Atty.
Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
People Vs. Marti
193 SCRA 57
G.R. No. 81561
January 18, 1991
Facts:
Accused-appellant went to a forwarding
agency to send four packages to a friend in
Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by the
proprietress if the packages can be examined.
However, he refused. Before delivering said
packages to the Bureau of Customs and the
Bureau of Posts, the husband of the
proprietress opened said boxes for final
inspection. From that inspection, included in
the standard operating procedure and out of
curiosity, he took several grams of its
contents.
He brought a letter and the said sample to the
National Bureau of Investigation. When the
NBI was informed that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office, three agents
went back with him. In their presence, the
husband totally opened the packages.
Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said
packages. The contents , after examination by
forensic chemists, were found to be
marijuana flowering tops.
The appellant, while claiming his mail at the
Central Post Office, was invited by the agents
for questioning. Later on, the trial court found
him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Issue:
 Whether or Not the items admitted in
the searched illegally searched and
seized.
 Whether or Not custodial
investigation properly applied.
 Whether or Not the trial court not
give credence to the explanation of
the appellant on how said packages
came to his possession.
Held:
No. “The case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention
and participation of State authorities. Under
the circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure
has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an
act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights,
be invoked against the State. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and
a standard operating procedure on the part of
Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of
Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the
mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search.”
No. “The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties (See.
5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
be given full faith and credence, there being
no evidence to the contrary.”
No. “Appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more
weight to the presumption that things which
a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j],
Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.”
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and
Alfredo Martin
(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996
Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the
private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo
Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine
while he is not in his house His wife took the
157 documents consisting of diaries,
cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and
photograph, private respondents between
her Wife and his alleged paramours, by
means of forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for
the evidence of her case of legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of
the documents and papers and for damages
against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered
judgment for Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s
Complaint or those further described in the
Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
a immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Zulueta filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained
from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court
regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring “the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from
a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies
between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to
do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
BON v PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
GR No. 152160,
January 13, 2004
Facts:
Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were
charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, together with Rosalio Bon under
Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of January or
February, 1990, at Barangay Basud,
Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of
Sorsogon, the accused, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, cut, gather
and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra
trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1)
amugis tree, with an approximate volume of
4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately
P25,000.00, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-
Mendoza and without having first obtained
from proper authorities the necessary permit
or license and/or legal supporting
documents, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government and the owner in the
aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution witnesses
had credibility and sufficiency of the evidence
proving their guilt.
Held:
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was
presented. This kind of evidence, however, is
not the only matrix from which the trial court
may draw its conclusions and findings of
guilt. [33] Conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence, as long as the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that
the following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,
[30] provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or
Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations,
the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of
the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation
in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
Punishable under the above provision are the
following acts: (1) cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; and (b) possessing
timber or other forest products without the
legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with the first offense.
[32] It was thus necessary for the prosecution
to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering
or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI v. PEOPLE
GR No. 200370
Jun 07, 2017
Facts:
In an Information filed before the Regional
Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,
Veridiano was charged with the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
Information read:
That on or about January 15, 2008, in the
Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being
permitted or authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody
one small heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried
marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20
a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen
called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio
operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station,
informing him that a certain alias "Baho,"
who was later identified as Veridiano, was on
the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal
drugs.
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the
information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin
Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who were both on
duty.[10] Chief of Police June Urquia
instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to
set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay,
Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The police officers at the checkpoint
personally knew Veridiano. They allowed
some vehicles to pass through after checking
that he was not on board. At around 10:00
a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a
passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and
asked the passengers to disembark. The
police officers instructed the passengers to
raise their t-shirts to check for possible
concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano
"a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana." PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea
bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano
was arrested and apprised of his
4
 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
constitutional rights. He was then brought to
the police station.
The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of illegal possession of marijuana.
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing
marijuana leaves was seized in violation of
his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He asserts that his arrest was illegal.
Petitioner was merely seated inside the
jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He
did not act in any manner that would give the
police officers reasonable ground to believe
that he had just committed a crime or that he
was committing a crime. Petitioner also
asserts that reliable information is
insufficient to constitute probable cause that
would support a valid warrantless arrest.
In the present case, the extensive search
conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches.
They had no probable cause to believe that
the accused violated any law except for the
tip they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may
either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.
Moreover, the search was flawed at its
inception. The checkpoint was set up to target
the arrest of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless
arrest that would vest the court with
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
HELD:
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
The invalidity of an arrest leads to several
consequences among which are: (a) the
failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law
enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search
incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus
rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused as a result of an invalid arrest must
be raised through a motion to quash before
an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived and an
accused is "estopped from questioning the
legality of his [or her] arrest."
The voluntary submission of an accused to
the jurisdiction of the court and his or her
active participation during trial cures any
defect or irregularity that may have attended
an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the
legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the accused."
Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the
illegality of an arrest does not preclude an
accused from questioning the admissibility of
evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the
evidence is not affected when an accused fails
to question the court's jurisdiction over his or
her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction
over the person of an accused and the
constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are
separate and mutually exclusive
consequences of an illegal arrest.
____________________________________________________
__________________
As to the legality of the search and seizure
made:
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires
that there must first be a lawful arrest before
a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
5
 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
arrest must precede the search; "the process
cannot be reversed." For there to be a lawful
arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a
valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may
also be effected without a warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a
warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When
Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known
as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity
of this warrantless arrest requires
compliance with the overt act test as
explained in Cogaed:
For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto
to be affected, "two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he [or she] has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be
justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest
under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court. He was not committing a crime at the
checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a
passenger who did not exhibit any unusual
conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
warrantless arrest, the police officers relied
solely on the tip they received. Reliable
information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from
the person to be arrested indicating that a
crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be
justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any
fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner
had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be
arrested has just committed a crime. This is
what gives rise to probable cause that would
justify a warrantless search under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The warrantless search cannot be justified
under the reasonable suspicion requirement
in "stop and frisk" searches. Law enforcers do
not have unbridled discretion in conducting
"stop and frisk" searches. While probable
6
 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
cause is not required, a "stop and frisk"
search cannot be validated on the basis of a
suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have
a genuine reason to believe, based on their
experience and the particular circumstances
of each case, that criminal activity may be
afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity
alone, or none at all, cannot produce a
reasonable search.
Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger
in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that
would give police officers reasonable
suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. Reasonable persons will act in a
nervous manner in any check point. There
was no evidence to show that the police had
basis or personal knowledge that would
reasonably allow them to infer anything
suspicious.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of
resistance can hardly be considered as
consent to the warrantless search. Although
the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be surrendered through a valid
waiver, the prosecution must prove that the
waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence. Consent to
warrantless search and seizure must be
"unequivocal, specific, intelligently given . . .
[and unattended] by duress or coercion."
The validity of a consented warrantless
search is determined by the totality of the
circumstances. This may involve an inquiry
into the environment in which the consent
was given such as "the presence of coercive
police procedures."
The presence of a coercive environment
negates the claim that petitioner consented to
the warrantless search.
Another instance of a valid warrantless
search is a search of a moving vehicle.
Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are
allowed in exceptional circumstances to
protect the lives of individuals and ensure
their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases
where the government's survival is in danger.
Considering that routine checkpoints intrude
"on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to a
certain extent, they must be "conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists." The extent
of routine inspections must be limited to a
visual search. Routine inspections do not give
law enforcers carte blanche to perform
warrantless searches.
In the present case, the extensive search
conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches.
They had no probable cause to believe that
the accused violated any law except for the
tip they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may
either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.
Moreover, the search was flawed at its
inception. The checkpoint was set up to target
the arrest of the accused.
a
In the present case, the extensive search
conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches.
They had no probable cause to believe that
the accused violated any law except for the
tip they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may
either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.
Moreover, the search was flawed at its
inception. The checkpoint was set up to target
the arrest of the accused.
Gaanan vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-69809, October 16,
7
 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
1986 145 SCRA 113 (1986)
Facts:
Complainant and his client were in the living
room of complainant’s residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint
for direct assault which they filed with the the
City Fiscal against Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico. Laconico telephoned appellant, to
advise him on the settlement of the direct
assault. When complainant called up,
Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through
a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault. Twenty minutes later, complainant
called up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to
deliver the money. Complainant called up
again and instructed Laconico to give the
money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta
of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the
Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested
by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed an affidavit stating that he
heard complainant demands for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to
the complainant for robbery/extortion which
he filed against complainant. Since appellant
listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant’s consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After
trial on the merits, the lower court, in a
decision dated November 22, 1982, found
both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. Not
satisfied with the decision, the petitioner
appealed to the appellate court who affirmed
the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature and,
therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200;
Issue:
Whether “any other device or arrangement”
includes extension phones and listening thru
it is a violation of RA 4200.
Held:
No, an extension telephone cannot be placed
in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated
in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should not
be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts. Likewise, Article
1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that
‘however general the terms of a contract may
be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases
that are different from those upon which the
parties intended to agree.’ Similarly, Article
1374 of the same Code provides that ‘the
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result
from all of them taken jointly. The law refers
to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a
“device or arrangement” for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.
Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should
be construed to comprehend instruments of
the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely
for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 |
J. Padilla
Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with
the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private
respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment
to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However,
the trial court admitted all of private
respondent’s offered evidence and later on
denied her motion for reconsideration,
prompting petitioner to file a petition for
certiorari with the CA to assail the admission
in evidence of the aforementioned cassette
tapes.
These tape recordings were made and
obtained when private respondent allowed
his friends from the military to wire tap his
home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape
recordings are not inadmissible per se. They
and any other variant thereof can be admitted
in evidence for certain purposes, depending
on how they are presented and offered and
on how the trial judge utilizes them in the
interest of truth and fairness and the even
handed administration of justice; and (2) A
petition for certiorari is notoriously
inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in
admitting evidence adduced during trial. The
ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in
the appeal from the judgment on the merits
and not through the special civil action of
certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously
that it exists, cannot be anymore than an
error of law, properly correctible by appeal
and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
 W/N the recordings of the telephone
conversations are admissible in
evidence
 W/N the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
properly availed of by the petitioner
in the Court of Appeals
Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word,
or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or
any information therein contained, obtained
or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing
or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of
the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act
No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of
certiorari is generally not available to
challenge an interlocutory order of a trial
court. The proper remedy in such cases is an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory
order is patently erroneous and the remedy
of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow
certiorari as a mode of redress.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBANK) v.
SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT.
G.R. No. 200238; November 20, 2013.
FACTS:
Petitioners Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank)
and Pascual M. Garcia III (Garcia), as
President of PSBank, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullity
and set aside the Resolution of respondent
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines,
sitting as an Impeachment Court, which
granted the prosecution's requests for
subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to
PSBank and/or its representatives requiring
them to testify and produce before the
Impeachment Court documents relative to
the foreign currency accounts that were
alleged to belong to then Supreme Court Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.
On November 5, 2012, and during the
pendency of this petition, PSBank and Garcia
filed a Motion with Leave of Court to
Withdraw the Petition averring that
subsequent events have overtaken the
petition and that, with the termination of the
impeachment proceedings against former
Chief Justice Corona, they are no longer faced
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
with the dilemma of either violating Republic
Act No. 6426 or being held in contempt of
court for refusing to disclose the details of the
subject foreign currency deposits.
ISSUE:
Should a TRO be issued against the
impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to
the alleged foreign currency denominated
accounts of CJ Corona?
RULING:
[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the
respondents from implementing the
subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents
to COMMENT on the [merits of the] petition.]
YES, a TRO should be issued against the
impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to
the alleged foreign currency denominated
accounts of CJ Corona.
There are two requisite conditions for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction:
(1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right. It must be proven
that the violation sought to be prevented
would cause an irreparable injustice.
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of
the foreign currency deposits of the Chief
Justice is provided under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as
the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the
Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes
the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits:
xxx xxx xxx
Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single
exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only
upon the written permission of the depositor.
In Intengan v. Court of Appeals, the Court
ruled that where the accounts in question are
U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law is not
Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426.
Similarly, in the recent case of Government
Service Insurance System v. 15th Division of
the Court of Appeals, the Court also held that
RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign
currency deposits and not Republic Act No.
1405. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The written consent under RA 6426
constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to
privacy in relation to such deposit. In the
present case, neither the prosecution nor the
Impeachment Court has presented any such
written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while
impeachment may be an exception to the
secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is
not an exemption to the absolute
confidentiality of foreign currency deposits
under RA 6426.
People v. Yatco
97 Phil 940 (1955)
Facts:
1. Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and
another whose identity is still unknown, were
charged with having conspired together in
the murder of one Jose Ramos
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
2. During the progress of the trial on while
the prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in
connection with the making of a certain extra-
judicial confession (allegedly made before
him) by defendant Consunji to the witness,
counsel for the other defendant Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any
evidence on such confession on the ground
that it was hearsay and therefore
incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban.
3. The Court below ordered the exclusion of
the evidence objected to, but on an altogether
different ground: that the prosecution could
not be permitted to introduce the confessions
of defendants Consunji and Panganiban to
prove conspiracy between them, without
prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of
definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
4. Court: That would be premature because
there is already a ruling of the Court that you
cannot prove a confession unless you prove
first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite
acts, conditions and circumstances as
required by law. MR denied.
5. This petition for certiorari was brought
before this Court by the Sol Gen, for the
review and annulment of the lower Court's
order completely excluding any evidence on
the extrajudicial confessions of the accused
Consunji and Panganiban without prior proof
of conspiracy.
Issue:
WON the lower court erred when it ordered
the complete exclusion of the confession
made by Consunji
Held: Yes
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is
specific as to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely
and voluntarily made, as evidence against
him.
"SEC. 14. Confession.·The declaration of an
accused expressly acknowledging the truth of
his guilt as to the offense charged, may be
given in evidence against him."
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of
evidence, even if Consunji's confession may
not be competent as against his co-accused
Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or
to prove conspiracy between them without
the conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession of Consunji was,
nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the
declarant's own guilt.
The rule cited by the Court below in support
of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is
Sec, 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
"The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against
the coconspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made
by one conspirator during the pendency of
the unlawful enterprises ("during its
existence") and in furtherance of its object,
and not to a confession made, as in this case,
long after the conspiracy had been brought to
an end.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered
the confessions to prove conspiracy between
the two accused, nor as evidence against both
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both
in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet
even been identified (the presentation of Atty.
Xavier was precisely for the purpose of
identifying the confessions), much less
formally offered in evidence
It is particularly noteworthy that the
exclusion of the proferred confessions was
not made on the basis of the objection
interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon
an altogether different ground, which the
Court issued motuproprio. By so doing, the
Court overlooked that the right to object is a
mere privilege which the parties may waive;
and if the ground for objection is known and
not reasonably made, the objection is deemed
waived and the Court has no power, on its
own motion, to disregard the evidence.
We see no need for the present to discuss the
question of the admissibility of the individual
extrajudicial confessions xxx
After all, the confessions are not before us
and have not even been formally offered in
evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that
the lower Court should have allowed such
confessions to be given in evidence at least as
against the parties who made them, and
admit the same conditionally to establish
conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a
chance to get into the record all the relevant
evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.
Once more, attention should be called to the
ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co.
vs. Phoenix Insurance Co.
“In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a
judge of first instance, in the early stages of
the development of the proof, to know with
any certainty whether testimony is relevant
or not; and where there is no indication of
bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering
the evidence, the court may as a rule safely
accept the testimony upon the statement of
the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later.”
There is greater reason to adhere to such
policy in criminal cases where questions arise
as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of
evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the charges,
from which the People can no longer appeal.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, the order excluding the
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside
and the Court below is directed to proceed
with the trial.
PHILIP S. YU v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SECOND DIVISION, AND VIVECA LIM YU
[G.R. No. 154115. June 28, 2006]
Facts:
On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private
respondent) brought against her husband,
Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal
separation and dissolution of conjugal
partnership on the grounds of marital
infidelity and physical abuse. The case was
filed before the RTC of Pasig. During trial,
private respondent Lim Yu moved for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum, to certain officers of Insular
Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production
of the insurance policy and application of a
person suspected to be petitioner’s
illegitimate child.
The trial court denied the motion, It ruled
that the insurance contract is inadmissible
evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]
2000, issued by the Insurance Commission
which presumably prevents insurance
companies/agents from divulging
confidential and privileged information
pertaining to insurance policies. It added that
the production of the application and
insurance contract would violate Article 280
of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil
Registry Law, both of which prohibit the
unauthorized identification of the parents of
an illegitimate child. Private respondent
sought reconsideration of the Order, but the
motion was denied by the trial court.
On appeal to the CA, private respondent was
merely seeking the production of the
insurance application and contract, and was
not yet offering the same as part of her
evidence. Thus, it declared that petitioner’s
objection to the admission of the documents
was premature, and the trial court’s
pronouncement that the documents are
inadmissible, precipitate.
Issue:
1. Whether or not an insurance policy
and its corresponding application form can be
admitted as evidence to prove a party’s extra-
marital affairs in an action for legal
separation;
2. Whether or Not the CA committed an
error of judgment in denying petitioner’s
Motion.
Ruling:
The insurance application and the insurance
policy were yet to be presented in court,
much less formally offered before it. In fact,
private respondent was merely asking for the
issuance of subpoena duces tecum and
subpoena ad testificandum when the trial
court issued the assailed Order. Even
assuming that the documents would
eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial
court was not then in a position to make a
declaration to that effect at that point. Thus,
it barred the production of the subject
documents prior to the assessment of its
probable worth. As observed by petitioners,
the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on
the admissibility of evidence; it was, more
importantly, a ruling affecting the proper
conduct of trial.
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which
although falling within the general powers of
the judge is not authorized and is
consequently void with respect to the
particular case because the conditions under
which he was only authorized to exercise his
general power in that case did not exist and
therefore, the judicial power was not legally
exercised.Thus, in declaring that the
documents are irrelevant and inadmissible
even before they were formally offered, much
less presented before it, the trial court acted
in excess of its discretion.
Anent the issue of whether the information
contained in the documents is privileged in
nature, the same was clarified and settled by
the Insurance Commissioner’s opinion that
the circular on which the trial court based its
ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful
court orders. Hence, there is no more
impediment to presenting the insurance
application and policy.
Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If
documents or things offered in evidence are
excluded by the court, the offeror may have
the same attached to or made part of the
record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and
other personal circumstances of the witness
and the substance of the proposed testimony.
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 Atty. Waldemar Gravador [EVIDENCE]

It is thus apparent that before tender of

excluded evidence is made, the evidence must
have been formally offered before the court.
And before formal offer of evidence is made,
the evidence must have been identified and
presented before the court. While private
respondent made a “Tender of Excluded
Evidence,” such is not the tender
contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for
obviously, the insurance policy and
application were not formally offered much
less presented before the trial court. At most,
said “Tender of Excluded Evidence” was
manifestation of an undisputed fact that the
subject documents were declared
inadmissible by the trial court even before
these were presented during trial. It was not
the kind of plain, speedy and adequate
remedy which private respondent could have
resorted to instead of the petition for
certiorari she filed before the Court of
Appeals. It did not in any way render the said
petition moot.

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