UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Indian Economy

Instructor: Hrushikesh Panda

Submitted by:
Group 4 | Section C
Mohit Verma (PGP35124)
Muhammad Afnaz K (PGP35125)
Lakshmi Deepak (PGP35126)
Nikita (PGP35127)
Nupur Goel (PGP35128)
Pankhuri Gupta (PGP35129)
Praveen Babu Pilli (PGP35130)
Pitour Murmu (PGP35131)
Pooja Malhiyan (PGP35132)
INTRODUCTION

What is Universal Basic Income?

Universal Basic Income like many other rights, is unconditional and universal. UBI says that by virtue of
being a citizen, every person in India deserves a basic income to cover their needs.
Economic Survey of India published in January 2017 outlined 3 proposed principles of UBI:-
 Universality: intent of providing every citizen "a basic income to cover their needs”
 Un-Conditionality: accessibility of everyone to the basic income without any qualifying criteria
 Agency: Citizens of India should be given the right to independently take decisions about how they
choose to spend their income in meeting their specific needs and wants

Why the idea is being talked about? Why India needs UBI?
 Social Justice: Due to unequal distribution of income in India and extreme poverty levels, UBI seeks
to guarantee a minimum standard
guarantee of standard of living to each and
every citizen of India. UBI promotes social
justice, equality, liberty because it is anti-
paternalistic and can result in greater
productivity. It would promote efficiency
by improving allocative efficiency and
minimizing leakages in government subsidy programs.
 Poverty Reduction: Due to massive leakages in government subsidy programs and involvement of
intermediaries, the benefits of these subsidies are not going to the neediest. Rather, they are being
utilized by people who need them less. For example, fertilizer subsidies are being used by farmers
who have bigger land size than other marginal farmers. Thus, UBI could provide a faster mechanism
for poverty reduction by actually helping the needy people.
 Agency: Poor in India are treated as objects of government policy. It is considered that the nation
being a welfare state would never take decisions that are against the needs of poor. However, the
reasons for poverty are different for different individuals, and still it is believed that the poor cannot
take economic decisions relevant to their lives. An unconditional cash transfer treats them as
agents, not subjects. The state is not in the best position to determine which risks and reasons of
poverty should be mitigated and how priorities should be set. UBI liberates citizens from
paternalistic and clientelist relationships with the state and treats them as dignified citizens of a
country. By transferring them a minimum basic income, UBI provides freedom to the citizens to
spend this income on meeting needs they want to fulfil.
 Administrative efficiency: India’s existing welfare scheme system is extremely week which is
riddled with misallocation,
leakages and exclusion of
poor. When the powerful
trinity of Jan Dhan, Aadhar
and Modile would
combine, it would lead to
an efficient building of
JAM + UBI = EFFECIENCY
infrastructure that would
help in transferring the
Universal Basic Income
directly to the accounts of the poor people without any unnecessary involvement of subsidiaries.
The Conceptual Case against UBI
UBI reduces incentive to work: Since UBI would be provided to every citizen without any precondition,
it is touted that UBI would eliminate the incentive to work. However, there is another school of thought
which believes that it is not just necessity of work that, humans work. Thus, certain level of minimum
income would not crowd out the incentive to work. As citizens would continue to strive harder to
improve their standard of living further. The same kinds of arguments used to me made against high
wages, that if wages rise beyond a particular level, workers would choose leisure over work. There is
little evidence to sustain that proposition.
Arguments in favour and against UBI
Poverty and vulnerability reduction Conspicious spending
Poverty and vulnerability be reduced in one fell
swoop
Choice
Treats beneficiaries as agents and entrusts citizens
with the responsibility of using welfarespending as
they see best, this may not be the case with in-kind
transfers
Better targeting of poor
As all individuals are targeted, exclusion error (poor
being left out) is zero though inclusion error (rich
gaining access to the scheme) is 60 percent
Insurance against shocks
This income floor will provide a safety net against
health, income and other shocks.
Administrative effeciency
A UBI in place of a plethora of separate government
schemes will reduce the administrative burden on
the
state.
Psychological benefits
A guaranteed income will reduce the pressures of
finding a basic living on a daily basis
Households, especially male members, may spend
this additional income on wasteful activities
Moral hazard (reduction in labor supply)
A minimum guaranteed income might make people
lazy and opt out of the labour market.
Gender disparity induced by cash
Gender norms may regulate the sharing of UBI
within a household – men are likely to exercise
control over spending of the UBI. This may not
always be the case with other in-kind transfers
Implementation
Given the current status of financial access among
the poor, a UBI may put too much stress on the
banking system
Exposure to market risks (Cash vs. Food)
Unlike food subsidies that are not subject to
fluctuating market prices, a cash transfer’s
purchasing power may severely be curtailed by
market fluctuations
Political economy of universality
Opposition may arise from the provision of the
transfer to rich individuals as it might seem to
trump the idea of equity and state welfare for the

Should income be detached from employment? The honest economic answer to this question is that
society already detaches income from employment. In a social setup where any form of inheritance or
accepting non-work related income is allowed, already separates income from employment. So even
if, people are receiving some minimum basic income, it doesn’t tamper with the existing structure
where society is already detaching income from employment for rich and upper class.
Should income be unconditional? i.e. with no regards to their contribution to the society?
This argument could be easily refuted, because even though citizens are guaranteed minimum basic
income that provides a subsistence level of income, people would still continue to contribute in the
society and its productivity, because human needs and wants are unlimited and they can never be
satisfied. Thus, people would always continue working more and contributing to the society by
increasing consumption and savings.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This project has been done by using both qualitative and quantitative analysis using different
sources.
Qualitative Analysis: In depth survey of the literatures, content analysis of policy documents and
papers of government departments and non-governmental sources related to valid pilot studies
on universal basic income were obtained from the main data sources. We tried to analyse why the
concept of universal basic income (UBI) came into being and the effects of its implementation on
a pilot basis in different states of our country. The different constraints that has to be dealt while
coming up with UBI and the factors effecting its implementation to alleviate the conditions of the
poor and move towards less inequality.
Quantitative Analysis: For the quantitative analysis we have taken data from various sources
namely “Economic survey 2016-17;2018-19” and RBI’s handbook of statistics on Indian economy.
Our main focus was to find out the portion of population where it is needed for the implementation
of UBI and how much should be allocated from the GDP for its fulfilment. Various other
government and non-government sources were also taken into account for the data required in
the analysis. Also, the various social schemes of the government and the budget allocation for these
schemes were also studied. The feasibility of the funding for the UBI has also been studied using
the quantitative data analysis on the basis of percentage of revenue, needed for the disbursal of
funds.
On the basis of the above analysis the main objectives of the project have been drilled down to:
i) To study the advantages and disadvantages of universal basic income (UBI)
ii) To assess the feasibility of UBI on Indian context
RESULT AND ANALYSIS

Economy of Financing

The irresistible force of even as powerful an idea as UBI will run into the immovable object of a
resistant, pesky reality. So, what is the way forward, always remembering that the yardstick for
assessment is not whether UBI can be perfect or faultless but only whether it can improve substantially
upon the status quo.

We look to analyse the potential cost for UBI. This is not an easy calculation because it depends on a
number of objectives and assumptions. This is described carefully in the following manner.

To analyse a feasible UBI implementation plan we looked at the numbers for the latest population
estimates, the percentage of poverty in the country and the minimum consumption level for poverty
line definition. Then using numbers from existing models for consumption level is computed for the
person who is at that the poverty threshold, we estimated the income needed to take him/her above
INR 1215 per month, which can be a proxy for the poverty line. This comes to INR 14580 per year. We
then estimated the percentage of GDP that would be required as of this year for implementing UBI for
different levels of coverage in the Indian population. We then chose an appropriate percentage form
the results based on feasibility & aiming for covering maximum poor population while minimizing
additional burden on the economy.

The optimal percentage for the coverage for UBI came out to be 20% for covering most of the poor
population. Out of the possible avenues for funding UBI, the one that matches the above requirement
& makes minimum impact on existing economic system are the removable subsidies that contribute to
about 2.72%.

The calculation assumes that private consumption does not change across geographies at all implying
that real income of the poor is taken as the average value across. This is unlikely to be true. Thus, the
actual cost of a UBI to the government could be lower. If, for example, the real income of the marginal
poor in some rural areas is higher due to lesser expenses or higher purchasing power as compared to
an urban poor individual, such differences are accounted for through the rule of averages.

Another, implicit assumption is that UBI will be additional to the poor’s existing consumption which
includes consumption from public programs (PDS, MNREGA, etc.).

On the one hand, a case could be made that if current programs are prone to exclusion error, which is
likely to affect the poorest amongst the poor to a greater extent, then this methodology is not
unreasonable.

However, there will be cases where PDS or fertilizer subsidies do reach most beneficiaries which will
then have be taken into account if a measure of UBI as a replacement program is to be calculated. This
is a complicated task because there will be a number of general equilibrium effects which will need to
be considered. For example, replacing the PDS will increase market prices of cereals the poor face.
Similarly, phasing down MGNREGS might reduce market wages for rural casual labour. Calculating
these effects and hence the exact magnitude of subsidies will help refine any costing of the UBI.

The process of determining a UBI amount is not a one-time exercise: as the UBI is a cash transfer, its
‘real’ value tends to be determined by inflation in the economy. Over time, the same amount of cash
transfer may not buy the same amount of goods. It is, therefore, important to index it to prices such
that the amount gets revised periodically. Politics can play a huge role in determining the exact amount
each time it is up for revision and so it is important to set up a sufficiently politically neutral mechanism
to do so. Ray proposes setting UBI as a constant share of the GDP to overcome this complication.

Any government will have to decide on what programmes/ expenditures to prioritize in order to
finance a UBI. The lowest rungs of the table are presented for completeness, and it may not be
advisable to replace these. In other words, while a UBI may certainly be the shortest path to eliminating
poverty, it should not become the Trojan horse that usurps the fiscal space for a well-functioning state.

The subsidies for the non-poor/middle class households, equivalent to about 1 percent of GDP. Among
these, the subsidies for fertilizer, petroleum and food constitute the largest amounts. The government
runs a plethora of schemes– the top ten centrally sponsored or central sector schemes (not including
subsidies) cost the state about 1.4 percent of GDP (2014-15 actuals). The remaining 940-odd sub-
schemes account for 2.3 per cent of the 28 Here, again, there is some double-counting. For instance,
some of the expenditure under the head “education” is also considered in the spending of the top-ten
central sector schemes. Similarly, for other heads like health and family welfare equal to the cost of a
UBI of INR 3240 per capita per year provided to all females. This will cost a little over 1 percent of the
GDP – or, a little more than the cost of all the middle-class subsidies. However, taking away subsidies
to the middle-class is politically difficult for any government. It is clear that while the fiscal space exists
to start a de facto UBI, political and administrative considerations make it difficult to do this without a
clearer understanding of its larger economy-wide implications.
Challenges in implementation of Universal Basic Income

1. Identification of Beneficiaries: The belief that the transfer of cash to bank accounts will reduce
leakages rests on the assumption that Aadhaar-based biometric authentication will allow technology
to sift out fraudulent claimants and reduce leakages. However, evidence from MNREGA reveals a high
failure rate of biometric authentication as well as false targeting. Of course, over time, identification
accuracy can be expected to improve but there is a long transition period between when programmes
are executed and their effectiveness monitored and tested, and the results used for further refinement
of delivery methods. The identification of households is just the first problem. The Socio-Economic and
Caste Census conducted in 2011-12 did not even attempt to measure the incomes of households.
Instead, it used multiple criteria to estimate poverty, which, in turn, became the basis for identifying
possible beneficiaries of schemes intended for the poor. At a more basic level, none of the nationwide
surveys thus far collate household income. Research studies and government audits show that many
deserving below the poverty line households and individuals are side-lined or crowded out of
programmes. Targeting thus has been inefficient and inequitable, giving rise to an ecosystem of
middlemen and abuse. Conversely studies have shown that the larger the coverage, the lower the
leakages – suggesting that programmes with universal coverage are more effective. The poor benefit
from wider coverage.

2. Measurement of Incomes: Estimating incomes or even proxies, such as consumption, poses

immense challenges in India. Incomes in the massive informal sector, where poor households are
concentrated, are seasonal, volatile and not recorded for official purposes. Informal economic activity
precludes meaningful measurement of incomes. Furthermore, about half of the workforce is self
employed, with non-wage income accounting for a significant proportion of earnings. Demarcation of
a demographic group based on an income threshold or economic activity (for example, agriculture) will
require estimating the incomes of everyone — a logistically, analytically and administratively complex
process. The most recent income survey was conducted in 2011-12.

3. Administrative and Technical Viability: The JAM trinity – Jan Dhan (Universal Bank accounts),
Aadhaar (Biometric identity) and Mobile phones – offers a technological foundation for effectively
executing transfer payments. However, this is still at a formative stage and, as mentioned earlier,
fraught with problems of mis-identification, bypassing authentic claimants. The poorest live in remote
areas and lack recourse to banking and often mobile phones as well as competitive retail markets
needed to avail of benefits, or to seek redress if marginalised by the system. Competitive federalism
offers useful insights into prospects for a UBI scheme. The effectiveness of targeting is contingent upon
a state’s administrative and implementation capabilities. States such as Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu
and Karnataka, which are considered 4 amongst the most efficient, will have higher take-up ratios
amongst targeted beneficiaries than poorer states like Bihar or Jharkhand.

4. Competitive Markets: Rural markets are improving. Even a partial UBI requires competitive
markets where recipients of the UBI grants can exercise consumption choices. If markets are limited
and sellers exercise monopolistic powers, the value of cash is quickly eroded. In the absence of
competitive markets and monitoring, special interest groups can easily hijack public assistance
programs.

5. Fiscal Viability: The UBI should ideally be budget-neutral, but with the volume of outlays that
may be required in India, this would be a challenge. The thorny issue of allocation of expenditures
between states and the Union government will also need to be addressed in the design of the program.
Social welfare programs in India are delivered primarily through deeply flawed subsidies, of food,
fertilisers and fuel. These disproportionately benefit the relatively well-off to the detriment of the
interests of the poor. Over the past decade, India has managed to successfully reduce expenditures on
subsidies to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2016-17 from 2.5 percent in 2013-14. There still remains vast scope
for improvement.

6. The UBI is too expensive: India spends a lot on protecting the poor. However, studies have
repeatedly shown that subsidies benefit the non-poor more than the poor. A UBI may well be more
cost-effective than India’s flagship programmes, the Public Distribution System (for subsidised food)
and the MNREGA, a workfare programme that aims to be self-targeted to poor people. Cutting these
and replacing them with some form of UBI would almost certainly have a greater impact on poverty.

7. Structure of the Indian Economy: Two distinct characteristics of the Indian economy heighten
the challenge of implementing a UBI programme. Firstly, India is still overwhelmingly rural, with a
patchy infrastructure and connectivity issues – though these are improving over time. Secondly, as
mentioned earlier, over 80 per cent of Indians are employed in the informal sector, where
measurement of incomes, prices, and expenditures are challenging. This complicates the task of
identifying beneficiaries as well as the appropriate quantum of benefits.

Comparison around the world

Finland: In January 2017, Finland implemented a temporary Universal Basic Income for a period of two
years. The program allowed 2,000 unemployed Finns to receive a UBI dole of 560 Euro per month, even
when they tried out casual employment at odd jobs. These 2,000 were to be compared against a
control group of 137,000 employed Finns. The results of the implementation were that it made people
generally happier, hence improving their physical and mental health. But for many people, the original
goal of getting people into work was flawed to begin with. It led to 8.1% unemployment rate in Finland
and the whole 2-year trial cost 20 Million Euro to the government.
Canada: The three-year UBI project was initiated in April 2017, but it was scrapped months after its
launch. Under the project, randomly selected participants living in three communities in Ontario were
being given at least C$16,989 ($12,600, £9,850) a year to live on, minus 50% of any earned income.
Couples on the programme would receive total C$24,027. The pilot project was expected to cost
C$50m per year and included 4,000 households. Early on, the province struggled to sign up participants
but reached full enrolment this year. Ministers claimed that the decision to scrap the UBI trial was
taken due to high costs, and because ministry staff indicated that "the program didn't help people
become 'independent contributors' to the economy."
United States: The Alaska Permanent Fund is often mentioned as one of the few existing basic income
systems in the world. The Fund pays a partial basic income to all (permanent) residents of Alaska since
1982 based on Alaska’s oil royalty program, in which every resident gets an annual dividend generally
between $1,000 and $2,000 from the Alaska Permanent Fund, which earns revenues from oil and
mining leases. The amount varies as oil prices fluctuate. According to Marinescu’s research paper on
Alaska’s program, co-authored by University of Chicago professor Damon Jones, “the dividend had no
effect on employment, and increased part-time work by 1.8 percentage points.” Further, they found
that “receiving this basic income tends to increase education among the most disadvantaged youth.”
They stay longer in school when they receive a basic income, she explained.

Expert Opinion
In 1967, Martin Luther King Jr. said a guaranteed income would abolish poverty and reduce income
inequality as well. Economist Milton Friedman proposed a negative income tax, where the poor would
receive a tax credit if their income fell below a minimum level. It would be equivalent to the tax
payment for the families earning above the minimum level.
Basic premise of Economic Survey (ES) of 2016-17's UBI: "A just society needs to guarantee to each
individual a minimum income which they can count on, and which provides the necessary material
foundation for a life with access to basic goods and a life of dignity." Three components of this UBI
model are: universality, un-conditionality and agency. These statements highlight the benefits of UBI
on the economy of a country, if well implemented.
Further, OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) simulations for four
countries (Finland, France, Italy and the UK) show that although a universal basic income is simple,
existing benefits are not, and replacing them with a single flat rate benefit produces complex
patterns of gains and losses. Those receiving social insurance benefits would normally lose out from
the replacement of those with a universal basic income at GMI (Guaranteed Minimum Income) levels.
Those not qualifying from any social benefit under existing policies would benefit as long as the
increase in benefits exceeds the corresponding increase in their taxes. Lower-income households are
more likely to receive means-tested income support so they are actually less likely to gain from a BI
set at a similar level to GMI.
Matthew Zwolinski, associate professor of philosophy at the University of San Diego quoted that, “As
a libertarian, I believe UBI should substitute at least a range of currently existing welfare programs.”
These thoughts of Professor Matthew align with Vijay Joshi’s thoughts that other welfare programs
such as subsidy which costs government huge amount but still fail to serve its purpose can be replaced
by UBI, which will give direct authority to the receiver in terms of utilizing the money for themselves.
Karl Wilderquist, associate professor at Georgetown University also support the above idea by quoting
“A basic income can be funded by taxing bad things, things we need less of, such as pollution, financial
transactions, and extreme wealth.”
Talking about the uncertainity of benefits of UBI on the economy, Arthur Guarino (assistant professor
in the Finance and Economics Department at Rutgers University Business School) commented, “While
in theory, GBI (Guaranteed Basic Income) seems like an idea that could relieve the burden of poverty
and level a nation’s economy so that it is fair to all individuals, it has its possible drawbacks. As
technology, automation, and artificial intelligence become prevalent in industry and society, more jobs
will eventually be lost. This could result in displacing millions of people from being productive members
of society to becoming unwanted burdens. Whether GBI will provide a remedy to this problem remains
to be seen.”

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary
We will be considering what is the current status of implementation of UBI in our country, followed by
what we found in our analysis and what views we hold of the policy depending upon our data. All these
will further guide us towards deciding the future aspect of UBI in India.
 Current Status of UBI in India: Current standing of UBI in India: If, as seems to be the case, that
thinkers on each the possible sides of UBI have all become its advocates, then UBI could be a
powerful plan whose time though not ripe for implementation is ripe for serious discussion. If
the government takes UBI to be an issue, they'd have seen the chance of UBI in achieving the
outcomes they thus deeply cared regarding and fought for all his life. However, a similar
government as moralist would have had doubts attributable to seeing unsalaried rewards as
harming responsibility people's effort. As a business conservative they'd allow UBI as long as
convinced that macro-economic stability wouldn't be jeopardized. Recognizing the problem of
exit, the government as shrewd political observer would have anxieties regarding UBI as being
simply another add-on government programme. The central government was believed to be
functioning on a Universal Basic income (UBI) theme for the poor earlier than the overall
Elections. The Economic Survey of 2016-17 had initially flagged the UBI as "a conceptually
appealing idea" and an attainable option to welfare programmes targeted at reducing
economic conditions. numerous demerits and cases against UBI has created it a matter of
thought however still some policies almost like UBI are enforced in the Republic of India.
1. In 2011-2013, Madhya Pradesh, Republic of India started Madhya Pradesh Unconditional
Money Transfers Project where Rs. 300 were provided to each single adult and Rs. 150 to
youngsters. it's thought-about a thriving experiment because the living conditions improved
drastically.”
2. TRS enforced the Rythu Bandhu Scheme(RBS) that encompasses a grant part of Rs 4000 per
acre per farmer for one season (kharif/rabi). So, in a year, Associate in Nursing eligible farmers
can receive Rs 8000 of grant for crop production that features getting of essential inputs,
irrigation and hiring of farm labour. The business burden of the theme will strain the Centre
to the tune of Rs 600-700 billion per annum, and also the Telangana government has allotted
regarding Rs 120 billion to focus on 5.83 mn farmers underneath RBS in 2018-19.”
3. “Recently, Subramanian and his colleagues have popped out with a proposal referred to as
quasi-universal basic rural financial gain or QUBRI for farmers. they need planned that it's
possible to transfer Rs. 18,000 per annum to every rural family, except those that area unit
“demonstrably well-off”, at Associate in Nursing calculable value of Rs. 2.64 lakh crore to
tackle the agricultural distress among others”
4. "In Feb, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government declared the Pradhan Mantri Kisan
Samman Nidhi(PM-Kisan) financial gain support theme in its 2019 interim budget. The interim
budget aforementioned that the theme would offer bureau 6,000 (US$87) annually – in 3
instalments – to farmers of little land holdings
 Summary of our Analysis: We after having a clear understanding of what UBI as a system have
tried to study its characteristics. Analysis of how UBI as a policy is what India needs and how it
can help a country like ours. What this policy brings to us, the cons like Social Justice, Poverty
Reduction and providing Administrative Efficiency in the system, Further analysis also entails
that how these pros come at a cost of some attributes which include reduced incentive to work,
conspicuous spending, moral hazard and create market risks. We also analysed the opinion of
the experts and their say on the implementation of UBI as a policy. Observation of how
implementation of UBI in some countries was a success and how at some it created severe
problem like increase in unemployment and people not contributing to economy of their
country
 Our Views on the Argument: Although the implementation of UBI revolves around several risks
and the process concerned cannot be reversed if something goes wrong. In a country like ours
with a high poverty percentage and a very uneven distribution, it becomes altogether a
different policy to implement. The discussed patchy behaviour of our economy also adds a
potential threat to implementation. Still considering all the views in mind we have come on a
stand to support the implementation of UBI. The implementation should be first a miniature
version of the original policy which should cover all the Below Poverty Line (BPL) population of
the country. It would surely overcome the problem with existing welfare schemes that keep
people “trapped in poverty”. The simplicity attached with the process can guarantee better
implementation and will also cost government less. A guaranteed income would ensure
financial security, allow financial freedom, remove the “poverty trap”, and support more path
choices.

 Future of UBI In India:UBI could be a radically new idea that looks to be the necessity of the
hour. Reckoning on how it is enforced, we'll either see a meteoric rise in world happiness, or a
horrifying crash of a dream that dared to soar too high.The Indian Ministry of Finance’s 2016–
17 Economic Survey provides the complete treatment of implementing Indian UBI. It finds that
 India’s largest welfare schemes are poorly targeted; and thus it argues that a UBI distributed
directly into bank accounts can limit thieving, be easier to administer, and prove to be a more
practical and effective antipoverty intervention in the Indian economy.Rather than relying
solely upon the survey’s projected ways for funding, targeting, and distributing a UBI, Indian
policymakers ought to be a part of their Finnish and Canadian counterparts in running one or
many large-scale experimental evaluations.
The uncertainty regarding the design decisions (which transcend targeting to incorporate the duration
and frequency of transfers) and the political practicability of a UBI emphasizes the necessity for an
Indian UBI pilot of ample length to check the impact of introducing regular, unconditional, universal
money transfers. A basic financial gain trial enforced by a state administration (or many, like the range
of municipal tests in progress in the Netherlands) to accurately present real conditions, with
independent organization running a large-scale experimental analysis, would generate the arduous
proof that the empirical and political discourse around an Indian UBI gravely desires before it graduates
from tutorial conferences and opinion pages into parliamentary dialogue and legislation.

References:
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pradhan_Mantri_Kisan_Samman_Nidhi
 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/should-india-embrace-universal-basic-income-
scheme-47677/
 https://carnegieindia.org/2018/02/14/india-s-universal-basic-income-conclusion-pub-75506
 https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/isas-insights-no.-567.pdf