LAWYER'S SEXY PHOTOS ON FB, NOT IMMORAL; ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
mmission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
IN DISBARMENT CASES
FIRST DIVISION: [A.C. No. 10295, August 30, 2017] MAY AZCUETA
YABUT V. ATTY. MARISSA V. MANALO.
In this Complaint [1] for disbarment, complainant charged respondent Atty.
Marissa V. Manalo of gross immoral conduct for having an alleged illicit affair with
complainant's husband, Ernie S. Yabut (Ernie) and for posting allegedly indecent
pictures on her social media account on "Friendster".
According to complainant, respondent and Ernie started their relationship in June
2008, by sending electronic mails (e-mails) to each other as Ernie was based in the
United States of America (USA) while respondent was a local television anchor in
the Philippines. [2] Despite knowing Ernie's subsisting marriage with complainant,
complainant alleged that respondent and Ernie continued their relationship and
met in person in January 2009. After such personal encounter, respondent
allegedly asked Ernie to do something about his marriage with complainant, and
finally gave him an ultimatum.[3]
Complainant alleged that sometime in January 2011, respondent went to the USA
and met with Ernie. Such encounter was seen by one of complainant's friends.[4]
In April 2011, complainant claimed that Ernie left complainant and their son,
stopped supporting them, and went to the Philippines to live with respondent.[5]
To support her allegation of an illicit relationship between respondent and Ernie,
complainant submitted in evidence the transcripts of e-mail exchanges between
respondent and Ernie.[6]
Complainant also questioned the respondent's conduct of being a member of the
bar when she posted several allegedly indecent pictures on her social media
account, "Friendster".[7]
For her part, respondent denied the accusations against her and countered that
complainant did not provide sufficient proof to establish her allegedly gross
immoral conduct. Moreover, as to the indecent pictures, respondent averred that
unconventional behavior is not immoral conduct which warrants disbarment.[8]
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The IBP-CBD held, in its Report and
Recommendation[9] dated July 6, 2013, that the evidence presented by
complainant failed to meet the standards of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.[10]
The fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the instant
case be DISMISSED for lack of merit, with caution on Respondent to be more
careful in her personal dealings in the future so as to not have any suspicion of
impropriety.[11]
In a Resolution[12] dated October 10, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD and dismissed the complaint against respondent.
The IBP- BOG disposed thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is HEREBY ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable
laws, and considering that the Complaint lacks merit, the case against Respondent
is hereby DISMISSED.[13]
We dismiss the instant complaint.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis -neither purely civil nor
purely criminal.[14] They do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers. While these proceedings
are sui generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence may not be altogether
dispensed with. More so in this case, when the evidence in consideration, i.e. the
transcripts of the e-mail exchanges between respondent and Ernie, fails to comply
with the basic rules on admissibility.
The e-mails between respondent and Ernie are considered electronic data
messages described in A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC or the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
An electronic data message refers to information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.[15]
Further, the Rules on Electronic Evidence regard an electronic document as
admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by
the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed
by the Rules on Electronic Evidence.[16]
Under the Rules of Court, "[ejvidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by law or [said] Rules".[17] One of the rules in admitting
evidence and avoiding its exclusion is to comply with the rules on authentication.
The Rules of Court provides that authenticity and due execution of a private
document, offered as authentic, must be proved before it is received in evidence.
[18] However, in cases of electronic evidence, the manner in which such due
execution and authenticity are to be proved is specifically stated under Rule 5,
Section 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides that "[b]efore any
private electronic document[19] is offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be
authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the
judge."
In this case, complainant merely presented in evidence the transcripts of the e-
mails with no proof of authentication. Failure to comply with the above-mentioned
proof of authentication, therefore, renders it inadmissible. Furthermore, We agree
with the IBP-CBD that the integrity of the e-mails was put into doubt when
complainant highlighted certain parts of the same for emphasis[20]. The act of
being able to edit the texts of the e-mails, such as highlighting, underscoring, and
using the bold style, to support the accusation of illicit relationship all the more
reinforces the fact that these electronic documents may easily be tampered,
manipulated, and edited.
The questionable integrity of the presented e-mail exchanges imperatively
necessitates the application of the Rules on Evidence.
Apart from e-mail exchanges, complainant submitted in evidence several pictures
of respondent and Ernie together. However, We find that such pictures do not
categorically depict an illicit relationship as said pictures are equivocal.
As to the indecent pictures, We do not find respondent's act of posting her
pictures, portraying herself in a seductive manner, on her social media account as
grossly immoral. While the kind of pictures which respondent posted do not
exemplify and represent how a lawyer, who is an officer of the court, must
properly behave in the eyes of the public, We are not inclined to rule that such act
is grossly immoral.
Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant,
or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.[21]
We emphasize that "in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof'.
[22] In this case, the complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving that
the actions of respondent would warrant the imposition of a penalty.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Marissa V. Manalo is
DISMISSED. Let this case be considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7820             September 12, 2008
ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR., complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO C. FRIAL, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
December 22, 2006, complainant Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr. charged
respondent Atty. Joselito C. Frial with violating his Lawyer’s Oath and/or gross
misconduct arising from his actuations with respect to two attached vehicles.
Complainant, owner of the vehicles in question, asked that Atty. Frial be
disbarred. 
The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo v. Ricardo Salomon et
al., docketed as Civil Case No. 05-111825 before the Regional Trial Court in
Manila, in which a writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favor of Lucy Lo,
Atty. Frial’s client. The writ was used to attach two (2) cars of complainant-a black
1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra.
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing
the attached cars in the court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Lo’s
counsel. Atty. Salomon claimed that on several occasions, the Nissan Sentra was
spotted being used by unauthorized individuals. For instance, on December 26,
2005, barangay captain Andrew Abundo saw the Nissan Sentra in front of a
battery shop on Anonas St., Quezon City. On February 18, 2006, Architect Roberto
S. Perez and three others saw and took video and photo shots of the same car
while in the Manresa Shell station at P. Tuazon Blvd. corner 20th Avenue, Quezon
City. Also sometime in June 2006, Robert M. Perez, complainant’s driver, saw the
said car in another Shell station near Kamias Street. On December 16, 2006,
Arlene Carmela M. Salomon spotted it driven by bondsman Ferdinand Liquigan
allegedly with Atty. Frial’s consent. As Atty. Salomon further alleged, when the
misuse of the car was reported, paving for Liquigan’s apprehension, Atty. Frial, in
a letter, acknowledged having authorized Liquigan to bring the car in custodia
legis to a mechanic.
As to the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial
deliberately withheld information as to its whereabouts. As it turned out later, the
Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but the court was not immediately put on
notice of this development.  Frial took custody of the Nissan Sentra and Volvo cars, he was duty bound to keep
In his Answer,2 Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars thru his own
undertaking, without authority and knowledge of the court. The subject vehicles,
according to him, were first parked near the YMCA building in front of the Manila
City Hall where they remained for four months. He said that when he went to
check on the vehicles’ condition sometime in December 2005, he found them to
have been infested and the wirings underneath the hoods gnawed by rats. He
denied personally using or allowing others the use of the cars, stating in this
regard that if indeed the Nissan Sentra was spotted on Anonas St., Quezon City on
December 26, 2005, it could have been the time when the car was being
transferred from the YMCA. The February 18, 2006 and June 2006 sightings, so
Atty. Frial claimed, possibly occurred when the Nissan Sentra was brought to the
gas station to be filled up. He said that the car could not have plausibly been
spotted in Project 3 on December 13, 2006, parked as it was then in front of
Liquigan’s house for mechanical check-up.
During the mandatory conference/hearing before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, the parties agreed on the following key issues to be resolved: (1)
whether or not Atty. Frial used the cars for his personal benefit; and (2) whether
or not Atty. Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached properties.
Thereafter and after the submission by the parties of their respective position
papers, the Commission submitted a Report dated October 9, 2007 which the IBP
Board of Governors forthwith adopted and then transmitted to this Court. In the
Report, the following were deduced from the affidavits of Andrew Abundo, Roberto
Perez, Robert Perez, and Dante Batingan: (1) at no time was Atty. Frial seen
driving the Sentra; (2) Abundo learned that at that time the car was spotted at the
battery shop, the unnamed driver bought a new battery for the car which was not
inappropriate since a battery was for the preservation of the car; (3) Atty. Frial
admitted that the Nissan Sentra was seen gassed up on February 18, 2006 and in
June 2006 and there was no reason to gas up the Nissan Sentra on those times
unless it was being used; (4) Roberto Perez said the Nissan Sentra was used to
buy goat’s meat; and (5) photos of the Nissan Sentra in different places obviously
showed it was being used by others.
In the same Report, the Commission observed that while there is perhaps no
direct evidence tying up Atty. Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the
unyielding fact remains that it was being used by other persons during the time he
was supposed to have custody of it. In addition, whoever drove the Nissan Sentra
on those occasions must have received the car key from Atty. Frial. When Atty.
and preserve these in the same condition he received them so as to fetch a good
price should the vehicles be auctioned. 
As to the burnt Volvo, Atty. Frial admitted receiving it in excellent condition and
that there was no court order authorizing him to remove the car from the YMCA
premises. Admitted too was the fact that he secured the release of the Volvo on
the strength alone of his own written undertaking; 3 and that the car was almost
totally destroyed by fire on February 4, 2006 at 1:45 a.m. 4 while parked in his
residence. He could not, however, explain the circumstances behind the
destruction, but admitted not reporting the burning to the court or the sheriff.
While the burning of the car happened before the mediation hearing, Atty. Frial,
upon inquiry of Atty. Salomon, did not give information as to the whereabouts of
the cars.
The destruction of the Volvo in Atty. Frial’s residence was not an ordinary
occurrence; it was an event that could have not easily escaped his attention.
Accordingly, there is a strong reason to believe that Atty. Frial deliberately
concealed the destruction of said vehicle from the court during the hearings in Civil
Case No. 05-111828, which were the opportune times to reveal the condition of
the Volvo car.
On the basis of the foregoing premises, the Commission concluded that Atty. Frial
committed acts clearly bearing on his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to
observe the diligence required of him as custodian of the cars. The Commission
thus recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended from the practice of law for one
(1) year.  of the case, there is no compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial
The findings and the recommendation of the Commission are well-taken. 
A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the
attached property, thus securing the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.5 When the objects of the
attachment are destroyed, then the attached properties would necessarily be of no
value and the attachment would be for naught.
From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is no question that
Atty. Frial is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics that states:
11. Dealing with trust property
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain
he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.  of the same served on the IBP and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own
or be used by him. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the
ultimate penalty of disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and moral character of
a lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 6 With the view we take
intended to pervert the administration of justice for some dishonest purpose.
Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment
less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end
desired.7 This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the
economic life and honor of the erring person. In the case of Atty. Frial, the Court
finds that a year’s suspension from the practice of his legal profession will provide
him with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Frial is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct and
infidelity in the custody of properties in custodia legis. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let notice of this Decision be entered in
his personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice
circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to

respect the court’s order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties
as such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued.

Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the
attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who
had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the
destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them
without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, we find Atty. Frial
guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We
must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not
without legal recourse in recovering the Volvo’s value from Atty. Frial should they
desire to do so. 
A.C. No. 7813               April 21, 2009
CARLITO P. CARANDANG, Complainant,  KANG PERA PANG-APILA" dahil sa sagot sa akin ay para akong nawalan [ng] pag-
vs.
ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint filed by Carlito P. Carandang (Carandang) against Atty. Gilbert
S. Obmina (Atty. Obmina). Atty. Obmina was counsel for Carandang in Civil Case
No. B-5109 entitled "Sps. Emilia A. Carandang and Carlito Carandang v. Ernesto
Alzona." Carandang brought suit for Atty. Obmina’s failure to inform Carandang of
the adverse decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 and for failure to appeal the decision.
The Facts
The facts of CBD Case No. 06-1869 in the Report and Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) read as
follows:
Complainant’s Sworn Statement is hereto reproduced as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
Ako si CARLITO P. CARANDANG, nasa wastong gulang, may asawa’t mga anak, at
nakatira sa 5450 Alberto Apt., St. Francis Homes, Halang Biñan, Laguna.
Na ako ay may kasong isinampa kay ERNESTO T. ALSONA tungkol sa aming bahay
at lupa, at isinampa sa BIÑAN RTC BRANCH 25, CIVIL CASE NO. B-5109.
Na ang naturang kaso ay natapos at nadisisyunan noong Enero 28, 2000 at ako ay
natalo sa naturang kaso.
Na ang aking naging abogado ay si ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA, tubong Quezon at
bilang kababayan ako ay nagtiwala sa kanyang kakayahan upang maipagtanggol
sa naturang kaso, ngunit taliwas sa aking pananalig sa kanya ang nasabing kaso
ay napabayaan hanggang sa magkaroon ng desisyon ang korte na kunin ang aking
lupa’t bahay, sa madali’t sabi kami ay natalo ng hindi ko man lang nalalaman at
huli na ang lahat ng malaman ko dahil hindi na kami pwedeng umapila.
Na nalaman ko lang na may desisyon na pala ang korte pagkatapos ng anim na
buwan. Ang aking anak na si ROSEMARIE ay nagpunta sa BIÑAN, sa RTC ay binati
at tinatanong kung saan kayo nakatira at ang sagot [ng] aking anak BAKIT? At
ang sagot naman [ng] taga RTC, HINDI MO BA ALAM NA ANG INYONG KASO AY
TAPOS NA. Nang marinig yon ay umuwi na siya at sinabi agad sa akin. Tapos na
daw yung kaso [ng] ating bahay at ako ay pumunta sa opisina ni ATTY. OBMINA
at aking tinanong "BAKIT DI MO SINABI SA AKIN NA TAPOS NA ANG KASO?" At
ang sagot niya sa akin "AY WALA KANG IBABAYAD SA ABOGADO DAHIL WALA
asa sa kaso.
Lumapit ako sa Malacañang at binigay yung sulat pero doon ay aking nakausap
yung isang abogado at ako’y kanyang pinakinggan at aking inabot ang papeles at
aking pinakita at ang sabi ay hindi na pwede dahil anim na buwan na [nang]
lumipas ang kaso. Kaya aking sinabi sa ATTY. ng Malacañang na hindi sinabi sa
akin agad ni ATTY. OBMINA na may order na pala ang kaso.
Kaya ang ginawang paraan ay binigyan ako ng sulat para ibigay sa IBP, at nang
mabasa ang sulat ay sinabi sa akin na doon sa SAN PABLO ang hearing, at
tinanong ako kung nasaan ang ATTORNEY’S WITHDRAWAL NYO? Ang sagot ko ay
"WALA HO," kaya inutusan ako na kunin ang ATTORNEY’S WITHDRAWAL at agad
akong nagpunta sa opisina ni ATTY. OBMINA at tinanong ko sa sekretarya niya
kung nasaan si ATTY. OBMINA ang sagot sa akin ay nasa AMERICA NA! Kaya’t
aking tinanong kung sinong pwede magbigay sa akin ng attorney’s withdrawal at
ang sabi ay yung anak nya na si CARMELITSA OBMINA. Bumalik ako noong araw
ng Biyernes at aking nakuha, pero hindi na ako nakabalik sa IBP dahil noong araw
na iyon ay hindi ko na kayang maglakad, kaya hindi na natuloy ang hearing sa
SAN PABLO.
CARLITO P. CARANDANG
Affiant
CTC No. 21185732
Issued on March 7, 2006
At Biñan, Laguna
On November 16, 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through Rogelio A.
Vinluan, the then Director for Bar Discipline (now the incumbent Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines), issued an Order directing
respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina to submit his Answer, duly verified, in six (6)
copies, and furnish the complainant with a copy thereof, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the Order.
On December 12, 2006, this Commission was in receipt of a Manifestation dated
December 11, 2006 filed by a certain Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaña.
Allegedly, she is the daughter of respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina. She further
alleged that [her] father is already a permanent resident of the United States of
America since March 2001 and had already retired from the practice of law.
That on February 20, 2007, undersigned Commissioner [Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.]
scheduled the Mandatory Conference/Hearing of the case on March 20, 2007 at
9:30 a.m.
On March 19, 2007, Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaña filed a Manifestation
and Motion reiterating her earlier Manifestation that the respondent, Atty. Gilbert
S. Obmina is already a permanent resident of the United States for the last six (6)
years and likewise, she reiterated her request that summons be served on her
father thru extraterritorial service. Atty. Muaña likewise requested the cancellation
of the mandatory conference and resetting of the same on April 10, 2007.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference on March 20, 2007, complainant Carlito
P. Carandang appeared. The undersigned Commissioner directed Atty. Carmelita
Muaña to appear before this Commission on May 18, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and to
bring with her the alleged withdrawal of appearance filed by her father and to
bring proof that her father is now really a permanent resident of the United States
of America. 
That on May 18, 2007, Atty. Muaña again filed a Manifestation and Motion
informing this Honorable Commission that she cannot possibly appear for the
reason that she is the legal counsel of a candidate in Muntinlupa City and that the
canvassing of the election results is not yet finished. She likewise submitted copies
of her father’s Passport and US Permanent Residence Card. That with respect [to]
the Withdrawal of Appearance, Atty. Muaña alleged that copies of the same were
all given to complainant Carlito P. Carandang.
That an Order dated May 18, 2007 was issued by the undersigned Commissioner
granting the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion. Atty. Muaña was likewise directed
to appear before this Office on June 22, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
On June 22, 2007, in the supposed Mandatory Conference, Atty. Carmencita
Obmina Muaña appeared. Likewise presented was Mr. Carlito Carandang who is
the complainant against Atty. Gilbert Obmina. In the interest of justice, Atty.
Muaña was given a period of ten (10) days within which to file a verified answer.
The Mandatory Conference was set on August 3, 2007 at 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon.
On June 29, 2007, Atty. Muaña filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file Answer.
On July 3, 2007, this Commission is in receipt of the verified Answer filed by
respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina.
On August 3, 2007, during the Mandatory Conference, complainant Carlito
Carandang appeared. Atty. Muaña appeared in behalf of [her] father. After making
some admissions, stipulations and some clarificatory matters, the parties were
directed to submit their verified position papers within ten (10) days. Thereafter,
the case will be submitted on report and recommendation.
On August 10, 2007, complainant, by himself, filed an Urgent Motion for Extension
of Time to File Position Paper. Likewise, respondent, through Atty. Muaña, filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Position Paper on August 13, 2007.
On September 3, 2007, the Commission on Bar Discipline received copy of the
Respondent’s Memorandum.
On September 12, 2007, this Commission received copy of complainant’s Position
Paper.1
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report2 dated 2 October 2007, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Jose I. De
La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) found that Atty. Obmina was still
counsel of record for complainant at the time the decision was rendered and up to
the time of the issuance of the writ of execution. Atty. Obmina received the
Decision dated 28 January 2000 on 1 March 2000. Atty. Carmencita Obmina-
Muaña manifested in Court that her father has been living in the United States of
America since 2001. There is nothing on record that will show that Atty. Obmina
notified complainant in any manner about the decision.
Although Commissioner De La Rama observed that complainant is partly to blame
for his loss for failure to maintain contact with Atty. Obmina and to inform himself
of the progress of his case, Commissioner De La Rama nonetheless underscored
the duty of Atty. Obmina to notify his client as to what happened to his case.
Thus:
One cannot escape the fact that the complainant himself failed to communicate
with his counsel for quite sometime. There is nothing in the complainant’s Sworn
Statement that would show that he regularly visited the office of the respondent,
Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina. Complainant is partly to blame for his loss and it should
not be attributed solely to the respondent.
The Supreme Court held that "clients should maintain contact with their counsel
from time to time and inform themselves of the progress of their case, thereby
exercising that standard of care which an ordinary prudent man bestows upon his
business (Leonardo vs. S.T. Best, Inc., 422 SCRA 347)
However, the respondent who has in his possession the complete files and address
of the complainant, should have exerted efforts to even notify Mr. Carandang as to
what happened to his case. Whether the decision is adverse [to] or in favor of his
client, respondent is duty bound to notify the clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence."  Further under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, " a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."  Lastly, under Rule 18.04, "a lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to client’s request for information."
That as a result of the respondent’s failure to notify the complainant, the latter lost
the case leading to his eviction.
In the case of Mijares vs. Romana 425 SCRA 577, the Supreme Court held that  "as
an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
information he may have acquired which it is important that the client should have
knowledge of."  In another case, the Supreme Court held that "respondent’s failure
to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and
malpractice proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility"  (Cheng vs.
Agravante, 426 SCRA 42).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with head bowed in sadness, it is
respectfully recommended that Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Although the said respondent is reportedly in the United States of America and
accordingly retired from the practice of law, this Commission will not close its eyes
on the negligence that he has committed while in the active practice.
SO ORDERED.3 (Emphasis in the original)
In a Resolution4 dated 19 October 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama. The
Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of
the case on 14 March 2008.
The Ruling of the Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations. Atty. Obmina
violated Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 
Atty. Obmina Failed to Serve Complainant 
with Competence and Diligence
Canon 18 states that "[a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence." Rules 18.03 and 18.04 provide that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable" and "[a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information."
In his Memorandum, Atty. Obmina admitted that he was counsel for Carandang in
Civil Case No. B-5109. Atty. Obmina blamed Carandang for the adverse decision in
Civil Case No. B-5109 because Carandang did not tell him that there was a
Compromise Agreement executed prior to Atty. Obmina’s filing of the complaint in
Civil Case No. B-5109. Carandang, on the other hand, stated that Atty. Obmina
made him believe that they would win the case. In fact, Carandang engaged the
services of Atty. Obmina on a contingent basis. Carandang shall pay Atty. Obmina
40% of the sale proceeds of the property subject matter of the case. Atty. Obmina
promised to notify Carandang as soon as the decision of the court was given. 
Contrary to Atty. Obmina’s promise, there is no evidence on record that Atty.
Obmina took the initiative to notify Carandang of the trial court’s adverse decision.
Atty. Obmina again put Carandang at fault for failure to advance the appeal fee.
Atty. Obmina’s version of Carandang’s confrontation with him was limited to this
narrative:
Sometime in the year 2000, complainant went to respondent’s law office. He was
fuming mad and was blaming respondent for having lost his case. He asked for the
records of the case because according to him, he will refer the case to a certain
Atty. Edgardo Salandanan. Respondent gave complainant the case file.
Complainant did not return to pursue the appeal or at least had given an appeal
fee to be paid to Court in order to perfect the appeal.5
Atty. Obmina’s futile efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only serve to
emphasize his failure to notify Carandang that the trial court already promulgated
a decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 that was adverse to Carandang’s interests.
Atty. Obmina cannot overlook the fact that Carandang learned about the
promulgation of the decision not through Atty. Obmina himself, but through a
chance visit to the trial court. Instead of letting Carandang know of the adverse
decision himself, Atty. Obmina should have immediately contacted Carandang,
explained the decision to him, and advised them on further steps that could be
taken. It is obvious that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal because of Atty.
Obmina’s inaction. Notwithstanding Atty. Obmina’s subsequent withdrawal as A.C. No. 8920               September 28, 2011
Carandang’s lawyer, Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record at the time the trial
court promulgated the decision in Civil Case No. B-5109.
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant, 
In Tolentino v. Mangapit, we stated that:
vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform her client of
whatever information she may have acquired which it is important that the client
should have knowledge of. She should notify her client of any adverse decision to DECISION
enable her client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping
the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize BRION, J.:
misunderstanding and [loss] of trust and confidence in the attorney. 6
Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the
Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03,
need for the lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be
developments affecting the client’s case. The lawyer should not leave the client in
reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the
the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. 7
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty.
Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao
The Court finds well-taken the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Gilbert
City.
S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year. In the cases of  Credito v.
Sabio8 and Pineda v. Macapagal,9 we imposed the same penalty upon attorneys
who failed to update their clients on the status of their cases. Considering Atty. Background
Obmina’s advanced age, such penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest
of the public and legal profession. Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment 2 with the Commission on Discipline of
the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 11 3 and
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors 124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina is found GUILTY of violation Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
of Canon 18 and of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDS Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of
law for one year, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for
will be dealt with more severely. reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing
his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited
appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then cite me!"5 Judge Baculi cited
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
their information and guidance.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and
SO ORDERED. shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you!"6 Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the
courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the
courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a
threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and challenged the judge to a
fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.7
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he
continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court. 8
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No.
2640, an ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which
he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision became final and
executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent
filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground
the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi
asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the
jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
The respondent filed his Answer,9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who
disrespected him.10 We quote from his Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law
against him once inside the court room when he was lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I
just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument
because he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to
make appear to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he
said "YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT" making it
an impression to the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT,
INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]
xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion,
Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an order that the Motion for
Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he
forced me to argue so that he will have the room to humiliate me as he
used to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la
Rama, Jr. In his Commissioner’s Report, 11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that
during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely
reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that
the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would
be submitted for the Commissioner’s review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and
the transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows: 12
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the
respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but the voice of the complainant
appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was also
observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks.
In fact, in the TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant stated
the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we
are very sorry if you do not want to appear before my court, then you better
attend to your cases and do not appear before my court if you do not want to be
corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words – "we are very sorry" [– were] actually uttered by Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of ₱100.00.
Atty. Battung while the judge was saying the quoted portion of the TSN)
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions ignorance of the law.
when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge.
Court: Yes, proceed.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
*
Court: Next case.
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to
present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
the court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like … (not finished)
Court: Do not shout.
Court: The next time…
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear …
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant. see me, see me after the court.

Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other. Next case.

Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he
shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that
it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases
to be called. They must have observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit
submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying that it was really
Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him "not
to shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita
Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and
maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated
Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The respondent’s
argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due
consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding
judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be
tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the
Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is
insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial
processes to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the IBP’s finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi
by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence
of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came
back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be
allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and
acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the
latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the
respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings.
These actions were not only against the person, the position and the stature of
Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and
flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed
duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a
judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr. 13 that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an
officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for
the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s
role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly
berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a
manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and
in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be
handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an
objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a
bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded,
while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months
suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.
In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State
Prosecutor,14 we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05,
Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and for violating the Lawyer’s Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in
newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battung’s violations are no less
serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial
proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and
before the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi
and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of
the judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY
of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon
the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the respondent’s personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7747               July 14, 2008
CATHERINE & HENRY YU, Complainants,  As Wealth Marketing’s Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a
complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña for alleged
acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 2 Complainants attached therewith their
Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit3which they earlier filed before the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the
criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP
22).
The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:
Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy)
who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General
Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency
trading.4 Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to
invest a minimum amount of ₱100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said
company. They were made to believe that the said company had the so-called
"stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum allowable
loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other
hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the
investors the principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further,
Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks
covering the principal investments. 5
It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing’s promises were false and
fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason
"account closed." The investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth
Marketing’s office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already
ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur-Link
Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the
former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the respondent.
complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former
company.6 To put a semblance of validity to such representation, respondent
signed an Agreement7 to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to
further deceive the investors. 8 This prompted the complainants to send demand
letters to Wealth Marketing’s officers and directors which remained unheeded.
They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa against the
respondent and his co-accused.9
Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has
been successful in defying the law, to this date.
In an Order10 dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B.
Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter
failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the
complainants.11 The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la
Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the
lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory
conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in
default and the case was heard ex parte.
In his report,12 the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing’s executives
(which included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the
complainants by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors
to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no such business
existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact
that Wealth Marketing’s financial status could not support the investors’ demands
involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link
was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner
likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court for
committing similar acts of defraudation. 13 Considering the gravity of the acts
committed, as well as his previous administrative case and defiance of lawful
orders, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents
presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the
same respondent, and said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of
the land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty.
Antoniutti K. Palaña be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
upon the approval of the Board of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court. 14
In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Commissioner’s report and recommendation. 15
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal
system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s
faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined
– whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any conduct that is
wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. 16
In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a
vital role, being Wealth Marketing’s Chairman of the Board and Ur-Link’s
representative. We quote with approval the Commissioner’s findings, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati, it appears that
the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic)
other to defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting
innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth of the
matter is that there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation
is not duly licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to
perform such task.
In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing and General
Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is only ₱9,680,000.00 and the
paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation is (sic) only ₱605,000.00. Said
corporation, as the records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions
of pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests as
promised. However, their company resources and financial status will show that
they are not in the position to meet these demands if a situation such as this
would arise.
xxxx
Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return
of their investments, said respondent even formed and made him part of a new
company, Ur-Link Corporation, which according to the complainants, when they
met the respondent, would assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth
Marketing Corporation. It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud. 17
To be sure, respondent’s conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of
facts is still pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of the
bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal
cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.18 Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of
a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise,
this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and
continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate. 19 Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. 20 The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. 21
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. x x x.
Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised
with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and a member of the bar.22
The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an
administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law
in Samala v. Palaña23 and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaña. 24 In Samala,
respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial
Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent
committed the same offense by making himself part of the money trading business
when, in fact, said business was not among the purposes for which FIRI was
created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with
more severely.25 Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his
continued refusal to settle his loan obligations. 261avvphi1
The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the
warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending)
exacerbates his offense.27
Finally, we note that respondent’s case is further highlighted by his lack of regard
for the charges brought against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges
head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position paper,
nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his
conduct.28 The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member
of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show
proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him.29 Verily, respondent’s failure to comply with the orders of the
IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. 30 As a
lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely
deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against
lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant
disrespect of the Court. 31 By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court. 32
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior
misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a three-year
suspension with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
dealt with more severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the
contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades
the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty ---
disbarment.33 Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. 34
WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaña is hereby DISBARRED , and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5916            July 1, 2003
SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao.
Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming an attorney. 
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this
wise:
"The Complaint arose from the [respondent’s] persistent refusal to make
good on four (4) RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand
(P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks were issued by defendant
in replacement for previous checks issued to the complainant. Based on
the exchange of letters between the parties, it appears that [respondent],
in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to ‘forthwith effect
immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with
Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end
of June 2000.’ Again, in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent]
made a ‘request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from June 30,
2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which to effect payment
of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao.’ Needless to say, the initiation of this present
complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never
made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his
indebtedness."2
In his Answer3 dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his
proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his
promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not
constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of the following: 
"(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice;
"(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in
the present case, it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is
being charged by the complainant, is merely a violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity), which is a special law, and is
not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-
evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a
violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-
dated check or a check in payment of an obligation, with insufficient
funds in the drawee bank, through false pretenses or fraudulent acts,
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
which is a crime involving moral turpitude;
"(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under
Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the
complainant, then, verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel
and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court would not
countenance;
"(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules, clearly shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the
alleged issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one
of the grounds for disciplinary action against a member of the Bar, to
warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, by the
Supreme Court; and
"(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in
violation of B.P. 22, does NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
 Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law profession swings on
reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable and
unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in
violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless
check, in violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the
said attorney, the benefit of the doubt."4
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply. 5 Thereafter, IBP-CBD
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for
investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on October 4, 2001. After
several cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing,
respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total
of P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorney’s fees).
Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt and
to discuss the plan of payment for attorney’s fees in the next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled
hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted
on leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency. Complainant’s counsel
objected and Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in
another case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a loud voice, "It’s up
to you, this is only disbarment, my family is more important." 6 And, despite the
objection and the warning, he arrogantly left. He made no effort to comply with
his undertaking to settle his indebtedness before leaving.  Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his September 19, 2002 Report,7 Commissioner Cunanan found respondent
guilty of violating the attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The former explained that, contrary to the latter’s claim, violation of BP 22 was a
crime that involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that ‘‘[w]hile no criminal
case may have been instituted against [respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed,
[the latter] committed not one (1) but four counts of violation of BP 22." 8 The
"refusal [by respondent] to pay his indebtedness, his broken promises, his
arrogant attitude towards complainant’s counsel and the [commission sufficiently]
warrant the imposition of sanctions against him." 9Thus, the investigating
commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,10 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years. The Resolution, together with
the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to
Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
but reduce the period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our
legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 11 In so doing, the
people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay
his debts and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from
complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless
checks, he contends that such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records
that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on
his obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he refused to recognize
any wrongdoing and transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted
reasoning that the latter had refused to accept the former’s plan of payment. It
must be pointed out that complainant had no obligation to accept it, considering
respondent’s previous failure to comply with earlier payment plans for the same
debt. 
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to
the payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had no real
intention to settle them is evident from his unremitting failed commitments. His
cavalier attitude in incurring debts without any intention of paying for them puts
his moral character in serious doubt. 
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly
pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers
for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue
as officers of the Court.12
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless
checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and
public order.13
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the
bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the
Code specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." In Co v. Bernardino, 14 the Court considered the
issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an act constituting
gross misconduct. It explained thus:
"The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred,
and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for
misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the
lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him
morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38
Phil. 569 [1923]).
"The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue
bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his
professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in
serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless
case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the
complainant, albeit very much delayed.
"While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between
complainant and respondent as the transaction between them did not
require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless
respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court. 
"As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez
[44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to
discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an
attorney and client x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice
Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction
to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many
exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists
between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and
the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during
the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is
held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him x x x. 
"Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was
suspended for one year from the practice of law for attempting to engage
in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which
show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not
curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's
character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to
be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power
to discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our
unqualified support."
 We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent
dealt with Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when
the former was expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We
cannot countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He should be
reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his
membership therein.15

Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to
investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter to
attend to, he could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating
commissioner and asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the
former showed dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without the
consent of complainant and the investigating commissioner. 

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. 16 It demands a

high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. 17 In this
case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice.18

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP

Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
for two years. However, in line with Co v. Bernardino, 19 Ducat Jr. v. Villalon
Jr.20 and Saburnido v. Madroño21 -- which also involved gross misconduct of
lawyers -- we find the suspension of one year sufficient in this case. 

WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is

hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act
will be dealt with more severely. 

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on
the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.