CASE DIGEST 6-10

6. WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O. DOMALANTA, respondents.

Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics

Canon 20, Rule 20.01 Code of Professional Responsibility

Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. . . . A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

FACTS:

*The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the now deceased
petitioners' parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His services as counsel pertained to two related
civil cases for a sum of money in connection with the redemption of the property subject matter of the two
cases covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both cases,
the respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his clients.

* The respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorney's Lien with Notification to his Clients which substantially
alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for professional services in his favor which provided that
a) The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the plaintiff's share of the lot in question
b) The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten (10) years of plaintiffs' share of
the lot in question c) And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is for the
undersigned counsel.

*A Petition for Attorney's Lien filed by Atty. Teodoro D. Domalanta, counsel for the plaintiff, praying that his
attorney's fees be annotated as a lien at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, subject matter of this case.

*Both Aurelio and Wilfredo Licudan manifested that they have freely and voluntarily signed the Contract for
Professional Services, dated August 30, 1979 and notarized before Notary Public Amado Garrovillas.

*Considering the manifestation of plaintiff, Aurelio Licudan and Alfredo (sic) Licudan that they have entered
freely and voluntarily in the said contract of professional services, let the same be annotated at the back of
TCT 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, upon payment of the required legal fees.

*The Contract for Professional Services differs from the earlier contractual provisions in that it entitled the
respondent lawyer to one-third (1/3) of the subject property or 90.5 square meters and provided for
usufructuary rights over the entire lot in question in favor of the respondent lawyer's son, Teodoro M.
Domalanta, Jr. for an agreed consideration.

*The respondent lawyer filed a motion ex parte to amend the Order dated September 19, 1979 so as to
conform with an additional professional fee covering 31 square meters more of the lot for services rendered in
Civil Case No. Q-28655 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 executed by Aurelio
Licudan in favor of the respondent lawyer.
*The the trial court ordered the respondent lawyer to submit a subdivision plan in conformity with his
attorney's fees contract under which one-third (1/3) of the property or 90.5 square meters was alloted to him.

*The respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the amendment of the Order to conform
with the Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed after the annotation of the original attorney's lien of 90.5
square meters.

*The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the respondent lawyer cannot collect attorney's fees for
other cases in the action for partition.

* A second motion for reconsideration and was justified. Thus the court let an attorney's lien be annotated in
the title of the property for 31 square meters as attorney's fees of said Atty. Teodoro Domalanta in addition to
the original 90.5 square meters.

* More than ten (10) months after the Orders had become final and executory, the petitioners as substituted
heirs of the respondent lawyers' deceased clients filed a motion to set aside orders on the ground that the
award of professional fees covering 121.5 square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is unconscionable and
excessive.

* The lower court set aside its Orders. The respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration stressing the
fact that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to a contract which could no longer be
disturbed or set aside because it has already been implemented and had since then become final. This motion
was denied.

*On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent lawyer by dismissing the appeal and the
prayed for writ of preliminary injunction. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied', the
petitioners filed the instant petition.

* The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case but
would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be totally deprived of their
house and lot and the recovered damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the
respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150 square meters would also
go to attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.

ISSUE:

WON the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees.

HELD:

*It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned
by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code
of Professional Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo

“. . . When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised
by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly
excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party.”

* The questioned Orders cannot become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always
subject to the supervision of the Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section
13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics

Contingent Fees.—
 A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be
subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.

* There is nothing irregular about the execution of a written contract for professional services even after the
termination of a case as long as it is based on a previous agreement on contingent fees by the parties
concerned and as long as the said contract does not contain stipulations which are contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

* Although the Contract was apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf
of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both
manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the said contract we cannot allow the
said contract to stand as the law between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the presence of
a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the law between
the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception—that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

* Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees.

* A careful perusal of the provisions of the contract for professional services in question readily shows that
what the petitioners won was a pyrrhic victory on account of the fact that despite the successful turnout of the
partition case, they are now practically left with nothing of the whole subject lot won in the litigation. This is
because aside from the 121.5 square meters awarded to Atty. Domalanta as attorney's fees, the said contract
for professional services provides that the remaining portion shall pertain to the respondent lawyer's son by
way of usufruct for ten (10) years. There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorney's fees
the entire property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose everything
he won to the fees of his own lawyer.

* We uphold the time-honoured legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering service and securing justice, not money-
making. For the worst scenario that can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in
whom an trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy. The Contract for
Professional Services was unconscionable and unreasonable.

7. ERNESTO F. ROLDAN and MARIETTA A. ROLDAN, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION OF DAVAO, Respondents.

FACTS:

*Petitioners spouses Ernesto and Marietta Roldan claim that the attorney’s fees claimed by the private
respondent, Commercial Credit Corporation of Davao City, being gargantuan, exhorbitant and unconscionable,
should be proportionately reduced on the basis of quantum meruit.

*Private respondent Commercial Credit Corporation of Davao demurs and states that the amount is reasonable
or conscionable considering the difficulty it has encountered in collecting from the petitioners.

*Petitioners purchased fifteen (15) trucks on installment basis for P1,250,000.00 from private Respondent.
Since they could not fully pay their obligation, private respondent sued them on November 21, 1981. The trial
court rendered its decision ordering the defendants to pay in solidum the plaintiff.
*Petitioners do not dispute the facts but only that portion of the findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed
by the appellate court on the alleged exhorbitant attorney’s fees, excessive liquidated damages and usurious
interest on the loan.

ISSUE:

WON the attorney’s fees is gargantuan, exhorbitant and unconscionable.

HELD:

*The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics
regulate if not limit the lawyer’s freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready
to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and second, as an officer of the
court in the administration of justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes
axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorney’s
fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. Even with the
presence of an agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney’s fees though
fixed in the contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

*A lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and one who acts like a middleman
always out on grabs for what he can get certainly lessens the dignity of the legal profession.

That one of the terms of Promissory Note is that in case of litigation, ‘. . .the makers and indorsers
shall in addition pay 25% of the amount due as attorney’s fees and 33 1/3 more of the principal due
and unpaid as liquidated damages . . .’

*It is clear that the liquidated damages and other charges are not to be included for computation of the
attorney’s fees. The reason why respondent’s counsel came up with his attorney’s fees of P577,320.20 is that
he erroneously added the liquidated damages and other charges and interests due to the balance of the
promissory note to get the total due to which he applied the 25% stipulated fee.

8. GUENTER BACH, petitioner, vs. ONGKIKO KALAW MANHIT & ACORDA LAW OFFICES,
respondent.

Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's fees; agreement as to fees.- An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to
the importance of the subject - matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

FACTS:

*Petitioner Guenter Bach engaged the services of respondent law firm Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Accorda Law
Offices to represent him in a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. The parties signed a "Fee Agreement," for the legal services to be rendered by
respondent.

*Respondent withdrew its appearance as counsel of petitioner, due to policy differences. Respondent sent the
termination billing for the services they rendered and billed petitioner the total amount of P1,000,000.00 plus
2% interest for every month of delay in payment, based on the provision for termination of services stated in
their Fee Agreement.

*Respondent filed with the RTC a Notice of Charging Lien over the properties of the spouses Bach. RTC issued
an Order directing the annotation of the charging lien in the amount of P1,000,000.00 on all the titles of the
spouses Bach's personal and real properties enumerated in the notice of charging lien.

*Despite respondent's demands for his legal fees, petitioner failed and refused to pay. Thus, respondent filed a
Complaint for a sum of money also before the RTC of Makati. Respondent prayed for the payment of the
following: P1,000,000.00 as the latter's lawful fees for services rendered in Civil Case, plus 2% interest from
date of final demand until paid; P250,000.00 as exemplary damages; P200,000.00 representing billable time
spent in prosecuting the case, plus another P150,000.00 for any appeal taken; and P50,000.00 as litigation
expenses and the cost of suit.

*Petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent's claim had already been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished. Petitioner contended that prior to respondent's withdrawal as counsel,
petitioner had already paid respondent's services in the total amount of P200,000.00. The Motion to Dismiss
was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Petitioner failed to file his Answer; thus, he was declared in default
and respondent was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.

*RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
modified the RTC Decision.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CONCEPT OF QUANTUM MERUIT, THE AMOUNT OF P750,000.00 AS FEES
FOR SERVICES RENDERED WITH INTEREST PEGGED AT 2% A MONTH FROM DATE OF DEMAND UNTIL FULLY
PAID IS REASONABLE

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO AWARD P50,000.00 AS AND FOR LITIGATION EXPENSES AND
COSTS OF SUIT.

HELD:

*There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in
its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid
by the losing party to the prevailing party.

*The issue in this case concerns attorney's fees in the ordinary concept. Generally, the amount of attorney's
fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer's
compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit,
i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney's services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found
to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed
to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Rule 20.1,
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following factors which should guide a
lawyer in determining his fees.

*The services rendered by the respondent appears complicated and no extra ordinary skill was needed for
lawyers of respondent Law Firm to accomplish what they had done in the case before they withdrew their
appearance. We do not find herein a situation so intricate that demands more than a careful scrutiny of the
legal matters involved. These are simply the normal duties of a lawyer that he is bound by law to render to his
clients with utmost fidelity for which his client must not be burdened to pay an extra price. It bears stressing
that at the time respondent firm withdrew their appearance due to policy differences with petitioner, the case
was still in its initial stage.

*The amount of P500,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services rendered by
respondent to the petitioner. The imposition of legal interest on the amount payable to private respondent as
attorney's fees is unwarranted. The imposition of interest in the payment of attorney's fees is not justified.

*Contracts for attorney's services in this jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different footing from contracts for
the payment of compensation for any other services. [A]n attorney is not entitled in the absence of express
contract to recover more than a reasonable compensation for his services; and even when an express contract
is made, the court can ignore it and limit the recovery to reasonable compensation if the amount of the
stipulated fee is found by the court to be unreasonable. This is a very different rule from that announced in
section 1091 of the Civil Code with reference to the obligation of contracts in general, where it is said that
such obligation has the force of law between the contracting parties.

*Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy, it has been
stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.

*The Court of Appeals did not err in awarding expenses of litigation. Considering the fact that respondent was
drawn into this litigation by petitioner to protect and defend their interest and taking into account the services
already rendered by respondent to petitioner, the sum of P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation and cost of suit
would be reasonable under the premises.

*The attorney's fees awarded to respondent is REDUCED to P500,000.00, the legal interest of 2% on the
amount due to respondent is DELETED, and the award of litigation expenses is REDUCED to P30,000.00.

9. EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. MASMUD), Petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) and ATTY. ROLANDO B. GO, JR.,
Respondents.

FACTS:

*Evangelina Masmud’s (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), filed a complaint
against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability
benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Alexander
engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel.

*In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney’s fees on a contingent basis, as
follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%)
in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed that any award of attorney’s fees shall pertain to respondent’s law
firm as compensation.
*Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. His claim for payment of
medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis.

*Alexander’s employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). During the
pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer’s fees
to Evangelina, Atty. Go caused her substitution as complainant.

*The NLRC rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexander’s employer. The employer subsequently
filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same.

*On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification. The award of moral and
exemplary damages was deleted. Alexander’s employers filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. The
Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.

*The decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC decision,
which was later granted by the LA. The surety bond of the employer was garnished. Upon motion of Atty. Go,
the surety company delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check amounting to
₱3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina.

*The LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of ₱3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said
amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of ₱680,000.00.

*Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina reneged
on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of ₱680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the
award as attorney’s fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as
attorney’s fees.

*Evangelina filed a comment with motion to release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier. Evangelina
manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total monetary award was null and void
based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.

*The LA issued an Order granting Atty. Go’s motio. The NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the
amount of ₱677,589.96 which is currently deposited therein to partially satisfy the lien.

*Evangelina questioned the Order of the LA before the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution dismissing the
appeal for lack of merit. Evangelina then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. CA rendered a
Decision partially granting the petition. Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA issued a
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS DECISION AS
IT UPHOLDS RESPONDENT LAWYER’S CLAIM OF FORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A
LABOR CASE AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.

HELD:

*There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in
its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid
by the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award
can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer
but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.

*We apply the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees, or the compensation that Atty. Go is entitled to receive for
representing Evangelina, in substitution of her husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court.

*Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should govern Atty. Go’s
compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer contract.

ART. 111. Attorney's fees. — (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be
assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.

*Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees. It regulates the amount
recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It
may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services
he rendered.

*Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty. Go’s compensation.

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to
the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

*The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall
control in the determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. Attorney's fees are unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness. The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent
fee contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation
for the lawyer's services.

*The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in assessing the proper
amount of compensation that a lawyer should receive. Canon 20, Rule 20.01.

*Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients
may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to
the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much
higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the
suit fails. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina’s
husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the attorney’s fees of Atty. Go and allowed him
to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.

*Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive adequate
compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA,
the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him
his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession.
A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his
client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that
a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital
consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of
time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his
client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to
secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.

10. JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY.
EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN,
and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

FACTS:

*William Strong (Strong), an American, was arrested and detained by the operatives of the Bureau of
Immigration. Strong sought the assistance of Philip3 G. Apostol (Apostol), a friend and neighbor, to secure the
services of a lawyer. Apostol referred him to Atty. Manuel, who is a partner at the M.M. Lazaro and Associates
Law Office (Lazaro Law Office).

*Atty. Manuel initially declined because his law office only handles cases of its retained clients and those
known to him or any of the associate lawyers. However, he was eventually prevailed upon by Apostol who
would consider it as a special favor if Atty. Manuel would handle Strong’s case. Hence, Atty. Manuel, together
with Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo, senior and junior associates, respectively, at the Lazaro Law Office, agreed
to meet Strong at the Taguig Detention Center of the Bureau of Immigration.

*During the meeting, Atty. Manuel explained to Strong the terms of the Lazaro Law Office’s engagement as
well as the fees. Strong assured him of his capacity to pay and offered to pay a success fee of US$100,000.00
should the said law office be able to expedite his release from detention as well as his departure from the
Philippines. Finding Strong to be believable and trustworthy, Atty. Manuel agreed to handle his case.

*Strong casually mentioned that he has a property in Boracay and that he suspected his neighbors as the
persons who caused his arrest. He disclosed that he and Rodica had been trying to sell the Boracay property to
rid themselves of the problems but could not find buyers because of the said case. They even offered the
property to Apostol but the latter was hesitant because of the said pending case.

*Upon inquiry with the Bureau of Immigration, it was discovered that Strong s arrest was made pursuant to an
Interpol Red Notice; and that Strong is wanted in Brazil for Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, Setting Up a Gang
and Other Related Crimes. Specifically, Strong is being indicted for his alleged involvement in "an international
gang involved in shares fraud which led to the creation of hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal securities."

*Strong denied any participation in the alleged crime. Strong then pleaded with Atty. Manuel to expedite his
deportation to any country except Brazil and reiterated his willingness to pay the success fee of
US$100,000.00.

*In her Complaint, Rodica alleged that in one of her meetings with the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office, she
hinted that Atty. Tan, a senior partner at the Marcos Ochoa Serapio Tan and Associates (MOST Law) and who
is also the lawyer of Hillview and Dornau, was instrumental in the immigration case of Strong.

*According to Rodica, Atty. Manuel called up Atty. Tan. Thereafter, Atty. Manuel allegedly informed Rodica that
Atty. Tan admitted having initiated the immigration case resulting in the detention of Strong; that Atty. Tan
threatened to do something bad against Rodica and her family; and that Atty. Tan demanded for Rodica to
withdraw the RTC case as part of a settlement package.

*Bureau of Immigration, rendered its Judgment granting the motion of Strong to voluntarily leave the country.
Strong left the Philippines. Rodica filed with the RTC a motion effectively withdrawing her complaint.

*Rodica alleged that after the deportation of Strong and the withdrawal of the RTC case, she heard nothing
from the Lazaro Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to her expectations, there was no "simultaneous
over-all settlement of her grievances with the case. Thinking that she was deceived, Rodica filed the instant
administrative case.

*She claimed that respondents committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT & DECEIT to complainant and the courts.
RESPONDENT Atty. JOSEPH C. TAN on the other hand performed as a willing partner of ATTY. MANUEL M.
LAZARO by acting as conduit to his Malacanang patron ("JOHN DOE") in causing the arrest of William Strong
last May 5, 2011, and in packaging with Lolong Lazaro of the magic formula regarding William Strong s
voluntary deportation bid and the conditions attached thereto as sufficiently explained. RESPONDENTS also
violated THEIR OATH AS ATTORNEYS, especially with the phrases ". . . I will obey the laws . . . I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; . . . I will delay no man for money or malice . . . with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients . . ."

*Rodica claimed that she is a client of the Lazaro Law Office and that she was deceived into causing the
withdrawal of the RTC case. Further, she claimed that the Lazaro Law Office collected exorbitant fees from her.

*Atty. Manuel contended that none of the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office communicated with Atty. Tan
relative to the deportation proceedings or the RTC case. He claimed that it was highly improbable for the
Lazaro Law Office to impress upon Rodica that it will coordinate with Atty. Tan for the withdrawal of the RTC
case to expedite the deportation proceedings as the RTC case was already dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action. Atty. Manuel averred that the two cases are incongruous with each other and one cannot be
used to compromise the other.

ISSUE:

WON the allegations in Rodica’s Complaint merit the disbarment or suspension of Respondents.

HELD:

*In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence. In the absence of
preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer continues and the complaint against him
must be dismissed.

*In the present case, the totality of evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said presumption of
innocence. Rodica s claim of "settlement package" is devoid of merit. Rodica’s assertions that Atty. Tan
orchestrated Strong s arrest and that Atty. Manuel proposed the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the
deportation of Strong, are mere allegations without proof and belied by the records of the case.

*Rodica failed to present even an iota of evidence to prove her allegations. In fact, the records belie her
claims. The documents issued by the Bureau of Immigration showed that Strong was the subject of the
Interpol Red Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted for crimes allegedly committed in Brazil. His
warrant of arrest was issued even before Strong was arrested and eventually deported, Atty. Tan had already
obtained a favorable judgment for his clients.

*As regards the alleged participation of Atty. Manuel in the "settlement package" theory of Rodica, suffice it to
say that Atty. Manuel has in his favor "the presumption that, as an officer of the court, he regularly performs
the duties imposed upon him by his oath as a lawyer and by the Code of Professional Responsibility." Hence,
absent any competent evidence to the contrary, Atty. Manuel, as Strong’s counsel, is presumed to have worked
out the release and subsequent deportation of his client in accordance with the proper procedures.

*As argued by Atty. Manuel, he and his lawyers only acted in the best interest of their client Strong and
rendered services in accordance with the latter s objective of leaving the country and not being deported to
Brazil. The Lazaro Law Office cannot be faulted for the dismissal of the RTC case because it had already been
dismissed even before the Lazaro Law Office was engaged to handle Strong s immigration case.

*There is likewise no merit in Rodica’s allegation that the Lazaro Law Office extorted from her more than P7
million for alleged professional and legal fees and penalties relative to Strong’s immigration case. The Court
notes that the sum total of the abovementioned figures in its peso equivalent is far less than P7 million. In
fact, the statements of account even support the contention of Atty. Manuel that Strong failed to fully pay the
amount of US$100,000.00 as success fee. Anent the alleged withdrawals from Rodica’s dollar savings account,
the same merely established that she made those withdrawals. They do not constitute as competent proof that
the amounts so withdrawn were indeed paid to Lazaro Law Office.

*Rodica was not the client of the Lazaro Law Office. This Court is more inclined to believe that the Lazaro Law
Office agreed to handle only the deportation case of Strong and such acceptance cannot be construed as to
include the RTC case. In fact, all the billings of Lazaro Law Office pertained to the immigration case, and not to
the RTC case. To reiterate, the RTC case has nothing to do with Strong’s deportation case. Records also show
that the RTC case was filed long before Strong was arrested and detained. In fact, it had already been
dismissed by the trial court long before Strong engaged the legal services of the Lazaro Law Office. More
importantly, Strong is not a party to the RTC case. Also, the counsel of record of Rodica in the RTC case is Atty.
Ibutnande, and not the Lazaro Law Office. There is nothing on record that would show that respondent Attys.
Manuel, Michelle, and Almario had any participation therein.