjudicator may also cite and
punish any person for indirect contempt on any of
the grounds and in the manner prescribed under
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which deals with the commencement of
indirect contempt proceedings, provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. —
Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated
motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other
formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt
shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If
the contempt charges arose out of or are related to
a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition
shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the
Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure explains this requirement:
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm
the proper procedure for commencing contempt
proceedings. While such proceeding has been
classified as a special civil action under the former
Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the
courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion
without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor
and without complying with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the
second paragraph of this amended section.
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt
proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a
formal charge by the offended court, all charges
shall be commenced by a verified petition with full
compliance with the requirements therefor and shall
be disposed of in accordance with the second
paragraph of this section.
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Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged
with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition;
and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu
proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in
charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. More
specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-
judicial entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. —
Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall
apply to contempt committed against persons,
entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial
functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such
rules as they may have adopted pursuant to
authority granted to them by law to punish for
contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place
wherein the contempt has been committed shall
have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed
therefore. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all
the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to
quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the
holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to
superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend
contempt committed against administrative or quasi-
judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is
clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court, as is done in the second
paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative
Code. The provision referred to contemplates the
situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails
to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce
documents when required to do so by the official or
body exercising such powers. For such violation,
said person shall be subject to discipline, as in the
case of contempt of court, upon application of the
official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the
corresponding sanctions.23 (emphasis in the
original)
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite
persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper
Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and
competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These
matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial
Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was
filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD,
and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect
contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an
unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with
the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the
Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition
with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in
this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu
proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction
to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The
issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the
PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings
that stemmed from respondent’s "Motion for Contempt,"
specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000
and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are
null and void.
C4.2 HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street,
Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for
brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
inerereklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw
ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty Salazar —
615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla. Ang panloloko ay
naganap sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. Pagkagaling ko sa
Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko
at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag 9
month's na ako sa Phils. Ay hindi pa niya ako napa-alis.
So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang
ibigay and PECC Card ko.
On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand
Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the
petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE
FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA
COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED
AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had
no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205,
ordering the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being
operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment. It having verified that you have
—
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment;
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(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38
of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal
prosecution under existing laws.
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and
Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara
and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. There it was
found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and
Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily
allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was
accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However,
when required to show credentials, she was unable to
produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon
twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and
saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for
by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.
On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following
letter:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that
the personal properties seized at her residence last
January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground
that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will
of the owner thereof.
Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine
Constitution. (unreasonable search and seizure)
the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal
properties belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of
authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile
under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter,
petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a
criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial
Fiscal.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for
prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are
alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we
consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave
public interest involved.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
ISSUE
May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or
the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is
also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's
resolution.
RULING
It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest
In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise
this power
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to
conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue
orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government
Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been
abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the
date of its ratification by the Filipino people.
neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body
Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested
in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see
that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably,
as the accused's adversary and his accuser.
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written,
was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos.
1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to
Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his
legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential
Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more
teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree
gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated
Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister
search and seizure powers as well
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c)
of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying
vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.
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We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge,
may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano
v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case,
governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration
Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of
an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final
decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however,
because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in
matters involving foreign affairs. We have held:
That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive
"when he deems such action necessary for the peace
and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's
opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there
are aliens whose continued presence in the country is
injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them".
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for
deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the
one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question,
assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is
clearly in the nature of a general warrant.
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things
to be seized; otherwise, it is null and void.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the
following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it
is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38,
paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents
are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the
implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
D. JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW
D.1 NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. V. UNIWIDE SALES, INC.
G.R. No. 174674 | October 20, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
• The petitioners in this case are Nestle Philippines, Inc. and
Nestle Waters Philippines, Inc., formerly Hidden Springs &
Perrier Inc. The respondents are Uniwide Sales, Inc.,
Uniwide Holdings, Inc., Naic Resources and Development
Corporation, Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Club,
Inc., First Paragon Corporation, and Uniwide Sales
Warehouse Club, Inc.
• On 25 June 1999, respondents filed in the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of
suspension of payment, formation and appointment of
rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan.
The SEC approved the petition on 29 June 1999.
• On 18 October 1999, the newly appointed Interim
Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the
SEC. The plan was anchored on return to core business of
retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and dacion en
pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges;
freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of
suppliers, contractors, and private lenders.
• On 14 February 2000, the Interim Receivership Committee
filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP).
The ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino
Guichard Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion in
fresh capital. On 11 April 2001, the SEC approved the ARP.
• On 11 October 2001, the Interim Receivership Committee
filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to the
Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard
Perrachon's withdrawal. In its Order dated 23 December
2002, the SEC approved the SARP.
• Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents,
appealed to the SEC praying that the 23 December 2002
Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be
issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in
consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the
terms and conditions of the SARP.
SEC RULING:
• In its 13 January 2004 Order, the SEC denied petitioners'
appeal for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed in the Court of
Appeals a petition for review of the 13 January 2004 Order
of the SEC.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING:
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• In its assailed 10 January 2006 Decision, the Court of
Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review
filed by petitioners, thus:
In reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of
fact made therein must be respected as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of the witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the
evidence; that the administrative decision in matters
within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside
on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error
of law.
• Petitioners moved for reconsideration. They also filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration alleging that they
received a letter on 25 January 2006, from the president of
the Uniwide Sales Group of Companies, informing them of
the decision to transfer, by way of full concession, the
operation of respondents' supermarkets to Suy Sing
Commercial Corporation starting 1 March 2006.
• In its questioned 13 September 2006 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied for lack of merit petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and referred to the SEC petitioners'
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation
proceedings terminated.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that from the time of
the filing in this Court of the instant petition, supervening
events have unfolded substantially changing the factual
backdrop of this rehabilitation case.
• As found by the SEC, several factors prevented the
realization of the desired goals of the SARP, to wit:
(a) unexpected refusal of some creditors to comply
with all the terms of the SARP;
(b) unexpected closure of Uniwide EDSA due to the
renovation of EDSA Central Mall;
(c) closure of Uniwide Cabuyao and Uniwide
Baclaran;
(d) lack of supplier support for supermarket
operations; and
(e) increased expenses.
• On 22 January 2010, respondents filed another petition
appealing the Hearing Panel's 13 January 2010 Resolution.
In order to preserve the parties' rights during the pendency
of the appeal, the SEC en banc in its Order dated 18 March
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
2010 directed the parties to observe the status quo
prevailing before the issuance of the 13 January 2010
Resolution of the Hearing Panel.
• Meanwhile, on 27 April 2010, the SEC en banc issued an
Order directing the rehabilitation receiver, Atty. Julio C.
Elamparo, to submit a comprehensive report on the
progress of the implementation of the SARP.
• In light of supervening events that have emerged from the
time the SEC approved the SARP on 23 December 2002
and from the time the present petition was filed on 3
November 2006, any determination by this Court as to
whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation
proceedings terminated, would be premature.
• Undeniably, supervening events have substantially
changed the factual backdrop of this case. The Court
thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to
determine whether, given the supervening events in this
case, the SARP is no longer capable of implementation and
whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a
consequence.
• Under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where
the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In other words, if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized
training, and knowledge of an administrative body,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the court is had even if
the matter may well be within the latter's proper
jurisdiction.
• The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
• It is not for this Court to intrude, at this stage of the
rehabilitation proceedings, into the primary administrative
jurisdiction of the SEC on a matter requiring its technical
expertise. Pending a decision of the SEC cases which both
seek to resolve the issue of whether the rehabilitation
proceedings in this case should be terminated, we are
constrained to dismiss this petition for prematurity.
G.R. No. 186487. August 15, 2011.*
ROSITO BAGUNU, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO
AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS: R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177
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 The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by
the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit
(respondents) against the Bagunu’s free patent
application over a parcel of unregistered land located in
Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending
before the DENR Regional Office Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan
 The subject land was previously owned by Marcos
Binag, who later sold it (1ST sale) to Felicisimo Bautista
(Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject
land (2ND sale) to Atty. Samson Binag
 Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land
with the Bureau of Lands
- Atty. Binag sold the subject land (3RD sale) to
Bagunu, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free
patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that
the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject
of Atty. Binags pending free patent application.
 The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject
land, the Bureau of Lands survey, and the free patent
applications uniformly identified the subject land
as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and
third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the
subject land.
 Aggabao and Acerit filed a protest against the
petitioner’s free patent application.
- They asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the
Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale,
executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael
Bautista.
 The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal
investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out
that Bagunu actually occupies and cultivates the
area in dispute including the area purchased by [the
respondents].
DENR Regional Office: ruled that the Bagunu wrongfully
included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot
belongs to the respondents
The petitioner MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION - denied
the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the
boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are
controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale
in the Bagunu’s favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot
258, what Bagunu acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the
erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322.
DENR Secretary: affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional
Office.
 After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in
the parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR
Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the
petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the
respondents.
 The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties
respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot
sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming
that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the
petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.[14] The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
CA RULING: affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary.
 Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA
ruled that since questions on the identity of a land
require a technical determination by the appropriate
administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR
Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary,
are entitled to great respect, if not finality. Bagunu
assails this ruling before the Court.
Civil Case No. 751
 In the meantime, (or during the pendency of the
respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for
reformation of instruments, covering the 2nd and 3rd
sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case)
with the Cabagan, Isabela RTC.
- Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing
the successive sale of the subject land correctly
identified the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds,
nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land
as Lot 322, instead of Lot 258.
 Bagunu and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the
RTC, citing the pendency of the land protest before the
Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its
resolution on the motion to dismiss
 After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR
Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in
the civil case by filing a complaint-in-intervention against
the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned
the respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of
Title, Reivindicacion and Damages.
- The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim
over Lot 322 is a cloud on their title and ownership
of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they
were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse
possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully
acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992,
when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy,
ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring his
possession from Lot 258. The respondents asked
the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322.
 After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable
resolution on the respondents protest, the respondents
asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively,
to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
 That the CA erred in affirming the DENR
Secretary’s jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting
claims of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that
the same issue is pending with the RTC.
- By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not
Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot
322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively
reformed contracts and determined claims of
ownership over a real property matters beyond the
DENRs competence to determine.
 The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better
right over Lot 322 does not involve the specialized
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technical expertise of the DENR. On the contrary, the
issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of
evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code
provisions, which are matters within the competence of
the courts.
 The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual
finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the
evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in
his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322,
which was the same land Atty. Binag identified in his free
patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously
determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself
(Atty. Binag), tallies with the area stated in the deed in
his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322
since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present
possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by
the DENR Regional Office during its ocular
investigation.
 The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity
of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322,
based on Atty. Binags testimony during the hearing on
the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the
respondents could not have expressed interest in buying
Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they already
acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.
The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the
respondents were already aware of Atty. Binags free
patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their
protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when
the petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The
petitioner claims that the respondents inaction is
inconsistent with their claim of ownership.
 Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322
in the respondents favor by claiming that the
respondents presented no sufficient evidence to prove
their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title.
In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for
failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed
CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his arguments
to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
ISSUES: Issue of jurisdiction and the consequent
applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
RULING:
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45
 The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the
alleged error of the DENR and the CA in identifying the
parcel of land that the petitioner bought an error that
adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent
over the subject land.
 The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that
questions of fact are generally barred under a Rule 45
petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and
322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the
identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their
actual boundaries in accordance with the parties
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others.
While there are instances where the Court departs from
the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45,
the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case
falls within the recognized exceptions. On top of this
legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of
Lands[22] on questions of fact, when approved by the
DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,
and even on this Court, when these factual findings are
affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently
confine our discussions to the petitioners twin legal
issues.
The determination of the identity of a public land is
within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to manage and
dispose of lands of the public domain
 The petitioner insists that under the law actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for
reformation of contracts belong, and those involving
ownership of real property fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC. Since these actions are already
pending before the RTC, the DENR Secretary
overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from
the petitioner’s free patent application and ordering the
respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.
 In an action for reformation of contract, the court
determines whether the parties written agreement
reflects their true intention. In the present case, this
intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the
2nd and 3rd sale. On the other hand, in
a reivindicatory action, the court resolves the issue of
ownership of real property and the plaintiff’s entitlement
to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff
is required to prove not only his ownership, but also
the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.
 While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC, the court’s jurisdiction to
resolve controversies involving ownership of real
property extends only to private lands.
 In the present case, neither party has asserted private
ownership over Lot 322. The respondents
acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by
mainly relying on the administrative findings of the
DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of
asserting their own private ownership of the
property. For his part, the petitioners act of applying for
a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an
acknowledgment that the land covered by his application
is a public land whose management and disposition
belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the
Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of
Executive Order No. 292 reads:
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The
Department [of Environment and Natural
Resources] shall:
(4) Exercise supervision and control over
forest lands, alienable and disposable
public lands, mineral resources and, in the
process of exercising such control, impose
appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals
and any such form of levy and collect such
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revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of
the public domain and serve as the sole
agency responsible for classification, sub-
classification, surveying and titling of lands
in consultation with appropriate agencies[.]
Under Section 14(f) of EO 192, the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to
assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions
of CA141) by having direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of
concession or disposition and management of the lands
of the public domain.
 As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case
stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents
against the petitioners free patent application. In
resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of
Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot
claimed by both parties.
This issue of identity of the land requires a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative
agency with direct control over the disposition and
management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of
public lands, must likewise determine the applicant’s
entitlement to a free patent.
 (Incidentally, the DENR RO still has to determine the
respondents entitlement to the issuance of a free
patent in their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion
of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.)
 Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective
rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable
public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on
matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR
Secretary and the Director of Lands, unless grave abuse
of discretion exists.
 After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322,
pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the
exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the
same matter properly within its jurisdiction, such as
the distinct cause of action for reformation of
contracts involving the same property.
- Note that the contracts refer to the same property,
identified as Lot 322, - which the DENR Regional
Office, DENR Secretary and the CA found to
actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative
agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions,
all controversies relating to the subject matter
pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be
included within its jurisdiction since the law does not
sanction a split of jurisdiction
- The argument that only courts of justice can
adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of
the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing
times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies
now performing this function by virtue of a valid
authorization from the legislature. This quasi-
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by
them as an incident of the principal power
entrusted to them of regulating certain activities
falling under their particular expertise
The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting
claims of title over public lands
 The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue
(of who has a better right over Lot 322) does not
require the specialized technical expertise of the
DENR.
We disagree.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must
refrain from determining a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter,
where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
 In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to
apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases
involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies.
 It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if
the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court.
- This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It
applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body, in
such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view.
 The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
however, does not call for the dismissal of the case
below. It need only be suspended until after the matters
within the competence of [the Lands Management
Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the
principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is salutarily served
 The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over
real property is within the regular courts’ area of
competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in
character. However, regular courts would have no power
to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the
public character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in
relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition
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and management of public lands fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands,
subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
 While the powers given to the DENR, through the
Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land
do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction
over possessory actions instituted by occupants or
applicants (to protect their respective possessions and
occupations), the respondents complaint-in-intervention
does not simply raise the issue of possession
whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the
issue of ownership as basis to recover possession.
- Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration
of ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would
have to defer its ruling on the
respondents reivindicatory action pending final
determination by the DENR, through the Lands
Management Bureau, of the respondents
entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
 Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322
from the petitioners free patent application and his
consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the
same lot are within the DENR Secretarys exercise of
sound administrative discretion.
 In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,
which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and
the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that
the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the
disputed public land since this matter requires a
technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since
this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the
courts must stand aside even when they apparently have
statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
D3. G.R. No. 191427 May 30, 2011
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION) vs
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) is engaged in, among
other things, the manufacture of animal feeds at its plant in
Bagong Ilog, Pasig City.
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent,
through its Pollution Control Division – Monitoring and
Enforcement Section, after conducting on March 14, 2000 a
laboratory analysis of petitioner’s corn oil refinery plant’s
wastewater, found that it failed to comply with government
standards provided under Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs)
Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.
LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order
requiring petitioner to explain why no order should be
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
issued for the cessation of its operations due to its
discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig River and
why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the
LLDA.
Still later, the LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint
conducted on August 31, 2000, another analysis of
petitioner’s wastewater, which showed its continued
failure to conform to its effluent standard in terms of
Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen
Demand (BOD), Color and Oil/Grease.
Hearings on petitioner’s pollution case were thereafter
commenced on March 1, 2001.
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and
inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioner’s
wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by
the aforementioned DAOs.
In early 2003, petitioner notified LLDA of its plan to
upgrade the wastewater treatment facility (WTF) of its
corn oil refinery plant in an effort to comply with
environmental laws, an upgrade that was completed only
in 2007.
On May 9, 2007 on its request,2 a re-sampling of
petitioner’s wastewater was conducted which showed
that petitioner’s plant finally complied with government
standards.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties, by
Manifestation and Motion3 filed on August 24, 2007 to
which it attached copies of its Daily Operation Reports
and Certifications4 to show that accrued daily penalties
should only cover a period of 560 days.
After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to
Pay5 (OP) dated January 21, 2008, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
After careful evaluation of the case, respondent is found
to be discharging pollutive wastewater computed in two
periods.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is
hereby ordered to pay within fifteen (15) days from
receipt hereof the accumulated daily penalties
amounting to a total of Pesos: One Million Two Hundred
Forty-Seven (Thousand) Pesos Only (PHP
1,247,000.00) prior to dismissal of the case and without
prejudice of filing another case for its subsequent
violations.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered
to pay only accumulated daily penalties in the sum of
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Five Hundred Sixty Thousand (₱560,000) Pesos7 on
grounds that the LLDA erred in first, adopting a straight
computation of the periods of violation – based on the
flawed assumption that petitioner was operating on a
daily basis − without excluding, among others, the period
during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent
rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30,
2001 (covering 212 days); and second, in disregarding
the Daily Operation Reports and Certifications which
petitioner submitted to attest to the actual number of its
operating days, i.e., 560 days.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before
the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and
maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDA’s order
justified such recourse as an exception to the rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
judicial action.
CA: affirmed both LLDA orders, which it found to be
amply supported by substantial evidence, the
computation of the accumulated daily penalties being in
accord with prevailing DENR guidelines. The appellate
court held that while petitioner may have offered
documentary evidence to support its assertion that the
days when it did not operate must be excluded from the
computation, the LLDA has the prerogative to disregard
the same for being unverified, hence, unreliable.
ISSUE: Petitioner cites lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from
complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
The petition fails.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the
rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence.10 The rationale for this doctrine
is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for
the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.11
Executive Order No. 19212 (EO 192) was issued on
June 10, 1987 for the salutary purpose of reorganizing
the DENR, charging it with the task of promulgating rules
and regulations for the control of water, air and land
pollution as well as of promulgating ambient and effluent
standards for water and air quality including the
allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. EO
192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under
the Office of the DENR Secretary which took over the
powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution
cases, including the latter’s role as arbitrator for
determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and
losses resulting from pollution.13
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of
appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to
show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an
exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDA’s
findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
D4. Motanez vs Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD)
FACTS:
Montanez was the owner of two parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 35.5998 hectares, both located at La
Castellana, Negros Occidental,
- the first denominated as Lot 750-A and registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-71582, with an
area of 21.9586 hectares.
- The second, denominated as Lot 850-A, had an area of
13.6412 hectares and was then covered by TCT No. T-
71583.
In October 1999, the DAR caused the publication of a Notice
of Land Coverage for Negros Occidental, which included the
two parcels of land referred to above.
- The notice, however, erroneously identified one of the lots
as covered by TCT No. T-71589, instead of by T-71583.
Later, the DAR notified petitioner that her property, to the
extent of 32.4257 hectares, has been placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
offered to compensate her the amount of PhP 5,592,3001.60
based on the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), subject to price adjustment to conform to the actual
area coverage.
Albeit petitioner rejected the offer, it would appear that the
LBP later issued in her favor a certification of deposit, in cash
and in bonds, corresponding to the amount aforestated
On June 28, 2000, the DAR secured from the Negros
Occidental Registry the cancellation of petitioners TCT Nos.
T-71583 and T-71582 and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of
TCT Nos. T-205481 and T-205482 respectively, in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
- On its face, TCT No. T-205481 identified the Republic
and the petitioner as owners of 11.4654 hectares and
2.1758 hectares, respectively, of the registered land. In
TCT No. 205482, the Republic and the petitioner are
shown as owning 20.9603 and .9983 hectares,
respectively.
Later on the same day, TCT No. CLOA (Certificate of Land
Ownership Award) 8434 covering an area of 21.9586
hectares was issued, purportedly as a transfer from TCT
Nos. T-715831/T-205482. On the other hand, TCT
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No. CLOA-8435 for an area of 13.6412 hectares was issued,
purportedly as a transfer from TCT Nos. T-715832/T-205481.
Evidently, such notations on the CLOAs were erroneous, the
aggregate land area stated in the CLOAs being larger than
what was reflected in the titles whence the CLOAs
emanate.In any event, said CLOAs were registered in the
name of, and delivered to, individual respondents as CARP
beneficiaries.
Petitioner forthwith filed a Petition with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) of Negros Occidental
for the annulment/cancellation of TCT Nos. CLOA-8434,
CLOA-8435, T-205481 and T-205482 on the ground of
irregular and anomalous issuance thereof.
PARAD: gave the petition a short shrift, stating that petitioner
based her action [for annulment/cancellation] on purely
technical grounds referring to the discrepancy between the
area coverage stated in the CLOAs and that stated in the
TCTs.
- These grounds, according to the PARAD, are beyond the
ambit of, and are not among those enumerated in DAR
Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, for the
cancellation of CLOAs and emancipation patents (EPs).
PARAD Alegario, however, stated the observation that the
aberration is correctible administratively and that the DAR
has effectively acknowledged the fact of discrepancy by
inscribing at the back of the CLOAs the condition that the
CARP award is subject to segregation and reconveyance.
CA: ordered the PARAD of Negros Occidental and other
agrarian officers to maintain a status quo including the non-
enforcement of the PARAD decision in DARAB Case No. R-
0605-1707-03 until further order from [the] Court.
On December 27, 2005, the CA, on the holding that the
petitioner is entitled to the rectification of the technical error
referred to above, but that the DAR is the proper office to
effect the correction, rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED.
The Decision dated October 18, 2004 issued by PARAD Gil
A. Alegario in DARAB Case No. R-0605-1707-03 is hereby
SET ASIDE.
The original petition is hereby referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform for correction of the technical description in
TCT No. CLOA-8434 and TCT No. CLOA-8435, and to take
such action as may be necessary and desirable to put into
effect the directive herein.
To the CA, the DARAB and necessarily its provincial and
regional adjudication boards cannot take cognizance of
the case owing to the absence of tenancy relationship
between the private parties.
- This jurisdictional determination notwithstanding, the CA
still ruled that there was no violation of the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
the DAR sought reconsideration while the petitioner
interposed a partial motion for reconsideration.[18] On April
18, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended
Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all of the foregoing
considerations, public respondent DARs Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED, the Decision of this
court dated 27 December 2005 is SET ASIDE and the
present petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Accordingly,
the status quo order issued by this Court on 7 February 2005
is revoked and rendered without force and effect.
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED insofar as the issue of the jurisdiction of public
respondent PARAD over petitioners complaint is concerned
which is also in consonance with public respondent DARs
contention. Her prayer for this Court to declare as null the
subject CLOAs and the land titles issued pursuant thereto is,
however, DENIED.
The amended decision, in essence, held: the underlying
DARAB Case No. R-0605-1707-03 is cognizable by the
PARAB whose decision is appealable to DARAB Proper.
- As a necessary consequence, petitioner breached the
rules on exhaustion when she went directly to the CA to
challenge PARAD Alegarios decision.
ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and, if so, what is the
effect of such failure
RULING: Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
doctrine of long standing and the Court has set out clear
guidelines on the matter.
- Paat v. Court of Appeals expounded on the doctrine, the
recognized exceptions thereto, and the effect on non-
compliance therewith in the following wise:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before courts judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal
to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for
lack of cause of action.
This doctrine of exhaustion x x x was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the
courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give
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the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, x x x
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule.
This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon
by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case.
Hence, it is disregarded
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention
Of the same tenor, sans an enumeration of the exceptions, is
what the Court said in Asia International Auctioneers, Inc.
v. Parayno, viz:
Petitioners failure to ask the CIR for a reconsideration is
another reason why the instant case should be dismissed. It
is settled that the premature invocation of the courts
intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. If a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy must first be exhausted before the courts power of
judicial review can be sought. The party with an
administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to
its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention
in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary
and premature resort to the court.
Corollary to the exhaustion rule is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, a basic postulate which precludes courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially
been lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
Following the lessons of Paat and Asia International
Auctioneers, Inc., the denial of the instant petition is
clearly indicated.
- It bears to stress at the outset that, as aptly observed by
the CA,[25] there is no challenge from either of the parties
to the jurisdiction of the PARAB or the provincial agrarian
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
adjudicator to take cognizance of the basic petition of
petitioner for annulment/cancellation of TCT Nos. CLOA-
8434, CLOA-8435, T-205481 and T-205482. Just as well.
- For, the DARAB and its regional and provincial
adjudication boards have jurisdiction to adjudicate all
agrarian disputes and controversies or incidents involving
the implementation of CARP under RA 6657 and other
agrarian law and their implementing rules and regulations.
Such jurisdiction of DARAB includes cases involving the
issuance, correction, and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs
which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.
For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion, the
remedies available to the petitioner are clearly set out in
the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, which took effect on
January 17, 2004. Under Section 1.6, Rule II, the adjudicator
shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate x x x cases x x x involving the correction, x x
x cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of
[CLOAs] and [EPs] which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority. According to the succeeding Section 2
in relation to Rule XIV, the proper remedy from an adverse
final resolution, order, or resolution on the merits of the
adjudicator is an appeal to the DARAB Proper which, among
others, require the filing of a notice of appeal and payment of
an appeal fee. And from the decision of the DARAB Proper,
an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV.
Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and
certainly within its sound discretion when it denied, in its
amended decision, petitioners petition for certiorari to nullify
the PARADs decision. Under the grievance procedure set
forth in the DARAB Rules of Procedure, PARAD Alegarios
decision was appealable to the DARAB Proper. The CAs
appellate task comes laterto review the case disposition of
the DARAB Proper when properly challenged.
In this recourse, petitioner makes little of the clear provisions
of the DARAB Rules on the right appellate forum and correct
mode of appeal. As she argues, the filing of her petition for
certiorari after the issuance of the PARAD Decision was but
proper as the PARAD Decision was that of the DAR itself,
hence may be elevated to the CA pursuant to Section 54 of
RA 6657 which states:
SEC. 54. Certiorari. - Any decision, order, award or ruling of
the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining
to the application, implementation, enforcement, or
interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian
reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari
except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if
based on substantial evidence.
Petitioner is now assuming a contradictory posture. As a
matter of record, her partial motion for reconsideration[33] of
the original CA decision recognized the applicability of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure to the instant case. Now then,
the DARAB Rules defines the jurisdiction of PARAD and
prescribes the rules on appeals from the PARAD decision. In
that partial motion, she stated:
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While it is true that there is no tenancy relationship that was
raised as an issue,
- the PARAD has the jurisdiction to hear, determine and
adjudicate this case involving the cancellation and
annulment of the subject CLOAs which were registered
before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Negros
Occidental.
- The jurisdiction of the PARAD over the instant case is
conferred by the DARAB New Rules of Procedures
In a real sense, petitioner is estopped at this stage to
downplay the applicability of the DARAB rules. She
cannot be allowed to invoked the rules when convenient, and
disregard the same when its application is adversed to her
cause. Raising the PARADs decision to the level of that of
the DAR Secretary strikes us as a strained rationalization to
lend tenability to an erroneous choice of a reviewing forum.
While the DARAB, provincial and central, is the DARs
adjudicative arm,[35] the respective jurisdictions of DAR and
DARAB are distinct and separate. Nuesa v. Court of
Appeals delineated the boundaries of their adjudicative
competence in the field of land reform in the following
manner:
As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno, the DAR is
vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB
has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
[CARP] under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules.
While not determinative of the issue at hand, the decision of
the DAR may initially be appealed to the Office of the
President, while that of the DARAB Proper is appealable only
to the court.
In its December 27, 2005 decision, the CA wrote:
In this case, an appeal to the DARAB would have been an
exercise in futility for the petitioner and would only serve to
add a bureaucratic layer to the case. The (public)
respondents have revealed that petitioner had filed petitions
for retention and inclusion of her farm workers as
beneficiaries before the DAR. An Order dated September 2,
2003 was issued by the DAR Regional Director denying
the petition for utter lack of merit and on the ground that
the petitioner has no legal capacity to file, not being a party-
in-interest. Her petitioner before the PARAD was also
dismissed.
Petitioners invocation of the foregoing CA pronouncement to
justify her elevation of the PARAD decision to the appellate
court instead of to the DARAB is misplaced. For one, the
aforequoted holding is without any binding effect, having
effectively been superseded by the issuance of the Amended
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
Decision. And for another, only decisions of the Court have
the force of precedents and form part of the legal system
There is no question then that petitioner, in seeking recourse
with the CA from the decision of the PARAD, failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The eventual dismissal by
the CA of her petition on that ground stands on legal ground.
To recall what we said in Paat, the premature invocation of
courts intervention is fatal to ones cause. x x x The case is
susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
It is true that the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies admits of several exceptions.
- Not one, however, obtains under the premises. What
comes close is the reason given originally by the CA
and which petitioner made capital of that an appeal to
the DARAB would be useless.
We are not persuaded. Other than its non-sequitur line
that petitioner had filed petitions for retention and inclusion of
her farm workers as beneficiaries before the DAR and that in
an Order dated September 2, 2003, the DAR Regional
Director [has denied the petition] for utter lack of merit,
- the CA had not explained with some measure of
plausibility how it arrived at its conclusion on the futility
of an appeal to the DARAB. Petitioner fares no better.
Absent such explanation, the conclusion must be
rejected as an arrant presumption.
- And it cannot be over-emphasized that the adverted
Order of September 2, 20003 referred to in the CAs
original decision denied petitioners petitions for
retention and inclusion, while, in the instant case, the
main thrust of her petition is for the annulment of the
CLOAs.
- There is, therefore, no logical basis for the conclusion
that the DARAB, which counts the DAR Secretary as a
member, would rule similarly in patently and completely
different cases.
Bare misgivings about the ability of a quasi-judicial agency to
render impartial justice would not, standing alone, be a
sufficient reason to dispense with the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine. As it were, the doctrine
ensures the efficient and speedy disposition of cases.
In all then, we find that petitioner had, without reason, let
alone explanation, failed to exhaust administrative remedies
provided by law. Such lapse, by weight of established
jurisprudence, is fatal to her petition.
Due to petitioners resort to an improper remedy, the filing
of the petition before the CA did not toll the reglementary
period for filing an appeal with the DARAB. As such, the
decision of the PARAD should ordinarily be considered as
final and executory. But the Court need not rub it in all the
more by depriving petitioner of any remedy.
The nature of the issues raised by petitioner before the
PARAD such as, but not limited to, the irregularity in the initial
acquisition proceedings, the undue haste in the issuance of
the TCT-CLOAs, and the consequent cloud that hangs over
the CLOAs in question needs to be addressed.
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The PARAD no less admitted that the entries and
annotations made in the CLOAs were erroneous and adverse
to the interest of petitioner, who it seems has yet to receive
just compensation for her two parcels of land. The inequity of
barring petitioner from vindicating her right is rendered more
acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the DAR has
taken her property for CARP purposes ostensibly with their
agents in the field not hewing strictly with the requirements of
the law and whose negligence tainted the CLOAs thus
issued.
The purpose behind the passage of the CARP law would not
be compromised should petitioner be allowed to pursue her
case before the right forum. With this in mind, we remand the
instant case to the DARAB for proper disposition of the
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CAs April
18, 2008 Amended Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00229
is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the DARAB for the
disposition of the issues raised by petitioner.
D5. ANGELES VS GAITE
G.R. No. 165276
(whos case is this no ponente)
FACTS:
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster
mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria
Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care
of the former by the girl’s grandmother and petitioner’s sister
Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned
at the tender age of four.
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to
her needs, sent her to a good school and attended to her
general well-being for nine (9) memorable and happy years.
The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother
and wrote the latter letters.
Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her siblings,
particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a
former drug-addict, and the latter’s family who were regular
beneficiaries of the undersigned’s generosity. Michael would
frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs
ranging from day to day subsistence to the medical and
hospital expenses of his children.
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling
out with petitioner for his failure to do a very important errand
for which he was severely reprimanded over the phone. He
was told that from then on, no assistance of any kind would
be extended to him and that he was no longer welcome at
petitioner’s residence.
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic),
retaliated on 12 April 1999 by inducing his half-sister, Maria
Mercedes, to leave petitioner’s custody. Michael used to
have free access to the undersigned’s house and he took the
girl away while petitioner was at her office.
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner,
accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco, sought Michael
Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan to
confront him about the whereabouts of his half-sister. He
disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her
maternal relatives in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for the
assistance of the 303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective
Group Field Office in Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl.
Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred
Ramirez accompanied petitioner and her friend to Hagonoy,
Bulacan where they coordinated with police officers from the
said place. The group failed to find the girl. Instead, they
were given the run-around as the spouses Ruben and
Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia
Nazareno misled them with the false information that Maria
Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito
Guevarra and the latter’s wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon
Province.
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for
Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael
Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and
Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes
Vistan.
Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them
and to evade the long arm of the law, Michael Vistan went
into hiding. He dragged along with him his half-sister Maria
Mercedes.
From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his
little sister in tow, shuttled back and forth from Guiguinto to
Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in Manila and Quezon City,
living the life of a fugitive from justice. He eventually brought
the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he made her
recite a concocted tale of child abuse against herein
petitioner hoping that this would compel the latter to withdraw
the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed.
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought
Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt himself cornered
by the police dragnet laid for him.
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against
petitioner and get himself off the hook from the kidnapping
charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously, selfishly
and insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and
psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of
which were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and
development.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint
against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of
Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610,
otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four
counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise
filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan,
aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
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In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating
Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended upheld
(sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but
recommended that only one Information be filed against
Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was
dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution to uphold the
petitioner’s complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic)
remained.
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente
denied the recommendation of the Investigating
Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation
RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for the
dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. This was denied in a Resolution dated 28
April 2000.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice on 18 May 2000. She also filed a
Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000.
In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel
A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary of Justice,
denied the petition for review. The undersigned’s Motion
for Reconsideration filed on 25 April 2001 was likewise
denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a
Resolution dated 15 October 2001.
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for
Review before the Office of President. The petition was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was
denied before said forum anchored on Memorandum
Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review
of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death.
On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review
before the CA assailing the Order of the Office of President.
Petitioner argued that the Office of the President erred in not
addressing the merits of her petition by relying on
Memorandum Circular No. 58, series of 1993. Petitioner
assailed the constitutionality of the memorandum circular,
specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an
invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control
of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
CA – dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Affirmed the
position of the OSG to apply the doctrine of qualified agency:
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued
by respondent Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs nor saw the necessity to exempt petitioner’s case from
the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of
the latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself
ISSUE:
1. WON Memorandum Circular No. 58 is invalid
because it diminishes the power of control of the
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
President and bestows upon the Secretary of
Justice almost unfettered power?
2. WON the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of
Section 1(e) of PD No 1829?
3. WON the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent for violation of Sec.
10(a), Art. VI of RA No 7610?
HELD:
1. THE PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT
he President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of
Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within
the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency,
long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive." The CA cannot be deemed to have committed
any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance
on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and
applied the law as it should be.
In Villena v. Secretary of Interior:
With reference to the Executive Department of the
government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and
is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight,
and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural,
Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall
be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that
the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of
the executive departments occupy political positions and hold
office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom
confidence", and, in the language of Attorney-General
Cushing), "are subject to the direction of the President."
Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as
forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme
Court of the United States, "each head of a department is,
and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority"
Memorandum Circular No. 58,19 promulgated by the Office
of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:
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In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the
guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4
November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President
of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of
Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal
cases are reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those
involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly
fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set
forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be
dismissed outright.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President
himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's
argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the
power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering
even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors
or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his
discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner
cannot second- guess the President's power and the
President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he
deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and
speedy administration of justice, especially that such
delegation is upon a cabinet secretary – his own alter ego.
Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not
without limits. No less than the Constitution provides for
restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena,
makes this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification
may seem plausible under the circumstances, it
should be observed that there are certain
prerogative acts which, by their very nature,
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be
exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise
of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3,
sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the
benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain
embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain
presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised
by co-equal branches of government. he declaration of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the
Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the
preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered
as falling within the same exceptional class which
cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully
abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No.
58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to
impose upon the President the task of reviewing all
preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of
Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important
duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every
decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the
latter’s expertise in said matter.
In Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia:
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to
personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from
running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying
and choosing among the many methods that may
be taken toward this end, meeting countless times
with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining
the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining
and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and
more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the
very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof
are accorded and would unduly hamper the
President’s effectivity in running the government
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot
subscribe to petitioner’s position asking this Court to allow
her to appeal to the Office of the President, notwithstanding
that the crimes for which she charges respondent are not
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of
1987 (EO No. 292), the Department of Justice, under the
leadership of the Secretary of Justice, is the government’s
principal law agency. As such, the Department serves as the
government’s prosecution arm and administers the
government’s criminal justice system by investigating crimes,
prosecuting offenders and overseeing the correctional
system, which are deep within the realm of its expertise.
These are known functions of the Department of Justice,
which is under the executive branch and, thus, within the
Chief Executive's power of control.
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Petitioner’s contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58
violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book
III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of
control over the executive departments deserves scant
consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No.
58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it
is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. Memorandum Circular No. 58
has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it
goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular
has the approval of the President.
2. Petitioner contends that respondent's act of going
underground obstructed the service of a court
process, particularly the warrant of arrest. The Court
does not agree.
There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance
taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement
objection in the manner the CA had disposed of the said
issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the
position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the
law on "obstruction of justice." As correctly observed by the
CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not
warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of
Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA
that based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the
failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the
person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice
and is not equivalent to a commission of another offense of
obstruction of justice.
Petitioner, however, vehemently argues that the law does not
explicitly provide that it is applicable only to another person
and not to the offender himself. Petitioner thus contends that
where the "law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish."
Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of
statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of the accused. Courts must not bring
cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly
embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not
clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within
them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Indeed, if the law is not explicit that it is applicable
only to another person and not the offender himself, this
Court must resolve the same in favor of the accused. In any
case, this Court agrees with the discussion of the CA,
however sarcastic it may be, is nevertheless correct given the
circumstances of the case at bar.
3. There was no grave abuse of discretion by the CA
Provincial Prosecutor in disapproving the recommendation
gave the following reasons:
The recommendation to file an information for viol. of
Sec. 10 (a) RA # 7610 vs. M. Vistan is hereby denied.
The affidavit of Ma. Mercedes Vistan, the minor involved,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
is to the effect that she found happiness and peace of
mind away from the complainant and in the company of
her relatives, including her brother, respondent Michael
Vistan. How can her joining the brother be prejudicial to
her with such statement?
Such finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the provincial
prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, as their conclusion of lack of probable
cause was based on the affidavit of the alleged victim herself.
The reasons for the cause of action were stated clearly and
sufficiently. Was their reliance on the victim's affidavit
constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? This Court does not
think so.
While petitioner would argue that the victim was
"brainwashed" by respondent into executing the affidavit, this
Court finds no conclusive proof thereof. Besides, even if their
reliance on the victim’s affidavit may be wrong, it is
elementary that not every erroneous conclusion of fact is an
abuse of discretion. As such, this Court will not interfere with
the said findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice absent a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion. The determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the
prosecutor and ultimately on the Secretary of Justice; it is an
executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is
a matter that this Court will not pass upon absent a showing
of grave abuse of discretion.
D.6 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, Petitioner, vs. CARLITO LACAP, doing
business under the name and style CARWIN
CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION
SUPPLY, Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: FACTS
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly
published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, 1992.
Respondent, doing business under the name Carwin
Constructio, was pre-qualified together with two other
contractors. Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he
was awarded the contract for the concreting
of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. A Contract Agreement was executed
by respondent and petitioner. Respondent undertook the
works, made advances for the purchase of the materials and
payment for labor costs.
After the project was done, respondent sought to collect
payment for the completed project. The DPWH prepared the
Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner. However, the
DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District
Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the
final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s
license of respondent had expired at the time of the
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execution of the contract. The District Engineer sought the
opinion of the DPWH Legal Department on whether the
contracts of Carwin Construction for various Mount Pinatubo
rehabilitation projects were valid and effective although its
contractor’s license had already expired when the projects
were contracted.
Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department
opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566),
otherwise known as the Contractor’s License Law, does not
provide that a contract entered into after the license has
expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits
or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable
and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any
appropriate administrative liability action that may be
imposed on the contractor and the government officials or
employees concerned.
Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department,
recommended that payment should be made to Carwin
Construction, reiterating his earlier legal opinion.13 Despite
such recommendation for payment, no payment was made to
respondent.
respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause
of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature
of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the
decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
RTC Ruling: Motion to Dismiss was denied. The RTC held
that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price
since it has accepted the completed project and enjoyed the
benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the
long standing and consistent pronouncement against
enriching oneself at the expense of another.
CA Ruling: On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision
sustaining the Decision of the RTC. It held that since the
case involves the application of the principle of estoppel
against the government which is a purely legal question, then
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply; that by its actions the government is estopped from
questioning the validity and binding effect of the Contract
Agreement with the respondent; that denial of payment to
respondent on purely technical grounds after successful
completion of the project is not countenanced either by
justice or equity.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s recourse to judicial
action was premature since the proper remedy was to appeal
the District Auditor’s disapproval of payment to the COA,
pursuant to Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D.
No. 1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines; that the COA has primary jurisdiction
to resolve respondent’s money claim against the government
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
under Section 2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of
action.
Respondent, on the other hand, in his
Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code
provisions relating to human relations. He submits that equity
demands that he be paid for the work performed; otherwise,
the mandate of the Civil Code provisions relating to human
relations would be rendered nugatory if the State itself is
allowed to ignore and circumvent the standard of behavior it
sets for its inhabitants.
RULING
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes.29 The issues
which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a
court without first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.30
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.31
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
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(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot;33
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable
to the present case.
Despite repeated demands, clearly, there was unreasonable
delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of
respondent.
The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with
the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature
is to be or can be done.36 The issue does not require
technical knowledge and experience but one that would
involve the interpretation and application of law.
complaint for specific performance and damages was not
prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to
resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-
Cebu (Branch VIII):
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and
wait until the Commission on Audit and the Ministry of
Public Highways had acted on the claims for
compensation for the lands appropriated by the
government. The road had been completed; the Pope
had come and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be paid
for the properties taken from them. Given this official
indifference, which apparently would continue
indefinitely, the private respondents had to act to assert
and protect their interests.
On the question of whether a contractor with an expired
license is entitled to be paid for completed projects, Section
35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price,
commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid
to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or
assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction
work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of
another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any
member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license,
impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate
or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall,
upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than
five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without interpretation.40 This rule derived from the
maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the
statute.41 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.42
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare,
expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a
contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless,
such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed
therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he
completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to
the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the
maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no
man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury)
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
D7. JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH v. HON. RENATO C.
CORONA
G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
• In their respective motions for reconsideration, both
respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred
to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated
April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the
required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not
met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be
decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following
constitutional provision:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of
at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en
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banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc.
• A careful reading of the above constitutional provision,
however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a
distinction between cases, on the one hand, and
matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided"
while matters, which include motions, are "resolved".
Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases";
while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying
the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in
the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution
where these words appear.
• With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear
that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained.
• Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case,
the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of
a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence
of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not
"matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article
VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a
division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision.
The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the
Court en banc.
• On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by
the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the
case undecided. There is still the decision which must
stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to
muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite
plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such
was the ruling of this Court in the “Win-Win” Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
• It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea
for the referral of this case to the Court en banc that the
issues submitted in their separate motions are of first
impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio
M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for
reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following was
expressed:
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the
movants are matters of no extraordinary import to
merit the attention of the Court En Banc.
Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power
of the local government units to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer
novel, this having been decided by this Court in
the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
• Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was
arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of
the Second Division of this Court, Stated otherwise, this
Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by
movants are nothing new and do not deserve the
consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation
of the full Court in the resolution of movants' motions for
reconsideration would be inappropriate.
• There are exceptional cases when this Court may
entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as
where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons.
Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for
reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court
first obtained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “Win-Win” resolution, issued after the
original decision had become final and executory, had any
legal effect.
HELD:
• We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office
of the President had already become final and executory
even prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration
which became the basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution.
• The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, viz.: "Just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution
of his/her case.”
• In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land
in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property. The issue in
this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit.
D8. G.R. No. 174830. July 31, 2009.*
ISABELITA vda. DE DAYAO and HEIRS OF VICENTE
DAYAO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF GAVINO ROBLES,
namely PLACIDA vda. DE ROBLES, TEODORA ROBLES
MENDOZA, CRISPINA ROBLES-ABAGAT, PAVIA
ROBLES vda. DE ADRIANO, TEOFILA ROBLES
VILLAFLORES and REGINO ROBLES, respondents.
FACTS:
 Anacleto Dayao was the owner of parcels of land located
in Paombong, Hagonoy and Malolos, in
the Province of Bulacan, and in
Minalin, Province of Pampanga. He died on July 24, 1934,
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leaving behind his spouse, Trinidad Ople Dayao and his

two children, Vicente and Isabelita. A. DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order
 Vicente filed before the DAR an application for retention denying Gavinos appeal and affirming the order of
of several parcels of land. In his Small Landowners the DAR Region III Regional Director
Undertaking, Application for Retention and Affidavit,  Gavino filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 19,
Vicente stated his desire to retain not more than 7 1997 Order, but former DAR Secretary Horacio R.
hectares of his rice and/or corn lands pursuant to Morales denied the same.
Presidential Decree No. 27, composed of the following Office of the President: denying his appeal
tenanted rice and/or corn lands:  Gavino subsequently filed a petition for review before the
IV. TENANTED RICE AND/OR CORN LANDS APPLIED Court of Appeals.
FOR RETENTION CA DECISION: reversing the orders of the DAR and the
Office of the President.
OCT/TCT/TD NAME OF LOCATION OF AREA - ruled that Vicentes application for retention was
No. TENANT- FARMHOLDINGS (in insufficient, incomplete and lacking forthrightness.
FARMER hectares) - Hence, the DAR had no basis to grant Vicentes
application for retention.
TCT Juan Dakila, Malolos, 3.5001 - Contrary to the finding of the DAR, Vicentes sister,
No.18548 Alcoriza, Bulacan Isabelita, never applied for retention and hence, the
Policarpio DAR had no jurisdiction to grant her any
Alcoriza & retention. The dispositive portion of the decision
Victorino states:
Teodoro
CT No. 38 Perlito Kapitangan, 1.1000  Petitioners herein Isabelita Dayao and the Heirs of
Santos Paombong, Vicente Dayao filed a motion for reconsideration before
[Bulacan] the Court of Appeals but it was denied in a Resolution
TD No. 2762 Jose San Sebastian, .4252 dated September 22, 2006.
Santiago [Hagonoy],  Hence, the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
[Bulacan] Court.
TD No. 2761 Jose San Sebastian, .9000
Santiago Hagonoy, ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err when it reversed the
[Bulacan] orders of the DAR and the Office of the President granting
petitioners application for retention?
TD No. 2529 Gavino Sta. Elena, .8425
Robles Hagonoy,
RULING:
[Bulacan]
Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal
by certiorari, as a petition for review under Rule 45 is
 20 years later or on October 16, 1996 Director Eugenio limited only to questions of law; Factual findings of
B. Bernardo of DAR Region III, San Fernando, administrative agencies are generally accorded respect
Pampanga granted Vicentes application for retention. By and even finality by the court if such findings are
that time, Vicente had already died and was survived by supported by substantial evidence.
his heirs who substituted for him in the action.  Moreover, it is settled doctrine that the “errors” which
may be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari
The DAR Order granting Vicentes application for retention are those of the Court of Appeals, and not directly those
states: of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or
1. GRANTING the Application for retention filed by officer which rendered the decision in the first instance.
the Heirs of Vicente O. Dayao,
 The factual findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
2. GRANTING the retention right of Isabelita O.
who has acquired expertise in specific matters within his
Dayao with respect to her own share, more
jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without justifiable
specifically described as:
reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.
3. CANCELLING the CLTs issued to the tenants in
the retained area, and in lieu thereof, directing
Also well-settled is the rule that the SC is not a trier of
the MARO concerned to assist the tenants in facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the
the execution of leasehold contracts with the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on
landowners over their respective tillages; and
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
4. ORDERING the applicants to accordingly respect
the case falls under any of the following recognized
the security of tenure of their tenants/lessees, exceptions:
and to leave them in their peaceful cultivation of
1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
the land.
speculation, surmises and conjectures
2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
 Gavino Robles, one of the tenant-farmers of the parcels or impossible;
of land which Vicente had applied for, appealed the 3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
order granting Vicentes application for retention.

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4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
6) When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based;
9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; an
10) When the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
 We find that this case falls under the exceptions,
since the findings of fact of the DAR are contrary to
that of the CA warranting review by this Court.
Accordingly, we shall now focus on the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, which categorically held as follows:
 One of the earliest issues that the petitioners
predecessor Gavino Robles raised was the question of
who applied for retention.
- Gavino pointed to the Small Landowners
Undertaking, Application for Retention and Affidavit
that Vicente filed to claim that Vicente was the sole
applicant.
- Isabelitas name surfaced in the records of the case
only through an Extrajudicial Settlement that Vicente
filed in 1981 showing how he and his sister Isabelita
were dividing up the estate of their deceased father
- The petitioners did not frontally raise this same
issue in the present petition for review, thus
suggesting that this is not an issue before
us. Whether the grantee of a right of retention
had filed an application for retention, however, is
a jurisdictional matter that the parties cannot
simply gloss over; the DAR has no authority to
decree a retention when no application was in
the first place ever filed.
 We find from our review that the above ruling is not
supported by the records before us. The petitions
Annex A, to be sure, contains no indication that there is
an applicant other than Vicente. Our examination of the
records in fact shows that Vicente categorically
claimed ownership of the lands he listed, with the
qualification that All the mentioned properties with
the exception of TCT No. T-51369 are still in the
names of the former owners. It likewise significantly
appears that he only included his share of the Minalin,
Pampanga ricelands in his sworn declaration. This, in
our view, confirms that he filed the application only in
his own behalf.
- We likewise examined the 1981 extrajudicial
settlement. While this notarized deed did mention
Vicente was the representative of my co-owner
Isabelita Dayao, there was no mention that
Isabelita was joining him as applicant for
retention or that the deed was submitted for
purposes of their application for retention. Thus,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B
it requires a good stretch of the imagination to say
as the DAR did that Isabelita had joined Vicente in
the latters application for retention
 We disagree with the DAR and the OPs conclusions as
we believe that Vicente failed to comply with the
requirements for retention.
- He is not entitled to retention because he failed to
list all his properties in his application and in the
1981 extrajudicial settlement he subsequently
submitted.
 The 1959 extrajudicial settlement provides a summary of
Anacletos properties that Trinidad([Anacletos] wife),
Vicente and Isabelita acquired by inheritance after
Anacleto died in 1934.
- As the DAR order correctly noted, this extrajudicial
settlement did not assign specific properties to
the heirs but merely divided the inherited
properties pro-indiviso; 1/2 of the totality went
to Trinidad while ½ was divided between the
children Vicente and Isabelita.
- In this light, this extrajudicial settlement may not
be a conclusive indicator of Vicentes
landholdings in 1976 (i.e., at the time he applied
for retention), but it is still material and significant for
Vicentes application in terms of the properties it
listed that continued to appear in Anacletos name
for taxation purposes under the Municipal Assessors
certifications, and as a standard of comparison to
test the evidentiary weight of the 1981 extrajudicial
settlement that the DAR almost wholly relied upon.
- Confronted with the 1959 extrajudicial settlement
and the submitted certifications, the least that
Vicente should have done is to explain and to
reconcile the different listings of properties in the
two extrajudicial settlements and his own 1976
sworn application for retention. It does not appear
from the records before us, however, that Vicente
ever made any such clarification. To us, this
omission is legally significant as the burden of
proving Vicentes entitlement thereby shifted. In the
absence of any clarification from Vicente, the DAR
lost its basis to justify Vicentes entitlement to
retention. For, in our view, the 1959 extrajudicial
settlement read in relation with the Municipal
Assessors certifications and with the 1981 Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate directly suggested that
Vicente failed to give a complete listing of his
landholdings when he applied for retention in 1976
and did not rectify it through the submission of the
1981 extrajudicial settlement.
- Thus, Vicentes application suffered from
material omissions and was fatally incomplete.
 To illustrate the extent of the properties still in
[Anacletos] name, in Malolos City alone, there are
several tracts of land that Vicente should have
accounted for in his sworn application for retention.
- These are the following: (1) a 2,626 square meter
land in Mabolo; and (2) the 935 square meter and
the 333 square meter lands in San Vicente.
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o In the Municipality of Hagonoy, the Office of the such application being “insufficient, incomplete and
Treasurer issued a certification that several lacking in forthrightness.” Indeed, the DAR had no basis
lands in the different barangays of the for granting Vicente’s application for retention. Hence,
municipality, with an aggregate of 81,223 the Court of Appeals committed no error in granting
square meters were still declared in [Anacletos] Gavino Robles’ petition below
name as of 1974.
- Out of these total landholdings in Hagonoy,
the 18,728 square meter land in San Miguel,
Hagonoy and the 22,862 square meter land in
San Agustin, Hagonoy were similarly not
accounted for in Vicentes application. Vicente
likewise did not declare these lands in his
application, although the San Pablo lands
were mentioned in the 1981 extrajudicial
settlement.
o In Paombong, the Office of the Municipal
Assessor issued a certification that Anacleto
was the previous owner of a parcel of land
measuring 11,634 square meters (1.1634
hectares) located in Barangay Pinalagdan (in
1997, this land was already declared in the
name of Gabriel Sapitan) and
that Trinidad claimed a 10,389 square meter
(1.0389 hectares) land located in the same
barangay.Vicente also did not likewise account
for these lands in his application. In addition,
Anacleto was the previous declarant of a parcel
of land, with an area of 2,051 square meters,
situated in Barangay, San Isidro II (which in
1997 was already declared in the name of
Melchor de Roxas, married to Cecilia Torres),
which was likewise not listed in Vicentes
application for retention.
 Since no other heirs were indicated in the records and
since all these lands already belonged to Anacletos heirs
after his death in 1934, Vicente had been less than
forthright in the application for retention that the DAR
passed upon.
- His application therefore should have been
disapproved for its patent incompleteness that
left the DAR with no certain way of knowing,
given Vicentes silence, how and why he should
be entitled to retention.
- Both the DAR on motion for reconsideration and the
Office of the President should have made this
conclusion as they had the benefit of Gavinos critical
submissions.
- DAR Region III, for its part, is no less responsible for
what happened in light of its unusually lengthy
inaction, and its failure to inquire deeper given two
extrajudicial settlements that substantially differed in
their listed properties. In sum, we hold that both the
DAR and the OP misappreciated material evidence
and thus made the wrong considerations when they
approved Vicentes application for retention

 After careful perusal of the records, we find that the

abovementioned findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are accurate and well documented. We
therefore sustain its findings that Isabelita Dayao did not
apply for retention, and Vicente’s application for retention
failed to comply with the legal requirements for retention,
Prepared by JBC, KKC, CA De D., JMM, KCQ, MAKR, 2B