Due Process Cases
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
Case #8 Government of Hongkong v. Olalia
Petitioner: Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
Respondent: Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muñoz
Facts:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department
of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. NBI agents arrested and detained him. Records show that
private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge
Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application
for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge. The respondent judge maintained that the right
to bail does not apply to extradition proceedings as it is only available to
criminal proceedings, as ruled by the Supreme Court in Purganan case. As
suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision
on bail in Sec 13, Art. 3 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extradite.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based
on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
Ratio:
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light
of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the
escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his
return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not
a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may
be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
The petition was DISMISSED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
Case # 9 Borromeo Bros. Estate v. Garcia
Petitioner: Borromeo Bros. Estate
Respondent: Edgar John A. Garcia
Facts: On August 17, 1938, Patricia Ruedas Vda. de Andrada (Patricia)
executed, for valuable consideration, a document granting a road right of
way to spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia (Garcia couple) over
Lot No. 6-H-2 described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 20923. On
September 28, 1938, Patricia sold the property to petitioner. The Deed of
Sale contained a provision that "the purchase of Lot No. 6-H-2 was subject
to the right of way granted by me (Patricia Ruedas Vda. de Andrada) to the
spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia." On September 28, 1938,
Patricia sold the property to petitioner. Petitioner retained ownership over
Lot No. 6-H-2 whereas the estate of the late Garcia couple (Garcia Estate)
was inherited by Vicente E. Garcia and Jose E. Garcia from whom respondent
acquired his title in 1996.
After acquiring the Garcia Estate, respondent came across the 1952
documents that granted to the deceased Garcia couple a road right of way
through petitioner's Lot No. 6-H-2. Thus, on May 19, 1997, respondent filed,
before the RTC of Cebu, a cadastral court, a petition captioned "Engineer
Edgar John A. Garcia v. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City, G.I.R.O. Rec.
No. 5988, Lot No. 6-H-2."
The cadastral court issued on June 6, 1997 an Order requiring the Register
of Deeds "to inform this [c]ourt regarding the status of the aforementioned
title, whether it has already been cancelled or not, the
encumbrances/annotations therein, and in whose name it is now." In its
Comment/Manifestation, the Register of Deeds informed the cadastral
court that Lot No. 6-H-2 covered by TCT No. RT-3972 is registered under
herein petitioner's name. On July 23, 1997, the cadastral court issued an
Order granting the petition of
Respondent.
The petitioner was furnished with the copy of the order, and
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and recall arguing that
the court violated its fundamental right to substantive and procedural
due process. The petition was denied, the court ruling that there was no
violation of the right of due process for the petitioner was furnished
with a copy of the order, heard the motion for reconsideration in open
court, and allowed both parties to submit their respective memoranda
before its ruling.
Petitioner filed with a petition for certiorari before the CA, while
the respondent filed a motion for execution with the cadastral court
which was denied because of the decision of the CA should still be
waited for, for it would be pre-emptive. Eventually the CA decided in
favor of the respondent holding that since no restraining order or writ of
injunction was issued in the other petition, the period on the finality of
the Order of the cadastral court was never interrupted; and that the filing
of a petition for certiorari does not prevent the decision from attaining
finality as it is an independent action which does not interrupt the course
of the principal action or the running of the reglementary period
involved in the proceedings; Hence this petition.
1. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were denied of
substantive and procedural right to due process.
HELD:
 1. No.

The Court ruled that the CA was correct in striking down the petition of the
petitioner on procedural grounds. The filing of a petition for certiorari before
the CA limits the determination to whether there was an error of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the cadastral court, both errors
the CA did not find. The cadastral court did not deny petitioner of its right
to due process of law for both the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit the evidence in support of one’s defense were afforded the
petitioner. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests
in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity
to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. The cadastral court
furnished the petitioner a copy of its order, and eventually heard the motion
for reconsideration in open court, allowing both parties to present their
respective arguments and their respective memoranda prior to the ruling.
Moreover, the orders of the cadastral court were based on established facts
and substantive evidence on the existence of the grant of an easement of
road right of way in favor of respondent. Therefore the CA was justified in
deciding in favor of the respondent.

The petition was DENIED.

Case # 10 Equitable Banking Corp. v. Calderon