G.R. No. L-38297 October 23, 1982 1.
1. The circumstances indicative of the manner by which the two brothers, as well as their
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO CAPALAC, defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
It was not unexpected, considering the close family ties so traditional among Filipinos.
that the stabbing, apparently without provocation, of one Moises Capalac by Jimmy
Magaso, would be attended with serious, if not tragic, consequences. It happened on
September 20, 1970 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the scene of the gory
incident being a duly licensed cockpit in the City of Iligan. The aggressor, attempting to
escape, was confronted by two brothers of Moises, Jesus Capalac, originally included in
the information but now deceased, and appellant Mario Capalac. The attempt of Magaso
to board a jeep was unsuccessful, he having alighted after two shots were fired in
succession. Knowing that he was completely at the mercy of the two brothers, he raised
his hands as a sign of surrender, but they were not to be appeased. He was pistol-
whipped by appellant Mario Capalac, being dealt several blows on the head and the
face. After he had fallen to the ground, Jesus Capalac stabbed the deceased on the
chest three or tour times. He was brought to the hospital where he died, the cause,
according to the coroner's report, being "hemorrhagic shock due to a wound of the
heart."
The above facts are not open to dispute, the decision of the lower court and the briefs for
both appellant and appellee being substantially in agreement. After trial duly held, Mario
Capalac was convicted of murder. The lower court found that the crime was committed
with evident premeditation and treachery. The lower court also held that appellant took
advantage of his position as a police officer and employed means or brought about
circumstances which added ignominy to the natural effects of his act. It sentenced him to
suffer the death penalty. Hence, this case is before this Tribunal for automatic review. 1
The brief for the appellant prays for the reversal of the judgment and assigns four errors
as having been committed by the lower court. The first error speaks of the absence of
conspiracy. The second and the third deny the existence of the qualifying as well as the
aggravating circumstances, Lastly, the brief imputes as error of the lower court what it
referred to as "discarding the ante mortem statement of the victim." As will be shown,
there is no basis for reversal. The judgment, however, calls for modification. Murder was
committed, the qualifying circumstance of alevosia being quite evident. The aggravating
circumstances, however, were not proved. Moreover, the lower court did not take into
consideration the existence of the mitigating circumstance of the immediate vindication of
a grave offense. Hence, the imposition of the death penalty was not warranted.
two companions, who apparently were not apprehended as they were not included in the
information, attacked the hapless victim, would suffice to show conspiracy. They
apparently had one purpose in mind, to avenge the stabbing of Moises Capalac. Such a
reaction, as noted at the outset, is quite understandable. It was not to be expected that
they would even bother to inquire why their brother was stabbed. It was enough that it
was done. They were impelled by a common purpose. They acted in concert. There is
sufficient basis for the finding of conspiracy then. As far back as United States v.
Magcamot, 2 a 1909 decision, Justice Mapa stressed as the essential element for conspiracy
to exist the "concurrence of wills" and "unity of action and purpose." 3 A recent decision is
partial to the phrase, "tacit and spontaneous coordination," in the assault. 4 A careful analysis
of the evidence by the lower court can yield no other conclusion but that conspiracy was duly
proved.
2. crime was one of murder, the qualifying circumstance of treachery being present. The
specific language of the Revised 'Penal Code calls for application: "There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. 5 Magaso's situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have put up would be futile
and unavailing. His hands were raised in surrender. That notwithstanding, he was pistol-
whipped. When lying prostrate on the ground, he was stabbed. It must be remembered that,
according to the testimonial evidence, there were two other persons assisting the brothers
Capalac. If they were not included in the information, the explanation would appear to be that
they managed to elude capture. There was no risk, therefore, to the aggressors, no hope for
the victim. 6 The trial court committed no error then in appreciating the circumstance of
treachery as being present.
3. The lower court erred, however, in finding the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, of means being employed or circumstances brought about to add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, and of the crime being committed with the
offender taking advantage of his official position as having attended the commission of
the crime. As early as 1903, Justice Mapa, in United States v. Alvares, 7 made clear that
an aggravating circumstance must be "as fully proven as the crime itself. 8 He added:
"Without clear and evident proof of their presence, the penalty fixed by the law for the
punishment of the crime cannot be increased. 9 Moreover, insofar as evident premeditation is
concerned, there is this relevant excerpt from the same opinion: "The record contains no
evidence showing that the defendant had, prior to the moment of its execution, resolved to
commit the crime, nor is there proof that this resolution was the result of meditation,
calculation and persistence. 10 In People v. Mendova, 11 it was emphasized that it should not
be "premeditation" merely; it is "evident" premeditation. 12 A recent decision, People v.
Anin, 13 ruled that the perpetration of a criminal act "evidently made in the heat of anger" did
not call for a finding that there was evident premeditation. 14 What is required is that the
offense was "the result of cool and serene reflection." 15 What was done by the brothers of
Capala, cannot be categorized as falling within the norm of means being employed or was incurred by him. In the light of the foregoing, and following the case of People v.
circumstances being brought about to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. It is well Rosel 20 where the murder was qualified by the circumstance of treachery and there was
to stress that they were prompted by their desire to avenge their brother, They went after likewise considered the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense,
Magaso, the victim. They assaulted him, relying on the weapons they carried with them. the penalty imposed on the accused should be "ten years and one day of prision mayor to
Jesus stabbed him and appellant Mario pistol-whipped him. They did what they felt they had seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal." 21
to do to redress a grievance. It cannot be said, therefore, that they deliberately employed
means to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. It is quite apparent that all they were WHEREFORE, the accused is found guilty of murder, but the decision of the lower court
interested in was to assure that there be retribution for what was done to their brother. The is hereby modified. The accused is sentenced to ten years and one day of prision
mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of mayor minimum to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
itself justify that the aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of his temporal maximum. In all other respects, the lower court decision stands affirmed.
public position be considered as present. He acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to
what was undoubtedly a vicious assault on his kin that could cause the death of a loved one.
It would be an affront to reason to state that at a time like that and reacting as he did, he
purposely relied on his being a policeman to commit the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased
because he had his pistol with him. It came in handy and he acted accordingly. 16 That he
was a policeman is of no relevance in assessing his criminal responsibility.

4. There is another aspect of the decision that calls for correction. The mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense was not considered. There is
no ambiguity in the language of the Revised Penal Code: "That the act was committed in
the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degree. 17 What was done was an immediate
vindication of the stabbing perpetrated by Magaso on appellant's brother Moises. For
relatively less serious crimes than this, this Court has taken into consideration this mitigating
circumstance. 18 Certainly it seems probable that the reason why, the lower court failed to do
so was the fact that appellant was a member of the police force. That is not conclusive. What
is decisive is the fact that the brothers Capalac, responsive to what is a traditional norm of
conduct, reacted in a manner which for them was necessary under the circumstances. That
was a fulfillment of what family honor and affection require. The aggressor who did them
wrong should not go unpunished. This is not to justify what was done. It offers though an
explanation. At the same time, the rule of law, which frowns on an individual taking matters
into his own hands, requires that every circumstance in favor of an accused should not be
ignored. That is to render justice according to law. This mitigating circumstance calls for
application.

5. There is no point in discussing the fourth assigned error, namely, that the ante mortem
statement of the victim should have been given weight by the Court. Such exhibit, 19 even
if considered a dying declaration, would not call for a reversal. It consisted of seven questions
and answers. The answers to the second and the third questions referred to what happened
to Magaso and who was responsible. His answer was that he was stabbed, and that it was
done by Jesus Capalac. The other questions dealt with when and where it happened as well
as whether or not he was in possession of his senses, and a rather unnecessary question as
to whether he was aggrieved. This Court, as was the lower court, is aware that the stabbing
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was by Jesus Capalac, not by appellant. It does not thereby mean that no criminal liability
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.
Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for appellee.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a
complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado
Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in
her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it
was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having
givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its
decision on May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not
more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and not less
than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice
of appeal; forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered
a decision the dispositive portion of which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado
Daniel has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should
accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime herein charged.
We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the
judgment appealed from is not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, providing that —
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of
a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic
Act No. 296, as amended) —
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein
provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment; ...
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for
appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this
Court and in a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question —
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very
root of a long standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since
the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of
Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court?5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that for
this Court to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have
imposed on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts
warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and
hold the view that the dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in
accordance with the Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act
on the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it
was "on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill this case is reclusion
perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as
imposed by tile lower court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be
followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division
should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may
say, strong reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall
not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the Court of Appeals was duty
bound to make its findings of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to the imposed
upon the appellant was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring the case within
the jurisdiction of this Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We
quoted the following pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted provisions of the law, must of
necessity defend upon the correctness of that opi nion There is nothing in
the law precluding this Court from exercising ing its authority to pass
upon such question which concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that
this Court may exercise its power of review the Court of appeals is bound
to make in its order f certification such findings of facts as are necessary
to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the
penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3,
which provides th where a court to which an appeal has been taken has
no appellate jurisdiction over lic case and it certifies the same to the
proper court, it must do so "with a specific and clear statement of grounds
therefor." the requirement of with and specific grounds is precisely a
device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to
a superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon"
appearing in the provision above quoted, are sufficient indication that the
Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court, had
already examined the evidence and was ready to render judgment on the
merits, but having found from the facts established by proof that the
penalty to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead of
entering judgment thereon , it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for
final determination. Since the Certification is the only ground for
determining our jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law
but also findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former
for they supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a
Court of First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty
is imposed, for in such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the
judgment appears to be erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of
First Instance has already exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering
judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and under such circumstance it is more practical for the
administration of the law that this Court should exercise its appellate
jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of
fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But
here, the Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the
merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court
and thus, it proceeds to transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that transfer
that we believe we may intervene in order to prevent an erroneous
transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
 Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to
make effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and
this Court, as defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section
138, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 3 and 259), offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment, including offenses arising from the same occurrence or
committed on the same occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the
Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of
fact necessary to support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is
either life imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the
findings of fact, it will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions
derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it
will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the case will be
returned to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis
supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was
substantial compliance with the law as the order of certification made reference to the
opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained sufficient
findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon
the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the
Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the
Court of Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to
determine whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that portion of the
Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case should have
been remanded to the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar
as it held that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the
reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life imprisonment should be imposed. He
particularly dissented from statements that if this Court found the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this Court it
is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by
Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino
Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos —
that is, for the Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt,
but also to impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant
in order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law
which confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and
impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not be deprived
thereof by, Congress then, now the National Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of
Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should
be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division
should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme
Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with
the duty of imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that
the Rule requires is that should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion
that death or life imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals
shall refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion
perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime committed. This can be the only
logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to
impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated
with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8,
Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a
final judgment — final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial
or appellate court within the reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal.12 It is only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered
or recorded in the book of entries of judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124
enjoins the Court of Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be
entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court when the decision being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished
from appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is a complete judgment to be
passed upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final
determination by the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
Hence, based on the findings of facts of the appellate court which as a rule are
conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness of the legal
conclusions derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty
for the offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain
from rendering judgment " there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only
assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the Revised
Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or adverse interpretation or
ambiguity in its implementation under the phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to
construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in harmony with pertinent
laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of
the testimony of the offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at
the time of the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the
trial court found the charge of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly
summarized in the People's brief as follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on
November 20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of
Balangabang Tublay, Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the
incident in question on September 20, 1965, complainant was temporarily
boarding at a house located at Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was
then a first year high school student at the Baguio Eastern High School
(pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had
just arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon).
Because it was then raining and the bus was parked several meters
away from the bus station, she waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After
about three minutes of waiting, the accused came and started molesting
her by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.).
But she did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the
attention of the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the
accused, but it seemed that the former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-
25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some
100 meters away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p.
4, Id.). When the jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside
her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had
to negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also
alighted and again he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was
not allowed to carry her bag, her was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to
close it when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp.
31-32, Id.). When she entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.).
He pulled a dagger eight inches long and threatened her: "If you will talk,
1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was stunned into silence because of
her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left hand
and forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left hand
with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the
dagger and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly
made to the down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons
of his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.).
Her attempts to extricate herself from the accused was to no avail assile
was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds (p.
35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about
 126 pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.), used
his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to
remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He nonetheless guided his penis and
inserted it inside the vagina of the complainant after prying open the part
of her panty covering her private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.).
Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone
(p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him
the terrible misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was
immediately brought to the Baguio General Hospital where she was
examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded to the Police Department.
The Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health Center where she
was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted
his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and
her father gave their respective statements before the police authorities
(Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.). She signed her criminal complaint
prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.
(pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and he
testified on the physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on
September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00
and 11:00 o'clock positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative
intra or extra-cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of
the hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained
of, and that the number of lacerations and contusions at the base of the hymen indicated
the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each
other since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the
incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with the latter's
consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first
time having occurred inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry
her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the
findings of facts of the trial court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the
latter had examined the evidence as a result of which it certified the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible
motive could a thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that
could only bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation and make her an
object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her hometown. It
cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to
what can be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination of her body,
an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where she has
to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to forget
and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the
cruel realities of the situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking
out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl
although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita
was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of marriageable age, hence,
marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the
complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the
trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to
ask for help or attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding
house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there were people at the Dangwa
station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place where the
girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the
closest of which was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by
complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the
moment she saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or
raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag and she caged
the attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two
did not do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney
station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he was
following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected that
appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along
Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for help
inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was not doing anything against her.
And when Margarita reached the boarding house there were no persons around 19 and in
fact she went straight to her room and it was at that particular moment when appellant
barged into the room before she could close the door. In short, the Poor girl was simply
taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch
long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that — some may manifest an
aggressive or violent attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while
others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of
the accused at the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the
medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on the girl's body, and
no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of
Margarita's straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old
farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and six inches
tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her
resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed
around 95 lbs.21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it
brings about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less
irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to
consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A
12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior physical strength.
In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the
existence of the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed
in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be
resisted; it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434,
437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The
Villarosa doctrine has been followed in numerous cases involving the
crime of rape and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice
Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence
necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of
the parties and their relation to each other. 23
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of
Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl
if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance
Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his
coitus on the victim. 24
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at
the time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant
voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation and
the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling
the truth on the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced
Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was "No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and
We quote from his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith
and credit on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its
efficacy depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken
and the nature of the subject. If subject is hard and the circumstances, as
in this instant, were not conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the
test will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because the trial was
over. He was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had
a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was
normal and unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-
173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly
weapon with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of
the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding
house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used
in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim
owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the
place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes,
the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for

the crime of rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the
amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.

Decision Modified.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133872 May 5, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEXANDER TAÑO y CABALLERO, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN,J.:
The appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape
because the asportation was conceived and carried out as an afterthought and only after
the rape has been consummated. Dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in this case because the rape was committed in the ground floor of a two-
story structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental store and not as a private
place of abode or residence.
The Case
This is an automatic review of the Decision 1 dated April 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, in Criminal Case No. C-53066, finding Accused-
Appellant Alexander Taño y Caballero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
rape and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. The case arose out of an
Information, 2 dated November 10, 1997, signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador C.
Quimpo, accusing the appellant of robbery with rape allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 1997 in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means fo force and
intimidation employed upon the person of one AMY DE GUZMAN Y
MAQUINANA, did there and then wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
rob and carry away the following articles, to wit:
Cash money P5,000.00
Three (3) bracelets 3,500.00
Two (2) rings 5,000.00
One (1) pair of earrings 2,000.00
One (1) Alba wristwatch 1,500.00
—————
TOTAL P16,000.00
with the total amount of P16,000.00 belonging to one ANA MARINAY Y
SICYAN; that in the course of said robbery, said accused, with the use of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said AMY DE
GUZMAN Y MAQUINANA, against the latter's will and without her
consent and with the use of a bladed weapon.
During his arraignment on November 26, 1997, appellant, assisted by his counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 3 After trial on the merits, the lower court
promulgated the herein assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
W H E R E F O R E the prosecution having established beyond an iota of
doubt the guilt of Accused ALEXANDER TAÑO Y CABALLERO of the
crime of Robbery with Rape, and considering the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling without any mitigating
circumstances to offset the same, this Court hereby sentences the
Accused to suffer the maximum penalty of D E A T H with all the
accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify Victim AMY DE
GUZMAN the amount of P50,000.00 and pay her actual damages of
P2,687.65 and to restore to the victim her gold ring of undetermined
amount as well as moral and exemplary damages in the total sum of
P100,000.00; and to pay the costs.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general sums the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:4
On November 6, 1997, at around 7:30 p.m., Amy de Guzman (Amy) was
tending a Video Rental Shop owned by her employer and cousin, Ana
Marinay (Ana) located at 153 Loreto Street, Morning Breeze
[S]ubdivision, Caloocan City (Tsn., January 8, 1998, p. 3). Thereupon,
accused-appellant Alexander Taño, a relative of Ana's husband Gerry
Marinay (Gerry), arrived at said shop (ibid., p. 4). Alexander Taño then
asked Amy about the time when Gerry would be coming home, to which
she replied, 10:00 p.m. (id.). He then asked about the time when Ana
would be coming home and Amy replied that she did not know (id.).
Thereafter, but still on the same date, Alexander Taño kept on going in
and out of the Video Shop, and on the last time that he went inside said
shop, he jumped over the counter of the shop to where Amy was and
seized the latter by placing one of his arms around Amy['s] neck, while
his other hand held a knife which he poked at her neck (id., pp. 4-5).
Terrified by the attack, Amy started shouting for help but Alexander Taño
increased the volume of a karaoke which was on at the time to drown
Amy's cries for help (id., p. 5).
Alexander Taño then dragged Amy to the kitchen of the shop where, at
knife point, he ordered the latter to undress and he thereafter started
raping her (id., pp. 5-6).
On the other hand, appellant's version of the incident is as follows: 5
However, while Alexander Taño was raping Amy, somebody knocked at
the door of the shop prompting the former to stop what he was doing and
ordered Amy to put on her clothes (id., pp. 6-7).
Alexander Taño then directed Amy to go upstairs to the second floor of
the shop to change clothes as he will be taking her with him (id., p. 7).
But suddenly thereafter, Taño pulled her down and punched her in the
stomach thrice causing her to lose her balance (id.). Taño then started
cursing her and again placed himself on top of her while poking a knife at
her neck (id.). Amy then pleaded with Taño to just take anything inside
the shop and to spare her life, to which Taño replied "no, I will not leave
you here alive." (id.).
But after a while and upon Amy's pleading, Taño put down his knife and
while he was kissing Amy, the latter got hold of the knife which she
surreptitiously concealed under the stairs (id.).
Therafter, Taño became violent again and banged Amy's head on the
wall causing the latter to lose consciousness (id., p. 9). When she
regained consciousness she found herself and Taño inside the toilet of
the shop and the latter again banged her head, this time on the toilet
bowl, several times causing Amy to again lose consciousness (id., pp. 8-
10).
Thereafter, Taño went upstairs and looted the place of valuables
belonging to Amy's employer, Ana. Amy, herself lost her ring, bracelet
and wristwatch during the incident in question (id., p. 10).
At about 9:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day, Amy's employer Ana arrived
and found the shop in disarray with the "karaoke" in full volume (Tsn., 13,
1998, pp. 2-4). After turning off the "karaoke["], Ana proceeded to the
toilet where she found Amy bathed in blood (ibid., p. 4).
Ana immediately sought the help of Barangay officials of the place and
Amy was brought to the "MCU" Hospital where she was initially treated of
her injuries (id., p. 5). Amy was, later on, transferred to Jose P. Reyes
Memorial Medical Center (JPRMMC) where she was confined for four (4)
days.
Version of the Defense
. . . [O]n November 6, 1997, at around 7:40 p.m., he went to the house of
his cousin Gerry Bautista Marinay at 113 Loreto St., Morning Breeze
Subdivision, Kalookan City and upon arrival thereat he found therein Amy
de Guzman alone which she greeted him because she knew that the
accused was a frequent visitor thereof. Upon learning from her that Gerry
was not around, accused proceeded to the kitchen to drink water and
after he bought cigarettes at the nearby store, he returned to the shop
and seated himself infront of Amy de Guzman's counter. After the lapse
of five minutes he got bored and went out again to wait for the arrival of
GERRY. After finishing his cigarette he returned to Amy and talked with
her and learned that ANA was at her newly opened restaurant. After a
while, the thought of stealing his cousin's valuables struck his mind owing
to his dire need of cash/money. Thus, he approached Amy and held her
hands and asked her to come with him because he badly needed money,
to lead him to where his cousin was keeping his money and valuables.
As to Amy's surprise [sic], she shouted and to stop her, the accused
covered her mouth with his right hand but Amy put up a struggle and in
the process they both fell down and rolled on the floor. Thence, the
accused was able to subdue Amy and forcibly took her in the upstairs
where he did the ransacking of the drawers while holding the private
complainant's hand. However, she was able to free herself from his hold
and ran downstairs to the kitchen where she tried to get hold [of] a knife
but he was able to wrest with her. As the accused was rattled, he pushed
Amy inside the comfort room and shoved her head against the tiles to
mum her. He took Amy's bag wherein he placed his loot consisting of 2
wrist watches, including Amy's Alba watch, a bracelet, clothes and hair
blower as well as jewelry box containing five rings which he placed in his
pocket, then he proceeded to his brother's house in Taytay. Upon arrival
 of the police and his cousin thereat he returned the jewelry box to the
latter but the same was not presented in court, that no other jewelry was
taken by him from the place except those already specified, muchless
has he taken any cash money from his cousin Gerry Marinay, that he has
a wife staying in Iloilo and he has a girlfriend here in Manila, that he
never raped the private complainant Amy de Guzman and neither [had
he] courted her prior to the incident. (TSN., March 3, 1998, pp. 2-9)
(TSN., March 4, 1998, pp. 2-6)"
Ruling of the Trial Court
Assessing the testimony of the private complainant, the trial judge observed: 6
Verily this Court finds the forthright account of the incident by the private
complainant whose small and slender physique was certainly no match to
the tall well-built body of an ex-convict, to be candid, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank which remained consistent and unwavering
despite the rigid cross-examinations of the defense counsel wherein she
narrated in detail the sexual assault with the use of a knife perpetrated by
the accused against her.
Parenthetically this Court has observed the deportment of the private
complainant at the witness stand and certainly she did not appear to
have the callousness and shrewdness of a woman capable of imputing a
heinous crime against the [a]ccused if the same is not true. Besides, the
defense has not shown any evil motive or ill will on the part of the private
complainant for testifying the way she did in this case.
The lower court accepted the judicial admission of the accused that he stole valuables
belonging to private complainant and her employer, and then proceeded to determine
"whether or not the prosecution evidence has sufficiently established the rape angle of
the case."
In fine, the [a]ccused having already admitted the robbery charge
coupled with the fact that the prosecution has established with clear and
convincing evidence [a]ccused's culpability for sexually assaulting the
pri[v]ate complainant leaves no room for doubt of the guilt of the accused
for the complex crime of robbery with (aggravated) rape[.]
Furthermore, the trial court appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance
because the incident took place supposedly at the residence of private complainant's
employer, "which doubles as a video rental shop." 7 Applying Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, it imposed the maximum penalty provided under
Article 294 of the same Code as amended, which is death.
Thus, this automatic review by this Court. 8
Issues
In his Brief, 9 Appellant Taño assigns only two errors or issues. These are:
I
The lower court erred in not taking into consideration the testimonies of
Dr. Godofredo Balderosa and Dr. Maria Redencion Bukid-Abella which
negate the rape [charge] imputed against the accused.
II
The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with rape despite the prosecution's
insufficiency of evidence.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case open for review and the appellate
court may correct such errors it may find in the appealed judgment, even if they have not
been specifically assigned. 10 Hence, this Court likewise reviewed (a) the propriety of
appellant's conviction of the special complex crime of robbery with rape and (b) the trial
court's appreciation of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. These two items will be
discussed as the third and fourth issues.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that (a) appellant is guilty
of two separate crimes — rape and robbery, (b) dwelling cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, and (c) the proper penalty for rape is reclusion perpetua, not
death.
First Issue:
Evaluation of the Examining
Doctors' Testimonies
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to give due credence to the testimonies of
Dr. Godofredo Balderosa and Dr. Ma. Redencion Bukid-Abella, who both examined and
treated Amy de Guzman's physical injuries immediately after the incident. Both doctors
similarly stated that the victim complained to them of physical assault and attempted
rape only, not of consummated rape. 11 Additionally, the findings of NBI Medico-Legal
Officer Aurea Villena were allegedly inconclusive as to whether there was sexual
intercourse between the appellant and the victim. 12 Their testimonies supposedly bolster
appellant's innocence of the rape charge.
Otherwise stated, appellant claims that the failure of Amy de Guzman to immediately
disclose the rape to her examining physicians could only mean that she was not in fact
sexually assaulted.
In many criminal cases, especially of rape, this Court has acknowledged that the
vacillation of the victim in reporting the crime to the authorities is not necessarily an
indication of a fabricated charge. Neither does it always cast doubt on the credibility on
the complaining witness. 1 The initial reluctance of a young, inexperienced lass to admit
having been ravished is normal and natural.14 The Court takes judicial notice of the
Filipina's inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which
blemish her honor and virtue. 15 She cannot be expected to readily reveal the fact of her
sexual violation to total strangers.
It is thus perfectly understandable and consistent with common experience that Amy
initially tried to downplay the assault upon her chastity by telling the doctors that there
was no consummation of the act. The following day, however, she was finally able to
gather the courage to reveal the entire truth to her cousin-employer, Ana Marinay. 16 She
also executed a Sworn Statement 17 before PO3 Jaime Basa, detailing how she had been
raped and beaten by appellant. Four days later, she acceded to undergo a medico legal
examination of her genital organ, which was conducted by Dra. Aurea Villena of the Jose
R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, where she was confined.
Time-honored is the doctrine that no young and decent woman would publicly admit that
she was ravished and her virtue defiled, unless such was true, for it would be instinctive
for her to protect her honor. 18 No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via
an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the
culprit apprehended and punished. 19 Thus, absent any credible imputation of ill motive on
the part of the private complainant to falsely accuse the appellant of a heinous crime, her
candid and consistent testimony should be given full faith and credit. 20 It is a basic rule,
founded on reason and experience, that when a victim testifies that she has been raped,
she effectively says all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. 21
In the case at bar, we find no reason to deviate from these doctrines. Amy de Guzman's
straightforward and convincing testimony, which will be detailed later, bears no badge of
material inconsistency which would bring doubt to its veracity. She stood firm on her tale
throughout her court appearance. The trial judge observed her "to be candid,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank . . . [and she] remained consistent and
unwavering despite the rigid cross-examinations of the defense counsel . . ." 22
Besides, no ill motive was imputed on her. Appellant offers us no plausible explanation
why Amy de Guzman cried rape against him. We believe she did so in order to bring out
the truth and to obtain justice.
Appellant's contention that the absence of genital and other injuries on Amy's body
proves his innocence is unacceptable. Time and again, we have ruled that hymenal
laceration is not an element of rape. 2 The victim need not sustain genital injuries, for
even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ is equivalent to
consummated rape. 24
Besides, the examining physician satisfactorily explained the absence of lacerations on
private complainant's genitalia: 25
. . . during the examination I found out that [the victim's] hymen is that of
elastic type and so it is disten[s]ible and it could accommodate the penis
without producing any genital injuries.
She elucidated that "[l]aceration only occur[s] on non-elastic hymen because non-elastic
hymen cannot accommodate the size of the penis without producing injury but hers is
that of the elastic type, like rubber band that could stretch and turn back into its proper
size." 26
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Time-tested is the guiding principle that when a victim cries rape, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that the crime was inflicted on her; and so long as her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof. 27 We have no reason in the instant case to deviate from this settled
jurisprudence.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
instances: (1) force or intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (3) she is under twelve years of age. 28 We find the necessary
elements of rape duly established by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman when she q You said you removed . . . your pants, where [sic] you
candidly testified thus: 29 wearing your panty at that time?

a Then Alexander Taño kept coming in and out of the a Yes, Sir. I was wearing one.
video rental shop and last time he went in, he slammed
the door and jumped over the counter where I was and q What happened to that panty?
strangled me while his other hand is holding a knife, the
knife was poked at the right side of my neck. a He told me to take off my pants, in doing so I took off
completely together with my panty.
q What else transpired thereafter?
q Then, what happened next?
a And he took the knife from the right hand and held it
with his left hand and turned the volume of the karaoke a And once [I laid] down on the floor, he tried . . . to make
louder so that my voice will not be heard since I was me spread[-]eagle my legs and in that process he knelt
shouting. between my legs then took off his pants.

q When the accused poked the knife, what did you feel? q And after that, what happen[ed] next after accused
removed his pants . . .?
a "Natakot po."
a Then after taking off his pants, he lay atop me and I felt
q What happen[ed] next Ms. Witness? he was forcing his penis in and [while] in that process the
knife was still poked at my left neck.
a Then after turning louder the volume of the karaoke to
down my voice, he took me to the kitchen. q When he inserted his penis into your private parts, what
did you feel?
COURT:
a Pain. (Masakit po).
q How [were] you taken to the kitchen?
q After inserting his penis into your private parts, what did
"Paano ka dinala sa kusina?" he do?

a Sakal-sakal po niya ako. a He kept on pumping.

xxx xxx xxx As noted earlier, the trial judge, who was able to observe firsthand the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, perceived Amy to be candid, straightforward,
a . . . and once in the kitchen he made me lay my back spontaneous and frank. Said witness was also found to have been consistent and
against the stairs and told me to take[ ]off my pants. Due unwavering despite the rigid cross-examination of the defense counsel. We note from the
to fright I did as told and the knife was then poked at my transcript of stenographic notes that the judge herself had posed additional clarificatory
stomach. questions upon Amy. 30 Throughout her testimony, she indeed remained consistent as
well as convincing.
Of long-standing is the rule that findings of trial courts, especially on the credibility of [A]tty. [C]risostomo
witnesses, are entitled to great weight and accorded the highest respect by the reviewing
courts, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked or misappreciated [O]bjection he did not mention other jewelries. He
such as would alter the conviction of the appellant. 31 Trial judges are in a better position specified one bracelet and one wrist watch.
to assess the behavior of witnesses and to detect whether they are telling the truth or not
because they could directly observe them in court. 32 The reviewing magistrate, on the Court
other hand, has only the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings to rely upon.
[W]itness may answer.
With respect to the robbery, its elements are: (1) the subject is personal property
belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that property, (3) the taking is with
Witness
the intent to gain, and (4) there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of
force upon things. 3 There is no question on the unlawful taking of valuables belonging to
Amy and her employer, Ana Marinay. Appellant openly admitted in court the unlawful a [T]here were sir.
asportation, thus:
Fiscal
q [W]ere you able to get some valuables from the room of
[the] Bautista 34 couple? q [W]hat are they?

a [Y]es sir. Witness

q [W]hat are these valuables? a [C]lothes and a hair blower because I was in a hurry. 36

a I remember the jewelry box containing jewelry, clothes
and other valuables [sic] things sir.35
xxx xxx xxx
q [W]here did you get that jewelry box containing rings?
a [I]nside the locker or aparador sir.
q [A]fter having taken all these jewelries and clothes you
placed them all in a blue bag and left the place?
a [T]he jewelry box was placed inside my pocket. I did not
place in the blue bag sir.
q [Y]ou mentioned five rings, Alba wrist watch owned by
rape victim [A]my de [G]uzman, you also mentioned other
jewelries, what other jewelries aside from the jewelry that
you took in the house of the couple Gerry [and Ana]
Bautista?
During his arrest, the following stolen valuables were found in his bag: P5,000 cash, two
bracelets, two rings and a pair of earrings, which Ana Marinay identified as belonging to
her; and one wristwatch and a bracelet belonging to Amy de Guzman. 37 Unrebutted is the
presumption that a person in possession of stolen personal effects is considered the
author of the crime.
Third Issue:
Crime(s) Committed
We do not, however, agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape. This felony contemplates a situation where the
original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging
to another; and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying
crime. 38
Such factual circumstance does not obtain here. As related by Private Complainant Amy
de Guzman, accused-appellant suddenly jumped over the counter, strangled her, poked
a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her towards the kitchen where he forced her to
undress, and gained carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent. Thereafter, he
ordered her to proceed upstairs to get some clothes, so he could bring her out, saying he
was not leaving her alive. At this point, appellant conceived the idea of robbery because,
before they could reach the upper floor, he suddenly pulled Amy down and started
mauling her until she lost consciousness; then he freely ransacked the place. Leaving
Amy for dead after repeatedly banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl,
he took her bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took as
well the jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's employer.
Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime
of robbery with rape. However, since it was clearly proven beyond reasonable doubt that
he raped Amy de Guzman and thereafter robbed her and Ana Marinay of valuables
totaling P16,000, he committed two separate offenses — rape with the use of a deadly
weapon and simple robbery with force and intimidation against persons.
Appellant may well be convicted of the separate offenses of rape and robbery
notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged in the Information is only "Robbery with
Rape." In a similar case, People v. Barrientos, 39 this Court held:
. . . Controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. Neither is it the technical name given
to the offense by the prosecutor, more than the allegations made by him,
that should predominate in determining the true character of the crime.
There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more
crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later
proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of
separate complaints or informations.
In the case at bar, we find the Information filed against appellant to have sufficiently
alleged all the elements necessary to convict him of the two separate crimes of rape and
robbery. Needless to state, appellant failed, before his arraignment, to move for the
quashal of the Information which appeared to charge more than one offense. He has
thereby waived any objection and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those
charged in the Information and proven during the trial. 40
Fourth Issue:
Dwelling as an
Aggravating Circumstance
Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the
offended party and the latter has not given any provocation. 41 It is considered an
aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law
accords to human abode. 42 As one commentator puts it, one's dwelling place is a
sanctuary worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another in the latter's house is more
severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere. 4 According to Cuello Calon, the
commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows worse perversity and produces
graver alarm. 44
In the case at bar, the building where the two offenses were committed was not entirely
for dwelling purposes. The evidence shows that it consisted of two floors: the ground
floor, which was being operated as a video rental shop, and the upper floor, which was
used as a residence. It was in the video rental shop where the rape was committed.
True, the victim was dragged to the kitchen and toilet but these two sections were
adjacent to and formed parts of the store. Being a commercial shop that caters to the
public, the video rental outlet was open to the public. As such, it is not attributed the
sanctity of privacy that jurisprudence accords to residential abodes. Hence, dwelling
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of rape.
Proper Penalties
Under Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, "[w]henever
the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon . . . the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death." Under Article 63 of the same Code, reclusion
perpetua is the appropriate penalty imposable upon accused-appellant for the crime of
rape, inasmuch as no aggravating circumstance was proven. Pursuant to current
jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape. 45 Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in
such amount as the Court deems just, without the need of pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. 46 In rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's moral injury is concomitant with
and necessarily results from the odiousness of the crime to warrant the grant of moral
damages. 47 In the instant case, we deem it appropriate to grant Amy de Guzman
P30,000 as moral damages. However, since no aggravating circumstance attended the
rape, no exemplary damages may be awarded. 48
For the crime of robbery committed under the circumstances of this case, the Code
provides the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period. 49 Further, the appellant is also entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the actual damages incurred by Amy de Guzman in
connection with her physical injuries, the lower court awarded P2,687.65, based on
receipts submitted by her. A recomputation of the receipts, however, reveals a total of
only P2,487.65. We, therefore, reduce the award accordingly. The trial court also ordered
appellant "to restore to the victim her gold ring of undetermined amount," which was
supposedly unrecovered. Upon an examination of the records, we note that the
Information alleges the robbery of the following items: P5,000 cash, three (3) bracelets,
two rings, one pair of earrings and one (1) Alba wristwatch. Except for the cash money,
which has already been returned to Ana Marinay by the police, the other items were
offered as evidence 50 and submitted to the custody of the trial court. Upon Motion 51 of
Ana Marinay and Amy de Guzman, the release to them of these items was ordered by
this Court via a Resolution issued on December 7, 1999. The stolen items are therefore
all accounted for. Thus, we find no sufficient basis for the trial court's order for the
appellant to return a "gold ring of undetermined amount."

In robbery and other common crimes, the grant of moral damages is not automatic,
unlike in rape cases. The rule that a claim for moral damages must be supported by
proof still stands. It must be anchored on proof showing that the claimant experienced
moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation or similar injury. 52 The private complainants,
however, did not present any evidence of their moral sufferings as a result of the
robbery. Thus, there is no basis for the grant of moral damages in connection with the
robbery.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-Appellant

Alexander Taño y Caballero is found guilty of two separate offenses: rape and robbery.
For the crime of rape, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and to pay
Private Complainant Amy de Guzman P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as
moral damages. For the crime of robbery, appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay De Guzman P2,487.65 as actual
damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51304-05 June 28, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN MANDOLADO and JULIAN ORTILLANO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Basilio V. Lanoria for defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
The judgment of conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I
I, Cotabato City dated June 28, 1979 sentencing the accused Martin Mandolado to the
supreme penalty of death in each case and the accused Julian Ortillano to imprisonment
of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17) years of prision
mayor as maximum, being merely an accessory, is before Us for mandatory review.
Under two (2) separate criminal informations dated January 5, 1978 filed by First
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ismael G. Bagundang, the two accused- appellants, Martin
Mandolado and Julian Ortillano, draftees assigned with the Alpha Company, 3rd Infantry
Battalion, Second Infantry Division, Philippine Army with station at Pikit, North Cotabato,
together with Anacleto Simon and Conrado Erinada, trainees attached to the
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 3rd Infantry Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, stationed at the Army Detachment along Simuay Junction, Simuay,
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, were accused of murder for the death of the victims
Herminigildo Tenorio and his driver Nolasco Mendoza with the use of their firearms in the
afternoon of October 3. 1977 at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, qualified with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength.
Specifically, in Criminal Case No. 561, the information charged the accused as follows:
That on or about October 3, 1977 in the afternoon, in the Municipality of
Sultan Kudarat, Province of Maguindanao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent
to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with treachery,
evident premeditation and the use of superior strength all armed with
high powered weapons did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, and with the use of their guns shoot Mr. Nolasco Mendoza
hitting the latter on the different parts of his body causing his
instantaneous death.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and the use of superior strength.
Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 562, the information reads:
That on or about October 3, 1977, in the afternoon, in the Municipality of
Sultan Kudarat, Province of Maguindanao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with
treachery, evident premeditation and the use of superior strength all
armed with high- powered weapons did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, and with the use of their guns shoot Mr.
Herminigildo Fajardo Tenorio hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body causing his instantaneous death.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and the use of superior strength.
The charges having been allegedly committed at the same place and occasion and
involving all the four (4) accused in each instance were jointly tried per order of the trial
court dated February 28, 1978 and after completion thereof, the two herein accused-
appellants were found guilty while the remaining two accused, Anacleto Simon and
Conrado Erinada were acquitted. We quote hereunder the dispositive portion of the
decision now under review, to wit:
WHEREFORE, Martin Mandolado is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 562 for the killing of
Herminigildo Fajardo Tenorio, and also in Criminal Case No. 561 for the
killing of Nolasco Mendoza, with the aggravating circumstances of (1)
'advantage was taken of his being a draftee in the Philippine Army,' and
(2) 'abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness' without the presence
of any mitigating circumstances and is meted the following penalty, to wit;
In Criminal Case No. 562, for the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of the crime in its maximum degree which
is death.
 He shall pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P12,000.00 for the
death of this victim, and the amount of P20,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of the driver, Nolasco Mendoza,
he is similarly sentenced to death.
He is to pay the heirs of said deceased the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of said victim, and the amount of P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
In both Criminal Cases Nos. 561 and 562, on the grounds of reasonable
doubt, Anacleto Simon and Conrado Erinada are both found not guilty.
This case against them (Anacleto Simon and Conrado Erinada) is hereby
dismissed.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 561 and 562, Julian Ortillano was found guilty as
an accessory. He fired his M-16 armalite whenever Martin Mandolado
fired his machine gun and this could be for no other purpose than to
conceal or destroy the body of the crime in making it appear the victims
were fighting them or running away or that somebody else like the MNLF,
rebels, NPA or bandits committed the crime. Furthermore, in his own
admission, the purpose of their attempt to leave Mindanao for Bulacan
after this incident was to hide and wait for the time when Martin
Mandolado could succeed in settling this case which is evidence that he
assisted in the escape of the principal of the crime.
He is hereby sentenced in each of both cases to serve an imprisonment
term of six (6) years of Prision Correccional as the
minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years of Prision Mayor as the maximum penalty.
Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano are to pay jointly and solidarily the
cost of this litigation.
SO ORDERED.
Given in the City of Cotabato, Philippines, the 28th day of June, 1979.
Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit, North Cotabato,
( appellant Mandolado got angry, "cocked" his gun and ordered the driver to stop (pp. 36-
D 38, Supra). While the jeep was coming to a full stop, Conrado Simon and Anacleto
Erinada immediately jumped off the jeep and ran towards their detachment camp located
The facts are as stated in the People's Brief as follows:
In the morning of October 3, 1977, Julian Ortillano, Martin Mandolado,
Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon, trainees/draftees of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army, were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap, North
Cotabato (p. 8, t.s.n., Feb. 21, 1979). They alighted at the bus terminal in
Midsayap. Being all in uniform, armed and belonging to the same military
outfit, they got acquainted and decided to drink ESQ rum, at the said bus
terminal (pp. 10-11, Supra).
While drinking, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon decided to join appellants in going
to Pikit, North Cotabato, home base of appellants (p. 59, Id.). After drinking for about an
hour, appellant Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market. Subsequently,
he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started firing. His companions tried
to dissuade him but he nonetheless continued firing his gun (pp. 11-12, Supra).
Sensing trouble, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon ran away, hailed and boarded a
passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and boarded
also the vehicle (pp, 13-15, Supra). The soldiers forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to
bring them to the Midsayap crossing (p. 58, t.s.n., July 24,1978).
On their way, appellant Mandolado got his knife and tried to attack the driver (pp. 61-
62, Supra). After appellants alighted at said crossing, the Ford Fiera sped away.
Appellant Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the speeding vehicle (p. 51,
t.s.n., Jan. 17, 1979) hitting the right side of the back of the driver's sister who was then
on board said vehicle (p. 64, t.s.n., July 24, 1978).
While waiting for a ride at the Midsayap crossing a privately owned jeep, driven by
Herminigildo Tenorio, passed by. On board said jeep which was bound for Cotabato City
were Nolasco Mendoza and two (2) others, but the latter two alighted at said crossing.
Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon boarded the jeep. Thereafter, appellants ran after
the jeep, shout at Herminigildo Tenorio the driver thereof, to stop the vehicle and
subsequently, both appellants Mandolado and Ortillano boarded the jeep (p. 34, Supra).
On the way, both appellants kept firing their guns (pp. 54-55, t.s.n., Jan. 17, 1979)
prompting Herminigildo Tenorio to remark, "Kung hindi kayo tatahimik, ibabangga ko
itong jeep" (Sworn Statement, Exh. Q., Mandolado) which literally means, "if you will not
stop firing your guns, I will ram this jeep into something. "
some two hundred fifty meters away. Appellants also got off the jeep. Thereupon,
appellant Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at and hit the occupants of the
jeep (Sworn Statement, Exh. Q, Mandolado). Appellant Ortillano likewise, fired his
armalite, not at the occupants of said jeep but downwards hitting the ground. These
bursts of gunfire were heard by both Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon who were
then already about fifty meters away from the jeep while running towards their
detachment camp (pp. 38 and 42, t.s.n., Feb. 21, 1979). Although it was then raining
torrentially, Anacleto Simon recognized the bursts of gunfire as those of a machine gun
(p. 43, Supra).
Appellants ran away from the scene and boarded another vehicle, alighting at Pinaring
crossing. Appellant Mandolado proceeded to a house where he left his belongings and
changed his wet uniform (p. 104, Supra). After about an hour, they rode in a "Hino"
passenger bus bound for Midsayap. On board said bus was a certain Mr. Leopoldo
Jalandoni who was seated in front of the appellants.
Upon reaching a BPH building near Nuling, Sultan Kudarat, the passengers of said bus
were ordered to alight at the military check point but appellant Mandolado did not alight
(pp. 10-13, t.s.n., Oct. 5, 1975). As the bus was not proceeding to Pikit, North Cotabato
and upon advice of Mr. Jalandoni, appellants alighted at the Midsayap crossing and
waited for a bus bound for Pikit (pp. 19-20, Supra).
Appellants were able to ride on a sand and gravel truck which took them to Pikit, North
Cotabato, arriving thereat at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At their camp,
appellants returned their firearms, but did not report the incident. In the evening,
appellants attended a party at the Pikit Elementary School (pp. 32-35, t.s.n., April 16,
1979). The following day, appellants proceeded to Davao City but stopped at Kavocan
where they stayed overnight.
Arriving at Davao City, the following morning, appellants went to see a movie and
afterwards proceeded to the Office of Doña Ana, a shipping firm (p. 40, Supra), where
they saw a certain Sgt. Villanueva who was then leaving for Luzon. Sgt. Villanueva
informed the appellants that they were suspects in the Tenorio and Mendoza killings.
Immediately thereafter, appellant Mandolado purchased two passenger tickets for
Manila. The other ticket was for appellant Ortillano (pp. 120-123, Supra). However,
before appellants could board the ship bound for Manila, they were apprehended by a
team led by Lt. Licas (p. 45, Supra). Appellants were brought to Pikit, North Cotabato
where they were investigated by Lts. Licas and Maburang about the aforesaid killings.
The following day, appellants were brought to the headquarters of the 2nd MP Battalion
at P.C. Hill, Cotabato City where they were again investigated. In said investigation, after
appellants were duly apprised of their constitutional rights, they executed and signed
their respective sworn statements (Exhs. "O" and "R"). Appellant Mandolado admitted
the killing of Tenorio and Mendoza (Exh. "Q"); whereas appellant Ortillano admitted his
presence at said killings and of his having fired his armalite downwards after appellant
Mandolado fired upon the killed the afore-named victims (Exh. "R ").
Silverio Balderosa, on October 3, 1977, at about 12:30 p.m., was on board a "Pinoy"
jeep. On his way home to Midsayap, he passed a jeep parked along the highway
towards the direction of Cotabato City and about 250 meters away from the BPH
building. The parked jeep was surrounded by several persons. Alighting from the "pinoy"
jeep, he went near the parked jeep to see what happened. He saw the lifeless bodies of
two persons, one sprawled along the highway whom he recognized as Nolasco Mendoza
and the other whom he recognized as Mr. Tenorio slumped on the wheel of the parked
jeep (pp. 13-15, t.s.n., July 24, 1978).
The postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Taeb Zailon, Municipal Health Officer of
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, upon the bodies of Tenorio and Mendoza on October 3,
1977, were reduced into writing and reads as follows:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION REPORT
Post-mortem examination was performed at the Rural Health Center, Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao on October 3, 1977 at around 3:30 p.m. in the presence of police officers
of Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao and personnel of the Health Center and other persons
in the vicinity.
PERTINENT PERSONAL DATA:
Name: HERMINIGILDO TENORIO
Sex: Male
Age: 55 yrs. old
Height: 5'5'
Weight: 145 lbs.
C.S.: Married
Residence: Midsayap, N. Cotabato
Place of Death: Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION FINDINGS Weight: 135 lbs.

1. Avulsed cranial content at the level of forehead including eyeballs; C.S.: Married

2. Wound-circular lacerate 3 inches in diameter T-T at lateral side of right deltoie region; Residence: Midsayap, North Cotabato

3. Wound-1 in. circular wound at the right forearm T-T 4 inches below the elbow; Place of Death: Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao

4. Comminuted fracture at right leg just below the knee cap; POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION FINDINGS

5. Comminuted fracture at right leg just above ankle; 1. Wound -Circular, one inch wide, one inch above right eyebrow;

6. Wound-1 in. circular non-penetrating at lateral side left arm; 2. Wound-Circular, 1/2 inch wide, lateral part of left side of neck:

7. Wound-1/2in.circularnon-penetrating at left region. 3. Wound-Circular, 3/4 inch wide, upper aspect of right deltoid muscle;

PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH 4. Wound-Circular, 1 1/2 inch wide, lateral aspect of right deltoid muscle; and

Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple gunshot wounds. 5. Wound-Circular, 1 1/2 inch wide, lateral aspect of right breast 3 inches below arm pit.

Respectfully submitted: PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH

(SGD.) TAEB ZAILON, M.D. Wounds, gunshot, multiple shock, secondary hemorrhage, external-internal, extensive
Municipal Health Officer
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao (Exh. "N") Respectfully submitted:

POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION REPORT (SGD.) TAEB A. ZAILON, M.D.

Municipal Health Officer
Post-mortem examination report was performed at the Rural Health Center, Sultan Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao (Exh. "P")
Kudarat, Maguindanao on October 3, 1977 at 3:30 p.m. in the presence of police officers,
personnel of the health center and other civilians. Acting upon the letter request of the commanding officer, Lt. Rodolfo Villanueva, a
ballistic test was conducted by Sgt. Leon Platoon of the P.C. Crime Laboratory at
PERTINENT PERSONAL DATA: Cotabato City, on the firearms issued to appellant Mandolado, Anacleto Simon and
Conrado Erinada. In said test, bullets were fired from said guns and the empty shells,
Name: NOLASCO MENDOZA called test specimen (T05-1 to T-05-3), together with the empty shells recovered from the
scene of the crime called specimen evidence, and the 10 links of cal. 30 machine gun,
Sex: Male were forwarded to Camp Crame for Ballistic Examination (pp. 20-24, t.s.n., October 6,
1978). Sgt. Platoon marked the 8 shells of .30 caliber recovered from the scene of the
crime as HT-1 to HT-8 and the armalite shells as CM-9 to CM-13.
Age: 45 years old

Height: 5'4"
In the ballistic examination conducted by Reynaldo Pasatiempo of the Camp Crame
Criminal Laboratory, it was found that the caliber .30 shells recovered from the scene of
the crime (Exh. "HT-1" to "HT-8 ") reveal Identical impressions as the test specimens of
five empty shells ("T-05-1 to "T-05-3 ") fired from appellant Mandolado's machine gun.
Whereas the armalite shells recovered from the scene of the crime reveal non-identical
impressions with the shells fired from the armalites of Conrado Simon and Anacleto
Erinada. He then concluded that the .30 caliber shells recovered from the scene of the
crime were fired from the same machine gun issued to appellant Mandolado (pp. 60-62,
t.s.n., October 6, 1978).
Appellants submit only one assigned error and that is, that the trial court erred in
convicting appellants Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano beyond reasonable doubt as
principal and accessory, respectively, of the crimes charged on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence totally disregarding the evidence of the defense. Appellants
contend that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the
circumstantial evidence of the prosecution merely proved the fact of the deaths of
Tenorio and Mendoza and not as to the actual perpetrators of the crime; that the
evidence of the prosecution being weak on its own, the only link of the appellant
Mandolado to the killings is his extra-judicial sworn confession, Exhibit "Q", which he
stoutly repudiates for being unlawfully taken under force and duress and in the failure of
the investigator to apprise him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be
assisted by counsel.
It is contended by the defense that although the ballistic expert and the firearm examiner
testified that they conducted ballistic and firearm examinations, respectively and that
their finding was that the caliber .30 empty shells were fired from the machine gun issued
to Martin Mandolado, the prosecution failed to prove that the "evidence specimen" (Exh.
"HT-1" " to Exh. "HT-8") were the empty shells recovered from the scene of the crime,
the prosecution not having presented any witness who recovered these empty shells. It
was not shown that these empty shells were recovered from the scene of the crime nor
that the slugs of these empty shells caused the gunshot wounds which resulted in the
death of the victims, Hence, the only link of appellant Martin Mandolado with the empty
caliber .30 shells was the fact that these shells were fired from his machine gun, yet the
records disclose that Mandolado accidentally fired his machine gun at the Mintranco
Terminal in Midsayap, North Cotabato, which is not the scene of the crime, when he
threatened the person who tried to steal his bag.
Appellant Mandolado's claim that he was not previously apprised of his constitutional
rights before he executed his extra-judicial confession, Exh. "Q ", deserves scant
consideration. His claim is clearly belied by the opening statements appearing in his
sworn statement, which reads, thus:
Preliminaries: Dft Martin Mandolado please be informed that you are now
under investigation by this unit in connection with the Shooting incident
that happened at National Highway particularly near the vicinity of the
BPH Office at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on or about 031300H
October 1977. Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your
legal rights to wit: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
maybe used for or against you as evidence. You have the right to the
services of a lawyer of your own choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer and
you want one, a lawyer will be appointed for you before I ask you any
questions.
Question: Are these all clearly understood by you?
Answer: Yes, sir.
2. Q— Do you wish now to proceed with this investigation
ever. in the absence of a lawyer of your own choice?
A— Yes sir.
3. Q— Are you willing to give your statement without
being forced, coerced, intimidated or promised of any
reward whatsoever?
A— Yes sir.
4. Q— Now that you are about to testify under oath, do
you swear to tell the truth?
A— Yes sir.
WAIVER
I have been advised of my legal right to remain silent; that anything I say
maybe used as evidence against me, and that I have the right to a lawyer
to be present with me while I am being questioned.
I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement and
answer to questions. I do not want the assistance of a counsel and I
understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been
made to me and no force or pressure of any kind have been used against
me.
 (SGD.) MARTIN A. MANDOLADO
Dft 07A-2853 PA
(Affiant)
And with respect to the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano, the same preliminary
questions were made to him before his investigation and he answered similarly as his co-
accused Mandolado which is shown in Exhibit "R" and said Ortillano likewise executed
the same waiver as that of his co- accused, which is marked Exhibit "R-A".
The contention of both appellants that they signed their sworn statements (Exhibits Q
and R) because they were maltreated and forced, cannot be believed, not only for failure
on their part to present any evidence of compulsion, duress or violence but also because
they even failed to Identify their investigators who allegedly inflicted maltreatment to
them, much less complained to the officials who administered the oaths to their sworn
statements of such maltreatment, if any. Moreover, the sworn statements themselves
contain significant and important details which the affiants alone could have furnished,
thereby clearly revealing the voluntariness of said statements and rendering the same
admissible as evidence. (People vs. Rosales, 108 SCRA 339; People vs. Regular, 108
SCRA 23, 39; People vs. Tintero, 111 SCRA 714; People vs. Estero, 91 SCRA 93,99).
The conviction of appellant Mandolado for double murder appears to be based not only
on his extra-judicial confession (Exhibit Q) but also upon the following circumstances
which proved that he did shot and kill the victims, Tenorio and Mendoza, beyond
peradventure of doubt. And these are listed in the People's Brief, to wit: "(1) he
repeatedly fired his .30 caliber machine gun while intoxicated at the bus terminal in
Midsayap (pp. 11-12, t.s.n., February 21, 1979); (2) that he fired at the Ford Fierra which
took them in the Midsayap junction (p. 51, Supra) hitting one of its passengers (p. 64,
t.s.n., July 24, 1978); (3) that Anacleto Simon while running away from the jeep driven by
the deceased, heard a burst of machine gun fire coming from the direction of the jeep (p.
42, t.s.n., February 21, 1979); (4) the result of the Ballistic examination showing that the
shells recovered from the scene of the crime were fired from the gun issued to appellant
Mandolado (pp. 60-62, t.s.n., October 16, 1978); (5) the attempted flight of both
appellants from justice (pp. 120-123, t.s.n., April 16, 1979) and which act clearly
indicates guilt for the 'wicked teeth where no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold
as the lion, and lastly (6) appellant's own admission before the lower court that he killed
Tenorio and Mendoza although he claims the same to be accidental (pp. 7-8, t.s.n.,
October 6, 1978). "
The killing of the two victims in the case at bar is correctly qualified as murder, there
being present the qualifying circumstance of treachery which is alleged in the
informations. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. (Art. 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code). The
prosecution evidence is quite clear and explicit that when appellants alighted from the
jeep, the accused Mandolado immediately fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the
occupants of the jeep, the victims Nolasco Mendoza and Herminigildo Tenorio, and both
of them died instantaneously on the spot, and from this sudden means or manner of
attack, it can reasonably be concluded that it tended directly to insure its execution
without risk to the appellant-assailant and also deprive the victims of any chance or
opportunity to defend themselves. We also rule that the particular means or manner
employed by the appellant-assailant was consciously or deliberately sought and not a
mere accidental circumstance resorted to on the spur of the moment on the basis of the
evidence that the appellant had previously and repeatedly fired his .30 caliber machine
gun at the bus terminal in Midsayap and had also fired the machine gun at the Ford Fiera
which took them to Midsayap junction and that appellants waited for sometime riding on
board the jeep driven by Tenorio before they ordered the jeep to stop, alight therefrom
and then shoot the occupants therein.
While the informations allege as aggravating circumstances that of evident premeditation
and the use of superior strength, aside from treachery, We cannot agree with the finding
of the trial court that the aggravating circumstances of (1) advantage was taken of his
being a Draftee in the Philippine Army, and (2) abuse of confidence or obvious
ungratefulness were present in the commission of the crime.
While it may be true that a soldier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines is deemed as
one who holds public position (U.S. vs. Gimenea, 24 Phil. 464, where a constabulary
soldier was held to be a public officer), there is no persuasive showing that herein
appellants being draftees of the Army, in full military uniform and carrying their high-
powered firearms, facilitated the commission of the crimes they were charged. It may be
conceded that as draftees, the accused could easily hitch hike with private vehicles, as in
the case of the deceased Tenorio's owner-type jeep, but there is no evidence that when
they stopped the jeep the accused already intended to shoot the occupants of the
vehicle. As it was held in People Pantoja, 25 SCRA 468, 471 which We reiterate that
"There is nothing to show that the appellant took advantage of his being a sergeant in
the Philippine Army in order to commit the crimes. The mere fact that he was in fatigue
uniform and had an army rifle at the time is not sufficient to establish that he misused his
public position in the commission of the crimes ... "
There is also merit in appellants' contention that there could be no abuse of confidence
as the evidence on record showed the lack of confidence by the victims to the appellants,
that this confidence was abused, and that the abuse of the confidence facilitated the
commission of the crimes. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating,
it is necessary that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused
and one against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such a
relationship to commit the crime." (People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155, 172). It is
also essential that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal
such as would give that accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the
crime; that such confidence was a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the
culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse
said confidence (People vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534). In the instant case, there is
absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence
might rest between the victims and the assailants who had just met each other then.
Consequently, no confidence and abuse thereof could have facilitated the crimes.
Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the commission of the
crime for the simple reason that the requisite trust of the victims upon the accused prior
to the criminal act and the breach thereof as contemplated under Article 14, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code are manifestly lacking or non-existent. In all likelihood, the accused
Army men in their uniforms and holding their high-powered firearms cowed the victims
into boarding their jeep for a ride at machine gun point which certainly is no source of
gratefulness or appreciation.
The finding of the trial court that: "There is no doubt about Martin Mandolado's state of
intoxication. He was so drunk that even his three (3) companions armed with M-16
armalite feared him. The same thing was true with the MPs," should credit said accused
with the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness but which the trial court decision failed
to appreciate in his favor. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-
appellant Mandolado shall be reduced in the computation thereof.
With respect to the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano who was found guilty as an
accessory in Criminal Cases No. 561 and No. 562 for having fired his M-16 armalite
whenever Martin Mandolado fired his machine gun and, according to the court, this could
be for no other purpose than to conceal or destroy the body of the crime and making it
appear that the victims were fighting them or running away or that somebody else like
the MNLF, rebels, NPA or bandits committed the crime, and for assisting in the escape of
the principal Martin Mandolado) of the crime and sentenced in each of both cases to
serve imprisonment for a term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
seventeen (17) years of prision mayor as maximum, We find and hold that the accused-
appellant Julian Ortillano should be convicted, not as an accessory, but as an
accomplice.
An accomplice cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts, provided he has no direct participation in its execution or does not force or induce
others to commit it, or his cooperation is not indispensable to its accomplishment (Art.
18, Revised Penal Code).
To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it must be
shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal,
which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which
contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether
physical or moral (People vs. Silvestre, et al., 56 Phil, 353, 356). As aptly
stated in People vs. Tamayo (44 Phil. 38, 49): 'It is an essential condition
to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way. (People vs. Custodia, 47 SCRA 289,303 [19721).
In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his acts, showed knowledge of the criminal design of
Mandolado. He was present when Mandolado tried to attack the driver of the Ford Fierra
with a knife and fired at the vehicle hitting a female passenger (p. 4, Decision). When
Mandolado got angry and "cocked" his gun and ordered Tenorio to stop the jeep, their
two other companions, Simon and Erinada, immediately jumped off the jeep and ran
away, but Ortillano stayed. In a display of unity with Mandolado, Ortillano fired his
armalite while they were riding in the jeep of the victim (p. 5, Decision). And Ortillano's
act of firing his gun towards the ground manifested his concurrence with the criminal
intent. In other words, Ortillano's simultaneous acts supplied, if not material, moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. Ortillano's presence served to
encourage Mandolado, the principal, or to increase the odds against the victims (U.S. vs.
Guevara, 2 Phil. 528 [1903]; People vs. Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil. 353 [1931]).
In convicting the accused Ortillano as an accomplice, We, however, appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of drunkenness in his favor, the same as We did to his co-
accused Martin Mandolado, the principal defendant.
In resume, the crime committed by the accused-appellant Martin Mandolado is murder,
qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating circumstance but having found and
appreciated drunkenness which is not habitual as a mitigating circumstance, the penalty
prescribed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be sentenced to imprisonment of ten
(10) years and one (;) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum in each case.
As to the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano, convicted as an accomplice to the crime of
murder, and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness which
is not habitual, the penalty to be imposed upon him shall be one degree lower than that
imposed for murder (Article 52, Revised Penal Code), which will be in the minimum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused Ortillano shall be
sentenced to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum in each case.

With respect to damages, for the death of Herminigildo Tenorio, the award of P12,000.00
as compensatory damages and P 20,000.00 for moral damages is hereby affirmed.

For the death of Nolasco Mendoza, We reduce the award of P50,000.00 as

compensatory damages to P12,000.00 We also reduce the award of P100,000.00 as
moral damages to P20,000.00.

The liability of the appellants for the above damages which shall be paid to the heirs of
the victims shall be in solidum (Article 110, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant Martin Mandolado is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing
of Nolasco Mendoza and in Criminal Case No. 562, for the killing of Herminigildo
Tenorio. There being no aggravating circumstance but having found and appreciated
drunkenness which is not habitual as a mitigating circumstance, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum in each of the two cases.

The accused-appellant Julian Ortillano is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as accomplice in the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of Nolasco
Mendoza and in Criminal Case No. 562 for the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio. Similarly,
there being no aggravating circumstance but having found and appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of drunkenness which is not habitual in his favor, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum
in each case.

In Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of Nolasco Mendoza, We sentence both accused
to pay the heirs of the victim P12,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as
moral damages. The liability of the accused shall be in solidum.

In Criminal Case No. 562 for the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio, We sentence both
accused to pay the heirs of the victim P12,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P20,000.00 for moral damages. The liability of the accused shall also be in solidum.

Costs against the appellants. Judgment modified.

G.R. No. 75267 September 10, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS DELA CRUZ y VENANCIO alias "BOSYO", accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ponciano G. Hernandez for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
There are not many crimes more morally repugnant than the sexual violation of a young child. This case involves such a
crime: rape committed, with the bravado of evil, in a place dedicated to prayer and worship of the Supreme Being. Accused-
appellant was charged with raping a 7-year old girl in Criminal Case No. SM-2219 in a complaint which read as follows:
Criminal Complaint
The undersigned complainant, Marciano Venancio, father of the minor,
Brigida Venancio accuses Carlos dela Cruz y Venancio alias "Bosyo" of
the crime of rape, penalized under the provisions of paragraph 3, Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 1980, in the municipality of
Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused Carlos dela Cruz y
Venancio alias "Bosyo", with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully,
lawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with a seven-year old girl,
Brigida C. Venancio, against her will and consent committed with force
and violence.
Contrary to law. 1 (Emphasis supplied)
The accused during the arraignment pleaded not guilty. After trial and in due course of
time, on 20 February 1985, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Carlos dela Cruz y Venancio, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized
under Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, he is
hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. He is furthermore ordered to
indemnify the victim Brigida Venancio, in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 2
The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:
At about 8:00 o'clock p.m. on 6 September 1980, Brigida Venancio—then barely seven
(7) years old 3 — was walking through a heavy rain, alone and without an umbrella,
bound for her grandparents' house. While Brigida was passing by the Chapel in Sta.
Cruz, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, the accused Carlos dela Cruz y Venancio, a blood relative of
Brigida (the record does not disclose in what civil degree), suddenly reached out from the
doorway and grabbed Brigida's arm and pulled her inside the Chapel. In the Chapel,
where it was dark the lights being off, the accused led her to the last pew, pinned her
down on the pew and removed her panty. 4 Accused also removed his pants and
immediately introjected or sought to introject his penis into little Brigida's private organ.
While so engaged, the accused covered Brigida's mouth with his one hand twisted her
arm with his other arm. Accused succeeded in placing his organ on top and at least
partially into Brigida's private part. 5 Shortly, thereafter, while the two (2) lay down on the
pew, head to head, with panty and pants on, respectively, two (2) young parishioners
Luzviminda Mendoza and Marilou Carpio, entered the Chapel for a scheduled prayer
rally and switched on the lights. Luzviminda Mendoza saw Brigida, who immediately
stood up almost simultaneously with the accused, dazed and soaking wet. 6 Another
parishioner Mrs. Francisca Mendoza, Brigida's teacher in Grade I primary school, arrived
in the Chapel a little later. She too saw Brigida and the accused and wondered why she
was still abroad rather than at home at such a late hour. 7 Mrs. Mendoza advised Brigida
to go home immediately which Brigida did. On her way back to her parents' house,
Brigida met Luzviminda Mendoza's father, Mang Domeng, who on noticing her dazed
condition accompanied her home to her doorstep.8
After the rally, Luzviminda who was an aunt of Brigida, did not go home directly but went
to the house of Brigida's parents 9 and asked the mother why Brigida was soaking wet
and still not at home at that late hour. After Luzviminda had left, the mother asked Brigida
what had happened. Brigida then told her mother she had been violated by Carlos
"Bosyo" dela Cruz. 10
The next day, 7 September 1980, Brigida and her parents and accompanied by Marilou
Carpio went to the office of the Police Station Commander of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and
reported the rape of Brigida by the accused and had the matter reflected on the police
blotter. 11 In the afternoon of the same day, Brigida was brought by her parents to the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") office in Manila for medical examination. 12 The
examination was conducted by Dr. Nieto M. Salvador who issued a Medico Legal Report
dated 7 September 1980 which set forth the following
 FINDINGS
General Physical Examination:
Height: 67 cms. Weight: 20 kgs.
Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative,
ambulatory subject.
Breasts infantile.
No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted.
Genital Examination:
Pubic hair, absent. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette
tense. Vestibule, reddish and congested. Hymen, intact. Hymenal orifice,
minular admits a tube 0.5 c.m. diameter.
Conclusion:
Hymen intact. 13
Brigida's parents, however, did not think very much of the medical
examination conducted by Dr. Salvador. Brigida's mother later testified in
court that she believed the examination had been done hurriedly and
cursorily and haphazardly. 14 Notwithstanding the conclusion of Dr.
Salvador's report that Brigida's "hymen [was] intact", Brigida's parents
were determined to pursue their complaint on behalf of Brigida. They
were not, however, able to lodge one immediately against the accused,
since the police investigator was not in his office whenever they went to
the police station. 15 Thus, on 18 September 1980, Brigida and her mother
went to the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS)
at Camp Crame for assistance. There, Brigida was again examined by
PC Medico-Legal officer Dr. Desiderio Moraleda who made the following
FINDINGS:
General and Extragenital:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts
are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and tight. There are not external signs
of recent application of any form of trauma.
Genital:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and gaping
with the pale brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating
the same are disclosed a congested vulvar mucosa, a tight and intact
fourchette and an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with a deep, healed
laceration at 6 and shallow, healed laceration at 3 and 9 o'clock. External
vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the
examining index finger.
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative
diplococci and for spermatozoa.
Remarks:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically. 16
The defense's version of the facts was simply that the rape never happened. The
accused testified that he had come from work and stopped by and stayed at the Chapel
waiting for the rain to stop. 17 He dozed off, he said, and upon waking up, found a child
sleeping on a pew some little distance from where he himself had fallen asleep. He
testified that he saw Mrs. Francisca Mendoza talk to the child; that he had not done
anything to Brigida; that he had not inserted his organ into Brigida's private part; and he
had not removed her panty nor lain on top of her. 18
The accused's bare denial was not corroborated by any other witness. Luzviminda
Mendoza's testimony, even if presented by the defense, strongly suggested that
something out of the ordinary had happened on the evening of 6 September 1980 inside
the Sta. Cruz Chapel; for, as noted, she proceeded to Brigida's home right after the
prayer rally, indicating that finding the child Brigida with the accused in the Chapel in
such a condition—soaked to the skin and dazed—had aroused her concern.
Upon the other hand, the testimony of the child Brigida in open court was starkly simple
and straightforward. She said:
Atty. Regalado:
Q Brigida, do you know a person by the name of Carlos
dela Cruz or "Bosyo"?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is inside this courtroom, can you point to him?
Q On the night that you reported to your mother, what
exactly did you tell your mother on the night you reported
it to your mother?
A That Bosyo "hinubaran po ako ni Bosyo at inilabas niya
and kanyang titi at inilagay sa kiki ko po".

A That man (witness pointing to a man who responded to Q What else did he do to you?
the name of Carlos dela Cruz).
A He covered my mouth with his hands.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else?
Q Ida, you earlier said that you have a complaint please
tell us what that complain was? You are complaining A He twisted my arm, sir.
against whom?
Q Will you please show the Honorable Court how your
A Bosyo, sir. arm was twisted by the accused?

Q Why? Ida, did you also complain to your mother about A This way, sir. (Witness holding her right wrist by her left
Bosyo? hand and twisting the same.)

A Yes, sir. Q Now Bosyo you said "hinubaran ka. . . "

Q What did you complain to your mother about? Court:

A Bosyo undressed me, sir. Was the panty removed?

Q Are you also making the same complaint here or what? Atty. Hernandez:

A The same, sir. We agree to that translation, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx Court:

Court: Go ahead.

Proceed. Atty. Regalado:

[Atty. Regalado:] Q When Bosyo pulled down your panty, will you please
state before this Honorable Court how he put down your
panty?
 A (Witness showing that her panty was being put down.) A Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, sir.

Q When your panty was down already, what did Bosyo Court:
do, if any?
Aside from you and Bosyo, were there other persons
A He put his penis on my vagina, sir. (Witness there?
demonstrated by movements)
A None, sir.
Court:
Atty. Regalado:
Q Were you sitting or standing at the time or were you
lying? Q How many minutes did this Bosyo had the opportunity
of putting his penis in your vagina?
A I was lying sir.
A Quite a few seconds, sir.
Q And how did he do it?
xxx xxx xxx 19
A (Witness demonstrated the manner how Bosyo laid on
top of her.) (Emphasis supplied)

Court: The trial court which heard Brigida's testimony from beginning to end, found that her
statements had the ring of truth and were convincing. The trial court said:
Proceed:
The Court is not unmindful of that judicial pronouncement deeply
Atty. Regalado: embedded in jurisprudence that the accusation for rape is easily made,
hard to prove, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though
Q At the time, what place was that where you said you innocent. (U.S. v. Flores, 26 Phil. 262). In this case, however, it is
were lying? inconceivable and it is extremely difficult for the Court to believe that a
seven year old girl, unmotivated and so blissfully innocent could concoct
A On a long bench, sir. a narration such as she testified to in Court. That she did not complain to
her Aunt or to her teacher when the two found her in the Chapel with the
accused is understandable. She was so young, just a child. She must
Q Approximately, if you can remember what time was that
have been shocked by what has been done to her by the accused. No
in the evening?
wonder she was speechless. She could not comprehend what happened.
The pain in her vagina when she urinated upon reaching home however
A Around 8:30 in the evening, sir. must have been such that constrained her to tell her mother what the
accused did to her.
Q Where did the incident happen?
Against the narration of a guileless 7 year old girl, the mere denial and
A Inside the chapel, sir. protestation of innocence of a 25 year old man cannot prevail. The Court
is thoroughly convinced of the truth of Brigida Venancio's story. No more
Q You said chapel, what chapel was that? need be said. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
We find no basis for disagreeing with the evaluation of the trial court.
The appellant, however, insists that the charge against him had not been established
beyond reasonable doubt. He urges that there is significant variance between the result
of the medical examination conducted on Brigida by the NBI doctor, Dr. Nieto M.
Salvador, who found Brigida's hymen to have been "intact" and the result of the
examination conducted a few days later by the Philippine Constabulary CIS physician,
Dr. Desiderio Moraleda who concluded that Brigida was then "in a non-virgin state".
Accused submits that the finding of Dr. Salvador should prevail over that of Dr. Moraleda
since the findings of the former were obtained barely twenty-four (24) hours after the
alleged rape had occurred while Dr. Moraleda examined Brigida some eleven (11) days
after the violation. Accused further argues that even assuming the truth of Brigida's
testimony in open court, such testimony indicated that the accused's male member was
merely placed on top of the private part of the victim Brigida and had not passed into
it, 21 and that there was no proof at all that his male member had penetrated into the
female opening of the victim.
A I think so because the appearance is reddish which is
not normal, it should be pinkish. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Dr. Moraleda's finding, upon the other hand, was that Brigida's hymen had in fact been
lacerated, showing that there must have been some penetration. The fact that Dr.
Moraleda's examination of Brigida took place eleven (11) days after the examination by
Dr. Salvador does not impair the credit worthiness of Dr. Moraleda's findings. It is
important to note, moreover, that the testimony of the child Brigida herself is quite
consistent with the findings and testimony of both Dr. Salvador and Dr. Moraleda that
there had been some penetration at least of the labia of Brigida's female part. Brigida's
testimony stated, in relevant part:
Court:
Q Ida, you said he put his penis into your vagina, does his
penis get into your vagina or not?

Apropos the above argument, we note, firstly, that medical findings are not indispensable A Only on top, sir.
in the prosecution of the crime of rape. 22 We note, secondly, that the fact that a woman's
hymen is found intact does not show that there had been no penetration by an accused's
Q It did not go in.
male organ. It is well-settled doctrine that the slightest penetration of the pudenda is
quite sufficient for the consummation of the crime of rape. In People v. Abonada, 23 the
Court pointed out that "the medical finding that the hymen is intact does not negate rape. A No, sir.
Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen suffices to warrant conviction for rape." 24 Moreover, Dr. Salvador Q And did you feel any pain or you did not feel any pain?
testified that he had found physical evidence of "manipulation" of the vagina or the
vestibule thereof, which is consistent with entry into the lips of the female part of Brigida: A Yes, sir, I felt pain, sir.

Court: Q Why did you feel pain, what pain? Where was the pain
on your vagina or your body as a whole?
Q You use the word manipulation, what was
manipulated? A In my vagina, sir.

A The attempt to insert a finger or in some other cases Q Was medical report?
wherein the man attempts to insert his erected penis on
the child whose genitalia is not yet ripe, with that Fiscal:
particular act, there is no way that the penis can go inside
the vaginal opening because at this age, the vaginal The record of the fiscal's office show there were two
opening is still narrow, normal, .5 cms. medical examinations.

Q In this particular case of Brigida, there were signs that Court:

there were manipulations?
 Q Ida, you said a short time did you urinate at that time? of the rape. Nonetheless, the trial court could have and should have found the presence
of the generic aggravating circumstance of commission of the offense in a place
A Yes, sir. dedicated to religious worship. 27 The trial court made no mention of such aggravating
circumstance in its decision. Because the appropriately imposable penalty of reclusion
Q What about this Bosyo did he urinate? perpetua is an indivisible penalty, and was in fact imposed by the trial court, the finding
that we here make of the presence of this generic aggravating circumstance, does not
impact upon the imposable penalty. 28
A No, sir.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated 20 February 1985 must be, as it is
Q How do you know you urinated?
hereby, AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
A (Witness does not answer.)
SO ORDERED.
Q Did you know whether something came out from the
penis of Bosyo?

A Sticky fluid and dropped on my thigh.

Q But you said you urinated, when did you urinate at the
time or when?

A When I went home, sir.

Q Did you notice any or rather did you notice whether or

not there was blood around the area of your vagina?

A No, sir. 26 (Emphasis supplied)

Brigida's statement that she had felt pain in her private part would have been
incomprehensible if there had been absolutely no penetration, not even of the
labia by the accused's male organ. It appears to the Court that the 7-year old
Brigida was much too young to be capable of distinguishing between the penis
merely lying outside the vagina and on top of the pubes, from the erect penis
poking into the labia in the effort to get into the vaginal canal, but being unable to
do so because of the unripe or infantile condition of the canal. We agree with the
conclusion of the trial court that there had in fact been some penetration at least
of the labia and that consequently, the crime that was committed was
consummated rape.

It was proven at the trial that the violation of the child Brigida took place in the Sta. Cruz
Chapel in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, a building dedicated to and actively used for religious
worship. The criminal information did not apparently specify the place of the commission
 G.R. No. L-13007 December 23, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LOPE CUNANAN, alias
PERLA, ET AL., defendants.
RAYMUNDO ABESAMIS, alias RADING, alias TEDDY, alias MIKE, alias MUNDING, alias
UTO, Defendant-Appellant.
Ernesto Escaler for appellant.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Atty. E.A. Salva for appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by defendant Raymundo Abesamis, alias Rading, from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, convicting him, as well as Lope Cunanan, alias Commander Perla, and
Ruperto Esquillo, alias Sergio, alias Alex, who have not appealed, of the crime of kidnapping
with ransom and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment, with the accessory penalties
prescribe by law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, Dr. and Mrs. Zosimo Fernandez in the
sum of P40,000.00, and to pay the proportionate part of the costs.
The lower court found, and it is not disputed, that, on April 23, 1953, at about 7:30 p.m.,
Dorotea Fernandez, wife of Dr. Zosimo Fernandez, their daughter Fe and the family driver,
Buenaventura Fernandez, were forcibly taken from their house in Pagsanjan, Laguna, and
brought to the mountains by a band of about seventeen (17) armed men headed by Lope
Cunanan, who was addressed by his men as "Capt. Mendoza". While in the hideout of the
malefactors, Mrs. Fernandez copied, by order of Cunanan, a letter prepared by him and
addressed to Dr. Fernandez, demanding P80,000.00 for the release of Dorotea, Fe and
Buenaventura Fernandez. Three (3) days later, captives were taken further into the mountain
fastness, where they stayed for thirteen (13) days. On different occasions, during this period,
Cunanan bade Mrs. Fernandez to write the letters Exhibits C, D and E, urging her husband to
expedite the raising of the ransom money. Moreover, Cunanan, as "Capt. Mendoza",
exchanged correspondence with Dr. Fernandez with respect to the amount of the ransom
money which was eventually reduced to P40,000.00. Upon payment thereof early on May 8,
1953, the captives were released.
Although positively identified by Mrs. Fernandez and her driver Buenaventura Fernandez (Fe
Fernandez did not take the witness stand, for she was abroad at the time of the hearing), as
one of the armed men who guarded the complainants during the entire period of their
captivity, Abesamis maintains that the lower court erred in convicting him of the crime
charged. More specifically, appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy
between him and Cunanan to commit said offense, upon the following grounds: (1) the only
direct evidence thereon is an extrajudicial confession of Cunanan, which is inadmissible in
evidence that appellant was one of those who forcibly took the Fernandezes from their house
in Pagsanjan in the evening of April 23, 1953; and (3) it has not been proven that appellant
knew that the captives had been kidnapped for purposes of ransom. In connection with the
last argument, it is argued that, as a member of the corps of security guards of the
Hukbalahap, to which appellant like Cunanan, as "Capt. Mendoza", guard the bases of
operation of said organization, where presumably, the captives were kept before their
release, and that, accordingly, the fact he guarded them does not necessarily show that he
was a privy to the commission of the crime charged.
The record shows, however, that upon being dragged from their house in Pagsanjan, on
April 23, 1953, at about 7:30 p.m., the Fernandezes and their captors, after crossing a river,
went afoot to the mountains; that after passing by steep trails, at about midnight, they
reached a place in the mountains where there was an improvised hut among coconut trees;
that, placed in said hut, the Fernandezes were heavily guarded, not only during that evening,
but also, during the entire period of their captivity; and that among those who so guarded
them was appellant Raymundo Abesamis and his co-defendant Ruperto Esquillo, who did not
appeal. Although, there is no direct evidence as to the identity of each and everyone of the
members of the members of the band who went to the house of Dr. and Mrs. Fernandez, in
the evening of April 23, 1953, except as regards Lope Cunanan, there is nothing to indicate
that there had been a change, either of the band, or in the composition thereof, at any time
during the period above mentioned. Indeed, the record suggests that there had been no
change in the composition of the group, from the midnight of April 23 to the early morning of
April 24, when Mrs. Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez first recognized Abesamis
among their captors. Moreover, there is evidence to the effect that the same group of men
guarded the captives from April 24 to May 8, 1953. Again, it has been clearly established that
the kidnapping was made by Huks under the command of "Capt. Mendoza", or Lope
Cunanan, and Abesamis admittedly belonged to the Huk detachment under such command.
In fact there is no question that the Fernandezes were kidnapped for purposes of ransom, in
which, accordingly, each one of the conspirators had a special interest. Hence, none of them
would have normally allowed the intervention of a stranger, not only because he could
jeopardize the success of their plan, as well as their own security, but, also, because he
would thereby be placed in a position to except and demand a share in the ransom money,
and, consequently, reduced the share therein of the original conspirators. The incriminatory
statements - to the effect that Abesamis was a member of the band that took the
Fernandezes from their house in the evening of April 23, 1953, and he was a party to
conspiracy to commit the crime charged - found in Cunanan's extra-judicial statement, merely
corroborated the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and is indicative of their
veracity.
Anent appellant's last argument, it appears that upon receipt of information to the effect that
an understanding had been reached with Dr. Fernandez, on May 7, 1953, there was a
general rejoicing in the second hideout of the malefactors; that at about 4:00 p.m., the latter
proceeded with their captives from said hideout to their first hideout, which they reached at
about 8:00 p.m.; that, the next day, a man came and said: "they are ready, they are there",
referring evidently to the bearers of the ransom money; that at about 2:00 p.m. the
malefactors brought the captives down the mountain to a brook, in a slope where several
friends of the Fernandezes were waiting with a bundle wrapped in a plastic cloth; that this
bundle was delivered to Mrs. Fernandez, who, following instructions said to have been given
by Dr. Fernandez, opened the bundle and counted the money contained therein; that after
verifying that it amounted to P40,000.00 Mrs. Fernandez delivered the money to Cunanan
who took P10,000.00 for himself, gave P6,000.00 to his "lieutenant", and divided the balance
among the other members of his detachment - including Abesamis; and that after a brief wait,
the captives were released.

These events, which took place in the presence of Abesamis - particularly, the general
rejoicing and rather vociferous expressions of happiness made upon receipt of notice of the
agreement reached with Dr. Fernandez, in the course of which the captives were assured
that they would soon be released and that they would only have to wait for the ransom
money, and the share thereof actually taken by Abesamis - considered in relation to the other
facts adverted to above, leave no room for doubt that Abesamis was in conspiracy with
Cunanan and the other members of his detachment in the commission of the crime charged.

Although the same was perpetrated at night time, with the assistance of armed men,
constituting a band, the maximum of the penalty prescribed by the law(Articles 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18[the crime charged was committed
before the approval of Republic Act No. 1084, on June 15, 1954]) for said offense - namely
death - cannot be imposed upon appellant herein, for lack of the number of votes necessary
therefor, owing to the fact that the head of the band, Lope Cunanan, had been sentenced to
life imprisonment.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant
Raymundo Abesamis. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez,
David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLANDO ALFANTA y
ALO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting1 accused-appellant Rolando
Alfanta y Alo of rape with two aggravating circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the
extreme penalty of death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply read:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
upon the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and consent.2
When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the
crime charged. Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its decision
under review, thus:
The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the afternoon,
he performed a physical examination and medico genital examination on one Nita Fernandez
for alleged rape. Upon physical examination he found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or
on the mandibular area left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found that the
labia majora and minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a woman who had just given
birth; or a normal appearance as a result of several sexual intercourses that had been
performed. He submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit A).
The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information who
testified that on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in the
residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati city, a man whom she had not seen
before suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and
put his hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She
resisted, but could not do anything. Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence. Because of
fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing the fence, the man
instructed her to go to a vacant house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant
house, she was told to undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo.
Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed her. Then she was told to lie down and told to
separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her vagina. After inserting the mans penis
to her vagina, she was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his
penis into her anus. After inserting the mans penis into her anus, she was told to turn around
face up. All these acts of the man hurt her. After turning around face up, the man inserted his
fingers in and out into her private part. After the man had finished inserting his fingers in and
out of her private part, she was told to go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as
he was going to take a rest and at the same time telling her not to tell what happened to
others saying that lahat ng nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong. All
the time the man was inserting his penis and fingers into her private part and into her anus,
she was shouting: tulungan po ninyo ako,' but nobody responded. Noticing that the man was
already sleeping, she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his
chest. The knife broke. She suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times.
Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the bolo and ran to the signal office of soldiers.
When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met that she killed
a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place
where she was raped. They found the man lying down still alive. The man was brought to the
hospital. The man turned out to be accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed
an affidavit (Exh. C), narrating what happened to her to the police; and was brought to the
NBI Medico-Legal Officer for examination.
On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she worked as
housemaid, she went to her friends house named Patrick because she brought mongo and
because she and Patricks wife Inday, are friends, arriving in the house of Patrick at 6:30 in
the evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back to her place of work at Valle
Verde, Pasig because it was already late at night and was told to sleep at Patricks house.
Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from
her two (2) other persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala,
while Inday and her son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In
entering the house were she slept, one has to reach the sala first. When awakened, she
shouted, but nobody heard her because they were sleeping and at the same time the
accused placed his hand on her mouth. She was really afraid because she was boxed on her
chest and accused was holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the
garage, which was not lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because of fear.
Accused also undressed himself. While accused was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried.
Accused is not her sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart.
The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit, Makati Police
Station who testified that she came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D, because Nita
Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo, which was brought by Nita Fernandez to
the Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the
Investigator. After the bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she
conducted an investigation. Based on her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that
when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August 26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a
man standing beside her. Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her to
go outside, instructed to climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the
fence, Nita Fernandez was told to undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to lie down
in a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua, where suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their
way to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked accused why he rape Nita
Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth because they were
sweethearts.
Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at AFOVAI
Village, Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house of General Renato Icarma
together with many other laborers, somebody told him that his wife was waiting for him in the
house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00 oclock that evening, he went to the house of Captain
Pascua; and upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the
caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the
door. After opening the door, Nita Fernandez, his live-in partner for almost a year came out,
in an angry mood, because she has been waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was
late. He explained that he did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita
Fernandez was, he will call her by phone or write her before she comes. Then Nita
Fernandez told him that they talk outside as she was ashamed with the neighbor, and they
will disturb the child who was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He and
Nita went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived in the
vacant house, it was closed, so they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what Nita
Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for
he knows of no reason why Nita Fernandez will hack him. He believes that Nita Fernandez
concocted the story of rape because of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for
hacking him.
On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of General
Romeo Icarma (the house where he and 15 other workers were constructing a fence), since
1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In February 1995, the daughter of Nita
Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita became
sweethearts in February 1995. They have not live together because Nita was working at Valle
Verde. They only meet during Nitas day off. He has been at Nitas place of work, but he used
to call then at her telephone numbers which are 6326062 and 6356060. They used to see
each other at Gen. Icarmas place where he lived. On August 26, 1995, when the incident in
questioned happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer residing at Gen. Icarmas place because
they were told to leave in April 1993. On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just
100 meters away from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking for him. Because Nita
does not know the workers in Gen. Icarmas house, Nita left and went to the house of Captain
Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters area, Melchor
Rudy Abella told him that Nita was looking for him. He went to the house of Captain Pascua.
At Captain Pascuas place, he met Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were
Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a small child who were all awake,
except the child. Although Ablon was very much willing to accommodate him in Ablons
house, he brought Nita to the house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a
roof to protect them and ashamed to stay at Ablons house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in
Ablons place, saying that instead of sleeping at Ablons place, she prefers to go back at Valle
Verde. He did not allow Nita to go back at Valle Verde because it was already late at night
and if anything happens to her, her daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame
him. He did not bring Nita to Gen. Icarmas house because it is crowded and the Colonels
house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascuas house. They went to the Colonels house,
climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying banig, pillow and blanket,
and did not notice that Nita was carrying a knife. Nobody live in the Colonels house and was
closed. They slept in the terrace of the house on a cement flooring. While he was sleeping
Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife. When hacked, he just said aray. The bolo was not used
in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen
knife. When the Military Police arrived, he was no longer at the Colonels house because he
went to another house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked the assistance of
Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the Military Police. He did not leave the colonels
house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite his wounds, he was able to sleep and woke
up at 5:00 in the morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that it was because he
hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand and pushing her on her chest when Nita insisted in leaving
for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file a complaint against Nita for hacking
him.3
In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
with aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the maximum penalty of death, and indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez the sum
of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit.4
Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and the
imposition of the death penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends that -
I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY.5
The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases that have
been previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances before it, of two people,
each testifying on the same incident but making a clearly discordant testimony. Since only the
participants could directly testify on the sexual congress, here conceded to have taken place,
extreme care is observed in evaluating the respective declarations of the complainant and the
accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great respect over the assessment of the
trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import
employed by the Court, it would be best not to disturb the findings of the court which has Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in AFOVAI
heard the evidence except only when a material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked Fort Bonifacio Makati City do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
or misappreciated which if properly taken into account can alter the outcome of the
case.6 Regrettably for accused-appellant, no such exceptive instances of possible oversight A There was sir.
are perceived or evident in this case.
Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the trial court and
by this Court as well, of what had transpired during the late hour of the night in question. A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there was a
man who entered the house where I was sleeping.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August 26, 1995
at around 12:00 oclock midnight?
A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.

A At Fort Bonifacio.
Q What else happened after that?

Q What city or municipality?

A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he said if I
will not obey him he will be going to kill me sir.
A I do not know but it must be here sir.
Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?
Q Meaning Makati City?
A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.
A Yes sir.
Q Did you climb over the fence?
Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?
A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
A I was sleeping in my friends residence.
Q Were you able to go over the fence?
Court:
A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.
Q What is the address of that friends residence at Fort Bonifacio?
Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the fence?
A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.
A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
Q Why were you there at that time?
Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?
A Because I always go there and my sons residence is beside the house of my friend sir.
A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and I took off
Court: Proceed fiscal: my clothes he embraced me and kissed me sir.

Pros. Manola: Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?
A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.
Q Did you obey him?
A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
Court:
Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the accused for
you to undress?
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to that
vacant house and to undress why did you follow this instruction?
A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.
Q Why do you say that he might kill you?
A He like to rape me sir.
Court:
Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?
A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.
Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he inserted his penis
to my vagina sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened next Mrs.
Witness?
A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to my
private parts going it and out sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person according
to you lie down after he put his fingers inside your private part?
A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?
A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does not want
me to tell it to anybody because he have raped many.
Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would you be
able to recognize him?
A Yes sir I could recognize him.
Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he is inside?
Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and when asked
his name answered as Rolando Alfanta.
Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of Rolando A Yes sir.
Alfanta uttered the words lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may
magsumbong what happened next Mrs. Witness? Q What was he doing?

A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take a rest. A He was lying down sir.

Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness? Q What happened after that?

A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab him in
the chest sir.
Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.
Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.
Q Who brought him to the hospital?
A The ambulance of the soldier.
Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in connection with
what you have just narrated or told or testified to this afternoon?

A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal where the
soldiers were.
Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
A I could remember.
Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?
A Yes sir.
Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutors office consisting
of two pages kindly go over it and tell us if you recognize this statement?

A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo. A Yes sir I could recognize this.

Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according to you Q Is that your statement
you have killed a person what happened next?
A Yes sir.
A We went to the person who raped me sir.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q And did you see him there?
Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if you see this
A Yes sir. bolo again would you be able to recognize it again?

Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly raped? A Yes sir.

A The soldiers sir. Prosecutor Manola:

Q Did you find this person who raped you?

We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this bolo is Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?
presented by the policeman who is in custody of this bolo.
A I do not know him.
Court:
Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?
Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of the
accused did you bring it also? A I saw him around 7:00 oclock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of the house
of my friends where I was sleeping.
A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.
Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?
Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
A Only me sir.
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q How did you ask for help?
Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him with the
A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir. knife how many times have you stabbed him with the knife?

Q The question to you was how did you ask for help? A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.

A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako. Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of the bolo you
hacked him how many times have you hacked him?
Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?
A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he might kill
A None sir. me.

Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your private part? Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.

A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir. Court: Cross-examination.

Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your vagina? Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.

A He forced that to insert it. Court: Proceed.

Q Forced it to where? Atty. Manalo:

A He forced it to enter my vagina sir. Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your friend at
AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?
Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?
A One of their children so there were three and I was one.
A Yes sir I feel it sir.
Q Were you sleeping in one room?
A I was sleeping in the sala sir. Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked placed
in that door like a wood?
Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that house?
A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.
A It was closed but it was not locked.
Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time?
xxx xxx xxx.
A Patrick sir.
Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when you could
already at the house of your employer? Q And how are you related to Patrick?

A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir. A His wife is my friend sir.

Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo to your
friend?
A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
Q By the way what time did you go there?
Q What is the name of his wife?
A Inday sir.
Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of your
friend Inday did you not shout when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?

A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening. A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same time he
placed his hands on my mouth sir.
Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times were you
A 6:30 sir. boxed by the accused on the chest?

Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isnt? A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him.

A Yes sir. Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?

Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that place A Yes sir.
isnt?
Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on her
A Three rides sir. mouth.

Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were sleeping Q Was it strong?
at the time the place where you were sleeping or the place of the room where the owner of
the house were sleeping? A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.

A First it is the sala where he passed. Note: Witness holding on his left chin.

Q How about on the chest?

Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest. Q How big?

A It was not too strong sir. Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.

Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow? Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.

A Yes sir. Court: Answer

Q Where? A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.

A I fell on the ground down. Atty. Manalo:

Q Where were you boxed by the accused? Q And then you lie down?

A Outside sir of the house. A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.

Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is that Q Was he still holding the bolo?
correct?
A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.
A Yes sir.
Q How did you see him?
Q And you followed him?
A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I cried and he
A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because I was was holding the bolo.
afraid because he was holding a bolo sir.
Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.
Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?
A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing himself.
Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
Q Was it lighted the place?
A He was molesting me sir.
A None sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?
Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to you?
A Near sir.
A 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?
Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?
A Yes sir.
A I saw him that he was passing.
Q Where were you at the time?
A I was seating by the window sir.7
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward categorical, and
relatively free from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to sufficiently
persuade the Court to conclude that the trial court has erred in giving due weight and
credence to the testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence adduced to show that the
complainant has had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant in a
fabricated charge. The Court repeats the familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show such a fact so long as her
testimony can meet the test of credibility,8 for it is said that no woman in her right mind will cry
rape, allow examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to the
humiliation concomitant to the prosecution of the case, unless the story were true. 9
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant had been
lived-in partner for almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at
the porch of the house of a certain Air Force officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal
knowledge of the victim that evening. In his appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to negate
any possible or likely use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in the house where
the victim was sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995, there were at least three persons (the
caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couples son) who
could have responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door of the house was
purposely left unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c)
when the victim was made to climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped
but did not.
The sweetheart theory of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out strategy,
often resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No
documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was
presented to confirm a romantic liaison between accused-appellant and the complainant. The
latter testified:
Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?
A No sir.
Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?
A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?
Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned because
your sweetheart was then womanizing?
Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Really?
A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir.10
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved for
petty reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz:
This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez were
sweethearts, for such a claim defies rationality, let alone common sense, because if they
were sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the manner on which she stabbed and
hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate the
outrage on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in
stabbing and hacking him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger
the way she did.11
Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August 1995 in the
house where victim was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It was already
close to midnight when the incident occurred, and the other occupants of the house were by
then apparently all sound asleep. The evidence is to the effect that accused-appellant
immediately after getting into the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on her mouth and
threatened to kill her if she dared refuse to yield to his demands. Understandably, the victim
was shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed into submission. Intimidation should be viewed
in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the
offense and not by any kind of hard and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to expect the
victim to act with equanimity of disposition and to have the courage and intelligence to
disregard the threat made by accused-appellant.12
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant wanted
accused-appellant to have a chance to see her during the late evening indeed should
deserve scant consideration. The so-called love angle was properly ruled out by the trial court
for lack of concrete evidence to establish any such relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered her to climb
a fence, it should be enough to state she did not appear to have had any real opportunity to
flee from the clutches of the intruder who was, in fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence
and while inside the abandoned and enclosed house, she could not have done any much
better since she was all the time within striking distance of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at
dawn.13 The law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise.14 By and of itself, nighttime
would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is
specially taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring
the offenders immunity from capture.15 As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime
can be so considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the information. 16 The
Court entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of
darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being recognized. Accused-
appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then
unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping world.17 The Court
has long held that this aggravating circumstance can be considered when an accused takes
advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal act. 18
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into
her vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into
her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger
inside her. The Solicitor General correctly invoked the case of People v. Saylan,19 where this
Court said:
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also the same position as dogs do
i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because The studies of
many experts in the matter have shown that this position is not novel and has repeatedly and
often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if
the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.20
Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating
circumstance any means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is said,21 "pertains to the moral order [and]
adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.22
In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with
a bolo to realize his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape 23 for not having been
correspondingly alleged in the information as to make the offense fall under the
jurisprudentially referred qualified rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In
People v. Garcia,24 the Court declared:
One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments
thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the death penalty, that is,
when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same
circumstances, a homicide is committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect
created a special complex crime of rape with homicide. The first two attendant
circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying circumstances since they
increase the penalties by degrees, and not merely as aggravating circumstances
which affect only the period of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher
degree. The original provisions of Article 335 and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111
are still maintained.
xxx xxx xxx.
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded
in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered
only as aggravating circumstances, (People v. Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934];
People v. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156; People v. Fuertes, G.R.
No. 104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People v. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101,
October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.) since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded.
(U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People v. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People v. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 73464, August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the
right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of
due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form
punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned.25

Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if
there were aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the
appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty,
it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by
hereby lowering the penalty therein imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An award
of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise ordered to be paid by accused-appellant
Rolando Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
indemnity ex delictu granted by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic appeal1 before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental, Branch 50, finding appellants Felix Ventura (Ventura) and Arante
Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692
and Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693.
The accusatory portion of the Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692
reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in concert, without any justifiable
cause or motive, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Home-made
Revolver and Arante V. Flores armed with a bladed weapon, and by taking
advantage of their superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab with bladed weapon one Aileen Bocateja y
Peruelo, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter the following wounds, to
wit:
- Cardio respiratory arrest
- Hemothorax
- stab wounds
which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said victim, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, night time and with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The accusatory portion of the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-
20693 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, without
any justifiable cause or motive, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38
Caliber Homemade Revolver and Arante Flores y Ventura armed with a bladed
weapon, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with said bladed weapon one
Jaime Bocateja, thereby causing upon of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
- multiple stab wounds
- #1 Posterior axillary area right
- #2 Posterior axillary area left with minimal hemothorax
- lacerated wound right parietal area
OPERATION PERFORMED:
- Exploration of wound right parietal for removal of foreign body
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of some cause or accident independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, due
to the timely and able medical assistance, which saved the life of the victim and
the victim was able to escape.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, night time, and with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.3 (Emphasis supplied)
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to both charges.4 The two criminal cases
were consolidated following which they were jointly tried.5
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000,
fast asleep in their room on the ground floor of their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. The room had a glass wall with a glass sliding door
which was closed but not locked. The kitchen light was open, as was the light in the
adjoining room where the couple's young children, Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping.
Their niece, Aireen Bocateja, and Jaime's elder daughter, Rizza Mae, were asleep in
their rooms on the second floor.6
At around 2:00 a.m.,7 Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who,
together with his nephew appellant Flores, had stealthily entered the couple's room after
they gained entry into the house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following
transpired thereafter:
Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on
the head with the gun and asked him for his keys. 8
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the
revolver. The two men then struggled for possession of the gun. As Jaime almost
succeeded in wresting possession of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to
appellant Ventura to stab Jaime. Using the knife he
was carrying, appellant Flores stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the
gun, threw a nearby plastic stool at the jalousy glass window causing it to break and
cried out for help.9
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw
her husband in mortal danger. Appellant Flores stabbed her, however, with his knife, and
although Aileen tried to defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores continued
stabbing her.10
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding
appellant Flores whom she recognized as a former employee of the butcher shop of the
Bocataje spouses. Pleading with appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back
upstairs into Rizza Mae's room, and the two called to their neighbors for help.11
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house,12 bringing nothing with
them.13
Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) arrived in response to a flash report.14 Some of the police officers took the spouses
to the Western Visayas Regional Hospital,15 while other elements of the CIU team
intercepted appellants Ventura and Flores who were being pursued by neighbors of the
spouses at the corner of Araneta-Yulo. Recovered from appellant Ventura was a .38
caliber revolver with five (5) live bullets, and from appellant Flores a blood stained
knife16 measuring 14½ inches from tip to handle with a 10-inch blade.17
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to
whom they admitted responsibility for stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to
questions from the reporters, appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife was
carrying on an affair with Jaime.18
In the ocular inspection of the Bocateja residence, the CIU team found the spouses'
room in disarray, with some cabinets opened and blood splattered all over the floor, the
bed and the ceiling. 19
Aileen eventually died in the hospital on the same day of the commission of the
crime.20 Dr. Luis Gamboa, City Health Officer of Bacolod City who conducted the autopsy
of her body, found that she suffered a hack wound on her face and four stab wounds on
her body, three at the chest and one at the back of the right shoulder, all caused by a
sharp bladed instrument, such as the knife recovered from appellant Flores. One of the
stab wounds penetrated Aileen's chest near the left nipple, the intercoastal space and
the middle of her right lung causing internal hemorrhage and ultimately resulting in her
death.21
Jaime who was hospitalized for a total of six days, was treated by Dr. Jose Jocson,22 who
certified that he sustained the following non-lethal injuries: 23
Multiple Stab Wounds
#1 Posterior Axillary Area Right
#2 Posterior Axillary Area Left with Minimal Hemothorax
Lacerated Wound Right Parietal Area24
From the evidence for the defense consisting of the testimonies of appellants Ventura
and Flores and Primitiva Empirado, the following version is culled:
Four days after February 13, 2000 when appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental
from Manila where he had been working as a security guard,25 he noticed that his wife,
Johanna, who had previously been employed as a house helper of the Bocateja
spouses, was wearing a new ring. When he confronted her, she said that it came from
Jaime who was courting her, and that it was because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had
discovered their illicit relationship that she had been dismissed from the Bocateja
household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon she left the
conjugal home.26
On February 22, 2000, Johanna returned to the conjugal home in Barangay Alegria,
Municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental to get her things. After a verbal confrontation
with her husband, she left to find work in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. This was the
last time that Johanna and appellant Ventura saw each other.27
That same day, appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at
length and appellant Flores, who had previously worked for a day at the meat shop of the
Bocateja spouses, confirmed that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair.28
Since appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura asked
him to go with him to their residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with
Johanna.29
Appellants, armed with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja
residence still on the same day, February 22, 2000, arriving there at around 11:00 p.m.
They were not able to immediately enter the premises, however. After boring a hole
through the kitchen door with the knife, appellants entered the Bocateja residence at
2:00 a.m. of the next day, February 23, 2000.30
Once inside, appellants entered the room of the Bocateja spouses through the unlocked
sliding door. Appellant Ventura woke Jaime up, confronted him and told him to stop his
relationship with Johanna. Jaime fought back, and he and appellant Ventura grappled for
possession of the latter's gun.31
Soon after, Aileen woke up, screamed for help, and began throwing things at appellant
Flores whom she attempted to strangle with an electrical extension cord. Unable to
breathe, appellant Ventura stabbed Aileen twice with his knife. And seeing that Jaime
had wrested control of the gun from appellant Ventura, appellant Flores also stabbed
Jaime.32
Since appellants had not intended to kill Aileen or stab Jaime, they fled in the course of
which Jaime began shooting at them with a 9 mm pistol. Appellants were eventually
intercepted by policemen who placed them under arrest.33
Interviewed by the media after his arrest, appellant Ventura stressed that he just wanted
to confront Jaime about the latter's relationship with appellant's wife, Johanna.34
By the appealed Decision of December 15, 2000, the trial court disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused FELIX VENTURA y
QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as Principals by Direct Participation of the crime of ATTEMPTED
MURDER as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20693 with the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling, nighttime
and the breaking of door to gain entrance to the house and with no mitigating
circumstance. Accordingly, they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they
shall serve a prison term of from Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as Minimum to
Eighteen (18) years of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum.
The Court also finds the two (2) above-named accused GUILTY as Principal[s]
by Direct participation for the crime of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information
No. 00-20692 qualified by abuse of superior strength. The aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and by the breaking of a door are
present in the commission of the crime. There is no mitigating circumstance.
The accused, therefore, are meted the Supreme penalty of DEATH.
By way of civil liability, the accused are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of
Aileen Bocoteja the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The accused are
likewise held solidarily liable to pay Jaime Bocateja the sum of P100,000.00 as
moral damages and the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.35 (Emphasis
supplied)
In their Brief,36 appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in convicting them despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) in
considering abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No.
00-20892; (3) in considering
evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893; and
(4) in considering the aggravating circumstances of breaking of door and nocturnity in
both cases.37
Appellants argue that, at most, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for the
stabbing of Jaime and homicide for the fatal stabbing of Aileen.38
From a considered review of the records and applicable jurisprudence, the instant appeal
fails.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.39 For it to be
appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when WITNESS:
the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such A On that day, I don't know Jaime Bocateja.
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.40
xxx
By appellants' argument, even if appellant Ventura became jealous when he learned of
the illicit affair between his wife and Jaime, it is not, by itself, sufficient proof that he ATTY. ORTIZ:
determined to kill the latter; that with Jaime's testimony that appellant had announced a
"hold-up," they, at most, intended to rob, but not kill the spouses; that their only purpose
Q On February 22. So that you did not ask your wife where the place of
was to confront Jaime regarding his supposed affair with appellant Ventura's wife,
Jaime Bocateja was at that time you were by him on February 22, 2000?
Johanna; and that if they had truly intended to kill Jaime, then appellant Ventura would
not have bothered to awaken him, but would just have shot him in his sleep.
A Johanna did not tell me the place of Jaime Bocateja.
These assertions run counter to the established facts and are debunked by appellants'
own admissions. Q Why did you not ask her where the house is, at that time?

Appellants admittedly arrived at the Bocateja residence at 11:00 p.m. and surreptitiously A What she told me was that, she is working in Bacolod City.
entered therein at 2:00 a.m. At that time, the surrounding premises were decidedly dark,
and all the members of the household were fast asleep. Armed with a gun and a knife, Q Mr. Witness, you had from February 17 to 22, a number of days to
they proceeded directly to the bedroom of the spouses, where appellant Ventura woke confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja. Did you not confront your wife or perhaps ask
up Jaime. These actuations are not of those seeking parley, but instead betray an her about the place or where this Jaime Bocateja was at that time and have
unmistakable intention to kill, not merely confront, Jaime. the intention to confront him, if that was really your intention to confront
him?
Indeed, when pressed during cross-examination to explain why he chose to "confront"
Jaime under the foregoing circumstances, appellant Ventura became evasive and did not WITNESS:
give a clear answer:
A No, I did not ask her because we had a confrontation and the next
Q Mr. Witness, you said that your purpose in going to the house of Jaime day, February 17, she left.
was only to confront him. My question is, why is it that you went there at 11:00
o'clock in the evening and not in the morning so that you will have all the Q Of course, when you arrived at the house of the Bocateja [spouses] at
opportunity to confront him? 11:00 o'clock in the evening, you were armed at that time, is that right, you and
your companion, Arante Flores?
A Because at that time, I was not on my proper frame of mind.
A Yes, sir.
Q Why, is it not a fact that as early as February 17, 2000, you were already
told by your wife that there was that relationship with Jaime Bocateja and your Q What was that weapon at that time?
wife?
A .38 caliber revolver.
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q Why did you not immediately confront Mr, Bocateja after that day or
February 17? ATTY. ORTIZ:
 Q Mr. Witness, if your intention was only to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja, ATTY. ORTIZ:
why is it that you did not wait or you did not come to that place earlier so
that at that time, Jaime Bocateja was still awake or perhaps waited until the Q You will admit Mr. Witness at the time you left your place at Brgy.
next day? Alegria you were already armed, is that right?

COURT: WITNESS:

Already answered. He said that he was not at the proper frame of his A Yes, sir.
mind.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Q Your uncle Felix Ventura was armed with [a] .38 caliber revolver, is that
Cross-examined on the same point, appellant Flores was equally evasive, but eventually right?
revealed that the timing and method of entry were purposely chosen to avoid detection
by either the Bocateja family or their neighbors: A Yes, sir.

Q You arrived in the house of Bocateja at about 11:00 o'clock is that Q And you were also armed with a bladed weapon is that correct?
right?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you have to bring this weapon Mr. Witness?
Q And your purpose in going to the house of Bocateja was only to confront
Jaime Bocateja about his relationship with Johanna is that right?
A We brought this weapon just to frighten Jaime Bocateja during [the]
confrontation.
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Are you saying Mr. Witness if your purpose was only to confront him
Q Why did you wait Mr. Witness why did you and the other accused Felix you have to bring this [sic] weapons?
Ventura wait for three (3) hours for you to confront him in his house?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
A Because we were not able to enter the door right away because the
door could not be opened.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime Bocateja about 11:00 o'clock. . .
by the way when did you arrive at the house of Jaime Bocateja?
Q My question Mr. Witness, is this you ate your supper at Libertad
market at about 8:00 o'clock why did you not go to the house of Jaime
A 11:00 in the evening.
Bocateja at 9:00 o'clock immediately after supper? At that time when the
members of the family were yet awake?A We stayed at Burgos market and
then from Burgos to Libertad we only walk and from Libertad to the house Q Of course you did not anymore knock at the door Mr. Witness?
of Bocateja.
A No, sir.
 Q Or you did not also call any member of the family to open [the door Q I recall that you left Murcia [at] 4:00 o'clock. Is that morning or afternoon?
for] you, is that right?
A I left Murcia at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
WITNESS:
Q 4:00 o'clock from Alegria then to Alangilan, then to Bacolod, is that
A No, sir. correct?

ATTY. ORTIZ: A Yes, sir.

Q As a matter of fact you only broke the gate Mr. Witness in order to enter Q From Alangilan to Bacolod, what mode of transportation did you make?
the compound of the Bocateja family?
A From Alegria to Alangilan, we only hiked and then from Alangilan to
A We scaled over the gate. Bacolod we took the passenger jeepney.

Q And why do you have Mr. Witness to go over the fence and open a
hole at the kitchen for you to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja if that was your
purpose?
A The purpose of my uncle was just to confront Jaime.
Q And when you confront, are you saying that you cannot any more
knock at the door, perhaps call any member of the family inside the house?
Q From Alegria to Alangilan, how long did it take you to walk? How
many kilometers?
A Four (4) kilometers.
Q And, I assume that while you were walking, you were talking with
Arante Flores, your nephew, about the plans to go to the house of Jaime
Bocateja?

WITNESS: A Yes, sir.

A No, sir. COURT:

ATTY. ORTIZ: Q By the way, what did you do at Alangilan?

Q Why Mr. Witness, Why? A I went there because my clothes were at my sister's house.

A We did not call or knock at the person inside the house because it will Q So, what time did you arrive in [Bacolod]?
make noise or calls and alarm to the neighbors.42 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) A We arrived here in [Bacolod] late in the evening.

To be sure, all the elements of evident premeditation were clearly established from the Q I assume that you disembarked at Burgos Market?
lips of appellants themselves. Thus, on clarificatory questioning by the trial court,
appellant Ventura testified: A Yes, sir.

COURT: Q And you just walked from Burgos Market to Libertad Baybay to the house
of Jaime Bocateja?
A Yes, sir. A We used the knife in unlocking the door. We made a hole.

Q It took you about thirty (30) [minutes] to one (1) hour, more or less? Q You made a hole and with the use of your hand, you were able to unlock
the inside lock because of the hole?
A More than one (1) hour.
A Yes, sir.
Q And during this time, you were talking again with Arante Flores
[about] the course of action that you will take once a confrontation takes Q And I assume that it took you twenty (20) – thirty (30) minutes to
place with Jaime Bocateja? make that hole?

WITNESS: A Yes, sir.43 (Emphasis supplied)

A Yes, I asked him the location of 3rd Road since I do not know the The immediately foregoing narration was echoed by appellant Flores who gave the
house of Jaime Bocateja. following testimony on direct examination:

COURT: ATTY. JACILDO:

Q I assume that the front main door of the house was close[d] at that time, Q So from Brgy. Alegria where did you proceed?
correct?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
A We proceeded to Brgy. Alangilan.
Q You scaled that door, the front main door of the gate?
Q This Brgy. Alegria how far is it from Brgy. Alangilan?
A Yes, sir, we scaled the gate.
A The distance between Brgy. Alegria to Brgy. Alangilan is about three (3)
Q You were not able to open it but you simply scaled, you went over? kilometers.

A Yes, sir. Q So, what means of transportation did you used in going to Alangilan?

Q And you said yet, you destroyed the main door of the house. Can you A We walked in going to Alangilan.
tell the Court, how did you destroy the main door of the house?
Q When you arrived at Brgy. Alangilan what did you do?
A No, the kitchen door, sir.
WITNESS:
COURT:
A We went to our aunt's house.
Q How were you able to destroy it?
ATTY. JACILDO:
WITNESS:
Q From Alangilan where did you proceed?
 A In Alangilan, we stayed at the house of my aunt and then we
proceeded to Bacolod.
Q So what time did you arrived [sic] in Bacolod?
A 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived in Bacolod, what did you do?
A We ate our supper at Libertad Market.
Q After eating your dinner at Libertad, what did you do?
A After eating our supper, we proceeded to the house of Jaime
Bocateja.
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q What time did you arrived [sic] at the house of Jaime?
WITNESS:
A 11:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime, what did you do?
A We enter[ed] the gate of their house.
Q Please continue?
A Then, we opened the door.
Q And then?
A We reach[ed] [the Bocateja residence] at around 11:00 o'clock and we
tried to open the door but we could not open the door immediately. We
made a hole so that we can get in the house. We entered the house at
about 2:00 o'clock in the morning the following day.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but
the calm and methodical manner by which they sought to carry out his murder. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, unless shown to be customary,45 appellants' act of
arming themselves with a gun and a knife constitutes direct evidence of a careful and
deliberate plan to carry out a killing. Consider the following ruling of this Court in People
v. Samolde:46
As stated earlier, accused-appellant and Armando Andres tried to borrow
Cabalin's tear gas gun. This attempt by the accused-appellant and his co-
accused to arm themselves prior to the commission of the crime
constitutes direct evidence that the killing of Feliciano Nepomuceno had
been planned with care and executed with utmost deliberation. From the
time the two agreed to commit the crime to the time of the killing itself, sufficient
time had lapsed for them to desist from their criminal plan had they wanted to.
Instead, they clung to their determination and went ahead with their nefarious
plan. x x 47 (Emphasis supplied)
From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, after they had resolved to go to
confront Jaime, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City, ten
hours had elapsed – sufficient for appellants to dispassionately reflect on the
consequences of their actions and allow for their conscience and better judgment to
overcome the resolution of their will and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if only
they had desired to hearken to such warnings. In spite of this, appellants evidently clung
to their determination to kill Jaime.
That evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and
not by those of the prosecution witnesses is of no moment. While appellants could not
have been compelled to be witnesses against themselves,48 they waived this right by
voluntarily taking the witness stand. Consequently, they were subject to cross-
examination on matters covered by their direct examination.49 Their admissions before the
trial court constitute relevant and competent evidence which the trial court correctly
appreciated against them. 50
Although he admitted stabbing Jaime, appellant Flores sought to justify his actions by
claiming that he was impelled by the need to prevent Jaime from shooting his uncle,
appellant Ventura. This pretense does not impress.
To successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person
killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking
the assailant, should any provocation have been given by the relative attacked.51 Of
these, the requisite of "unlawful aggression" is primary and indispensable without which
defense of relative, whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked.52
Not one of the foregoing requisites of defense of a relative is present. From all accounts,
it was appellants who initiated the unlawful aggression, and it was the victim Jaime who
acted in self defense. Hence, neither the justifying circumstance of defense of a
relative53 nor the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative54 may
be appreciated in appellant Flores' favor.
While appellant Ventura did not directly participate in the stabbing of Jaime, the trial court
correctly held both appellants collectively liable for the attempt on the latter's life since
they were shown to have acted in conspiracy with each other.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.55 Where conspiracy has been adequately
proven, as in these cases, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of law, the act of
one is the act of all.56
By stabbing Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced
the commission of murder directly by overt acts. Despite their efforts, however, they
failed to inflict a mortal wound on Jaime, hence, their liability only for attempted murder.57
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants guilty of murder
qualified not by evident premeditation but by taking advantage of superior strength, 58 to
wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. The accused Arante Flores who delivered the
stabbing blow is big and strong, standing about five feet and six (5'6")
inches tall. His weapon was a 14 inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood] only
about five (5'0") feet tall. The disparity of their strength is
enormous.59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.60 The appreciation of
this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties, and
is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assuming a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous to the
aggressor, which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime.61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante Flores is taller, and
probably stronger than the victim Aileen Bocateja because of their difference in sex as
well as the fact that the accused appellant Flores was armed at that time x x
x."62 Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death was not attended by abuse of superior
strength since: (1) though ultimately unsuccessful, she was able to put up a defense
against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that appellant Flores
deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size and sex in order to facilitate the
commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or
repel the aggression,63 taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the
victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of
the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary
position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not
annulling it.64 Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her and her
husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does
not automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his
superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an
attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon
used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself.65 Thus, in People v. Molas,66 where the accused was convicted of murder for
stabbing to death two women and an eight year old boy, this Court discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas,
the killing of the three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. There was abuse of
superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds upon
Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger, was armed with a
weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was
also present when he hacked eight-year old Abelaro and also Dulcesima
who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was unarmed.67 (Emphasis
supplied)
And in the more recent case of People v.Loreto,68 this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that a crime against persons is aggravated by the accused
taking advantage of superior strength. There are no fixed and invariable rules regarding
abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense of the victim.
Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of superiority depends
upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim. There is abuse of superior
strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse of superiority is
determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense,
although not annulling it. The aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to
insure the commission of the crime. In this case, accused-appellant was armed with a
knife and used the same in repeatedly stabbing Leah, a young wisp of a girl, no
less than eighteen times after overtaking her in the sala of Dan's house.
Irrefragably, then, accused-appellant abused his superior strength in stabbing
Leah. In a case of early vintage [People v. Guzman, supra. at 1127], the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of
murder. An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and
from which the woman was unable to defend herself (U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36
Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly
appreciated by the trial court, as qualifying the offense as murder.69 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took
advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his
unarmed victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a
relative, one claiming self defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence70 both
unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured and reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. As a third requisite,
he must also prove lack of sufficient provocation on his part.71 None of these requisites
was shown to be present. As expounded by the trial court:
Arante declared that Aileen panicked and screamed and was hitting him with an
extension cord so he stabbed her. Arante was suggesting that had Ai[l]een
remained cool, composed and friendly, she would not have died.
This perverted reasoning need not detain the Court. There was an on-going
aggression being committed inside her house and within the confines of her
room, hence, Aileen's actuations were perfectly just and legitimate.72
As adverted to earlier, the trial court, citing People v. Dueno,73 did not consider evident
premeditation as having aggravated the killing of Aileen since she was not the intended
victim of appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court finds that this
aggravating circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's
murder. Jurisprudence is to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as
present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the
conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who
may help him put a violent resistance.74
Here, it was established that upon seeing her husband being attacked by appellants,
Aileen immediately called for help and hurled objects at appellant Flores. And it was
because of this passionate defense of her husband that appellant Flores hacked at her
face and stabbed her four times. These factual circumstances are analogous to those
in People v. Belga,75 where this Court had occasion to state that:
While it would seem that the main target of the malefactors were Alberto and
Arlene Rose, this does not negative the presence of evident premeditation on the
physical assault on the person of Raymundo Roque. We have established
jurisprudence to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered
as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed (or
wounded, as in this case), if it is shown that the conspirators were
determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may
help him put a violent resistance. Here, Raymundo Roque provided such
violent resistance against the conspirators, giving the latter no choice but
to eliminate him from their path.76 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied,
citations omitted)
Thus, while appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime, the trial
court correctly held both of them responsible for the murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators
are liable for such other crimes which could be foreseen and are the natural and logical
consequences of the conspiracy.77 In Pring, et al. v. Court of Appeals,78 this Court held:
While the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-
accused, there is no question that they were all prompted and linked by a
common desire to assault and retaliate against the group of Loreto Navarro.
Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done by the participants in
such a felonious undertaking. While petitioners herein, Rogelio Pring and Alberto
(Roberto) Roxas, on their part, had ganged up Jesus Yumol who belonged to the
group of their adversaries by hitting the latter with a bench and a piece of wood,
and that it was a certain David Ravago who stabbed the deceased Loreto
Navarro, nevertheless, it is a rule that conspirators would necessarily be
liable also for the acts of the other conspirators unless such acts differ
radically or substantially from that which they intended to commit (People
vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536; People vs. Rosario, 68 Phil. 720).
The pronouncements made by this Court in the aforecited case of People vs.
Enriquez, still serve as the governing rule that should be applied to the case at
bar. In the said case, this Court stated:
 "x x x x x x x x x
'We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused
had undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to the deceased,
and now that the injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they
cannot escape from the legal effect of their acts on the ground that one of
the wounds was inflicted in a different way from that which had been
intended. x x x x x x x x x.
'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a
number of persons agree to commit, and enter upon the commission of
the crime which will probably endanger human life such as robbery, all of
them are responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a
consequence.' (Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35 Law. ed. 1077). In
United States vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators who join in a
criminal attack on a defenseless man with dangerous weapons, knock
him down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with increased
numbers, and continue the assault, are liable for manslaughter when the
victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of the them during the
beating, although in the beginning they did not contemplate the use of a
knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C., 239)"
Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the
petitioners herein was directed against the other members of the group of Loreto
Navarro and not on the deceased, this would not relieve them from the
consequence of the acts jointly done by another member of the petitioners' group
who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro.79 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al.,80 this Court held:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates
which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of
its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as
part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to
collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts
and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly
produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with
intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of
another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively
from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it
in United States v. Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal
venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and
membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he
understands them." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom
where his wife Aileen was also sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's
violent resistance was an unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape
accountability for the tragic consequences of their actions.
In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstances of dwelling,81 nighttime82 and breaking of door83 in connection
with both crimes.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law
accords to human abode.84
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows
greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm.85 Here, dwelling was
correctly appreciated since the crimes were committed in the place of abode of the
victims who had not given immediate provocation.86
Upon the other hand, as pointed out by both appellants and the Solicitor General, the
breaking of a door was not alleged in either of the two informations. Thus, the same
cannot be appreciated against appellants. On this point, this Court's discussion in People
v. Legaspi,87 quoted in the Solicitor General's Brief, is instructive:
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation
thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death upon accused-appellant. In People v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, 338
SCRA 21, August 15, 2000), We had occasion to rule thus:
"In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136, 1995), we admonished courts to
proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form – death – because the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable.
Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as
possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the Court to exercise extreme
caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards designed to
reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate the grain of human fault ought not
to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of capital punishment for
an erroneous conviction 'will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of
 justice.' The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to
present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would
spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to
properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties'
evidence.' This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the
aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him
to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death
sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away
life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting
what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him.
xxx
The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently,
we hold that due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against
accused-appellant, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling
cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant
from reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has
now been formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 now provides that:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the
acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omission complained of
as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.88 (Emphasis
supplied)
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been
considered since Jaime himself testified that their bedroom was well-lit and there was
light coming from the kitchen and the adjoining bedroom of their children.89
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test,
under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of
the offense; and (2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because
the darkness was purposely sought by the offender.90 Applying these tests to the
established factual circumstances, this Court concludes that nocturnity was correctly
appreciated in connection with both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in
furtherance of their murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of
nighttime, as well as the fact that the household members were asleep, in order to gain
entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed, their own testimony indicates that while they
were already outside the Bocateja house at around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited
until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call the attention of the
Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants deliberately took
advantage of the darkness of the night, not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were
fast asleep, to conceal their actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the
victims' home would be undetected.
No mitigating circumstances are present to offset the foregoing aggravating
circumstances. While the trial Court noted that appellants were apparently motivated by
their belief that Johanna and Jaime were carrying on an illicit relationship, to wit:
The accused presented evidence to prove that Jaime Bocateja and Johanna
Ventura, wife of the accused Felix Ventura, were maintaining an illicit
relationship. The evidence on this point is principally hearsay – the alleged
admissions made by Johanna of the relationship. There is no doubt, however,
that the accused Ventura believes that [his] wife and Jaime Bocateja are
clandestine lovers. It is fairly reasonable, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, that it is Ventura's belief of this illicit relationship which prompted him to
confront Jaime Bocateja,91
it nevertheless ruled out passion or obfuscation92 or immediate vindication of a grave
offense93 as mitigating circumstances.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation,94 for the appreciation of this
mitigating circumstance it is necessary that the act which produced the obfuscation was
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.95 In the same vein,
while "immediate" vindication should be construed as "proximate" vindication in
accordance with the controlling Spanish text96 of the Revised Penal Code, still this
mitigating circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient time elapsed for the
accused to regain his composure.97
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17,
almost a week before the stabbing incidents on February 23, when he first confronted his
wife about her ring. Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the time
appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the
Bocateja residence in Bacolod City. Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity
to change his clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring barangay and both appellants
were able to take their dinner at the Burgos Market in Bacolod City. They even waited
three hours outside the Bocateja residence before carrying out their plan. Without
question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them to
recover their equanimity.
In fine, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
murder qualified by evident premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and nighttime. However, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in
imposing the sentence of Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18)
Years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that
prescribed for the consummated penalty shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two
degrees lower is prision mayor.98 Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,99 as amended,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the presence of
two aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty falls within the range
of prision mayor in its maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day to Twelve
(12) Years) as maximum and prision correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day
to Six (6) Years) as minimum. Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences appellants to an
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12)
Years of prision mayor as maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, dwelling and nighttime. As already noted, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when
the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be imposed when,
in the commission of the deed, one aggravating circumstance is present. Consequently,
the trial court's imposition of the supreme penalty of death must be sustained.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People vs. Echegaray100 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes
the penalty of death, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be
imposed.
As regards the civil liability of the appellants, the award of the trial court is hereby
modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Aileen as civil
indemnity for her death is sustained, the commission of the crime by appellants having
been duly proven.101 The award of moral damages to her heirs is likewise proper
considering that the prosecution presented adequate proof that they suffered mental
anguish and wounded feelings.102 However, the amount of moral damages awarded by
the trial court is hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.103 It should be borne in mind that the purpose for such award is to
compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich
them.104
The award of exemplary damages should be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00.
Such award is proper in view of the presence of aggravating
circumstances.105 Furthermore, considering that counsel for appellants admitted that the
heirs of Aileen incurred funeral expenses of P100,000.00106 and such admission has not
been shown to have been made through palpable mistake, the same should be awarded
as actual damages.107
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the trial court did not grant Jaime's claim for P20,000.00
in actual damages for hospitalization expenses since he failed to present any receipts to
substantiate the same. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Jaime was actually
hospitalized and operated upon, this Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as
temperate damages.108 Moreover, Jaime is also entitled to moral damages in accordance
with Article 2219, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, which this Court hereby awards in the
amount of P25,000.00.109 Finally, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are also in order
considering that the crime was attended by two aggravating circumstances.110
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder qualified by evident premeditation
with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime and are hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional as minimum to
Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor as maximum.

Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the victim, Jaime Bocateja, the amounts of:
(a) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as temperate damages; (b) Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages; and (c) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

The judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 is likewise AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and nighttime and are SENTENCED to
the supreme penalty of DEATH.

Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocateja the amounts of:
(a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; (b) One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; (c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages; and (d) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages.

Upon the finality of this Decision, and pursuant to Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 7659, let the records of the cases be immediately
forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the exercise, at her discretion, of her
power to pardon appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39746 September 27, 1983 earning, without any subsidiary liability in case of insolvency, and to pay
one-third of the costs. (Expedients, pp. 49-50.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs. Under consideration is the appeal of Blandino from the foregoing going judgment.
BLANDINO SAN MIGUEL Y BELGAR ALIAS "EDUARDO MENDEZ Y BELGAR
PETER DOE, ALIAS "ALBERT ADIN JR.", JOHN DOE ALIAS "BALUT" accused The evidence for the prosecution as summarized by the trial court is as follows:
BLANDINO SAN MIGUEL Y BELGAR accused-appellant.
At about 6:00 o'clock on the morning of October 2, 1972, Luis Tarum was
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. sleeping under a mosquito net inside his house located at the squatter's
area at 7th Street, Broadway, Quezon City. His wife Lolita Tarum was in
Alberto B. Guevara for accused-appellant. front of the stairway. Suddenly the three defendants arrived. One of them
Junior, went up the house. He suddenly stabbed Luis Tarum and
dragged him outside the house where the two other defendants Blandino
San Miguel and "Balut" were waiting. The three defendants
ABAD SANTOS, J. simultaneously attacked Luis Tarum with a club and bladed weapons.
Blandino San Miguel stabbed Luis Tarum three times and also clubbed
him three times at the back of his neck with an iron pipe three feet long
In Criminal Case No. Q-3378 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal, BLANDINO
and one inch in diameter. One of the stab wounds inflicted by Blandino
SAN MIGUEL, ALBERT ADIN, JR. and JOHN DOE alias BALUT were accused of
San Miguel landed above the heart. While Blandino San Miguel was
homicide in an information which reads as follows:
clubbing Luis Tarum, Junior and Balut were also simultaneously stabbing
him. During the attack "Balut" said: "Nobody must interfere!
"That on or about the 2nd day of October, 1972, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
After inflicting several wounds on Luis Tarum all the defendants ran away
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
together. Lolita Tarum wife of Luis Tarum, brought her husband to the
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and without any
hospital but Luis Tarum died before he arrived at the hospital; All in all
justifiable motive, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
the deceased received nine stab wounds, and abrasions and other
person of one LUIS TARUM Y BINAG by then and there stabbing him,
incised wounds found by Dr. Prospers Cabanayan, who conducted a
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which was the
post-mortem examination of the deceased (Exhibit "A"); The cause of
direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
death was "hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds, multiple".
the heirs of said Luis Tarum y Binag, in such amount as may be awarded
(Exhibit "A-1").
to them under the provisions of the Civil Code." (Expedients, p. 1.)
At the time of his death Luis Tarum was in good health, earning P7.50 a
Only Blandino was arrested and tried. The trial court pronounced the following sentence:
day as security guard and he used to deliver every fifteen days to his wife
the amount of P115.00. (Expediente, pp. 42-43.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the defendant Blandino San Miguel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and although there is
Upon the other hand, Blandino who testified alone in his defense claimed
one aggravating circumstance of treachery without any mitigating
that:
circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby merely imposes a
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA instead of DEATH.
At about 6:00 o'clock on the morning of October 2, 1972, he (Blandino
San Miguel) went to the house of Junior to ask whether the latter would
The Court hereby further sentences the defendant Blandino San Miguel
be reporting for work. Junior did not answer but instead he went down
to pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death
from their house and went to the house of Pedring which is only a few
of Luis Tarum P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P99,360.00 as loss of
 meters away. After a while, Junior went out of the house of Pedring A At that moment the wife of Luis was shouting and she
carrying with him a bolo. After arming himself with a bolo, which he took was asking for help and for me to pacify them.
from the house of Pedring, Junior went next to the house of another
neighbor, Luis Tarum y Binag. Blandino San Miguel followed Junior but Q What did you do when you heard the wife of Luis
stayed only at the door of the house. Suddenly, Blandino San Miguel calling for help?
heard a commotion inside the house of Luis Tarum After sometime Junior
fell downstairs from the house of Luis Tarum Luis Tarum followed him A I went near them and then I called Luis, saying, that is
downstairs with a bolo in his hand. When Luis Tarum reached the ground enough, that is enough.
he boloed Junior who was not hurt because he could parry the blow.
Then Luis Tarum and Junior grappled for the bolo. While they were
Q And when you said calling the attention of Luis, that is
grappling for the possession of the bolo the wife of Luis Tarum asked
enough, that is enough, what happened next?
Blandino San Miguel to pacify them. So Blandino went near them and
called to Luis Tarum 'That is enough. That is enough.' "Apparently, Luis
was startled by the voice of Blandino San Miguel and so he began A Maybe he was a little bit surprised when I called him
attacking the latter with his bolo. Blandino was not hit because he ran because I was quite near him and he tried to strike me
and sought cover under a neighboring house where he got hold of a pipe with the bolo which he got from Junior.
and then returned to Luis Tarum When Blandino emerged from under the
house Luis Tarum again attacked Blandino with a bolo which the latter Q Were you hit when Luis Tarum struck you with the
parried After parrying the blow Blandino struck Luis Tarum with the iron bolo?
pipe. But Luis Tarum persisted in attacking Blandino who thereupon
Tarum inflicted a second blow on the neck of Luis Tarum, who thereafter A No, sir, I was able to retreat and went inside the house.
felt groggy and proceeded in a weak condition to his house. On the way
to his house "Balut", who is a brother of Junior stabbed Luis, who Q After you retreated, what did you do?
immediately fell upon receiving the stab wound. Then "Balut" picked up
Luis Tarum bolo which had fallen to the ground and gave it to Junior. A I was able to get hold of a pipe under the house.
Thereafter, "Balut" and Junior repeatedly stabbed Luis Tarum
Court:
According to Blandino San Miguel, he immediately instructed the wife of
Luis Tarum to call the police. Then he went to a Metrocom officer's house Whose house was that where you got a pipe?
to report the incident. (Expediente, pp. 43-44.)
A I do not know, sir.
The appellant admits having struck the deceased twice with an iron pipe. But he claims
that he did so in self-defense. His claim is not impressed with merit.
Q Then after that, after holding that pipe, what did you
do?
According to the appellant he started out as a peace-maker between the deceased and
Junior only to become one of the protagonists afterwards. Here is his testimony:
A I went out, sir, from under the house.
Q. [Atty. Viterbo Tagarda]
Q After going out from under the house, what happened
next?
What did you do while you saw they were grappling for
the bolo?
A He boloed me again.
 Q Were you hit?
A No, sir, I was able to parry it. So I hit him at the head.
. (Witness indicating).
Interpreter:
The witness indicating the back of his head.
Q When you hit him at his head, what happened next?
A None, sir. When I hit him on the head, after hitting him
on the head he faced me again, and struck me again. At
that moment I again hit him.
Q Where was the second blow land when you hit him?
A Here, at the head, sir. (Witness indicating)." (TSN, Sept.
25,1974, pp. 2-3.)
If it is true that the deceased turned on the appellant, what the latter should have done
was simply to run and get away as far as possible. Instead, he got hold of a pipe,
confronted the deceased and struck him twice with the pipe. The circumstances do not
paint a picture of self-defense.
Upon the other hand, the trial court said "after considering all the facts and the
circumstances of the case, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial, [the
court] is more inclined to accept the version of Lolita Tarum who was the lone witness for
the prosecution." We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the court a
quo which was in a better position to appreciate the credibility of witnesses.
The appellant was charged with homicide only but the trial court adjudged him guilty of
murder. The appellant complains with justification that the trial court treated him harshly.
The trial court rationalized its action as follows:
The legal question is: What crime has been committed? While treachery
obviously attended the commission of the offense, it can be taken into
account only as a generic aggravating circumstance because it is not
alleged in the information.
However, it will be observed that while in the information, the fiscal
designated the crime as Homicide, yet, the information alleges acts which
show that the defendants took advantage of superior strength and that
the crime was committed with the aid of armed men, circumstances
which qualify the killing into Murder.
xxx xxx xxx
In the opinion of the Court, the acts alleged in the information sufficiently
show that at least the defendants took advantage of superior strength.
The averment that the three accused conspired together, confederated
with and mutually helped one another in inflicting the stab wounds
sufficiently alleges the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength and that the killing was done with the aid of armed men.
To sufficiently allege 'abuse of superior strength,' or 'with the aid of armed
men,' the information does not have to use the language of the statute.
Different words or phrases equally describing the same facts may be
used." (Expediente, pp. 46-47.)
The People agree with the appellant. The People's brief submits:
"The words conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
one another' contained in the information, simply convey the allegation of
conspiracy. Otherwise, as the defense rightly argues, 'every charge of
conspiracy to commit homicide, would result in a charge of murder'.
There should be some other allegation in the information showing that
the accused did take advantage of superior strength and/or with the aid
of armed men." (Brief, p. 9.)
The common opinion of the appellant and the appellee has jurisprudential support
in People vs. Bautista, L-23303, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184, which held that if the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is not alleged in the information, it may only
be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the
corresponding penalty. (See also People vs. Jovellano, L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56
SCRA 156.)
The trial court did not err when it concluded that there was abuse of superiority. For as
the People say:
Considering that three assailants, all armed with bladed weapons,
simultaneously and repeatedly stabbed and clubbed the defenseless
 victim, the killing was thereby attended by the aggravating circumstances
of abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men. (Brief, p. 8.)

Neither did the trial court err in awarding damages. The indemnity of P12,000.00 is
jurisprudential; the award of P10,000.00 as moral damages is justified by the Civil Code;
and the award of P99,360.00 for loss of earnings was arrived as follows:

With respect to the civil liability, it appears that at the time of the death of
Luis Tarum he was 25 years old, and that he used to turn over to his wife
the amount of P115.00 every fifteen days or P230.00 a month. Had Luis
Tarum not been killed by the defendants, his remaining life expectancy is
computed by the following formula: 2/3 (80 minus 25, which is the age of
the deceased at the time of his death), which gives 36 years as the
remaining life expectancy of the deceased. Thus, by his untimely death,
his family lost an expected earning in the amount of P99,360.00 (Villa-
Rey vs. Court of Appeals, L-25499, February 18,1970). (Expediente, p.
49.)

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified in that the appellant shall be
convicted for the crime of homicide only and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The appealed judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Costs
against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120548 October 26, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE VILLACASTIN JR., HERNANI ALEGRE, and RODOLFO
CAÑEDO, accused,
JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, finding accused Joselito Escarda and
Jose Villacastin Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the Anti-Cattle Rustling
Law. In its decision, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds both
accused JOSELITO ESCARDA and JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of "Viol. of P.D. 533" (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law),
and there being the presence of three generic aggravating circumstances of
[r]ecidivism, nighttime and unlawful entry, with no mitigating circumstances to
offset the same, as such, the accused are each sentenced to suffer, considering
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imprisonment of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (I) DAY as the minimum to RECLUSION
PERPETUA as the maximum, together with all the accessory penalties imposed
by law and to indemnify the offended party, Joel Barrieses, in the amount of
P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused being detained, are hereby entitled to the full credit of their
preventive imprisonment as provided for under R.A. 6127.
Costs against both accused.
SO ORDERED.1
In an information dated April 18, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Othello Villanueva charged
accused with violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974, as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE
VILLACASTIN, JR., HERNANI ALEGRE (at-large) and RODOLFO CAÑEDO (at-
large) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, (Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974), committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July, 1987, in the Municipality of Sagay,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the first two (2) above-named accused, in company of their two
(2) other co-accused, namely: Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo, who are both
still-at-large, conspiring, confederating and mutually help[ing] one another, with
intent of gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away two (2) female carabaos, valued in the total amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to JOEL
BARIESES, without the consent of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the
said owner in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, accused Escarda and Villacastin, assisted by counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts as presented by the prosecution and summarized by the trial court are as
follows:
[Dionesio Himaya] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 o'clock in the
morning in [Hacienda] Ricky, Jose Villacastin, Jr. and his group passed by his
house. [He] was still awake at that time because he was watching over his
cornfield and while doing so, he saw the two accused remove the cyclone wire
which was used as the corral for the two (2) carabaos of Rosalina Plaza. He was
able to see Jose Villacastin, Jr. cut the cyclone wire because he was just four (4)
arms length away from them and after Jose Villacastin cut the wire, they swept it
aside and untied the two (2) carabaos. After untying the carabaos, they rode on it
and proceeded to the canefields. [He] saw two (2) persons riding on the carabao
whom he identified as Jose Villacastin, Jr. together with Joselito Escarda. He
awakened Rosalina Plaza who thereafter went to Joel Barrieses, owner of the
carabaos, to inform the latter that his carabaos were stolen.
[Rosalina Plaza] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 o'clock in the
morning, in the residence of Joel Barrieses, Dionesio Himaya called her and
informed her that the carabaos were stolen and when asked who stole the
carabaos, Dionesio Himaya only mentioned Jose Villacastin, Jr. Before the
incident of July 29, 1987, she already knew the person of Jose Villacastin, Jr.,
because the latter always passed by their house. After she was informed of the
stealing of the carabaos, she went to the corral to check whether the carabaos
were there but discovered that the beasts were no longer there and the cyclone
wire was destroyed. She informed Joel Barrieses, that Jose Villacastin, Jr., stole
the carabaos and she went to the 334th PC Company and reported the incident.3
In their defense, Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges. Escarda claimed that he
was sleeping in the house of Gilda Labrador during the incident while Villacastin declared
that he too was sleeping in his house at that time.4 The defense version of the incident
was summarized by the trial court as follows:
. . . Joselito Escarda testified that he did not know his co-accused in this case,
specifically, Jose Villacastin, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cahedo. Neither did he
know of somebody by the name of Dionesio Himaya although he knew
somebody by the name of Gilda Labrador. In the early morning of July 29, 1987,
he was working as cane cutter and hauler in the hacienda of Javelosa located in
Barrio Malubon, Sagay, Negros Occidental which is fifteen (15) kilometers away
from the house of his mother where he was residing. On July 29, 1987, he
started working at 8:00 o'clock in the morning and ended at 11:00. After he
finished working in the field, he went to the house of his mother where he ate
lunch and rested until 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. In the evening of July 29,
1987, he slept at the house of Gilda Labrador starting at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening and woke up at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of July 30, 1987. Sometime
on August 29, 1987, he left alone for the dance hall located at Hda. Ricky to
attend a dance held there because there was a fiesta at that time. While he was
at the dance hall, he was arrested by the PC elements and brought to the 334th
PC Company where he was maltreated. He was asked whether or not he stole
the carabaos at Hda. Ricky but he denied the commission of the crime and
again, he was maltreated. He suffered injuries when they maltreated him so he
made a confession before them but did not sign the same. His injuries were not
treated by a physician because the PC would not let him go out of the jail, so, his
injuries healed while he was in jail. He did not know the names of the PC who
maltreated him and forced him to admit the loss of the carabaos at Hda. Ricky
because the maltreatment happened in the evening. Furthermore, he did not
know the complainant in this case, i.e. Joel Barrieses.
xxx xxx xxx
[Jose Villacastin, Jr. testified] that on or before July 29, 1987, he did not know the
accused Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo because in the
early morning of July 29, 1987, at more or less 2:00 o'clock to 3:00 o'clock, he
had not gone with Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo
because he was sleeping in his house which is located in Sitio Candiis. He
started sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of July 28, 1987 and woke up the
next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00 in the morning. On August 29, 1987 at 10:00
o'clock in the evening, he was attending a dance at Hda. Ricky and while
watching the dance, he was arrested and brought to the 334th PC Headquarters
in Tan-ao, Sagay, Negros Occidental. When they arrived at the PC
Headquarters, they were investigated about the stealing of the carabaos and the
PC elements wanted them to admit it. He denied what they were accusing him of
because he has not committed the crime. He does not know of anybody by the
name of Joel Barrieses. When he denied the commission of the crime, he was
maltreated and was forced to admit it and to make a confession. They were
detained for about a month at the 334th PC Headquarters and they were
transferred to the Municipal Jail of Sagay, Negros Occidental and there was no
lawyer present during his refusal to admit the stealing of the carabaos.5
The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible, while it
disbelieved the defense of denial and alibi of accused Escarda and Villacastin. They
were found guilty as charged. However, the charge against accused Rodolfo Cañedo
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Earlier, the charge against co-accused
Hernani Alegre was dismissed on motion by the prosecution, for lack of evidence.
Insisting on their innocence, Escarda and Villacastin filed their notice of appeal. In their
assignment of error, they alleged that the trial court erred in convicting them of the crime
charged.6
On November 27, 1995, we required the trial court to order the commitment of Escarda
and Villacastin to the Bureau of Corrections or the nearest national penal institution.
However, Executive Judge Renato Munez requested that their commitment to the
Bureau of Corrections be deferred until the termination of the other criminal case7 against
them pending before the said trial court. Further, Captain Eduardo Legaspi, Acting
Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, also requested to hold in abeyance the
commitment of Escarda and Villacastin in view of their pending criminal cases before the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City.8 Accordingly, we granted the aforesaid request for
deferment.9 On August 12, 1998, they were eventually committed to the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City.10
On October 12, 1998, Escarda sought the approval of this Court to withdraw his
appeal.11 We required the Director of the New Bilibid Prison to confirm the voluntariness
of said withdrawal.12 In his certification dated July 15, 1999, Atty. Roberto Sangalang,
who personally examined Escarda, attested that Escarda executed his urgent motion to
withdraw appeal on his own free will and fully understood the consequences of the same.
On August 9, 1 999, we granted Escarda's motion to withdraw appeal.13
Accordingly, we are now concerned only with the appeal of the remaining appellant, Jose
Villacastin, Jr. In his brief, he assigns only one error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF
THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that the element of "taking away of carabaos by any means, method
or scheme without the consent of the owner" was not proven by the prosecution. He also
alleges that his identity was not established beyond reasonable doubt, thus, he should
be acquitted. He adds that the prosecution failed to prove ownership of the stolen
carabaos by presenting the certificate of ownership,14 as required by the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law.
Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent
of the owner or raiser of cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other domesticated member
of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or
without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. Cattle rustling
includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the
owner or raiser.15
In this case, the overt act which gives rise to the crime of cattle rustling is the taking
away of the carabaos by the accused without the consent of the caretaker. Dionisio
Himaya testified that he saw appellant cut the cyclone wire used as corral for the
carabaos. Afterwards, appellant untied the two carabaos. Then, appellant rode on one
carabao while co-accused Escarda rode on the other and immediately proceeded to the
canefield.16 The taking was confirmed by Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos,
who declared that after she was informed by Himaya about the incident, she went right
away to the corral and discovered that indeed the two carabaos were missing.
Appellant's assertion that his identity was not positively established deserves no serious
consideration. Prosecution witness Dionisio Himaya identified appellant and Escarda as
the rustlers. In his testimony, Himaya said he was awake at that time as he was watching
over his cornfield nearby, and there was enough illumination from the moon.17 He was
just four arm's length away. He saw appellant and Escarda unleash the two carabaos.
He stated that appellant rode on one carabao while Escarda rode on the other, and both
immediately went away. He said he easily recognized appellant as he knew him long
before the incident. According to the witness, appellant was the nephew of his wife and
used to visit them before. During the trial, the witness positively identified appellant as
the same person who stole the carabaos. Appellant's contention concerning lack of
proper identification is, in our view, baseless and unmeritorious.
Similarly, appellant's assertion, that the prosecution should have first presented the
certificate of ownership of the stolen carabaos to warrant his conviction, is untenable. It is
to be noted that the gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is the "taking" or "killing" of
large cattle or "taking" its meat or hide without the consent of the owner. The "owner"
includes the herdsman, caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in
the raising of large cattle or other persons in lawful possession of such large cattle. In
this case Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the taking
away of the carabaos. She immediately informed Joel Barrieses, the owner, that the
carabaos were stolen and reported the incident to the police. Note that the ownership
was never put in issue during the trial in the lower court and is now raised belatedly. It is
settled that, generally, questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on
appeal.18
Appellant's alibi must likewise fail. He insists that he was sleeping in his house at the
time the crime occurred. He slept at 8:00 P.M., July 28, 1987 and woke up the next day,
July 29, 1987 at 7:00 A.M. As the trial court noted, it is difficult to believe appellant's
claim that he slept for eleven hours straight just like Escarda. Besides, the rule is settled
that alibi cannot prosper unless it is proven that during the commission of the crime, the
accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
place where the crime was committed.19 In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate
satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time
of the incident. Admittedly, the scene of the crime was only a fifteen-minute walk from
appellant's house.
We note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
unlawful entry and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance. The prosecution,
however, failed to specify these circumstances in the charge filed before the trial court,
as now required expressly by the Code of Criminal Procedure effective December 1,
2000 but applicable retroactively for being procedural and pro reo.20
Moreover, we find that the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of the Code. In its decision, the trial court merely mentioned that appellant was
convicted for cattle rustling under Criminal Case No. 627-S on February 8, 1993, at the
time when the case at bar was being tried. It did not state that said conviction was
already final. Even the records did not show that appellant admitted his previous
conviction. As we had held before, there can be no recidivism without final
judgment.21 The best evidence of a prior conviction is a certified copy of the original
judgment of conviction, and such evidence is always admissible and conclusive unless
the accused himself denies his identity with the person convicted at the former trial.22
P.D. 533 does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under Articles
30923 and 31024 under the Revised Penal Code. It merely modified the penalties provided
for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 by imposing stiffer penalties thereon
under special circumstances.25 Under Section 826 of P.D. 533, any person convicted of
cattle rustling shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished
by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the
offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed.

In the instant case, the offense was committed with force upon things as the perpetrators
had to cut through the cyclone wire fence to gain entrance into the corral and take away
the two carabaos therefrom. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty imposable on appellant is only prision mayor in its maximum
period as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Thus, it is
proper to impose on appellant only the indefinite prison term of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-
one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Jose Villacastin, Jr., is declared guilty of violating the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law (P.D. 533) and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to indemnify
offended party Joel Barrieses the amount of P5,000, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEMETRIO NABUAL, LUIS
NABUAL, and ELPIDIO BACHICHA, Defendants-Appellants.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Hector C. Fule for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Zaida Ruby S. Alberto and Guido A. Lavin, Jr., for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
CONSIDERED IN INSTANT CASE. — Where the defendants admit the allegation in the
information that the "accused conspiring, confederating together and helping one another . . .
armed with guns and a knife . . . with intent to kill . . . willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter
the house" of the offended parties and steal the aggregate sum of P535, and "pursuant to
their conspiracy, . . . did . . . stab several times . . . Pablo Ocenada . . . with said knife with
which said accused had conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting
upon said Pablo Ocenada several wounds. . . which . . . caused his death," evident
premeditation to kill should be considered to have aggravated the commission of the crime.
2. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN INSTANT CASE NOT OFFSET BY PLEA OF
GUILTY. — Independently of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and reiteration,
evident premeditation, dwelling, and abuse of superior strength were considered present at
the commission of the offense. Defendants’ plea of guilty is insufficient to offset these three
aggravating circumstances and the extreme penalty was properly meted out by the trial court
to Luis Nabual and Elpidio Bachicha.
3. ID.; ATTENDING CIRCUMSTANCES; CONSIDERATION THEREOF BY THE COURT. —
Some aggravating circumstances are graver than others. Indeed, the same aggravating
circumstance may connote a greater degree of malice or perversity in one case than in
another. Conversely, the same mitigating circumstance may merit more weight in one case
than in another, depending upon the conditions surrounding each. In the very nature of
things, judges must exercise their sound judgment in the appraisal thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — In the present case, the defendants had planned not
only the robbery. They had entered the house of their victims with the intent to kill. For this
purpose, they had armed themselves with deadly weapons. This, notwithstanding the fact
that they had been previously convicted of and sentenced for murder. Even if the legal
feasibility of considering such conviction and sentence as sufficient to establish the
aggravating circumstance of reiteration may be debatable, said fact is undoubtedly indicative
of the marked moral perversion of the defendants and of the grave danger they pose to
society. There is every reason to believe that the plea of guilty entered into by them was
prompted, not by a feeling of regret or remorse and a willingness to pay their debt to society,
but by a desire to avail of the only means to create a possibility, no matter how remote, of
preventing the imposition of the death penalty, by establishing one mitigating circumstance in
their favor. Had a plea of not guilty been entered, there was a great likelihood that the
following aggravating circumstances would have been established, namely: (1) nighttime;(2)
dwelling; (3) abuse of superior strength; (4) evident premeditation; and (5) as regard Luis
Nabual and Demetrio Nabual, reiteration. With no mitigating circumstance to offset any of
these aggravating circumstances — in the absence of a plea of guilty — defendants’ chances
of avoiding the extreme penalty were nil. Hence, they had no choice but to enter said plea.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is before Us on automatic review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Samar, convicting defendants Demetrio Nabual, Luis Nabual and Elpidio Bachicha, of the
crime of robbery with homicide, under an information alleging:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 7th day of January, 1967, in the Municipality of Calbiga, Province of
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another with one Cresencio
Mabute who is still at large, armed with guns and a knife, with intent to kill and to gain, by
means of force, violence against and intimidation of persons, and at nighttime, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of one Carlota P. Ocenada, and
once inside thereat, pointed their guns at said Carlota P. Ocenada and demanded money
from her and because of fear that she might be killed, said Carlota P. Ocenada handed said
accused money in cash which was placed inside their trunk, amounting to One Hundred
Thirty Five (P135.00) Pesos, and accused forcibly opened the suitcase and got another
money in cash amounting to Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, which the said accused took,
stole and carried away with them, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the total
sum of Five Hundred Thirty Five (P535.00) Pesos, Philippine currency; and accused,
pursuant to their conspiracy and on such occasion thereof and for the purpose of enabling
them to take, steal and carry away with them said amount of money, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab several times one Pablo
Ocenada, husband of said Carlota P. Ocenada with said knife with which the said accused
had conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Pablo
Ocenada several wounds on the different parts of his body which wounds caused his death.
"That in the commission of the crime the following aggravating circumstances were present:
(1) Nighttime; (2) the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not
having been giving provocation for it; (3) habituality or reiteration, they having been convicted
on September 5, 1962 in the Court of First Instance of Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for
murder, in Criminal Case No. 6074, and was sentenced to imprisonment from 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, with accessory penalties provided "COURT
by law and indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Loreto Cabrillas and pay the costs; as
to accused Luis Nabual and Demetrio Nabual; (4) evident premeditation; (5) taking Arraign the accused.
advantage of superior strength in number and arms."cralaw virtua1aw library
"INTERPRETER
When the case was called for arraignment, counsel de oficio for the defendants informed said
Court of their intention to enter a plea of guilty, whereupon His Honor, the trial Judge, (Reading the information to the three accused).
propounded to them the questions and the defendants gave the answers quoted
hereunder:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "INTERPRETER

COURT (To the three accused) "Q Did you understand what was read to you? (Interpreter asking the same question to the
three accused)
"Q Your lawyer has manifested to this court that you desire to enter the plea of guilty to the
offenses charged. Do you agree to that manifestation of your lawyer? "A Yes, sir (all the three accused).

"A Yes, sir (all the three accused). "Q What is your plea Demetrio Nabual?

"Q Do you know that by so agreeing to that manifestation of your lawyer you will be admitting "A Guilty.
the commission of the crime charging you with robbery with homicide?
"Q What is your plea Luis Nabual?
"A Yes, sir (all the three accused).
"A Guilty.
"Q And for which this court will sentence you to death or of imprisonment for which length of
time that it will determine? "Q What is your plea Elpidio Bachicha?

"A Yes, sir (all the three accused). "A Guilty.

"Q And, notwithstanding what was explained to you still insist your desire to enter the plea of "COURT
guilty to the offense charged?
"Q Why did you enter the plea of guilty to the crime charged?
"A Yes, sir (all the three accused).
"A I pleaded guilty because I have done it. (All the three accused). answering one by
"Q The court would like to inform you again that this robbery with homicide is punishable one)."cralaw virtua1aw library
with reclusion perpetua with death?
Thereupon, the trial court rendered judgment finding the defendants guilty of robbery with
"A Yes, sir (all the three accused). homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength, in addition, insofar as Luis Nabual and Demetrio Nabual are
"Q And there is a likelihood that you might be sentenced to death? concerned, to the aggravating circumstance of reiteration, with no mitigating circumstance in
favor of any of said defendants except that of plea of guilty, which is, however, insufficient to
"A Yes, sir (all the three accused). offset all of the aforementioned aggravating circumstances, and, accordingly, sentenced
them to death, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Pablo Ocenada in the sums of
"Q And, notwithstanding what is explained to you by the court you still insist in your desire to P6,000.00 and P535, which latter sum represents the amount stolen, and to pay the costs.
enter the plea of guilty? Hence, the present automatic review.

"A Yes, sir (all the three accused). During the pendency thereof, or on December 24, 1968, Demetrio Nabual died in
consequence of injuries sustained when prison guards fired at him, as he, together with other
prisoners, tried to escape from the New Bilibid Prisons, where he was undergoing preventive
imprisonment. By resolution of this Court, dated February 21, 1969, the case against him
was, therefore, dismissed, so that the present decision refers exclusively to defendants Luis
Nabual and Elpidio Bachicha.
Conceding the propriety of the judgment of conviction against these defendants, their counsel
de oficio maintains 1 that the lower court erred in considering that the crime charged was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of reiteration, nighttime and evident
premeditation; that the commission of said crime was attended by no other aggravating
circumstances than those of dwelling and abuse of superior strength; that these two (2)
aggravating circumstances should be deemed offset by the plea of guilty entered by the
defendants, so that they should be sentenced merely to life imprisonment; and that said
judgment should be modified accordingly.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of reiteration and nighttime, it is urged that,
according to the information, the defendants had been previously "convicted" of the crime of
murder and "sentenced" therefor; that there is no allegation that they had served the
sentence; that actual punishment or service of the sentence is essential to the aggravating
circumstance of reiteration, 2 unlike recidivism, for which previous conviction of a crime falling
under the same title of the penal code is sufficient; and that the information fails to aver that
nighttime had been purposely or especially sought or that the defendants had taken
advantage thereof in order either to facilitate the commission of the offense or to afford them
impunity. We deem it unnecessary, however, to discuss these aggravating circumstances,
because even if we discarded them, the result would be the same.
Indeed, appellants affirm that evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery and
that robbery with homicide is essentially a crime against property. It is true that in the case of
People v. Valeriano, 3 which was one of robbery with homicide, it was held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Evident premeditation is not considered as an aggravating circumstance in crimes of robbery
because the same is inherent in the crime specially where it is committed by various persons;
they must have an agreement, they have to meditate and reflect on the manner of carrying
out the crime and they have to act coordinately in order to succeed . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
However, in the same case, this Court added:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . But in the name of robbery with homicide, if there is evident premeditation to kill besides
stealing, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance . . . In the instant case, it has been
proven that the accused, on various occasions before committing the crime, planned and
decided not only to steal but also to kill Judge Bautista. Hence, there is present evident
premeditation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Similarly, in the case at bar, the information explicitly alleges that the "accused conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another . . . armed with guns and a knife . . . with
intent to kill . . . did . . . willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house" of the offended
parties and steal the aggregate sum of P535, and "pursuant to their conspiracy, . . . did . . .
stab several times . . . Pablo Ocenada . . . with said knife with which said accused had
conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Pablo
Ocenada several wounds . . . which . . . caused his death." This allegation was admitted by
the defendants, who acted, therefore, with evident premeditation to kill.
Independently, therefore, of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and reiteration,
evident premeditation, dwelling, and abuse of superior strength should be considered present
at the commission of the offense. In the light of the conditions obtaining in the present case,
we believe that defendants’ plea of guilty is insufficient to offset these three aggravating
circumstances, and that the extreme penalty was properly meted out to Luis Nabual and
Elpidio Bachicha.
We have not overlooked the fact that, in People v. Apduhan, 4 we refrained from imposing
the extreme penalty, for lack of the number of votes necessary therefor, despite the existence
of three aggravating circumstances as against the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
Such case should not be construed, however, as implying that this mitigating circumstance
has as much weight as three aggravating circumstances, whatever the latter may be.
Obviously, some aggravating circumstances are graver than others. Indeed, the same
aggravating circumstance may connote a greater degree of malice or perversity in one case
than in another. Conversely, the same mitigating circumstance may merit more weight in one
case than in another, depending upon the conditions surrounding each. In the very nature of
things, judges must exercise their sound judgment in the appraisal thereof.
In the present case, the defendants had planned not only the robbery. They had entered the
house of their victims with the intent to kill. For this purpose, they had armed themselves with
deadly weapons. This, notwithstanding the fact that they had been previously convicted of
and sentenced for murder. Even if the legal feasibility of considering such conviction and
sentence as sufficient to establish the aggravating circumstance of reiteration may be
debatable, said fact is undoubtedly indicative of the marked moral perversion of the
defendants and of the grave danger they pose to society.
Then, again, there is every reason to believe that the plea of guilty entered into by them was
prompted, not by a feeling of regret or remorse and a willingness to pay their debt to society,
but by a desire to avail of the only means to create a possibility, no matter how remote, of
preventing the imposition of the death penalty, by establishing one mitigating circumstance in
their favor. This assertion is based upon the fact that otherwise the prosecution would have,
in all probability, proven that nighttime had been purposely sought or taken advantage of, and
that the defendants had not only been convicted of and sentenced for murder, but, also,
served the sentence therefor. In fact, the lower court found — upon informal examination of
the documents that the prosecution intended to introduce in evidence, had the defendants
chosen to proceed to trial — that Luis Nabual and Demetrio Nabual were parolees, so that
they must have served part of their aforementioned sentence. In short, had a plea of not
guilty been entered, there was a great likelihood that the following aggravating circumstances
would have been established, namely: (1) nighttime; (2) dwelling; (3) abuse of superior
strength; (4) evident premeditation; and (5) as regards Luis Nabual and Demetrio Nabual,
reiteration. With no mitigating circumstance to offset any of these aggravating circumstances
— in the absence of a plea of guilty — defendants’ chances of avoiding the extreme penalty
were nil. Hence, they had no choice but to enter said plea.

WHEREFORE, modified as to the indemnity of P6,000 00 which is hereby increased to

P12,000.00, 5 in addition to the stolen sum of P535, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against defendants Luis Nabual and Elpidio
Bachicha. It is so ordered.