ANH - India - HAZOP Version Dec 2013-001

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY
Page 0 of 76
DSM NUTRITIONAL
PRODUCTS INDIA
PVT.LTD.
PLOT NO. E 57 & E 58,

ADDITIONAL MIDC,
ANANDNAGAR,
AMBERNATH (E) – 421501,
INDIA
CONTACT DETAILS :
(T) 00912516484018/19
(F) 00912512620612
WEBSITE :
www.dsmnutritionalproducts.com
Page 0 of 76
Ambernath Plant - DNP ANH Premix operations
Product: Premix for Animal Feed Industry (Nature/Form of Product : Powder).
Scope of the study : Complete Process from Raw Materials intake to Finished Goods (Premix).
OVERALL SUMMARY:
- Identified Process safety scenarios classified according to the DSM Risk Graph (RL: Risk Level).
- Identified dust explosion scenario covered by Explosion risk management regulations (ATEX for Europe).
- Identified scenarios classified according to machine safety assessment .
- Identified scenario mitigated by Safety Critical Procedures (SCP) according to the DSM guidance PSN-GN015.
- Identified scenarios in the scope of occupational building and health care covered by SCP guidance.
RL 4 RL 3 RL 2 RL 1 RL a No RL Covered by Machine Process Occupied building
ATEX safety SCP SCP & Health Care
Number of 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 7 3 10
scenarios
Scenario n° - - - - 8&9 3, 6 12 to 17 18 to 22 31,34 & 36 to 45
& 10 &24 ,25 35
HAZOP TEAM at Ambernath Premix Plant
Participants of the hazard and operability study
Name Function/Department Session Attended signature
Manje Gowda Operations 16,18,20,24 December 2013
Ashok Bhere SHE, Maintenance & Projects 16,18,20,24 December 2013
Dr . Mahesh Gujar Production 18,20,24 December 2013
Rajesh Patkar Quality 16,18,24 December 2013
Vikesh Shirsekar Production 18,20,24 December 2013
Vijay Mule Warehouse 20,24 December 2013
HAZOP Team Approved by Business Head – ANH, South Asia : Capt. Ravindra Vyawahare
Reference - Generic HAZOP – DNP ANH Premix Operations- July 2013 page 1 of 76
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Document valid from the 09th of Jan 2014
Name
Description Position Signature Date
Document owner Ashok Bhere SHE Manager – ANH

Premix Plant(S) India
Operations Head – ANH
Reviewer Manje Gowda
India
Operations Head – ANH

Approval Manje Gowda
India
Business Head – ANH

Approval Capt. Ravindra V
South Asia
Document history
Version Reason of change Valid as of
1 New document/Revision 29.08.2012
2 Update 09.01.2014
REFERENCE DOCUMENT
GLOBAL GENERIC HAZOP - DNP ANH PREMIX OPERATIONS

VERSION 2 - DATED 19.07.2013
Name Position
Document owner Ph. Glad Global SHE Manager ANH
Reviewer M. Driess Global technical Manager ANH
Approval F. Kloren Vice President Global Commercial

and Premix Operations ANH
Approval M. Stock President DNP Animal Nutrition &

Health
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. Summary of the hazard and operability study. .............................................................................................. 5
2. Process Safety Analysis - Part 1: Basic Data of raw materials and end products ........................................... 6
2.1 Material safety data sheet/source of information .................................................................................... 6
2.2 Physical Properties data ........................................................................................................................... 7
2.3 Chemical properties data ......................................................................................................................... 7
2.4 Safety data – Process Safety Tables ....................................................................................................... 13
2.5 Toxicity, environment data..................................................................................................................... 17
3. Process Safety Analysis - Part 2: Compatibility............................................................................................ 20

3.1 Chemical interactions ............................................................................................................................. 20
3.2 Interaction from raw materials and finished goods to construction material ...................................... 21
3.3 Interaction between raw materials and finished goods and used utilities………………………………23
4. Process Safety Analysis - Conclusions. ........................................................................................................ 23
5. Process description ....................................................................................................................................... 24

5.1 Ex-Zoning-ATEX zoning plan ...................................................................................................................... 30
5.2 ATEX compliance of equipment which could generate energy inside ATEX zones defined: .................... 30
6. Interfaces ....................................................................................................................................................... 38
7. Matrix of risks ............................................................................................................................................... 40

7.1 Concept for failure of process control system.............................................................................................. 40
7.2 Checklist and Risk matrix for Process Safety.............................................................................................. 40
7.3 Basic requirements and references for risk rating…………………………………………………………..36
7.4.Groups defined for scenarios listing…………………………………………………………………………..38
7.5 Methods for risk rating of scenarios listed……………………………………………………………………38
7.6 List of scenarios…………………………………………………………………………………………………42
7.7 Overviews of all scenarios listed & Safety Critical Procedures………………………….…………....……58
8. Risk graph for process safety related scenarios ( rated with Risk Level rating) ......................................... 71
9. Risk graph for machine safety scenarios (rated with a Risk Score rating) .................................................. 72
10. Additional safety provisions (follow up actions) ........................................................................................... 73
DNP ANH Premix Operations
1. Summary of the hazard and operability study.
All actions, according to action list at the end of this document are closed (see section 10) Yes No
If no,
- remaining actions have been addressed into the action plan according to timelines defined to responsible persons.
- actions have been escalated to Regional/Global level for support.
Conclusion :
. The plant is safe to operate (all safety provisions defined in the HAZOP study implemented) : Yes No
. And all relevant DSM SHE requirements are covered: Yes No
If the plant is not safe to operate or if any DSM SHE requirement applicable for the site is not covered, a Management Decision form has to be issued, in
order to approve the planning and due dates for correction of open action(s).
Note :
. Scope of work : All operations performed on the DNP site, from raw material intake to finished goods (Premix), including warehousing .
. The DNP ANH policy statement chapter 4 explains how to use the generic HAZOP document.
. The list of scenario defined in the section 7.6 must be available for the plant management, known by the production staff and must be consulted during the
Management Of Change processes.
. For the list of abbreviations, see DSM guidance note 016.
. This document doesn’t deal with malicious acts; these issues are covered by the site security policy and Security assessment.
Generic HAZOP - ANH Premix Operations July 2013 - Page 5 on 76

2. Process Safety Analysis - Part 1: Basic Data of raw materials and end products
General points :
- A premix plant is a multiproduct production activity.
- An inventory of all raw materials is executed by the site in order to collect and to list all basic data from the raw materials. Worst case figures are listed in the PSA
generic study as an example but each site has to define their own worst case according to results of their own raw materials inventory.
- For the end products, a worst case product defined by Global ANH in the generic Process Safety Analysis is used.
- A revision of the Process Safety Analysis is done at site level if a worst case figures is detected for any new raw material or end product versus the worst case tables
identified if this document. The MOC process is applied, in order to detect any change having an impact on the HAZOP study (DSM SHE requirements chapter 7)
- If any new ingredient, the X rating method explained in the DNP code of practice for safe powder handling has to be applied. If the explosion figures are missing and
can’t be provided by the supplier, the following criteria have to be taken into account in order to request additional analysis for dust explosion figures assessment to
our DNP safety lab in Sisseln, via Regional and Global ANH:
. if any solvent into the powder. OR

Then, additional tests for getting explosion figures and expertise for assessment are needed
. if storage into any silo of the premix plant.
- The tables used in order to identified the hazards coming from the products are listed in the DSM process Safety Guidance PSN GN002, available in the DSM web
site : https://intranet.my-dsm.com/org/co-rc/English/feo/ProcessSafety/Pages/ToolsSupport.aspx
2.1 Material safety data sheet/source of information
The Premix Feed product groups are:

-Carotene, other Carotenoids, Vitamin A, Vitamin D, Vitamin E, Vitamin K1, Vitamin B1, Vitamin B2, Vitamin B6, Vitamin C, Pantothenates, Biotin, Folic Acid, Nicotinates,
Vitamin B12, Vitamin K3, Choline chloride, Organic Acids, Enzymes, Amino Acids Trace Minerals, Medicated Feed Additives (MFA), Probiotics and Flavours,
The SHE information is withdrawn from the material safety data sheet which could be found on DSM intranet for all DNP raw materials
http://titlis.dnpappl.dsm-group.com/prodinfo/productfamilies.html
No intermediates, additives or cleaning agents (as understood in terms of chemical production) are used in the production process.
All third party products MSDS sheets are available on the relevant user local sites and a central databank is also available under
G:\ANHPLANT\QA\MSDS
REMARK : Trainings on Material Safety Data sheets and on basic safety data of the products used in the plant are regularly given to the operational staff
TBT Calender
January 2012.pdf

Physical Properties data
The raw materials used are mainly solid without any specific physical properties that might result in a SHE risk.
Some of the raw material are hygroscopic (i.e. sulphated minerals, niacin, nicotinamide, Manganese sulphate,copper sulphate, pentahydrate ,D3,HyD ,cobalt sulphate,CDP)
which could result in blockages inside of equipment and pipes.
For more detailed DNP raw material information including chemical and physical specification sheets please see :
- For DNP raw materials, MSDS : http://titlis.dnpappl.dsm-group.com/prodinfo/productfamilies.html
- For third party raw materials : The MSDS folder under QA hard copy, G:\ANHPLANT\QA\MSDS
Only mineral oil is used at the Ambernath plant. With a high boiling point (> 350 Auto ignition temperature > 400) and a very low vapour pressure. Thus there
is no risk of a pressure rise due to higher temperature. More details are available in the file attached below
MSDS of mineral oil
Acrobat Document
Chemical properties data
None of the raw materials / finished products are auto ignitable below 50°C.
None of the raw material and mixtures has a combustibility index = 6
The raw materials / finished products are sensitive to humidity and exposure to air, light and heat for quality reasons only.
Interactions with acids and bases are possible with minerals (salts of copper, cobalt, selenium, manganese, iodine, iron, magnesium, zinc, calcium, potassium and sodium
molibdate).
Acids and bases are not used in the premix plants but nutritional acidifiers as citric acid are used.
The individual chemical properties are available on the product data sheets and/or the MSDS of all products used in the plant.
The MSDS of all material used in the plant are available in common folder G:\ANHPLANT\QA\MSDS in the Ambernath plant.

Below an inventory of DNP raw material used with safety properties coming from the MSDS relevant for the current risk assessment study..
DNP Raw Materials : GHS classification used.

List of GHS substances
GHS Substances used at DSM-ANH Ambernath Plant

DSMIA/QA/GH
S/001
GHS 02 GHS 05 GHS 06 GHS 07 GHS 08 GHS 09
Product Material No hazard Product Name GHS GHS Manufacturer No MIE MIT C M T
family ous Pictogr Pictogr Picto
group substa am NOT am
nce searcha searcha
accord ble ble
ing to
GHS
y/n
Carrier 5060043BAG y Rice Husk no symbol no symbol Varad Enterprises 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Carrier 5062918BAG Limestone
Anticaking 5060888BAG y Sipernate no symbol no symbol Madhu Sillica 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Antioxidant 5060316BAG n Oxiban P no symbol no symbol Pranav biotek 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Binder 5061493BAG n Light Liquid Paraffin no symbol no symbol Savita Oil 0 NA > 400 NA NA NA
°C
Mineral 5063485BAG y Copper Sulphate no symbol no symbol Jyoti 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Pentahydrate
Mineral 5061508BAG y Zinc Sulphate no symbol no symbol Jyoti 0 NA NA n NA NA
Monohydrate
Mineral 5063701BAG y Zinc oxide no symbol no symbol Anjaria Eviro 0 NA NA n y NA
Mineral 5063590BAG y Manganese Sulphate no symbol no symbol Jyoti 0 NA NA NA NA y
Mineral 5069289BAG y Magnesium Sulphate no symbol no symbol Ganesh Krupa 0 NA NA NA NA NA

heptahydrate
Mineral 5063353BAG y Dried Ferrous no symbol no symbol Jyoti 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Sulphate
Mineral 5068062BAG y Sodium Sulphate no symbol no symbol Radheshwar 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Mineral 5063191BAG Sodium Chloride
Mineral 5062977BAG y Dicalcium Phosphate no symbol no symbol KPR Fertilizers 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Mineral 5062993BAG y Mono calcium no symbol no symbol 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Phosphate
Mineral 5061489BAG n Chelated selenium no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA

symbol symbol
Mineral 5065410BAG n Chelated Iron no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol
Mineral 5061491BAG n Chelated Zinc no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol
Mineral 5065399BAG n Chelated copper no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol
Mineral 5063116BAG y Magnesium Oxide no no Central & 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol Western
Mineral 5064406BAG y Potassium Chloride no no Mebross 0 NA NA NA y NA
symbol symbol
Mineral 5061503BAG y Potassium Iodide no no Calibre 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol Chemical
Mineral 5060428BAG y Cobalt Sulphate GHS Rubamin 2 NA NA y y NA
08,GHS
09
Mineral 5062026BAG n Chelated Cobalt no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol
Mineral 5061531BAG n Chelated Chromium no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol
Mineral 5061777BAG Monopotassium
Phosphate(Potassium
Dihydrogen Orto Phosphate)
Mineral 5064774BAG y Sodium Selenite no no Salvi 0 NA NA NA NA NA

symbol symbol Chemical
Mineral 5065402BAG n Chelated Manganese no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol
Mineral 50060077BAG y Manganese Oxide no no Good Earth 0 NA NA NA NA NA
symbol symbol Agrochem
Mineral 5061242BAG Aluminum oxide

Mineral 5060852BAG Calcium chloride
Vitamin 489727329 y ROVIMIX A 1000 GHS 07, DSM 2 100- 240 °C NA n y

GHS 08 300
mJ
Vitamin 5012813329 y ROVIMIX AD3 GHS 07, DSM 2 3-10 >=350 NA n y
1000/200 GHS 08 mJ °C
Vitamin 421863368 n ROVIMIX B1 no no DSM 0 1-3 >=270 NA NA n
symbol symbol mJ °C
Vitamin 470392334 n ROVIMIX B2 80 no no DSM 0 10-30 >=420 NA NA NA
symbol symbol mJ °C
Vitamin 423831366 n ROVIMIX B6 no symbol no symbol DSM 0 30- >=510 n NA n
100 °C
mJ
Vitamin 5006155668 y ROVIMIX K3 MNB GHS 07, DSM 2 3-10 NA NA n NA
GHS 09 mJ
Vitamin 442291366 VITAMIN B12 1 % no symbol no symbol DSM 0 NA >580 NA NA NA
°C
Vitamin 417831602 n ROVIMIX FOLIC 80 no symbol no symbol DSM 0 NA >=540 NA NA NA
°C
Vitamin 5005582334 n ROVIMIX BIOTIN HP no no DSM 0 300- >=410 NA NA NA
symbol symbol 1000 °C
mJ
Carotinoid 443077304 n ROVIMIX ß- no no DSM 0 NA ca. 420 NA NA NA
es CAROTENE 10% symbol symbol °C
Carotinoid 5002907304 n CAROPHYLL no no DSM 0 NA ca. 450 NA NA NA
es YELLOW 10 % symbol symbol °C
Carotinoid 5002885304 n CAROPHYLL RED 10 no no DSM 0 NA ca. 390 NA NA NA
es % symbol symbol °C
Carotinoid 5006589304 CAROPHYLL PINK no no DSM 0 10-30 >=380 NA NA NA
es 10 % symbol symbol mJ °C
Vitamin 483044377 y ROVIMIX STAY C 35 no symbol no symbol DSM 0 >1J 570 °C NA NA NA
Vitamin 5061673BAG y NIACIN GHS 07 Jubilant 1 NA 580 °C NA NA NA
Vitamin 5061507BAG y ASCORBIC ACID no no Bajaj 0 NA 660 °C NA y NA

COATED symbol symbol
Vitamin 440140329 y ROVIMIX D3 500 GHS 07, DSM 2 30- >=400 n NA y
GHS 08 100 °C
mJ
Vitamin 434604375 n ROVIMIX E 50 no no DSM 0 1-3 >=400 NA NA NA
ADSORBATE symbol symbol mJ °C
Vitamin 442305366 n ROVIMIX CALPAN no no DSM 0 30- >=330 NA NA NA
symbol symbol 100 °C
mJ
Vitamin 5064538BAG INOSITOL
Vitamin 5002370227 n ROVIMIX HyD 1.25 % no symbol no symbol DSM 0 10-30 >=400 NA NA y
mJ °C
Enzymes 5008778293 y RONOZYME NP (M) GHS 08 DSM 1 NA NA NA NA NA
Enzymes 485721293 y RONOZYME WX CT GHS 08 DSM 1 >1 460 °C NA NA NA

000
mJ
Enzymes 485535293 y RONOZYME VP CT GHS 08 DSM 1 NA >=440 NA n n
°C
Enzymes y RONOZYME A CT GHS 08 DSM 1 NA NA NA NA NA
Enzymes 5009243495 y RONOZYME NP (CT) GHS 08 DSM 1 >1 450 °C NA NA NA

000
mJ
Enzymes 50012236495 y RONOZYME Proact GHS 08 DSM 1 >= 1 >=440 NA NA NA
CT 000 °C
mJ
Amino 5060838BAG Dl Methionin
acid
Amino 5067928BAG Lysine
acid Hydrochloride
Mineral 50060037BAG Potassium
Carbonate
Carrier Calcit
Mineral y Availa Se 1000 no symbol no symbol Zinpro 0 NA NA n NA NA

Corporation
Mineral y Availa Fe 100 no symbol no symbol Zinpro 0 NA NA n NA NA
Corporation
Mineral y Availa Sow Feet First no symbol no symbol Zinpro 0 NA NA n NA NA
Corporation
Enzymes y RONOZYME HiPhos GHS 08 DSM 1 >1 410 °C n n NA
(M) 000
mJ
Enzymes y RONOZYME HiPhos GHS 08 DSM 1 NA >= 500 n n NA
(GT) °C

2.2 Safety data – Process Safety Tables
Chemical hazards :
A. Physical properties and instability storage.
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES INSTABILITY STORAGE
SADT
Substances and Product Melting.point. Boiling Specific vapor vapor (degree Celcius) stabilized
.point. .mass. pressure pressure Nr
mixtures code (degree Celcius) Y/N
(degree Celcius) kg/m3 at 20 °C at 100 °C
mbar mbar
No hazard coming from instable physical

properties of product stored on the Premix
The product handled are solid. There is no hazard identified coming from the plant (raw materials, intermediates, end
physical properties of the powders handled in the plant products)
Mineral oil Light liquid paraffin is used in the plant. Please refer MSDS for details.
NB: element sulphur is banned from all ANH Premix plants.
B. Flammability : fire hazards and dust explosion hazards

. Raw materials (DNP and non DNP) have been assessed regarding their dust explosion figures. See the DNP dust explosion figures database with the link below in the
DNP website :
http://intranet.my-dsm.com/org/dnp/English/int_func/she/pro_info/safety_data/Pages/default.aspx
. Regarding the dust explosion properties criticality of raw materials, a risk rating has been done, according to a method developed by N SHE DNP in coordination with
SWISSI experts.
See the DNP web link : http://intranet.my-dsm.com/org/dnp/English/int_func/she/safety/powder/Pages/default.aspx
Classification for raw

materials accordingly to the DNP Guideline.pdf
The results are in the attachment (version June 2013) :

The worst case figures about fire risk and dust explosion for raw materials used in the plant are the following :
The following explosive parameters for products used in the facilities have been considered as the most critical ones :
MIE (mj) MIT (mj) TONSET Finest particle size – Biggest particle
(on sieved sample, (on sieved (auto inflammation) median value size – median
Burning Dust ex. class Minimum dust cloud Powder volume
according to the sample, according (Microns) value (microns)
class. St(H) content ignition resistivity :
standard EN to the standard EN
13821) 13821)
5 2 30 g/m3 1- 3 mJ 250 °C 90 °C 30 micr. > 500 > 1.0E+12

Except 3 for BHT, = insulating
but used in small micr. powders
qty in dispensary
area only
Example . Biotin . Rovimix E 50 . RX AD3 . Rx A1000 . Sodium Ascorbate . L- Lysine .Menadion
of . Rovimix . Rx B1 All dust Ads 1000/200 Cryst milled Hydrichloride . Rx B1
product SD A . Niacinamid . Nicotinic acid . Danex full . Niacin
500WS . Rx A 1000 . Niacinamid Soybean . RX AD3
.Carophyll . Menadion . RX B1 . Roxazyme G2G 1000/200
yellow . RX Niacin . Vevovitall . Rx A1000
.Methionine . Menadione . DL Methionine
. Vevovitall
silo
NB : BHT and Monobenzoate have a MIE<1mJ; it’s only allowed to be used in small quantities and never stored into silos (stored in their packaging box in dispensary).
The worst case figures about fire risk and dust explosion for the end product (Premixes) is the following recipe :
NB : Defined by experience , according to the highest content of X3 classified raw material (for instance, Rx E 50 ads)
. Composition of the Premix : Rice hulls 10.4%, Nicotinamide feed grade 10.0%, RX E-50 ads 49.6%, Menadione sodium bisulfite feed grade 2.4%, Vit. D3 500 1.2%,
RX B1 0.5%, RX B2 80 SD 2.2%, RX B6 1.1%, Vit. B12 1% feed grade 0.6%, RX Biotin 5.6%, RX Calpan 6.9%, Folic 80 SD 1.2%, Silicon 4.0%, Ethoxyquin 66% 0.07%, RX
A 1000 3.8%
Below the full SILAB analytical report :
img-315084716-0001
.pdf
For information, two other mixtures with high vit E content (X3 rated raw material) have been analysed. The worst case mixture for ANH Premix Operations is X1 rated.
See the analytical sheets below :
img-315084800-0001 img-315084826-0001
.pdf .pdf
In Ambernath maximum Vitamin E 50 is 48.72%
Composition of the Premix (Ambernath): Rice hulls 5.363%, Nicotinamide feed grade 8.16%, RX E-50 ads 48.72%, Menadione sodium bisulfite
feed grade .958%, Vit. D3 500 .103%, RX B1 0.333%, RX B2 80 SD .114 %, RX B6 0.644%, Vit. B12 .412% feed grade 0.6%, RX Biotin .306%, RX
Calpan .204%, Folic 80 SD 0.26%,
Material code IN 10243202
Product Name Rovimix Broiler starter –OVN (Special)

Definitions :
Burning class = Combustibility Index : Dust explosion class St : MIE : Minimum Ignition Energy
For deposited dust lowest energy value required to ignite dust/air mixture at 1013 mbar and 20°C :
. < 3mJ = extremely sensitivity
(test with 900 - 1000 °C hot Pt-wire, 5 . 3mJ < MIE < 10mJ = high sensitive
seconds) St(0) = no explosion = > Kst = 0 bar*m/s . 10mJ < MIE < 25mJ = sensitive : majority of ignition incidents occur when
1 = no combustion (e.g. : common salt) St(1) = weak explosion = > 0 < Kst < 200 bar x m/sec MIE is below this level of 25 mJoules.
. 25mJ < MIE < 100mJ = medium sensitivity : consider grounding personnel
when ignition energy is below 100 mJ.
. > 100 mJ = low sensitivity : ground plant when ignition is below 500 mj.
2 = After ignition the fire dies out rapidly St(2) = strong explosion = >200 < Kst < 300 bar x m/sec
(e.g. : zing stearate)
3 = Local burning or glowing showing St(3) = very strong explosion = > Kst = 300 bar*m/s
very little tendency to spread (e.g. :
sodium choroacetate) MIT : Minimum Ignition Temperature
4 = Persistent glowing without the
emission of sparks or slow
decomposition without a flame (e.g. : H Minimum Ignition Temperature for whirled up dust on a hot surface measured in
acid) the BAM furnace
5 = Burns like a firework or slow quiet
burning with a flame (e.g. : sulphur) Powder volume resistivity : Grewer Owen Test (TONSET) :
6 = Burns very rapidly with a flame or Auto-Ignition Temperature of Solids : auto-ignition is the process which causes
there is a rapid decomposition without the ignition of a dust layer, after self-heating of dust that is surrounded by a heat
flame (e.g. : gun powder) The electric resistance of a powder can only be determined in a laboratory. The source and air, is called auto-ignition.
conductivity of a dissipative item is very often defined by its surface resistance
(SR).
. Conductive powder : SR < 104 at 23°C and 50%r.h. Minimum dust cloud content ignition : Dust cloud content from which an
4 9 ignition is possible
. Dissipative powder : 10 < SR < 10 at 23°C and 50%r.h.
9
. Insulating powder : SR > 10 at 23°C and 50%r.h.

2.3 Toxicity, environment data –
Toxicity:
Substances (Raw material, Rice Husk Limestone Sipernate Oxiban Light Liquid Copper Zinc Sulphate Zinc oxide Manganese
Paraffin Sulphate Monohydrate Sulphate
Products, Intermediates, …)
Nh according to NFPA704
Dangerous Goods (Class 6) - - - Class 6.1 - -
OEL (Occupational Exposure Limit) [mg/m3 10 mg/m3 - - 1 mg/m3 - 5 mg/m3

or MAK Value (Germany) ]
Odour threshold [mg/m3 - - - 1 mg/m3 - 0.2 mg/m3

]
Very toxic/Fatal (H300, H310, [Y/N] - - - - - -
H330, H370,H371, H372, H373)
Toxic (H301, H304, H311, H331) [Y/N] - - - - - -
Harmful (H302, H312, H332, H336) [Y/N] - - - - - -
Corrosive (H314, H315, H318, [Y/N] - - - Yes(H315, Yes(H315, H320) Yes(H315,

H319, H320, H335) H320) H320)
Sensitizing (H334, H317) [Y/N] - - - Yes(H334) Yes(H334) Yes(H334)
CMR category 1 or 2 (H340, [Y/N] - - - - - -

H341,H350, H351,H360,H361)
Carcinogenic (H350, H351) [Y/N] - - - - - -
Mutagenic (H340, H341) [Y/N] - - - - - -
toxic to reproduction [Y/N] - - - - - Yes(H360)

(H360,H361,H362)
Endocrine disruptors [Y/N] - - - - - -

Environment:
Substances (Raw material, Rice Husk Limestone Sipernate Oxiban Light Liquid Copper Zinc Sulphate Zinc oxide Manganese
Paraffin Sulphate Monohydrate Sulphate
Products, Intermediates, …)
Persistant Bioaccumulative Toxic [Y/N]

(PBT) (H410)
Ozone Depleting Substances [Y/N]
(ODS)
Very toxic to aquatic life (H400, [Y/N]
H410)
Toxic to aquatic life (H401, H411) [Y/N]
Harmful to aquatic life (H402, 412) [Y/N]
Long lasting effects (H410, H411, [Y/N]
H412)
. Disposal of any waste has to be carried out in the authorised manner, land fill is not permitted. In addition all products must be handled in the correct manner according to
SOPs
. Critical minerals are cobalt sulphate which is carcinogenic, selenium which is sensitising and harmful to aquatic animals and copper and zinc with all ADR substances
which are also harmful to aquatic animals.
. Vitamins A and D3 are toxic and vitamin A especially for the pregnant woman (CMR). Vitamins K3 and Menadion sodium bisulphite (MSB) are toxic to aquatic animals as
well as being irritants. Rovimix Niacin and nicotinic acid are irritants
CMR list at Ambernath site
Identify Carcinogenic
Raw materials and laboratory Reagents at ambernath plant.pdf
See below documents and templates for CMR assessment.
Inventory sheet assessment sheet assessment sheet

CMR.pdf CMR 1&2.pdf CMR 3.pdf
Training CMR.pdf

. All enzymes are allergenic. See the MSDS on the DNP web link below and the Power Point presentations below :
http://titlis.dnpappl.dsm-group.com/prodinfo/productfamilies.html
See the section 8.2 of the MSDS in order to define the Personal Protective Equipment to be worn in the plants during enzyme handling.
and the Power Point presentation below regarding safe enzymes handling :
Safe enzymes
handling DNP Novozyme.pdf
TBT Calender April

2013.pdf
. Carotenoids have generally a low toxicity.
. Probiotics used in Feed Premix applications are classified as harmless. See the corresponding MSDS.

3 Process Safety Analysis - Part 2: Compatibility

According to the DSM Corporate practice Process Safety Analysis (PSA) and practical guide issued by N SHE DNP.
3.1 Chemical interactions
. Risk of exothermic reaction between Choline and copper sulphate.
Formulation Constraint is addressed in Customer Order Review:
DSMIA_MKT_IP_02_
Customer_Order.pdf
See the constraint table issued by QA for formulation management.

http://vitashare.dnpappl.dsm-group.com/vitashare/livelink?func=doc.ViewDoc&nodeId=665065
Raw material, Finished goods
Name Copper
sulphates
Abbreviation
Choline Chloride +
Key: + = reaction between both substances

++ = heavy reaction between both substances
REM : Chemical reaction listed and explained in details with the scenario n° 3, process safety related.

3.2 Interaction from raw materials and finished goods to construction material
Some minor rusting may occur for instance between salt (NaCl) and carbon steel/stainless steel.
The ANH Premix plant DNP ANH Ambernath is built such that all equipment in contact with raw materials or premixes is of normal steel or stainless steel .
Name Sodium Copper

chloride sulfate
Abbreviation NaCl CuSO4-

5H2O
1. Stainless steel + 0
2. Mild steel and carbon steel + +
remark:
In terms of techniques a construction material (wall thickness) is corrosion proofed at a corrosion rate < 0.1 mm/year
Key:
0 = No reaction/resistant (corrosion rate < 0.1 mm/year)
+ = Reaction/slightly attacked (corrosion rate > 0.1 mm/year to 0.2 mm/year)
++ = Heavy reaction/not resistant (corrosion rate > 0.2 mm/year)
NR = Not relevant
C = Corrosion, softening, swelling, not resistant

3.3 Interaction between raw materials and finished goods and used utilities
The table below is not applicable, .
There are no utilities introduced in the process of Ambernath Plant.
Name
Abbreviation
1. Water (T = °C)
2. Chilled water (T °C)
3. Brine (T = °C)
4. Ammonia (T = °C)
5. Steam bar (Tmax = °C)
6. Steam bar (Tmax = °C)
7. Sealing liquid ( )
8. Grease/lubricant
9. Air bar
10. Nitrogen bar
Key:
0 = No reaction/resistant
+ = Reaction/slightly attacked
++ = Heavy reaction/not resistant
NR = Not relevant
M = mixable/soluble

4 Process Safety Analysis - CONCLUSIONS.

a. The dust explosion hazard has been identified in the process safety analysis as the highest hazard for ANH Premix Operations. It comes
from the flammability figures of the raw materials classified X3 (according to the rating methodology defined in the DNP code of practice
002 for safe powder handling).
All possible scenarios coming from the dust explosion hazard are identified in the section 7.6 of the HAZOP study.
b. CMR, toxic, harmful and corrosive hazards have to be taken into account by the production staff during handling. Appropriate Personal
Protective Equipment has to be used. See scenarios n°5 to 10 and scenario n°43 in the section 7.6 of the HAZOP study.
c. One chemical interaction hazard identified between two raw materials creating an exothermic reaction after mixing : Choline + Copper
sulphate.
See scenario n°3 in the section 7.6 of the HAZOP study.
. Cholie Chloride not used at Ambernath. However, MCP has been identified for exothermic reactions. For this scenario, we have changed
specification of MCP & now only coated MCP is being used in the premises which does not have any exothermic reactions.

5. Process description –
The process involves dosing and weighing the individual raw materials, sieving and mixing them to produce an end product or premix which is packed in bags or bulk (if
appropriate).
The production of feed premixes consists of:
Raw material intake and storage.
Raw material filling into hoppers, dosing, weighing, and then transfer to the mixers.
Raw material mixing (with possible liquid addition)
Sieving of the mixed product
Premix packing and storage.
Sampling and analysis.

1.1 Modular Plant flow diagram

1.2 Block flow diagram:

4.3 Description of Manufacturing Flow diagram
1. Raw/Packing material receipt and storage

The material received in vehicle is checked by the security according to the Invoice & inform the purchase manager & warehouse keeper regarding the unloading. Then the
security park the vehicle at the unloading point as per instruction of warehouse keeper.
Materials are delivered to DNP ANH Ambernath premix plant by trucks or container trucks. Materials are stored mainly in bags, boxes and small drums; it is stored on
pallets. The material is transferred to QC quarantine area for lab testing.
Stacker and Trolley are used to move materials from trucks or container trucks to stack on the racks of WH. The site has controlled condition room for vitamin storage and
warehouse to keep rest of the materials and finished goods.
2. Lab Analysis
The samples are taken by chemist for lab analysis. After analysis the QC will release the material from quarantine to unrestricted use. The ware house keeper creates the
bar code label from the Buhler & put the label on the each bags for its identity. Then move material from QC quarantine to raw material storage area by stacker.
3. Selection and formulation

The production plan is setup as per requirement of the sales. The production is planned in such a way that there is production of vitamin premix, mineral premix & enzyme
premix one after the other & the production line is flushed with carrier material to avoid cross contamination. The process order is created & released from SAP. Then batch
will come from SAP to Buhler operating PC through gateway PC. Then batch released from operating PC to production. Then it goes first in Macro dispensing for scanning
of the full bags & system generate the assembly label. This assembly label is scanned at handtip at the time of hand tipping.
Then batch will come in the dispensing room for part bag assembly.The plant has one dispensary rooms. The micro dose is weighed in these rooms. Material batches after
weighing are moved by pallet trucks and then by elevators to the hand tip floor for tipping to mixer.
The hand tip station is to be equipped with control sieve (easy to change for cleaning purpose), magnet and dedicated filter unit The hand tip station as well as the working
area shall be designed to allow two operators to tip at same time to handle the weight more than 30 Kg. All materials will be charged via the hand-add station.
All materials will be transferred batch wise to the hand tip level by cargo hoist. In the cargo hoist having interlocking system if hoist is failed in operation & lift can operate
only lift doors are closed.
The hand tip station is charging into an upper hopper on loads cells that can receive a full batch; size 1900 litres. From the upper hopper the batch is discharged into the
mixer. There is a intermediate discharge for those which density is less.
The metal detection is done by magnet bar above the weighing hopper below vibrator motor. The arrangement is made to clean the magnet bar.
4. Mixing
The line is equipped with a mixer that can receive a maximum batch size of 1’000 kg at a density of 0.6 kg/l. The volume range of the mixer is from 200 – 1000 Kg in which
the selected mixer can guarantee the required CV value. The mixers are to be made of stainless steel for all surfaces that get in contact with product. The mixer discharge
needs to be done by big size bomb doors to ensure a very quick emptying out and to achieve minimum material carry over. The validated carry over level is max 20 ppm.
3
Mixer volume – max. 2000 dm .
The mixer is to be equipped with a frequency drive (or at minimum a two speed motor). At time of material charging the paddle tip speed in the mixer is to be less then 1 m/s.
After the complete batch has been added to the mixer the speed shall be changed to the standard mixing speed.
The mixers need to be suitable and equipped for mineral oil addition (maximum 1% of batch weight within less than 1 minute). Mixing time (including liquid addition) needs to
be less than 7 minutes and the CV needs to be less than 5% based on typical DSM premix formulation to be commonly tested.
Below the mixer all surfaces that get in contact with product need to be in stainless steel and no possible rust formation. The mixer is discharging in an under hopper of 2.5
3
m which is equipped with a low level probe.
The mixer motor start after the manual confirmation of completion of job from handtip section. Then motor of mixer start without product inside for 30 sec refer Buhler
parameter & after tha valve is opened & then material is charging from the weighing hopper to mixer. After mixing of 6 min batch released from mixer to intermediate hopper
for packing. After batch released from mixer then mixer motor run empty for 30 sec then it stops. After manual confirmation from packing then again mixer motor starts if
hantip section is finished dumping of all raw material.
5. Testing
The random sampling is done for each premix batch & two samples approximately 200 gm are drawn. One sample is kept as a control sample till the shelf life of the premix
batch. Another sample is tested with physical analysis like colour, appearance etc. and depending on the observations the premix batch is released for dispatch.
Two ramdomly selected samples of premix bathes per week are tested for chemical analysis to find out percentage of ingradient in the premix batch as per SOP.
6. Packing & Storage
The hopper under mixer will feed into a manual packing line capable of handling pack sizes between 01 – 25 kg. There are two packing line one packing line is for the
packing of 20 – 25 kg & other is for packing of the 1 & 5 Kg (Nichrome Machine)
The packer should be a gross weigher and should be able to handle 4 bags per minute. The weighing accuracy should be within + 0.2%.
For standard pack 20 kgs = 25 minutes per 1000 kg batch.
For standard pack 5 kgs = 35 minutes per 1000 kg batch
For standard pack 1 kg = 90 minutes per 1000 kg batch

The packer is to be equipped with double screw feeders. These should be easy retractable for cleaning purposes.
The CV after packing needs to be guaranteed at < 5.
The full bags need to be folder over and then, stitched by a heavy duty industrial stitching machine with feed-in device. The full bags need to be transferred by an automatic
conveyor belt & transferred the stitched bags on the pallet for storage.
7.Finished goods Storage
After packing the premix batch in 20 kg or 5 kg depend on customer requirement 25 bags or boxes are kept on wooden pallets & the pallet is wrapped with plastic flim. The
wrapped pallet is moved with the help of forlift & placed on finished goods storage racks.
8.Despatch
As per the delivery note received from CSO warehouse keeper will arranged the goods which are to be dispatched in dispatching area. Warehouse keeper will confirm the
quantity & other details as per the received delivery note. CSO will arrange the vehicle for the dispatch of the goods. After information of vehicle by security the warehouse
keeper will load the finished goods ready for dispatch in the vehicle. After proper required documents security will allow the vehicle to go out the factory premixes.

Ex-Zoning
5.1 ATEX Zoning plan :


See for reference : DNP code of practice 002 for safe powder handling.
The plant has been divided into smaller units. A unit is considered as an independent part of the plant that has no connection to other parts or is decoupled (independent)
from the rest of the plant.
For each plant a hazardous area classification or Ex-Zone concept is defined and described in a document (flow scheme, plant plan). In Europe, zoning is carried out
according to IEC standards and EN 1999/92 (ATEX 192). China standard (GB12476.3) is according to IEC standards. The correlation between Ex-Zones and the US
classified locations according to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA Code 69, NFPA Code 654) is given below :
The following definitions are applied:
Explosive atmosphere …
Zone 20 … is present continuously or for long periods or frequently .

Zone 21 … is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.
Zone 22 … is not likely to occur in normal operation, and if it does occur, it will exist for a short period only. e.g. < 10 hrs/year.
Example 1
Zone 20 • inside silos and containers with pneumatic filling,

• inside mixers and ducts where combustible powder is processed
• in vent lines of containers, reactors and pipes containing combustible powder up to the filter
• inside spray dryers, fluidized bed dryers and cyclones
• in vent lines of dryers containing combustible powder up to the filter cyclone.
• on the outlet side of mills, i.e. in the receiver
Ex-Zone 20 is normally not allowed outside the equipment, for reasons of industrial hygiene.
Zone 21 • inside silos and containers with manual filling

• inside containments, which are filled most of the time with powder
• at openings for filling combustible powder into containers and other packages
• inside containments, which are filled most of the time with powder
Zone 22 • adjacent to zone 21 where there is no separation

• where layers of combustible powder could be raised to form an explosive atmosphere
• on the clean air side of single filters

Example 2 : (in line 3, it includes a pneumatic TIP station for silos).

Remarks
All instruments for separation of batches like butterfly valves and slides are considered part of the related equipment and zoned respectively.
Our plants are considered to be dust tight (rule of thumb: dust layer on piping, cable support etc. < 1mm or no foot prints are visible on the floor), therefore no zone
classifications is required for the outside of the equipment. For parts of the plant that are NOT dust tight, like silo charging units or packer machines, the area in a distance of
1 meter is to be considered as zone 22. Measurement of the actual dust level around the openings will help to determine the area of zoning required. If the assessment
would show that a plant is not dust tight (see above definition) secondary explosions must be considered in the scenarios described in chapter 7.3.
For example, attached is a link to a marked up flow sheet and building layout of a typical premix plant:
http://vitashare.dnpappl.dsm-group.com/vitashare/livelink?func=ll&objId=933301&objAction=browse&sort=name
And see “ATEX Generic Zoning Plan 1, 2, 3, and 4” and “Practical ATEX zoning – Andrew Deacon) as example under this link.

The table below also state mechanical equipment, such as butterfly valve or rotary valve.

5.2 ATEX compliance of equipment which could generate energy inside ATEX zones defined.
The used electrical devices, which could be a possible ignition source, are procured according hazardous area classification

An example is available with the web link :

http://vitashare.dnpappl.dsm-group.com/vitashare/livelink?func=ll&objId=933301&objAction=browse&sort=name
And see as a reference for assessment, the DNP code of practice n°002 for safe powder handling.
NB : We require the plant Management to sign off after assessment the DNP code of practice 002 for
powder handling, latest version, in order to get the guarantee that all safety provisions defined in this
central guideline have been taken into consideration in the Process Risk Assessment. If any gaps noticed,
they have to be formalized in a dedicated document with an action plan.
6. Interfaces Open point should be covered by a Management decision form.
The PFD No.FUFD-0295-3-01-8 is the objective of this hazard and operability study in which all pipes, equipment and instruments are considered.
The interface is created by valves to other P&IDs.
No risk coming from interfaces as no interfaces connected to our Premix process lines
.

REMARK: Full PI &ID diagram is available with Plant Manager/SHE Manager

\

7. Matrix of risks
7.1 Concept for failure of process control system
The Premix plant uses electrical power of 440 V 3 phases and 630 KVA. And 200KVA Generator
In case of a failure of electricity the process stops at any stage without safety consequences due to the physical nature of premix production.
The unplanned shut down is followed by a start-up under load where the PCS will guarantee a safe restart or go to failure mode. The failure mode correction
is described in a SOP and the responsible people are trained on it .
Thus an unexpected process stop can result in a loss of production batches due to the inability to accurately trace their status.
Valves are activated via compressed air. In case of an under pressure valves remain in the current position. Despite this the product remains within the
system and does not discharge externally. In addition a pressure below the minimum acceptable operating instrument air pressure is flagged by the PCS
7.2 Checklist and Risk matrix for Process Safety
The assessment has been done for each unit operation present in Premix plants and is based on the standard check list of the DSM HAZOP method (= the
check list of hazards defined in the DNP Guideline Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), PSN GN 017.
- See web link: https://intranet.my-dsm.com/org/co-rc/English/feo/ProcessSafety/Pages/ToolsSupport.aspx


All 40 points of the process chain have been used.
. Based on these 40 item to be checked, all steps of the process have been taken into account, in order to build the following Risk Matrix with 3 output :
- Risks related to possible scenarios numbers with a risk listed in the next section 7.3 .
- General comments with letters because the item assessed did not result in a probable risk scenario.
- Items rated “NA” (not applicable) for the ANH Premix Plant processes.

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY . The scenario number 1 to 44 are related to possible scenarios with a risk listed in the next section 7.3 .
DNP ANH Premix Operations . General comments are shown with letters A to S, because they did not result in a probable risk scenario.
. The topic rated “NA” are not applicable for the ANH Premix Plant processes.
Process chain:
Raw material flow Mixing ingredient F.G
Flow
Storage Filling Sieving Dosing Transfer Liquid Mixing Packaging Storage
Silo Weighing Addition
1. Pressure (too high and too low) NA NA NA NA NA 10 NA NA NA
2. Temperature (too high and too low) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3. Level (too high and too low) NA NA NA E, NA H 8-F NA NA
4. Flow (too high, too low, back flow) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
5. Instrument air (failure) NA NA NA NA P P P P NA
6. Aux. energy (failure) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
7. Cooling water (failure) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
8. Electrical power (failure-see chapter 7.1) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
9. Nitrogen NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
10. Steam (low P, medium P, High P). Failure NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
11. Other utilities (failure) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
12. Process steam NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
13. Chemical reaction- Incompatibility of raw materials (see chapter NA NA D D D D D D D
3.1)
14. Blockage NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
15. Leakages / spill NA NA 6 6 NA 10 6 6 NA
16. Drain- possible effect of drainage NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
17. Blow off NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
18. Fouling NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
19. Blocking in NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
20. Defect hose / flexible connexions – tube rupture NA NA 6 6 6 NA 6 6 NA
21. Demand authority NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
22. Material selection (good design selection) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
23. Pipe appurtenances NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
24. Vulnerable parts : expansion joints NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
25. Vibration - abrasion NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
26. Cavitation NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
27. Liquid hammer NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
28. Material stresses NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
29. Contamination by mechanical foreign body NA NA NA NA NA NA M NA NA

30. Contamination wrong product-feeding sequence of raw NA NA NA A NA NA NA NA NA
materials
31. Quality of raw materials – concentration - viscosity NA NA NA N NA I NA NA NA
32. Gas and foam detection NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

33. Fire detection and fire proofing NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
34. Sparking electrostatic/mechanical/electrical – dust explosion - 15 NA 13-14- NA J-16 L 13-14-15- 15
fire 12a-13- 15-16- 12-13- 16-17
14-15- 17-31 14-15-
16-17 16-17
35. Emergency shut down – energy break down NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

36. Personel protection (dust, noise, odour) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
37. Environnemental pollution NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
38. Extrem process conditions NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
39. Biological hazards (GMO, enzymes, allergy, sensitizing) O NA O O NA NA O O NA
40. Interface NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NB :
- Additional scenarios in the scope of Machine Safety have been listed from the n°18 to 25 in the section 7.6.
- Maintenance/cleaning/sampling operation into mixers, Scenario n°34&35, covered by safety critical procedure listed in the section 7.6.
- Additional scenarios in the scope of occupational health have been listed from the n°36 to 45 in the section 7.6.

COMMENTS LIST
Comment:
A Incorrect feeding sequence of raw materials has only a quality effect.
B Blockage in transfer pipe due to a failing pressure transmitter or humid raw material and transfer blower continuous running:
- Too high pressure : increase of pressure limited to 1,2 bar (maximum pressure of blower). Design pressure of transfer pipe (10 bar) prevents rupture no LOPC. In
addition a pressure relief valve is installed that discharges the overpressure of air at 0.8 bar bars max. No cracks and debris from the pipe.
- Too low pressure due to blockage in the blowing line: loss of flow leading to blockage of powder or valve during transfer from vessels to top hopper above mixers.
The blowing line is running. Under pressure will reach the max Pressure of the fan, 0,021 bars. No damage on the pipes and joins. No consequence.
C The blower is protected against running hot. The PCS turns it off after prescribed running time (e.g. 1 minute) and also at a prescribed minimum and maximum blowing
pressure. In case of a failure of this PCS control, the thermal switch will cut out if the blower motor overheats and thus the pneumatic transfer will stop. The overheated
blower is no ignition source for the powder mixture.
D All used substances are compatible with each other with exception of sulphates and choline chloride which may not exceed a combine inclusion rate of 35% (see scenario
3). The avoidance of these reactions is assured by production constraints for ANH.
E Failure of load cells would result in a potential overfilling of weighing hoppers. All upstream equipment (piping, dosing screws) becomes full. But no leakage occurs!
Intrinsic design assures that process control system stops any further feeding.
F The design of the plant is such that net volume of all receiving hoppers and vessels is bigger than the maximum batch volume.
G In normal conditions the loaded mixer runs for several minutes only. Should a batch stay in a running mixer for a longer period the temperature will rise by a maximum lift
of the order of 20 °C because the heat loss via the mixer surface and the mechanical energy introduced will reach equilibrium.
H In case of liquid addition, the liquid container tank (1000 l capacity) is replaced with a new tank when empty. No risk of too low or too high level.
I The viscosity of the Propandiol (liquid addition) will have an effect on dosing rate and as spraying time is set for a pre prescribed time the only effect will be on the
quantity sprayed and hence only impact Quality.
J There is no SHE risk related to sparking and Propandiol
K The sieve is dosed by a rotary valve at the bottom of the mixer under hopper. The duration of sieving is controlled via the PCS in relation to the covering or not covering of
the low level sensor on the mixer under hopper. Should the sieve fail to start, then the rotary valve above will also not start, as it is controlled by the interlock in the PCS. If
the interlock fails, eventually a blockage in the sieve will occur and in the upstream under mixer hopper. No LOC will occur.
L Due to the characteristics of the raw materials used in our plants, the design and the normal filling level of the mixers the chances for an ignition due to mechanical sparks
is negligible if the speed is below 1m/sec. If the speed if between 1 and 10 m/sec, according to the SWISSI formula, alpha <0 with the worst case Premix Phantom MIE 10
mJ.
M Due to the characteristics of the raw materials used in our plants the chance of an ignition in a sieving device or the pneumatic transfer system by sparks generated from a
metal object is negligible if the speed is below 1m/sec. See Swissi statement n° 10 august 2010 if steel to steel impact/abrasion/grinding is considered.
N In case raw materials with incorrect quality are used OR a mistake happens at dosing of materials OR a wrong bag or label is used at packing this could result in the
production and distribution of unhealthy or harmful finished products. Although this can lead to depressed performance or even the death of animals it is considered as a
quality risk only.
O Enzymes can cause irritation and sensitizing if direct contact with the skin – No issue if the recommended PPE are used by people.
P The standard Plant Control System detects compressed air pressure and stops the plant if it drops below a critical pressure (and all instruments remain in same position).
Q The Emergency break down management and systems don’t lead any risk for our Premix plants. Start-up instruction after an emergency break-down is existing for all
facilities. No SHE risk. ANH Premix activity is a batch process.
R An electrical shut down doesn’t result in a probable risk scenario. When a such shut down occurs, all production activities stop in the plant without any impact on process
safety. The Premix activity is a discontinuous process.
S This scenario needs a double failure for occurrence: filter socks damage and a mechanical spark coming from the fan of the filtration unit. Proper preventive maintenance
on fans implemented. So, it doesn’t result in a probable risk scenario.

7.3 Basic requirements and references for risk rating:
. We consider that all items below are present and practiced, as covered by the manufacturing practices defined by the plant
management :
- Explosion hazardous area classification (ATEX Europe) and the use of zone conforming equipment (ex proof or IP 5X). Right and safe design for equipment
used.
- Earthing and bonding of complete filling system including flanges, gaskets, anti-static filter system, silos, structure, operator
- Regular preventive maintenance incl. earthing measurements and visual checks (SHE critical list). = Safety Critical Procedure : Ref. Process grounding check
DNP guideline for ANH Premix units.
- Regular inspections and SHE tours.
- Maintenance program for all items of the process line
- House-keeping (dust level). SOP and dust explosion hazard management guidance.
- Training of operators (SOP know-ledges).
- The 12 Life Saving Rules implemented.
- The DSM SHE requirements in the scope of operational areas.
. Dust explosion hazards statements :

Rem : All dust explosion hazards have been assessed and mitigated according to the following DNP guideline : Code of practice n°2 – Safe powder handling version Nov
2009.
DNP_safe powder
handling COP_002A.pdf
And the following statements from Swissi experts have been taken into account in order to assess the risks of dust explosion :
. Risk of a cone discharge in a 50m3 methionine silo : . Risk of a mechanical spark by milling a wheat flour in a hammer mill :
Final Version Final Version

Statement 1 Cone Discharge in a 50 m3 Methione Silo.pdf Statement 2 Mechanical spark in a hammer mill.pdf

. Risk of propagating brush discharges in 600L mixers or in 40m3 silos : . Recommended grounding systems for FIBC type C:
Final Version img-327113302-0001

Statement 3 Propagating brush discharges in mixer & silo.pdf .pdf
. Risk of electrostatic discharge due to propagating brush discharges : . The risk of cone discharges when filling silos with bags:

Statement 6 Risk of discharges manual loading.pdf Statement 7 risk of cone discharges with bags.pdf
. Risk of electrostatic discharge during manual loading powders into epoxy-coated silos :
Final Version
Statement 8 Risk during manual loading into silos.pdf
. Maximum permitted capacity of un-earthed objects : . Risk of a dust explosion due to mechanical impact in pneumatic system :

Statement 9 maximum capacity of un-earhed objects.pdf Statement 10 risk due to mechanical impact.pdf
. Risk of dust explosion during packaging 20t of powder into a lorry : . Need of construction protection against explosions for FIBC filling & emptying stations (walls)
Final Version Statement 12.PDF

Statement 11 risk during packaging 20t powder into lorry.pdf
. Need of construction protection against explosions around blenders : . Assessment of occurrence of Cone discharges during filling of silos with Niacin and Rovimix E-50:
Statement 13
SWISSI_cone_discha
Construction explosion protection.pdf rge_E_Niacin.PDF

7.4 Groups defined for scenarios listing:
The scenarios listed in this generic HAZOP study are switched into 5 groups.
- 1. Process safety scenarios. Strategy plant integrity.

- 2. Scenarios covered by ATEX guidance. Strategy ATEX.
- 3. Scenarios covered by machine safety guidance. Strategy machine safety.
- 4. Scenarios covered by the Safety Critical Procedure guidance. Strategy SCP.
- 5. Scenarios in the scope of occupational building and health care covered by SCP guidance. Strategy SCP.
7.5 Methods for risk rating of scenarios listed:
1. The process safety related scenarios (Strategy plant integrity) have been rated with the HAZOP method (Risk Level rating). See the DSM Corporate SHE requirements
annex 03.
With the design requirement after risk rating as follow :

2. The ATEX related scenarios are covered by the ATEX guidelines (strategy ATEX), requirements and regulations, as well as the protocol implementation of
the DNP code of practice 002 for safe powder handling.
The process safety related scenarios have been rated with the HAZOP method (Risk Level rating).
The ATEX related scenarios are covered by the ATEX guidelines, requirements and regulations.
3. The scenarios Machine Safety related have been rated according to a risk score rating (risk score as explained below) :
MSA LIST
List of MSA.pdf
Below the standard and several templates which can be used:
Explanation behind generic machine Machine safety risk Machine safety risk Machine safety risk Machine safety risk
Machine Safety Method.pdf safety risk assessment.pdfassessment Blower.pdf assessment Mixer.pdf assessment Screw conveyor.pdf
assessment Packaging line.pdf
The hazard is evaluated with a risk score score (RS) when no controls are in place. The hazard rating of these scenarios is done with a risk score formula resulting of
the level of the potential injury (=E) and the frequency of exposure to hazard (F).
Potential Injury (effect) = E Frequency of Exposure to Hazard = F
F=1 Very unlikely (less than once per 10 year)

. E=2 No effect on people and environment : NEGLIGIBLE
F=2 Unlikely (less than once a year)
. E=3 Minor injury without lost workday or disability. For Environment, only site area affected : MARGINAL
F=3 Moderate (yearly)
. E=4 Major Injury with lost workdays to a single fatality. Reversible environmental effect outside of the plant : CRITICAL
F=4 Likelyl (monthly)
. E=5 Very Severe, death of several persons. Irreversible environmental effect outside the site : CATASTROPHIC
F=5 very likely (weekly)

- Calculated Risk Score (RS) : RS= E x F
Class of risk Risk Score Action
. Green 1<RS<7 . Needs attention, possible risk.
. Orange 7<RS<13 . Measures to be taken if the existing controls are not good enough (Action plan with due dates), significant risk.
. Red 14<RS<26 . Stop production if no existing control or if the existing controls are not good enough. Immediate improvements needed, high risk.
In this table, it is necessary to evaluate the risk by entering a number taken from the risk rating matrix. For instance, an incident that is placed in the ‘very likely to occur
‘category and which has an expected ‘catastrophic’ outcome, is given a rating of 25 in the risk rating matrix above. It is vitally important to realise that the risk rating is
based on a scenario where no controls are in place. This means that the ratings for each hazard can later be ranked in order of severity and frequency and will
demonstrate how important the control measures are for each hazard.
5. For the scenarios covered by Safety Critical Procedures (Strategy SCP guidance), the following requirements have been defined in order to implement
the preventive measures. (see the Process Safety Guidance Note n°015 : Safety Critical Procedure)
Web link :
https://intranet.my-dsm.com/org/co-rc/English/feo/ProcessSafety/Pages/ToolsSupport.aspx
5. For the scenarios related to occupational building and health care and covered by SCP guidance (SCP strategy), the SCP method for mitigations is
applied.

7.6 List of scenarios
SCENARIOS PROCESS SAFETY – Rated with the HAZOP method – Strategy : Plant integrity
SC Description Initial failure – Cause Sequences of effects and consequences C- Risk level SHE provisions Remarks Remarks
n° Class
1 Too high pressure (max . Initial failure : Manual error from the As no filter or exhaust relief on the silo, over
2 bars) inside silos truck driver during unloading truck who pressure max 2 bars inside silo during filling. C1 No Risk - Safe manual handling NA
doesn’t stop the blowing line and Too high pressure. The lorry is empty Level implemented for lorry drivers =
continue sending pressure inside the silo If the design pressure of the silo is below 1 (F2xP1xW2) SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE.
when there is no powder anymore bars, cracks will appear on the silo. Lost of
inside the lorry. primary containment only of powder inside
the plant.
2 Too high pressure (max . Initial failure : Manual error from the If there is a filter on the silo in order to - Over pressure filter sensor
2 bars) inside big silos truck driver during unloading truck who prevent an overpressure till 2 bars inside the C1 No Risk implemented NA
doesn’t stop the blowing line and silo, no break of the silo as filter sock on each Level or
continue sending pressure inside the silo silo is considered as the weak point and will (F2xP1xW2) - Presence of a exhaust relief
when there is no powder anymore through the escape chimney on
release the over pressure outside the silo.
inside the lorry. the top of each silo 50 m3.
Consequence : Dust cloud with concentration
- proper maintenance on the
of 30 g/m3 develops in plant area for a filters or on the exhaust relief
period of 10 to 15 min. In addition a 100% panel if implemented.
blockage of the filter doesn’t occur - Safe manual handling
immediately implemented for lorry drivers =
SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE.
3 Chemical reaction : . Initial failure : human error made After mixing, extreme heating leading to self C1 No risk level . Fire detection existing in
hygroscopic choline during the formulation of the Premix combustion in the packaging material (bags). (F2xP1xW2) warehouses. SOP for Formulation
chloride reacts recipe : wrong formulation. Formulation Fire in finished goods warehouse only due to . Fire extinguishing device Constraint to be
exothermically with constraints rules not followed. a slow chemical reaction. available in the warehouse. reviewed in accordance
mineral sulphates. Choline chloride (60% vegetal carrier) 6-12 hours after mixing. . Emergency response plan with DNP Code of
+Sulphates : more than 35 % of the implemented Practice 2 (Risk
formulation (Up to 35% under certain Destruction of equipment in the storage . Formulation constraint table : Grading)
conditions – (low humidity and low area. SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE
moisture content )
chemical constraints
ANH.pdf
4 Initial failure : Growth of micro Increase of temperature to >250 °C after a C1 No risk level . Smoke detectors alarm at
Fire in the production organism in organic carrier (e.g. wheat storage time of 5 days; self ignition of organic (F2xP1xW2) each floor activates audible NA
building. middlings) silos under warm humid carrier due to the growth of micro organism alarm system
conditions (> 52pprox. 35 °C, 52pprox. into the powder. Fire inside silo and filter;
14%rH) and storage time of 52pprox. 5 within 15 minutes fire escapes through top of . Emergency plan describes
days. silo. 2 to 3 persons always close to the silo evacuation and behaviour in
Latent failure due to poor quality of the escape of persons via emergency exits. case of fire : Emergency
product. Quality issue. response plan implemented.
persons develop respiratory problems from SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE
UNLIKELY EVENT. smoke

SCENARIOS PROCESS SAFETY – Rated with the HAZOP method – Strategy : Plant integrity
SC n° Description Initial failure – Cause Sequences of effects and consequences C- Risk SHE provisions Remarks
Class level
5 Spillage from Initial failure : Leakage Spill of solid raw material max 1000 kg on the floor. LOPC. No Risk Mitigation by use of appropriate PPE
the process during pneumatic transfer 1 to 2 persons clean with brush and pan and collect it. Raw material C1 Level for spillage cleaning. NA
line. due to abrasion comes into contact with person. Irritation (skin, eyes). (F2-P1- PPE policy: SAFETY CRITICAL
Plant integrity. medical treatment case W2) PROCEDURE
6 Spillage from Initial failure: Defective Spill of solid (or liquid if liquid addition) raw material max 1000 kg on No Risk Mitigation by use of appropriate PPE Spill
the process gaskets and joints or the floor. LOPC. C1 Level for spillage cleaning. Control
line. flexible connection during 1 to 2 persons clean with brush and pan and collect it. Raw material (F2-P1- PPE policy: SAFETY CRITICAL Procedure
Plant integrity. pneumatic transfer or comes into contact with person. Irritation (skin, eyes). W2) PROCEDURE (DSMIA/SH
production pipelines along medical treatment case E/IP/42) &
the process PPE Policy
(DSMIA/SH
E/PPE/01)
available
Spillage from Initial failure: Failure of Spill of solid raw material max 1000 kg on the floor. LOPC. RL a Mitigation by use of appropriate PPE
7 the process level sensor inside silo 1 to 2 persons clean with brush and pan and collect it. Raw material C1 (F2-P2- for spillage cleaning. NA
line. comes into contact with person. Irritation (skin, eyes). W2) PPE policy: SAFETY CRITICAL
Plant integrity. medical treatment case PROCEDURE
8 Spillage from Initial failure: Wrong Spill of solid raw material max 1000 kg on the floor. LOPC. RL a Mitigation by use of appropriate PPE Spill
the process calculation of refill quantity 1 to 2 persons clean with brush and pan and collect it. Raw material C1 (F2-P2- for spillage cleaning. Control
line. for silo or blender comes into contact with person. Irritation (skin, eyes). W2) PPE policy: SAFETY CRITICAL Procedure
Human failure. medical treatment case PROCEDURE (DSMIA/SH
E/IP/42) &
PPE Policy
(DSMIA/SH
E/PPE/01)
available
9 Dust cloud Initial failure: Failure of Development of dust cloud 1 m around hand filling equipment. RL a - Preventive maintenance on aspiration PM for
during filling aspiration system during LOPC. C1 (F2-P2- system (SHE critical list). Aspirator &
operation out hand filling (small bags 25 1 to 2 operator directly exposed to hazardous / toxic / sensitising raw W2) - Mitigation by use of appropriate PPE Spill
of the process kg) material for about half an hour. for spillage cleaning. Control
line. Operator suffers from irritation of eyes, skin or respiratory problems. PPE policy: SAFETY CRITICAL Procedure
Plant integrity. medical treatment case PROCEDURE (DSMIA/SH
E/IP/42) &
PPE Policy
(DSMIA/SH
E/PPE/01)
available
10 Tube rupture Initial failure: Spray line Pressure in pipe increases leading to LOPC. No Risk - Pressure relief valve.
on the becomes blocked Liquid comes into contact with one person’s skin when cleaning up. C1 Level - Mitigation by use of appropriate PPE SOP for oil
propandiol (Propandiol). Pressure in Irritation of skin and eyes (F1-P1- for spillage cleaning. spillage
supply pipe increases. Too high medical treatment case W2) PPE policy: SAFETY CRITICAL revised
equipment. pressure. PROCEDURE DSMI/PRO
Plant Integrity. - Provision of eye wash and shower in D/SP/19
case of contact with person. Eye wash
- Propandiol is used to spray in the station
mixer. Around the mixer is not a layout plan
workplace. No people. is available

SCENARIOS ATEX - For these scenarios, no risk level rating – Strategy : ATEX
SC n° Description Initial failure – Cause Sequences of effects and consequences C- Class Strat SHE provisions Remarks
egy
11 Dust explosion Initial failure : . Cone discharge + dust cloud. C2 ATEX . Assessment with the Swissi formula done
during filling Cone discharge is an electrostatic discharge involving a large for all silos in order to detect if there is any NA
operation into silo Cone discharge risk not volume of insulating powder (> 50 kg) during its introduction into a risk or not.
with flammable assessed or not taken unit, typically into a silo. . MOC approval required in case of change of
powders. into account. If the energy brought by the electrostatic discharge is over the storage into silos.
HUMAN FAILURE. minimum ignition energy of the product, the dust explosion hazard = Safety Critical Procedure
is present. . After assessment, if there is a risk, explosion
. Ignition of dust cloud (of organic material) by means of an protection or other safety provisions
electrostatic discharge: Cone discharge. recommended by Swissi as a metallic rod
Primary explosion results inside the equipment. inside the silo. To be validated by N SHE DNP
. Possible secondary explosion outside the equipment due to Kaiseraugst and SHE Premix Operations
ignition of whirled up dust around and inside the big bag. Global to before implementation.
Destruction of silos partially. Possible serious injury of one or
more persons.
NB: Probable scenario identified within ANH Premix Operations after
investigations further a process safety incident reported (Nov. 2011)
12 Dust explosion Initial failure : Missing . Mechanical spark by C2 ATEX . Ex proof of the equipment. 12.1>
during milling or process grounding and milling a flammable product in a hammer mill . OR the rotation speed is reduced to 1m/s Buhler is
mixing operations non ex proof equipment. . Primary explosion results inside the equipment. . OR the filling level is, during milling, always certified
of flammable Possible secondary explosion outside the equipment due to ignition higher than 70% Ex-proof
powders of whirled up dust (rule of thumb: If foot print can be seen in the . OR ensure inert conditions during the equipment
dust layer a dust cloud can develop to 1 m in height (dust layers milling process with e.g. N2 12.2>
thicker than this are regarded to be potential risk to a secondary See the DNP code of practice for safe Bonding &
dust explosion). powder handling earthing in
Destruction of equipment and/or building resulting in serious . Process grounding check procedure= Safety place &
permanent injury of one or more persons. Critical Procedure checked
annually
13 C2 ATEX See DNP code of practice for safe powder
Dust explosion Initial failure : Contact . Mechanical spark with rotation speed of the mixer screw above handling, section 4.6 Mixing, hazard M7 for 13.1> SOP
during mixing metal / metal inside the 1m/sec and flammable powder dust cloud inside the mixer. mitigations : for adding
operations of mixer while mixing . Primary explosion results inside the equipment. - the combustible powders with a high MIE material
flammable Possible secondary explosion outside the equipment due to ignition must be loaded first and the powders with a into hopper
powders of whirled up dust (rule of thumb: If foot print can be seen in the low MIE last (Examples E50 Adsorbate,
dust layer a dust cloud can develop to 1 m in height (dust layers Niacin)
thicker than this are regarded to be potential risk to a secondary - Ex proof of the equipment.
dust explosion). - OR the rotation of the mixing element must DSMIA/PR
Destruction of equipment and/or building resulting in serious be limited to a circumferential speed below OD/IP/07
permanent injury of one or more persons. 1m/s during loading of the mixer. to be
- OR the filling level is, during milling, always reviewed
higher than 70%
- OR ensure inert conditions during the
mixing process with e.g. N2

SCENARIOS ATEX - For these scenarios, no risk level rating. – Strategy : ATEX
SC n° Description Initial failure – Sequences of effects and consequences C- Class Strategy SHE provisions Remarks
Cause
14 Dust explosion Initial failure : Use of flammable product (powder) in the process C2 ATEX 1. Earthing of complete filter units Earthing of complete filter
inside dust Missing process line, aspiration system is running and failure on the and regular preventive maintenance units is done and regular
extracting units. grounding. grounding of filter cloths ( e.g.sparks from clamps incl. earthing measurements and preventive maintenance
in filters, sparks from baskets in filters). visual checks. Technical grounding available.
controls for filtration units = Safety Antistatic or conductive
Ignition of dust cloud by electrostatic discharge Critical Procedure filter cloths is used .See
inside the filter housing leads to an explosion. 2. Antistatic or conductive filter filter test report and spac
cloths used as a standard; Ensure as a standard; Ensure
Destruction of equipment resulting in serious correct bonding of clamp. correct bonding of clamp.
permanent injury of one or more persons. LOPC 3. ATEX rating of filter housing 3. ATEX rating of filter
inside the building with dust after explosion. 4. MOC management applied in case housing is done
of change of filter properties or 4.MOC will apply in case
NB: Scenario occurred (probable scenario identified) within change of supplier = Safety Critical of change of filter
ANH Premix Operations (Dec. 2010) Procedure properties or change of
supplier
15 Dust explosion Initial failure : Packaging material defect or damaged due to rough C2 ATEX . Use of EX proof vacuum cleaner to
during cleaning of Missing grounding. handling during filling/handling/packaging clean the spillage >>> Only the ex 15.1> Plant Cleaning
flammable Technical failure. operations + ignition source from the vacuum proof vacuum cleaner is available in Procedure(DSMIA/PROD/I
powder spillage cleaner used (Non Ex Proof device). production areas. P/11 15.2> Ex-proof
from the process. Spill of solid hazardous and flammable raw material Vacuum available
on the floor : LOPC. According to the DNP Code of 15.3> Bonding &
Ignition of dust cloud inside the vacuum cleaner or Practice for safe powder handling Grounding in place
pipe.
deflagration (localized limitation no risk of . Process grounding check procedure=
secondary explosion). Safety Critical Procedure
as 1 person cleans up with vacuum cleaner, this
operator is seriously injured or dies by deformation
/explosion /fracture of vacuum cleaner. Dust
explosion . Pressure from the dust explosion 56
56pprox... 8 x existing pressure inside the vacuum
cleaner. Blast wave 300m/sec
16 Dust explosion in Initial failure : Electrical spark from non compliant electrical C2 ATEX ATEX proof or IP54 of all electrical 2 no of IP motor(IP 42& IP
the building after electrical spark equipment (as hoist, forklift, motors, switches, equipment present inside an EX zone 44) to be replaced .Status
electrical ignition lights, lamps etc…). 22 defined in the plant. According to :Under purchase process
Ignition of dust cloud by electrical ignition inside the the DNP Code of Practice for safe
building (after process line leakage or dust emission) powder handling, section 3.12
leads to an explosion.
Destruction of equipment resulting in serious

permanent injury of one or more persons. LOPC
inside the building with dust after explosion.
SCENARIOS ATEX - For these scenarios, no risk level rating. – Strategy : ATEX
SC n° Description Initial failure – Cause Sequences of effects and consequences C- Class Strategy SHE provisions Remarks
17 Fire of organic Initial failure : Hot surface on an equipment and organic and C1 ATEX - In compliance with the 17.1> Ex-proof
dust layer on Non ex proof compliance combustible powder present on the equipment (dust requirement T1 : Tmax(surface) < switchgear in
electrical equipment. layer) . The temperature is above the MIT / LIT Minimum{2/3xMIT[°C] place & all
equipment >>> Fire in operational areas. . Motors rating and electrical motors confirm
Destruction of equipment resulting in serious devices as a minimum T4 or bigger to <IP 54
permanent injury of one or more persons.. According to the DNP Code of 17.2> Plant
Practice for safe powder handling Cleaning
- Fire detection existing in all Procedure
operational areas. 17.3> Smoke
detectors
provided

SCENARIOS MACHINE SAFETY– Rated with a risk factor method – Strategy : Machine Safety.
SC n° Description Initial failure – Sequences of effects and consequences Risk score SHE provisions Remarks
Cause
Scenario 18 is part of a specific health risk assessment described in an other document.
18 Reverse jet pulsing at Normal production Noise nuisance exceeding permitted limit (85 dBA) 8 1.) Regularly check noise 18.1> Noise level has been
aspiration system Hearing ability of several operators diminishes over a long (2x4) level – Measurements checked annually and areas in the
or period (irreversible) done and no area are plant are not exceeding 85db
Knocking / Vibratory exceeding 85 dB except air compressor room.
hammers 2.) Ensure of appropriate 18.2> Ear Plug is mandatory for
or PPE if necessary (ear entering Air compressor room.
Pneumatically activated plugs, ear muffles) 18.3> All equipment are CE
systems 3.) CE compliance Compliance.
Scenario 19 is part of a specific health risk assessment described in an other document. See document reference ………….
19 Ergonomics issue Initial failure : Long term risk to muscular skeletal system. 12 1. Ergonomic risk Ergonomic training has been
Wrong postures (3x4) assessment with action done. Ergonomic risk
during handling of NB: Scenario occurred (probable scenario identified) within plan. assessment done.
bags during loading ANH Premix Operations (April 2012) 2. Training for people.
and packaging.
Scenario 20, 21, 22, 23, 23, 24, 25 are part of the global machine safety assessment study. See document reference ………….
20 Risk of cut coming from Initial failure : The cutting part of the machine is not protected enough from 12 . JSA 20.1> Cut resistance glove are
maintenance operations in PPE not worn by the hands and fingers of the worker. (4x3) . Training available. 20.2> Retractable knife
the workshop with people. HUMAN 1 person injured . Ensure of appropriate PPE is available
machines FAILURE NB: Scenario occurred within ANH Premix Operations (July 20.3> Safety induction program in
2011) place. 20.4> Cutting operation risk
assessment is available.
21 Machine safety. Initial failure : Crepe paper strip has to be lead manually to needle of sewing 9 Is covered by job safety JSA for needle changing is
Risk of cut Crepe paper feeder machine (3x3) analysis (JSA) number available. Reference : JSA015
mechanism Finger is pierced
defective
22 Machine safety Initial failure : . Guarding dismantling of an equipment of the process line or 12 . SOP regarding isolator List of JSA and MSA available
Failing of operation stops palletising robot in palletizing and a second person (4x3) switch, lock out-tag out and all concerned are trained.
switch and a person closes the safety limit switch and/or restarts the machine procedure, etc. SOP, LOTOTO and work permit
closes or dismantle 8hazardous rotating parts) . Training of people are available.
the guarding + 1 person in contact with rotating equipement . Covered by job safety
restart the Equipment starts/continues working analysis (JSA) number
equipment. HUMAN
1 person is severely injured
FAILURE
NB: Scenario occurred within ANH Premix Operations (Feb.
2013)

SCENARIOS MACHINE SAFETY– Rated with a Risk Score factor method– Strategy : Machine Safety
SC n° Description Initial failure – Cause Sequences of effects and consequences Risk Available Safety Provision chain, Remarks
score SHE provisions
23 Machine safety Initial failure : More than 2 of the 8 rubber suspension legs on a tumbler mixer 9 . Sieves are in a restricted and fenced NA
Technical failure on the screening machine break (3x3) off entry area for which special entry
rubber suspension which procedures apply.
break during mixing. Unbalancing of the orbit occurs and breaks the shaft. . Regular maintenance SOP including a
1 person is severely injured regular integrity check of the rubber
suspension legs and ensuring that
suitable spares in stock
24 Machine safety. Initial failure : . During charging accumulator of acid battery in forklift starts to 9 . Fire detection existing the charging
Fire from battery Poor cabling on the burn. (3x3) room. All batteries of forklift
during charging battery of forklift or Fire starts in the charging room from acids battery . Fire extinguishing device available in and stacker are jail
operations of electrical pallet truck the warehouse. type.
lifting and causing a short power NB: Scenario occurred within ANH Premix Operations (April 2011) . Emergency response plan Fire detection system
handling circuit implemented. provided in the
equipment. . Suitable air extracting unit charging room.
implemented in the charging room. . Fire extinguishing
device available in the
warehouse.
. Emergency response
plan implemented.
25 Machine safety. Initial failure: . During non gel battery charging, hydrogen emission inside the 9 . Fire detection existing the charging Fire detection, Fire
Fire from battery Poor ventilation and charging room is accumulating. If a spark occurs, explosion of (3x3) room. extinguisher are
during charging hydrogen accumulation hydrogen. . Fire extinguishing device available in available and
operations of inside the charging room If any people inside the room, sever injury. the warehouse. Emergency Response
lifting and above 4% volume. . Emergency response plan is in Place.
handling Second failure : implemented.
equipment. Spark coming from a . Suitable air extracting unit
short circuit (poor implemented in the charging room.
cabling).

SCENARIOS SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE (see the PSN guidance note n°015, version august 2010). – Strategy : SCP guidance
SC n° Description Initial failure – Sequences of effects and consequences C- Strategy SHE provisions Remarks
Cause Class
26 Dust explosion . Initial failure : A wrong product (flammable) is supplied from the C2 SCP 3 layers of Safety Critical Procedure approach required (or 4 NA
during filling A wrong product is truck (normal product is Calcium Carbonate- non guidance layers for a daily operation to be checked on site).
operation into 20 supplied and filled flammable) by blowing with powder pile generation
m3 silo or more in a silo containing inside and presence of dust cloud of powder . + 1.Only limited number of flammable products are stored inside
by pneumatic usually a non Electrostatic ignition produced after process these 20 m3 silos. MOC mgt in place if change of RM storage
transfer line. flammable grounding failure or cone discharge. into silos (no storage of explosive product with MIE < 1000
product. Then, ignition of dust cloud (of organic material) by mjoules into the big silo 50 m3). Safety Critical Procedure.
HUMAN FAILURE. means of an electrostatic discharge: Cone discharge 1ST LAYER
From lorry driver or spark discharge. 2. Dust explosion panel on the top of the 50 m3 silos. Explosion
Primary explosion results inside the equipment. panel breaks at 0.1 bar (gauge) with exhaust relief through the
. Possible secondary explosion outside the escape chimney bar (Equipment part of the SHE critical list for
equipment due to ignition of whirled up dust around Maintenance) (to be checked the current situation on site)
and inside the big bag. 3. 1 person checks the delivery document given by the truck
driver before any filling operations into silos (SOP) or procedure
Destruction of silos partially. Possible serious to open the right silo or/and check the product (e.g. NIR). Safety
injury of one or more persons. Critical Procedure. 2nd LAYER.
4. Unique locking device used in order to connect the right
pipeline. 3rd LAYER.
27 Dust explosion . Initial failure : A wrong silos filled in with an unwanted raw C2 SCP 3 layers of Safety Critical Procedure approach required NA
during filling A flammable material (e.g. flammable) supplied from the truck guidance
operation into 20 product is filled in but sent in a wrong silo not designed for flammable 1. Only non flammable product or products with Minimum
m3 silo or more in a wrong silo product. By blowing with powder pile generation Ignition Energy higher than 1000 mjoules stored inside these 20
by pneumatic designed for inside and presence of dust cloud of powder . + m3 silos. MOC mgt in place if change of RM storage into silos (no
transfer line. containing an non Electrostatic ignition produced after process storage of explosive product with MIE < 1000 mjoules into the
flammable grounding failure or cone discharge. big silo 50 m3). Safety Critical Procedure. 1st LAYER
product. Then, ignition of dust cloud (of organic material) by 2. Dust explosion panel on the top of the 50 m3 silos. Explosion
HUMAN FAILURE. means of an electrostatic discharge: Cone discharge panel breaks at 0.1 bar (gauge) with exhaust relief through the
From management or spark discharge. escape chimney bar (Equipment part of the SHE critical list for
Primary explosion results inside the equipment. Maintenance)
. Possible secondary explosion outside the 3. Check the delivery document given by the truck driver before
equipment due to ignition of whirled up dust around any filling operations into silos (SOP) or procedure to open the
and inside the big bag. right silo or/and check the product (e.g. NIR). Safety Critical
Destruction of silos partially. Possible serious Procedure. 2nd LAYER.
injury of one or more persons. 4. Cross check delivery documentation by a second person.
Safety Critical Procedure. 3rd LAYER.

SCENARIOS SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE (see the PSN guidance note n°015, version august 2010) – Strategy : SCP guidance
Cause Class
28 Dust explosion . Initial failure : Primary explosion results inside the equipment or C2 SCP 3layers of Safety Critical Procedure approach required NA
during filling Use of a wrong big bag. guidance
operation of raw type of big bag ( Possible secondary explosion outside the equipment . Check at reception (warehouse) with registration
materials type A instead of due to ignition of whirled up dust (rule of thumb: If signed before storage of RM of the correct type of big
classified X3 from type B, C or D) foot print can be seen in the dust layer a dust cloud bag required. Refuse the good reception if not correct.
a big bag to a silo during filling can develop to 1 m in height (dust layers thicker Safety Critical Procedure.
or mixer. operation into silo than this are regarded to be potential risk to a 1st LAYER.
of a flammable secondary dust explosion).
product with . Check by the operator at the filling point before any filling
critical Minimum Destruction of equipment and/or building operation. Cross checked by an other person and before signing
Ignition Energy and resulting in serious permanent injury of one or more off at the hold point, the second person verifies that all previous
energy brought by persons. safety critical steps have been properly executed (4 eyes
an electrostatic principle). Safety Critical Procedure. 3 LAYERS.
spark in the same NB: Scenario occurred (probable scenario identified)
time. within ANH Premix Operations (October 2007)

Cause Class
29 Dust explosion Initial failure : C2 SCP 3layers of Safety Critical Procedure NA
during manual Wrong storage .Formation of propagating brush discharges. guidance approach required
loading of silos management. This may occur, if the break through voltage of the epoxy
epoxy coated Flammable and coating is >4kV and if there is some To be checked case per case in our Premix facilities
inside conductive powder significant charge separations process between the powder
stored into epoxy and the coating. Therefore the requirement . Only non conductive products are stored inside
coated silo when the to eliminate coatings with break through voltage >4kV these silos.
loading chute is > 3m. (requirement S4) refers Written instruction (and training) for operators in
HUMAN FAILURE. clearly to loading chutes of 3m and more and not to the silo. order to check before any loading. Signed by the
operator: Safety Critical Procedure. 1 layer.
.Formation of spark discharges
If the powder is electrically conductive, an electrically . MOC mgt in place if change (written procedure
isolated, i.e. not grounded capacity is built up inside the silo, with approval of several persons) of RM storage
because of the isolating effect of the coating. into silos (no storage of conductive powder inside
- Charge separation these epoxy silos). Safety Critical Procedure. 2
- Charge accumulation (due to isolation) layers.
- Isolation (epoxy)
+ . Create specific marking for silos with epoxy
Dust cloud inside the silo. coating inside. 1 layer
Consequences : Primary explosion results inside the equipment . The risk can be avoided by inserting grounding
or bag. elements
Possible secondary explosion outside the equipment due to into the silo reaching to the very bottom.
ignition of whirled up dust (rule of thumb: If foot print can be >>> Earthing rod (charge flows to earth)
seen in the dust layer a dust cloud can develop to 1 m in height
(dust layers thicker than this are regarded to be potential risk
to a secondary dust explosion).
Destruction of equipment and/or building resulting in

serious permanent injury of one or more persons
NB: Scenario occurred (probable scenario identified) within ANH

Premix Operations (October 2007)
See Swissi statement.

SC n° Description Initial failure – Sequences of effects and C- Strateg SHE provisions Remarks
Cause consequences Class y
30 Dust explosion Initial failure : Electrostatic ignition C2 SCP 2 or 4 layers of Safety Critical Procedure approach required according to the size of the NA
during Electrostatic + guidance Premix site.
packaging ignition produced Flammable powder cloud This operation can safely be carried out provided the following precautions are taken:
20t of powder after process (Premixes rated X1 worst case
into a lorry grounding failure with MIE > 10 mJ) - The general precautions for lorry loading are observed
(technical or (e.g. switching off the motor, blocking the wheels with wheel chokes, clear assignment of
human failure) or Primary explosion results responsibility for the “all clear” etc.)
cone discharge inside the equipment.
(human failure). Possible secondary explosion - The basic safety precautions in the DNP guide and relevant SWISSI statement have to be
outside the equipment due to implemented.
ignition of whirled up dust
(rule of thumb: If foot print - The formation of dust clouds around the loading point should be avoided by an appropriate
can be seen in the dust layer a and certified dust extraction system.
dust cloud can develop to 1 m
in height (dust layers thicker - The surface temperature of equipment around the unloading point (Zone 22) must be
than this are regarded to be limited based on MIT and LIT(5mm) of the powder.
potential risk to a secondary
dust explosion). - If the powder is classified as self-heating (Transport Class 4.2) the maximum temperature of
the powder to be filled into the silo must be determined based on thermal stability data.
Destruction of equipment
and/or building resulting in - To avoid static sparks all parts of the equipment made of conductive material (r <106Ohm)
serious permanent injury of must be grounded. DNP code of practice for safe powder Handling + process grounding check
one or more persons. procedure. SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE. Special attention should be given to the lorry, the
spirals in the transfer hose as well as flanges and couplings. Written instruction for
operators with training and signature- Safety critical procedure : 1 layer. 3 Layers if two
people are checking (cross check)
- Nonconductive liner/coating/bellows/gaskets are not permitted in loading ducts, unless the

breakthrough voltage is <4kV. Check also the coatings of valves and flaps.
Voltage < 4kV and the powder in the receiver must be earthed if it is conductive. Check
loading/unloading papers from approved/preferred supplier : 1 layer.
- The risk of cone discharges must be evaluated according to Annex 1 of the DNP Guide, and
appropriate precautions must be taken if necessary. MOC management with several
approval in place in case of change : 2 layers. (SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURE)
- A fire fighting plan must be developed in collaboration with the relevant fire brigade.

31 Dust Initial failure : Dust cloud generation out of the process line or inside. C2 SCP 3 layers of Safety Critical Procedure Antistatic shoes
explosion Grounding failure of a part + guidance approach required available EN345
during filling of a conductive / dissipative electrostatic discharge (spark) between operator and
operation item of the process line or the frame of the filling station or bags or big bags. .Antistatic shoes and gloves worn by operators. 2.Safe powder
into silos or from the operator. Technical Or 1 layer. handling e-
mixer with failure. electrostatic spark inside the process line by grounding training given to
bags or big failure of a part of a conductive / dissipative item of . Antistatic properties of the shoes operators
bags. the process line checked on a daily basis (frequency to be 3.Yearly check of
defined) and registered. Safety critical earthing and
Spark with energy is generated + cloud of dust inside procedure. 1 layer bonding
the hopper. If explosive RM loaded (low MIE) dust performed. 4.
explosion and 1 operator injured or killed. LOPC inside Antistatic
the building with dust after explosion. . Training of operators : written SOP. property of shoe
1 layer checked on
NB: Scenario occurred (probable scenario identified) Quarterly basis.
within ANH Premix Operations (October 2007) . Technical grounding controls for all
fixed items of the process line. Yearly
check for fixed equipment. DNP code of
practice for safe powder handling +
process grounding controls = Safety
critical procedures. 1 layer
32 Dust Initial failure: Electrostatic ignition is occurring during filling C2 SCP 3layers of Safety Critical Procedure
explosion Grounding failure on the operation inside the process line by process grounding guidance approach required NA
during filling process line (pipeline, Failure.
operation mobile hopper, filtration Primary explosion results inside the equipment. And .Written instruction How to connect the
into silos unit). Technical failure. possible secondary explosion outside the equipment mobile hopper and how to check the correct
with bags or due to ignition of whirled up dust. process grounding from an electronic earthing
big bags check system with requirement of signature .
through a Destruction of equipment resulting in serious Safety critical procedure. 1 layer
mobile permanent injury of one or more persons. LOPC inside
hopper. the building with dust after explosion. Special marking with a lamp from the elec earth
check system : 1 layer
NB: Scenario occurred (probable scenario identified) within
ANH Premix Operations (October 2007) .Use of safe big bags suitable to the MIE value
of the product (see N SHE DNP table and
guidelines. DNP code of practice).
. Earthing Control System on the mobile hopper.

Safety Critical procedure. Written procedure and
registration with signature and cross check (4
eyes principle). 3 layers.

Cause Class
33 Dust explosion Initial failure : The conductive type C big bag work as a capacitor, C2 SCP 3layers of Safety Critical Procedure approach
during filling Type C big bag not accumulates some electrical charges during filling guidance required. NA
operation into grounded during operation and a spark discharge occurs while dust
silos with big filling operation. cloud on the top of the silo , inside the process line. - Use grounding systems of type C FIBC for filling/emptying places
bags type C Human failure. Ignition of dust cloud (of organic material) by means of rated as zone 20 or 21 with visual control as a minimum. 1 layer
through a mobile an electrostatic discharge.
hopper or a big Primary explosion results inside the FIBC or the - specific marking on the type C big bags of the point to be
bag filling station. process line. And possible secondary explosion outside grounded actively with a cable in order to avoid confusion. To be
the FIBC due to ignition of whirled up dust labelled by the manufacturer. 1 layer
Destruction of equipment resulting in serious - If different types of FIBC (especially FIBC type B) are used in the
permanent injury of one or more persons. LOPC inside same places, inform operators that an active grounding is
the building with dust after explosion. mandatory with FIBC type C only.
NB: Scenario occurred (probable scenario identified) within - Give operators explanations how to identify FIBC type C and
ANH Premix Operations (May 2013) how to ground them properly (grounding instruction)
(e.g.:type C rating, black structure on it, black grounding path,
labelling for new FIBC, etc): TRAINING and written SOP= CRITICAL
SAFETY PROCEDURE.
1 layer.
34 Moving part Initial failure : Mixer starts or continues running C2 SCP 3layers of Safety Critical Procedure approach required SOP
Blenders – 1 person is severely injured or killed guidance available
Machine Safety Failing/overriding of 1.) SOP regarding isolator switch, lock out-tag out- try out for SCE.
safety limit switch procedure. Safety Critical Procedure and training Create Safety
(opening of lid stops circumstances making it unlikely that a person is present in devices
rotation) during the effect area (restricted area, no entrance during inspection
sampling operation. 1 layer. report
and person partially 2.) Preventive maintenance on interlocks available.
enters mixer. 3.) Training of people PM plan
Human failure. 4.) Covered by a machine safety analysis available.
5.) Work permit management. Safety Critical Procedure. PTW &
Written instruction with registration and signature on the LOTOTO
work permit and LOTOTO form. 4 eyes principle. 3 layers. system
strictly
followed.

35 Maintenance or Initial failure : Person inside the machine is severely injured or C2 SCP 3layers of Safety Critical Procedure SOP for PTW &
cleaning killed by moving parts. guidance approach required. LOTOTO AND JSA
operations into Someone goes inside the for Buhler and
mixers packaging machine a NB: Scenario occurred within ANH Premix Operations 1) SOP and Training of people Ribbon Mixer
MIXER (repairs, (July 2007) 2) Interlock on the doors managed by the cleaning
cleaning) and someone control panel (DSMIA/PROD/IP/1
else starts the machine. 3) The pack line is protected by door 1) is available.
Human failure. 4) Regular maintenance Refrence:
5) Safety Critical Procedure : LOTOTO. JSA006/7/8
Written instruction with registration and Maintenance
signature on the work permit and program is
LOTOTO form. 4 eyes principle. 3 layers. available see
6) Mixer defined as a confined space area : List of confined
it creates circumstances making it space
unlikely that a person is present in the
effect area (restricted area, no entrance
during operation. 1 layer.

SCENARIOS RELATED TO OCCUPATIONAL BUILDING & HEALTH CARE – Strategy : Occupied building and health care including fire
protection defined with SCP guidance.
SC n° Description Initial failure – Sequences of effects and C- Class Strategy SHE provisions Remarks
Cause consequences
36 Fire in the Incorrect identification Wrong raw material filled into silo C1 SCP 1 layer required 36.1> Smoke detectors in Ambernath plant
production of raw material due to (e.g. copper sulphate + choline guidance 1.) Smoke detectors in warehouse warehouse activate fire alarm system.
building. human error chloride and magnesium oxide + activate fire alarm system 36.2> See Emergency procedure in place
/disregard of SOP / choline chloride interchanged) 2.) Emergency procedure in place and and training of personnel.
failure of PCS alarm resulting in incorrect Premix training of personnel. Safety 36.3> SCP for Occupied Buildings in place
system (i.e. alarm fails composition Critical Procedure. 1 layer
when opening wrong Bags self ignite in warehouse (within ½ 3.) Safety Critical Procedure : SOP for
lid) h when auto ignition of choline filling operations. 1 layer + 1 layer
chloride has started at T >120 °C)
Smoke (incl. hydrochloric acid)
development in warehouse
2 to 3 persons develop respiratory
problems from smoke
37 Fire in the Electrical fault in the Fire with combustible material stored C1 SCP 1 layer required 37.1> Fire detection control panel is in
production premise or offices in the offices, production areas, guidance - Fire detection connected to the guard guard room. Guard is always present
building or when nobody present warehouse or administrative building house. Guard is always present 24h/24h.
offices. (dust, wood, paper). 24h/24h. 37.2> Fire drill conducted regularly basis.
2 to 3 persons develop respiratory - Preventive Maintenance on the fire 37.3> Preventive maintenance program for
problems from smoke detection system. Electrical panel is available.
- Preventive Maintenance on electrical 37.4> Emergency response plan is availble
utilities. .Local Emergency Management chart
- Emergency response plan : Safety avaible.
Critical Procedure. 1 layer Fire bridage station is near about 1km from
premix plant.
Evacuation
plan.
See. Occupied building risk assessment
Reference : DSMIA/SHE/IP/16;
DSMIA/MAINT/IP/06; DSMIA/SHE/IP/47
38 Fall of the 1 person is severely injured or killed C2 SCP 3 layers required Provision of guard is available in hand tip
operators guidance . Training implemented. floor and for hoist maintenance .Working
from the NB: Scenario occurred within ANH Premix . Warning in the facilities. at height equipment like Aerial plant form
platforms or Operations . LSR working at height. Procedure on is available
ladders site : Safety Critical Procedure. 4 eyes Passport System Procedure in place
principle (work permit). 3 layers. (DSMIA/SHE/IP/32)

39 Storage and Unawareness of Too high stacked or overweighed C1 SCP 1 layer required SOP for storage of goods
warehousing personnel during pallets / big bags guidance SOP. Safety Critical Procedure. 1 layer (DSMIA/SHE/IP/36) available .Training for
handling operations. Load slips and falls during lifting Training of people operator on forklift, SCP
People sitting in the manoeuvre
forklift and people
around the operation
NB: Scenario occurred within ANH Premix

Operations
40 Storage and Bags fall to floor in Too high stacked or overweighed C2 SCP 3 layers required SOP for storage of good
warehousing warehouse due to pallets / big bags guidance - SOP (DSMIA/SHE/IP/36) Racking Inspection
pallet collapse or bad Damages to racking and pallets stored - Periodic training of people on Good available and done annually. Maximum
stacking. are falling down Storage Practices. Safety Critical load capacity displayed.
Due to pallet collapses Procedure.
or bad stacking, or - Programmed SHE inspections on racks.
damages to racking. 4 eyes principle (regular cross
inspections by different people) 3
layers.
- Overweight sign on racks
- Purchasing policy in place regarding
pallet quality

SCENARIOS RELATED TO OCCUPATIONAL BUILDING & HEALTH CARE – Strategy : Occupied building and health care including fire
protection defined with SCP guidance.
SC n° Description Initial failure – Cause Sequences of effects and C- Class Strategy SHE provisions Remarks
consequences
41 Logistics During the loading or Pallet is falling down or someone (truck C1 SCP guidance 1 layer required See JSA for loading and
unloading material from driver, lorry driver is severely injured) .SOP and training unloading available
a truck, truck is not implemented. (JSA030/31).
stable and moves. Safety Critical training : Internal
transport. 1 layer
42 Fire and If a fire occurs in the Soil pollution with water C1 SCP guidance 1 layer required Currently no water collective
environment facilities, the . The drain water collector system is in system is available.
contamination contaminated water NB: Scenario occurred within ANH Premix place around the facilities ( 4 drain Emergency response team is
used by firemen goes to Operations (April 2006) water collector with a total capacity available.
the surrounding ground of 1000 m3). Emergency
. Emergency team in place with Response procedure is
procedure. Safety critical training available
and procedure. 1 layer
43 Open handling of No aspiration unit and no Health hazards coming from chemicals C1 SCP guidance 1 layer required PPE guidelines is available .
chemicals in the PPE PPE policy , training and procedure. Training is available
filling, weighing, Safety critical procedure. 1 layer
and packaging
areas
44 Open flames from Hazards not assessed in Fire with combustible material stored in C1 SCP guidance 1 layer required See Hot work permit
a maintenance the specific work permit the workshop, (dust, wood, paper). 1) . Hot work permit. 4 eyes Zoning classification is
work persons develop respiratory problems principle. 3 layers. available ,Contractor
from smoke Safety critical procedure induction is available.
Passport System in place.
(DSMIA/SHE/IP/32)
45 Risk of Lack of oxygen into the Requirement of the Life Saving Rule not C2 SCP guidance 2 layers required CSE work permit available. O2
suffocation confined space. Wrong followed and applied. . Confined Space entry work permit= content measurements and
during risk assessment. safety critical procedure controls are available. PTW
maintenance NB: Scenario occurred within DSM (Sept . O2 content measurements and system is available and
task- Confined 2010) controls. followed.
space entry . Procedure Confined Space Entrance Passport System in place.
and training = safety critical (DSMIA/SHE/IP/32)
procedure

7.7 SCENARIOS OVERVIEW:
RL 4 RL 3 RL 2 RL 1 RL a No RL Covered by Machine Process Occupied building
ATEX safety SCP SCP & Health Care
Number of 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 7 3 10
scenarios
Scenario n° - - - - 8&9 3, 6 12 to 17 18 to 22 31,34 & 36 to 45
& 10 &24 ,25 35
SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURES defined: Overview

Title Scenario N°
Filling operation into silos from lorries for raw materials in bulk NA
Management Of Change 14
LOTOTO 34-35
Check of raw material delivery documentation at reception NA
Check of big bag at reception if compliant and process grounding of NA

type C big-bags
Raw materials filling operations into silos and mixers 31
Packaging of premixes from mixer to a lorry NA
Formulation constraint table procedure 3
SOPs Spill Control Procedure

(DSMIA/SHE/IP/42), SOP for oil spillage revised DSMI/PROD/SP/19,
SOP for adding material into hopper DSMIA/PROD/IP/07, Plant Cleaning Procedure(DSMIA/PROD/IP/11 ,
Passport System Procedure in place (DSMIA/SHE/IP/32); SOP for LOTOTO (DSMIA/SHE/IP/38); SOP for
Safety Critical Equipment (DSMIA/SHE/IP/47)
Procedure for Electrical Maintenance (DSMIA/SHE/IP/16); Procedure for Preventive Maintenance
(DSMIA/MAINT/IP/06); SOP for storage of goods & material handling (DSMIA/SHE/IP/36); SOP for CSE
(DSMIA/SHE/IP/37); SOP for PTW (DSMIA/SHE/IP/40); SOP for On-Site Emergency Plan
(DSMIA/SHE/IP/46); SOP for Plant Evacuation during Emergency (DSMIA/SHE/IP/07)
Occupational Building & Health Care 36 - 45

8. Risk graph for process safety related scenarios

Risk graph Process Safety Hazards rated with HAZOP
Scenario N°
Process safety
related
1–2–3
–4–5–
6 - 10
7–8–
9

Scenario N° Machine
9. Risk graph for machine safety scenarios (risk score rating) safety related
20-22
21-23-24-25
19
18
NB: rating risk factor when no mitigations and controls in place. When controls and mitigations are in place, the risk are under control as mitigated.

10. Additional safety provisions (follow up actions)
ACTION Completion DATE RESPONSIBLE PERSON Scenarios number STATUS.

(Follow up next 1 month)
Formula Constraint addressed in

1. Formulation constraint Q1 -2014 Dr.Mahesh, Rajesh Patkar 3 Customer Order Review Procedure. To
procedure review & update Formula Constraint
Table in accordance with DNP Code of
Practice 002 Safe Powder Handling
2. To provide access to MSDS in To mitigate the risk of new raw All MSDS stored in the public folder:
group/public folder under Q1 -2014 Vanita materials for new users G:\DSM\ANHPLANT\QA\MSDS
G:\DSM\ANHPLANT\QA\MSDS
3. To display MSDS near loading

bay for awareness Q1 -2014 Vijay Mule To mitigate the risk of new raw MSDS printed & framed
materials for new users
4. To update raw materials list GHS Substance classification list

to cover Environment Toxicity Q1 -2014 Rajesh To mitigate the risk of new raw available and updated.
data materials
5. To review & update Purchase Q1 -2014 Vikram, Rajesh 14 Procedure updated to include changes
procedure to include MOC in RM, Vendor, etc. to be addressed
guideline via MOC.
6. To display ATEX Zone
Classification Labels on each Q1 -2014 14, 15 Labels printed & displayed
equipment Ashok
7. To request replacement of
both motors with IP 54 and Vikram 16 Purchase department provided with IP
higher specifications Q3 -2014 specs. for the two motors. Vendor
sourcing in progress.

8. To conduct refresher training
on PTW, CSE & LOTOTO
Ashok, Vanita 34, 35 Training plan available
Q1 -2014
9. To review Passport System

Q1-2014 Ashok 34, 35, 45 Procedure for Passport System
developed & implemented.
10. To develop VISA System Develop “Violation Identification &
Q3-2014 Ashok 34, 35, 45 Safety Adherence” (VISA) System for
ensuring BBS and proactive SHE
culture at site.
11. To review the SOP for adding

material in hopper Q1-2014 Dr. Mahesh 13 Material adding sequence reviewed as
per DNP Code of Practice Section 4.6

ANH - India - HAZOP Version Dec 2013-001

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PLOT NO. E 57 & E 58,

Product: Premix for Animal Feed Industry (Nature/Form of Product : Powder).

RL 4 RL 3 RL 2 RL 1 RL a No RL Covered by Machine Process Occupied building

ATEX safety SCP SCP & Health Care

Scenario n° - - - - 8&9 3, 6 12 to 17 18 to 22 31,34 & 36 to 45

& 10 &24 ,25 35

HAZOP TEAM at Ambernath Premix Plant

Participants of the hazard and operability study

Name Function/Department Session Attended signature

Manje Gowda Operations 16,18,20,24 December 2013

Ashok Bhere SHE, Maintenance & Projects 16,18,20,24 December 2013

Dr . Mahesh Gujar Production 18,20,24 December 2013

Rajesh Patkar Quality 16,18,24 December 2013

Vikesh Shirsekar Production 18,20,24 December 2013

Vijay Mule Warehouse 20,24 December 2013

Document valid from the 09th of Jan 2014

Document owner Ashok Bhere SHE Manager – ANH

Operations Head – ANH

Business Head – ANH

Version Reason of change Valid as of

1 New document/Revision 29.08.2012

GLOBAL GENERIC HAZOP - DNP ANH PREMIX OPERATIONS

Document owner Ph. Glad Global SHE Manager ANH

Reviewer M. Driess Global technical Manager ANH

Approval F. Kloren Vice President Global Commercial

Approval M. Stock President DNP Animal Nutrition &

1. Summary of the hazard and operability study. .............................................................................................. 5

3. Process Safety Analysis - Part 2: Compatibility............................................................................................ 20

4. Process Safety Analysis - Conclusions. ........................................................................................................ 23

5. Process description ....................................................................................................................................... 24

7. Matrix of risks ............................................................................................................................................... 40

10. Additional safety provisions (follow up actions) ........................................................................................... 73

1. Summary of the hazard and operability study.

. And all relevant DSM SHE requirements are covered: Yes No

. For the list of abbreviations, see DSM guidance note 016.

Generic HAZOP - ANH Premix Operations July 2013 - Page 5 on 76

. if any solvent into the powder. OR

2.1 Material safety data sheet/source of information

The Premix Feed product groups are:

Generic HAZOP - ANH Premix Operations July 2013 - Page 6 on 76

Physical Properties data

MSDS of mineral oil

Chemical properties data

None of the raw material and mixtures has a combustibility index = 6

Generic HAZOP - ANH Premix Operations July 2013 - Page 7 on 76

DNP Raw Materials : GHS classification used.

Generic HAZOP - ANH Premix Operations July 2013 - Page 8 on 76

List of GHS substances

GHS Substances used at DSM-ANH Ambernath Plant

Carrier 5062918BAG Limestone

Anticaking 5060888BAG y Sipernate no symbol no symbol Madhu Sillica 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Antioxidant 5060316BAG n Oxiban P no symbol no symbol Pranav biotek 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Mineral 5063590BAG y Manganese Sulphate no symbol no symbol Jyoti 0 NA NA NA NA y

Mineral 5069289BAG y Magnesium Sulphate no symbol no symbol Ganesh Krupa 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Generic HAZOP - ANH Premix Operations July 2013 - Page 9 on 76

Mineral 5062977BAG y Dicalcium Phosphate no symbol no symbol KPR Fertilizers 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Mineral 5062993BAG y Mono calcium no symbol no symbol 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Mineral 5061489BAG n Chelated selenium no no Priya chemical 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Mineral 5064774BAG y Sodium Selenite no no Salvi 0 NA NA NA NA NA

Generic HAZOP - ANH Premix Operations July 2013 - Page 10 on 76

Vitamin 489727329 y ROVIMIX A 1000 GHS 07, DSM 2 100- 240 °C NA n y