I

I
I
I
I
I
I

Report on Enclosure I
I
I
I

Internal Arcing Tests I

I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
he improvement of electrical equipment is Maintenance had just completed overhauling an I
an ongoing process including investigative old size 3, two-speed, 460 V MCC starter unit. As I
research. This is a report on research work the contactor was closed to start up the cooling I
concerning factors regarding high-energy arcing tower fan, a loud “rattling” was heard from inside I
faults, the tests conducted on containment of these the starter compartment. The electrician, who was I
faults, and standards addressing arcing fault test I
dressed in flame-retardant clothing, reached for the I
requirements. This report is focused on low-voltage,
starter disconnect as two other electricians in the I
600 V class Motor Control Centers (MCCs),but the
issues presented should not be limited to only this area, dressed in street clothes, ran for cover. As the I
electrician opened the disconnect there was a loud I
type of electrical equipment. Also, the scope of this
I
work is restricted to a high-energy arcing fault explosion. The MCC starter unit door was blown
I
occurring in a latched or closed compartment dur- open and the electrician was engulfed in flaming hot
I
ing “normal” operating conditions and does not gases. Fortunately, his protective clothing and face I
include arcing faults occurring in compartments shield prevented serious injury, and his co-workers I
when the compartment door is open. were able to get behind other equipment and also I
In one major chemical company over a five-year escaped injury. Although difficult to reconstruct, I
period there were approximately 75 incidents in I
the findings of the investigation were that the rat-
I
which an arcing fault occurred. An incident was tling noise was actually caused by the contactor I
defined as an event that did, or had the potential to, armature, which was missing its shaded pole piece. I
result in personal injury and/or major equipment Subsequently, the electrician actually opened the I
damage. Roughly 75% of these occurred in 600 V switch under motor accelerating current and the I
class motor control equipment. Of these incidents, I
older switch was unable to contain the current in
I
43 occurred with persons present, and 23 burn the arc chute, resulting in a phase-to-ground fault I
injuries resulted. Several of these injuries resulted and ultimately a phase-to-phase fault in the vertical I
due to the misconception that an MCC with doors bus structure. I
and covers properly fastened would protect the In a second incident the operator was performing I
individual under all arcing fault conditions. These I
a routine switching operation to energize a size 2
I
findings have resulted in expanding their personal MCC starter unit. An explosion initiated in the I
protective equipment usage to many “routine” op- starter unit, causing the unit door to blow open. The I
erations such as switching. The following are actual operator, although wearing protective clothing, did I
incidents and are typical of many that occur annu- receive second-degree burns on his upper arm, I
ally throughout industry. I
where there was a gap between his clothing and
I
glove. Investigation revealed that a metal lever that I
This article appeared in its originalform at the 1994 was part of the switch operator had come loose and I
Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference in Vancou- fallen into the line side fuse clips, causing a line-to- I
ver, B.C. Heberlein, an IEEE Senior Member, and ground arcing fault. I
I
Higgins, an IEEE Member, are with Allen-Bradley The arcing fault phenomenon has been well
I
Company of Milwaukee, Wis. Epperly, an IEEE Senior known particularly for medium- and high-voltage I
Member, is with E.I. du Pont de Nemours C. Co. of equipment. Ralph Lee and others began raising I
Wilmington, Del. awareness of this hazard in low-voltage equipment I

IEF Industry Applicutions Muguzine Muy/lune 1 996

m I
I
I
I
I
I
I
contacts, bus bars, cable terminations, etc. The
I
I The boltedfuult withstand test is not a mpedance is minimal for a bolted fault resulting in
I highest current flow. The electromagnetic force
measure of the capability of un

-
I generated by these high currents is proportional to
I enclosure t o contain a high-energy 2
the square of the peak current (Ip ) and is therefore
I
I
urcing fault. maximized in a bolted fault. Certainly, the bolted
I
fault tests are essential to qualify equipment to
I withstand short circuit stresses. However, the
I bolted fault withstand test is not a measure of the
I in the early to mid-1980s 11, 2). Lee’s IEEE paper capabhty of an enclosure to contain a high-energy
I
“The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast arcing fault Enclosure containment is relative to
I
I Burn” was one of the first attempts t o quantify this the amount of thermal energy transferred over a
I hazard [lf.This signaled industry to begin estab- short period of time This rapid transfer of thermal
I lishing standards and practices that address the energy superheats the surrounding air, causing
I hazards presented by the high temperatures and rapid expansion, which in turn causes high pressure.
I ’
Accompanying this gas expansion may be pressure
pressures developed in an arcing fault. Although
I
I there have been subsequent papers addressing this shock waves and gas ionization, which can create
I hazard, the subject, like many facing engineering, secondary faults due to the highly conductive ions.
I is complex and difficult to define. Finding solutions This thermal energy is proportional to the square of
I to the problem, and furthermore cost-effective so- the rms current (Irm:) multiplied by the arc resis-
I tance, while the pressure developed is proportional
lutions, is recognized to be a substantial technical
I
challenge. One common solution today is that to the rate of transfer, change in temperature per
I
I many companies are now requiring electricians and unit of time (dT/dt), of air heating created by this
I operators to wear personal protective equipment thermal energy
I (PPE), e.g., flash suits, flame-retardant clothing, It should be noted, as developed by Lee, that the
I maximum fault energy transfer occurs when the
hard hats with face shields, leather gloves, etc.
I
Although the PPE probably represents the best mpedance across the arc equals the impedance of
I
I “solution” to date, it can introduce other potential the distribution system El). There is a continuum
I safety issues, such as restricted visibility, loss of
I dexterity, and heat exhaustion for personnel.
I The purpose of this article is to share our test
I
I
results with others and to raise awareness so that Bolted L. A’CW
I work can continue in the area of arc containment,
E’ectromagnetic Thermal Energy
I i.e., guidance for standards, manufacturers, and Energy
I
I
users. The tests are focused on low-voltage MCCs, +II) :1 I2t)
(1

as substantial numbers of this low-voltage type

I High mrces High dT!dt
equipment are in use. However, it must be pointed between curreni c
I
I out that the findings and results reported in this carrying components High Pressure
I article can apply to any electrical equipment in
I which the chance of high-energy arcing faults can Fig. 1. Effects of “bolted“ and ‘harcingfauln.”
I occur.
I
I -
Table 1. Maximum Power Transferred
1
I Bolfed Fault Versus un Arcing Fadf
I in a Three-phase Arc --
The relationship between a bolted fault and an
I
arcing fault and the resulting dissipation of energy ~ Fault Available (kA)
I
I is much more complicated and frequently misun- 1 0.42
I derstood. Fig. 1is a diagrammatic representation of 5 2.08
I the relationships of a low-impedance (bolted) and
I 10 4.1 5
the high-resistance (arcing) faults. Standards such
I 15 6 23
as UL 845, NEMA ICs 2-322, and IEC 439 call for
I
I and recognize only bolted fault withstand tests r3, 20 8-30-
I 4,51 30 12.50
I The bolted fault withstand test is the most severe 40 16.60
I
test for determining the mechanical strength and
I 50 20.80
I
bracing for the current-carrying components, e.g ,

/E€€ Industry Applicutions Muguzine Muy/Jonell996

I

of potential energy transfer ranging from the low-
impedance bolted fault, where the energy is dissi-
, p a t e d in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n system, t o t h e
very-high-resistance arcing fault, in which most of
the energy is dissipated in the fault, but with re-
2 I
duced magnitude due to the low current (I R). This
latter type of fault could produce a damaging “melt-
down” condition if sustained for a relatively long
time, but would not tend to create the explosive
energy associated with high power being dissipated
over a short period of time. The phenomenon ad-
dressed in this article is the rapidly expanding high-
energy arcing fault.
Lee developed the theory that stated that the
maximum power transfer in the arcing fault is equal
to 0.5 times the maximum bolted fault current of
the system, at the point of the fault 111. Therefore,
the maximum arc power, in watts, is the system
voltage times 0.5, times the maximum bolted avail-
able fault current, times 1.732. Lee also developed
the maximum power transfer in a three-phase arc
(refer to Table 1).
The data in Table 1 indicates that in a supply
with an availablefault current of 50 kA and without
current-limiting upstream protection, that 20.8 x
106 Joules per second could be transferred (a Joule
being equal to a watt-second of energy). Thus, on
a 60 Hz system this energy transfer equals 350,000
Joules per cycle which is equivalent to 330 BTUs
per cycle (a BTU being equal to 1055 Joules)
between the inception and the interruption of the
arc.
User Safety Requirements
For continuous improvement in safety, the user
community has been working on the high-energy
arcing fault issue. Addressing the hazard of arcing
faults varies greatly from user to user. The variation
in approach is due to the lack of understanding the
arcing fault phenomenon and the false assumption
that equipment meeting various standards is pro-
tected against these faults. User safety requirements
or practices can be divided into the following cate-
gories:
w Design of equipment to either contain or vent,
under control, the radiated energy and hot
gases resulting from an arcing fault.
Isolation of the equipment subject to high-en-
ergy arcing faults to protect both personnel
and equipment from exposure to the hazard.
Provide procedural guidance to prevent or
limit exposure of personnel to the potential
hazard.
w Protect personnel by using personal protec-
tive equipment such as face shields, fire-retar-
dant clothing, hard hats, safety glasses, etc.
I
I
I
I
I
I
~~
I
The question fdcing both the equipment I
mdnuhcturer and the user is how and I
I
where one “drawsthe line” between the I
potential occurrence of low-energy I
urcing faults dnd high-energy arcing I
I
fdults. I
I
I
I
All of these categories are important and should
I
be employed to the maximum extent practical, in I
order to limit the potential of injury and equipment I
damage. The question facing both the equipment I
manufacturer and the user is how and where one I
I
“draws the line” between the potential occurrence
I
of low-energy arcing faults and high-energy arcing I
faults. This quandary is complex with unpredictable I
variables. I
I
I
High-€nergy/Lo w-bergy Equipment Designs I
I
The problems facing the designer of equipment are
I
multifaceted. Heat and high pressure must be a I
consideration in the design. The initiated arc can I
have temperatures up to 35,000’ F with high
dT/dt, which in turn superheats the surrounding
air, Iiterally causing a explosion due to the rapid
expansion of the gases El]. Given this fact, the
challenge for the equipment designer is to:
w Reduce the potential for an arcing fault to
occur by protection of exposed energized
components, i.e., insulation and isolation.
w Eliminating potential arc initiating paths, ef-
fective location of components to reduce op-
portunity for loose parts to initiate faults, etc.
Reduce the severity of the arcing fault should
it occur by utilizing highly “current-limiting”
protective devices, designing potential arcing
distances that will promote self-extinction,
etc.
w Reduce potential personnel injury or limit
damage of arcing faults by designing for con-
trolled venting or containment.
The design considerations have historically
taken different directions between North American
and European equipment manufacturers and users.
This direction difference has not only been evident
in low-voltage MCC designs but is also evident in
switchgear and even motor junction box designs, as
detailed by Crawford, Clarke, and Doughty E6f. In
general the Europeans have been working in arc
containment designs to greater detail than their
North American counterparts. Also, the Austra-
lians have been working in this area but have ad-
dressed arcing faults by special controlled venting
lEEE Industry Applications Magazine May/June I 996
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
International Test Standards
I
I and Requirements
I International standards or-
I ganizations are recognizing
I this issue to varying degrees in
I terms of providing a stand-
I ardized test for an arcing fault
I in low-voltage equipment. In
I all cases found by the authors,
I
the arcing test requirements re-
I
side in appendices and are only
I
I
meant to define a standard test
I that can be utilized when there
I is agreement between the user
I and the manufacturer
I The Standards Association
I of A u s t r a l i a ’ s S t a n d a r d
I
1136 1-1988provides two re-
I
I
lated appendices: Appendix D,
I “Guidelines for Assemblies In-
I tended to Provide Increased Se-
I curity Against the Occurrence
I
of or the Effects of Internal Arc-
I
I
ing Faults,” and Appendlx E,
I “Internal Arcing-Fault Tests ”
I An important point for all test-
I ing in this area is stated in the
I
Australian Standard in Appen-
I
dix E, Section ET: “Relevance
I
I of Tests. The arcing-fault test
I is carried out to assess the abil-
I ity of the assembly to limit the
I Fig.2. Center (of three sections) MCC test section. risk of personal injury and the
I
extent of equipment damage resulting from an
I
equipment designs [7}. At this time there are no arcing fault. It should be realized that it i: not
I
I
North American standards known to the authors possible to simulate all conditions that can produce
I that address the design or testing of arcing fault arcing faults in service and that the arc does not
I containment particularly relating to low-voltage always behave in a repeatable manner. It follows
I equipment. However, there is in the IEC standards, that tests may not give a true indication of the
I IEC 298, a reference to an internal arcing fault test
I performance of the equipment under all arcing
I
{8}. This standard is for metal-enclosed switchgear conditions and that an assembly proven by such
I rated above 1 kV up to and including 52 kV, and tests cannot be guaranteed to withstand all arcing
I this reference is not in the main body of the standard faults that may occur in service” {7].
I but in the Annex, i.e. not a requirement. However,
I the Annex of IEC 298 is being utilized by some
I
low-voltage MCC manufacturers as a fault-contain-
I
I ment test. It should be noted that any arcing fault Internal Arcing Tests
I test, even when guidance from standards is fol- The testing for this report was carried out under the
I lowed, is not a definitive indicator that total com- guidance of IEC Standard-298;Annex AA. The test
I petency of arc containment has been reached. There setup consisted of three vertical sections with 1
I
is no assurance the test parameters truly simulate space factor fused disconnect units. Black cotton
I
I the worst-case possibilities in any individual instal- flame indicators were placed on a separate stand and
I lation. Even when equipment has fulfilled test re- were placed 300 mm from the front ofthe enclosure
I quirements, the user should exercise caution. The (refer to Fig. 2). The fault was initiated on the load
I user’s installation conditions may be completely side of a 30 A disconnect switch in a center unit by
I
different from those represented by the test parame- connecting a 0.5 mm wire between phase A and
I
I
ters. phase B (refer to Fig. 3).

IEEE Industry Applications Magazine May/Junel1996

I

I
 I
I
I
I
I
I
In addition to the IEC
I
test requirements, a pres- I
s u r e t r a n s d u c e r was I
mounted in the side wall of I
the MCC unit to monitor I
I
pressures encountered in
I
the MCC unit as a result of I
the high-energy arcing I
faults. The particular unit I
under test had an experi- I
mental latching system on I
I
its door, with the exception
I
of Tests 9 and 10, which I
utilized the standard latch- I
ing system. I
The experimental latch I
I
under test shown in Fig. 4
I
was specifically designed I
with two main features to I
enhance the capability of I
the unit door to withstand I
I
the forces developed by the
I
high-energy arcing fault: I
1. The latching pin is a I
quarter-turn “bayonet” I
type that fits into a station- I

ary mounted “keeper”, i.e., Fig 3. Unit arc initiation. I

I
placing the latching means I
in direct shear for a high degree oflatching strength. damaged and further pressure measurements in this I
This is in contrast to the standard latching system, series may be suspect. I
which utilizes a cantilever design that catches on the Test 1: 5 1.5 kA rms sym available open circuit, I
MCC frame. 441 V, 21.9% PF, without fuse protection. I
2 I
2. The new latching pin is spring-loaded, which The total three-phase I t on this test was 7.2 x
2 I
allows the door to open slightly under extreme 106 ampere-squared-seconds (A s). The voltage I
pressure, allowing the gases to vent along the face was maintained for 6 cycles or 100 ms; however, I
of the adjacent sections. the fault current self-extinguishedin approximately I
28 ms (1.67 cycles). The peak pressure of 4.94 psi I
With the small amount of opening permitted by
I
the pressure relief design, the experimental latching developed in approximately 6.7 ms (0.4 cycles).
I
system held the door of the unit closed throughout This translates to approximately 900 pounds of I
all tests. However, on a number of tests, several unit pressure on a 14 in x 13 in door. I
doors fitted with the standard latching system, Test 2: 25.7 kA rms sym available open circuit, I
located above or below the unit under test, opened 441 V, 18.0% PF, without fuse protection. I
I
as a result of the pressures developed. The total three-phase 12t on this test was 7.0 x
I
10‘ A2s. I
Test Results The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles or 100 I
ms; however, the fault current self-extinguished in I
Tests were conducted following the guidance of IEC I
approximately 39 nis (2.35 cycles).
Standard 298, Annex AA. In addition to the re- I
quirements specified in Annex AA, an attempt was Test 3 : 66.0 kA rms sym available open circuit, I
made to qualify the pressures developed within an 483 V, 16.7% PF, without fuse protection. I
2
MCC unit and to correlate these pressures to the The total three-phase I t on this test was 6.8 x I
6 2 I
fault current availability.The testing was as follows: 10 A s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles
I
or 100 ms; however, the fault current self-extin-
I
guished in approximately 13.8 ms (0.83 cycles). I
First Series (Feb. 19, 1993)
I
The tests were successfully conducted, but unfortu-
I
nately after the first test the pressure transducer was Second Series (May 5, 1993)

I€€€Industry ApplicationsMagazine MoyAune 1996

ch
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 2
ducing the I t and the inherent thermal and pres-
I
sure damage of an arcing fault.
I
Test 6 : 67.8 kA rms sym available open circuit,
I
I 486 V, 16.7% PF, 400 Ampere Class RK-1 fuse
I protection.
2
I The total three-phase I t on this test was 1 14 x
I 6 2
10 A s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles
1
or 100 ms, however, the fault current was cleared
I
I by the current limiting fuse in approximately 5 ms
I (0.3 cycles). The peak pressure, 7 5 5 psi, developed
I in approximately 2 ms (0.125 cycles).
I Test 7 . 67.8 kA rms sym available open circuit,
I
486 V, 16.7% PF, 600 Ampere Class RK-1 fuse
I
I protection.
2
I The total three-phase I t on this test was 4.53 x
Fig. 4. Standard and experimental latching sys&". 6 2
I 10 A s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles
I or 100 ms, however the fault current was cleared by
I These two tests were conducted to repeat Tests 2 the current-limiting fuse in approximately 11.7 ms
I and 3 to obtain pressure data for those fault current
I
(0.7 cycles). The peak pressure, 11.0 psi, developed
values. in approximately 2 ms (0.125 cycles).
I
I
Test 4: 25 .OkA rms sym available open circuit, Test 8: 67.8 kA rms sym available open circuit,
I 445 V, 25.0% PF, without fuse protection. 486 V, 16.7% PF, 800 Ampere Class L fuse protec-
2
I The total three-phase I t on this test was 6.7 x tion.
I 6 2
10 A s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles The total three-phase 12t on this test was 3.42 x
I 6 2
or 100 ms; however, the fault current self-extin- 10 A s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles
1
I guished in approximately 31 ms (1.85 cycles). The or 100 ms; however, the fault current was cleared
I peak pressure, 4.04 psi, developed in approximately by the current-limiting fuse in approximately 8.3
I 5 ms (0.3 cycles). ms (0.5 cycles). The peak pressure, 9.15 psi, devel-
I Test 5 : 66.0 kA rms sym available open circuit, oped in approximately 2 ms (0.125 cycles).
I
483 V, 16.7% PF, without fuse protection. The following Test 9 was intended to demon-
I 2
I The total-three phase I t on this test was 5.67 x strate the relationship between unit door size and
6 2
I 10 A s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles unit volume and pressure developed. A full vertical
I or 100 ms; however, the fault current self-extin- section door, 20 in x 7 8 in, was utilized, increasing
I guished in approximately 23 ms (1.4 cycles). The the door surface area and volume approximately 8.5
I
I
peak pressure, 6.26 psi, developed in approximately times. Electrically this test is comparable to Test 5
I 5 ms (0.3 cycles). above.
I Test 9: 67.8 kA rms sym available open circuit,
I 486 V, 16 7 % PF, without fuse protection.
I T h i r d series (Feb. 8, 1 9 9 4 ) 2
The total three-phase I t on this test was 31.27
I The first three tests, Tests 6 , 7 , and 8 , of this series 6 2
I were initiated primarily to help quantify the effec- x 10 A s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles
I tiveness of upstream current-limiting fuses in re- or 100 ms, however, the fault current propagated
I
I
-- .~. ~ __- __
I Tat1&2. Measured vressurefiersus 12t- I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

/FEE Industry ApplicutionsMagazine Moy/June/1996

I

I
 I
I
I
I
I
I
into the vertical bus and did not self-extinguish
I
until approximately 46.7 ms (2.8 cycles). The peak The dutu obtuined did, in generul, I
pressure, 4.62 psi, developed in approximately 1.7
substantiate the basicpremises I
ms (0.1 cycles). I
For the final test, Test 10, the vertical bus concerning the expected relative forces I
I
isolation was removed to determine the likelihood encountered in a high-energy I
of an arc which was initiated in a size 1 unit to urczng fuult. I
propagate to the exposed bus work. Standard I
latches were used on all unit doors. In this test the I
black cotton flame indicators were not used. I
Test Summary I
Test 10: 67.8 kA rms sym available open circuit,
The results of these tests should provide a higher I
486 V, 16.7% PF, without fuse protection. I
degree of confidence. Tests 1 through 9 indicated
The total three-phase 12t on this test was 177.4 I
that the high-energy arcing fault was contained in
x 106 A2s. The voltage was maintained for 6 cycles I
the unit compartment. However, under no circum- I
or 100 ms; however, the fault current propagated
stances should one assume that these tests in any I
into tt e vertical bus and did not self-extinguish. The
way guarantee that under all conceivable circum- I
peak pressure, 9.0 psi, developed in approximately I
stances a fault would be contained. The violence of
2.5 ITS (0.15 cycles). Some additional pressure I
these faults, condition of the equipment, capabili-
surges of lesser magnitude were recorded, which I
ties of the power systems, and other variables all I
probably indicate restriking of the arc as it pro-
provide a high degree of unpredictability, and PPE I
gressed into the bus structure. Due to the pressure,
should be utilized in areas where high-energy arcing I
none of the standard latches in the MCC section I
faults can occur. Table 2 is a summary of actual
were 2 ble to hold the unit doors closed. I
measured pressures and resultant total force devel- I
All tests, Tests 1 through 10, were initiated as a 2
oped on the unit doors with total I t developed. I
single phase fault between A and B phase, but the
The data obtained did, in general, substantiate I
fault c uickly developed into a three-phase high-en-
the basic premises concerning the expected relative I
ergy arcing fault. I
forces encountered in a high-energy arcing fault. As
In the tests where the black cotton flame indi- I
can be seen in Table 2 the measured pressures I
cators were used, Tests 1 through 9, there were no
converted to total force on unit doors indicates I
indications of burning or scorching on any of the
shock wave pressures with resultant forces ranging I
black cotton indicators. I
from approximately 600 pounds to more than
In rests 1 through 9, the doors that were fitted I
1,500 pounds on a 1 space factor door (approxi-
with the experimental latch did not open. Interest- I
mately 14 in x 13 in) to more than 7,200 pounds I
ingly, on several tests, the top door on the vertical
on a full vertical section door (approximately 20 in I
sectio 1, two space factors away from the unit being
x 78 in). In summary, the data reinforced the I
tested, opened. This door was fitted with the stand- I
following basic premises:
ard latches. It should be noted that no hot gases I
w The pressures developed in identical tests tend
were observed escaping from this upper door. 2 I
to track the expended I t. I
The adjacent units or wireways showed little or w For these high-energy arcing faults, the more I
no internal sooting and no indication of any dam- current-limiting the upstream fuse, the less I
age. S:orch marking was observed on external sur- pressure developed under identical test condi- I
faces immediately adjacent to the faulted unit, tions. I
particilarly on the latch and hinge sides. The dam- H The larger the enclosure, the less psi pressure I
developed, but total pressure on the enclosure I
age in the faulted unit was extensive. Wires feeding
door increases significantly. I
the unit under test were vaporized. The doors were I
bulge'l and the hinge sides were bent and sprung. Unprotected bus work when exposed to the
I
All hi iges remained intact. The experimental door ionized fault gases will tend to allow the fault I
to propagate into a highly damaging traveling I
latches and the holders were, in some cases, slightly
arcing fault. An important additional obser- I
bent.
vation can be drawn from the pressure data is I
It .vas particularly noticeable on the high-speed the unpredictable nature of the magnitude of I
video: that the spring loaded latches allowed the the faults and the resultant pressures devel- I
door t o open slightly at the instant of fault to relieve oped. Uncontrollable and unpredictable vari- I
some ?ressure. The gases escaping during this pres- ables such as arc characteristics, initiation I
I
sure Ielief appeared to flow along the face of the conditions, propagation characteristics,
I
adjacmt section and to cool rapidly. dT/dt, etc., make it virtually impossible to I

I€€€IndustryApplications Mogozine = Moy/June I996

6
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
accurately predict or duplicate test results. tive solutions for lessening the potential impact of
I
Additional field conditions outside the lab arcing faults.
I
I
environment further complicate these issues. 2. Help the user community by defining the
I Therefore, the most one should interpret from
parameters under which individual equipment
I these test results or other similar test results
should be protected to improve designs and safety.
I is an appreciation of the arcing fault phenom-
I ena, an indication of the expected magnitude Users:
I of the pressures to which protection must be 1. Press for equipment designs that incorporate
i provided, and the importance of insulation improved unit door latching and quality insulation
I and isolation of the equipment design. ’
I and isolation of the bus work.
I 2. Work with the standards organizations and
I the manufacturers to ensure the needs of the user
I Recommendufions are being satisfied.
I The dangers of a high-energy arcing fault have been
I 3 . As the parameters ate defined, ensure the
addressed by international standards for medium-
I equipment is being properly installed and pto-
I and high-voltage equipment. This high-energy arc- /
tected.
I ing fault has historically not been examined for
I low-voltage equipment until recently. Internation- 4. Ensure that equipment for which it is impqac-
I ally, arc testing standards that were originally writ- tical to assure containment or venting is identified
I
ten for medium-voltage class equipment have been and that personnel ate properly protected whenever
I exposed to the potential hazard.
I
adopted on an “as requested” basis for low-voltage
I equipment. As the improvement of electrical equip-
I ment is an ongoing process, the authors recommend
I the following groups rake steps toward addressing
I high-energy arcing faults in low-voltage equip- References
I 111RH Lee, “The Other Electrical Hazard Electric Arc Blast
ment:
I Burn,” IEEE Transactzons on Indnstrzal Applzcatzons, vol IA-
I Standards Groups: \ 18, no 3, May/June 1982
I 1. Conduct and/or support testing that will bet- 121 R H Lee, “Pressures Developed by Arcs,” IEEE Tmnsactzons
I on lndustrtal Applzcatzons, vol IA-23, no 4, JulyIAugust
ter quantify the various parameters associated with 1987
I
I
high-energy arcing faults. 131 ANSI/UL 845, “Standard for Motor Control Centers,” Un-
derwriters Laboratories Inc ,3rd ed , Feb 18, 1988, North-
I ‘ 2. Based upon the above findings, develop stand-
brook, IL 60062
I ards that aid the manufacturer in designing equip- 141NEMA ICs 2-322, 1988, National Electrical Manufacturers
I ment that will reduce the potential for the creation Association, Washington, D C 20037
I I51IEC439-1, 1992, “Low Voltage Switchgear and Controlgear
of a high-energy arc, reduce the personnel exposure Assemblies,” International Electrotechnical Commission,
I
I to the hazards of an arcing fault, and reduce damage Geneva, Switzerland
I to equipment resulting from an arcing fault. t61 K S Crawford, D G Clark, R L Doughty, ‘ Motor Terminal
Box Explosions Due to Faults,’ IEEE Petroleum and Chemi-
I 3. Develop standardized testing procedures to cal Industry Conference, September 1991 (Conf Record #
I
simulate, as much as possible, worst-case arcing 91-CH3057-7 )
I 171AS 1136 1-1988, “Low Voltage Switchgear and Controlgear
I
energy transfer and the resultant containment or
Assemblies,” Standards Association of Australia, Sydney,
I venting capabilities. Australia
I Manufacturers: 181IEC 298, 1990, “A C Metal Enclosed Switchgear and Con-
I trolgear for Rated Voltages Above 1 kV and Up To and
1. Work with both the standardization and the Includmg 52 kV,”International Eiectrotechoical Commis-
I
I
user communities, determine adequate, cost-effec- sion, Geneva, Switzerland
I
I
I
I .~ ~.

I
I We invice readers to submit copic sugges- John PI. Kassrbaum, Editor-in-Chief
I
tions, m d rlie associated author(s), for future l E E E lndwrty App/icatzG??rMqil‘“zi?ze
I
I feacure articles. Please reply either by using the 2503 Pleasant Way, West Drirc
I Reader Service Card ot by sending your sugges- Indianapolis, I S 46280
I (ions dittccly to: Fax: 3 17-844-9678
I , E-mail: j.i:asscbauni~~iee.or~
I
I
I

/E€€ lndustry ApplicufionsMuguzine Muy/June/ 1 996

I
\
I