AGAPITO CARDINO v. COMELEC
173 on July 17,
FACTS: The petitioner and Rosalina Jalosjos both ran for
the position of mayor of Dapitan city. Jalosjos was the
one proclaimed as the winner with 18k votes. This
resulted to petitioner filing a petition for quo warranto
before COMELEC to nullify the candidacy of jalosjos on
the ground of ineligibility on the ground of citizenship.
and was therefore disqualified from running for any
Cardino alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born
Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America (USA). Jalosjos
later applied for the reacquisition of her Filipino
citizenship under Republic Act No. 92255 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles,
California, USA. On August 2, 2009, Jalosjos took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
an Order of Approval of citizenship retention and
reacquisition was issued in her favor. However, when
Jalosjos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Mayor of Dapitan City on October 1, 2012, she attached
therein an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American
citizenship that was subscribed and sworn to on July
16, 2012 before Judge Veronica C. De Guzman-Laput
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte.
Cardino averred that based on the certification from
the Bureau of Immigration, Jalosjos left the
Philippines for the USA on May 30, 2012 and she
presented her US passport to the immigration
authorities. Jalosjos then arrived back in the
Philippines via Delta Airlines Flight No.
2012 at around 10:45 p.m. using her US passport. he
alleged that there is a physical impossibility and alleged
that Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation was a falsified
document that had no legal effect. As such, when
Jalosjos filed her COC for Mayor of Dapitan City, she still
possessed both Philippine and American citizenships
elective local position.
As a defense, Jalosjos answered that the date of "16th
day of July, 2012" was mistakenly indicated in the
Affidavit of Renunciation instead of its actual
execution date of July 19, 2012. Jalosjos claimed that
it was on the latter date that she appeared before
Judge De Guzman-Laput to execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship.
Jalosjos further contended that Cardino failed to show
that Judge De Guzman-Laput denied having
administered the oath that Jalosjos took as she
renounced said citizenship.
The COMELEC ruled for the dismissal of the petition for
quo warranto, since, the affidavit of renunciation cannot
be considered falsified but only one containing clerical
error in the date of execution.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC is liable for grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
dismissing the petition for quo warranto.
Page 1 of 12
HELD: The case at bar has already been rendered as
moot and academic. Since, the mayorship of Dapitan
City following the May 13, 2013 Elections, already
expired on June 30, 2016. However, we deem it
appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits
considering that litigation on the question of Jalosjos'
citizenship is capable of repetition in that it is likely to
recur if she would run again for public office.
The present case arose from a petition for quo warranto
filed by Cardino under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which pertinently reads:
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter
contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the [COMELEC] within
ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election.
According to Cardino, the ineligibility of Jalosjos
stemmed from the fact that she was a dual citizen of the
Philippines and the USA when she submitted her COC
for Mayor in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the
Court explained in detail the requirements that must be
complied with under Republic Act No. 9225 before a
person with dual citizenship can be qualified to run for
any elective public office, to wit:
[Republic Act] No. 9225 allows the retention and re-
acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
allegiance to the Republic
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. -
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
Page 2 of 12
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
finds no proper reason to disturb the factual findings of
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
x x x x
and explicitly made independent by the Constitution
In this case, the crux of the controversy involves the
validity of Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation. Cardino
asserts the spuriousness of the affidavit based on the
date of its supposed execution on July 16, 2012;
whereas Jalosjos claims otherwise, insisting that while
the affidavit was so dated, the same was merely an error
as the affidavit was executed and subscribed to on July
19, 2012.
its jurisdiction, not that it simply erred or has a
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the
Second Division that the date of July 16, 2012 in the
Affidavit of Renunciation was indeed a clerical error.
The COMELEC Second Division gave greater weight
to the evidence offered by Jalosjos, particularly the
testimony of Judge De Guzman-Laput, who
unequivocally stated that Jalosjos personally
appeared before her sala "n July 19, 2012 to
subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on hand, the Court
the COMELEC. We reiterate our ruling in Typoco v.
Commission on Elections that:
The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are final and
nonreviewable by courts of justice. This principle is
applied with greater force when the case concerns
the COMELEC, because the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the poll body - created
itself- on a level higher than statutory administrative
organs.
To repeat, the Court is not a trier of facts. The Court's
function, as mandated by the Constitution, is merely
to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
different view. Time and again, the Court has held
that a petition for certiorari against actions of the
COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process, because the
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in
matters falling within its domain.
Page 3 of 12
Notably, the Court arrived at a similar conclusion in
resolving the administrative case filed by Cardino against
Judge De Guzman-Laput relative to the incidents of this
case. Thus, in our Resolution24 dated June 18, 2014 in
OCA IPI No. 13-2627-MTJ, we adopted and approved
the following conclusions of law and recommendations
of the OCA:

EVALUATION: On the issue of falsification, this Office

finds for respondent Judge. There was really no
reason why respondent Judge would have to falsify
the date of the notarization of the Affidavit of
Renunciation when indicating the actual date of
notarization, 19 July 2012, would not have affected
the validity of the affidavit. There was no deadline to
reckon with since the Affidavit of Renunciation was
required to be executed, at the latest, on the day of
the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy and Jalosjos
filed it later or on 1 October 2012. In sum, the facts
surrounding this particular issue lead to the
conclusion that the date appearing in the Affidavit of
Renunciation is the result of an honest mistake.
Furthermore, respondent Judge could not have falsified
the Affidavit of Renunciation just to do Jalosjos a favor.
Respondent Judge was correct in saying that if there was
anybody who benefited from her inadvertence, it was
complainant since the mistake gave him a ground to
question the validity of the election of Jalosjos as mayor
of Dapitan City, Zamboanga [d]el Norte.

Page 4 of 12
ROMUALDEZ v RTC
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner is qualified to be a
FACTS:  Philip G. Romualdez is a natural born citizen of registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte despite his
the Philippines and a son of a former governor of Leyte sudden departure to the U.S?

Benjamin “Kokoy” and sole nephew of First lady Imelda

Marcos. He served as a barangay captain of the said HELD: The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as
place during snap election in 1986.
a registered voter because he is still considered a
resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

He fled the country and went to U.S. and sought asylum,

took special studies in the development of Leyte-Samar He is still a sovereign here in the Philippines and not to
with International business studies as well.
question his right to suffrage. The self-exile of the
respondent was for the purpose of safety and security to
When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and run his family from the rage of Marcos regime.

in National Congress the Commission on Election

allowed him to vote and have him registered on precinct The respondent was a domicile in U.S. but it doesn’t
9 of Tolosa, Malbog Leyte where he had resided.
mean that there would an estopped to exercise his
privilege as a Filipino citizen in registering his name from
However, Advincula filed a petition questioning the the said precinct in Leyte: questioning right to suffrage.

registration of Romualdez to the said Municipality in

MTC. The former allege that Romualdez was not a Stating that, the political situation brought about by
resident of the said municipality because he leave the people’s Power Revolution must have caused great fear
country and resided in U.S. Massachussets. He just to the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the
recently arrive here and did’nt acquired 1 year residency safety of their families, their self-exile is understandable.
here yet.
Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described
as ‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment of residence’.

The MTC denied the petition of Advincula in the

Registration of Romuladez on the said precinct and the It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most
right to suffrage. But the RTC reverse the discretion and precious political right; a bounden duty of every citizen
disqualified the voter registration of Romualdez favoring enabling them to participate in the government process
the petitioner.
to ensure the will of the people.

The respondent prayed that the MTC’s discretion over

questioning his right to suffrage will be affirmed.

Page 5 of 12
DELA TORRE vs COMELEC HELD: YES.

[258 SCRA 485]
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective
Officials, Moral Turpitude)
FACTS: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.

conviction of a crime becomes a ground for

From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an
disqualification from running for any elective local
element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that “the
position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an offense
accused knows or should have known that the said
involving moral turpitude.”

article, item, object or anything of value has been derived

from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution,

declared petitioner disqualified from running for the
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held
by the “fence” of the fact that property received as stolen
that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of
of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature
one’s rightful property as that which animated the
involves moral turpitude.

robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of

moral turpitude. And although the participation of each
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local
felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in
Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch
degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of
as the probation granted him by the MTC which
the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for
suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction
gain – thus deliberately reneging the process “private
and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom,
duties” they owe their “fellowmen” in a manner “contrary
rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he
to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.

honesty and good morals.”

ISSUE: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for

Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves
the coming elections due to a crime involving moral
moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general
turpitude.

principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude

while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, SC
admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether

Page 6 of 12
moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely
classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala prohibita.
Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the circumstance 

Page 7 of 12
MARQUEZ v COMELEC HELD: NO.

(243 SCRA 538)

Disqualification case on the ground of “fugitive from
justice”
FACTS: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in
Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a
petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification
under section 40 of the Local Government Code Section
40. Disqualification.
conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from
justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment,
but such definition is an ordinate and under
circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from
justice includes not only those who after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly
finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be
connotation of the term.

The following persons are disqualified from running for

any local elective position… (e) Fugitive from justice in
criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.

Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance

fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United
States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of
his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed
Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the
Governor-elect of Quezon.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, who at the

time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal
charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of
arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice.”

Page 8 of 12
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ 
 challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for
v
 disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally
COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.
 on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
justice.”

FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private
respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and
Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the
gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992
elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the
MARQUEZ Decision definition of “fugitive from justice”,
found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again
emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995
election for the position of governor.

elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’
via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, proclamation which the COMELEC granted.

alleging that the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a  

fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the elective ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC decision
position.
suspending Rodriguez is valid?

Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from HELD: NO.

justice”, which includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
it may be so conceded as expressing the general and an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there
ordinary connotation of the term.
is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
In previous case, the issue of whether or not Rodriguez is conviction.

a “fugitive from justice” under the definition thus given

was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez)
devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from
with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the
conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.
instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal
(the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the
Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal
same position of governor. This time, Marquez

Page 9 of 12
although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition,
(Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez).
Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post.

Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the

controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must
govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to
the concept of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the
main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, which highlights
the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez
and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded
definition, seem to trivialize or undermine.

To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment

instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink
dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.

To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a

ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person
seeking to run for any elective local petition under
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be
understood according to the definition given in the
MARQUEZ Decision.

A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee

after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore

be established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at
the time of flight.

Page 10 of 12
SALAYSAY v CASTRO
FACTS: The petitioner files a petition to the Supreme
Court for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The argument and contention on both parties was in the
Nicanor G. Salaysay was the duly elected Vice Mayor of
San Juan del Monte, Rizal. In Sept. 1955 the elected
Mayor of the said town, namely Engracio E. Santos, was
suspended from his office due to administrative charges
filed against such mayor. The Vice Mayor filled the
vacancy by order of succession. As stated under section
2195 of the Revised Administrative Code:
“…that in case of temporary disability of the
Mayor such as absence, et., his duties shall be
discharged by the Vice Mayor..”
“Sec. 27. Candidate holding office- Any elective
In Sept. 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the
office of Mayor as an automatic resignation from his
office of Vice Mayor, consequently, forfeiting the office he
was holding as acting Mayor. He was advised to resign,
by the Provincial Governor, to turn over the office of
Mayor to Braulio Sto. Domingo, being designated by the
Office of the President of the Philippines on Sept. 12,
1955, as Vice Mayor. If not he will be prosecuted for
violation of Article 237 of the revised penal code for
prolonging performance of duties. Salaysay refused to
turn over the office of Mayor and brought this action of
prohibition with preliminary injunction against Executive
Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual and Sto. Domingo to
declare invalid. For Salayasay contended that he was
actually holding the office of Mayor in his capacity as
acting Mayor.
provision of section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666
provides:
“Any elective provincial, municipal or city official
running for an office than the one for which he
has been lastly elected, shall be considered
resigned from his office form the moment of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
And the amendment found in section 27 of the Revised
Election Code.
provincial, municipal or city official, running for an
office, other than the one which he is actually
holding, shall be considered resigned from his
office form the moment of filing of his certificate
of candidacy.”
ISSUE: Whether or not elected municipal official was
considered resigned when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for an office other than the one he was
elected or actually holding?
HELD: The petition for prohibition was denied, with cost.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued was
hereby dissolved.
Page 11 of 12
Reason for the decision:
To ascertain the purpose and intention of the law, it must
be construed in the light of the reason for the
amendment in order to give breathe the purpose,
meaning, and intention of the statute as intended by the
legislature. Not to defeat its purpose and intention but to
enforce and to effectuate it. Thus, going back to its
history and background of the statute, when it was
enacted into law by the legislator. The intention of the
amendment by the President Roxas was to give and
extend privilege to the appointees and elected official for
continuity in their office. This was not applicable for the
official who assumed the office by succession because
of incapacitated of his predecessor.

Page 12 of 12