LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs.
COURT OF Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
APPEALS
G.R. No. 110120 | 1994-03-16
ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to
dispose of the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern
and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay
Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped
everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R. No.
107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of
November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No.
29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29,
1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala
Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2
with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation
of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation,
monitoring and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite
to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA
Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan
was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing
an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on
the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water
collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably
affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the
presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the
sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA
issued a Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of
Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other
entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind
of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of
Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was
resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA
at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U.
Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August
14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991
order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine
National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the
entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on
September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration
of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the
people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from
enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was
presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the
ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law,
the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the
Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating
Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed
by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon.
Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the
foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated
separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to
dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion
to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf,
from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents
plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite
during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated
October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of
Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10,
1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at
the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of
Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued
a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City
to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration
of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the
City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage
at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio,
Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to
quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for
reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that
would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of
garbage daily for lack of a dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue
be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents
to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court
of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of
determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the
Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to
be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or
converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at
10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court
of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December
8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City,
the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized
representative were required to appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992
to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to
the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's
technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days
from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which
the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding
such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding
that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear
and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order,
including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive
and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3),
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development
Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under
its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the
preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and
desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining
order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the
condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in
conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the
proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of
the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part
of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is
granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal
proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the
temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until
after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation
of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining
the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to
cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and continuing until
otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need
to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the
surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which
agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open
to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local
government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local
Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the
dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is
maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception
of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power
and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City
Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the
theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated
in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the
necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program
within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the
Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned
ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency
which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power
and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c),
(d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides,
thus:
"SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The Authority shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c ) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of
this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after
proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance
must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine
to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the
discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of
sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof. . . .
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or
modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary
to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government
agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive
Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and
decisions of the Authority."
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally
disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are
applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of
government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of
whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which,
in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination
of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly
endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to
pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment
that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business
establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive
Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of
the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic
Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad
grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs
and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its
letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter
was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the
open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay
Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required
under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the
said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary
jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at
the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan,
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss
the possibility of re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down
to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue
a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping
of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be
stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By
its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make,
alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24
(Underscoring for emphasis) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of
1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power
"to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were
not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect
that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. 25
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that
an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express
powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect
to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to
issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well
be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when
there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente,
Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
"Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous
discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland
waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar
has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health,
and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of
plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those
here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . ."
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital
public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article
II, Section 16 which provides:
"The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the
correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the
declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in
mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health
as a fundamental human right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper
exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.
Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by
the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further
legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of
conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna
de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently
broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake
region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with
cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant
to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the
thwarting of its laudable objective. To meet such contingencies, then the
writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA
to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna
Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned,
the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more
appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special
knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
"KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA
PILIPINAS" vs. GOTAMCO SAW MILL
G.R. No. L-1573 | 1948-03-29
HILADO, J:
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Kahoy sa Pilipinas" prays, for the reasons therein set forth, that we reverse
and vacate the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations dated September
23, 1946 (Annex A) and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its resolution of July
11, 1947 (Annex C).
In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in the main
case (case No. 31-V of the Court of Industrial Relations) declared a strike on
September 10, 1946, "which suspended all the work in the respondent
company"; that on September 19, 1946 (presumably after the case had been
brought to the Court of Industrial Relations) said court informed the parties
that the continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice both parties,
and that a temporary solution, satisfactory to both parties, must be found to
put an end to it, at the same time, urging both parties to be reasonable in their
attitude towards each other; that ample opportunity was given to both parties
to iron out their differences until September 21, 1946, when the court
continued the conference at which, among other things, the leader of the
laborers informed the court that, although said laborers were not exactly
satisfied with the arrangement, in order to cooperate with the court and with
the parties so that the laborers could return to work and the company resume
its operation, they had no objection to accepting a temporary settlement of
P3.50 without meal, as against the proposal of the company of P2.00 without
meal; that after a series of conferences held on September 23, 1946, the date
of the order now under consideration, the labor leader decided to accept a
temporary arrangement of the wage problem as proposed by the
management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to all striking
laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union, manifested that he
would have a hard time convincing the laborers, but in view of their desire to
preserve the harmony which used to exist between the parties, they were
going to accede to this proposition, provided that the management would
permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces of
lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations culminated in an
agreement by which the laborers would return to their work on Tuesday,
September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent
company would resume its operation on said date under the following
conditions:
"(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an overall increase of
P2.00 daily, without meal, over the wages received by them before the strike;
"(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring with them home,
if available, small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; and
"(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect upon the return
of the workingmen to work until the final determination of the present
controversy."
The same order then proceeds as follows:
"Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable
and advantageous to both, the court approves the same and orders the striking
laborers of the respondent company to return to their work on Tuesday,
September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent
company to resume its operation and admit the striking laborers. The
respondent company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss any
laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the
temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out
or strike during the pendency of the hearing."
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7, 1947, the
respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial Relations an
urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held for contempt of court
for having staged a strike during the pendency of the main case "in violation
of the order of this court dated September 23, 1946"; that on January 9, 1947,
petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among other
things, that a representative of petitioner conferred with respondent regarding
certain discriminations obtaining in the respondent's saw mill, but instead of
entertaining their grievances said respondent in a haughty and arbitrary
manner ordered the stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did
then and there stop working; and in the counter-petition said petitioner asked
that the respondent be held for contempt for having employed four new
Chinese laborers during the pendency of the hearing of the main case, without
express authority of the court and in violation of section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. It is also recited in the said order
of March 28, 1947, that on that same date, January 9, 1947, respondent filed
with the court another urgent motion for contempt against the petitioning
union for picketing on the premises of the respondent's saw mill and for grave
threats which prevented the remaining laborers from working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation of evidence
pertinent to the incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the said order of March 28,
1947, was entered, and the court stated therein the three questions to be
determined as follows: first, if there was violation by the petitioning union of
the order of said court of September 23, 1946, which would warrant the
commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the facts and
circumstances attending the picketing constitute contempt of court; third,
whether there was violation by the respondent of section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, in taking in four Chinese laborers
pending the hearing and without express authority of the court; and fourth,
whether the dismissal of Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
"(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated September 23,
1946, by the petitioning union and thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes,
special agent of the court, to take such action as may be warranted in the
premises against the person or persons responsible therefor for contempt;
"(2) That the question of picketing being closely and intimately related to the
strike which had been found illegal, did not need to be passed upon, it being
imbibed by question No. 1;
"(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the question of respondent
having violated section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended,
respondent was thereby exonerated from any liability in connection with the
alleged employment of four Chinamen;
"(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and unworthy to
work among his fellow laborers, his petition for reinstatement contained in
demand No. 5 of the main case was thereby denied."
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the Court of
Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, and denied reconsideration of its order
of March 28, 1947, as requested by the petitioning union. In the course of
said resolution, the union's contention is recited that the provisions of section
19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, upon which the order of
September 23, 1946, was based, had not been complied with; in other words,
that the said order was not issued in conformity with the requisites of the said
section, because, it was said, before its issuance there had been no proper
hearing and there was no express finding by the court that public interest
required the return of the striking workers. The further contention is therein
recited that, granting that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued in
conformity with said section 19, said provision is unconstitutional for being
in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Passing
upon these contentions, the Court of Industrial Relations said:
"The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with the
provisions of section 19. Said order was proposed and issued on the basis of
the agreement entered into by the parties after the preliminary hearings and
conferences. While it is true that the order of the Court now in question did
not make any express finding as to whether public interest required the return
of the striking workers, it is undeniable, however, that until the present the
main case has not been decided or settled in view of the numerous incidents
arising therefrom since the certification of the dispute by the Department of
Labor to the Court on September 14, 1946. The fact that the Court did not
decide nor settle the dispute promptly, need not be stated in the said order
because it is a fact which is borne out by the entire record of the case. If the
petitioner was aggrieved by the terms of the order, it could have objected
right then and there and could have appealed said order within the period
prescribed by law, and not to wait after it had become final, definite, and
conclusive. The record shows that the petitioner in its answer and counter-
petition for contempt based its complaint upon section 19 (Incidental Case
No. 31-V [4]). It is, indeed, strange that after taking advantage of this order
and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder, the petitioner now comes to
impugn and challenge the validity. The second motion for reconsideration is
a sad instance where the petitioner attacks the validity of an order under
which it once took shelter.
"The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start with, this section
is presumed to be constitutional. Several laws promulgated which apparently
infringe the human rights of individuals were `subjected to regulation by the
State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power'. The provisions
of Act No. 103 were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the
concern of the State to promote social justice to insure the well being and
economic security of all the people. In order to attain this object, section 19
was promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to capital and denies to
labor what it denies to capital. Section 19 complements the powers of the
Court to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such powers which
are conferred upon it by the different provisions of the Court's organic law,
more particularly, sections 1 and 4, and 'other plenary powers conferred upon
the Court to enable it to settle all questions matters, controversies or disputes
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees', 'to prevent non-
pacific methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes'
(International HardWood and Venser Co. vs. The Pañgil Federation of
Laborers, G. R. No. 47178, cited in the case of Mindanao Bus Co. vs.
Mindanao Bus Co. Employees' Association, 40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has
been upheld in the case aforecited. It appearing that the power of this Court
to execute its orders under section 19 is also the same power it possesses
under section 4 of the same act, it inferentially follows that section 19 is
likewise valid. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union,
G. R. No. 47796.)"
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union, supra,
this Court said:
"In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is to concede to
the Court of Industrial Relations the power to decide a case under section 19
but deny it, the power to execute its decisions thereon. The absurdity of this
proposition is too evident to require argument. In the second place,
considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under
section 19 is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously
acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the power to execute its
orders under section 19 is also the same power that it possesses under section
4." (40 Off. Gaz., [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 178.)
Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for an order of the court for the
return of striking workers, authorizes such order, among other cases, "when
the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled". The
provision says: ". . . and if he has already done so (struck or walked out), that
he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued
only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute
cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled" (Italics supplied). In
other words, the order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or
settled, may be issued "only after hearing when public interest so requires",
but if in the court's opinion the dispute cannot be promptly decided or settled,
then it is also authorized after hearing to issue the order: we construe the
provision to mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or
settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order
for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or
paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as well stated by the court's
resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or
settlement was a fact which was borne out by the entire record of the case
and did not need express statement in the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by
the Court of Industrial Relations (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15,
as amended by Commonwealth Act 559, section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court;
National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134,
Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil
Workers' Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Supp., p.
71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our
opinion on the constitutionality of the above statutory and reglementary
provisions should it, in the future, become necessary to decide it.
For all these considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations assailed by the instant petition are hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner-appellant. So ordered.

Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an order

such as those now under consideration as for contempt of court.

We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of

Commonwealth Act No. 103 is constitutional. It does not offend against the
constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. An employee
entering into a contract of employment after said law went into effect,
voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section
19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between
the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it,
the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment
when so enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so
requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it,
upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public
interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly
decided or settled . . .". (Italics supplied.) The voluntariness of the employee's
entering into such a contract of employment - he has a free choice between
entering into it or not - with such an implied condition, negatives the
possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. The resolution of July 11, 1947,
states that the order of - September 23, 1946, was issued after a series of
preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied that these were
"hearings" within the meaning of the above mentioned section 19 of the law.
The record certainly reveals that what was done during and what resulted
from said preliminary hearings or conferences were reported to the court at a
formal hearing. As to public interest requiring that the court enjoin the strike
or walk out, or the return of striking laborers, aside from the legal
presumption that the Court of Industrial Relations complied with the
provisions of the law in this respect, we think that, considering the
universally known fact, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that as a
result of the destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and social
rehabilitation of this country urgently demands the reconstruction of
industrial, commercial and residential buildings, which in turn necessitates
building materials, in which lumber figures prominently among the most
vital, public interest of a most real and positive character has attached to the
lumber business. It is obvious that any undue stoppage or diminution in the
production of lumber or allied products so sorely needed in reconstruction
work will inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or slow down the country's
program of rehabilitation which, for obvious and natural reasons, the
government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their
work. And that order was made after hearing, and, moreover, section 19 of
BOROVSKY vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-4352 | 1951-09-28
TUASON, J.:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner with this
Court, the first having been denied in a decision promulgated on June 30,
1949.
Victor A. Borovsky, the petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in
Shanghai, China, of Russian parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936
and had resided therein ever since, if the period of his detention be included.
On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of Immigration, the
petitioner was arrested for investigation as to his past activities. Following
his arrest, a warrant for his deportation was issued by the Deportation Board,
which is said to have found him an undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual
drunkard. The petitioner protests that he was not given a hearing, nor
informed of the charges preferred against him. This point however is
unimportant in this proceeding.
In May, 1947, the petitioner was put on board a ship which took him to
Shanghai, but he was not allowed to land there because he was not a national
of China and was not provided with an entry visa. He was therefore brought
back to Manila and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa
until December 8, 1947, when he was granted provisional release by the
President through the Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before
the expiration of that period, namely, on March 20, 1948, the Commissioner
of Immigration caused his rearrest and he has been in confinement in the
abovementioned prison ever since.
In his return to the writ, the Solicitor General in behalf of the respondents
alleges that the Commissioner of Immigration "has availed of every
opportunity presented to carry out the deportation order as shown by the fact
that when the petitioner was enjoying his provisional release after the
unsuccessful attempt to deport him to Shanghai, China, he was again re-
arrested and flown to Cebu for the purpose of placing him on board a Russian
vessel which had called at the port, with a view to carrying out the deportation
order issued against him, but said deportation was not carried out for the
reason that the captain of the said boat refused to take on board the herein
petitioner on the ground that he had no permission from the Russian
government to take on board the petitioner." It is further alleged that "the
immigration officials have taken steps regarding the disposition of those
foreigners subject to deportation while awaiting availability of transportation
or arrangements to the place where they may be sent."
In this Court's majority decision on the first application it was observed that
the applicant's detention was temporary, and it was held that "temporary
detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of
undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the
Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for
a reasonable length of time." It took note of the fact that "this Government
desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's
expense . . . making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest
officer of the land." No period was fixed within which the immigration
authorities were to carry out the contemplated deportation beyond the
statement that "The meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the
circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the
availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the
governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away,"
but the Court warned that "under established precedents, too long a detention
may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto,
and the writer of this decision dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice
Perfecto voted for outright discharge of the prisoner from custody. Mr.
Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating that he might agree "to a further
detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if after six
months, the Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined in
the latter dissent but thought that two months constituted reasonable time.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated,
the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner
out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in justice
to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or
country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein
(Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they
are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true however as
impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, and numerous American
decisons, that foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal
charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not
indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws
of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents,
except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered
the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long
as the Government is unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need
not decide. There is no allegation that the petitioner's entry into the
Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference from the pleadings
and the Deportation Board's findings is that he came to and lived in this
country under legal permit.
Moroever, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of
which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10,
1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied
to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human
beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone
is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2); that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the
power to release from custody an alien who has been detained an
unreasonably long period of time by the Department of Justice after it has
become apparent that although a warrant for his deportation has been issued,
the warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is
given the power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able
to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is being held without any
authority of law." The decision cited several cases which, it said, settled the
matter definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the same result had been
reached in innumerable cases elsewhere. The cases referred to were United
States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404; Caranica vs. Nagle, 9
Cir., 28 F. 2d 955; Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last
paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs.
Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28, 1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of
Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948), 80 Fed. Supp. 132, which is nearly
foursquare with the case at hand. In that case a stateless person, formerly a
Polish national, resident in the United States since 1911 and many times
serving as a seaman on American vessels both in peace and in war, was
ordered excluded from the United States and detained at Ellis Island at the
expense of the steamship company, when he returned from a voyage on
which he had shipped from New York for one or more European ports and
return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were that he had
no passport or immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of
perjury because in certain documents he represented himself to be an
American citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the
Court released him upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, said in part:
"When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I
suggested that all interested parties . . . make an effort to arrange to have the
petitioner ship out to some country that would receive him as a resident. He
is a native-born Pole but the Polish Consul has advised him in writing that he
is no longer a Polish subject. This Government does not claim that he is a
Polish citizen. His attorney says he is stateless. The Government is willing
that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent back aboard ship and sailed to
the port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last sailed to the United States
he would probably be denied permission to land. There is no other country
that would take him, without proper documents.
"It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner
should be released from custody on proper terms . . .
"What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in
custody almost seven months and practically admits it has no place to send
him out of this country. The steamship company, which employed him as
one of a group sent to the ship by the Union, with proper seaman's papers
issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying $3.00 a day for petitioner's
board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that petitioner
is an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials describe him . . .
"I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the
petitioner on his own recognizance. He will be required to inform the
immigration officials at Ellis Island by mail on the 15th of each month stating
where he is employed and where he can be reached by mail. If the
government does succeed in arranging for petitioner's deportation to a
country that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the
petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the manner
provided by law."
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited
offered a happy solution to the quandary in which the parties here find
themselves, solution which we think is sensible, sound and compatible with
law and the Constitution. For this reason, and since the Philippine law on
immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and
practice, we choose to follow and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the
Staniszewski decision with some modifications which, it is believed, are in
consonance with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
Philippines.
It was said or insinuated at the hearing of the petition at bar, but not alleged
in the return, that the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and fear
was expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal elements if allowed to be
at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer that "the
herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and
the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the Philippines
nor identified with the countries allied against those nations, the possibility
of the petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile acts prejudicial to the
interest and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the
petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the
Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that
is by no means, actual, present, or uncontrollable. After all, the Government
is not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure as that just
outlined. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court in connection with the application for bail of
ten Communists convicted by a lower court of advocacy of violent overthrow
of the United States Government is, in principle pertinent and may be availed
of at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:
implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience lies
back of our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such
questions exist, to avoid the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with
consequent reproach to our system of justice. If that is prudent judical
practice in the ordinary case, how much more important to avoid every
chance of handing to the Communist world such an ideological weapon as it
would have if this country should imprison this handful of Communist
leaders on a conviction that our own highest Court would confess to be
illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am
not naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities of the
defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to the dangers, the worst
they can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the litigation is
preferable to the possibility of national embarrassment from a celebrated case
of unjustified imprisonment of Communist leaders. Under no circumstances
must we permit their symbolization of an evil force in the world to be
hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid
that risk is not to jail those men until it is finally decided that they should stay
jailed."
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying
principle is of universal application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with
greater force to the present petition, since the right of accused to bail pending
appeal of his case, as in the case of the ten Communists, depends upon the
discretion of the court, whereas the right to be enlarged before formal charges
are instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no charges
pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him
are slim and remote.
Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to
release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be
placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents
in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep
peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The
surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be
submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision
in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the
amount of P5,000.00 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by Section 40 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613. No costs will be charged.

"The Government's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior

after conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail. Grave public danger is
said to result from what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they
have done since their conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to
commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist countries, it is
still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons
by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes.
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses
is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses
and injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial
technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which
defendants stand convicted.

xxx xxx xxx

"But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped
up in the same constitutional bundle with those of these Communists. If in
anger or disgust with these defendants we throw out the bundle, we also cast
aside protection for the liberties of more worthy critics who may be in
opposition to the government of some future day.

xxx xxx xxx

"If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters

of principle, there is a very practical aspect of this application which must
not be overlooked or underestimated - that is the disastrous effect on the
reputation of American justice if I should now send these men to jail and the
full Court later decide that their conviction is invalid. All experience with
litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about a conviction
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777 | 1989-07-14
CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and
challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his
eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary
to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume
their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing
amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that
Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his
body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held
Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed
him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose
invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell
of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like
Antaeus, need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in
the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more
than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battlecry
dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us
for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social
justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," 1
especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this
goal, adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably
diffuse property ownership and profits.' 2 Significantly, there was also the
specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these
sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social
Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere
provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines
on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was
substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even
energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in
favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of
still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation
No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the
Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own
deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the
interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve
common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one
common discussion and resolution. The different antecedents of each case
will require separate treatment, however, and will must be explained
hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants
and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano,
Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as
qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she
promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI,
Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners
argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the
President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay
5 and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just
compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in
cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive
order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due
process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places
the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D.
No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored
judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would
not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived
of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already
been upheld in the earlier cases of Chavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8
and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. the
National Land Reform council 9 The determination of just compensation by
the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose
judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the
challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has
as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are
also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27
does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event
their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings
below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just
compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As
for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales
was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1988, it is contended that P.D.
No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself
also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the
same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by
Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1.83-hectare land, who complained that the DAR
was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite
a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of
rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the
allegations in the basic amended petition that the above-mentioned
enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill
District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee,
Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition
seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could
exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so
only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even
assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly
exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled
for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process,
and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund. - There is hereby created a special fund, to be known
as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS
(P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from
the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and
Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government
may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special
fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose
authorized in this Proclamation.
the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover
the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be
appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of
just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in
full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the
Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established
by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current
fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain
controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of
several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest,
maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually
agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or
approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort
was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no
tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the
CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the
same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with
problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been
violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27, 1987 by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at
least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10,
1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions
were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian
Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because
of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and
Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of
fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum
authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial
amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually
available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of
the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to
own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which
is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government
assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the
landowner declares his own valuation, he is unjustly required to immediately
pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the
"whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the
petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP
and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable
prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters
have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress
first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation
of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for
prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is
against the payment of public money without the corresponding
appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be
the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion
pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount,
is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means
that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on
his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to
the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is
unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in
the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987;
and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National
Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian
Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just
compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the
private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his
small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall
and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the
private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was
denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because
they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the
Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for
under the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.O Nos. 228 and 229 shortly
before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the
doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the
President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures
that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property
without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of
riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution.
He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land,
the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October
21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his
contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program along
with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is
undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature
because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian
Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos.
228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article
XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until
the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was
deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after
that date should therefore be considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the
motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office
of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's
acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No.
27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as
they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do
not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of
P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn
shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the
respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D.
No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has
so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been
amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own
other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands
used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which
they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the
petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No.
27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975
(Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an
accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated
April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum
Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29, 1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on
Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for
Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their
Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For
failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these
measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely
initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the
President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing
rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion
which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially
true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of
the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not
applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of
agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended
to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because
they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court
in Tañada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the
additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the
presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of
the three departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested
with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or
of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for
what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this
power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation
of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of
their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down
the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy,
indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory
is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were
made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution
would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a
declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the
deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as
established by judge-made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a
judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the
cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and
intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13
And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued
by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the
objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We
have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present
petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when
confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not
hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be
done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution
as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover
its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies
that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will
not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's
pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that -
. . . when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court
must categorically resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before
resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his
powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella
and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power
of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229,
the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987,
when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over
legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to
pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987,
and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both
issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased
to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they
continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or
declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become
inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted
it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not
have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as
long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected
but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has
specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657
whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of
the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of
Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been
incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. 18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it
does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in
the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation
measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not
its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific
purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.
19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit,
Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular
reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with
for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the
exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been
convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then
solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were,
both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229
should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as
required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable.
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law,
which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares:
Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land,
the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-
sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five
(5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that
a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only
short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text
are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential
issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law
because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence,
it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474
could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of
instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos,
whose word was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos
still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in
Tañada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force
and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in
that case. (LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated
November 29, 1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742
that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a
discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That
is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification.
Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to
compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the
discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty
imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy
of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts
will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by
mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a
particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court
should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it
jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and
in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there
is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative
authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a
question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA,
24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks
systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the
Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the
property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property
is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down
the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far"
was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures
for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a
coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but
reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and
waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained
without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in
which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the
police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in
that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or
morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted
remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or
make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use
which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use
prohibited ceases to be noxious - as it may because of further changes in local
or social conditions - the restriction will have to be removed and the owner
will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of
the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used
as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment
of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26
As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of
Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police
power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the police and
eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they
viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private
property for improvements that would be available for "public use," literally
construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less
intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities, a point reflected in the
Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support
of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a
plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure
need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth
of government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two
powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs
eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police
power - a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in
Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public
use" test to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of
blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police
power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose,
Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3
vote in 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks
Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had
not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal,
which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark
was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however,
was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the
airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their
respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court
nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand
Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused
by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by
Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn
Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized
but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a
landmark - the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story
building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing
bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed,
theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site
by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more
profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent
domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground
that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and
dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during
the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally
agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions.
We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other
claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the
adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal
protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not
questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they
should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also
made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class
with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been
submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been
violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar
to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court
finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged
as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except
to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the
Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under
the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the
lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the
State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian
reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the
first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights
of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not
enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even
the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only
to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed
under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the
rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section
1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner
enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where
the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in
which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It
is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or
other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain
will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the
interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification,
as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in
the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that
has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2)
just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No.
79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the
pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights
by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not
correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP
as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In
any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner
prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive
departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in
reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been
abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political
departments when they decide what is known as the political question. As
explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with
the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority of the
courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed
as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views
may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to
include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the
distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also
continuing space under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The
Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert
only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do
not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3, 1909 that the
entire St. Mary's river between the American bank and the international line,
as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its
entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters,
and the waters connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in
condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and
there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress . . .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled
for us by the Constitution itself. No less than the 1987 Charter calls for
agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be
taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits.
The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are
only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the
necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or
collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a
longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed
by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40
The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation"
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate
more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police
power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that
has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its
beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation
mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable
taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter
a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures
before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a
deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the
compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for
its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue
a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the
land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation,
which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation
of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which
provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of
the government to buy his land -
. . . the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine
the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of
the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to
the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official
of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for
property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property
by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever
was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held
through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved
to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating
the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to
appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the
need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is
seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not
had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees
during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade
as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that
of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The
court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is
just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar
as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question
of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same
provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the
power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is
stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such
purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx xxx xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that
the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to
the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and
after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination
have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not
suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees
constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as
summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed
an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more
importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not
by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested
party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by
all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right
to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just
compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate
the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and
the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option
of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned - Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares -
Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below - Thirty-five percent (35%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable
at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance
with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent
(10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner
choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in-interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their
face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including
assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province or region where the
lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government owned or controlled
corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided
the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small and medium-scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use
of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of
the outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That
the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospital; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above
provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the
expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than
money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this
contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than
the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been
understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner
of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. 45
(Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of
the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and
anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not
whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of
the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned
property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person
desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled
to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been
derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation
for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
- Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The
condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can
the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis
than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner
prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent
domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding
upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47
(Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things,
be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair
equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time
after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute
for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49
(Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the
payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably,
has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However,
we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent
domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property
of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for
a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever
found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended
for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of
the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society,
from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not
cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the
foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are
as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as
beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them
tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this
revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of
lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now
become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under
the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be
needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated,
which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is
in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty
when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the
expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less
conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were
aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that
there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they
wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that
their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for
by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner
cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what
they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D.
No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new
Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any
categorial agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given
the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian
reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune"
the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that
they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made
to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries.
compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition
of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against
the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the
members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the
landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations
of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and
manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18
of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind
admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on
this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from
the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its
enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see
the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades.
We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the
nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in
the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of
cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the
bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in
bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government
financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable
at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner
at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares
of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things
of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the
landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked,
this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these
countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their
forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable
share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit
of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O.
No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of
the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This
repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but
does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register
the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city
assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just
compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its
Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his
property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here
and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not
vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered
and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the
petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under
the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
. . . although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete
at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until
payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases
holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just
compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be
uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was
held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a
condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State"
albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55
the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes
was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the
compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land
was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on
principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the
property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under
the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the
owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and
Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation
adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no
piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner
until compensation is paid . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-
farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner"
of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to
the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he
had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just
compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October
21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
(Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said
decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives
and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper
for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the
landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending
transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be
considered as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with
the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by
arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be
rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer
under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him
even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counterbalance the express
provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742
that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has
already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial
action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the
administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered
by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects
of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that
the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D.
No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights
provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal
than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have
been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of
these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these
enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-
examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better
protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the
pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on
terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The
CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice
Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we
learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We
cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means.
Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron
shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the
soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the

comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for
the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be
released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the
past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his
servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his
farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only
the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only
deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling
future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities
and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only

upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under

P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under
the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED,

without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 | 1957-05-31
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in
significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power
and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that
is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really
or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates,
Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national
survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free
the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the
country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence
and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business."
In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the
Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are
not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in
favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the
laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other
laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring
aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with
the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a
provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who
die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and
all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers,
from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the
Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law
; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and
those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to
entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and
5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend
that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the
State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the
title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property
is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power. —
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police
power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a
violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and
resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the
determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope
of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses
related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is
the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and
correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be
brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has
become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from
the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so
under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of
nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of
public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee
the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent
or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain
or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth
the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause
and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the
following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual
liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are
admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing
is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment
of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither
be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role
of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature,
which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the
prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness
and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or
of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public
interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual
liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the
exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there
has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the
legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override
legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly
into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation,
as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the
legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a
group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes
more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old
as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to
residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and
consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as
group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing
more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they
do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance
is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which
man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and
proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him
the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed
within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of
capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies
are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life
of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its
increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home
and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or
corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking.
He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the
clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a
supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the
bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was unknown in
provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and
villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He
even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life
appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their
agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many
communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this
trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without
murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in
his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community
takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true
to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer
holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all
articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and
centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent
control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber,
hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other
goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the
Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal
foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail
trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is
imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of
radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an
element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business
make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an
issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion
within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our
prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the
figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention year
(1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade
already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year
of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official
statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and
Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of
Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the
figures on Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors,
whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross
sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of
course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more
than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales
which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much
more. The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of
foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were
largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents,
the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically
helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional
convention. —
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently
shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed
nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our
Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and
control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other
things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires
the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was
twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant
or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of
Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the
fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation
of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought
under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the
country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the
concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic
life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the
Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic
life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain,
political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and
strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands
the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation
and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions,
the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic
freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for
political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized
movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities
of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests
in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other
quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they
fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express sentiments of
economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on
July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and
a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National
Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also
believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers,
which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien
stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a
reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not
seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such
predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital,
unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and
merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters
as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles
to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or
articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of
dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded.
Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to
be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer
them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger
profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to
sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as
a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is
thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious
influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise
of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of
justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and
justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and
intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our
purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have
hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming
public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National
Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding
practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had
to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate
and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret
combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of
the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest
merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in
unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by
the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out
of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like,
in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have
engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a
matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action
which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of
the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things
may come in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer,
especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential
source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here
in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among
nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that
dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and
big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and
the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the
national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his
country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances
that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or
discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination
of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from
the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public,
nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of
police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and
security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. —
The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal
protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the
root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted
country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure
of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate
nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living,
or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino
customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness
and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go
back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that
it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really
makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly
contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not
invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase
national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and
temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very
important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already
pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and
prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the
ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of
the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These
differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national
over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction
can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by
the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative
classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree
with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that
this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class
are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature
acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and
classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal
protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope
of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only
when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the
authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs.
Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly
defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided
as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does
not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for
classification has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as
well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co.
vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting
the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed
by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the
right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in
enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We
held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions
are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation
of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of
the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said
decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson
in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for
example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc.
The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping,
and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost
every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping
is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject.
It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted;
that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is
to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign;
and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class
falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree
of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar
classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification
in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute
on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can
obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen
of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem
wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have
regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the
court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State,
99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among
them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the
result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate,
but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted
with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation
of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore,
invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115
(1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the
city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard
rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens
is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not
bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as
to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state
that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of
methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol,
124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs.
City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking
was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it
to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying
aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs.
May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van
Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially
known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and
loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business
of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement
of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners,
90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as
barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings
that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the
morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi
vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute
banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to
citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of
ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate
justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However,
two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated
traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82
Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every
employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age,
was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of
an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained. —
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in
the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not
a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid
were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the
result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question
of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L.
ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a
Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any
language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main
reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business
there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would
fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right
to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for
the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be
derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive
Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on
officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons
and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was
arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the
administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof
was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900),
a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void,
because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in
respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we
already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic
consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily
contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except
in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens
have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of
crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton
vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance
of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country
are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our
own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of
different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural
and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to
their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and
control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes
and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor
are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by
citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is
unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with
absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against
aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature
decisive. —
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police
power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought
to be attained. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs.
New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in
considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the
test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the
legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured
to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it
imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation
upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a
particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302.,
1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395,
fixes this test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise
of the police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not
constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is
whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in
connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and
capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety,
morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered. —
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation,
one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly
pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation
and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized.
This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is
engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an
honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the
citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and
welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated,
that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate
use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic
control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which
overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion
in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious,
taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which
the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the
answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring
about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from
alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.)
Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but
actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that
accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold
upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our
economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have
no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent
stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other
people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood.
While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects
of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing
rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic
independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real
and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination
of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and
eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is
one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe
the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate
aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere
of legislative action. —
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the
constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble
motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise
of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the
legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote
the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the
precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they
adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is
within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment
introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to
promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege
to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various
provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is
the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and
utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is
provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of
the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and
spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as
manifested in the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully
justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its
people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency
and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power
of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and
meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination
of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how
tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged
in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The
right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses.
In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact
that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself,
its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into
the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative
judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its
validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom
of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the
legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a
violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness,
and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer
various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the
law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be
thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the
elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that
adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown;
that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies
solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the
claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real
purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit
aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed
to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely
fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the
term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the
idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main
purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than
either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included
within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the
Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of
Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act
of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of
intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act
prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of
getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject
of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42
of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree
of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing
to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of
prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning
when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or
only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also
been said that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law
(I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was
followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also
contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title
changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have
been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would
have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in
accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a
simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include
all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the
public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been
appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion
of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the
law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The
objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed
violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration
of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We
find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of
the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such
is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human
Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations
Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from
engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law
in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging
in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed
by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within
the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law
is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the
law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is
stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation
of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty,
however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal
protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of
the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power
and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

MOSTERO vs. THE CHIEF OF POLICE
G.R. No. L-2128 | 1948-05-12
FERIA, J:
Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with
having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of
the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a
complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948,
when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the
petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed against them an information with the proper courts of justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a
sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, and it had to be
transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for
deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as
to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by
Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever might have been the action
taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in order to
lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and
guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide
whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is
the following: Is the city fiscal of Manila a judicial authority within the
meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided
in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted
article, the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and
the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are
of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean
the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to
order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with
having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.).
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article
202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force in these Islands, which penalized
a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall
arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to
the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no
doubt that the judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court
of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the
temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city
fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because
article 204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code provided
that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be
imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the
period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force,
shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner
formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which
the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has
not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words
judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by
the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1(3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizure
shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement]
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he
may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived
of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon
probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his
witness. And the judicial authority to whom a person arrested by a public
officer must be surrendered can not be any other but a court or judge who
alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention
of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without
such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for more
than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court,
which, referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant,
provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without
unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code,
take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action as they
may deem proper to take ;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that
"after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be
informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be
informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against
him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his
favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not
be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him."
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of sections 1 and 4, Rule 102
of the Rules of Court. According to the provisions of said section, "a writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed."
Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and
the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code
can not be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other
city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or
temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a
person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashin vs. Boncan,
40 Off. Gaz. 13th Suppl., p. 13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on
January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city fiscal
of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in
section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all persons charged with
offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled,
but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing
the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper
municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the
investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant
of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by law as a substitute, in a certain
sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or
malicious prosecution, since defendants charged with offenses triable by the
courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary
investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary
investigation in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace
and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place,
are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant
of arrest of the accused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6,
Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a
city fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation
referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an
offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with the municipal
court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the
latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The
complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who,
personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for
the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper
court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the
investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or
commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted by law, the
officer or person making the arrest should, as above stated, without
unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of
time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having
jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section
17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court
has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary
investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original
jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance
in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.

In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the
municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making
the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the
city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and
file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by
section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant
of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal
or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially
impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer
making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and
shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested
or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to
the probability of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is
not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence
presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer
period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making
or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information
against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest.
Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for
the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information,
must be taken into consideration.

To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law
without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city
fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter
had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by
a court or judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant

upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those
cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in
such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with
the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the
arrest of a person charged with having committed a public offense even if he
finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon
complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after
investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged.

In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the

responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the
petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the
absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter, in believing that he had complied
with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours
to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that
the petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a
complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are
being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered
unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent
court of justice. So ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CUIZON
G.R. No. 109287 | 1996-04-18
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal
searches and seizures, and the requirements for a valid warrantless search
incident to a valid warrantless arrest. While the Court appreciates and
encourages pro-active law enforcement, it nonetheless upholds the
sacredness of constitutional rights and repeats the familiar maxim, "the end
never justifies the means."
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated January 5, 1993 (Criminal Case
No. 92-0230) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, 2 Pasay City finding
appellants guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
On March 10, 1992, an Information 3 was filed against the appellants
charging them as follows:
That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country, without
lawful authority, 16 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as "SHABU", a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment of appellants Paul Lee and Steve
Pua, the latter translated the information into Chinese-Cantonese for the
understanding of appellant Lee, who does not speak nor understand English,
Pilipino or any other Philippine dialect. Both of them, duly assisted by their
counsel, also pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial ensued and on January 5, 1993, the
court a quo found appellants guilty as charged and rendered the following
disposition: 5
WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias
Stephen Po y Uy or Tommy Sy, and Paul Lee y Wong, alias Paul Leung, are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal
authority, methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu", a regulated drug, as
charged in the aforequoted Information; and they are each sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" involved in this case is
declared forfeited in favor of the government and is ordered turned over to
the Dangerous Drug Board for proper disposal.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor
General, who added the page references to the transcript of stenographic
notes as indicated in brackets, are as follows: 6
In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) gathered an information regarding the drug, activities of accused
Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was
conducted on them. The residence of the spouses was traced to Caloocan City
(tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18, 21).
In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report
from its informant in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife,
was arriving on the same day at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila, from the British crown colony,
carrying with him a big quantity of "shabu". A team was organized to
intercept the suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with Ernesto Diño,
Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller and Alfredo Jacinto, as members. Some
belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to the Reaction Group of
the NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4, 18).
Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Diño
positioned himself at the Arrival Area, while Yap and the other members of
the team posted themselves at the parking area of the airport. At about 12:45
in the afternoon of the same date, accused Cuizon and his wife, who had just
returned from Hong Kong, after passing through the Immigration and
Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to the Arrival Area of the airport
preparatory to their boarding a car. While there, accused Cuizon, together
with his wife, handed four (4) traveling bags to accused Steve Pua y Clofas
and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the Arrival Area.
Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they boarded in
leaving the airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle (tsn,
May 19, 1992, pp. 4-5, 8-9).
At this juncture, Diño, who was observing the activities of the accused,
radioed the group of Yap at the parking area, describing the vehicle boarded
by accused Pua and Lee so that Yap and his companions could apprehend the
two. However, the message of Diño was not completely received by his
teammates as the radio he was using ran short of battery power (tsn, May 13,
1992, pp. 25-26).
Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Diño
proceeded to the place where his companions were stationed for the purpose
of giving assistance to them, believing that they were already in the process
of apprehending accused Pua and Lee. When he realized that the two accused
were not apprehended, Diño told the group of Yap to follow him as he was
following the vehicle taken by Pua and Lee which, according to an earlier tip
he learned, was proceeding to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati, Metro
Manila (tan, May 19, 1992 pp. 25-26; tsn, May 21, 1992, pp. 6, 15).
Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in
the Manila Peninsula Hotel, in whose premises the taxicab boarded by
accused Pua and Lee entered, Diño and the other members of the team
coordinated with Col. Regino Arellano, Chief Security Officer of the hotel,
for the purpose of apprehending the two accused. A verification made by the
Chief Security Officer showed that accused Pua and Lee occupied Room 340
of the hotel. The two accused allowed Diño and Yap, together with Col.
Arellano, to enter their room. Found inside Room 340 were four (4) traveling
bags, which were similar to the ones handed by accused Cuizon to accused
Pua and Lee at the Arrival Area of the NAIA. After having introduced
themselves as NBI agents, Diño and Yap were permitted by accused Pua and
Lee to search their bags in the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was
made in writing. (Exh. I). Three (3) of the four (4) bags each yielded a plastic
package containing a considerable quantity of white crystalline substance
suspected to be methamphethamine hydrochloride or "shabu". Each package
was sandwiched between two (2) pieces of board which appear to be
"lawanit" placed at the bottom of each of the three (3) bags. The suspected
"shabu" contained in one bag weighed 2.571 kilos, that found in the other
had a weight of 2.768 kilos, and the suspected "shabu" retrieved from the
third bag weighed 2.970 kilos. Pua and Lee were then apprehended by Diño
and his companions (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 9-13; tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 9,
Exh. "F-2", p. 75, Records).
Immediately thereafter, Diño and the other members of the team proceeded
to the house of accused Cuizon in Caloocan City, taking with them accused
Pua and Lee and the bags with their contents of suspected dangerous drugs.
They reached the place at about 5:50 in the afternoon of the same date of
February 21, 1992. Retrieved from accused Cuizon in his residence was
another bag also containing a white crystalline substance weighing 2.695
kilos, likewise believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu".
In addition, a .38 Cal. firearm was taken from accused Cuizon (tsn, May 19,
1992, pp. 10-11).
Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to
the NBI headquarters at Taft Avenue, Manila, for further investigation. They
were subsequently referred to the Prosecution Division of the Department of
Justice for inquest. However, only the present three accused were charged in
court (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 12-13, 16-17).
In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992,
Joselito Soriano, roomboy of the Manila Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning
Room 340, observed that a portion of the ceiling was misaligned. While
fixing it, he discovered in the ceiling a laundry bag containing suspected
"shabu" of more than five (5) kilos (Exh. "X," p. 110). Informed of the
discovery while they were already in their office in the NBI, Yap and some
companions returned to the hotel. The suspected "shabu" was turned over to
them (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).
When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white
crystalline substance taken from the three (3) travelling bags found in the
room of accused Pua and Lee in the Manila Peninsula hotel, the white
crystalline substance retrieved from the bag confiscated from accused Cuizon
in his house in Caloocan City, and the white crystalline substance hidden in
the ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were confirmed to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu", a regulated drug. (Board Regulation No. 6, dated
December 11, 1972, of the Dangerous Drugs Board) (tsn, May 7, 1992, p.
12).
The Defense's Version(s)
Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct
examination, he testified that at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, he and his co-appellant Lee were in their room at the Manila
Peninsula Hotel. 7 His version of what happened on February 21, 1992 can
be summarized as follows:
At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to check-
in at the Manila Peninsula Hotel for and in behalf of the latter's personal
friend named Leong Chong Chong or Paul Leung, who was expected to
arrive that evening because of a delayed flight. Appellant Pua was engaged
by appellant Lee to act as interpreter as Lee does not know how to speak
English and the local language. 8
While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from the
lobby informing them of the arrival of Paul Leung's luggage. At Pua's
instructions, the said luggage were brought to the room by a bellboy.
Thereafter, two persons knocked on their door, accompanied by a "tomboy"
and a thin man with curly hair. The two men identified themselves as NBI
agents and asked appellant Pua to let them in. He declined since he did not
know who they were. However, when Col. Arellano, the Chief Security
Officer of the hotel, arrived and identified the two NBI agents, he and Lee
relented and permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were told by the
agents to sign a piece of paper. Made to understand that they were merely
giving their consent for the agents to enter their room, Pua and Lee signed
the same. Whereupon, the agents told them that they will open Paul Leung's
bags. Again appellant Pua refused, saying that the bags did not belong to
them. Just the same, the agents, without appellants Pua and Lee's consent,
opened the bags and found the shabu. Pua and Lee were then apprehended
and brought to the NBI headquarters. 9
Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecution's version
of the incident. While admitting that on February 21, 1992, he and his wife
Susan did arrive from Hong Kong with several pieces of luggage, he denied
that he met Pua and Lee at the arrival area of the airport, much less passed to
them the four pieces of luggage. According to him, only his two-year old son,
accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan Ong, met them outside the airport.
Ong fetched them from the airport and brought them to their home in
Caloocan city. They arrived at their house around 3:00 in the afternoon. 10
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son
on his bed, two NBI agents suddenly barged in and poked a gun at him. They
manhandled him in front of his wife and son. His hands were tied with a
necktie and he was forcibly brought out of their house while the NBI agents
ransacked the place without any warrant. He, his wife Susan, and his cousin
Ronald Allan Ong, were afterwards brought to the NBI Headquarters in
Manila and there the NBI agents continued mauling him. 11
Appellant Cuizon's wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his nephew
Nestor Dalde, testified in his favor basically reiterating or confirming his
testimony. 12
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word
of English or Pilipino and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to
take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his
testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial
date allotted to the defense for the reception of Lee's testimony, his counsel,
although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the trial court
deemed him and Pua to have waived their right to present additional
evidence, 13 and the case was considered submitted for decision after the
filing of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the
reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he submit any memorandum. Only
accused Cuizon, who was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his
memorandum.
The Issues
In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of
errors: 14
I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Marcelino Amurao, Jose Yap and Ernesto Diño despite
contradictions made on material points.
III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to
present his evidence in his defense in violation of his constitutional right to
due process.
Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two
assignments of errors above-quoted, and in addition challenges the legality
and validity of his warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incidental
thereto. 15
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question
of the legality of the arrest and search of herein appellants effected by the
NBI operatives. Put differently, were the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless searches conducted by the NBI legal and constitutional?
The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of
the court a quo will stand or fall. Consequently, there is a need to resolve first
this issue before endeavoring to consider the other issues raised by
appellants.
A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and arrests
to have been illegal, whether failure by appellants Pua and Lee to explicitly
assign the same as errors before this Court amounted to a waiver of their
constitutional rights against such illegal searches and arrests.
The Court's Ruling
General Rule on Warrantless Arrests, Searches & Seizures
Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure
can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.
So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of theland 16
ordains it:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may "produce, and particularly describing the place to be
Searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17
However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is not
absolute. Thus, under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court,
an arrest without a warrant may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a
private person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest
without warrant, the person arrested may be subjected to a search of his body
and of his personal effects or belongings, "for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,"
likewise without need of a search warrant. 18
However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under
circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest, as discussed
above, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal
activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been
committed by him, then the search made of such person as well as his arrest
are deemed illegal. 19 Consequently, any evidence which may have been
obtained during such search, even if tending to confirm or actually
confirming such initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any purpose
and in any proceeding, 20 the same being "the fruit of the poisonous tree".
21 Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first
undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search,
both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under
The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.
Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot
agree with and accept the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto which would justify the search without a warrant.
The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness of its
findings and conclusion:
. . . the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be
regarded as valid for being incidential to a lawful arrest. . . . The arrest of
accused Pua and Lee without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be
considered to have committed the crime of transporting "shabu" in the
presence of the arresting officers from the time they received the bags
containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time they brought the
bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling under
the situation where an offense had in fact just been committed, and the
arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said
accused were the ones who committed it. . . . 22
Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on
lawful arrests without warrant, we note that par. (c) of said section is
obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal
institution at the time of arrest. Par. (a) an the other hand requires that the
person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence
of the arresting officer(s). These requirements are not present in the case at
bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely
resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed
resting with his wife and child inside his home. No offense had just been
committed, or was being actually committed or being attempted by any of
the accused in the presence of the lawmen. 23
Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally
exacting requirements have also not been met. The prosecution failed to
establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it. Appellant Cuizon
could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other
two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense of "carrying and
transporting" prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there
was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the
accused were then and there committing a crime. The act per se of handing
over the baggage, assuming the prosecution's version to be true; cannot in
any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under
suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad daylight,
practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public. 24
Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for
travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering
pieces of baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant
of our fellow countrymen for sending along ("pakikipadala") things and gifts
through friends and relatives. Moreover, one cannot determine from the
external appearance of the luggage that they contained "shabu" hidden
beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of
parting with luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious deed,
at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI
agents purportedly received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon
would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote from
another decision of like import, "(A)11 they had was hearsay information
(from the telephone caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed."
25
In the leading case of People vs. Burgos, 26 this Court laid down clear
guidelines, as follows:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be
considered lawful under Section 6 (b) using the test of reasonableness. He
submits that the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to
induce a reasonable ground (for belief) that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed
first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition.
It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact
of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable
ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal
report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had
committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet
ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.
...
The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro, 27 where
this Court ruled that ". . . under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer
making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as
stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos."
In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay
information ("tips"), but they were completely uncertain that anything was
really "going down" that day. That much is undisputed, from a reading of the
testimony of Agent Diño:
Q Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the
spouses Cuizon were going to bring in or transport into the country shabu on
February 21, 1992?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they indeed would
bring in shabu, is it not? That was only the information relayed to your group?
A Yes, sir.
Xxx xxx xxx
Q But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that they
were bringing in shabu?
A Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.)
In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Diño
during the operation, likewise admitted in substantially the same tenor their
uncertainty regarding the commission of the offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992,
pp. 29 & 34.).
We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution
failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI
agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the
search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made; hence, said search and arrest do
not come under the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and therefore
should be deemed illegal. We eight add that the search conducted on Pua and
Lee was not incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, having preceded the same
and produced the justification therefor. On the other hand, the search on
Cuizon's residence, without the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly
illegal and the "shabu" seized thereat cannot but be considered inadmissible
in evidence. More an these points later.
Comparison Between The Present Case and Earlier Decisions of This Court
For clarity's sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with
previous decisions by this Court in various drug cases, in which apparently
different conclusions were reached, in order to distinguish them from the
instant case and avoid any potential misunderstanding of the foregoing
holding as well as the constitutional and legal principles on which it is based.
1. In People vs. Claudio, 28 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for
Baguio city, was arrested by a policeman on the same bus because of the
distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the plastic bag she was
carrying. The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be
lawful, the search justified and the evidence thus discovered admissible in
evidence.
2. In People vs. Tangliben, 29 the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus
terminal, was noticed by lawmen to be acting suspiciously, and was also
positively fingered by an informer as carrying marijuana, and so he was
accosted by policemen who happened to be on a surveillance mission; the
lawmen asked him to open the bag, in which was found a package of
marijuana leaves. It was held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and
search incident thereto. The Court in effect considered the evidence on hand
sufficient to have enabled the law enforcers to secure a search warrant had
there been time, but as the case "presented urgency," and there was actually
no time to obtain a warrant since the accused was about to board a bus, and
inasmuch as an informer had given information "on the spot" that the accused
was carrying marijuana, the search of his person and effects was thus
considered valid.
3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 30 the accused was seen acting
suspiciously, and when accosted by two members of the Davao INP who
identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was pursued, subdued
and placed in custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed
revolver, live ammunition and a tear gas grenade. This Court upheld his
conviction for illegal possession of firearms, holding that there was under the
circumstances sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search.
4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., 31 agents of the Narcotics
Command set up a checkpoint on a highway in Atok, Benguet, to screen
vehicular traffic on the way to Baguio City due to confidential reports from
informers that Maspil and a certain Bagking would be transporting a large
quantity of marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of November 1, 1986, the two
suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the checkpoint and were made to stop.
The officers noticed that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks and tin cans,
which, when opened, were seen to contain marijuana leaves. The Court
upheld the search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless
arrest.
5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al., 32 the Court ruled that the search of the
appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure of "shabu" therefrom was legal,
in view of the intelligence information, including notably, clandestine reports
by a planted deep penetration agent or spy who was even participating in the
drug smuggling activities of the syndicate, to the effect that appellants were
bringing in prohibited drugs into the country. The Court also held that it is
not practicable to secure a search warrant in cases of smuggling with the use
of a moving vehicle to transport contraband, because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.
6. In People vs. Malmstedt, 33 NARCOM agents stationed at Camp Dangwa,
Mountain Province, set up a temporary checkpoint to check vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region, due to persistent reports that vehicles from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other drugs, and because of
particular information to the effect that a Caucasian would be travelling from
Sagada that day with prohibited drugs. The bus in which accused was riding
was stopped at the checkpoint. While conducting an inspection, one of the
NARCOM men noticed that accused, the only foreigner on board, had a
bulge at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun, the officer sought
accused's passport or other identification papers. When the latter failed to
comply, the lawman directed him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging at his waist. It was a pouch bag which, when opened by the accused,
was found to contain packages of hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Invited
for questioning, the accused disembarked from the bus and brought along
with him two pieces of luggage; found inside were two teddy bears stuffed
with more hashish. The Court held that there was sufficient probable cause
in the premises for the lawmen to believe that the accused was then and there
committing a crime and/or trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. Said probable cause arose not only from the persistent reports of
the transport of prohibited drugs from Sagada, and the "tip" received by the
NARCOM that same day that a Caucasian coming from Sagada would be
bringing prohibited drugs, but also from the failure of the accused to present
his passport or other identification papers when confronted by the lawmen,
which only triggered suspicion on the part of the law enforcers that accused
was trying to hide his identity, it being the normal thing expected of an
innocent man with nothing to hide, that he readily present identification
papers when asked to do so. The warrantless arrest and search were thus
justified.
In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found by
the Court to provide probable cause justifying warrantless arrests and
searches, i.e., distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or
positive identification by informers, suspicious behaviour, attempt to flee,
failure to produce identification papers, and so on. Too, urgency attended the
arrests and searches because each of the above-mentioned cases involved the
use of motor vehicles and the great likelihood that the accused would get
away long before a warrant can be procured. And, lest it be overlooked,
unlike in the case before us now, the law enforcers in the aforementioned
cases acted immediately on the information received, suspicions raised, and
probable causes established, and effected the arrests and searches without
any delay.
Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case
In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly decided
against arresting the accused-appellants inside the airport as they allegedly
wanted to discover the identities of the airport immigration, security or
customs personnel who might be protecting the accused or otherwise
involved in the drug smuggling activities, and also in order to avoid the
possibility of an armed encounter with such protectors, which might result in
injuries to innocent bystanders. These excuses are simply unacceptable. They
are obviously after-thoughts concocted to justify their rank failure to effect
the arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the NBI men failed to explain
how come they did not apprehend the appellants at the moment Cuizon
handed over the baggage to Pua and Lee, or even afterwards, in relative
safety. Such arrest would have been consistent with the settled constitutional,
legal and jurisprudential precedents earlier cited.
The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security checks
allegedly with their contraband cargo undetected in their luggage.
Apparently, the NBI agents did not see (as indeed they did not testify that
they saw) anyone from the airport immigration, security or customs who
could have escorted the spouses Cuizon, and therefore, there was no danger
of any "live ammo encounter" with such group(s). The alleged drug couriers
had already made their way outside the NAIA, had allegedly made contact
with the accused Pua and Lee, and were in the very act of handing over the
luggage to the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in and pounce on them
at that very instant has not been satisfactorily explained. Instead, one of the
agents, Diño, merely watched as Pua and Lee loaded the luggage into a cab
and took off for Makati. Furthermore, it taxes the imagination too much to
think that at the most critical and climactic moment, when agent Diño radioed
his companions for help to close in on the suspects, the most amazing and
stupendous thing actually happened: Murphy's Law kicked in whatever could
go wrong, did, and at the worst possible time the batteries in Agent Diño's
hand-held radio supposedly went dead and his message was not transmitted.
Thus the departing Pua and Lee proceeded merrily and unimpeded to the
Peninsula Hotel, while the spouses Cuizon simultaneously sped off to their
residence in Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed and
scampering madly to catch up. Such absolutely astounding and incredible
happenstance might find a place in a fourth-rate movie script, but expecting
the courts to swallow it hook, line and sinker is infinite naivete, if not
downright malevolence.
Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the
agents were not thereby rendered helpless or without recourse. The NBI
agents, numbering five in all, not counting their so-called informant, claimed
to have piled into three cars (TSN, May 19, 1992) and tailed the suspects Pua
and Lee into Makati, keeping a safe two-car distance behind (TSN, May 20,
1992). The lawmen and the prosecutors failed to explain why the agents did
not intercept the vehicle in which Pua and Lee were riding, along the way,
pull them over, arrest them and search the luggage. And since the agents were
in three (3) cars, they also could have easily arranged to have agents in one
vehicle follow, intercept and apprehend the Cuizons while the others went
after Pua and Lee. All or any of these possible moves are mere ordinary,
common-sense steps, not requiring a great deal of intelligence. The NBI men
who testified claimed to have conducted or participated in previous drug
busts or similar operations and therefore must have been familiar with
contingency planning, or at least should have known what to do in this
situation where their alleged original plan fell through. At any rate, what the
lawmen opted to do, i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave the airport,
allegedly bringing the drug cache to the hotel, and Cuizon to leave
unimpededly the airport and reach his residence with one of the luggage,
increased significantly the risk of the suspects (and/or the drugs) slipping
through the lawmen's fingers, and puts into question the regularity of
performance of their official functions. The agents' alleged actions in this
case compare poorly with the forthright and decisive steps taken by lawmen
in the cases earlier cited where this Court held the arrests and seizures to be
valid.
Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents
intercepted and collared the suspects on the way to Makati and Caloocan, or
better yet, at the very moment of the hand-over, then there would not have
been any question at all as to the legality of their arrest and search, as they
would presumably have been caught red-handed with the evidence, and
consequently for that reason and by the very nature and manner of
commission of the offense charged, there would have been no doubt also as
to the existence of conspiracy among the appellants to transport the drugs.
However, because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no
sufficient proof of conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and
Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence
that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were
the very same ones found in the possession of the latter in Room 340 of the
Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could definitely
and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very same
ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say that they
"looked like" the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to be
the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the actual ownership
of the said bags as at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they were seized
by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding of conspiracy
as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-
settled is the rule that conspiracy must be proved independently and beyond
reasonable doubt. 34
Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely
difficult to subscribe to the trial court's finding as to the existence and
sufficiency of probable cause in this case, one major component of which
would have been the alleged information or "tip" purportedly received by the
agents as to the expected arrival of the spouses Cuizon that fateful day with
a large cache of "shabu". The question that defies resolution in our minds is
why, if indeed the information or "tip" was genuine and from a highly reliable
source as claimed by the government agents, did they not act on it? Throw in
the alleged month-long surveillance supposedly conducted by some of the
NBI people on the Cuizon couple, and the mystery only deepens. Even with
the so-called tip and the results of surveillance, the government officers were
still seemingly hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps afraid, to arrest and
search the accused appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who went after
Pua and Lee at the Peninsula Hotel, instead of outrightly cuffing and
searching them, as they were supposed to, opted instead to play it safe and
meekly beseeched the two to sign a written consent for the agents to search
their personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books. If this is how
confident the agents were about their "hot tips", reliable informers and
undercover surveillance, then we cannot be blamed for failing to appreciate
the existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest and
search in this case.
There is a whole lot more that can be said on this score, but we shall leave it
at that for now. We shall now dispose of the appeals of the accused-appellants
individually.
Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon
The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without
any warrant, and not on the occasion or as an incident of a valid warrantless
arrest, was indubitably illegal, and the shabu seized thereat could not be
admissible in evidence. That is why even the trial judge did not make an
effort to hold him liable under such seizure. He lamely argued: "(A)t any rate,
accused Cuizon is not held criminally liable in this case in connection with
the bag containing "shabu" confiscated from his residence. His responsibility
is based on the bags containing "shabu" which he handed to Pua and Lee at
the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag and its contents of "shabu" taken
from his house were not admitted in evidence, the remaining proofs of the
prosecution would still be sufficient to establish the charge against him."
However, contrary to the trial judge's conclusion, we hold that insofar as
Cuizon is concerned, all the evidence seized are considered fruit of the
poisonous tree and are inadmissible as against him, and thus, he should be
acquitted, since, as shown hereinabove, (i) the warrantless search conducted
on Pua and Lee was clearly illegal per se, not being incident to a valid
warrantless arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee were not
illegal, conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and appellants Pua
and Lee on the other had not been established by sufficient proof beyond
reasonable doubt; and (iii) appellant Cuizon had timely raised before this
Court the issue of the illegality of his own arrest and the search and seizure
conducted at his residence, and questioned the admission of the seized shabu
in evidence.
Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ "Tommy Sy"
What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While
the search and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal for
not being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that
appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search, as well
as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby; he did not raise the issue
or assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any possible
challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This
Court has upheld and recognized waivers of constitutional rights, including,
particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases
such as People vs. Malasugui 35 and De Garcia vs. Locsin. 36
Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by
virtue of the handwritten consent (Exhibit "I") secured by the arresting
officers from appellants Pua and Lee, the latter freely gave their consent to
the search of their baggage, and thus, the drugs discovered as a result of the
consented search is admissible in evidence. The said written permission is in
English, and states plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely consent to the search
of their luggage to be conducted by NBI agents to determine if Pua and Lee
are carrying shabu. It appears that appellant Pua understands both English
and Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino mother, had resided in Vito Cruz,
Manila, and gave his occupation as that of salesman. He admitted that he was
asked to sign the written consent, and that he did in fact sign it (TSN, May
28, 1992, pp. 33-34). His barefaced claim made during his direct and cross
examinations to the effect that he did not really read the consent but signed
it right away, and that by signing it he only meant to give permission for the
NBI agents to enter the room (and not to search) is hardly worthy of belief,
considering that prior to the search, he seemed to have been extra careful
about who to let into the hotel room.
Thus, the full weight of the prosecution's testimonial evidence plus the large
amount of prohibited drugs found, must be given full force vis-a-vis Pua's
claim of innocent presence in the hotel room, which is weak and not worthy
of credence.
Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ "Paul Leung"
Appellant Lee's situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the
Solicitor General when he noted that the trial judge did not exert sufficient
effort to make available compulsory process and to see to it that accused-
appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is clear that appellant Lee was
effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was provided with
one, he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his
defense such that, among other things, no memorandum was filed on his
behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to
guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his
behalf, including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to
enable him to present his testimony. 37 In sum, he was denied due process.
For this reason, we hold that the case as against Lee must be remanded to the
court of origin for a re-trial.
Epilogue
It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug
bust operation and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees
against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the
large haul of illegal drugs that the government officers claimed to have
recovered, this Court agonized over the case before us and struggled to apply
the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of
justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we
do not insist on the full protection of their rights.
Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal
search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of
the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind
of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement.
Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice,
and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the
peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.
Truly, the end never justifies the means.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant

Antolin Cuizon y Ortega is hereby ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds.
His immediate release is ordered unless he is detained for other valid causes.
Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of the crime
of Illegal Transport of Regulated Drugs, penalized under Section 15, R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua; the Decision appealed from, as herein modified, is hereby
affirmed as to appellant Pua. Finally, the case as to appellant Lee is hereby
ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said accused may be
given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with
respect to the disposition of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.

SO ORDERED.
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the
dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints,
for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the
Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers
and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an
association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National Capital Region.1 As part of its duty
to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their
alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin
Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela,
for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these
checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up
without a court order or search warrant.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a
vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in
other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take
judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by
the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila
were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the
conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by
the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police
Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or
court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by

the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare
the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed
committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search
and seizure or other rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and

Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was
held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were
violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a

personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4
or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been

stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the
checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all
searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOLANOS
G.R. No. 101808 | 1992-07-03
PARAS, J.:
This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case No. 1831-M-90, for "Murder",
wherein the accused-appellant, Ramon Bolanos was convicted, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder and the Court hereby imposed upon
the accused Ramon Bolanos the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life
imprisonment) and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00. With Costs.
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

"SO ORDERED." (Judgment, p. 6) "(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
The antecedent facts and circumstances, follow: similar practices and their families." (Underscoring supplied)

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Patrolmen Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the
Marcelo J. Fidelino and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring
(INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and Dr. Benito Caballero, fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle
Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan and documentary exhibits. The was the only reason for the conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not
testimonial evidence were after the fat narration of events based on the report proved beyond reasonable doubt, this Court has no recourse but to reverse
regarding the death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian which was communicated the subject judgment under review.
to the Police Station where the two (2) policemen who responded to the
incident are assigned and subsequently became witnesses for the prosecution. WHEREFORE, finding that the Constitutional rights of the accused-
(Appellant's Brief, p. 2) appellant have been violated, the appellant is ACQUITTED, with costs de
oficio.
Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao testified that they
proceeded to the scene of the crime of Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and SO ORDERED.
upon arrival they saw the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an improvised
bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then inquired about the
circumstances of the incident and were informed that the deceased was with
two (2) companions, on the previous night, one of whom was the accused
who had a drinking spree with the deceased and another companion (Claudio
Magtibay) till the wee hours of the following morning, June 23, 1990. (Ibid.,
p. 3)

The corroborating testimony of Patrolmen Francisco Dayao, further

indicated that when they apprehended the accused-appellant, they found the
firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated;
that they boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police
vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the vehicle where the
suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the
deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive." (Ibid., p. 4)

During the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of
the appellant was given without the assistance of counsel as it was made
while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police station. The
specific portion of the decision of the court a quo reads as follows:

". . . the police boarded the two, the accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio
Magtibay in their jeep and proceeded to the police station of Balagtas,
Bulacan to be investigated, on the way the accused told the police, after he
was asked by the police if he killed the victim, that he killed the victim
because the victim was abusive; this statement of the accused was considered
admissible in evidence against him by the Court because it was given freely
and before the investigation.

"The foregoing circumstances clearly lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion

that the accused Ramon Bolanos is guilty of having killed the victim Oscar
Pagdalian." (Judgment, p. 6)

A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by the Solicitor

General's Office, dated April 2, 1992, with the position that the lower court
erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while
on board the police patrol jeep. Said office even postulated that: "(A)ssuming
that it was given, it was done in violation of appellant's Constitutional right
to be informed, to remain silent and to have a counsel of his choice, while
already under police custody." (Manifestation, p. 4)

Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol
jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have
been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional
rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly
provides:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BASAY
G.R. No. 86941 | 1993-03-03
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder with
Arson in a criminal complaint 1 filed on 24 March 1986 with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose in the Province of
Negros Oriental for having allegedly killed the spouses Zosimo and Beatrice
Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and for having burned the
said spouses' house to conceal the crime; as a consequence of such fire, the
spouses' other daughter, Manolita, was burned to death.
On 31 March 1986, the MCTC issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused;
no bail was recommended. 2 It appears, however, that the accused had earlier
been apprehended on 6 March 1986 by elements of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) and were
detained at the Pamplona municipal jail.
On 15 April 1986, the accused filed a Waiver of Preliminary Investigation 3
which prompted the MCTC, the following day, to order the clerk of court to
forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. 4
Meanwhile, on 14 August 1986, the Integrated National Police (INP) Station
Commander of Pamplona amended the complaint by including therein the
name of another victim, Manolo Toting, who suffered second and third
degree burns because of the burning of the house. 5
On 11 December 1986, the Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros
Oriental filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental an
Information for Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson 6 against
the accused. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
xxx xxx xxx
"That on or about March 4, 1986, at sitio Tigbao, Barangay Banawe,
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and acting in common accord, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack, stab and hack with the use of a bolo and sickle,
with which the accused were then respectively armed and provided, one
ZOSIMO TOTING, SR., thereby inflicting upon the victim hack wound,
neck posterior area 5" long, 3" depth, hack wounds, left upper back 3" long,
4" depth, stab wound, thru and thru, lower abdomen, 4" width , exit lower
back 1" width, 90% 2nd and 3rd degree burns of the body, and which wounds
caused the death of said Zosimo Toting, Sr., immediately thereafter; one
BEATRICE TOTING, thereby inflicting upon the victim hacking (sic)
wound, neck posterior area, 5" long, 6" depth, incised wound, epigastric area
11" long, 4" depth, exposing vital organs, lower abdomen, 11" long, 4" depth
exposing intestines, 90% 2nd and 3rd degree burns of the body, and which
wounds caused the death of said Beatrice Toting immediately thereafter; one
BOMBIE TOTING, thereby inflicting upon the victim infected hack wound
from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid-abdomen, inguial area
left to the medial thigh left, through and through, with necrotic transected
muscle, and which wounds caused the death of said Bombie Toting shortly
thereafter; and in order to cover-up the heinous crime committed, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and acting in common
accord, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set to fire the
house of the aforesaid victim (sic) spouses Zosimo Toting, Sr. and Beatrice
Toting, thereby razing it to the ground, and as a consequence thereto
MANOLITA TOTING suffered Third degree burns, all burn (sic) body,
head, extremities or 100% burns, and which wounds caused the death of said
Manolita Toting immediately thereafter and also causing injuries to
MANOLO TOTING, to wit: 20% 2nd and 3rd degree burns on the upper
extremity bilateral, posterior shoulder, left and back, and which wounds
would have caused the death of victim Manolo Toting, thus performing all
the overt acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, the timely medical
assistance extended to said Manolo Toting which prevented his death.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Articles 6, 48 and 50 of the Revised
Penal Code."
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7411 and was raffled off to
Branch 40 of the said court.
After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their arraignment on 23
February 1987, 7 trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented Dr.
Edgardo Barredo, MCTC Judge Teopisto Calumpang, Jaime Saguban, Sgt.
Reynaldo Tabanao, Dr. Edgar Gantalao and Dr. Lucio Togonon as its
witnesses for the evidence in chief, and Judge Calumpang and Elpedio
Catacutan in rebuttal; for its surrebuttal, Pfc. Urbano Cavallida was
presented. On the other hand, the accused testified for the defense together
with witnesses Joven Lopez and Maxima Basay. Accused Ramirez took the
witness stand again in surrebuttal.
On 15 December 1988, the trial court promulgated its Decision, dated 14
December 1988, acquitting accused Teodoro Basay but convicting accused
Jaime Ramirez. 8 Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Multiple Murder,
Frustrated Murder With Arson against the accused Teodoro Basay, this Court
hereby finds said accused Teodoro Basay NOT GUILTY and orders his
immediate release from detention.
The prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Multiple Murder, Frustrated Murder With Arson against
accused Jaime Ramirez (sic), this Court finds him GUILTY to (sic) said
crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos as his civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED." 9
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is based is
summarized in detail in the trial court's decision and is further condensed in
the Appellee's Brief 10 as follows:
"On March 6, 1986, Zosimo Toting Jr. reported to the Nabalabag Philippine
Constabulary Patrol at Pamplona, Negros Oriental, that his parents had been
killed and their house at Tigbaw, [Pamplona] Negros Oriental, burned. This
prompted PC Sgt. Reynaldo Tabanao, Sgt. Nestorio Rubia, Jaime Saguban
and three members of the Civilian Home Defense Force to go to Tigbaw,
[Pamplona] Negros Oriental, to investigate the incident (TSN, January 20,
1988, p. 5).
Upon arriving at Tigbaw, they found a burned house and several dead bodies.
The trial court identified the four (4) fatalities and their injuries as follows:
(1) Zosimo Toting, Sr., with hack wound neck, posterior area, . . . hack
wound, left upper back . . . stab wound, through and through, lower abdomen,
. . . 90% second and third degree burns of the body;
(2) Beatrice Toting, hack wound, neck posterior are . . . incised wound,
epigastric area . . . exposing vital organs, lower abdomen . . . exist (sic) lower
back, 90% second and third degree burns of the body;
(3) Bombie Toting, inflicted hack wound from the anterior lumbar area
transecting mid-abdomen, inguial area left to the medial thigh left, through
and through, with necrotic transected muscle;
(4) Manolita Toting, third degree burns, all burned body, head, extrimities
(sic) or 100% burns;
Manolo Toting did not die but suffered 20% second and third degree burns
on the upper extremity bilateral, posterior shoulder, left and back (Records,
p. 213).
Zosimo Toting, Sr, Beatrice Toting, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting
were found near the vicinity of the burned house. About forty (40) meters
away, the investigating officers found six year old Bombie Toting suffering
from serious hack wounds (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18). The young girl
said that she had been in this condition for one and a half days already.
Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at 7:00 o'clock
in the evening, appellant and Teodoro Basay killed her parents and burned
their house (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18, Records, p. 9).
On the same day the investigating officers went to the appellant's house. They
saw appellant fixing the roof of his house and when appellant saw them, he
went down and tried to ran (sic) away (TSN, January, 20, 1988, p. 22).
Appellant was turned over to the Pamplona Police Station (TSN, January 20,
1988, p. 25).
Bombie Toting was brought to the hospital but due to the gravity of her
injuries she died on March 7, 1986 at 1:40 P.M. (Records, p. 12, Exhibit I).
Appellant was brought into the chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang, the
municipal circuit trial judge of Pamplona, Amlan, and San Jose, on March
14, 1986. He was accompanied by Mr. Elpedio Catacutan who acted as
appellant's counsel (TSN, June 6, 1988, p. 6). They brought with them an
affidavit previously typed by a police investigating officer. The Judge then
made the court interpreter translate the allegations of the sworn statement
into the local dialect for appellant (TSN, June 6, 1988). Thereafter, in the
presence of the Judge, appellant and Mr. Catacutan signed the affidavit.
(TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 14). Appellant and counsel also signed the
vernacular translation of Exhibit F (Records, p . 12)."
Upon the other hand, the evidence for accused Jaime Ramirez is substantially
summarized in the Appellant's Brief 11 in this wise:
"Evidence for the Defense:
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Jaime Ramirez testified that he was cooking food for the pig when
the armed uniformed men arrested him on March 5, 1986 and was brought
(sic) to the Nabalabag PC Detachment where he was maltreated. Later, he
was brought to Municipal (sic) Jail where he stayed for one month and 23
days.
Queried on the 'Joint Waiver', this witness said he did not read it because he
did not know how to read. When it was read to him, he did not understand it
because it was read in English. Elpedio Catacutan was not his lawyer and he
did not know him (TSN, March 5, pp. 3, 5-6, 9-10).
On cross-examination, this witness said he reached Grade II and knows how
to write his name. He was alone at the time he was arrested. He was arrested
ahead of Teodoro Basay and those who arrested him where (sic) not the same
persons who arrested Teodoro Basay.
He first saw Elpedio Catacutan in the Pamplona Municipal Hall when
Elpedio was going upstairs. When he signed Exhibit "F", Catacutan was in
front of him. They did not converse with each others (sic). He did not engage
Catacutan to assist him, nor solicit his services. He does know (sic) any one
who solicited Catacutan's services for him. He did not ask the Judge
(Calumpang) that a lawyer be designated to help him in connection with the
affidavit. The Pamplona Judge did not offer to give him a lawyer to assist
him in the execution of the affidavit (TSN, October 4, 1988, p.4)." 12
Jaime Ramirez is a farmer and at the time he testified on 8 March 1988, was
nineteen (19) years old and single. 13 The prosecution did not rebut his claim
that he had only finished Grade II and that he does not know how to read.
He, however, understands the Cebuano dialect. 14
The Exhibit "F" referred to above is the Sworn Statement, 15 in English, of
accused Jaime Ramirez taken in the Pamplona police station on 7 March
1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on 14 March 1986 before Judge
Teopisto L. Calumpang of the MCTC of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose. The
trial court described this document as the Extra-Judicial Confession 16 of
Ramirez.
The Joint Waiver (Exhibit "G") mentioned the testimony of Jaime Ramirez
is in the Cebuano dialect and was signed by accused Basay and Ramirez on
7 March 1986. Both accused state therein that for their safety and security,
they voluntarily decided to be detained and that they killed the spouses
Zosimo Toting and Betty Toting and thereafter burned the spouses' house;
this fire resulted in the death of one and the hospitalization of two Toting
children. 17
The trial court disregarded this Joint Waiver insofar as it tended to
incriminate the accused "because when they signed said Joint Waiver, they
were not represented by counsel;" thus, the same was prepared in violation
of "Section 12, Article 3 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution." 18
There being no other evidence against Basay, the trial court acquitted him.
However, it admitted in evidence the so-called extra-judicial confession of
Jaime Ramirez, considered as part of the res gestae the alleged statement
given by Bombie Toting to PC Sgt. Reynaldo Tabanao and Jaime Saguban
identifying Ramirez and Basay as the perpetrators of the crime and
considered as flight - which is indicative of guilt - Ramirez's running away
when he saw the law enforcers on 6 March 1986. It further ruled that the
latter signed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and in the presence of
Elpedio Catacutan, the COMELEC registrar of Pamplona - "a barister (sic)
who appeared as counsel for accused Jaime Ramirez;" hence it is admissible
against the latter. 19
On the other hand, the trial court did not admit the statement of Bombie
Toting as a dying declaration but merely as part of the res gestae because the
prosecution failed to prove two (2) of the requisites for the admissibility of a
dying declaration, viz., that the statement was given under consciousness of
an impending death and that Bombie Toting is a competent witness. 20
Accused Jaime Ramirez neither filed a notice of appeal nor orally manifested
his intention to appeal. However, on 31 January 1983, the trial court handed
down an order directing the clerk of court to transmit to this Court the entire
records of the case because in view of the penalty imposed - life
imprisonment - "such Decision is subject for automatic review by the
Supreme Court." 21 This of course is erroneous as, pursuant to Section 10,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, the automatic review of a criminal case is
applicable only where the penalty of death has been imposed which,
nevertheless, is now banned under Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
In the interest of justice, however, We accepted the appeal in the Resolution
of 8 May 1989. 22
In his Appellant's Brief, 23 Jaime Ramirez, hereinafter referred to as the
Appellant, imputes upon the trial court the commission of this lone error:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY
AS CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF EXHIBIT "F" (AFFIDAVIT) WHICH
WAS EXECUTED IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND ON THE
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT."
Appellant contends that his so-called extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "F",
was executed in blatant disregard of his constitutional right to counsel and to
remain silent during custodial investigation. It is therefore inadmissible in
evidence. 24 Without the said confession, the only piece of evidence which
seems to point to his guilt is the alleged statement of Bombie Toting.
Appellant asserts, however, that the said statement was "very doubtful and .
. . no reasonable mind would conclude that she was candidly truthful;" hence,
her statement, besides being hearsay as it came from a person who was not
presented in court to testify, should not have been taken at "face value against
any of the accused, much less against the appellant." 25 Besides, the
appellant asserts that the same statement was not used against his co-accused
Basay who was, unlike him, acquitted by the trial court. As to his having run
away upon seeing the armed law enforcers, appellant claims that he did so
out of fear as the latter were armed. 26
On the other hand, it is maintained by the People, in the Appellee's Brief 27
submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, that the appellant executed
the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and without duress; in signing such
confession, he was accompanied by a certain Mr. Catacutan, a non-lawyer,
inside the chambers of Judge Calumpang - "an environment . . . other than
vindictive and oppressive which the courts desired to guard against in
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436." 28 As to Bombie's statement, it is claimed
that the same should be considered as a dying declaration.
We find merit in the appeal.
1. Jaime Ramirez's sworn statement or extra-judicial confession was
prepared on 7 March 1986 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning in the
Pamplona police station. Pertinent portions thereof read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"PRELIMINARY - MR. JAIME RAMIREZ, you are now under
investigation in connection with the death of the couple and the burning of
their house, ZOSIMO TOTING and BEATRICE TOTING alias BETTY
TOTING on March 4, 1986 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at sitio
Togbao, Barangay Banawe, Pamplona, Negros Oriental. You are also
informed that under our new constitution you have the right to remain silent
and not to answer questions which will incriminate you and to have a counsel
of your own choice to assist you in this investigation, do (sic) you aware of
this?
ANSWER - Yes.
Q - You are also informed that whatever statement you may offer in this
investigation it (sic) might be used as evidence in your favor or against you
in the future, do (sic) you aware of this this (sic)?
A - Yes.
Q - After you have informed (sic) of your rights are you willing to proceed
with this investigation of yours even if you have no counsel of your own
choice that will assist you in this investigation?
A - Yes. I don't need any counsel in this investigation because I will just tell
the truth.
1. Question - If so, please state your name, age and other personal
circumstances?
Answer - Jaime Ramirez y Tano, 19 years old, single, Filipino, farmer and a
resident of sitio Palale, Barangay San Isidro, Pamplona, Negros Oriental.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Q - What more can you say?
A - No more. I proved that my statement is correct I signed this 7 March 1986
(sic), at Pamplona, Negros Oriental.
(Sgd.) JAIME T. RAMIREZ
(TYP) JAIME T. RAMIREZ
Affiant
NOTE: ASSISTED BY:
(Sgd.) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN
(TYP) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN
Counsel of the accused
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14th day of March 1986, at
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines.
(Sgd.) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG
(TYP) TEOPISTO L. GALUMPANG
Mun Trial Circuit Judge
CERTIFICATION
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have personally examined the affiant and that I
am satisfied that he voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit.
(Sgd.) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG
(TYP) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG
Mun Trial Circuit Judge" 29
We do not hesitate to rule that this purported extra-judicial confession
belonging to appellant Jaime Ramirez and obtained during custodial
interrogation was taken in blatant disregard of his right to counsel, to remain
silent and to be informed of such rights, guaranteed by Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution - the governing law at that time. Said section reads:
"SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
The source of this provision is Miranda vs. Arizona, 30 in connection
therewith, this Court stated in People vs. Caguioa 31 that:
" . . . The landmark opinion of Miranda vs. Arizona, decided in 1966, as noted
above, the source of this constitutional provision, emphasized that statements
made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a
clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned
prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance
may be used against him, and that he has the right to the presence of a
counsel, either retained or appointed. In the language of Chief Justice
Warren: 'Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages
which follow, but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards
to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform
accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does not make (sic) may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does
not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned.'" (citations omitted).
Then, in Morales vs. Enrile, 32 in the light of the said Section 20, prescribed
the procedure to be followed by peace officers when making an arrest and
when conducting a custodial investigation. Thus:
"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means -
by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the reason arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."
This was reiterated in People vs. Galit. 33
In People vs. Nicandro, 34 this Court declared that one's right to be informed
of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." Thus, is not enough for the
interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions
of section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 12, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such
provision in practical terms - e.g., what the person under interrogation may
or may not do - and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right
"to be informed" carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication
which results in the subject's understanding of what is conveyed. Since it is
comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence and
other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing
investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that
the subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to
avail of the same and should be told that he could ask for counsel if he so
desired or that one could be provided him at his request. 35 If he decides not
to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and,
therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and
effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel. 36 That counsel
must be a lawyer. 37
The foregoing pronouncements are now synthesized in paragraphs 1 and 3,
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"SEC 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
The adjectives competent and independent, which qualify the kind of counsel
an accused is entitled to during investigation, were not found in the previous
Constitution. Their incorporation in the 1987 Constitution was thus meant to
stress the primacy of this right to counsel.
A close scrutiny of the questioned extra-judicial confession in the case at bar
reveals all possible violations of the appellant's right to remain silent, to
counsel and to be informed of such rights, and of the safeguards prescribed
by this Court for the holding of custodial interrogations:
(a) The interrogation was the conducted and the confession was written in
English a language the appellant, a farmer in a remote barangay of Pamplona,
cannot speak and does not understand; he only finished Grade II. There is no
evidence to show that the interrogator, who was not even presented as a
witness and remains unidentified, translated the questions and the answers
into a dialect known and fairly understood by the appellant.
(b) Appellant was not told that he could retain a counsel of choice and that if
he cannot afford to do so, he could be provided with one.
(c) He did not sign any waiver of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
(d) He was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation. Instead, a
certain Elpedio Catacutan, who claimed to have appeared for him as a
"friend-counsel," 38 was present only at the time that appellant was brought
to the office of Judge Catacutan for the preparation of the jurat. It was
precisely for this reason that the following notations were inserted above the
jurat of the so-called extra-judicial confession:
"NOTE: ASSISTED BY:
(Sgd.) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN
(TYP) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN"
In reality, Catacutan signed not as counsel, but only as a witness. Thus:
"Q. Do you recall having signed as a witness of an affidavit of one Jaime
(sic) T. Ramirez which affidavit is now marked as Exhibit "F"?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell the court where did you sign that Exhibit "F"?
A. I signed this affidavit in the office of the Municipal Judge of Pamplona."
39
Moreover, it is to be observed that the appellant does not even know the said
Elpedio Catacutan. 40
(e). Assuming arguendo that Elpedio Catacutan may have been summoned
to act as appellant's counsel, he was, nevertheless, not present during the
custodial interrogation which, by the way, was conducted exactly a week
before he appeared -or more correctly, was made to appear - before Judge
Calumpang. His presence before the latter did not change the situation. As
this Court stated in People vs. Burgos, 41 the securing of counsel to help the
accused when the latter subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's
Office was too late and had no palliative effect; it did not cure the absence of
counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when the extra-judicial
statement was being taken.
(f). Furthermore, Elpedio Calumpang is not a lawyer; according to the trial
court, he is "a barister (sic)." In fact, he candidly admitted that he is not a
lawyer but that he obtained a law degree from the Siliman University in 1959.
Unfortunately, however, he failed in three Bar Examinations. 42
(g). There is no showing that the so-called extra-judicial confession, which
is in English, was correctly explained and translated to the appellant by Judge
Calumpang. Although the latter claimed in his testimony on direct
examination that he translated the same in the local dialect to the appellant
before the latter affixed his signature thereto, 43 Elpedio Catacutan
categorically declared that it was the interpreter, one Pedro Rodriguez, who
translated it to the appellant. Thus:
"Q. Who is the interpreter who made the translation?
A. Pedro Rodriguez.
Q. Were you there when the translation was made?
A. Sure.
Q. So it was not the Judge who made the translation, is that what you mean?
A. The translation was course (sic) through the interpreter." 44
(h). Finally, the kind of "advice" proffered by the unidentified interrogator
belongs to that stereotyped class - a long question by the investigator
informing the appellant of his right followed by a monosyllabic answer -
which this Court has condemned for being unsatisfactory. 45 The
investigator gave his advice perfunctorily or in a pro-forma manner,
obviously to pay mere lip service to the prescribed norms. As this Court
observed in People vs. Newman, 46 this stereotyped "advice":
" . . . has assumed the nature of a 'legal form' or model. Its tired, punctilious,
fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing
of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing."
Consequently, Exhibit "F", which is indisputably an uncounselled confession
or admission, is inadmissible in evidence. The trial court, therefore,
committed a fatal error in admitting it.
2. We harbor very serious doubts about the alleged statement given by
Bombie Toting to Sgt. Tabanao and Jaime Saguban identifying the appellant
and Teodoro Basay as the perpetrators of the heinous crime. In the first place,
the trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent witness. We agree
with such a conclusion, not necessarily because she was only six (6) years
old, but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave her statement
made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively. She suffered
the following injuries:
"Infected hack wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid
abdomen, inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and through, with
necrotic transected muscle." 47
She was taken from the crime scene only on 6 March 1986, or two (2) days
after the commission of the crime, and died in the hospital on 7 March 1986.
The doctor who first attended to her when she arrived at the Provincial
Hospital, a certain Dr. Sy, was not presented as a witness. On the other hand,
the doctor who attended to her before she died, Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified
that when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not talk. 48 It was this inability
to talk which led the trial court to express its doubts on the veracity of the
latter's supposed statement:
" . . . Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth, however, the
Court must be cautious in appreciating said testimony where the person had
a serious wound and had not eaten for one day and one night. There is no
evidence to show that Bombie Toting told the doctor as to who were the
perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own brother, Zosimo Toting,
Jr. that it was the accused, Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez who killed her
parents and her brother and sisters and burned their house. . . . The Court
cannot understand why P.C. Sgt. Tabano did not ask Bombie Toting
questions concerning the commission of the crime by the accused. Neither
did the P.C. or (sic) the police take any statement from her on her way to the
hospital or at the hospital. Surprisingly, Bombie Toting did not even tell her
own brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused who committed the
crime. Had the statement of Bombie Toting been made to the doctor or to the
barangay captain or to any reputable member of the community where the
incident happened, the Court will have to put weight and consider her
statement as a dying declaration. Our experience has shown that persons in
authority are prone to fabricate or misrepresent the facts to serve their own
purpose. Innocent people had been charged in Court simply by the false
statements of peace officers. The Court therefore has to be cautious when
these peace officers testify in Court." 49

In the second place, as a result of the foregoing observations, the trial court
completely disregarded Bombie Toting's so-called statement as against
Teodoro Basay. We therefore see neither rhyme nor reason for the trial
court's admission of the same as against the appellant.

3. While it may be true that the appellant ran away when he first saw the
armed law officers, he did so merely out of fear of them. This act should not
be considered as the flight which is indicative of guilt. The appellant had not
left his house or barangay since 4 March 1986, the day the crime was
committed. If he were indeed one of the perpetrators and had the intention to
flee in order to avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner and should not
have remained in his house. Besides, if indeed his running away could be
construed as flight, it could only be considered as circumstantial evidence.
Such evidence would still be insufficient for a conviction. Under Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in order that circumstantial evidence may
sustain a conviction, there must, inter alia, be more than one (1)
circumstance. No other circumstance was established in this case.

Hence, the appellant's guilt was not established with moral certainty. He
should be acquitted.

We cannot, however, close this case without making some observations

about the legal conclusions of the trial court anent the crimes committed and
the penalty imposed. The facts indisputably establish that Zosimo Toting, Sr.,
Beatrice Toting and Bombie Toting were stabbed and hacked before their
house was burned. Zosimo and Beatrice died immediately while Bombie
lived for a few days. As a matter of fact, the thesis of the prosecution is that
the house was burned to conceal the stabbing and hacking. As a result of this
fire, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting suffered burns which caused the
death of the former; the latter, however, survived due to timely medical
attention. Four (4) crimes were therefore committed, viz.: three (3) separate
murders under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code 50 for the deaths of
Zosimo, Beatrice and Bombie, and arson as punished under Section 5 of P.D.
No. 1613 51 for the death of Manolita and the injuries sustained by Manolo
as a consequence of the burning of the house. The aforementioned Section 5
reads:

"SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the

occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death
shall be imposed."

Also, the information that was filed is clearly duplicitous and thus vulnerable
to a motion to quash under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. No
such motion having been filed, appellant is deemed to have waived the
defect.

Finally, We have time and again said that life imprisonment is not a penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code and is not the same as reclusion
perpetua. 52 Unfortunately, the trial court still disregarded this
pronouncement. It is hoped that it will not happen again.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision in Criminal Case No. 7411 of

Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental is REVERSED and
appellant JAIME RAMIREZ alias "NEBOY" is hereby ACQUITTED with
costs de oficio. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED.
JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 | 1986-09-22
CRUZ, J:
The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground
that as a result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is
not as simple as that, Several lives have been lost in connection with this
case, including that of the petitioner himself. The private respondent is now
in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned
through a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent
in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy
more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee
of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the
elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's
men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial
for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province
and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it
intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into
supporting the candidate of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election
developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were
attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went
to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election
returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner
thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because
made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation,
the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986,
the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The
nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a
scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they
were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that
strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that
toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under
President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office
in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent ---- both of
whom have gone their separate ways ---- could be a convenient justification
for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here
raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible
terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also
the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law
but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There
are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled
and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also
times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not
only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press
that elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main
a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence,
illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other elections anomalies
misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office
of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate.
Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule
was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the
barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and
referenda that also elicited the decision and provoked the resentments of the
people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the
viciousness of elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism
was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned,
which victimized no less than one of the main protagonists and implicated
his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril
of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of violence at
the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent
attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being
committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the
terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the
matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its
constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A
more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre
and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil
because of its transparent bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice
left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of
the election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to
prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent
herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred
by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering
and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent
Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the municipalities of Caluya,
Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the
petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but
merely wrapped in cement bags or manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the
canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until
further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice
to the outcome of the case before the Commission. 4 On certiorari before this
Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the
Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which
inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the
province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and
Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked
to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private
respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in
the election?
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the
1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
"(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials."
Section 3 provides:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All
election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall
be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision."
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents
have arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous and some
of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might
be, for the noble profession of the law ---- despite all the canards that have
been flung against it ---- exerts all efforts and considers all possible
viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.
The petitioner complains that the proclamation made by the Second Division
is invalid because all contests involving the members of the Batasang
Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en
banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision,
considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their
part, argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all
other cases can be ---- in fact, should be ---- filed with and decided only by
any of the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a
plausible distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his
point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy
between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that
time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the
Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this
stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its
power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, 9 not its
authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties
for the same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder
but also to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as
yet been made when the petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since
neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed
office, there was no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose
election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission on
Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when
deciding election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying
down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en
banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a
candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was
only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising
before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of
the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election
cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters
arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by
division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters
arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en
banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission
as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was
hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang
Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way,
the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was
competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a
mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save
only those involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and city
officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up
to the election protest, In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and
then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its
jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest
was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in
the exercise only of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by
the whole, granting to the division while denying to the banc. We do not think
this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have
intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all
contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases
from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the winners.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are
now called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation
in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296,
otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:
"Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation. The Commission
shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its
decisions, orders or rulings shall he final and executory. It may, motu proprio
or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the
suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any
proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in
Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof."
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and
qualifications of public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the
competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of
judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the
framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in
1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the electoral process
into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to
provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first
administrative and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C,
Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the
strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under
the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into consideration
when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the
quo warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of
disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself
not claiming the office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the
contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule
that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As
employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as
referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office,
made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the
contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term
should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under
both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title.
But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution,
could be heard and decided by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be
heard and decided by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a
general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring
that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and
decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved
if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been
made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the
grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous
candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the
virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory
would make this gambit possible for the pre-proclamation proceedings, being
summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in
division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been
observed by the Commission en banc.

After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able
to rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made
by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might
find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would
have already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre-
proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to
prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the
theory that the greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but
then it could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate
against the purpose of the provision, which precisely limited all questions
affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases in general,
to the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole
judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of
the Commission. A decision made on the contest by less than the
Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard of care and
deliberation ordained by the Constitution.
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre-proclamation
controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the
body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved in
Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 13 where the said provision was
applied, were heard and decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but
accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is
due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the
hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to
inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private
respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he
was biased. 14
Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party
in power at the time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner
Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not
certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As
in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his
objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by
any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded
protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division
when it rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go
to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise
they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions
and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer
to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and
distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or
even only possible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if
only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above
suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized
his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing
to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the
questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null
and void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken
place, not the least significant of which was the February revolution of
"people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty
years of travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail
of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to
be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of
power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been
abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the
Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without
reason, to send the records of this case to the archives and say the case is
finished and the book is closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck
down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against tyranny.
Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others
feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He
was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power
did not awe him. His was a singular and allexacting obsession: the return of
freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war
amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless,
fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his
race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a
perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn,
sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw
nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and
stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the
late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the
grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of
Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the election eve ambush in
Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her
provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution of
that horrible crime, saying "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey
to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to
see justice to my son and grandsons,' May I also add that the people of
Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections
will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the
wake of the February revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let
us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been
banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the
horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the Constitution
of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able
to express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his
counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can
and will be won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again
to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then,
and not until then, can we truly say that the case is finished and the book is
closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for
the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this
petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on
Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMOS
G.R. No. L-59318 | 1983-05-16
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila finding the accused Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in Criminal Case No.
61029 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II, in
relation to Section 2(i), Article I of the Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
by P.D. No. 44 and further amended by P.D. No. 1675, and imposing upon
him the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
There is no dispute about the facts of this case. At about 10:00 o'clock in the
evening of May 3, 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A. Linga were
on routine patrol along Taft Avenue, they had seen and observed one
MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of
Estrada Street. 1 The police officers, after identifying themselves, stopped
and frisked the suspect and found in his possession dried marijuana leaves. 2
The police officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under arrest. Upon
investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered
marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, alias
"Balanchoy". 3
The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, a police team
with suspect Malcon Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant
Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in 2366 Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrested
him. The police operatives immediately brought appellant to the Drugs
Enforcement Section Western Police Department Headquarters for
investigation.
During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a
written sworn statement implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as
the source of the marijuana leaves. 4 The accused, after having been duly
apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E.
Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He
likewise admitted that he sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for
P10.00. 5
On May 22, 1981, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant Ramos entered a
plea of not guilty to the information filed by assistant fiscal Antonio J.
Ballena which states:
"That on or about May 4, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or
distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
sell or offer for sale and deliver dried marijuana leaves, which is a prohibited
drug.
Contrary to law." 6
At the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses to wit: Patrolman Jaime
Cruz, a police investigator, Patrolman Agapito Linga, a police agent, and
Felisa Vequilla, an NBI forensic chemist.
Patrolman Cruz testified that on May 5, 1981, he investigated and took down
the sworn statement of one Malcon Olevere who disclosed that the accused-
appellant Ramos was the source of the marijuana leaves. Patrolman Cruz also
testified that he prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the
appellant Ramos and the corresponding Crime Report. 7 Patrolman Agapito
Linga declared on the witness stand that Lt. Mediavilla arrested appellant
Ramos because Malcon Olevere declared that the appellant sold to him the
confiscated marijuana leaves. 8 The third witness, Felisa Vequilla, a forensic
chemist, affirmed that after conducting a dangerous drug test, the leaves
confiscated from Malcon Olevere are positive for marijuana. 9
The prosecution offered the following as documentary evidence. 10
Exhibit "A" The Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of accused Rogelio Ramos
prepared by witness Patrolman Cruz which was offered as part of his
testimony;
Exhibit "B" Crime Report dated May 6, 1981 also prepared by the witness
Patrolman Cruz;
Exhibit "B-1" second page of Exhibit "B'
Exhibit "C" Sworn Statement of Malcon Olevere y Napa;
Exhibit "C-1" The bracketed portions of Exhibit "C" stating among others
that it was Rogelio Ramos herein accused who furnished Malcon Olevere the
marijuana leaves;
Exhibit "D-1" marijuana leaves examined;
"Exhibit "E" the envelope containing the marijuana leaves which was
confiscated from Malcon Olevere.
After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial
Court) found the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged in view of the verbal admission given by the appellant
himself and the evidence offered and admitted in court. The dispositive
portion of its judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, accused ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 4, Article II in
relation to Section 2(i), Article I Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by PD
44 and further amended by PD 1675 as charged in the present information,
for selling subject prohibited drugs (marijuana leaves) without any lawful
authority and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
(life imprisonment); to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos,
without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs. Let the accused be given full credit of the entire period of his
preventive imprisonment.
Subject marijuana leaves (Exhibit E) are confiscated, to be destroyed by the
Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED." 11
The case is now before Us for automatic review. Accused-appellant submits
before this Honorable Court the following errors: 12
I
That the court erred in finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 4
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended (Selling-Pushing).
II
That the court erred in its findings both in question of law and fact in
convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to
adduce the quantum of evidence necessary to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt by failing to present Malcon Olevere y
Napa, the person who claimed that it was the therein accused who allegedly
sold the marijuana leaves.
III
That the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to
meet the witness against him face to face and to cross-examine him has been
violated.
IV
That the court has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a denial
of due process of law.
The principal issue in this case is whether there is competent and/or
admissible evidence in the record to justify the conviction of the accused-
appellant Ramos.
We find petitioner's case meritorious. The lower court erred in admitting as
evidence the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned
from the records that Malcon Olevere executed the written sworn statement
declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for P10.00.
This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was
not produced in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-
parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. 13 Such kind of evidence is
considered hearsay. 14 The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face
15 in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties without due
process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence. Thus, in People vs.
Toledo, 16 We elucidated:
"Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-
court declaration, even when the witness has in fact been confronted already
by the defendant. The direct relevance of the trial to the ultimate judgment
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any other
proceeding and is thus a factor that can influence materially the conduct and
demeanor of the witness as well as the respective efforts of the counsels of
the parties."
For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving
the adverse party the right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the
fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of
this sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part
of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, 17 but also on the
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them. 18
The Booking Sheet and the Dangerous Drug Report of chemist Felisa
Vequilla which were presented as evidence by the prosecution, established
nothing to support the conviction of the appellant herein. For the same
reason, that Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness and insofar as
they impute to appellant the commission of the crime charged, the adduced
evidence are nothing but hearsay evidence. They cannot be regarded as
competent evidence as to the veracity of the contents therein.
It is not disputed that the marijuana leaves recovered and tested by witness
Vequilla came from Malcon Olevere and not from appellant. It would be
absurd and manifestly unjust to conclude that appellant had been selling
marijuana stuff just because what were recovered from Olevere were real
marijuana. Proof of one does not necessarily prove another. Nowhere can it
be found on the record that appellant was caught in possession or in the act
of selling the prohibited marijuana leaves.
The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing
material and culpable against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, not anyone of the three witnesses presented testified on the
basis of their personal knowledge that the appellant sold the marijuana leaves
to Malcon Olevere. Under Rule 130, Sec. 30 of the Revised Rules of Court,
"a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception. . . "
"At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means -
by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."
In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, 22 which means that
he is not adequately educated to understand fairly and fully the significance
of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is not
enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the
interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him.
The records do not reveal that these requirements have been fully complied
with, nor was there any showing that appellant has been represented by
counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the
Bill of Rights which states that "any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence," We hold that the verbal
admissions of appellant during custodial investigation may not be taken in
evidence against him.
We hold and rule that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt and he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila is REVERSED, and appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information. No costs.

A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from SO ORDERED.
others, either because he was told or having read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth
of what he has learned. Since Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness,
the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the prosecution are regarded as
hearsay, insofar as they impute to the appellant the commission of the offense
charged.

The lower court, in convicting appellant of the crime charged, partly relief
on the verbal admission made by appellant himself before Lt. Mediavillo and
Sgt. Linga during the custodial investigation. Although the records prove that
the appellant has been duly apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and
to counsel, 19 We are not fully convinced that this appriasal was sufficiently
manifested and intelligently understood and accepted by the appellant. This
is fatal to the admissibility of appellant's verbal admission. We have
repeatedly emphasized that care should be taken in accepting extrajudicial
admissions, especially when taken during custodial investigation. In People
vs. Caquioa, 20 We ruled:

"As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right to silence and
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are
required. Prior to questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the prosecution that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does
not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned."

Again, the constitutional rights of the accused to silence and to counsel is

fortified in the very recent case of Morales and Moncupa vs. Enrile 21 where
this Court said:
CHAVEZ vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COURT:
G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
SANCHEZ, J.: The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which
to confer and explain to his client about the giving of his testimony.
The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary
petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas xxx xxx xxx
corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which
resulted in his conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be COURT: [after the recess]
compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he
fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down Are the parties ready? .
the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure
to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal FISCAL:
to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
The indictment in the court below — the third amended information — upon
which the judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for ATTY. CARBON:
qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-
143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me
worth P22,200.00. Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger to confer with my client.
Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias
"Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the
Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul prosecution this morning after I have explained to him the consequences of
Doe.2 what will transpire.

Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of
November, 1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain,
abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun
Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been
identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.1äwphï1.ñët
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City.
The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it
has on this case, is here reproduced:.
COURT:
The parties may proceed.
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on
the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when
the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the
witnessstand.

FISCAL GRECIA: ATTY. CARBON:

Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused]. I submit.

ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]: xxx xxx xxx

I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with
this move of the Fiscal in presenting him as his witness. I object.
COURT:
On what ground, counsel? .
ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that
at this stage, without my being notified by the Fiscal, my client is being
presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is
only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the
prosecution.
ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the
prosecution is something so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this
counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the
information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet
whatever testimony this witness will bring about. I therefore move for
postponement of today's hearing.

COURT (To the Fiscal): COURT:

You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-
by making [him a] state witness?. examination of this witness.

FISCAL GRECIA: ATTY. CRUZ:

I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor. I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this
I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness. criminal case are those only listed in the information.

ATTY. CARBON: I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as
witness for the prosecution.
As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
COURT:

That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused
and will give them time within which to prepare for their cross-examination
of this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
Call the witness to the witness stand.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently
detained at the Manila Police Department headquarters, after being duly
sworn according to law, declared as follows:
ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused
know what the prosecution events to establish by calling this witness to the
witness stand.
ATTY. IBASCO:
I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3
And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger
Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as
found by the court below may be briefly narrated as follows:
A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a
Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor
Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car,
Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively
and left his address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met
Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about the Thunderbird. But
Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead,
he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to
cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they
went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages
and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the
same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on
how to raise the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who
was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away
with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit.
Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the
name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. 1äwphï1.ñët
In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and
arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon. Chavez and
Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was
introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took
the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price
(P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok,
in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer
notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the drafting of the deed
of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as
the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee
the witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of
them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and
other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the
money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same
note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he
requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer.4
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who
had left the table to pose for pictures with some fans and come back, again
left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the
pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and
Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found
that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much
later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged
that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the
Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang
P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the
transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was
transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in
the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part
by Asistio, may be condensed as follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas
station. The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark
Field for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said
that it could be held for him with a down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of
a certain Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as
a loan to Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and Chavez
then went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay
City Mayor, and Narsing Cailles, Chief of the Fire Department. Sumilang
asked the two for a P10,000-loan backed up by the P5,000.00-check aforesaid
on condition that it should not be cashed immediately as there were not
enough funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the money the
nextday as long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would
sign a promissory note for P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that
Chavez picked up the money the next day. Four or five days afterwards,
Chavez returned P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for
the deposit. And so, Sumilang gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked
Sumilang for another P3,000.00. Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and
Cailles, with a note requesting that they accommodate him once more. He
also sent a check, again without funds. Baltazar gave the money after
verifying the authenticity of the note.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that
the car was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So
Sumilang got P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his
aparador. He immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out
the balance upon the car's delivery. It was then that Chavez told Sumilang
that the car was already bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee
was P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents commission at the expense of the
buyer. Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang
accommodated. There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual. In the
course of their conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed
transaction thru Chavez. Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent
and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A certain
Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his
fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez. Sumilang
requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did.
This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to
him the deed of sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car. After
shaking hands with Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at
the wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his
way to a film shooting at Bulacan. He saw Asistio with many companions.
Asistio liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from
him for P22,500.00. As the offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his
friends' reputation for always getting what they wanted, Sumilang consented
to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he
promised to pay the next day after negotiating with some financing company.
Before said balance could be paid, the car was impounded.
The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by
Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money for the car.
Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to
be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy
was discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias
"Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was
also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in
court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does
not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the
prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."5 The trial court
branded him "a self-confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger
Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down with him by coloring his story with
fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the
newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But
Roger Chavez' accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly
uncorroborated. And coming, as it does, from a man who has had at least two
convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this information,
the Court would be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his words
even if they concerned a man no less notorious than himself.7
The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid
for his car, he had no one but Roger Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger
Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of not less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more
than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum, to
indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird
car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo
Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless
the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract
price for the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez,
counsel for Roger Chavez, to show cause within ten days from notice why
Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason
for this is that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967
and the period for the filing thereof lapsed on January 27, 1968 without any
brief having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation.
She also stated that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go
along with the factual findings of the court below but will show however that
its conclusion is erroneous.8
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation,
resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing. For, on
June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution,
disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed
the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant
of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered
remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this
Court.
Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral
arguments, we now come to grips with the main problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's
assertion that he was compelled to testify against himself. For indeed if this
one question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in
which case, these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of
violation of his right — constitutionally entrenched — against self-
incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon
his conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to
consider the constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself,"9 fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of
Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e)
To be exempt from being a witness against himself." .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war
with "the fundamentals of a republican government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the
purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personal freedom."11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts
the historical background of this constitutional inhibition, thus: " "The maxim
Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons,
which has long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion
of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional
barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary
power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of
confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always
ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be
asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation,
the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he
be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal
contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials,
notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan
minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total
abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular
seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a
general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But,
however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in
American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system
impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states,
with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a
part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere
rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law.
ed., 819, 821)." 12 Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that
this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in a revolt against
the thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks
of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United
States"; as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of
interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the
Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands
of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give
testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory;
it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental
to our scheme of justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the
United States (January 29, 1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned
that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and
imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." 16
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be
treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every
defendant a valuable and substantive right. Tañada and Fernando
(Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S.
vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional
proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and
humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest
temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort
a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which
the law abhors. 17
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against
his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to
compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a
confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission
of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless
he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of
his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which
operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational
choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be
sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant." 18
2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a
defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first
witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial
thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination.
This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But
petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that
it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not
object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative
impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was
thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing
situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the
law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness
stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. 20 For, in reality,
the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to
incriminate him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the
certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-
defendant in a joint trial.23
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the
accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the
probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is,
that it was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with
these words:.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on
the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when
the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness
stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep.
I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p. 355, 25 While a defendant's
knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but
draw it from thence, and he is exposed" — to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object
to have the accused called on the witness stand" — wielded authority. By
those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him
of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell
us that as he took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand.
Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to
be a witness for the People is at once apparent. The record discloses that by
leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement
given to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26
And this statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang
(Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car.
And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He
identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case
for the People was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself.
The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution".
Indeed, the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from
the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang
for the defense. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that
"even accused Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird that Johnson
Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez "testimony as witness for the
prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is
"a self-confessed culprit". 1äwphï1.ñët
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced
to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to
remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself
as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.
If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being
accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be
counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a
case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings
before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he
chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it
abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be
taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand
became fruitless, no objections to questions propounded to him were made.
Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's
constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the
objection made at the beginning is a continuing one. 1äwphï1.ñët
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must
be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly
made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully
accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his
privilege on vague and uncertain evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs.
Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights
and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case
heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by
his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim
remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives
protection - even to the guilty. 30
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the
absence or loss of jurisdiction 33 and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
34 That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack,
which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. 35 This writ may issue even
if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
36 Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be granted
upon a judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39
the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given
effect 40 so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety
of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another
constitutional right, in this wise:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime
to the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is
an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority. When
this right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a
necessary element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and
sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial
may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the
court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived
this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced
by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may
obtain release of habeas corpus. 41

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger
Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional
right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that:
"A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested.
From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All
acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... " 42

6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final

and valid judgment of conviction for another offense. We should guard
against the improvident issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from
confinement. The position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to
liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was
prosecuted and convicted.

Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing
the respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons
or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by
reason of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311, entitled "People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to discharge said Roger
Chavez from custody, unless he is held, kept in custody or detained for any
cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event
the discharge herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or
reason ceases to exist.

No costs. So ordered.
BELTRAN vs. SAMSON
G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains
that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal
to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing
the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these
proceedings; but the respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to
the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial
fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again which the instant action
was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative
Code and on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Badilla (48
Phil., 718); United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145); United States vs. Ong
Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by counsel for the respondents, and in the case
of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in
question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the
proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present
at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to
appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks
refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and
incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the
constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to
execute what is enjoined upon him by the order against which these
proceedings were taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in
Spanish) reads: "Ni se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso
criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal Procedure (General
Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.
As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English
text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover,
as we are concerned with a principle contained both in the Federal
constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the United States, but
expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a
common conception.
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of
wording in the constitutional clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252).
It is therefore immaterial that the witness is protected by one constitution
from 'testifying', or by another from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from
'giving evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various
phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the form of the protected
disclosure. What is that conception? (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863, 1923
ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends
to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no
man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is
so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the
suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts
liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse
to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-
established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely
to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence
by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact
which the accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page
434 and notes.) (Emphasis ours.)
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from
the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf,
denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-
examination be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury maybe
able to compare his handwriting with the one in question.
It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013)
inasmuch as the defendant, in offering himself as witness in his own behalf,
waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378), where
the judge asked the defendant to write his name during the hearing, and the
latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We
are not concerned here with the defendant, for it does not appear that any
information was filed against the petitioner for the supposed falsification, and
still less as it a question of the defendant on trial testifying and under cross-
examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and with
a view to filing it. And let it further be noted that in the case of Sprouse vs.
Com., the defendant performed the act voluntarily.
We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of
writing of the defendant was obtained before the criminal action was
instituted against him. We refer to the case of People vs. Molineux (61
Northeastern Reporter, 286).
Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid
case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
We cite this case particularly because the court there gives prominence to the
defendant's right to decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote.
The following appears in the body of said decision referred to (page 307 of
the volume cited):
The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley. He preferred
to accede to the latter's request, and we can discover no ground upon which
the writings thus produced can be excluded from the case. (Emphasis ours.)
For the reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert (41
Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199), that the defendant could not be compelled to write
his name, the doctrine being stated as follows:
The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the endorsement.
He was then cross-examined the question in regard to his having signed
papers not in the case, and was asked in particular whether he would not
produce signatures made prior to the note in suit, and whether he would not
write his name there in the court. The judge excluded all these inquiries, on
objection, and it is of these rulings that complaint is made. The object of the
questions was to bring into the case extrinsic signatures, for the purpose of
comparison by the jury, and we think that the judge was correct in ruling
against it.
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4,
page 878), says:
Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor it is the
removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that
the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring
him to make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to move
his body . . ." but he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens
of handwriting. We note that in the same paragraph 2265, where said authors
treats of "Bodily Exhibition." and under preposition "1. A great variety of
concrete illustrations have been ruled upon," he cites many cases, among
them that of People vs. Molineux (61 N. E., 286) which, as we have seen, has
no application to the case at bar because there the defendant voluntary gave
specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do so and
has even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be
compelled to do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving
the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act,
because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case
is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And
as to such production of documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so
serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in
his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
. . . 2264. Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. — 1. It
follows that the production of documents or chattels by a person (whether
ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, or to a motion
to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (
i.e. as a person appearing before a tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral
responsibility for truthtelling), may be refused under the protection of the
privilege; and this is universally conceded. (And he cites the case of People
vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119; 38 N.E., 1003)
testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the
purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor vs. Summers, it was
sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the
question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought
to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence
not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously
incriminate him.
Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of
United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), wherein the defendant was
not compelled to perform any testimonial act, but to take out of his mouth
the morphine he had there. It was not compelling him to testify or to be a
witness or to furnish, much less make, prepare, or create through a
testimonial act, evidence for his own condemnation.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the
respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.

And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the
production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled
to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not
exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. And for this reason the
same eminent author, Professor Wigmore, explaining the matter of the
production of documents and chattels, in the passage cited, adds:

For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the
documents or chattels be already in existence and not desired to be first
written and created by testimonial act or utterance of the person in response
to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats
him as a witness; because in virtue it would be at any time liable to make
oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the articles produced. (Ibid.,
pp. 864-865.) (Emphasis ours.)

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a

specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal
treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing
it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the
means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal
right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of
the respondents, it should be remembered that in the case of People vs.
Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and other
witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not
refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional
privilege, as they could certainly do.

The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when

claimed, maybe waived by any one entitled to invoke it. (28 R. C. L.,
paragraph 29, page 442, and cases noted.)

The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil.,
145), were the defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the
substance later used as evidence against him.

In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that
the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on
blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case there consisted in
that it was the case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could
be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the
petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality
she was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial
act; she was only enjoined from something preventing the examination; all
of which is very different from what is required of the petitioner of the
present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AUSTRIA
G.R. No. 55109 | 1991-04-08
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision * dated March 18, 1980 of the then Circuit
Criminal Court, 12th Judicial District, Bacolod City, finding accused-
appellants Eduardo Austria, Pablo Austria and Jaime dela Torre guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
death, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Tomas Azuelo
in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs Rollo, pp. 12-13)
It appears from the records that in the morning of August 10, 1975, the police
dug out of the ground in a sugarcane field in sitio Palanas, Sagay, Negros
Occidental, the lifeless body of Tomas Azuelo. Found near his grave were
the traces of blood and a bloodstained piece of wood. Post mortem
examination showed that Tomas Azuelo's skull was fractured and his body
sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds, fifteen (15) of which were fatal. The
payroll, together with the sum of P771.40 intended for the wages of laborers
of Hacienda Austria, of which Azuelo was the overseer, was missing.
Four suspects for the death of Tomas Azuelo were picked up by the police
working together with the Philippine Constabulary. One of the suspects,
Pablo Austria, was the last person who was seen with Tomas Azuelo. They
boarded a tricycle together, on August 9, 1975 at about 3:30 p.m., from the
poblacion of Sagay and alighted at about 4:00 p.m. at crossing Tupas.
The other suspects were implicated based on the sworn statement dated
September 17, 1975 of Pablo Austria, who imputed to his son Eduardo, his
brother-in-law Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla, the commission of
the crime. In his sworn statement, Pablo Austria stated that while he and
Tomas Azuelo were on their way home on August 9, 1975, Eduardo Austria,
Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla suddenly appeared and pulled
Tomas Azuelo toward the sugarcane field. Thereafter, Jaime de la Torre
struck the victims on the head with a piece of wood while Leopoldo Abanilla
stabbed Tomas Azuelo in different parts of his body. Jaime de la Torre got
the money inside Tomas Azuelo's pocket and together, they buried the victim
(Original Records, pp. 7-9).
On September 17, 1975, Gregorio Eras, Deputy Chief of Police, Sagay,
Negros Occidental, filed a complaint for robbery with homicide against
Eduardo Austria, Pablo Austria, Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla.
After preliminary examination, Judge Emilio Ignalaga, Acting Municipal
Judge, Sagay, Negros Occidental, issued a warrant of arrest against herein
appellants. No bail was recommended (Original Records, p. 9).
On December 11, 1975, an information was filed against accused/appellants,
which reads:
"The undersigned provincial Fiscal accuses Eduardo Austria y Montano,
Jaime de la Torre y Pahiluna, Pablo Austria y Camelloso, and Leopoldo
Abanilla y Bantalagon of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed
as follows:
"That on or about the 9th day of August 1975, in the municipality of Sagay,
province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a piece of wood
and sharp instrument, by means of force, violence and intimidation of person
and with intent of gain, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away the money in the total sum of Seven Hundred Seventy-one Pesos and
40/100 (P771.40), Philippine Currency, belonging to Tomas Azuelo y
Binigay, without the consent of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Tomas Azuelo y Binigay the aforestated amount.
"That on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling
them to take, steal and carry away the money to be robbed, the said accused,
in furtherance of their conspiracy, with intent to kill, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault strike and stab the said
Tomas Azuelo y Binigay, thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the different
part of the body of the latter which caused the death of the said victim.
"Contrary to law."
(Original Records, pp. 51-52).
All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution then presented the testimonies of the following witnesses:
Rodolfo Labajas, cashier of the RLC Management Corp., testified that in the
morning of August 9, 1975, Tomas Azuelo, as overseer of Hda. Austria,
received from him the sum of P771.40 representing the wages of laborers of
said hacienda. Tomas Azuelo left his office at 12:00 o'clock noon and that
was the last time he saw Tomas Azuelo alive (TSN, January 27, 1978, pp.
315-333).
Nestor Colegado, tricycle driver, testified that at about 3:30 in the afternoon
of August 9, 1975, the deceased and accused Pablo Austria boarded his
tricycle together with three women passengers at the poblacion of Sagay.
Both Pablo Austria and Tomas Azuelo, who were neighbors, alighted at
crossing Tupas. (TSN, January 30, 1978, pp. 334-352).
Andres Caro, a farmer/resident of Hda. Palanas, Sagay, Negros Occidental,
testified that at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 9, 1975, he saw
accused Eduardo Austria standing at the side of the latter's farm along the
road going to Hda. Austria. (TSN, February 23, 1978, pp. 368-372).
Diego de Ocampo, Rural Health Physician of Sagay, Negros Occidental,
declared that in the morning of August 10, 1975, he, together with policeman
Voltaire Yee, recovered the body of Tomas Azuelo which was buried in the
sugarcane field. His post mortem examination showed that Tomas Azuelo
had a fractured skull and his body sustained several stab wounds, fifteen (15)
of which were fatal. Shock secondary to severe hemmorhage due to multiple
stab wound was the cause of Tomas Azuelo's death (TSN, February 23, 1978,
pp. 356-368).
Voltaire Yee, a police investigator, testified that in the morning of August
10, 1975, Eugenio Azuelo reported to the desk officer the disappearance of
his father Tomas Azuelo. After receiving the report, they proceeded to the
scene of the crime together with other policemen. There, they saw the payroll
and the protruding toe of a human being buried in the sugarcane field which
the people in the area discovered. A wooden bat with bloodstains was found
six (6) meters from the protruding toe. Coins, slippers, fish, and bloodstains
were also discovered in the area. The lifeless body of Tomas Azuelo,
identified by his daughter Nenita, was exhumed in the presence of Dr.
Ocampo. Joint investigation by the police and the Philippine Constabulary
ensued, after which Pablo Austria and his son Eduardo were picked up by the
police for investigation. Jaime de la Torre was also picked up and
investigated on account of a bloodstained hoe found in his home. On
September 17, 1975, Pablo Austria executed a sworn statement implicating
his son Eduardo in the commission of the offense (TSN, August 17, 1978 to
September 20, 1978, pp. 373-391; 1-47).
Vicente Aquino a PC soldier, testified that on September 16, 1975, he
investigated Jaime dela Torre as one of the suspects in the killing of Tomas
Azuelo. He declared that de la Torre was informed of his constitutional rights
to remain silent and to counsel but he voluntarily waived said rights (TSN,
January 13, 1976, pp. 253-283).
Myrna Areola, a forensic chemist of the Third Regional PC Crime
Laboratory testified that upon the request of Capt. Natino she conducted a
laboratory examination of the short pants of Jaime de la Torre, a hoe, a piece
of wood, soil scraped from the surface of the hoe and sample of the soil where
the victim was buried. Her findings showed that the blood stain on the handle
of the hoe and that the piece of wood submitted for examination were positive
for human blood belonging to the same blood group. The pants, however,
were negative for human blood. Analysis of the soil also revealed that the
soil scraped from the surface of the hoe and the soil from the place where the
victim was buried were of the same origin (TSN, November 17, 1977, pp.
283-295).
Emilio Ignalaga, Municipal Judge of Escalante, Toboso and Sagay, Negros
Occidental, testified that on September 17, 1975 the accused Jaime de la
Torre and Pablo Austria subscribed before him their written extra-judicial
statements. Before they affixed their thumbmarks, he read and explained to
them the contents of their extrajudicial statements and warned them that the
same can be used against them. They affixed their thumbmarks on said
document voluntarily (TSN, November 17, 1977, pp. 296-307).
Accused/appellants testified as follows:
Pablo Austria testified that Tomas Azuelo was his second degree cousin. On
August 9, 1975, he was summoned by the wife of Tomas Azuelo to fetch
water. He was in Azuelo's house from 11:00 o'clock in the morning, took his
lunch there at upon invitation of Azuelo's wife and waited for Tomas Azuelo
up to 7:00 o'clock in the evening for his compensation in plowing their farm.
On August 14, 1975, he was picked up without a warrant of arrest by a
policeman and a PC soldier while working on the concrete cover of the
deceased's tomb.
He was investigated without informing him of his right to remain silent and
to counsel. After six (6) days in detention he was released upon the
intercession of Iluminada, wife of the deceased. On September 17, 1975 he
was again picked up by Voltaire Yee at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
Jaime de la Torre, who was with him in the PC stockade, struck him in the
head with a revolver on orders of a certain Torenas, a PC soldier. Later, he
was brought out of the PC stockade and Torenas kicked and boxed him. The
following day, Alberto Olario, the commanding officer, again maltreated him
as he refused to admit participation in the killing of Tomas Azuelo. On orders
of the commanding officer, Voltaire Yee prepared an affidavit. He did not
read the affidavit, as he does not know how to read, nor was it read to him.
Voltaire Yee forced him to affix his thumbmark in the affidavit inside the
office of Judge Ignalaga. (TSN, December 4, 1978, pp. 171-200).
In his testimony, Jaime de la Torre disowned the statements attributed to him
during the investigation conducted by Sgt. Vicente Aquino and instead
declared that it was not Eduardo Austria but Carlos Capitle, Jr. who borrowed
his hoe in the afternoon of August 9, 1975. He also contradicted the
statements contained in the affidavit that he saw Pablo Austria, Eduardo
Austria and another person standing near the body of the deceased. Instead,
he testified that in the sugarcane field that day (August 14, 1975), he saw
Carlos Capitle, Jr. and Celestino Capitle with another person looking at the
dead body of Azuelo. He helped cover the dead with grass on orders of Carlos
Capitle with warning not to tell his family or anybody, otherwise his family
will be killed. He admitted ownership of the hoe, but denied any participation
in the killing. He also claimed that he was arrested without warrant and
detained for more than a month in the PC headquarters, at Sagay, Negros
Occidental.
During said detention he was investigated and allegedly maltreated by
Captain Olario (TSN, January 22, 1980, pp. 149-170, 210-221, 393-404).
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, as follows:
Capt. Olario denied that he manhandled Pablo Austria and Jaime de la Torre
and claimed then he merely interviewed the suspects; it was Sgt. Aquino who
conducted the formal investigation after Jaime de la Torre narrated the
commission of the crime and implicated Pablo Austria and Eduardo Austria.
Both Jaime de la Torre and Pablo Austria admitted to him the commission of
the crime.
On cross-examination, however, Capt. Olario admitted that the suspects were
not apprised of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel as
he was merely conducting an informal interview (TSN, August 23, 1979, pp.
86-148).
Celedonio Capitle, a watchman denied the imputation of accused Jaime de la
Torre that he participated in the killing of Tomas Azuelo. He was not even
investigated by the police for the death of the latter and learned of his
implication only through Roger Azuelo, son of the deceased (TSN, August
24, 1979, pp. 426-446).
Carlos Capitle, Jr., also denied that he borrowed a hoe from Jaime de la Torre
on August 19, 1975; he, his brother, Celedonio, and another person were not
standing and looking at the dead body of Tomas Azuelo on the day he was
killed; nor did they warn and threaten de la Torre not to tell anybody about
the incident; he has no participation in the killing of Tomas Azuelo (TSN,
October 15, 1979, pp. 405-425).
Iluminada Azuelo, wife of the deceased, declared that: before the death of
Tomas, only Pablo Austria was working in the hacienda as her late husband
dismissed Jaime de la Torre and Eduardo Austria; Pablo Austria worked in
her house in the morning but did not return in the afternoon of August 9,
1975; she interceded for the release of Pablo Austria upon the request of the
latter's wife, Leonora, since there was no strong evidence against him; the
second time Pablo Austria was picked up, she turned down the request of
Leonora for her to intercede in behalf of Leonora's husband (October 15,
1975, TSN, pp. 405-417).
In its sur-rebuttal, the defense presented Paquito Tolentin. Tolentin testified
that from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon up to 5:45 or 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of August 9, 1975, he, together with Pablo Austria, Diosdado Alova,
Ricardo Alova and Eugenio Azuelo were playing a card game known in the
locality as "41" in the house of Tomas Azuelo. During the time they were
playing, Pablo Austria never left the place and was in fact there when he left
the house of Tomas Azuelo (November 13, 1979, TSN, pp. 222-232).
On March 18, 1980, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellants
of the imputed crime, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds all accused
Eduardo Austria y Montaño, Jaime de la Torre y Pahiluna and Pablo Austria
y Camelloso, GUILTY beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of robbery
with homicide, as charged, . . . and pursuant to paragraph 1, Articles 294, in
relation to paragraphs 13 and 15, Article 14, of the Revised Penal Code, the
Court sentences all accused. Eduardo Austria y Montaño, Jaime de la Torre
y Pahiluna and Pablo Austria y Camelloso, each to suffer the maximum
penalty provided by law which is DEATH, to jointly and severally indemnify
the heirs of the late Tomas Azuelo the amount of P12,000.00. as indemnity
for his death, and to pay the costs."
During the pendency of the appeal, Pablo Austria and Jaime de la Torre died
of undetermined cause and hypertension, respectively, at the New Bilibid
Prisons Hospital. Hence, the resolution of the instant appeal should be based
on the evidence against the surviving appellant, Eduardo Austria.
After a review of the records, the Court finds that the evidence presented by
the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant Eduardo Austria
beyond reasonable doubt.
In the first place, as stated in the appealed decision, the evidence of the
prosecution against appellant Eduardo Austria is merely circumstantial.
Aside from the extra-judicial confessions of the deceased appellants, there is
neither direct evidence nor actual witness to the commission of the crime.
This is not to say, however, that conviction cannot be had simply because the
evidence is circumstantial. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 133, there must be (a) more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The series of circumstances proved must be consistent with each other and
that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with his innocence. To warrant conviction in
criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence, it must constitute an
unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the circumstantial
evidence do not prove an unbroken link of events that could give rise to a
reasonable and fair conclusion that appellant committed the imputed offense.
As regards appellant Eduardo Austria, the only evidence against him is that
he was seen at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 9, 1975 along
the road going to Hda. Austria. This evidence even if tied up with the
testimony of Iluminada Azuelo that Austria harbored ill-feelings against the
deceased because he was dismissed from the hacienda by the deceased does
not establish or support an inference, much less a conclusion, that he
participated in the commission of the offense charged. The conviction of
appellant Eduardo Austria on an inference based on another inference cannot
be maintained.
It is axiomatic that conviction should be made on the basis of a strong, clear
and compelling evidence (People v. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107 [1986]. Thus,
"if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
tests of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction" (People
v. Ale, 145 SCRA 64 [1986]; People v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 36 [1968].
To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is needed. Thus, in People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60 [1971], this Court held:
"Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need
far the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such
an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment."

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED and the

accused/appellant Eduardo Austria is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971
FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of
petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in
this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate
prohibiting excessive bail.1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus
apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order by reducing
the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile,
petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case moot
and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of lower
court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that
should be observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full
respect be accorded to such a constitutional right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal
Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968
and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in
the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21,
1968. Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan
filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder2
and another for multiple murder3 against petitioner, his co-accused
Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid
occurrence. Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by
petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no
evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise
mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on
February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of
the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its
evidence.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the
opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then
came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente
Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to
respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting
that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There
was likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent
Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the
circumstances concerning the issuance of the above order and the other
incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove any charge that he
wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the
challengedorder would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice
given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack
of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance
for both the petitioner and respondents with the former, upon written motion,
being given thirty days within which to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral
argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period from receipt
thereofto file his reply. Such a memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner
on April 6, 1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a
supplemental answer wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the
provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then remained at large. There
was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit,
towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with
this Court the next day with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore,
vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's
prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in
this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue
in the present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal
is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who maybe awaiting the
clear-cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to
the fixing of bail."4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for
certiorari is not warranted, still, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the
fact that this case is moot and academic should not preclude thisTribunal
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligationof
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of
theConstitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital
offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.5 Such a right flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof
liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe
realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially
so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarceand thus
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such
an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short
of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance
of the accused" for the subsequent trial.6 Nor is there, anything unreasonable
in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of
guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the
proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat,
temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of
such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight
of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against
excessive bail.7 As construed in the latest American decision, "the sole
permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial,
and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount
reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth
Amendment."8
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August
10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted
by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the other
offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly
violative of constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being
only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly
exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the
other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case
that the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for
the twooffenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its
face, appears to be indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseñor v.
Abano.9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the
opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character
and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice
when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases." 10 Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive
consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed,
is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress,
however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail
would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right
to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the
required remedy." 11
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the
challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a
right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant
sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would
apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a
sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a
purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position
of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of
escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a stateof
desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would
bebeyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed
categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have
beenno disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words
of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing
illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will."12 It is no wonder that
the resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's
subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the
relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for
repudiation from this Court.

Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser
amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even
if one were charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result
is that there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such a meaning
was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to doso
would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe
order complained of absolutely bereft of support in law, but it flies in the face
of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with thecommand
of reason.

With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling
can be had on his plea to nullify the above order.

WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
OPLE vs. TORRES
G.R. No. 127685 | 1998-07-23
PUNO, J:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F.
Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr.
Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.'' 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we
invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated
by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996
and reads as follows:
"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic
services and social security providing agencies and other government
instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct
the following:
SEC. 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key
basic services and social security providers is hereby established.
SEC. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines
and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by
the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby
designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative
and technical support to the IACC.
SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number
(PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall
coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer
application designs of their respective systems.
SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the
Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS
and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a
massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise
public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social
Security Identification Reference.
SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system
shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall
submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on
the status of implementation of this undertaking.
SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation
of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A
LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS,
THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT
OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS
THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE
BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION." 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS
WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM
THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN
PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues
relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the
case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet
to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of
the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.
No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact
that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot
cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has
publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals
from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308
and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the
rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle
an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a
mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the
lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the
demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of
power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny
by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and
to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in their
original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is
broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes
the laws. 14 The executive power is vested in the President. 15 It is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power
of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive.
He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. 18 He has control
over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has
the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary
to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables
the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates
to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be
in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing
the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument
that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative
Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance" 25 and "embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people." 26 The Code is divided into seven
(7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book
II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book
III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V
on the Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government
Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain
provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization
and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive
branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions
and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget,
as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal
administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and
recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside
government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies - the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power
of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and
creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus
clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising
his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that
A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of
administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of
Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining
the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher:
". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still
it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to
be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United
States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it
ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right
of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by
emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . .
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in
any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'"
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that
there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief
Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
"xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons;
rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications
though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state.
In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector -
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual - has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the
forces of a technological age - industrialization, urbanization, and
organization - operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society.'"
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is
expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the
Bill of Rights, viz: 34
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes
as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and
trespass to dwelling. 40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the
Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden
of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need
to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth
of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy
in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical
methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." 45
The term "biometrics" has now evolved into a broad category of technologies
which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the
use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46
A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic
such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A
behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and
includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric
identification systems use a card or personal identification number (PIN) for
initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the
individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the
card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where
technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an
individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in
computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual
using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every
time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan.
Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary
pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print
similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is known as the
"artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of
substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of
biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by
taking pictures of a face using infrared cameras, a unique heat distribution
pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all
contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some
science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited
to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses
various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an
individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state
what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage.
Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O.
No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not
groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that
it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information
alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." 54 This is an
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the
generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O.
No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government
the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than
the identification of the individual through his PRN .
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot
be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an
individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded - whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may
include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of
assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the
files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government
purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great
for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to
the name, address and other basic personal information about the individual.
57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from
constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does
not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances
and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and
guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer
linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there
are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code
of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an
intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for
whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed
for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in
this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of
abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse
of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on
his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten
the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-
to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is
one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. 64 The computer
is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can
continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date.
Retrieval of stored data is simple. When information of a privileged character
finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data
on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of
any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting
opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and
hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The
Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty
if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but
would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use
of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The
factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or
diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer technology
in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the
physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and
software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a
minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of
technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal
defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or
order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC virtually unfettered
discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act No. 591 penalizes the disclosure
by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with
imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure
of SSS employment records and reports. 74 These laws, however, apply to
records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may
be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the
National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is
another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment
of the right of privacy by using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed
that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding
duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development
planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the
right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a
public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities,
his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right
to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration
by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019
is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is
sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and
penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O.
No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass
constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold that
when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It
will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove
that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not
defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must
satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law,
rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is
demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to
protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the
least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the
rights protected by the Constitution.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line.
In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question
of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record
of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs
pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled
Substances Act of 1972 required physicians to identify patients obtaining
prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized
medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses
of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State
Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed
that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear
that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public
disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts.
80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, i.e, the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an aspect of the right to
privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No.
violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and
rational legislative decision made upon recommendation by a specially SO ORDERED.
appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter.
Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous
safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the
procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the
information. It enumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also
prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its
violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right
to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed
above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.

Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court
is not per se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process,
retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work
wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private
industry seek. Many information systems in different countries make use of
the computer to facilitate important social objectives, such as better law
enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management
of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and
streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the
computer could help good administration by making accurate and
comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key
decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of
cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual,
armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and
classes of information from libraries and databases connected to the net.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and
the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85
and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right
must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that
invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.
The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:

"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system
of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector - protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual - has become increasingly important
as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age -
industrialization, urbanization, and organization - operate to narrow the area
of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 87

IV

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources - governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting
citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr.,
"the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an
unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that
because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity
to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not
be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close
with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our
Constitution for flattery.
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-14639 | 1919-03-25
View Summary
EN BANC
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the
one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While
hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant
democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept
in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and
if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary
question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of
a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but
which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the
government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and
October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the
district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities
quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for
the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the
Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October
25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended
upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed
them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They
had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary
guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau
of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with
their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women
were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial
governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The
governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no
previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled
from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the
serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but
are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally,
that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine
relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others
assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means
to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the
Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of
a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,
through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who
were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned
them all, the application will be considered as including them. The
application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged
that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before
the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation,
and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were
not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court
of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control,
and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the
city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal,
the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the
haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted,
in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been
sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an
order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco
Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero
of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be
deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at
their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was
taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the
day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose
behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has
been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila
through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service
to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the
original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to
the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that
had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau
then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were
contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila.
Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the
order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his
control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because
they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo
answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control
and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court,
after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order,
which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order
to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and
therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before
the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13,
1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made
before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce
the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal
motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later
be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the
women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor
of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in
the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically
presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through
their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again
recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons
involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the
respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in
bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women
were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to
Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements;
that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite
all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for
petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first
formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau
of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of
court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los
recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be
struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the
writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and
seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their
consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions
unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily
and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the
presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically
admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By
authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act
in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality
within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity
with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of
undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the
Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city
of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of
any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of
any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy,
to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the
commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common
prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion
leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in
vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the
Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens
of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense
lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to
change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary,
Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed
so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under
the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply
imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not
even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often
been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such
arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the
executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If
the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the
most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure,
then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities
of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to
themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any
official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much
right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under
no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can
hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No
freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9
Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how
high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law,"
said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every
man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs.
Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of
the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in
issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the
Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The
remedies of the citizen are three:
(1) Civil action;
(2) criminal action, and
(3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party
may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to
pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to
meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these
Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to
a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except
it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not
less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation
of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person
to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and
a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper
prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of
law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as
vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action.
Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof
can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the
words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would
be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully
confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the
confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until
the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of
criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.)
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are
left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised
three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued
(l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court
should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not
restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the
jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only
extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women
from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The
petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion
was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign
a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be
submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal
liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is
unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be
made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had
standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the
Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before
that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary
expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented
to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and
fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or
any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the
writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior
court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by
which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown
that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with
their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties
situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might
still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the
writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and
decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court
to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted
to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet.
When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it
was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in
Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend
beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first
principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint
of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings,
they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely
and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean.
The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could
calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and
that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We
believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to
do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted
with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila
to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process,
may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her
to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while
the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse.
The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts
for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the
authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an
early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the
Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into
the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and
continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief
justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question
presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred
Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice
Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English
decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken
a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of
Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue
the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six
centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers
of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke
could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was
such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus
acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the
protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole
instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy,
as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. .
..
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the
case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right,
but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon
this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but
his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer
or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner
free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if
he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion
are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and
if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are
usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if
the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court
he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress
is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state,
except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the
power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the
matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by
other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People
[1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a
child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas
corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the
mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The
judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child,
but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the
writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his
custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He
was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher,
M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22.
That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a
judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt
of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a
command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless
some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child.
If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the
possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no
longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence
of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he
is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse.
Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt
to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at
some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as
to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there
has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing
the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23
Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12
Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case
[1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas
corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the
District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention.
Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the
negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of
habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his
custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes
because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court
held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to
produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall
until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course
of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the
production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and
been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last
day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed.
Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church
on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense
offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the
writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the
two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if
it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be
taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann,
Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ
before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4,
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month,
to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city
of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for
the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao
women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to
do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally
resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on
the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses
were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according
to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that
on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons
in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be
present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to
show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which
have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least
sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found
in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at
their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court,
and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the
non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited
herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what
exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's
case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court,
said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own
illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to
use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write
letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could
do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an
absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not
show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was
because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a
clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to
give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to
mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were
dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges
in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our
mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.
Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire
to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any
particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object
of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial
compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police
force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of
Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal
of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should
the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one
is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not
offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the
respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned
or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to
a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed
in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson
[1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for
human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the
possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting
in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and
Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of
public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a
powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have
been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done
no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city
government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-
motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the
petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted.
When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was
primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to
facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban,
the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in
pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties
aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of
pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of
the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that
since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of
the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the
court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears
to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first
mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of
justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as
extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect
without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus
is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo,
and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is
found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica
al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs
shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to

express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of
an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other
aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into
exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic
under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of
power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led
by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel
7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists"
and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from
Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the
capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism
and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987
Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly
reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did
not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28,
1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February
Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and
civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance,
but the message they conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the
military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and
brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the
mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided
elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the
communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which
gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the
communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they
effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in
armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest
power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to
through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos
and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign
debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies
left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in
alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to
the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise
and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator
forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political,
economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of
three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the
resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President
Marcos and family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos
and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national
security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to
national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such
finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the
President's decision, including the grounds upon which it was based, been
made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos
and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national
security, public safety, or public health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former
President Marcos and his family is a clear and present danger to national
security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such
fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision
to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family, acted and would
be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of
former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum
for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the
limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory,
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this
case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the
Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and
liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo
without reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the
Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the
President that such return and residence will endanger national security and
public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a
political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law
provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed
by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with
the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and
safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable
Court can not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the
Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable
question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to
the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and
residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still
a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand
E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their
residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court
can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of
the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11;
Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family
from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public
safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala,
Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were
among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented
by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S.
Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp.
314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of
presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different
light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues,
we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the
confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt
1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L
Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to
the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These
are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a
country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art.
13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to
"be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights
may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which
one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country
in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right
to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of
passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not
determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine,
and even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether
or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of
legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its
resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to
explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will
involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the
President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the
express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three
great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in
Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has
blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."
[At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI,
Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art.
VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by
actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer
plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations
provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power
means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means
a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which
is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two
hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of
courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one
official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it
does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the
power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and
the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the
President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers
the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view
that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the
1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers,
and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est
exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This
argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which
ours is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States
grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who
think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a
nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers
ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it
should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the
different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's,
and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship,
he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends
in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it
remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying demands
and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of
government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in
charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and character, his values,
standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions,
phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The
executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from
the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its
impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to
President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal
obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the
confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and
posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional
order. [At 212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she
does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of
presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a
complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's
powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong
President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the
parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through
numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the
point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution,
however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the
power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head
of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark
decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines
and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to
elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National
Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-
General to do so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the
"board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the performance
of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the
moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are
vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are
not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The
fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes
logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining
one among which the powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203;
Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring
words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be
a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only
what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it
by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At
210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime
duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But
such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making
any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for
the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the
powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek
to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door
the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed
to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional
guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise
of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched
in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements
of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President
but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power
borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also
may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that
the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where
the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is
unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as
protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the
President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on
the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration
of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as
Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's
from returning has been recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is
manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national
reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not
question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow
a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise
of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with
the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction
the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or
for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for
example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no
matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set
aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is
totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under
the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is
reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts
of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If
grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that
the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental
law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971,
42 SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the
separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more,
it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the
Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if
and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In
the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check
— not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates
do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she
has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented,
there exist factual bases for the President's decision..

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the
country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist
insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab
power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police
officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history
of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country,
as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be

contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could
handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of
the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that
would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be
said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will
cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for
the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted
her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State,
acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive
action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition
of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the
faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning
to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy
attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country,
while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its
efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in
foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing
burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during
the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the
root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting
precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within
the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of
the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years
and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and
common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President

did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
EBRALINAG vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS OF CEBU
G.R. No. 95770 December 29, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
The State moves for a reconsideration of our decision dated March 1, 1993
granting private respondents' petition for certiorari and prohibition and
annulling the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents therein on
the ground that the said decision created an exemption in favor of the
members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in violation of the
"Establishment Clause" of the Constitution. The Solicitor General, on behalf
of the public respondent, furthermore contends that:
The accommodation by this Honorable Court to a demand for special
treatment in favor of a minority sect even on the basis of a claim of religious
freedom may be criticized as granting preference to the religious beliefs of
said sect in violation of the "non-establishment guarantee" provision of the
Constitution. Surely, the decision of the Court constitutes a special favor
which immunizes religious believers such as Jehovah's Witnesses to the law
and the DECS rules and regulations by interposing the claim that the conduct
required by law and the rules and regulation (sic) are violative of their
religious beliefs. The decision therefore is susceptible to the very criticism
that the grant of exemption is a violation of the "non-establishment"
provision of the Constitution.
Furthermore, to grant an exemption to a specific religious minority poses a
risk of collision course with the "equal protection of the laws" clause in
respect of the non-exempt, and, in public schools, a collision course with the
"non-establishment guarantee."
Additionally the public respondent insists that this Court adopt a "neutral
stance" by reverting to its holding in Gerona declaring the flag as being
devoid of any religious significance. He stresses that the issue here is not
curtailment of religious belief but regulation of the exercise of religious
belief. Finally, he maintains that the State's interests in the case at bench are
constitutional and legal obligations to implement the law and the
constitutional mandate to inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism
and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs, referring to
the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. vs. O'Brien.1
II
All the petitioners in the original case2 were minor school children, and
members of the sect, Jehovah's Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who
were expelled from their classes by various public school authorities in Cebu
for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by
Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Department of
Education. Aimed primarily at private educational institutions which did not
observe the flag ceremony exercises, Republic Act No. 1265 penalizes all
educational institutions for failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony
with public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or
permit on second offense.
The implementing regulations issued by the Department of Education
thereafter detailed the manner of observance of the same. Immediately
pursuant to these orders, school officials in Masbate expelled children
belonging to the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses from school for failing or
refusing to comply with the flag ceremony requirement. Sustaining these
expulsion orders, this Court in the 1959 case of Gerona vs. Secretary of
Education3 held that:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.
Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. . . .
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or
sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations
and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious
groups or sects or followers.
Upholding religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest
priority and amplest protection among human rights," this Court, in
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu4 re-examined our
over two decades-old decision in Gerona and reversed expulsion orders made
by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of
religion clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987
Constitution.5
From our decision of March 1, 1993, the public respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration on grounds hereinabove stated. After a careful study of
the grounds adduced in the government's Motion For Reconsideration of our
original decision, however, we find no cogent reason to disturb our earlier
ruling.
The religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect,
the Jehovah's Witnesses are widely known and are equally widely
disseminated in numerous books, magazines, brochures and leaflets
distributed by their members in their house to house distribution efforts and
in many public places. Their refusal to render obeisance to any form or
symbol which smacks of idolatry is based on their sincere belief in the
biblical injunction found in Exodus 20:4,5, against worshipping forms or
idols other than God himself. The basic assumption in their universal refusal
to salute the flags of the countries in which they are found is that such a salute
constitutes an act of religious devotion forbidden by God's law. This
assumption, while "bizarre" to others is firmly anchored in several biblical
passages.6
And yet, while members of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the basis of religious
convictions, refuse to perform an act (or acts) which they consider proscribed
by the Bible, they contend that such refusal should not be taken to indicate
disrespect for the symbols of the country or evidence that they are wanting
in patriotism and nationalism. They point out that as citizens, they have an
excellent record as law abiding members of society even if they do not
demonstrate their refusal to conform to the assailed orders by overt acts of
conformity. On the contrary, they aver that they show their respect through
less demonstrative methods manifesting their allegiance, by their simple
obedience to the country's laws,7 by not engaging in antigovernment
activities of any kind,8 and by paying their taxes and dues to society as self-
sufficient members of the community.9 While they refuse to salute the flag,
they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully at attention, hands on their
side, in order not to disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who believe
differently.10
The religious beliefs, practices and convictions of the members of the sect as
a minority are bound to be seen by others as odd and different and at
divergence with the complex requirements of contemporary societies,
particularly those societies which require certain practices as manifestations
of loyalty and patriotic behavior. Against those who believe that coerced
loyalty and unity are mere shadows of patriotism, the tendency to exact "a
hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards,"11 is seductive
to the bureaucratic mindset as a shortcut to patriotism.
No doubt, the State possesses what the Solicitor General describes as the
responsibility "to inculcate in the minds of the youth the values of patriotism
and nationalism and to encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs." The teaching of these values ranks at the very apex of education's
"high responsibility" of shaping up the minds of the youth in those principles
which would mold them into responsible and productive members of our
society. However, the government's interest in molding the young into
patriotic and civic spirited citizens is "not totally free from a balancing
process"12 when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to
education and the unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious
upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates of their
conscience and their sincere religious beliefs.13 Recognizing these values,
Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino, the writer of the original opinion,
underscored that a generation of Filipinos which cuts its teeth on the Bill of
Rights would find abhorrent the idea that one may be compelled, on pain of
expulsion, to salute the flag sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge during a flag ceremony.14 "This coercion of conscience has no place
in a free society".15
The State's contentions are therefore, unacceptable, for no less fundamental
than the right to take part is the right to stand apart.16 In the context of the
instant case, the freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution should be
seen as the rule, not the exception. To view the constitutional guarantee in
the manner suggested by the petitioners would be to denigrate the status of a
preferred freedom and to relegate it to the level of an abstract principle devoid
of any substance and meaning in the lives of those for whom the protection
is addressed. As to the contention that the exemption accorded by our
decision benefits a privileged few, it is enough to re-emphasize that "the
constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did
not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity."17
The essence of the free exercise clause is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.18 Moreover, the suggestion implicit in the State's pleadings to the
effect that the flag ceremony requirement would be equally and evenly
applied to all citizens regardless of sect or religion and does not thereby
discriminate against any particular sect or denomination escapes the fact that
"[a] regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion."19
III
The ostensible interest shown by petitioners in preserving the flag as the
symbol of the nation appears to be integrally related to petitioner's
disagreement with the message conveyed by the refusal of members of the
Jehovah's Witness sect to salute the flag or participate actively in flag
ceremonies on religious grounds.20 Where the governmental interest clearly
appears to be unrelated to the suppression of an idea, a religious doctrine or
practice or an expression or form of expression, this Court will not find it
difficult to sustain a regulation. However, regulations involving this area are
generally held against the most exacting standards, and the zone of protection
accorded by the Constitution cannot be violated, except upon a showing of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a right to
protect.21 Stated differently, in the case of a regulation which appears to
abridge a right to which the fundamental law accords high significance it is
the regulation, not the act (or refusal to act), which is the exception and which
requires the court's strictest scrutiny. In the case at bench, the government
has not shown that refusal to do the acts of conformity exacted by the assailed
orders, which respondents point out attained legislative cachet in the
Administrative Code of 1987, would pose a clear and present danger of a
danger so serious and imminent, that it would prompt legitimate State
intervention.
In a case involving the Flag Protection Act of 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the "State's asserted interest in preserving the fag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity was an interest related to the suppression of
free expression . . . because the State's concern with protecting the flag's
symbolic meaning is implicated only when a person's treatment of the flag
communicates some message. 22 While the very concept of ordered liberty
precludes this Court from allowing every individual to subjectively define
his own standards on matters of conformity in which society, as a whole has
important interests, the records of the case and the long history of flag salute
cases abundantly supports the religious quality of the claims adduced by the
members of the sect Jehovah's Witnesses. Their treatment of flag as a
religious symbol is well-founded and well-documented and is based on
grounds religious principle. The message conveyed by their refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony is religious, shared by the entire community
of Jehovah's Witnesses and is intimately related to their theocratic beliefs and
convictions. The subsequent expulsion of members of the sect on the basis
of the regulations assailed in the original petitions was therefore clearly
directed against religious practice. It is obvious that the assailed orders and
memoranda would gravely endanger the free exercise of the religious beliefs
of the members of the sect and their minor children.
Furthermore, the view that the flag is not a religious but a neutral, secular
symbol expresses a majoritarian view intended to stifle the expression of
the belief that an act of saluting the flag might sometimes be — to some
individuals — so offensive as to be worth their giving up another
constitutional right — the right to education. Individuals or groups of
individuals get from a symbol the meaning they put to it.23 Compelling
members of a religious sect to believe otherwise on the pain of denying minor
children the right to an education is a futile and unconscionable detour
towards instilling virtues of loyalty and patriotism which are best instilled
and communicated by painstaking and non-coercive methods. Coerced
loyalties, after all, only serve to inspire the opposite. The methods utilized to
impose them breed resentment and dissent. Those who attempt to coerce
uniformity of sentiment soon find out that the only path towards achieving
unity is by way of suppressing dissent.24 In the end, such attempts only find
the "unanimity of the graveyard."25
To the extent to which members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect assiduously
pursue their belief in the flag's religious symbolic meaning, the State cannot,
without thereby transgressing constitutionally protected boundaries, impose
the contrary view on the pretext of sustaining a policy designed to foster the
supposedly far-reaching goal of instilling patriotism among the youth. While
conceding to the idea — adverted to by the Solicitor General — that certain
methods of religious expression may be prohibited26 to serve legitimate
societal purposes, refusal to participate in the flag ceremony hardly
constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as to
prompt legitimate State intervention. It is worth repeating that the absence of
a demonstrable danger of a kind which the State is empowered to protect
militates against the extreme disciplinary methods undertaken by school
authorities in trying to enforce regulations designed to compel attendance in
flag ceremonies. Refusal of the children to participate in the flag salute
ceremony would not interfere with or deny the rights of other school children
to do so. It bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly
constitutes a danger so grave and imminent as to warrant the state's
intervention.
Finally, the respondents' insistence on the validity of the actions taken by the
government on the basis of their averment that "a government regulation of
expressive conduct is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government (and) furthers an important and substantial
government interest"27 misses the whole point of the test devised by the
United States Supreme Court in O'Brien, cited by respondent, because the
Court therein was emphatic in stating that "the government interest (should
be) unrelated to the suppression of free expression." We have already stated
that the interest in regulation in the case at bench was clearly related to the
suppression of an expression directly connected with the freedom of religion
and that respondents have not shown to our satisfaction that the restriction
was prompted by a compelling interest in public order which the state has a
right to protect. Moreover, if we were to refer (as respondents did by referring
to the test in O'Brien) to the standards devised by the US Supreme Court in
determining the validity or extent of restrictive regulations impinging on the
freedoms of the mind, then the O'Brien standard is hardly appropriate
because the standard devised in O'Brien only applies if the State's regulation
is not related to communicative conduct. If a relationship exists, a more
demanding standard is applied.28
The responsibility of inculcating the values of patriotism, nationalism, good
citizenship, and moral uprightness is a responsibility shared by the State with
parents and other societal institutions such as religious sects and
denominations. The manner in which such values are demonstrated in a
plural society occurs in ways so variable that government cannot make
claims to the exclusivity of its methods of inculcating patriotism so all-
encompassing in scope as to leave no room for appropriate parental or
religious influences. Provided that those influences do not pose a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to society and its institutions, expressions
of diverse beliefs, no matter how upsetting they may seem to the majority,
are the price we pay for the freedoms we enjoy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the
City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the
Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the
ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989
which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec
Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad,
who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City
of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. —
During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for
or against the plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression
and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports
the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and
necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue
or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes
subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a
penal provision, as follows:
Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities.
— Except to the extent that the same may not be applicable plebiscite. the
banned acts/activities and offenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus
Election Code ('Sections 261, 262, 263 and Article' XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and
the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be aplicable to the plebiscite
governed by this Resolution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their
views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in
fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and
hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
On November 28, 1989, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent Commission on Elections from enforcing and implementing
Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167. We also required the respondent to
comment on the petition.
On January 9, 1990, respondent Commission on Elections, through the
Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment.
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation
of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election
or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely
bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or
against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or
against the act through the Comelec space and airtime. This is provided under
Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881:
Section 90. Comelec Space. — Commission shall procure space in at least
one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided,
however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in
any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be
known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their
candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge equally and
impartially within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.
Section 92. Comelec Time. — The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of
all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide
radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Respondent Comelec has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation
of the questioned Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167.
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
Similarly, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law
of 1987) likewise provides:
Prohibited forms of election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of
election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, it shall be unlawful: ...
(b) for any newspaper, radio, broadcasting or television station, or other mass
media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except
to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, or
personality who is a candidate for any elective office shall take a leave of
absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis ours)
However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was
granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be
prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor
or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or
radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective
office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid
that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more
exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to
take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd
par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods
are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the
constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda
was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the
police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the
electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The
evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case
does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on
some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in
favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is
asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.

Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec

Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from
expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act
because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does
not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction
on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was
advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form
of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues,
including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where
the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio
time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or
television times.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec

Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The
restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. vs. CAPULONG
G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production
company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), 1
envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and for Philippine
and international release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at
EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project
with local movie producer Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with
the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos
and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events
proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as wel
as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also
signified his approval of the intended film production.
In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed private
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a
synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out below:
The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People Power—a
unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution in
the Philippines in 1986.
Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble events, screenwriter David
Williamson and history Prof Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style
and created [four] fictitious characters to trace the revolution from the death
of Senator Aquino, to the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the
country.
These character stories have been woven through the real events to help our
huge international audience understand this ordinary period inFilipino
history.
First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television journalist working for
major network. Tony reflects the average American attitude to the
Phihppinence —once a colony, now the home of crucially important military
bases. Although Tony is aware of the corruption and of Marcos'
megalomania, for him, there appears to be no alternative to Marcos except
the Communists.
Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist. A 'new girl in town,' she
is quickly caught up in the events as it becomes dear that the time has come
for a change. Through Angle and her relationship with one of the Reform
Army Movement Colonels (a fictitious character), we follow the developing
discontent in the armed forces. Their dislike for General Ver, their strong
loyalty to Defense Minister Enrile, and ultimately their defection from
Marcos.
The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a middle-aged editor of a
Manila newspaper who despises the Marcos regime and is a supporter an
promoter of Cory Aquino. Ben has two daughters, Cehea left wing lawyer
who is a secret member of the New People's Army, and Eva--a -P.R. girl,
politically moderate and very much in love with Tony. Ultimately, she must
choose between her love and the revolution.
Through the interviews and experiences of these central characters, we show
the complex nature of Filipino society, and thintertwining series of events
and characters that triggered these remarkable changes. Through them also,
we meet all of the principal characters and experience directly dramatic
recreation of the revolution. The story incorporates actual documentary
footage filmed during the period which we hope will capture the unique
atmosphere and forces that combined to overthrow President Marcos.
David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright with some 14 hugely
successful plays to his credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,' Travelling North) and
11 feature films (The Year of Living Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap').
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian
with a deep understanding of the Philippines, who has worked on the research
for this project for some 18 months. Together with Davi Wilhamgon they
have developed a script we believe accurately depicts the complex issues and
events that occurred during th period .
The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy co-production with Home Box
Office in American, the Australian Broadcast Corporation in Australia and
Zenith Productions in the United Kingdom
The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of the
events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed
in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,
creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and
utilizing actual documentary footage as background.
On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not
and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition
of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing,
showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference
whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him]
or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to
them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private
respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application
for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof,
seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day
Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-
series without private respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes
an obvious violation of his right of privacy. On 24 February 1988, the trial
court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the
application for preliminary injunction.
On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition
to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series fim
would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family
and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their
right of free expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own
Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not
yet been completed.
In an Order 2 dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering
defendants, and all persons and entities employed or under contract with
them, including actors, actresses and members of the production staff and
crew as well as all persons and entities acting on defendants' behalf, to cease
and desist from producing and filming the mini-series entitled 'The Four Day
Revolution" and from making any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his
family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears rent substantial or marked resemblance or
similarity to, or is otherwise Identifiable with, plaintiff in the production and
any similar film or photoplay, until further orders from this Court, upon
plaintiff's filing of a bond in the amount of P 2,000,000.00, to answer for
whatever damages defendants may suffer by reason of the injunction if the
Court should finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a
Petition for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition was docketed as
G.R. No. L-82380.
A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitiioner Hal McElroy also filed separate
Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March 1988, docketed as G.R. No. L-82398.
By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were consolidated and
private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer. Further, in the
same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially
enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March
1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and allowing the
petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected
mini-series which do not make any reference to private respondent or his
family or to any fictitious character based on or respondent.
Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April 1988
invoking in the main a right of privacy.
I Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and
The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are sharply
drawn. Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution,"
they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under
our Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts a right of
privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-
series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is
entitled to enjoy.
Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression
the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to
film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion
pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of
expression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures
constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information,
education and entertainment. In Gonzales v. Katigbak, 3 former Chief Justice
Fernando, speaking for the Court, explained:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of
Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effect on the perception
by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the
pre cultural traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson
(343 US 495 [19421) is the Importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well
as to inform' (Ibid, 501). There is no clear dividing line between what
involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were
sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. ...4
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to
foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the circumstance that
the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to
yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of
speech and of expression. In our community as in many other countries,
media facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector but
the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained
by being devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. Indeed,
commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our
country and hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media from
the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of speech and of expression can
only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our
country.
The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was
demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cortes that our law,
constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. 5 It is left to case
law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in
differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to
be let alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought
to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic
character. 7 Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist
publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. 8 The interest
sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs
and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate
public concern. 9
Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 10 on which private respondent relies
heavily, recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a claim to
freedom of speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a suit fortion
picture producer as licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises
Padilla as licensors. This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a
motion Picture Portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate
of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental during the November 1951 elections and for whose murder,
Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and
his men were tried and convicted. 11 In the judgment of the lower court
enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had produced the
motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated royalties, the
Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that the Licensing Agreement is
null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration, while
it is true that petitioner bad pled the rights to the book entitled "The Moises
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the member of his family. As
held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],147 NY 434,42 NE 31 LRA 286.49 Am
St Rep 671), 'a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deperson
to protect his memory, but the privilege wts for the benefit of the living, to
protect their feelings and to preventa violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased.'
Petitioners averment that private respondent did not have any property right
over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither
well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in
toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a he or she may be (Garner
v. Triangle Publications, DCNY 97 F. Supp., SU 549 [1951]). In the case at
bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life Story
Of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the
film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. 12
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to deal with
contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of expression and to privacy.
Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, in the name of freedom of speech
and expression, a right to produce a motion picture biography at least partly
"fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the consent of and without paying
pre-agreed royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. In rejecting the
licensee's claim, the Court said:
Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing
Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of
the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to
express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior
restraint.The right freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA
191 [1963]). It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
xxx xxx xxx
The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed. p. 79). The principle
"requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interests observable in given situation or type of situation" (Separation
Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, supra, p. 899).
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner.
taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the
particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed
in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom
of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern." 13
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test"
be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a
different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by
petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does
not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon
private respondent's "right of privacy."
1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is
a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the
exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge
has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed
motion picture. It is important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior
restrain of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact completed
and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. Because of the speech
and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates. 14 The
invalidity of a measure of prior restraint doesnot, of course, mean that no
subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to
exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have
stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order
one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a
Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion
picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no
"clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private
respondent could lawfully assert.
2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody
change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in
February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that denouement.
Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it
is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a
highly critical stage in the history of this countryand as such, must be
regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate
subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media.
The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the
private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which
concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his
immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less
fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution"
is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile'
but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan
Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of
government in February 1986.
3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce
Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four
Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that
intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may
be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep
that film a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim that
petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the
private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family.
4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private
respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public
figure:"
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments,
fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to
be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of
reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a
professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. The list
is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors
and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and
no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in
short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused
upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight
to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the
decisions" that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could
not complaint when they received it; that their personalities and their affairs
has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private
business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform
the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest.
On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there
was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to matters
legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused.
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public interest,
was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to know what is
going on in the world, and the freedom of the press and other agencies of
information to tell it. "News" includes all events and items of information
which are out of the ordinary hum-drum routine, and which have 'that
indefinable quality of information which arouses public attention.' To a very
great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to what its readers
will want, has succeeded in making its own definination of news, as a glance
at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and
othe crimes, arrests and police raides, suicides, marriages and divorces,
accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare disease, the
birth of a child to a twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to
have been murdered years ago, and undoubtedly many other similar matters
of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.
The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited, to the
dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It extended also to
information or education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books,
articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of
human activity in general, as well as the reproduction of the public scene in
newsreels and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line, the courts
were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public may be
permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the
benefit of the doubt. 15
Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his
participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of
government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major
in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make
reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly
unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower
than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the
seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure."
After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the
EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and
television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines.
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between
the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of
privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of
truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of
the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or
embarrassing personal facts. 17 The proposed motion picture should not
enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as
"matters of essentially private concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day
Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent
in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private
respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable.
Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private
respondent.
II
In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy informed
this Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988, was
issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 88-413, entitled "Gregorio B. Honasan vs.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd., McElroy Film Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope
Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures Production" enjoining him and his
production company from further filimg any scene of the projected mini-
series film. Petitioner alleged that Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and
paste" pleading, cut out straight grom the complaint of private respondent
Ponce Enrile in Civil Case No. 88-151. Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a
separate Manifestation dated 4 April 1988, brought to the attention of the
Court the same information given by petitoner Hal McElroy, reiterating that
the complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was substantially identical to that filed
by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing to join Honasan in
Civil Case No. 88-151, counsel for private respondent, with whom counsel
for Gregorio Honasan are apparently associated, deliberately engaged in
"forum shopping."
Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988 stating
that the "slight similarity" between private respondent's complaint and that
on Honasan in the construction of their legal basis of the right to privacy as
a component of the cause of action is understandable considering that court
pleadings are public records; that private respondent's cause of action for
invasion of privacy is separate and distinct from that of Honasan's although
they arose from the same tortious act of petitioners' that the rule on
permissive joinder of parties is not mandatory and that, the cited cases on
"forum shopping" were not in point because the parties here and those in
Civil Case No. 88-413 are not identical.

For reasons that by now have become clear, it is not necessary for the Court
to deal with the question of whether or not the lawyers of private respondent
Ponce Enrile have engaged in "forum shopping." It is, however, important to
dispose to the complaint filed by former Colonel Honasan who, having
refused to subject himself to the legal processes of the Republic and having
become once again in fugitive from justice, must be deemed to have forfeited
any right the might have had to protect his privacy through court processes.

WHEREFORE,

a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order
dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited Temporary Restraining Order
granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining
unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March
1988 and made PERMANENT, and

b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4

April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise of its plenary and
supervisory jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil
Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his
Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary
Injunction that may have been issued by him.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE, JR.
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject
information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte
the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am
requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition
members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan
of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand
that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise,
may we be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the
Freedom Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the
citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec.
6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your
favorable response on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Compañero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred
to me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list
of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a
clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between
the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the
GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it
would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a
reputable financial institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot
respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure
to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant
suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137
former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa,
including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the
GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor
General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given
due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties
having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable
by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief
from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since
administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause
of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue,
viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of
their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls
under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can
be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means
of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of
law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a
question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466
(1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129
SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation
of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be
passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its
Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the
exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural
issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus
hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done,
in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be
done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are
entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy
directly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tañada v.
Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case
of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987,150
SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed
of matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned
to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which
states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973
Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the
citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral
and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas
and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government
envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system
of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the
inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims
and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate
of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art.
XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would
certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to
gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information the
disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only
critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to
information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the
government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element
of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest
of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's
will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to
speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is
merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of
the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information
goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure *
and honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role
of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to
"matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited
to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information
sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public
interest" and "public concern". As observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional
right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the
various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citezens. In
Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
are eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that
certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were
able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February
7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees
and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the
latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly,
Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of
the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its
funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence
and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations.
Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A.
No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial
solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second Whereas Clause,
P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is
not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the
insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated
funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that
the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an
its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be
enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought
must not be among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the
GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts
the indiscriminate dissemination of information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position
is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does
not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are
within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is
equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents
evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit
of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In
the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424],
this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept
of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. UItimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute. state, In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important
as modem society has developed. All the forces of technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the
privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and
to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need
not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of
the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS.
Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As
held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982
(1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the
party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke
the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature
[Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA.
219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286
(1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is
claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most
especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more
limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions
being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v.
Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions
of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the
Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which
guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation
performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's
right of access to official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely
incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered
by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to
information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy characterizing
government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation
of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484
and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the
government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some
business, discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a
proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from
the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of
1986, to include government-owned and controlled corporations and
transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of
fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" —
referring to the transactions of the State — and when we say the "State"
which I suppose would include all of the various agencies, departments,
ministries and instrumentalities of the government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore,
it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-
25.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not
binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further
that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing
proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the
Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of
the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that
damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with
the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right
of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil.
383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to
be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by
petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able
to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto,
are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required
act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768,
November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344,
August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet
this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list
requested.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General

Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to
allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted
to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify,
subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not
incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

SO ORDERED.
REYES vs. BAGATSING
G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, in this case of first impression, at least as to some aspects, is
called upon to delineate the boundaries of the protected area of the cognate
rights to free speech and peaceable assembly, 1 against an alleged intrusion
by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing. Petitioner, retired Justice JB L.
Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City
of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00
to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates
of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an
open space of public property, a short program would be held. 2 During the
course of the oral argument, 3 it was stated that after the delivery of two brief
speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the
International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented
to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there
so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference.
There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps
would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally." 4
The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was due to the fact
that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on
his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On October 25, 1983,
the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor
General Eduardo G. Montenegro. 5 It turned out that on October 19, such
permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was
sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police
intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing
such permit at this time and at the place applied for." 6 To be more specific,
reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." 7
Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the
recommendation of the police authorities, that "a permit may be issued for
the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area
where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may
be ensured." 8
The oral argument was heard on October 25, 1983, the very same day the
answer was filed. The Court then deliberated on the matter. That same
afternoon, a minute resolution was issued by the Court granting the
mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could
justify the denial of a permit. On this point, the Court was unanimous, but
there was a dissent by Justice Aquino on the ground that the holding of a rally
in front of the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the
City of Manila. The last sentence of such minute resolution reads: "This
resolution is without prejudice to a more extended opinion." 9 Hence this
detailed exposition of the Court's stand on the matter.
1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the
cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial
of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances." 10 Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the liberty
to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. 11 There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, 12
prosecution for sedition, 13 or action for damages, 14 or contempt
proceedings 15 unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." 16 Freedom of assembly connotes
the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters
Of public concern.17 It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is hot to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as 's
the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 18 Even prior to the 1935
Constitution, Justice Maicolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary
consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free
speech. 19 To paraphrase opinion of Justice Rutledge speaking for the
majority of the American Supreme Court Thomas v. Collins, 20 it was not
by accident or coincidence that the right to freedom of speech and of the press
were toupled in a single guarantee with the and to petition the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not Identical, are inseparable. the every
case, therefo re there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise
of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is
the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
21
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of
Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of
Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free
speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means
for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions
due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty
of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of
an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the
Constitution." 22 What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason,
the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It
must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety
valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their-views, even if
contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of
communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be
the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent.
It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels
aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in
the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That
is to ensure a true ferment of Ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits.
What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in
the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly.
resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The
utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine
case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: 23 "It is rather
to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of
the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because
on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement,
and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers." 24 It bears repeating that for the constitutional right
to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must
be avoided, To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to call for
condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
3. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed
in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO:
25 Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied. 26 The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. 27 Primicias made explicit what was
implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas," 28 a 1915 decision, where this
Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the
commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of
plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a
promenade for public use," 29 which certainly is not the only purpose that it
could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not
be granted for the or oposed march and rally starting from a public dark that
is the Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the
gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.
Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding
that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a
public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared:
"Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs.
State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New
Hampshire P. L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that 'no parade or procession
upon any ground abutting thereon, shall 'De permitted unless a special license
therefor shall first be explained from the selectmen of the town or from
licensing committee,' was construed by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion
to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the
United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes
affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that 'a statute
requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to
procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of
speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with
a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity
to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to
issue or refuse license, ... " 30 Nor should the point made by Chief Justice
Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored, "Civil liberties, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the
excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the
use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil
liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon
which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is
the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a
restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the
attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would
be entitled to protection." 31
5. There is a novel aspect to this case, If the rally were confined to Luneta,
no question, as noted, would have arisen. So, too, if the march would end at
another park. As previously mentioned though, there would be a short
program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the United
States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the handing
over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of
the Anti-Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by
the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification
was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter
deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15.
As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph
of the Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity. " 32 The Constitution "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. ..." 33
To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the
land. 34 That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any
intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or
impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the
permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover,
respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius
of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other
purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its
invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the
primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that question the confronts
this Court.
6. There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a
litigation, the judgment must be confined within the limits of previous
decisions. The law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide,
So it has been here. Hence, as noted, on the afternoon of the hearing, October
25, 1983, this Court issued the minute resolution granting the mandatory
injunction allowing the proposed march and rally scheduled for the next day.
That conclusion was inevitable ill the absence of a clear and present danger
of a substantive, evil to a legitimate public interest. There was no justification
then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of tree speech and
peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by our Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 35 The participants to such
assembly, composed primarily of those in attendance at the International
Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta. proceeding through
Roxas Boulevard to the gates of the United States Embassy located at the
same street. To repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially so
as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent
on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it
were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise
to an equal protection question. The principle under American doctrines was
given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to
the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to
The relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." 36 There
could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked
by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then,
only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing
official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of
what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the
relevant circumstances, still the assumption — especially so where the
assembly is scheduled for a specific public — place is that the permit must
be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is
not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
37
7. In fairness to respondent Mayor, he acted on the belief that Navarro v.
Villegas 38 and Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP.) v. Bagatsing,
39 called for application. While the General rule is that a permit should
recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place
of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if
it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no
such change were made. In the Navarro and the Pagkakaisa decisions, this
Court was persuaded that the clear and present danger test was satisfied. The
present situation is quite different. Hence the decision reached by the Court.
The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice. Not that it should be overlooked. There was
in this case, however, the assurance of General Narciso Cabrera,
Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, that the
police force is in a position to cope with such emergency should it arise That
is to comply with its duty to extend protection to the participants of such
peaceable assembly. Also from him came the commendable admission that
there were the least five previous demonstrations at the Bayview hotel Area
and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United States Embassy where no untoward
event occurred. It was made clear by petitioner, through counsel, that no act
offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in the Philippines would
take place and that, as mentioned at the outset of this opinion, "all the
necessary steps would be taken by it 'to ensure a peaceful march and rally.' "
40 Assistant Solicitor General Montenegro expressed the view that the
presence of policemen may in itself be a provocation. It is a sufficient answer
that they should stay at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to cope
with any contingency. There is no need to repeat what was pointed out by
Chief Justice Hughes in Cox that precisely, it is the duty of the city authorities
to provide the proper police protection to those exercising their right to
peaceable assembly and freedom of expression.
8. By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and
the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent
of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must
be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so
minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments
— rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and
deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase
can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice
Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the
presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side
of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. Clearly then, to
the extent that there may be inconsistencies between this resolution and that
of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was made clear
in the original resolution of October 25, 1983.

9. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No.

7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign
mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds
support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance
between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it
could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that
respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial
of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case
of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right
of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that
the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated,
Should it come, then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar
and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate
accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing
less.

10. Ordinarily, the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the denial
or the modification of the permit sought and order the respondent official, to
grant it. Nonetheless, as there was urgency in this case, the proposed march
and rally being scheduled for the next day after the hearing, this Court. in the
exercise of its conceded authority, granted the mandatory injunction in the
resolution of October 25, 1983. It may be noted that the peaceful character
of the peace march and rally on October 26 was not marred by any untoward
incident. So it has been in other assemblies held elsewhere. It is quite
reassuring such that both on the part of the national government and the
citizens, reason and moderation have prevailed. That is as it should be.

WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.

VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the
religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.
As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
(hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as
follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for
all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was
renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is
the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic
Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to
appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated
his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal
letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service
in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that
unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union,
the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This
prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company
and the Union from dismissing Appellee.1 In its answer, the Union invoked
the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court
had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections
24 and 9 (d) and (e).2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the
pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26,
1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the
defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his
present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this
action.3
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely
questions of law, assigning the following errors:
I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350
is unconstitutional.
II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof.
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the
Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to
form lawful associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act
3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all those
belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor
organization"4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from
joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto"5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional
right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the
1935 Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the
Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement
containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer from its
reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union membership
as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the
Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under the
Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such members.7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily
favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor
unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and
while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or
protection to labor organizations.8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the
constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join
associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the
Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to
sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor
organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would
violate religious freedom.9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal
protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminately
legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the operation of closed shop
agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members
undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them
from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same
time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that
the union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a
collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious
freedom, as to call for the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350;
12 and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade
unionism in this country would be wiped out as employers would prefer to
hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with
labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No.
3350 does not violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to
join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor
organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membership therein, and
the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of
workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act does not impair the
obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into,
the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that the Act does not violate the
establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State, for
Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodated the religious needs of
those workers whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor
unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the
constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion;
that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy
and preference over union security measures which are merely contractual
16 ; that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of equal
protection, for the classification of workers under the Act depending on their
religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose
of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act,
finally, does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said
Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all
citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs." 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is
necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly established principles
which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as
obtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are indulged in
favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that
a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be
upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute;
and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and
bans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their
members with labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the
wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by
necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant,
having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act
is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of
association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well
as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right
to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall
have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial
Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations.
Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools
of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be
safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at
least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of
legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an
association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as
to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still
retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with
said organization at any time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a
union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as
what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice,
it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon
the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an
employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3
of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted
to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where
a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of
which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the
duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,
provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making
an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop
agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person,
regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union.
Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act
No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the
Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not
cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely
excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association,
upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining;
and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic
Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security
clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company,
by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a condition for
employment for all permanent employees workers". This agreement was
already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June
18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into
the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as others
similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he
should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the
Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation
from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express
terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law
from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only
Union members in permanent positions, It cannot be denied, therefore, that
there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express
terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge,
or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the
change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but
of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of
its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by
law from its performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on laws
which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual
rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the
obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is
general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the
details. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 24 In
spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority
to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in
effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation
under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the
possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable
reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for
the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be
not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate
instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of
the people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of
impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to
impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of police power,
although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by
the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating relations
between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor
contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common
good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing
the obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the state
involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also held that the Blue Sunday
Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a contract that required the
employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the law having been
enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and
being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract
obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all
circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or
determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its
own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be
sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the
people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both
the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the
scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the
constitutional limitation of that power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350?
Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the
general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of
religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions,
confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can
maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid
that said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious
sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual
needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his working
life, is confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor, directed
by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an
institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect
the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is,
paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of
their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it
produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual
also needs protection — the collective bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the
Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act
No. 3350, as follows:
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account
of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor
organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is
tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right
under the law to believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to
flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any
labor organization. Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of
their right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any
manner violating their religious faith and/or belief. 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to
achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects from
coverage of union security agreements — is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious
profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States
has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment,
which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the
constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a
fundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in the
hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of
religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement
of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor
of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill
of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination and preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of
any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship, 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of
religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion
clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs,
to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good. 36 Any legislation
whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions,
or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for
its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government
should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character
even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has
likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of
constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by
these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the
constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the
Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not
spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular
purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion,
by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work,
or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help
its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to
support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact,
the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor,
and regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so
now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate
the relation between workers and employers. 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor
of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating
with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the
aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain
citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain
extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace
to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from
the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish,
the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit
those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental
and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation
on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the
Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be
preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted
consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to
relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed
by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden
when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly,
Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is
certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the
land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"
intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to
withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of
certain religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection
of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to
grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided
for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented
silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice
it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not
by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship does
not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons
to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their
religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help, labor unions, Congress has
seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other
workers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than
political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country,
and a fortiori to a labor — union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be
attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable
at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of
a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as
a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership
in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require
affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor
union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union.
Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic
Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the
coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector
is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign
from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on
his part. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act
or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — he is exempted from
the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have
entered into. How then can there be a religious test required for the exercise
of a right when no right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact
Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance
with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a constitutional
provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in
itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a
discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain
religious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus violating Section
1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any
person of the equal protection of the laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. 52 The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting
laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying
a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the classification be
based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. 57
Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical
nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest
on narrow distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is
addressed to evils as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned
requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of
their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and
those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and
sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious
faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious
beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and
in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination.
There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs
among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally
paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the
country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in
religion do exist, and these differences are important and should not be
ignored.
Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based on real
and important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas
existing only in the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences
and are the motives of certain rules. of human conduct and the justification
of certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events
in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive character, its
tone, its happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a
strong and passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain
persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to them than
their religion, or their not having any religion. Because of differences in
religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself
better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may
be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries. Due to their
religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable
and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains.
Because of differences in religious beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil,
civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large
extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs.
The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on
substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The
purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their
religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work
and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security
agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that
it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply
for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As
long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor
union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from
affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said
agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is
evident from its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members
of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as
We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of
association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them
in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion
from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees,
because they are differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does
not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the
Constitution by its nature involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality
is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of
persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree,
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise
reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in practice it
results in some inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that
whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the
benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are
of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage
may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is
intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350
promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who,
because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents
their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining
whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary
that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of
the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
inter-relations of the members of the community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350
insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia
ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security
in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union
having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances
the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and
employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the
compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop
agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those
whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose
religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not imply
social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social
relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social justice does
not require legal equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is
necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or natural
conditions. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this
is precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives
laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by
Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for — in other words, the Act is not
proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a
statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in
determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are
unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the
legislation in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68
Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to
understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it may
change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that
unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The threat to
unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of the
religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. But there is
really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot
judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute
is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish
the end desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential
basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from
its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be
measured. 71
and that the Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that
since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect his right to
work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles
1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied
upon by appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against
a labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or
on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which
it is a party, on the ground only that such act induces some other person to
break a contract of employment or that it is in restraint of trade or interferes
with the trade, business or employment of some other person or with the right
of some other person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed for
appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop
agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question
involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74
The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the
labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer
to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done ... in furtherance of an industrial
dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily
mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant
Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No.
875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing
at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as
its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
may be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any other case
where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid
that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused
Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs
according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as
a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated
August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case
No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union. It
is so ordered.

II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the
Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay
P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No.
875, for the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union
was a party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights under
the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with
the Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code;
that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant
Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72

In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant

case there was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel
Appellee to maintain its membership in the union under pain of dismissal,