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Andreas Kalyvas - The Tyranny of Dictatorsip. When The Greek Tyrant Met The Roman Dictator
Andreas Kalyvas - The Tyranny of Dictatorsip. When The Greek Tyrant Met The Roman Dictator
Andreas Kalyvas - The Tyranny of Dictatorsip. When The Greek Tyrant Met The Roman Dictator
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The Tyranny of Dictatorship : When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman
Dictator
Andreas Kalyvas
Political Theory 2007 35: 412
DOI: 10.1177/0090591707302208
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The article examines the inaugural encounter of the Greek theory of tyranny
and the Roman institution of dictatorship. Although the twentieth century is
credited for fusing the tyrant and the dictator into one figure/concept, I trace the
origins of this conceptual synthesis in a much earlier historical period, that of
the later Roman Republic and the early Principate, and in the writings
of two Greek historians of Rome, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Appian of
Alexandria. In their histories, the traditional interest in the relationship
between the king and the tyrant is displaced by a new curiosity about the
tyrant and the dictator. The two historians placed the two figures alongside
one another and found them to be almost identical, blurring any previous
empirical, analytical, or normative distinctions. In their Greco-Roman
synthesis dictatorship is re-described as ‘temporary tyranny by consent’ and
the tyrant as a ‘permanent dictator.’ Dictatorship, a venerated republican
magistracy, the ultimate guardian of the Roman constitution, is for the first
time radically reinterpreted and explicitly questioned. It meets its first critics.
Author’s Note: I am grateful to Andrew Arato, Melvin Richter, Dmitri Nikoulin, Vassilis
Lambropoulos, and Mary Dietz for their advice and insightful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. I would also like to thank Nadia Urbinati, Jason Frank, Gerasimos Karavitis, Ann
Kornhauser, Claudio Lopez-Guerra, Jim Miller, and the two anonymous reviewers for their
helpful and constructive suggestions and criticisms.
412
series of disruptive and violent civic conflicts that brought about the col-
lapse of the res publica. As an emergency magistracy, dictatorship played a
decisive role in the republic’s slow and painful descent into discord and dis-
order.41 Its direct interventions in the politics of social conflict enjoy a
prominent place in Appian’s depiction of the gradual dissolution and ulti-
mate death of republican institutions. With Appian, dictatorship remained
where Dionysius had relegated it, fallen from its previously lofty constitu-
tional position and irremediably tainted by its association with tyranny.
things that are universally advantageous and useful.58 This synoptic disap-
proval resonates throughout Dionysius’ Roman history. Based on the
description of its genesis, dictatorship was more of a political weapon in
Rome’s ongoing civic struggles than a military magistracy aimed at exter-
nal foes.59 The senate deliberately designed dictatorship as an instrument
for domestic emergencies. Its purpose was to spread fear and insecurity
among the disobedient masses, abolish legal protections and rights if
needed, suppress popular dissent, and protect the interest and privileges of
the patricians. This may explain why, as Theodor Mommsen observed,
“since the fall of monarchy, the suppression of dictatorship became in
Rome the objective of the party of liberty.”60
As a supreme device of repression, the result of “an aristocratic plot,”
institutionally engineered for situations of class warfare, dictatorship neces-
sarily militarized political contestation.61 The fact that the first archaic name
for the dictator was magister populi underscores the primary function of a
military commander.62 Dictatorship not only criminalized political conflict
and militarized the city but also transformed the political adversary into a
hostis, a public enemy, against whom the dictator could legally apply in full
force the law of war.63 As Clinton Rossiter observes, “the resort to the dicta-
torship converted the Roman Republic and its complex constitution into the
simplest and most absolute of all governments—an armed camp governed
by an independent and irresponsible general.”64 All this would have sounded
familiar to Greek ears. Tyrants “know well that all who are subject to their
.
tyranny are their enemies (ε′χθροι ),” Xenophon’s “Hieron” laments, as they
live “in a perpetual state of war.”65 Tyranny was a friendless power, and the
militarization of the political was considered a defining attribute of tyranni-
cal rule.66 Aristotle, in his historical and comparative investigations on the
nature of this form of boundless power, concurred: the tyrant is a war-maker,
a “πολεµοποιο′ς.”67 The tyrannical city was always under siege; and so it
was with Rome under the rule of a dictator.68
These similarities may have informed Dionysius’ sweeping redefinition
of dictatorship as “elective tyranny.” On the one hand, dictatorship was
tyrannical because it was absolute and unaccountable, entailed the discre-
tionary use of the means of violence, the ability to breach the laws at will,
and threatened the life, liberties, and property of its subjects while seeking
to protect and advance partial class interests against the common good. On
the other hand, it was also elective. The people explicitly consented to
sacrifice temporarily their freedom when they ratified the senate’s proposal.
That they were fooled and manipulated, as Dionysius maintained, does not
alter the fact that in the end they sanctioned the new law, thus surrendering
. .
to a “voluntary tyranny” (αν′θαιρετον τνραννιδα).69 With the Romans,
the tyrant became a constitutional choice in moments of crisis and tyranny
took the new form of arbitrary personal rule by consent.
Dionysius’ radical reappraisal not only challenged established views on
dictatorship, it also questioned classical definitions of tyranny. For instance,
from the well-known Greek designations of tyranny as a particular form of
rule over unwilling subjects, against the law, and in the service of the
private interests of the ruler, Dionysius retained the two last attributes,
illegality and partial interests, and reduced the significance of the first,
involuntary rule.70 As a consequence, the non-consensual foundations of
tyranny and its association with usurpation became less important in his use
of the term, given that he thought it possible to have a tyranny consented to
by the many as long as the ruler remained unaccountable and outside the
law, enjoying full powers over his subjects while seeking to advance
particular social interests. In this way, Dionysius distanced himself from
the classical meanings traceable at least to Herodotus’ story of the first
tyrant Gyges, according to which tyranny was an act of usurpation in vio-
lation of established norms and rules regulating the acquisition of power.71
Dionysius drew attention instead to the nature and quality of rule itself and
not to the method of its possession, thus departing from the view of tyranny
as a violation of the procedural law of succession. This reformulation of
tyranny anticipates the medieval distinction between tyranny ex defectu
tituli (with respect to the illegitimate and non-consensual acquisition of
power) and tyranny quoad exercitium (with respect to the way of exercis-
ing power).72
This subtraction of the principle of consent from the attributes of tyranny
was not fully innovative considering the Aristotelian category of “elective
tyranny” that was included in his typology of royalty.73 Aristotle distin-
guished among several types of kingship, dissimilar but still partaking in
the same regime form, allowing for a more complex, comparative approach.
Dionysius’ approach directly relies on one of Aristotle’s royal sub-types,
the obscure and almost unknown to us archaic, pre-democratic Greek insti-
tution of aesymne–tae, under which a military commander was elected and
granted additional powers to save the city from external dangers.74 After the
completion of the mission, the aesymne–tes abdicated. Aristotle considered
this ancient practice tyrannical because it was absolute in the manner of its
rule, notwithstanding its likely origin in popular support or through the
established legal forms and procedures. Such regimes “are of the nature of
tyrannies,” Aristotle writes, “because they are despotic, but of the nature of
kingships because they are elective and rule over willing subjects.”75 The
advantage of the death of the two consuls during the civil war, Sulla ‘con-
vinced’ the senate to appoint an interrex. He subsequently ‘persuaded’ the
interrex not to organize and supervise the elections for the new consuls
but instead to appoint him dictator for an indefinite period and with leg-
islative powers.83 The interrex followed Sulla’s ‘suggestion’ and proposed a
new law which was approved by a weakened and demoralized centuriate
assembly thus formally appointing Sulla dictator (βασιλεν′ ων δικτα′τωρ),
and establishing, in effect, a dictatorship by popular election.84 As if history
were repeating itself within just a few centuries, “the Romans welcomed this
treachery of an election as an appearance and pretence of freedom and
appointed Sulla as tyrant with absolute power (τν′ραννον αντοκρα′τορα) for
as long as he wished.”85 Like the closing of a circle, the republic’s beginnings
met the republic’s end: in “voluntary servitude.”86
Like Dionysius, Appian redefined Sulla’s dictatorship as a tyrannical
form of rule.87 What exemplified Sulla’s tyranny was not external, solely
because of his skillful manipulation of his appointment procedure. Nor was
the tyrannical character of his rule due simply to the crimes he committed
and the visceral terror he unleashed. Likewise, Sulla’s dictatorship could
not be explained by his legislative constituent powers (dictator legibus
scribendis et rei publicae constituendae) which gave him unlimited powers
to make laws and amend the constitution.88 Rather, the tyrannical nature of
Sulla’s rule was inscribed in the very logic of his dictatorial position as
such. As Appian claimed, following on Dionysius’ steps, dictatorship is in
itself a form of tyranny and thus “even in the past the dictator’s power had
been tyrannical.”89 Dictatorship had always been a tyrannical power, irre-
spective of Sulla’s procedural irregularities and innovations.
If Appian was right, however, there would be no difference between
Sulla and all the previous dictators, all of whom would look like tyrants.
Obviously this cannot be the case since Appian is well aware of the histor-
ically distinct character of Sulla’s dictatorship. It was the violation of the
temporary limits of dictatorship that accounts for Sulla’s historical unique-
ness. By removing the time limits, Sulla unleashed the tyrant residing
within the emergency magistracy, and its dreadful powers. While in the past
.
the tyranny of dictatorship “was limited to short periods” (ο′λι γω χρο′νω
δ’ο′ριζοµε′νη), with Sulla it became “indeterminate” (α′ ο′ριστος).90 Here,
Appian’s approach recalls Plutarch’s, insofar as it was the latter who a
century earlier had defined Caesar’s dictatorship as tyrannical precisely
because it was perpetual and who also identified Sulla as “nothing else than
always a tyrant.”91 But Plutarch did not qualify his definition. It was in
Appian’s histories, as Mario Turchetti correctly notes, that “dictatorship
was originally a tyrannical power, even if it was short-term limited. But for
the first time, granted without limits, it became a perfect tyranny.”92
Appian’s distinction between dictatorship and tyranny derives from the
fact that the first is a limited form of the latter. The dictator is a temporary
tyrant, whose tyranny is short-lived, regulated, and bounded. Thus, the dif-
ference between Sulla and previous dictators was that the latter were limited.
In Appian’s narrative, the dictator resembles an interim tyrant, restrained and
.
contained, designed to exercise “tyrannical power” (τνραννικη′ µα′ρχη′ν)
only in brief moments of grave emergencies not exceeding the six months of
unlimited power, not subject to appeal and to countervailing checks, when
the law undoes the temporal chains that bind him.93 As a slumbering tyrant,
he lies dormant in normal times, waking up only temporarily during a crisis
to wear his dictatorial mantle. By being appointed for an indefinite period,
Sulla seems to have fulfilled the tyrannical logic of dictatorship. From a lim-
ited tyranny, periodic and segmented,94 Sulla moved to a form of tyranny that
.
was, for Appian, pure and absolute (εντελη′ ς τνραννι ς).95
Appian’s argument is subtle but decisive. The constitutional principle of
time-limits does not indicate an essential difference between these two
forms of power but rather an internal differentiation of degree between a
limited and an unlimited tyranny. The temporary suspension of the law
amounts to a provisional abolition that subordinates it to the arbitrary rule
of human will. Dictatorship and tyranny partake in the same species of
power: supreme, discretionary, arbitrary, personal, and violent. Two varia-
tions on a common theme, the dictator is a temporary tyrant and the tyrant
a permanent dictator. Sulla’s magistracy is thus at once both typical and
unique in that it realized the genuinely tyrannical nature of dictatorship by
ridding it of temporal limits. By redefining dictatorship as a temporary
tyranny and tyranny as a permanent dictatorship, Appian registered the
deep affinities between the two concepts, thereby reaffirming Dionysius’
view of dictatorship as tyrannical by nature.96
To be sure, Appian’s account is not identical to Dionysius’. Their inten-
tions and preoccupations were not similar as the historical, biographical,
cultural, and political contexts of their respective histories diverged sharply.
Many differences separate the two Greek historians. Even on the issue of
dictatorship, there are some discrepancies in tone and orientation. Appian
appears ambivalent toward the tyrannical effects of dictatorship as in one
occasion he displayed a kind of appreciation for how in the past dictator-
ship had served Rome. He thus acknowledged that this exceptional magis-
tracy “had been useful in former times.”97 However, it is unclear why he
thought so and how this relates to his more systematic, informed observa-
tions on dictatorship and its role in the demise of the republic, where there
is no mention of any positive advantage. Might it be that he held a prag-
matic view according to which the dictator as a short-term tyrant could still
be useful in certain occasions? Here, the interpretative difficulty relates to
whether Appian, while stressing the usefulness of dictatorship, recognized
the necessity of tyranny for moments of crisis. This puzzle pertains to the
consistency and clarity of Appian’s account and how this brief commentary
could fit into his broader narrative. But the fact remains that even in this
case Appian upheld his description of dictatorship as an absolute power,
thus concurring not only with his explicit analysis of this institution as
tyrannical and unlimited but also with Dionysius’ version of unaccount-
ability. When it comes to their descriptive understanding of the nature of
dictatorship the similarities between the two Greek historians are more
pronounced than any of the differences that may set them apart.
behind the hero, the wolf inside the soldier, the anomie inhibiting the law.
The towering reputation dictatorship enjoyed with its martial aura of nobil-
ity, an ethical embodiment of civic virtue and patriotism, are now all cast
aside as institutional and oratory ornaments to reveal that dictatorship is
another name for tyranny. As a consequence their histories disclosed a
tyrannical kernel hidden inside the institutional fabric of republican
government.
Furthermore, an additional ramification is that both Dionysius and
Appian’s views question much later attempts, such as those of Mommsen
and Carl Schmitt, to distinguish between two different dictatorships: an
older, ancient dictatorship and its irregular, radical reinvention by Sulla and
Caesar.104 Against this influential interpretation of two types of dictatorship,
the one commissarial and the other constituent, the two Greek historians
point to the historical continuity and institutional consistency of Roman
dictatorship. For instance, in their historical revisions of Roman history,
Sulla’s dictatorial tyranny loses all of its exceptional or innovative charac-
ter. It is neither an unfortunate anomaly nor an erratic occurrence. His dic-
tatorship does not signify a break in the history of the institution. Instead,
it is regarded as the repressed but permanent, endemic tyrannical possibil-
ity of dictatorial powers. Tyranny, therefore, is seen as an integral part of
dictatorship. They may differ from a formal point of view but they are sim-
ilar in substance. In fact, if the two Greek historians did not consider Sulla’s
rule accidental or ground-breaking, it is only because they situated its
tyrannical deeds within the very structure and logic of this supreme emer-
gency magistracy that offers itself to abuse.105
Here, one cannot help but notice the tragic irony, even poetic justice, of
Dionysius and Appian’s histories. Although the Romans took pride in over-
throwing the monarchy, elevating the removal of Tarquinius to a republican
foundational myth, to an anti-tyrannical instituting act, they were ultimately
unable to rid themselves of the (bad) king.106 And along with praising them-
selves for their devotion to the law and their patriotic respect for tradition
and custom, the Romans opened up a permanent gap, an internal fissure in
the legal edifice of their republic. To save the city, the constitution created
this void, this empty space of the law, the space of a-nomia, where the dic-
tator comes to encounter the tyrant in their common ambition to fill it up
with the power once owed by the kings. It is ironic that despite the Romans’
renowned hatred of kings (odium regni), the expulsion of Tarquinius, and
the collegiality of the consuls, the tyrant was never really barred from the
city but rather remained harbored within the republican institution of dic-
tatorship.107 By retaining the kingly powers, the Romans ‘inadvertently’
preserved as well their tyrannical potential and failed to fully break away
from their monarchical past.108
In fact, kingship, whose abolition was predicated on the dangers it posed
to liberty, was preserved by the republic in the ‘minimal’ form of dictator-
ship with the utmost task of defending the city in its most vulnerable
moments.109 In the Roman republic, the enemy of freedom was elevated as
its defender. And what was meant to be used against internal and external
enemies was turned ultimately against the Roman constitution itself, which
thus fell victim to its own dangerous creation. Plotting to strengthen exec-
utive power beyond law, the constitution ended up caught in its own trap,
undermining the freedoms that had sustained its very existence and identity.
By importing the tyrant into their republic after the expulsion of the kings
under the guise of extraordinary emergency powers, the ancient Romans
made an ill-fated choice that eventually contributed to the loss of their lib-
erty. To lose their libertas, what the citizens feared and hated the most,
finally became a reality. With Sulla and Caesar the dictator is finally
exposed: he is the tyrant within a free city, a Trojan horse situated at the
heart of the Roman constitution. Thus, Tarquinius might have been ban-
ished but his abusive, tyrannical powers survived in the new emergency
magistracy and returned with a vengeance to play an active part in the con-
flicts that brought the republic to an end.
Many centuries later, this reinterpretation of dictatorship would reverber-
ate in modern political thought in a radically altered historical context. With
the return of dictatorship and its dissemination through republican doctrines
of politics, the moderns gradually rediscovered its tyrannical nature. From
this rich and fascinating period, one telling example stands out. It is in
Thomas Jefferson’s writings that Dionysius and Appian’s analysis is fully
resuscitated and brought to its ultimate conclusion. In a section of his Notes
on Virginia regarding the defects of the Virginia State constitution he
denounced two proposals made in 1776 and 1781 “to create a dictator,
invested with every power legislative, executive, and judiciary, civil and mil-
itary, of life and of death, over our persons and over our properties.”110
Jefferson used his disagreement with these two proposals as an occasion
not only to deplore dictatorship but, more tellingly, to attack tyranny.
Commenting on the Romans, he keenly reproached their republican consti-
tution because it “allowed a temporary tyrant to be erected, under the name
of a Dictator; and that temporary tyrant, after a few examples, became
perpetual.”111 Temporality is the crucial feature, the one that blends the
tyrant and the dictator together. More forthright than Dionysus and Appian,
Jefferson explicitly recognized the extent of the destructive potential of
tyrannical rule which he did not think could be tamed and regulated in the
form of dictatorship. The temporal constraints would not last forever to per-
petually bind this extraordinary device of domination and to compel it to
act for the preservation of the republic. Once included in the constitutional
arrangement of dictatorship, tyranny becomes a permanent, endemic threat
to that same arrangement. This threat arises because the tyrant cannot be
moderated by or accommodated within an institutional mechanism and an
overarching constitutional system of mixed powers. Instead, he will throw
the mixed constitution out of balance. The tyrant, who inhibits the dictator,
will seek to permanently unbind himself from the legal restrictions and use
his exceptional power to subvert constitutional constraints.
The ancient Greeks noticed early on this unruly drive of tyranny and reg-
istered it in classical political philosophy. Tyranny is excessive, “unlimited”
.
(α′ο′ριστος τνραννι ς), striving voraciously for absolute sovereignty (απα′ντων
κν′ριο′ς). It amounts, for Herodotus, to hubris, as the tyrant’s desires
112
temporary tyrant must have looked not only paradoxical, but deeply unrea-
sonable and dangerous. How is it possible that in moments of crisis a free city
appeals to a tyrant for its survival as the only means to restore order? Can the
tyrant whom Cicero described, following Plato, as “the most monstrous of the
wild beasts in the cruelty of his nature . . . who desires no bond of shared law,
no partnership in human life with his fellow citizens” be constitutionally
bound as to safeguard the republic?123 Can a tyrant ever be trusted? Can he
defend liberty? From a democratic standpoint, the republican theory of dic-
tatorship now viewed through the lens of Dionysius and Appian asks of citi-
zens that they entrust provisionally their freedoms, life, and property to a
power they most fear and find insufferable, “since no free man willingly
endures such a rule.”124 It demands to surrender the defense of the city to its
enemy and it undoes the civic vow of democratic citizenship.
Finally, and more crucially, Dionysius and Appian help us grapple with
the politically pressing issue of whether it is wise for citizens of constitu-
tional democracies to grant extraordinary emergency powers for security
reasons (even if temporally limited and constitutionally defined) to an office
which stands in an ambiguous relation to the rule of law.125 Especially in a
time when democratic republics are willingly or tacitly opting to suspend
some of their constitutional liberties for purportedly greater security,
Dionysius and Appian’s radical reinterpretation of Roman dictatorship
appears astonishingly salient. Of course, one should not expect to find in
their ancient histories precise answers and definitive solutions to today’s
problems and dilemmas regarding constitutional dictatorship and the threat
of terrorism. But precisely because they recognized that Roman dictatorship
can enjoy a semblance of democratic legitimacy and accommodate itself
with electoral consent, their investigation into the origins and effects of this
ancient exceptional institution could advance a more informed, critical, and
politically incisive understanding of emergency regimes in liberal democra-
tic states. The enduring legacy of the two Greek historians is to have refor-
mulated the question of whether the citizens or their elected representatives
in exceptional moments of crisis should have recourse to a dictator in terms
of the more fundamental issue about the relative advantages of tyranny and
its unpredictable, counter-productive consequences.
Notes
1. Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, “Democracy or Dictatorships?” The Contemporary
Review, 286 (1934), p. 432. Also see, Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, Hannah D. Kahn
(trans.), New York: McGrawn-Hill Book Company, 1939, pp. 355, 486; Giovanni Sartori, The
Theory of Democracy Revised, Vol. I, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers,
1987, p. 204.
2. Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship, Peter Kennedy (trans.), Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 166.
3. For example, see E. E. Kettlet, The Story of Dictatorship. From the Earliest Times till
Today, London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937; Alfred Cobban, Dictatorship: Its History
and Theory, New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1939; Oscar Jászi and John D. Lewis,
Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957;
Maurice Latey, Patterns of Tyranny, New York: Atheneum, 1969; Maurice Latey, Tyranny: A
Study in the Abuse of Power, London: Macmillan, 1969; Raymond Aron, De la dictature,
Paris: René Julliard, 1961; Raymond Aron, Machiavel et les tyrannies modernes, Paris: Édi-
tions de Fallois, 1993; Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in
Latin America, University of Pittsburgh, 1993; Alan Axelrod and Charles Phillips, Dictators
and Tyrants: Absolute Rulers and Would-Be Rulers in World History; Facts on File, 1995; Daniel
Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1996; Simon Tormey, Making Sense to Tyranny: Interpretations of
Totalitarianism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995; Roger Boesche, Theories of
Tyranny From Plato to Arendt, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1996; For three noticeable exceptions, see Élie Halévy, The Era of
Tyrannies: Essays on Socialism and War, New York: New York University Press, 1966, p. 308;
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: A Harvest Book, 1975, p. 6;
Andrew Arato, “Good-bye to Dictatorship?” Social Research, 67:4 (2000), pp. 926, 937. Franz
Neumann adopts a different view in his “Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship.” See Franz
Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory,
Herbert Marcuse (ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 233-256. For an illuminating dis-
cussion of dictatorship and tyranny in the twentieth century, see Melvin Richter, “A Family of
Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,”
European Journal of Political Theory, 4:3 (2005), pp. 242-243.
4. Chantal Millon-Delson, “Dictature et despotisme, chez les Anciens et chez les
Modernes,” Revue Française D’Histoire des Idées Politiques, 6 (1997), pp. 245-251.
5. Claude Nicolet, “Dictatorship in Rome,” Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (eds.),
Dictatorship in History and Theory. Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 263.
6. It may well be that Cromwell was the first modern to be considered by many of his
contemporaries to be both a tyrant and a dictator. Pierre Jeannin, “Cromwell: une dictature
introuvable?” Maurice Duverger, Dictatures et Légitimité, Paris: PUF, 1982, pp. 143-158;
R. Zaller, “The Figure of the Tyrant in English Revolutionary Thought,” Journal of the History
of Political Ideas, 54 (1993), pp. 585–610.
7. Claude Nicolet, L’idée républicaine en france (1789-1924), Paris: Gallimard, 1994,
p. 101-105.
8. François Hinard, “De la dictature à la tyrannie. Réflexions sur la dictature de Sylla,”
François Hinard (ed.), Dictatures, Actes de la Table ronde de Paris, 27-28 février 1984, Paris:
De Boccard, 1988, pp. 87-96.
9. For the Greek historians of the Roman empire, see G. W. Bowersock, Augustus and
the Greek World, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965; G. W. Bowersock, “Historical Problems
in Late Republican and Augustan Classicism,” T. Gelzer, F. W. Bowersock (eds.), Le classi-
cisme à Rome aux I siècle avant et apres J.-C., Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1978, pp. 65-72; Bettie
Forte, Rome and the Romans as the Greeks Saw Them, Rome: American Academy in Rome,
1972; E. L. Bowie, “The Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic,” Studies in Ancient
Society, M. I. Finley (ed.), London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1974, pp. 166-209; Hugh J.
Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions, Toronto: American Studies in Papyrology, 1974;
André Hurst, “Un critique grec dans la Rome d’Auguste: Denys d’Halicarnasse,” ANRW II.
30.1, 1982, pp. 839-865; Claude Nicolet (ed.), Demokratia et Arisokratia. A propos de Caius
Gracchus: mots grecs et réalites romaines, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1983; Emilio
Gabba, “The Historians and Augustus,” Fergus Millar and Erich Segal (eds.), Caesar
Augustus: Seven Aspects, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 61-88; Erich S. Gruen, The
Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984,
pp. 316-356; Robert Syme, “Greeks Invading the Roman Government,” Roman Papers, 4,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 1-20; Claude Nicolet, “Dictateurs Romains,
stratégoi autokratores et généraux carthaginois,” Dictatures, pp. 27-47; I. S. Moxon, J. D.
Smart, and A. J. Woodman (eds.), Past Perspectives. Studies in Greek and Roman Historical
Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; George A. Kennedy (ed.), The
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Vol. I: Classical Criticism, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989; Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher (eds.), Between Republic and
Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990; Michael Grant, Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation,
London: Routledge, 1995; Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey, Erich Gruen (eds.), Hellenistic
Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996; Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and
Power in the Greek World, AD 50-250, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996; David S. Potter,
Literary Texts and the Roman Historian, London: Routledge 1999; Fergus Millar, The Roman
Republic in Political Thought, Hanover and London: The University Press of New England,
2002, pp. 37-49; Timothy E. Duff, The Greek and Roman Historians, London: Bristol
Classical Press, 2003.
10. T. J. Cornell, “The formation of the historical tradition of early Rome,” Past Perspectives.
Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writings, pp. 74, 80-81; Emilio Gabba, Dionysius and
the History of Archaic Rome, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 10-11, 21-22,
87-96, 152; Harvey C. Mansfield, Taming the Prince. The Ambivalence of Modern Executive
Power, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 84-85; Gregory S. Bucher,
“The Origins, Program, and Composition of Appian’s Roman History,” Transactions of the
American Philological Association, 130 (2000), pp. 411-458; Duff, The Greek and Roman
Historians, p. 118.
11. Nicolet, “Dictateurs Romains, stratégoi autokratores et généraux carthaginois,” pp. 35-36,
38; Schultze, “Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his audience,” p. 128; Gabba, Dionysius and
the History of Archaic Rome, pp. 23-59; Matthew Fox, “History and Rhetoric in Dionysius of
Halicarnassus,” The Journal of Roman Studies, 83 (1993), p. 42; Alain M. Gowing, The
Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1992, pp. 283-287; Swain, Hellenism and Empire, pp. 253, 414-421; Millar, The Roman
Republic in Political Thought, pp. 38-39; Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et Tyrannicide de
l’Antiquité à nos jours, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, pp. 162-164.
12. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971, Book V: 70-77, pp. 211-237; Appian, Roman History: The Civil Wars, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, Book I: 98-115, pp. 181-215.
13. Cicero, “Philippic I,” Philippics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001,
1, p. 23; Cicero, “Philippic II,” Philippics, 36, p. 155; Appian, The Civil Wars, Book III:25,
p. 565; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Book 54:51, p. 401, Book 54:2, pp. 283-285.
14. Res Gestae Divi Augusti, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, 5, p. 353;
Theodor Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Paris: Thorin et fils, Éditeurs, Vol. IV, 1894,
pp. 428-429, 436-438; Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002, pp. 53-54; Cobban, Dictatorship. Its History and Theory, p. 331; Arthur Kaplan,
Dictatorships and “Ultimate” Degrees in the Early Roman Republic 501-201 BC, New York:
Revisionist Press, 1977, pp. 6, 165.
15. Clemence Schultze, “Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his audience,” Past Perspectives.
Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writings, pp. 131-134; Bucher, “The Origins,
Program, and Composition of Appian’s Roman History,” pp. 431, 433-437, 441.
16. For example, see Sallust, The Conspiracy of Catiline, New York and London: Penguin
Books, 1963, Book I: 10-12, p. 181-183; Livy, History of Rome, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1998, Book I: Preface, pp. 3-9; Gabba, Dionysius and the History of Archaic
Rome, pp. 211-213.
17. Polybius, The Histories, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book VI: 7-8,
pp. 283-285; Cicero, De Re Publica, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book I: 33,
42, pp. 77, 97-99; Book II: 26-29, 32, pp. 150, 167-169. Also, see Roger Dunkle, “The
Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy, Tacitus,” Classical World, 65
(1971), pp. 12-20; Alain Michel, La philosophie politique a Rome d’Auguste a Marc Aurèle,
Paris: Armand Colin, 1969, pp. 22-27.
18. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999,
Book VIII: 10, p. 491; Cicero, De Re Publica, II: 27, p. 159; Melvin Richter, “A Family of
Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,”
p. 224.
19. For the merging of the Roman king and the Greek tyrant, see Roger Dunkle, “The
Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late republic,” Transactions and
Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 98 (1967), pp. 151-171.
20. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-277; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II: 56,
p. 69-71. More generally, see D. Cohen, “The Origin of Roman Dictatorship,” Mnemosyne,
4:10 (1957), pp. 300-318.
21. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-277. Also see, Clifton Walker Keyes, “The
Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” Studies in Philology, 14 (1917), pp. 298-
305; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Paris: Thorin et fils, Éditeurs, Vol. III, 1893, p. 163;
Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999, pp. 109-113.
22. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 277. A reaction mentioned by Cicero as well.
Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I: 60, p. 95; Nicolet, “Dictateurs Romains, stratégoi autokratores
et généraux carthaginois,” p. 30.
23. Dunkle, “The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic,”
pp. 153-156; J. Béranger, “Tyrannus: Notes sur la notion de la tyrannie chez les Romains
particulièrement a l’époque de César et de Cicéron,” Revue de études Latines, 13 (1935),
pp. 89-90; Jászi and Lewis, Against the Tyrant, pp. 10-11; Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et
Tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours, pp.160-164; Cicero, “Pro rege Deiotaro,” Orations,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 501-541; Jean-Louis Ferrary, “Cicéron
et la. dictature,” Dictatures, pp. 97-105; Neal Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 155-158.
24. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-276; Mommsen, Le droit public romain,
Vol. III, pp. 162-163.
25. Aristotle, Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990, Book V: 10,
pp. 457; Plato, The Republic, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book VIII:
19, p. 333; Book II: 3, pp. 117-119; Diogenes Laertius, “Plato,” Lives of Eminent Philosophers,
Vol. I, Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, III: 83, p. 349; Heredotus’ story of
Gyges, the first tyrant, exemplifies the violent, murderous beginnings of tyranny. Herodotus,
Histories, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, Book I: 8-15, pp. 11-19;
Cicero, De re publica, Book I: 64, pp. 101-103. For the relationship between tyranny and
violent usurpation, see Dolores Hegyi, “Notes on the Origins of Greek Tyrannis,” Academia
scientiarum Hungarica, Acta Antiqua, 13 (1965), pp. 303-318; H. W. Plecket, “The Archaic
tyrannis,” Talanta, 1 (1969), pp. 19-61; Jules Labarbe, “L’apparition de la notion de tyrannie
dans la Grèce archaique,” L’Antiquité Classique, 40 (1971), pp. 471-504.
26. Aristotle, Politics, Book IV:8, p. 327; Book VI:2, p. 507; Polybius, The Histories, Book
VI:7, pp. 283-284.
27. Cicero, Laws, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book III:3, p. 467.
28. This contrasts with the arbitrariness and indeterminacy of tyranny that made law its
enemy. For an insightful discussion of this aspect of tyranny, tyranny as freedom, see Arlene
W. Saxonhouse, “The Tyranny of Reason in the World of the Polis,” The American Political
Science Review, 82:4 (1988), pp. 1261-1275.
29. Aristotle, Politics, Book V:9, 10-11, p. 467.
30. Aristotle, Politics, Book III:11, pp. 269-271; Book V:9, p. 459-475; Plato, The Laws,
Book VIII, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 832c, pp. 137-139; Nicolet,
“Dictatorship in Rome,” p. 265; Lucien Jerphagnon, “Que le tyran est contre-nature. Sur
quelques clichés de l’historiography romaine,” Actes du Colloque: La Tyrannie, Centre de
Publication de l’Université de Caen: Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique, 1984,
pp. 39-50.
31. Herodotus, Histories, Book III:80, p. 105; Aristotle, Politics, Book III:5, p. 207;
Cicero, De Re Publica; Book II:32, pp. 169; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV:13
(Zonaras), p. 107; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. III, pp. 7, 164-165, 191-197; D.
Cohen, “The Origins of Dictatorship,” pp. 300-318; F. E. Adcock, Roman Political Ideas and
Practice, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967, p. 46; Mansfield, Taming the
Prince. The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power, pp. 82-85. Polybius and Cicero rec-
ognized in the tyrant a deviant ruler, an unjust king. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book
VIII: 10, pp. 489-491; Cicero, De Re Publica, II:27, p. 159; Book I: 28-31, 60, 62, pp. 69-
71, 93-95, 97; Book II: 25-27, 32, pp. 155-161, 169; Polybius, The Histories, Book VI:7,
pp. 284-285. Tyranny was regarded as an almost inevitable, natural perversion of kingship in
that the limits separating them did not mark any real difference. See, Aristotle, Politics,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book III:5, p. 209; Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII:10, pp. 489-491; Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I:8, p. 89;
Polybius, The Histories, Book VI:7, p. 285; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II:25, 157; Claude
Nicolet, “Polybe et les institutions romaines,” Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique de la
Fondation Hardt, XX, Genève: Vandoeuvres, 1974, p. 209-265; Neal Wood, Cicero’s Social and
Political Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 156-157.
32. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I: 30, p. 95; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV:13
(Zonaras), pp. 107-109; Carl Schmitt, Die Dictatur, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994,
p. 2l; Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern
Democracies, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004, pp. 17-18.
33. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I:40-43, pp. 93-101; Book II:26-30, 32, pp. 157-163, 169;
Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV:13 (Zonaras), p. 107. Also, see Jean-Louis Ferrary,
“Cicéron et la dictature,” pp. 97-105; Béranger, “Tyrannus: Notes sur la notion de la tyrannie
chez les Romains particulièrement a l’époque de César et de Cicéron,” pp. 89-90.
34. Clinton l. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 17.
35. Polybius, The Histories, Book VI: 7, pp. 284-285; Kurt von Fritz, The Theory of the
Mixed Constitution in Antiquity. A Critical Analysis of Polybius’s Political Ideas, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954; T. Cole, “The Sources and Composition of Polybius VI,”
Historia, 13 (1964), pp. 440-486; Claude Nicolet, “Polybe et les institutions romaines,” Emilio
Gabba (ed.), Polybe. Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique, Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1973,
pp. 209-259; S. Podes, “Polybius and his Theory of Anacyclosis—Problems of not just
Ancient Political Theory,” History of Political Thought, 12:4 (1991), pp. 577-587.
36. Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV:13 (Zonaras), p. 109.
37. Aristotle, Politics, Book III:4, p. 201, Book III:9, p. 249; Polybius, The Histories; Book
III:86, 87, pp. 213, 215; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I:32, p. 77, Book I:60, p. 95, Book II:32,
p. 169. Also see, James F. McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 9. Here, the term anomia refers to its original ancient
Greek meaning and not to its modern appropriation by Emile Durkheim.
38. For tyranny as anomy, see Plato, Republic, Book IX: 572b, 575a-b, pp. 339, 349; Plato,
Statesman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, 302e-303a, p. 163; Aristotle,
Politics, Book IV:8, pp. 325-327; Dionysius, Roman Antiquities, Book V:70, p. 211. Raymond
Weil, “De la tyrannie dans la pensée politique grecque de l’époque classique,” Dictatures et
Légitimité, p. 38. For an insightful discussion of nomos, anomie, and tyranny, see Angel Sanchez
de la Torre, La tyrannie dans la Grèce antique, Paris: Éditions Bière, 1999, pp. 23-124.
39. P.-M., Martin, L’idée de royauté à Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royauté et séductions
monarchiques (du IVe siècle av. J.-C. au principat augustéen), Clermont-Ferrand: Adosa, 1994,
pp. 104-105.
40. Hinard, “De la dictature à la tyrannie. Réflexions sur la dictature de Sylla,” pp. 89-92;
Ferrary, “Cicéron et la dictature,” pp. 101-105.
41. Martin, L’idée de royauté à Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royauté et séductions monarchiques
(du IVe siècle av. J.-C. au principat augustéen), pp. 104-105.
42. For a brief but clear comparative presentation of the two accounts, see Kaplan,
Dictatorships and “Ultimate” Degrees in the Early Roman Republic 501-201 BC, pp. 18-20;
Fox, “History and Rhetoric in Dionysius of Halicarnassus,” pp. 134-135; H. Hill, “Dionysius
of Halicarnassus and the Origins of Rome,” The Journal of Roman Studies, 51:1-2 (1961),
p. 92; Emilio Gabba, “Diogini e la dittatura a Roma,” Tria Corda. Scritti in onore di Arnaldo
momigliano, Como: Biblioteca di Athenaeum, 1983, pp. 215-228.
43. Emilio Gabba, Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome, pp. 140-141; Lintott, The
Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 110; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. III,
p. 163; Paul M. Martin, L’idée de royaté à Rome. Vol. I. De la Rome royale au consensus
républicain, Paris: Adosa, 1982, p. 302.
44. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211. Cicero proposes
a different account of Publius Valerius and his legislation. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II:31,
p. 165.
45. A. W. Lintott, “Provocatio: From the Struggle of the Orders to the Principate,” Aufstieg
und Niedergang der römischen Welt, 1:2 (1972), pp. 226-267; A. W. Lintott, Violence in
Republican Rome, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 12-13; A. W. Lintott, The
Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 33. Also see, A. H. J. Greenidge, “The Procedure of the
‘Provocatio,’” The Classical Review, 9:1 (1895), pp. 4-8; A. H. J. Greenidge, “The ‘Provocatio
Militiae’ and Provincial Jurisdiction,” The Classical Review, 10:5 (1896), pp. 225-233;
E. S. Staveley, “Provocatio during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC,” Historia, III (1954-
1955), p. 412-428. Cloud J. Duncan, “The Origin of Provocatio,” RPh, 72:1 (1998), p. 25-48.
46. M. Humbert, “Le tribunat de la plèbe et le tribunal du people: remarques sur l’histoire de
la provocation ad populum,” Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome, 100 (1988), pp. 431-503;
Michèle Ducos, Les Romains et la Loi. Reserches sur les rapports de la philosophie grecque et
de la tradition romaine á la fin de la République, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984, pp. 71-79.
47. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, pp. 211-215; Livy,
History of Rome, Book II: 7-8, pp. 239-245; Plutarch, “Publicola,” Lives, Vol. I, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998, sections xi-xii, pp. 531-535.
48. Livy, History of Rome, Book III:55, p. 183; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II:31, 53,
p. 165; Cicero, De Oratore, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book II:199, p. 343.
Also, see Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and
Early Principate, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1950, pp. 25-27.
49. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211.
50. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 213.
51. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 213.
52. Livy, History of Rome, Book II:18, 29-30, p. 277, 313-315; Mommsen, Le droit public
romain, Vol. IV, p. 461.
53. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 215.
54. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 75, p. 229.
55. Gabba, Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome, p. 140.
56. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, 71, pp. 215, 213, 217.
57. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 73, p. 223. Also, see Forte,
Rome and the Romans as the Greeks Saw Them, p. 200; Nicolet, “Dictateurs Romains, stratégoi
autokratores et généraux carthaginois,” pp. 30, 34-37, 42; Hinard, “De la dictature à la tyrannie.
Réflexions sur la dictature de Sylla,” pp. 94-96; Ferrary, “Cicéron et la dictature,” p. 103.
58. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, “Thucydides,” Critical Essays. Vol. 1: Ancient Orators,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973, 51, p. 617; Hurst, “Un critique grec dans
la Rome d’Auguste: Denys d’Halicarnasse,” pp. 841-843; Gabba, Dionysius and the History
of Archaic Rome, p. 147.
59. Gabba, Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome, p. 140.
60. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, p. 187.
61. Gabba, Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome, p. 140; Mansfield, Taming the
Prince. The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power, pp. 84-85; Hugh J. Mason, “The Roman
Government in Greek Sources: The Effect of Literary Theory on the Translation of Official
Titles,” Phoenix, 24:2 (1970), pp. 153-154.
62. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I:63, p. 95; Cicero, De Legibus, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, Book III:3, p. 467; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 110;
Giuseppe Valditara, Studi sul magister populi. Dagli ausiliari militari del rex ai primi magistrati
repubblicani, Milano: Giuffré, 1989.
63. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. III, pp. 187.
64. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship. Crisis Government in the Modern
Democracies, p. 25.
65. Xenophon, “Hieron,” Scripta Minora, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2000, 4, p. 35; 6, p. 29.
66. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII: 12, pp. 497-499; Lucian, “The Downward
Journey, or the Tyrant,” Lucian, Vol. II, 11, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999,
p. 23; Melvin Richter, “A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism,
Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,” p. 224.
88. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 185. Also, see Kaplan, Dictatorships and
“Ultimate” Decrees in the Early Roman Republic 501-202 BC, p. 144; Frédéric Hurlet, La
dictature de Sylla: Monarchie ou magistrature Republicaine? Brussels: Institut Historique
Belge de Rome, 1993, pp. 93-108; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, pp. 425-470.
89. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 183.
90. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 183. In addition, the exceptional trait of Sulla’s
tyranny also was due, according to Appian, to the unparalleled fact that “he was the first man,
so far as I know,” who “desired to turn himself . . . from a tyrant into a private citizen” and
“had the courage to lay down his tyrannical power voluntarily.” Appian, The Civil Wars, Book
I: 3, 104, p. 7, 195.
91. Plutarch, “Caesar,” Lives VII, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, 53:1-2,
pp. 575; Plutarch, “Lysander and Sulla,” Lives IV, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2000, 1:1, p. 447.
92. Turchetti, Tyrannie et Tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours, p. 163.
93. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 3, p. 7.
94. I say “almost all” because there are three recorded cases, that of Furius Camillus II (390
BC), L. Aemilius Mamercinus Privenas (316 BC), and M. Servilius Pulex Geminus (202 BC),
which violated the six-month limit. Another irregular dictatorship was that of Minucius in 217
BC. T. A. Dorey, “The Dictatorship of Minucius,” The Journal of Roman Studies, 45: 1-2.
(1955), pp. 92-96. For these and some additional violations, see Saint-Bonnet, L’État d’excep-
tion, pp. 59-60.
95. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, pp. 183-184.
96. Appian’s tyrannical dictatorship reappears timidly and ambivalently in Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s republican vision. Although Rousseau approves of the institution and the practice,
he warns, echoing Appian, that “in the crises that call for its establishment the state is soon
destroyed or saved, and once the pressing need has passed, the dictatorship becomes tyranni-
cal or useless.” Departing clearly from his more canonical and “precise” definition of tyranny
as usurpation of royal authority, Rousseau places it in the void opened up by the absence of
temporal limits, suggesting that the tyrant is a permanent dictator. This formulation evokes
Appian in that the affinity between the dictator and the tyrant unfolds in a temporal horizon.
For this reason Rousseau insists that the best protection against this ominous prospect is to
never extend or prolong a dictator’s commission. However, there is an important difference
between the two thinkers. While Appian understands the temporal factor as only one of degree,
Rousseau sees it as a bridge allowing the crossing from one form of rule over to another. In
that sense, although the Roman institution of dictatorship appears to be liable to abuse once it
is abused it is not the same anymore. It has undergone a qualitative transformation into some-
thing else: tyranny. Here one can sense the presence of Rousseau’s canonical definition. The
dictator who has violated the law regulating the length of his magistracy has in fact usurped a
title “without having any right to it.” In that sense, the tyrant remains a usurper, he who by vio-
lating the temporal restrictions seizes illegally dictatorial power. Tyranny is again a stolen,
degenerated form of a supreme executive rule and not the secret truth of dictatorship, not even
its dark side. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Du Contract Social; ou, Principes du Droit Politique,”
Œuvres Complètes, Volume III, Gallimard: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1964, Book IV: 7,
pp. 458, 423; Pierangelo Catalano, “Le concept de dictature de Rousseau à Bolivar: essai pour
une mise au point politique sur la base du droit romain,” Dictatures, pp. 7-25; Jean Ferrari,
“Rousseau, Kant et la tyrannie,” Actes du Colloque: La Tyrannie, pp. 177-189.
97. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I:16, p. 33.
98. Cicero, “The Third Speech on the Agrarian Law,” Orations, Vol. IV, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1930, III: 5, p. 489.
99. Livy, History of Rome, Book 9:26, pp. 263-267; Kaplan, Dictatorships and “Ultimate”
Decrees in the Early Roman Republic 501-202 BC, pp. 93-94; Lintott, The Constitution of the
Roman Republic, p. 112.
100. It is worth noting, however, that Diodorus of Sicily (80-20 BC), another Greek historian
contemporary of Livy, does not confirm this interpretation. Although Diodorus recounts the dic-
tatorship of Gaius Manius, he does not mention the story of his impeachment. Diodorus of Sicily,
Library of History, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, Book 19:76, p. 43.
101. It seems that Dionysius and Appian’s re-interpretation of tyranny is empirically con-
tradicted by the lex repetundarum or recovery law, contained in a fragmented bronze tablet,
and which suggests that the dictator could be brought to trial after the end of his tenure in
office. Without knowing, however, the exact dating of the law, its duration, and most impor-
tantly its author, it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the extent and character of its legal
impact on dictatorship. For example, most scholars have suggested that the law was authored
by Gaius Gracchus in his struggle to weaken the senatorial class and thus has been interpreted
as an instrument in the political warfare between the orders. Two questions are relevant here:
(1) How did the demise of Gracchus affect this law? (2) Is it not the case that the law itself is
a telling instance of how the institution of dictatorship was turned into a site of political strug-
gle and that the problem of the accountability of the dictator was a contested, open-ended
issue, depending on relations of power and political interests? On this see, Emilio Badian,
“Lex Acilia Repetundarum,” The American Journal of Philology, 74:4 (1954), pp. 374-384;
A. N. Sherwin-White, “The Date of the Lex Repetundarun and its Consequences,” The Journal
of Roman Studies, 62 (1972), pp. 83-99; A. N. Sherwin-White, “The Lex Repetundarum and
the Political Ideas of Gaius Gracchus,” The Journal of Roman Studies, 72 (1982), pp. 18-31.
102. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 112.
103. Richter, “A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism,
Dictatorship, 1750-1917,” pp. 221-248.
104. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. III, pp. 193-194; Vol. IV, pp. 425-470; Carl
Schmitt, Die Diktatur, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994, p. 3; Saint-Bonnet, L’État d’ex-
ception, pp. 47-70; Nicolet, “Dictatorship in Rome,” pp. 265-276; Andrew Arato, “Good-bye
to Dictatorship?” pp. 925-933.
105. Hinard, “De la dictature à la tyrannie. Réflexions sur la dictature de Sylla,” pp. 87-105.
106. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I:11, p. 185; Plutarch, “Comparison of Solon and
Publicola,” Lives, II-III, pp. 569-575; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV:13 (Zonaras),
p. 109; Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and
Early Principate, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 64. As Aristotle percep-
tively observed regarding Greek tyrants, “a mode of securing tyranny is to make it more like
kingship.” Aristotle, Politics, Book V: 9, p. 467.
107. Martin, L’idée de royauté à Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royauté et séductions monar-
chiques (du IVe siècle av. J.-C. au principat augustéen), pp. 3-11.
108. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. III, p. 193; Dio Cassius, Roman History,
Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 107.
109. Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 107.
110. Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia: Query XIII,” Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball
(eds.), Jefferson. Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 332.
Michael Zuckert offers an illuminating interpretation of Jefferson’s objections to Roman
dictatorship within the context of the neo-republican revival. See, Michael P. Zuckert, The
Natural Rights Republic. Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition, Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996, pp. 212-219.
111. Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia: Query XIII,” p. 335 (emphases added).
112. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, Book I: 8, p. 89.
113. Herodotus, Histories, Book III:81, p. 107,
114. Plato, Gorgias, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996, 493, p. 417;
Plato, The Republic, Book IX: 578, p. 361.
115. Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia: Query XIII,” p. 334.
116. Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia: Query XIII,” pp. 334-335. Also, see Spinoza, A
Political Treatise, New York: Dover Publications, 1951, chapter X:1, pp. 378-379.
117. Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia: Query XIII,” p. 335. For dictatorship as a “remedy,” see
Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. III, p. 169.
118. Polybius, The Histories, Book VI: 10, p. 291; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II: 57, p. 167.
119. Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia: Query XIII,” pp. 334-335.
120. For the concept of constitutional dictatorship, see Schmitt, Die Dictatur; Frederick M.
Watkins, “The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship,” Friedrich and Mason (eds.), Public
Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940, pp. 324-378; Carl J. Friedrich,
Constitutional Government and Democracy, New York: Ginn and Company, 1950, pp. 572-588;
Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies,
pp. 3-32, 288-314; Bruce Ackerman, “The Emergency Constitution,” The Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 113:5 (2004), pp. 1029-1091. For a recent opposite approach that opposes the
historical and conceptual continuity of constitutional dictatorship, see Giorgio Agamben, State
of Exception, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 6-11. Clinton Rossiter,
Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, pp. 5, 8, 288.
121. Antocides, “On the Mysteries,” Minor Attic Orators: Antiphon, Andocides, Vol. I,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982, Book I: 96-98, p. 413; Benjamin D.
Meritt, “Greek Inscriptions: Anti-tyrannical Inscription,” Hesperia, 21 (1952), pp. 355-359;
Lysias, Against Eratosthenes; Lucian, “Tyrannicide,” Lucian. Vol I, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1996; Martin Ostwald, “Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and
Subversion,” Transactions of the American Philological Association, 86 (1955), 110-128;
Jaszy and Lewis, Against the Tyrant: the Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide; Antony J.
Podlecki, “The Political Significance of Athenian ‘Tyrannicide’ Cult,” Historia, 15:2 (1966),
pp. 129-141; F. L. Ford, Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Political Terrorism, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985; Michael W. Taylor, The Tyrant Slayers. The Heroic
Image in the Fifth Century BC: Athenian Art and Politics, Salem: Ayer, 1992.
122. Robert J. Bonner, “Emergency Government in Rome and Athens,” The Classical
Journal, 18:3 (1922), p. 144; Saint-Bonnet, L’État d’exception, pp. 45-46.
123. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II: 26, p. 157; Plato, Republic, Book VIII, 566b, p. 321.
124. Aristotle, Politics, Book IV:8, p. 327.
125. For the continuity between Roman dictatorship and modern theories and practices of
the state of emergency, see Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, p. 187.
Andreas Kalyvas is an assistant professor of political science at The New School for Social
Research in New York City. He is the author of Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary:
Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). He is
currently completing a coauthored book manuscript on liberalism and republicanism while
working as a monograph on tyranny and dictatorship in Western political thought.