EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163556. June 8, 2004.]

CONG. RUY ELIAS

C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPI
NES [represented by Franklin Drilon,
President ofthe Senate],
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., respondents.

RESOLUTION

Gentlemen :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc

June 8, 2004.
G.R. No. 163556 — CONG. RUY ELIAS
C. LOPEZ v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon,
President of theSenate], HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.
Before the Court is a Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify
Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session ofCongress, dated
May 28, 2004, creating a Joint Committee which shall preliminarily
canvass the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President
during the May 10, 2004 elections.
At the outset, the Court stresses that it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this controversy, because the herein Petition contains sufficient
allegations claiming violations of the Constitution. Basic is the rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the initiatory pleading,
likethe complaint or petition.
However, after careful deliberation on the merits of the Petition
and the Comments filed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, Speaker Jose C.
De Venecia and the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the Petition on the ground that it
failed to show that Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating such Joint
Committee.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates." In Arroyo v. De
Venecia (277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997), the Court ruled that it had no power
to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear
violation of the Constitution. Likewise, Santiago v. Guingona, (298 SCRA 756,
November 18, 1998) held that the Court —
under thedoctrine of separation of powers — has "no authority to interfere"
in the "exclusive realm" of a co-equal branch, absent a showing of grave
abuseof discretion. The Court has no authority to restrict or
limit the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot
be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members ofCongress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under
attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject
to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately
(See Sections 19, 23, 24 and 27 of the Rules).
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(As above-worded, the foregoing Resolution was approved unanimously, 14 to 0,
by the Court. In addition, individual opinions, copies of which are attached hereto,
were written by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; Justice Reynato S. Puno,
joined by Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
who concurs in a Separate Opinion, and Adolfo S. Azcuna; Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing; Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales; Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and
Justice Dante O. Tinga.) DHATcE

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In his petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on 2 June 2004, Ruy Elias
C. Lopez, Representative representing the 3rd Legislative
District ofthe City of Davao, asks this Court to declare
unconstitutional the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates
in the May 10, 2004 Elections (hereafter, Canvassing Rules),
which the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives, in joint session, approved,
after much debate, on 28 May 2004.
Petitioner alleges that the Canvassing Rules was adopted by both
Houses of Congress with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy other than this petition. He requests the Court to issue a temporary
restraining order directing Respondents to cease and desist from implementing,
executing, and/or enforcing the Canvassing Rules.
In the resolution of 4 June 2004, the Court, by a unanimous vote,
denied the application for a temporary restraining order, and by a vote of 9-4
required Respondents and the Solicitor General to comment on the petition by 12
noon on Monday, 7 June 2004. The Senate, the House ofRepresentatives
and the Office of the Solicitor General seasonably filed their separate comments.
The prefatory statement of petitioner summarizes the main arguments found
throughout his petition:
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government
are distributed among three (3) independent
branches of government. The very important and delicate
power and authority to open all
certificates of canvass of votes for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely
and exclusively vested by the Constitution
in the President of the Senate, just as the very important
and delicate power and authority to
determine the authenticity and due executions (sic) of all
certificates of canvass and to canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely
and exclusively vested by the Constitution
in the Congress as one whole body." Any attempt to
delegate these powers or a portion thereof to any other
person or entity — whether within or without the Congress
— is unconstitutional on the principle that potestas delegata
non potest delegari. 1
Petitioner thus contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because:
1) It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint
Committee of Congress; 2) It constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution; 3) It deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a
Member of Congress; and 4) By the passage of the Canvassing Rules, Congress
has neglected to perform an act which theConstitution specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from office.
The arguments of respondents, the Solicitor General, the Senate,
and the House of Representatives, are similar in that they agree
that theadoption of the Canvassing Rules are internal matters of Congress which
is beyond this Court's scope of judicial inquiry. They are likewise unanimous in
their argument that there has been no invalid delegation to the Joint
Committee of the Constitutional duties of Congress.
This Court's jurisdiction over the issue raised in this case is founded on Section
1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that judicial power
includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on thepart of any
branch or instrumentality of the government". This duty does not do away
with the "political question" doctrine. It only clarifies it by limiting it to its definition
laid down in Tañada v. Cuenco. 2 That case defines political questions as those
"which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government." The clarification
became necessary because prior to the 1987 Constitution, as long as an act or
measure was invoked as involving a political question, the courts affirmed such
invocation rather than risk the separation of powers. The result, then, was
that the legality of an act or measure was likewise left to the political branch in
question. 3
Thus, now plainly stated in the 1987 Constitution, the mere invocation of a
political question does not warrant an immediate or summary dismissalof a case.
It falls, as it always has, within judicial power to determine for itself
whether the legality and the limits of the exercise of a power have been observed
and respected.
The contested provisions of the Canvassing Rules pertain
to the functions of the Joint Committee, as follows:
SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created
composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the President of theSenate and eleven (11)
members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of Each House
panel shall elect from among themselves their respective
Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee
may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two division of eleven
(11) members each composed of a chairman, five (5)
members from the Senate and five (5) members
from the Houseof Representatives: Provided, That a
member of Congress who is a candidate for President or
Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment
to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a
Chairman of the Joint Committee.
 The Joint Committee shall, upon
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily
canvass thevotes of candidates
for the offices of the President and Vice-President.
The Representatives of the province or city whose
certificate of canvass is being canvassed shall be an ex
officio member of the Joint Committee, without voting
rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.
It is petitioner's position that the formation of a Joint Committee, which
determines the authenticity and due
execution of the certificate of canvassof the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates and thereafter canvasses the votes, is a transfer or surrender to an
entity of a duty imposed by the Constitution exclusively upon Congress as
a whole body — that is, "in joint public session assembled." 4 Accordingly,
petitioner claims that such transfer violates the principle that a delegated power
cannot again be delegated, 5 potestas delegata non delegari potest.
The source of the duty of Congress to act as the National Board of Canvassers
for the office of the President and Vice-President is in paragraph 4, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the S
enateshall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, open all certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House ofRepresentat
ives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. caTESD

It is true that where the Constitution has vested powers in a

branch of government there can be no further delegation of such authority by that
branch to any other body. Originating from the law on agency, the principle has
evolved in Constitutional law as a natural corollary
to theseparation of governmental
powers. 6 Thus, the foundation of the principle of potestas delegata non delegari
potest in Constitutional law lies inthe sovereignty that resides in the people from
which all governmental authority emanates. 7 It is invoked as a prohibition
against the three major branches of government — the executive, legislative,
or the judiciary — from transferring the powers and duties conferred
by the people upon it to another branch; neither does it allow any branch to
invest in itself or its members the powers and duties belonging to another. 8
Moreover, there is no distinction as to what kind of power is delegated
by the Constitution. Although the three branches of government each have its
general functions in accordance
with the principle of separation of powers, the system of checks and balances
imposes upon each branch — or its members — powers outside of its usual
functions. 9 Thus, even when the legislature is performing a non-legislative act as
a National Boardof Canvassers, its inability to delegate such function to another
branch of government remains intact.
In this context, the principle does not apply in this case insofar as no other
branch of government has been tasked with the duties of Congress as a National
Board of Canvassers.
As to whether there has been are invalid delegation of power "within" Congress,
such argument, and the basis of petitioner's discussion, is an imprudent one.
From a cursory reading of the Canvassing Rules, it can readily be seen that there
has been no delegation or abdication of any Constitutional authority, even within
Congress itself. Key provisions throughout the Canvassing Rules
reveal the nature of the Joint Committee and its relation
to the duties of Congress, whether referring
to the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates ofcanvass or the canvassing of the votes itself.
Some of these provisions, however, are conveniently omitted by petitioner in his
arguments. For one, Section 19 thereof provides: SCEDaT

Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in

divisions, shall decide any question
involving the Certificate of Canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such
decision shall be subject to approval by the joint
session, the Senate and House of Representatives voting
separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in
consultation
withthe Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail." [Emphasis supplied]
As to the canvassing of votes, paragraph 2, of Sec. 13, provides
that "[t]he Joint Committee shall, upon
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily
canvass the votes of candidates for the offices of President and
Vice-President." And again, in Sec. 23, the final report of the Joint
Committee "shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en
 banc to the joint public session for its approval, each House voting
separately."
Further, in Section 27, we find that:
Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the Joint
Committee report and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Membersof both. Houses voting
separately in the joint public session, Congress
through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House ofRepresentatives shall forthwith
proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect.
[Emphasis supplied]
Since the Canvassing Rules subjects the acts of the Joint Committee
to the affirmation of Congress, the Committee's report
is preliminary andrecommendatory in nature.
The Canvassing Rules leaves to both Houses of Congress, as an entire
body, the final act of determining the authenticity in the manner provided by law,
and due execution of the certificates of canvass,
and the proclamation of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect.
Anent to his argument that the Canvassing Rules is an unlawful
delegation of power, petitioner claims that the creation of the Joint Committee
deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a member of Congress to be
present during the canvassing of genuine certificates of canvass, and to
participate in its deliberations. He argues that by excluding him
from the proceedings, the Canvassing Rules likewise deprives his constituents —
the sovereign people — of representation and a voice
in the affairs of government.
Unfortunately, petitioner once again relies on his misreading of the Canvassing
Rules. The fact that the findings of the Joint Committee are subject to a final
act of Congress, then, by casting his vote and declaring his approval or
disapproval of the final report, petitioner exercises his prerogatives as a
Member of Congress. By claiming a sovereign duty to be present in all
stages of the proceedings, petitioner confuses his rights as a
Member of the Congress with the powers given to Congress itself.
Under the Constitution, it is Congress that, in accordance with the law and its
rules, canvasses the certificates of canvass certified
by the Boardsof Canvassers of provinces and cities after determining their
authenticity and due execution in the manner provided by law. Being a
member ofCongress, his participation is likewise determined by the internal
rules of congressional proceedings, and, in general, is determined by his
vote.The quality of his participation is determined by such means as Congress
deems fit to ensure the use of discretion when his vote is cast.
As for the Canvassing Rules itself, petitioner's third argument is that Congress
amends the Constitution by investing itself with powers beyond what was granted
therein. He cites the three constitutional functions of Congress as a National
Board of Canvassers: 1) the opening
by thePresident of the Senate of all the certificates of canvass
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint public
session; 2)the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass; and 3) the canvassing of votes based on
said certificates. It is his observation that with the enumeration of these three
duties, the Constitutional mandate is specific, thereby foreclosing the need for
implementing or procedural rules. The argument is bereft of merit. DCcHIS

The authority of Congress to adopt its own rules of procedure under par. (3),
Sec. 16, Art. VI 10 is a right that has been recognized to apply
regardless of whether Congress is exercising its legislative power or its other
duties, such as in this case when it acts as the National Board ofCanvassers. 11
Here, apart from the general authority of Congress to promulgate its internal
rules, the Constitution itself specifically leaves it to Congress to
determine the conditions and procedures of fulfilling its duty as a National
Board of Canvassers. The sixth paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII ofthe Constitution, plainly and clearly states: "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of certificates."
The reason for the insertion of this provision, and its relation
to the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates ofcanvass, was likewise explained
during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission.
MR. DAVIDE:
On page 2, between lines 22 and 23, I propose to insert a
new paragraph to read as follows: CONGRESS
SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES
FOR THE CANVASSING OF THE CERTIFICATES.
MR. SUMULONG:
Will Commissioner Davide repeat the proposed
amendment?
MR. DAVIDE:
CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES
FOR THE CANVASS OF THE CERTIFICATES.
THE PRESIDENT:
Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO:
 For the benefit of the other Commissioners, will
Commissioner Davide explain this proposal?
MR. DAVIDE:
This is necessary in order that Congress will
have the authority now to promulgate the necessary
rules for the canvassing of thecertificates of canvass
for the Offices of the President and the Vice-
President.
MR. REGALADO:
How will that tie up with line 16
regarding the determination of the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass
in themanner provided by law?
MR. DAVIDE:
That is entirely a different matter, Madam President,
because it would relate to the rules
concerning the determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof, whereas the other one would
be the rules of procedure. 12 [Emphasis supplied]
As regards the determination of authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, the scope of the duty of Congress is to
be defined by a law to be enacted by it. This was made clear
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
explaining the inclusion of this provision in the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. MAAMBONG. . . . The Committee had to
insert the phrase "in the manner provided by law" so
that the legislature itself will find out andwill make it very
specific as to what flaws or deficiencies
in the certificates of canvass can be taken
cognizance of by the canvassing board oftellers, because
as of now the guiding regulations that govern the National
Assembly, as I mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules
and regulations of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election
Code, the jurisprudence from the decisions of the Supreme
Court. All these things taken together, the legislature is
given a notice by using the phrase "in the manner provided
by law," so that it will make a determination now of what
are the points which the board of tellers can take
cognizance of, because it is not very clear right now
under the laws and regulations, and as a matter of fact, that
was one of the controversies which arose
during the canvassing of the votes of President Aquino and
 former President Marcos in the last Batasan. 13 [Emphasis
supplied]
The law referred to is R.A. No. 7166, 14 which was enacted on 26 November
1991. Section 30 thereof provides the flaws over which Congress would take
cognizance, as well as the manner by which it would do so, thus:
Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers
for the Election of President and Vice-President:
Determination ofAuthenticity and Due
Execution of Certificates of Canvass. — Congress shall
determine the authenticity and due
execution of thecertificate of canvass for President and
Vice-President as accomplished and transmitted to it
by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1)
each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and
members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or
caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each
certificate of canvass
contains the names of all of the candidates for President
and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words
and in figures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in other
authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy
in the votes of any candidate in words and figures
in the certificate.
TcaAID

When the certificate of canvass, duly certified

by the board of canvassers of each province, city or district,
appears to be incomplete, theSenate President shall
require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by
personal delivery, the election returns from polling places
that were not included in the certificate of canvass and
supporting statements. Said election returns shall be
submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from
receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or
supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or
alterations which may cast doubt as
to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and
may affect the result of the election, upon
request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate
concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for
President and Vice-President, count the votes as they
appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, therefore, whether Congress deems it fit to
require its entire membership to examine each certificate ofcanvass, raise their
comments and objections thereto, or engage in parliamentary debate before
reaching its conclusions, or else leave preliminary matters to be discussed and
argued according to different rules, must be left to the wisdom of Congress. So
long as the ultimate power to canvass remains lodged in the body tasked to
perform it, congressional rules adopted to address matters of expediency
or the orderly conduct of proceedings is precisely the purpose of such rules. 15
Congress remains the body exercising its canvassing duties, and delegating
preliminary determinations to expedite proceedings. Where the rulesof Congress
have thus been passed within the limits of constitutional and legal boundaries,
everything else remains internal and procedural, and to which petitioner is bound.
As procedural rules, "[t]hey may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure. 16
In claiming that the creation of a Joint Committee is an unlawful
delegation of authority, petitioner asserts
that the determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates is a
function that requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the individual
members of Congress. He implies that a ministerial function can be delegated
whereas the determination of the authenticity and due execution, being more
than ministerial, cannot. The distinction is facetious since petitioner argues
throughout his petition that none of the duties of Congress under par. 4, Sec. 4,
Art. VIIof the Constitution can be delegated "whether within or without" Congress.
On the contrary, respondents argue extensively that the nature of canvassing, as
well as determining the authenticity and due
execution of thecertificates of canvass, are ministerial functions, which can be
delegated in any case.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary function was amply cited
in the Comment of Respondent Senate:
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a
power or right conferred upon them by law of acting
officially, under certain circumstances, according
to the dictates of their judgments and consciences,
uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others. A
purely ministerial act of duty, in contradistinction to a
discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
 upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires
neither theexercise of official discretion nor judgment." 17
Referring, once again, to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: SHEIDC

MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2, referring
to the certificates of canvass of the President and
Vice-President. Am I right if I say that
because of the use of these
words, theduty of the legislature to canvass is no
longer ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as applicable
to the canvass made by theNational Assembly,
and the reason why we did not put the word
"ministerial" in the Article is, it has been understood
in the case ofLopez v. Roxas and in other cases.
When we used the words "authenticity" and
"genuineness," the question refers
to the problem ofwhether or not the ministerial
function is already nonministerial. The answer is, it is
still ministerial but when we say "authenticity and
"due execution," what it really means is
that the National Assembly will look
at the certificates of canvass and find out
from the face ofthe document whether there are
flaws in the execution and
authenticity of the document. That is what it means.
MR. NOLLEDO:
Madam President, in the event that the legislature finds out
that there are serious defects
in the certificates of canvass — as when theseals
are broken, there are a lot of erasures and then
many of them are unsigned and, therefore,
authenticity appears to be questionable — what will
happen?
MR. REGALADO:
 The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided
by law. . . ." 18 [Emphasis supplied]
TIcAaH

Indeed, the inclusion in the 1987 Constitution of the duty of Congress to

be the National Board of Canvassers for the election of the President
andthe Vice President meant that Congress was to have expanded powers.
These expanded powers did not necessarily mean that the nature of thepower
changed from a ministerial to a discretionary one. However, nor
can the power of Congress to determine authenticity and due
execution ofthe canvass of votes be deemed purely ministerial, as whether there
has been tampering or not, or, as according to Sec. 30 of R.A. No. 7166, or
determining when there is 'doubt' requires some degree of discretion.
The distinction made in Lopez v. Roxas 19 was a distinction made
between the duties of Congress and that of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal,the latter charged with judging all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates,
under Section 1, R.A. No. 1793:
Needless to say, the power of congress to declare who,
among the candidates for President and/or Vice-President,
has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely
different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts
as a national board of canvassers, charged
with the ministerial and executive duty to make said
declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly
certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers.
Upon the other hand, thePresidential Electoral Tribunal
has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly
certified election returns have been irregularly made or
tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections
in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to
recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass
upon the validity of each ballot or determine
whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative,
in whose favor, which Congress has power to do." 20
Thus, while petitioner correctly maintains that the 1987 Constitution sought to
expand the power of Congress by requiring it to
determine thegenuineness of the certificates of canvass, the act of discretion was
done upon determining the rules of authenticity and due execution. That
accomplished, the National Board of Canvassers could only act
within the parameters and according to the criteria specifically provided
by thelaw.
Nevertheless, even if, for
purposes of argument, the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass were more than a ministerial
function, the Canvassing Rules, as discussed earlier, does not delegate nor
abdicate such determination to the Joint Committee, nor for that matter
any of the other duties Congress prescribed under Sec. 4, Art. VII. Therefore,
discussion on the accusation against Congress regarding its neglect of duty
because of the adoption of its Canvassing Rules would now be superfluous.
What remains for petitioner, as a member of Congress and a
representative of his constituents, is in the opportunities to make the informed
judgments provided by the Canvassing Rules itself. The Canvassing Rules
provides safeguards, which would enable petitioner to responsibly perform his
individual duty as a Member of Congress and properly
represent the interests of his constituents. A
declaration of yea and nay or theraising of hand to express protest or approval is
a diminished prerogative only when it is not exercised with the full
weight of the trust of thepeople and the powers of reason and conscience. aTcIAS

Finally, the challenged Canvassing Rules is similar, for the most part,
to the Canvassing Rules for the Presidential and Vice Presidential
Electionof 1998. 21 That canvassing Rules was unanimously approved
by the Senate and the House of Representatives at its joint session. In
attendance at that session were Senators, same of whom are now incumbent
Senators Edgardo Angara, Gregorio Honasan, Sergio Osmeña III and Vicente
Sotto III, 22 and opposition Representatives Bellaflor Angara-Castillo, Didagen
Dilangalen and Rolando Zamora, among others. 23 Indeed, I cannot understand
why an almost the same Rules is now assailed on constitutional grounds. I
cannot likewise understand why Congress should promulgate separate
Canvassing Rules for every Presidential elections. It should have promulgated
one set of Canvassing Rules for all such elections, thereby ensuring stability and
avoiding delays and confusion in future Presidential elections.
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition for its utter failure to show
that the Rules of the Joint Public Session on Congress on Canvassing theVotes
for Presidential and Vice Presidential abuse of discretion by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint session.
PUNO, J.:
The facts are sparse but sufficient. We held our national election last May 10,
2004. The candidates for President were President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
actor Fernando Poe, Jr., Senator Panfilo Lacson, former Secretary of Education
Raul Roco, and religious leader Bishop Eddie Villanueva. The candidates for
Vice-President were Senator Noli de Castro, Senator Loren Legarda, former
Congressman Herminio Aquino and Mr. Rodolfo Pajo.
Congress thereafter convened itself in joint session to
canvass the results of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. It
approved theRules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing Votes
for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004
Elections.ETAICc

On May 2, 2004, petitioner, a member of the House of Representatives

representing the 3rd Legislative District of the City of Davao, filed theinstant
petition for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of a status
quo ante order, temporary restraining order and writ ofpreliminary injunction. He
assailed said Rules as constitutionally infirmed allegedly because they: (1)
constitute an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative power to a Joint
Committee of Congress; (2) constitute an unconstitutional amendment of Article
VII, Section 4 of the Constitution; (3) constitute an unconstitutional deprivation
and derogation of his rights and prerogatives as a
member of the House of Representatives; and (4) bythe passage of the Rules,
Congress has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the Constitution specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
In their respective Comments, public respondents defended the validity of their
act. The Senate, represented by the President of the Senate, Honorable Franklin
M. Drilon, submits that the Legislature's formulation and implementation of its
own rules affecting its internal operation are beyond the ambit of judicial scrutiny.
And, contrary to petitioner's contention, the Rules are in complete accord
with the Constitution as they do not remove from Congress the power to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and to
canvass the votes of thecandidates for President and Vice-President, which
power is still reposed in Congress as a whole, nor do they curtail the rights and
prerogativesof any member of Congress to participate in the canvassing. Neither
does the creation of the Joint Committee constitute an undue delegation of a
legislative function since the canvassing of votes is not an
exercise of the legislative function of Congress. In fine, the Senate President
believes that the instant petition is a mere disguised attempt to change the rules
and delay the canvassing of votes. CaTcSA

Respondent House of Representatives,

through the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Honorable Jose C. De
Venecia, maintains that theconstitutional grant of the power to canvass the votes
for the President and the Vice-President and the corresponding mandate to
formulate its own rules of procedure authorize Congress which has the sole
discretion to create a Joint Committee to preliminarily canvass the votes to
expedite the proceedings. Similarly, the Speaker is of the view
that the creation of the Joint Committee is not violative of the well-known
maximdelegata potestas non delegari 1 which finds application only when what is
delegated is legislative power, and not an electoral function such as
canvassing of votes.
The Solicitor General argues that the constitutionality of the act of Congress in
assigning the preliminary canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is
a political question. It is Congress, and not the Judiciary, which gets to decide
what procedures are proper in this circumstance. And, while the Constitution
assigns to Congress the power to canvass the votes, it does not mean
that the whole Congress, as a body, should actually canvass the votes. Congress
has the discretion to follow its previous practice of using a joint committee to
canvass the certificates ofcanvass and does not abdicate its power
because the Joint Committee, apart from being a part thereof, will just come out
with a final report which will be submitted to the whole Congress, in joint public
session, for approval. Finally, there is no delegation of legislative power since
delegation oflegislative power applies only when there is transfer of power from
one department of government to the other departments. In this case, Congress
did not delegate its power to the Executive or Judicial department.
In short, the petition poses two hinge issues: (1) whether it hoists a political
question over which the Court has no jurisdiction; and (2) assumingthe issue
raised is justiciable, whether the Rules violate Article VII, Section
4 of the Constitution.
Let us keep a full eye on the Rules. The pertinent parts provide:
RULE VIII
JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created
composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the President of theSenate and eleven (11)
members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of each House
panel shall elect from among themselves their respective
Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee
may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two
divisions of eleven (11) members each composed of a
chairman, five (5) members from the Senate and five (5)
members from theHouse of Representatives: Provided,
That a Member of Congress who is a candidate for
President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for
appointment to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be
chaired by a Chairman of the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee shall, upon
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily
canvass thevotes of candidates for the offices of President
and Vice-President.
The Representative of the province or city whose
certificate of canvass is being canvassed shall be an ex
officio member of the Joint Committee, without voting
rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.
SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions,
shall satisfy itself that each certificate of canvass was duly
executed, signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and
Members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned; that it
contains the names of allthe candidates for President and
Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and
in figures; and there exists no discrepancy in other
authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy
in the votes of any candidate in words and figures
in the same certificate.TIcAaH

SEC. 15. When the certificate of canvass, duly certified

by the Board of Canvassers of each province, city or
district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President
shall require the Board of Canvassers concerned to
transmit by personal delivery, the election returns from
polling places that were not included
in the certificate of canvass and supporting documents.
Said election returns shall be submitted by personal
delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
SEC. 16. In case of omission
in the certificate of canvass of the name of any candidate
and/or the votes obtained by any
candidate, thePresident of the Senate shall summon,
in the most expeditious manner, the provincial, city or
district Board of Canvassers concerned to
supplythe missing data in the certificate of canvass and to
authenticate the same by affixing their signatures thereon.
SEC. 17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or
supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or
alterations which may cast doubt as
to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and
may affect the result of the election, upon
request of thePresidential or Vice-Presidential candidate
concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for
President and Vice-President, count the votes as they
appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
SEC. 18. In case the copy of the certificate of canvass for
Congress is delayed, the President of the Senate shall
obtain said delayed certificate of canvass
from the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers
concerned within a period of two days. In
case the certificate ofcanvass has been lost, destroyed or is
otherwise unavailable, the Joint Committee shall
immediately request the Commission on Elections for its
authentic copy of said certificate of canvass.
SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in
divisions, shall decide any question
involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such
decision shall be subject to approval by the joint
session, the Senate and House of Representatives voting
separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in
consultation
within the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail.
SEC. 20. The Joint Committee en banc or in divisions, may,
by a majority vote of its Members each House panel voting
separately, punish for contempt any person who commits
disorderly behavior during its session. Any
member of the provincial, city or district
Board ofCanvassers who refuses without reasonable cause
to obey any order issued by the President of the Senate as
provided in Sections 15, 16, 18 and 21 hereof, may likewise
be punished for contempt by the joint public session upon
recommendation of the Senate President.
SEC. 21. The chairmen of the Joint Committee shall
request from the Commission on Elections technical
assistance for purposes of thecanvassing of votes. A
list of the names, specimen signatures and thumb
marks of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city
and district Boards of Canvassers shall be obtained
from the Commission on Elections
for the determination of the authenticity and due
executionof certificates of canvass. When there is any
doubt regarding the authenticity and due
execution of the certificate of canvass, the Joint
Committee, en banc or any of its divisions, may
require the personal appearance of the chairmen and
members of the provincial, city of district
Board of Canvassers concerned.
SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall
tabulate the votes and, for this purpose, may
avail of the services of an independent accounting/auditing
firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.
After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes
have been tabulated, any Member of Congress may
request in writing for copies thereof from the Secretariat
prior to the consideration of any interim or final report
to the joint session.TSaEcH

SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions,

shall meet eight (8) hours a day from Monday to Friday until
all the certificates ofcanvass referred to it by the joint public
session shall have been canvassed. The final report shall
be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to the joint
public session for its approval, each House voting
separately.
RULE IX
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all
certificates of canvass have been received, the Joint
Committee may submit to the joint public session its final
report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass
if the total number of registered voters corresponding
to theprovince, city or district covered
by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the result of the election. Congress in joint
public session, voting separately, shall immediately act
on the final report.
The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim
report to the joint public session whenever there is a need
for guidance or direction from Congress. Provided, That
objections raised and rulings made therein shall no longer
be included in the final report.
SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each
House panel shall sign the final report of the Joint
Committee. Every Member shall be provided with a
copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four (24)
hours within which to submit his concurring or dissenting
opinion.
 SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member
designated by the Joint Committee shall speak for not more
than one hour on thereport and the accompanying
resolution approving the report of the Joint Committee,
declaring the results of the canvass and
proclaiming thePresident-elect and Vice-President-
elect. The Member designated by those against the report
shall also speak for not more than one hour. Subsequent
speakers for or against the resolution shall be allowed to
speak for not more than three hours; Provided, That one (1)
speaker for each candidate shall be given the opportunity to
speak for not more than twenty minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and
approval of the Joint Committee report
and the accompanying resolution by
majority of allthe Members of both Houses voting
separately in the joint public session, Congress
through the President of the Senate and the Speaker ofthe
House of Representatives shall forthwith
proclaim the President-elect and Vice-President-elect.
I respectfully make the following submissions:
I
The petition poses a justiciable issue
over which this Court has jurisdiction.
The first issue is whether the petition involves a political question, hence, this
Court is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. This is not thefirst time, and
it will not be last, when the Court will wrestle with the political question defense.
As early as 1957, in the landmark case of Tañadav. Cuenco, 2 this Court has
held that political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, a
question of policy. It refers to "those questions which under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom
not legality of a particular measure." For this reason ". . . courts will not normally
interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless thecase shows a
clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution." 3 We
have a continuous river of rulings that the political question doctrine cannot be
invoked when the issue is whether an executive act or a law
violates the Constitution. 4 Thus, in Tatad v.
Secretaryof the Department of Energy, 5 we emphatically explained that
"the principle of separation of powers mandates that challenges
on theconstitutionality of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice while
doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls ofCongress." IaDcTC

When the Constitution is violated, even an act of a co-equal and coordinate

branch of government has to be struck down. Our government operates both
under the principle of separation of powers and the principle of checks and
balances. In less esoteric terms, this means that our three
branches of government, vis-à-vis each other, follow the rule of trust the two
but trust no one absolutely. Thus, in Arroyo v. de Venecia, 6 this Court,
citing U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 7 and speaking thru Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, held that "[t]he Constitution empowers each house to determine its
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained." In the recent case of Francisco,
Jr. v. The House of Representatives, et al., 8 promulgated on November 10,
2003, it was also pointed out, viz.:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court
becomes more feeble in light of the new Constitution
which expanded thedefinition of judicial power as
including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess ofjurisdiction on the part of any part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by
retired Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded
definition of judicial power considerably
constricted the scope of political question. He opined
that the language luminously suggests that this duty (and
power) is available even against the executive and
legislative departments including the President
and the Congress, in theexercise of their discretionary
powers.
We shall not be breaking grounds in striking down an
act of a co-equal branch of government or an act of an
independent agency ofgovernment done in grave
abuse of discretion. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution provides, inter alia,
that the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) shall be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and
qualifications of themembers of the House. In Bondoc v.
Pineda, et al. this Court declared null and
void the Resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election of Congressman Camasura as a
member of the HRET. His expulsion from the HRET
by the House of Representatives was held not to be for a
lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere
with the tribunal's disposition of theBondoc case and
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the HRET's decision in his
favor. This Court found that the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing
Congressman Camasura. Its action was adjudged to be
violative of the constitutional mandate which
created the HRET to be the "sole judge" of the election
contest between Bondoc and Pineda. We held that a
showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government is not an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof
may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a
constitutional grant of authority is not unusually
unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may
be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then,
it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain
whether the two coordinate branches have adhered
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political."
We further explained that the power and duty of courts to
nullify, in appropriate cases the actions of the executive and
legislative branches does not mean that the courts are
superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean
though that the judiciary may not shirk "theirksome
task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and
legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
controversy is brought beforethe courts by someone who
has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action. It is "a
plain exercise of judicial power, the power vested in courts
to enable them to administer justice according to law. . . . It
is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and
dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court,
to the determination of which must be brought the test and
measure of the law."
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we also ruled
that the Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ
created for the specific purpose ofdetermining contests
relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly may
not be interfered with by thejudiciary when and while acting
within the limits of authority, but this Court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission
for the purpose ofdetermining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole
judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Similarly, in Arroyo v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Augusto Syjuco, we
nullified the HRET's decision declaring private respondent
Syjuco as the duly elected Congressman of Makati for
having been rendered in persistent and deliberate
violationof the Tribunal's own governing rules
and the rules of evidence.
To be sure, this Court has reviewed not just
acts of the HRET but also of the House of Representatives
itself. We passed upon the issue ofwhether the procedure
for passing a law provided by the Constitution was followed
by the House of Representatives
and the Senate inTolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et
al. involving R.A. No. 7716 or the VAT law. We ruled
that the VAT law satisfied the constitutional provision
requiring that all appropriation, revenue and tariff bills
originate from the House of Representatives under Article
VI, Section 24 of the1987 Constitution. We also
interpreted the constitutional provision
requiring the reading of a bill on three separate days
"except when thePresident certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." and held that this requirement
was satisfied when the bill which became R.A. No. 7716
underwent three readings on the same day
as the President certified the bill as urgent. Finally, we
interpreted the Rules of theSenate and the House of Repre
sentatives and held that there was nothing irregular
about the conference committee including in its report an
entirely new provision not found either in the House bill or
in the Senate bill as this was in accordance with the said
Rules. TADCSE

The recent case of Macalintal v. COMELEC on absentee

voting affirmed the jurisdiction of this Court to
review the acts of the legislature. In said case, the Court
settled the question of propriety of the petition which
appeared to be visited by the vice of prematurity as there
were no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or
before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions as required by Rule
 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court
considered the importance of the constitutional issues
raised by the petitioner, and quoted Tañadav.
Angara stating that "where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only theright but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute."
(citations omitted)HSaIET

This line of thought enjoys the unanimous view of the Court. It is

therefore futile to contend that this Court has no jurisdiction
over the petition at bar on the ground that it poses a political
question. The petition assails the creation by Congress of a Joint
Committee for the purpose ofdetermining the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass appertaining
to the positions of President and Vice-President in our last May
10, 2004 elections. Petitioner contends that the creation violates
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution under which it is alleged
that only Congress, in joint public session, can exercise the said
power. Petitioner also argues that the creation of the Joint
Committee deprives him of his constitutional right to participate
in the canvass of the results of the last Presidential and Vice-
Presidential elections. Theissue raised by petitioner calls
for the proper interpretation of Article VII, Section
4 of the Constitution vis-à-vis the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress or Canvassing the Votes Cast
for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May
10, 2004 Elections. Since time immemorial, the jurisdiction of this
Court to interpret the Constitution has never been successfully
flayed. Indeed, this authority has been broadened
by the expanded definition of judicial power in the 1987
Constitution. In expanding the judicial power of this Court, we said
that "[t]o a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this Court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government." 9 We even held
that the Constitution "did not just
grant the Court the power of doing nothing." 10 Stubborn thoughts
that still insist this Court has no jurisdiction on issues that
 involve the interpretation of the Constitution should now be
consigned tothe museum of memories.
II
Creation of Canvassing Committee constitutes
no grave abuse of discretion.
The next issue is whether the creation of a Joint Committee on Canvassing
constitutes grave abuse of discretion for being violative of Article VII, Section
4 of the Constitution which relevantly states:
xxx xxx xxx
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the S
enateshall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House ofRepresentat
ives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case of two or more shall have
an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules
for the canvassing of the certificates:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner also contends that the Rules deprived him of his rights
and prerogatives as a member of Congress. STcHDC

The nature of the work of the Joint Committee deserves minute

examination. The purpose of the Joint Committee is spelled out in no uncertain
terms in Rule VIII, Section 13, viz.: "The Joint Committee shall, upon
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates ofcanvass, preliminarily
canvass the votes of candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-
President." The key word is "preliminarily"which means its work
is preparatory, 11 a mere prelude. The preliminary work is performed
by the Joint Committee by satisfying itself — (1) that each certificate of canvass
was duly executed, signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and
Members of the provincial, city or district Board ofCanvassers concerned; (2) that
it contains the names of all the candidates for President and Vice-President and
their corresponding votes in words and figures; and (3) that there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy
in the votes ofany candidate in words and figures in the same certificate. 12
Provisions were then crafted to deal with certain concrete problems. Rule VIII,
Section 15, deals with the situation when the certificate ofcanvass, duly certified
by the Board of Canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be
incomplete. In this case, the SenatePresident shall
require the Board of Canvassers concerned to transmit by personal
delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not included
in the certificate of canvass and supporting documents. Rule VIII, Section 16,
applies when there is
an omission in the certificate ofcanvass of the name of any candidate
and/or the votes obtained by any candidate. In this
case, the President of the Senate is mandated bythe rule to summon,
in the most expeditious manner, the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned to supply themissing data
in the certificate of canvass and to authenticate the same by affixing their
signatures thereon. Rule VIII, Section 17, is apt when it appears that any
certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by precinct
bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity or
authenticity of the number of votes stated therein and may
affect the result of the election. Upon request of thePresidential or Vice-
Presidential candidate concerned or his party, the rule requires Congress itself,
for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for President
and Vice-President, to count the votes as they appear
in the copies of the election returns submitted to it. Rule VIII, Section 18, deals
with the situation when the transmittal of the copy of the certificate of canvass
is delayed. The rule directs the SenatePresident to obtain said delayed
certificate of canvass from the provincial, city or district Board of canvassers
concerned. The same Section 18 likewise addresses the situation
when the certificate of canvass has been lost, destroyed or is otherwise
unavailable. The rule requires theJoint Committee to immediately
request the COMELEC for its authentic copy of said certificate of canvass.
The Rules give the Joint Committee the necessary powers to discharge its duty.
Rule VIII, Section 20, grants it the power of contempt. It can punish for
contempt any person who commits disorderly behavior during its session. Rule
VIII, Section 21, accords to it the right to request fromthe COMELEC technical
assistance for purposes of the canvassing of votes. When there is any doubt
regarding the authenticity and due
execution of the certificate of canvass, the Joint Committee, may
require the personal appearance of the chairmen and members of the provincial,
city or district Board of Canvassers. Rule VIII, Section 22,
empowers the Committee to avail of the services of an independent
accounting/auditing firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.
The Rules then provide for the Report to be submitted by the Joint Committee.
Two kinds of reports can be submitted by the Committee to thejoint public
session: One is the interim report which the Committee, in its discretion, may
submit whenever there is a need for guidance or direction from Congress.
Second is the final report containing the objections raised on certain
certificates of canvass and the rulings of theCommittee. Rule IX, Section 25,
requires that every member of the Committee shall be provided a
copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours within which to
submit his concurring or dissenting opinion. At least a majority of the members
from each House shall signthe final report. The final report shall then be
submitted to the joint public session for its approval.
aDATHC

Rule IX, Section 26, then provides the manner on how the final report shall be
debated by the joint public session. Various speakers are allowed to speak for
or against the final report during the joint public session. First, the member
designated by the Joint Committee shall speak in favor of the final report for not
more than one (1) hour. Second, the member designated by those against shall
be given the same time. Third,subsequent speakers for or against the report
shall be allowed to speak for not more than three (3) hours. Fourth, one (1)
speaker for each candidate shall be given the opportunity to speak for not more
than twenty (20) minutes. After the debates, the Joint Committee report
and theaccompanying resolution have to be approved by
majority of all the members of both Houses voting separately in the joint
public session. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall then
be proclaimed through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of theHous
e of Representatives.
The Constitution, the Rules, as well as jurisprudence, inform
us of the nature of the work of Congress as the national canvassing
board ofthe votes cast for the highest elective positions in the land and how it
should be discharged. They establish the following indubitable postulates,viz.:
First. When Congress convenes in joint public session as a national canvassing
board, it is not meeting as a lawmaking body. Its function as a canvassing
board is not to make laws but to count the votes cast by the electorate
for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency. As we succinctly held in Cordero v.
Judge of First Instance of Rizal, 13 while the Board of Canvassers is made
up of legislators, it does not act in its capacity as a maker of laws but as an
entirely different and distinct entity organized for a specific
purpose. The Board of Canvassers exists for a specific function, that is, to
canvass the result of the election as shown in the election returns and to
proclaim the winning
candidates. 14 The exercise ofthe power of canvassing of votes is more akin
to the discharge of an administrative power.
Second. As canvassers of votes for the positions of President and Vice-
President, our lawmakers are to discharge their duties with fairness and
impartiality. Canvassing is an important
part of the process of determining the choice of our sovereign people on who
ought to be our President and Vice-President, the two highest elective posts in
our country. Thus, in making the canvass, our lawmakers should act more as
representatives of the people and less as partisans of political parties. For
this reason, Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution did not give any
significance to the political affiliation of the lawmakers when they are
discharging their duty as canvassers. In cadence, Rule VIII, Section 13, bars
a member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President from
sitting in the Joint Committee. Stated otherwise, lawmakers when canvassing
votes, should keep their eyes open but should shut them off to any political
light. The membersof city, provincial and district boards of canvassers
canvass the votes appertaining to our lesser elective officials yet they are
enjoined to be non partisan in the discharge of their duties. No less can be
expected from members of Congress acting as the national
board of canvassers. In fine, when our legislators acting as canvassers add
1 + 1, the sum should be 2, regardless of their political affiliation.
Third. Congress can only proclaim as President-elect and Vice-President-elect
they who, on the basis of the election documents required by law, such
as the certificates of canvass, election returns and statements of votes, have
established, at the very least, a prima facie title to said offices. No candidate
who has failed to establish a colorable legal title to the positions of President and
Vice-President can be proclaimed and be endowed with the awesome mandate
to govern our people. Democracy disdains the rule and reign of the unelected.
Fourth. In canvassing the votes, our lawmakers are to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass in the manner provided by
law. Republic Act No. 7166, Section 30, prescribes the manner by which
certificates of canvass are deemed authentic and duly executed. Read as a
whole, Section 30 states that Congress must examine each certificate of canvass
not only on its face, but also vis-à-vis thestatement of votes and election returns
when necessary. This law is binding on Congress acting as a canvassing body.
Rightly, the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7166 were incorporated in the Rules.
As a canvassing body, Congress has no lawmaking power and hence cannot
amend or repeal R.A. No. 7166. It has therefore no discretion to disregard R.A.
No. 7166. The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates
in the May 10, 2004 Elections have to be read, interpreted and enforced in
consonance with R.A. No. 7166.
Fifth. The determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass cannot be done in a robotic manner.
R.A. No. 7166 and the Rules look upon our lawmakers not as unthinking slot
machines when conducting the canvass. For this reason, the law and the rules
require that due consideration be given not only
to the certificates of canvass but also to the election returns
and the statement of votes. In other words, the search for the truth
about the true will of the electorate should not be confined to the four
corners of the certificates ofcanvass. The truth, if blocked by the opaque
face of the certificates of canvass, must be extracted from the election returns
and statements ofvotes. It is self-evident that discovering and
distilling the truth of who were really elected by our people
for the positions of President and Vice-President deserve more than a
mechanical effort.
Sixth. The determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass calls for the exercise of discretion. It is
self-evident that reconciling discrepancies in the certificates of canvass vis-à-
vis, among others, the election returns and statements of votes
involvesintelligent judgment. It is for this reason that in the discharge of its
functions, the Joint Committee was clothed with certain powers. It can request
technical assistance from the COMELEC. It can require the personal
appearance of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers. It can avail of the services of an independent accounting or
auditing firm. It has the awesome power to punish for contempt any person who
commits disorderly behavior during its session. More importantly, the Rules
require that our lawmakers decide theauthenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass only after a full debate by
members of Congress. In fine, determining the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass cannot be done by adding machines. cHSIAC

Seventh. The primary consideration in determining the authenticity and due

execution of the certificates of canvass is accuracy — accuracy in
determining the sovereign will of the people. The need to fast
track the determination of the will of the people pales in comparison with this
consideration. It is a travesty of democracy for the people to be governed by
people without a mandate. The nation can endure a slow but trustworthy
tally. It may not survive an indefensible count, however speedy it may be.
Eight. The determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass is governed by a distinct process
to insure that when it reaches its end, the ones who will be proclaimed
President-elect and Vice-President-elect can, at the very least, have a colorable
claim to said offices. This colorable claim can only be established after full
debate on the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass in
light of other election documents such as election returns and
statements of votes and the testimonies of the chairmen and
membersof the provincial, city, or district board of canvassers, in
appropriate cases. The debate contemplated is one that will elicit the truth
as to the choice of the people, hence, the Rules provide the following, viz.: (a)
each candidate is allowed two (2) watchers who shall have access to an
unimpeded view of the entire proceedings; (b) each candidate is likewise allowed
lawyers who may argue and question any certificate ofcanvass; (c)
upon the opening of the certificates of canvass, observations and
objections of any member of Congress with reference to thecondition of their
envelope, seal and serial number shall already be entered into the records and
shall be considered during the proceedingsof the Joint Committee;
(d) the Joint Committee is composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to
be appointed by the President of theSenate and eleven (11) members from
House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker. To insulate it from
partisan politics, a memberof Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-
President is barred from appointment to the Joint Committee;
(e) the Representative of theprovince or city whose certificate of canvass is being
canvassed is made ex-officio member of the Joint Committee, without voting
rights, for theduration of the canvassing of the aforesaid certificate of canvass; (f)
remedies are provided for in cases where a certificate of canvass is incomplete
or with omissions or where it is lost destroyed or otherwise unavailable;
(g) the Joint Committee is given the authority to avail of thetechnical
assistance of the COMELEC and of the services of an independent accounting or
auditing firm for the proper discharge of its task; (h)
after the Certificate of Canvass and statement of votes have been tabulated
by the Committee, any member of Congress may request in writing for copies
thereof from the secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or final report
to the joint public session; (i) the interim and final report shall
contain the objections raised and the rulings thereon by the Joint Committee; (j)
every member of the Joint Committee is given twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt of the final report within which to submit his concurring or dissenting
opinion; (k) the final report is then forwarded to the joint public session for
debate. A member of the Joint Committee is given one (1) hour to speak in
favor of the final report; another member of the Committee is given also one (1)
hour to speak against the report; other speakers for or against the report are
further allowed to speak for not more than three (3) hours; and one (1) speaker
for each candidate is given the opportunity to speak for not more than twenty 20
minutes; (1) after full debate, the final report is submitted to a vote by the joint
public session, each House voting separately. In casethe two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation
with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, will prevail. AEIcTD

The process may be long and laborious but it has a purpose. It is designed to
give our lawmakers all the facts and all the arguments necessaryfor an informed
and intelligent judgment in determining the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of a canvass. It demands
that theevidence, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law should be
meticulously weighed by the lawmakers before they pass judgment on whether to
canvass the votes in the certificates of canvass. The objections to their
authenticity and due execution should be given their appropriate
consideration. An unreasoned or unreasonable judgment by Congress
runs the risk of rejection in the parliament of thestreet of the people.
And the danger is that we may not just face a mute multitude.
Ninth. The laws and the rules give clear rights to the candidates. Candidates
to the position of the President and Vice-President cannot be denied due
process. Thus, they are allowed watchers. They are entitled to lawyers who can
question any certificate of canvass before the Joint Committee. When the final
report is up for voting by the joint public session of Congress, they can have
speakers to defend their interest. Candidates are also entitled to the equal
protection of the law. They cannot be subjected to discriminatory treatment. All
these and their otherconstitutional rights are not suspended
during the canvass.
Tenth. The law and the rules likewise impose duties on Congress as a
canvassing board. Congress must be an outpost of openness. Thecanvassing
must be transparent. Lawmakers must conduct the canvassing without a
taint of arbitrariness. The worse type of arbitrariness is arbitrariness that runs
roughshod over the sovereign will of the people.
Prescinding from these predicates, I find no difficulty in voting to
dismiss the petition at bar. The Rules of the Joint Public Session ofCongress
on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates
in the May 10, 2004 Elections do not violate Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution. To begin with, the Constitution grants Congress the power to
promulgate its own rules for thecanvassing of election certificates. The Rules
enjoy the presumption of legality and the petitioner has miserably failed to
overcome this presumption.
The argument that the creation of the Joint Committee constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power is an egregious error. As a canvassing board,
Congress exercises no legislative power and therefore did not delegate
any.
In creating the Joint Committee, Congress did not abdicate its constitutional
duty to determine the authenticity and due
execution of thecertificates of President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004
election. Even a side-glance at the powers and prerogatives of the Joint
Committee will subvert petitioner's submission. The function of the Joint
Committee is laid down in Rule VIII, Section 14. To stress again, it shall satisfy
itself that (1) each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb
marked by the Chairman and members of the provincial, city or district
board of canvassers concerned; (2) it contains the names of all the candidates
for President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and
figures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic
copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate
in word and figures in the same certificate. In the performance of this
function, the Joint Committee has to prepare a Report which will
contain the objections raised by the parties
on the admission of the certificates of canvas concerned and its rulings thereon.
Rule VIII, Section 13, emphasizes that the canvass of the Joint Committee is a
mere preliminary canvass. The rulings of the Joint Committee reflected in its
Report are merely recommendatory in nature. Its Report is yet to be submitted
to the joint public session of Congress for approval, each House voting
separately. The constitutional canvassing duty of Congress is therefore
preserved and remains undiminished. cAHDES

Nor is the right of petitioner as lawmaker — canvasser unduly prejudiced

by the creation of the Joint Committee. The proceedings of the Joint Committee
are open and transparent. Under Rule VIII, Section 22,
after the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes have been tabulated
by the Joint Committee, petitioner, like any other member of Congress, may
request in writing for their copies prior to the considerationof any report
by the Committee to the joint public session. Under Rule IX, Section 26,
petitioner may speak for or against the final report of theJoint Committee whose
findings and rulings are non-binding to the joint public session of Congress. His
right to vote for or against the final report of the Joint Committee therefore
stands undiluted. In truth, the creation of a Joint Committee to preliminarily
canvass the results of thePresidential and Vice-Presidential election is compelled
by the need to hasten the canvass considering that our laws have set a deadline
for proclamation. History is studded with insights. The practice of creating a Joint
Committee was resorted to by Congress in the 1961, 1965, 1992 and 1998
elections. Its effectiveness has been proven.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to dismiss the petition.
 QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition before us for prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction and
duty of the Supreme Court pursuant to the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1,
par. 2, "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse ofdiscretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." SIaHDA

Yet, basing on his arguments, we can say that the pith of petitioner's plea goes
deeper than the averment of personal exclusion from the select panel tasked as
"a joint committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 national elections." He
assails the Rules * that Congress passed on May 28, 2004 because, in his
view, the Rules "effectively amends and abrogates" certain
provisions of the Constitution, particularly Section 4, Article VII, which give
Congress the power and authority to promulgate rules for said committee
as the Board of National Canvassers. Further, he
charges the Congress of unlawful neglect in the performance of duty enjoined
by the Constitution because, by its passage of said Rules, Congress as a whole
delegated unlawfully its tasks as canvasser at thehighest level to a mere joint
committee of eleven Senators and eleven Congressmen. *
Noteworthy, he raises expressly before us only one issue:
"Whether or not the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May
10, 2004 Elections are Valid, Legal, and Constitutional."
He marshals his arguments abovecited to advance the thesis that said Rules are
invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional. But by prefacing his plea to us
on the principle of the tripartite separation of powers of government
and the principle of potestas delegata non potest delegari, he also triggers
implicitly a second issue: whether the court possesses jurisdiction
over the subject matter he brings.
In the Resolution dated 4 June 2004, we denied petitioner's prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order. Without giving due course
to thepetition, we required respondents herein and the Solicitor General to
comment. On June 7, 2004, before noontime, we
received the Comment ofrespondent Senate of the Philippines, the Comment/Op
position by respondent House of Representatives, and the Comment
by the Office of theSolicitor General. * After a thorough dissection of the issue
raised by petitioner, we find that the respondents rightly prayed for
dismissal of thepetition outright, "for lack of constitutional and legal basis" ** and
"for lack of merit". ***
ADECcI
In denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order, we were not
unmindful of the prevailing air of anxiety and popular perception
that thecanvass of votes for the two highest positions of government is overdue.
Announcement of the election results cannot be delayed for weeks by mere
technicalities. At the same time, a majority of nine members of the Court
were of the considered opinion that the views of the opposition parties need to be
fairly and fully ventilated in a neutral forum that could render the appropriate
relief. Despite prevailing doubts on the possible pre-emption of the functions
reserved by the Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 4, to the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, we could not let the petitioner go away empty handed simply because
he failed to attach his affidavit of service to the petition. Majority of the Court
members believe it is in thepublic interest that comments on the petition be
required from herein respondents as well as the people's tribune, the Solicitor
General. Thereafter, the Court could promptly rule on the merits of the petition,
provided the members are satisfied that the vital requirements ofconstitutional
litigation, including the existence of a case and controversy, lis mota,
ripeness, locus standi and justiciability, are clearly met.
As a member of the House of Representatives, believing that he was prejudiced
gravely by that chamber's action, petitioner has in his favor therequisite
personality (locus standi) to bring this suit before us. This we need not belabor.
But it still behooves us to determine, at the very inceptionof our discourse,
whether the issue raised by petitioner is one that is justiciable rather than a
political question. By itself, the threshold requirementof justiciability, which is to
say the appropriateness of a subject matter for judicial consideration, is trumped
by the assertion of the political question doctrine, perhaps rendering certain
government conduct immune from judicial review. * ECcaDT

In Tañada v. Cuenco, (103 Phil. 1051) the Court defined political questions as
those "which, under the Constitution are to be decided by thepeople in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of thegovernment (Id. at p.
1065). ** This formulation evolving from the separation of powers doctrine has
been sharpened by saying that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should
be resolved by the Court while doubts on the wisdom of law should be debated
in the halls ofCongress. (Tatad v. Secretary, 281 SCRA 347). More
recently, Francisco, Jr. v. HR, (G.R. No. 160261, decided Nov. 10, 2003), gave
us theopportunity for further distinction. Per Madame Justice Carpio-Morales,
"the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits." To that
extent, we consider Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, cited by the OSG,
inappropriate. Instead we find instructivethe ruling in U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
144 U.S. 1, which held that while each House of Congress is empowered
by the Constitution to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.
Procedurally, it must be stressed that the petitioner in an action
for mandamus has the burden to show a clear, certain, and well-defined right
tothe relief sought. (Sales v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-39537, 31 May 1984, 129 SCRA
180, 183.) Mandamus cannot compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
Further, an action for prohibition, as a rule, lies only against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not legislative functions. (Ruperto v. Torres, G.R. No. L-8785, 25
Feb. 1957.)
Be that as it may, considering the crucial importance of the matter at hand, not
just for the moment but also for the future of a nation beset by crises after crises,
it is our view that a prompt consideration of the instant petition is called for. As
well said in Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, "a showing that plenary power is
granted [to another branch of the government] is not an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy."
Nevertheless, with due respect to a co-equal branch, interference
with the adoption and implementation of internal rules of Congress is furthest
from our mind. Indubitably, per the Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4, it is Congress
and not any other organ of the State which shall promulgate therules
for the canvassing of the certificates of votes for the President and the Vice-
President. Indeed we recognize the plenary power of Congress to enact its own
internal rules on the matter. (Osmeña v. Pendatum, 109 Phil. 863. See
also Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268). What prompts us today to look
into the present petition is the duty to say what the law is, as a
matter of constitutional prerogative by way of judicial review. * To abdicate that
duty is to invite lawlessness and disorder.
If only for edification, let us now focus on petitioner's complaint.
He alleges that "the questioned Rules of Congress call for the creation of a Joint
Committee under Section 13, Rule VIII thereof, which provides that the Joint
Committee shall: (a) be composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the Senate President and eleven (11) members
from the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker; (b) sit en
banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions of eleven members each; (c)
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass; and
(d) preliminarily canvass the votes ofcandidates for the offices of President and
Vice-President." * HECTaA
Petitioner concludes that the Rules thus "(a) removed from the Congress as one
whole body and transferred to the Joint Committee of Congressthe duty and
function of determining the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, and (b) removed from the Congress as
one whole body and transferred to the Joint Committee of Congress the duty and
function of canvassing the votes cast for presidential and vice-presidential
candidates." *
"Such removal and transfer of canvassing tasks from the constitutionally
mandated entity to the Joint Committee is directly contrary to theConstitution
itself," according to petitioner. "There is absolutely nothing in the Constitution
which allows expressly or by inference such removal and transfer of canvassing
tasks from Congress as one whole body to another entity," he adds. "Neither is
there anything in the constitution which allows any substitution of the Congress
as one whole body in the performance of the constitutionally mandated
canvassing tasks. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution cannot be any clearer
on the matter."
With the alleged delegation and transfer to a Joint
Committee of the task of canvassing the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates, he contends, "the canvassing of the votes will be done
by and only before the Joint Committee . . . composed of only 11 members
from the Senate and 11 members of the House of Representatives. Petitioner
and all other members of both Houses of Congress who are not
members of the Joint Committee of Congress have thus been unduly
deprived of their rights and prerogatives as incumbent members ofCongress to
be present at, observe and participate in the canvassing of votes. . ." *
Respondent House of Representatives, thru its Speaker Jose de Venecia,
traverses petitioner's allegations. Joint Committees, according to De Venecia, are
constituted primarily to facilitate the work of the two
houses of Congress. The use of the joint committee system, he adds, is a well
recognized and established practice. Such was the mode, he says, in
canvassing the Presidential and Vice-Presidential votes during elections held on
1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1992, and 1998. ** Even assuming
that the principle of delegata potestas non potest delegari applies, nevertheless
he submits that such delegation by the Congress is a valid delegation of powers
beyond cavil, for Congress retains its control overthe canvassing process,
and the ultimate decision on the matter is lodged in Congress itself. On this
score, we are in agreement. Equally important, we also agree with the Speaker
that when acting as the National Board of Canvassers, Congress is not engaged
in legislation, hence no issue of undue delegation of legislative power need arise.
In any event, we are assured by respondent Senate, through its President
Franklin M. Drilon, that contrary to the assertion of the petitioner, he is not
deprived of any right or prerogative by the Joint Committee under its Rules that
he now assails. Petitioner's participation in the canvassing
remains guaranteed under the Rules of the Joint Public Session, thus:
"SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in
divisions, shall decide any question
involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such
decision shall be subject to approval by the joint
session,the Senate and House of Representatives
voting separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in
consultation
with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or divisions, shall
meet eight (8) hours a day from Monday to Friday until
all the certificates ofcanvass referred to it by the joint public
session shall have been canvassed. The final report shall
be submitted by the Joint Committee en
banc to the joint public session for its approval, each
House voting separately. ScHADI

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all
certificates of canvass have been received, the Joint
Committee may submit to the joint public session its final
report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass
if the total number of registered voters corresponding
to theprovince, city or district covered
by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the results of the election. Congress in joint
public session, voting separately, shall immediately act
on the final report.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and
approval of the Joint Committee report
and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Members of both Houses voting
separately in the joint public session, Congress
through the President of theSenate and the Speaker of t
he House of Representatives shall forthwith
proclaim the President-elect and Vice-President elect."
By its very nature, either chamber of Congress must act through committees.
They make the business of legislation feasible and practicable. Without working
committees, the tasks of the Senate or the House would be
unmanageable. The same is true of both chambers acting as theNational
Board of Canvassers. To deprive the Board of the committee system is
tantamount to obstructing its work and consigning it to delay and failure.
Whether the Joint Committee or Congress as a whole is clothe with ministerial or
discretionary powers in the canvass of votes,
including the"determination of the authenticity and due execution" relative
to the canvass of certificates need not, in my view, preoccupy us now. Nor
shouldthe question of fraud and other matters more appropriate for an election
protest, if any. What is important now is that the canvass be conducted
"in the manner provided by law." *
The OSG calls attention, however, to one factor in this controversy:
"the avoidance of undue delay in the canvass of certificates to
ensure theproclamation of the winning candidates before June 30, 2004
Constitutional deadline" ** Respondent House thru its Speaker bewails "an
obvious attempt to stop or delay the current canvassing of votes for
both the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency," whereby petitioner, in effect
"would cast a cloud of doubt on the elections for the two highest posts of land,"
including most if not all previous elections. To respondent, such doubt would
have staggering implications. ***
As the Solicitor General keenly observed:
"In the judgment of the Congress, to require the whole
Congress to canvass the certificates would unduly
delay the canvassing of votes. This delay may prove
detrimental to the national interest. Far from
undermining the Constitution, the creation of the joint
canvassing committee will ensure that the elected
President and Vice-President shall assume office at
noon of June 30, 2004, in accordance
with the Constitution. Thenational interest would be best
served by deferring to this policy decision made
by the Congress." *
WHEREFORE, finding no clear and adequate basis to declare that there is a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents, I vote thatthe instant
petition be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
CARPIO-MORALES, J., concurring:
I join in the Resolution dismissing the instant petition, and in addition, I would like
to make the following observations.
By his Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus (Petition), petitioner Ruy Elias
C. Lopez, incumbent Representative of the 3rd Legislative District ofDavao City,
seeks: HICEca

(1) a judgment declaring null and

void the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes
Cast for thePresidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections (Rules
on Canvassing) adopted by both
Housesof Congress on May 28, 2004;
(2) the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing
all of respondents to cease and desist from
implementing the Rules on Canvassing; and
(3) the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing both
Houses of Congress "to immediately
open the certificates of canvass
inthe presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives in joint public session,
and the Congress to determine theauthenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law and canvass the votes as
expressly commanded under Section 4
(paragraph 4), Article VII of the Constitution . . .
." 1
Petitioner advances the following arguments in support of his Petition:
ARGUMENTS
The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28,
2004 Constitute
an Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power to a
Joint Committee of Congress.
The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28,
2004 Constitute an Unconstitutional Amendment of Section
4, Article VII of theConstitution.
The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28,
2004 Constitute
an Unconstitutional Deprivation and Derogation of the Right
s and Prerogatives of Petitioners [sic] as
Members [sic] of Congress.
By the Passage of the Aforementioned Rules Dated May
28, 2004, Congress
 has Unlawfully Neglected the Performance of an Act which
theConstitution Specifically Enjoins as a Duty Resulting
from Office. 2
In fine, the Petition raises two issues for resolution. First, whether the Rules on
Canvassing constitute an unconstitutional delegation of a non-ministerial power
vested exclusively by the Constitution in the Congress as a whole. Second,
whether the Rules on Canvassing deprives petitioner of his alleged rights and
prerogatives to be present, observe and participate
in the determination of the authenticity and due
executionof the Certificates of Canvass for President and Vice-President.
As always, in exercising its power of judicial review, 3 this Court does not assert
any superiority over a co-equal branch of the government, but merely acts
pursuant to its mandated duty to determine whether an organ of government has
acted within the restrictions and limitations imposed by the Constitution. 4 Where
an act of Congress is shown to have outstripped the boundaries set
by the Constitution, this Court has not hesitated to declare the same null and
void. 5 But, at the same time, where constitutional infirmity has not been proven,
this Court is duty bound to uphold and respect the actions of the Legislature. 6
Matters of procedure and jurisdiction aside, for the reasons discussed hereunder,
I find that the issues raised in the Petition must be decided inthe negative.
The national canvass of votes for President and Vice-President by Congress is
provided for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, as follows: cSEAHa

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be

elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years
which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date six years thereafter. ThePresident
shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more
than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular elections for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified
 by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed
to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, thePresident of th
e Senate shall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of theSenate and the House of Represe
ntatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law,
canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall
be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall
have an equal and highest number of votes,
one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Cong
ress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules
for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the foregoing solely and exclusively vested three tasks
on Congress, in its capacity as the National Board ofCanvassers, to wit:
a) the President of the Senate shall open
all the certificates of canvass
in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives in joint public session,
b) Congress shall determine the authenticity and due
execution of all certificates of canvass in the manner
provided by law, and
c) Congress shall canvass the votes for presidential and
vice-presidential candidates. 7
Petitioner then argues that the following portions of the Rules on Canvassing:
Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created
composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the President of theSenate and eleven (11)
members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of each House
panel shall elect among themselves their respective
Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee
 may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two (2)
divisions of eleven members each composed of a
chairman, five (5) members from the Senate and five (5)
from the House ofRepresentatives: Provided, That a
Member of Congress who is a candidate for President or
Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment
to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a
Chairman of the Committee.
The Joint Committee shall, upon
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily
canvass thevotes of candidates for the offices of President
and Vice-President.
The Representative of the province or city whose
certificate of canvass is being canvassed shall be an ex-
officio member of the Joint Committee, without voting
rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.
Sec. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall
satisfy itself that each certificate of canvass
was duly executed, signed andthumbmarked by the Chairm
an and Members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned; that
it contains the names of allthe candidates for President and
Vice-President and
their corresponding votes in words and in figures; and there
exists no discrepancy in other authentic
copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy
in the votes of any candidate in words and figures
in the same certificate. . . .
Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in
divisions, shall decide any question
involving the Certificate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. . . . (Rule
VIII). 8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
removed from Congress and transferred to the Joint
Committee the functions of (a) determining the authenticity and
due execution of thecertificates of canvass and (b)
canvassing the votes for President and Vice-President, in
contravention of the Constitution.
This argument fails.
First, contrary to petitioner's
assertions, the functions of determining the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and theactual canvassing of votes are
both ministerial functions. Thus, in Lopez v. Roxas, 9 this Court, noting
that the function of Congress as theNational Board of Canvassers was
essentially just like that of any municipal, city or provincial board of canvassers,
held:CSHcDT

Needless to say, the power of Congress to declare who,

among the candidates for President and/or Vice-
President, has obtained thelargest number of votes, is
entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal by Republic Act No.
1793. Congress merely acts as a national board of canv
assers, charged with the ministerialand executive duty
to make said declaration, on the basis of the election re
turns duly certified provincial and city boards ofcanvas
sers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not
said duly certified election returns have been irregularly
made or tampered with, or reflect the true
result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if
not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto,
pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine
whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative,
in whose favor, which Congress has power to
do. 10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics
in the original)
Petitioner, however, contends that the foregoing no longer holds since,
unlike the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution vested Congress,
as the National Board of Canvassers, with "more than merely ministerial
functions." In particular, petitioner contends
that thedetermination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass necessarily
"requires the exercise of sound discretion based upon informed judgement
through the use of the faculty of the intellect." 11
Petitioner is mistaken.
A ministerial duty is one which is clear and specific leaving no room
for the exercise of discretion in its performance. Upon the other hand,
adiscretionary duty is that which by its nature
requires the exercise of judgment. 12
In general, the duty of a board of canvassers has been held to be purely
ministerial in function, its task being limited to mathematically
computingthe results of the elections on the basis of the documents submitted to
it. Thus, in Demafiles v. Commission on Elections, 13 this Court held:
First, a canvassing board performs a
purely ministerial function — that of compiling and
adding the results as they appear in thereturns
transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista
Party v. Commission on Elections: "the canvassers are
to be satisfiedof the genuineness of the returns —
namely, that the papers presented to them are not
forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that
they are signed by the proper officers. When so
satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns
because of informalities in them or because of illegal
and fraudulent practices in the elections." Thus, they
cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much
less exclude it from the canvass on the ground
that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are
illegal.
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be
justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured"
because, contrary to thestatement therein that there were
195 registered voters, of whom 188
voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states
that only 182 voters had registered on October 30,
1967. Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections is cited in
support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were
palpably false as it was indeed statistically improbable
that "all the eight candidates of one party garnered
all the votes, eachof them receiving exactly the same
number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other
party got precisely nothing." In other
words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as
"the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself (res
ipsa loquitur — thething speaks for itself), there is no
reason to accept it and gives it prima facie value." LLpr

On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing

on its face from which the canvassers might conclude
that it does not speakthe truth. It is only when it is
compared with the certificate of the election registrar that a
discrepancy appears as to the number of registered
voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously
manufactured" so as to justify its exclusion.
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more
people than registered voters were allowed to vote in
 precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner
claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were
allowed to register (making a total of 190 voters), and
on theday of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to
precinct 6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that
was where they were really assigned. The point is
simply that this question should be threshed out in an
election contest. 14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing decisions also clearly illustrate that the duty of a
board of canvassers to authenticate the documents submitted to it, before
tabulating the results is not something new. Indeed, authentication is necessarily
included in the task of canvassing since only genuine documents which are in
due form may be canvassed. This, however, does not imply that a
board of canvassers also exercises adjudicatory powers to assume jurisdiction
over allegations of electoral fraud or irregularity. Such allegations may only be
threshed out through an election contest before the proper adjudicatory body.
Thus, in Dizon v. Tizon, 15 this Court held:
We are of the opinion that the dismissal of the petition
below is correct, and that the remedy now sought against
such dismissal should be denied.
1. The election return for precinct No. 18 of Dinalupihan is
not "obviously manufactured" within the meaning of our
decision in Lagumbayvs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. L-25444, January 21, 1966. The said return, as found
by the lower court, is regular and complete on its face. In
fact, when it was canvassed by the provincial
board of canvassers on December 7, 1967, the petitioner
did not raise any objection to it or point to any defect or
infirmity in its
contents. The discrepancy on which the petition was ba
sed is not one which appears on the faceof the return,
but between the statement therein that 279 ballots had
been cast and an entirely different document,
namely thecertification of the election registrar that
only 80 voters actually voted. This certification, as
correctly explained by the trial court, was not material
insofar as the board of canvassers was
concerned, since its ministerial duty was to read and c
anvass the results ofthe election on the basis of the ret
urns, once satisfied that the same were genuine. aADSIc

xxx xxx xxx

If there was any fraud or irregularity committed
in the election in said precinct; if, for example, some ballots
 were filled and cast by persons other than the registered
voters themselves, the election return could not, for that
reason, be considered as obviously manufactured. It would
still reflect the actual number of ballots found and counted,
and the remedy to correct the anomaly would be an
election contest, not a petition to exclude the return in
question from the canvass and thus virtually
annul the election in that precinct. 16 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And in Abella v. Commission on Elections, 17 this Court stated:
. . . The issue is the refusal of the COMELEC to
consider objections to 24 election returns on
which the board of canvassers had not made a written
ruling. But it would seem that, strictly speaking, no
ruling was necessary, or even proper. By the petitioners'
own contention "in all those 24 returns, the Christian name,
nickname or maternal surname of private respondent's
husband was used with her Christian name or nickname
which, as we will show at length infra, did not constitute a
valid vote for private respondent. If so, the total 1,912 votes
in these returns credited for private respondent should be
discounted." This matter was obviously
beyond the competence of theboard of canvassers to
resolve. Neither was it cognizable in a pre-proclamation
controversy before the COMELEC as defined in Section
243of the Omnibus Election Code.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation
controversy. — The following shall be proper issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain
material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or
contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress,
threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted
polling places were canvassed, the results of which
 materially affected thestanding of the aggrieved candidate
or candidates.
The inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of certain
election returns where votes allegedly cast for
Emeterio Larrazabal were counted for his wife is an
issue appropriate in an election contest and not in a
pre-proclamation controversy. And it is also immaterial
that, as also contended, the inclusion of such votes would
affect the over-all results of the election and swing it in his
favor. The accepted rule is
that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and d
uly accomplished, the board of canvassers cannot look
beyond them to verify allegations of irregularities
in the casting or the counting of the votes. These issues
cannot be resolved by the board ofcanvassers. A long
line of decisions has established the doctrine
that the board of canvassers has
only the ministerial task oftallying the votes as reported
in the election returns and cannot exercise the judicial
power of deciding an election contest. 18(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) ACIDTE

It does not appear from the text of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
that the phrase "upon determination of authenticity and due execution
[of the certificates of canvass] in the manner provided by law" was intended to
confer anything more than a ministerial duty on Congress and theNational
Board of Canvassers. In fact, when this very point was raised
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner
Maambong, the author of the amendment expressly clarified
that the duty of the National Board of Canvassers was ministerial in nature, to
wit:
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon
determination of the authenticity and the executi
on thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2, referring
to the certificates of canvass of the President
and Vice- (page 391) President. Am I right if I say
that because of theuse of these
words, the duty of the legislature to canvass is
no longer ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always
been interpreted by the Supreme Court as
applicable to the canvass made by the national
 Assembly, and the reason why we did not
put the word "ministerial" in the Article is, it has
been understood
inthe case of Roxas v. Lopez and in other cases.
When we used the words "authenticity" and
"genuineness," the question refers
to theproblem of whether or not the ministerial
function is already
nonministerial. The answer is, it is still ministerial,
but when we say "authenticity and due
execution," what it really means is that the nation
al Assembly will look at the certificates of canvas
s andfind out from the face of the document whet
her there are flaws in the execution and authentic
ity of the document. That is what it means.
MR. NOLLEDO:
Madam President, in the event that the legislature finds out
that there are serious defects
in the certificates of canvass — as when theseals
are broken, there are a lot of erasures and then
many of them are unsigned and, therefore,
authenticity appears to be questionable — what will
happen?
MR. MAAMBONG:
The answer to that is the phrase "in the manner provided
by law." The Committee had to insert the phrase
"in the manner provided by law" so
that the legislature itself will find out and will
make it very specific as to what flaws or
deficiencies in thecertificates of canvass can be
taken cognizance of by the canvassing
board of tellers, because as of now the guiding
regulations that govern the National Assembly, as I
mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules and
regulations of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election
Code, the jurisprudence
from the decisions of the Supreme Court. All these
things taken together, the legislature is given a
notice by using the phrase "in the manner
provided by law," so that it will make a
determination now of what are the points
which the board of tellers can take
cognizance of, because it is not very clear right
now under the laws and regulations, and as a
matter of fact, that was one of the controversies
 which arose
during the canvassing of the votes of President
Aquino and former President Marcos in the last
Batasan. 19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed a contrary interpretation is not possible because the last
paragraph of the very same constitutional provision vests the power to adjudicate
electoral controversies concerning the positions of President and Vice-President
exclusively with the Supreme Court, viz.: EcTCAD

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose
An examination of Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, the implementing law
referred to in the above-cited constitutional provision, removes all doubt as
to the ministerial character of the duties and functions of the Congress
as the National Board of Canvassers:
Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers
for the Election of President and Vice-President:
Determination of Authenticity and Due
Execution of Certificates of Canvass. — Congress shall
determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificate ofcanvass for President and
Vice-President as accomplished and transmitted to it
by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that:
(1) each certificate of canvass was executed, signed
and thumbmarked by the chairman and
members of the board ofcanvassers and transmitted or
caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each
certificate of canvass
contains the names ofall of the candidates for
President and Vice-President and their corresponding
votes in words and in figures; and (3) there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic
copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy
in the votes of any candidate in words and figures
in the certificate.
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province, city or district,
appears to be incomplete, theSenate President shall
require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by
personal delivery, the election returns from polling places
that were not included in the certificate of canvass and
 supporting statements. Said election returns shall be
submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from
receipt of notice.AISHcD

When it appears that any certificate of canvass or

supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or
alterations which may cast doubt as
to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and
may affect the result of the election, upon
request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate
concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for
President and Vice-President, count the votes as they
appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing clearly limits the authentication of the certificates of canvass to
(1) a physical examination of the certificates themselves to determine whether:
(a) each certificate was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and
members of the board of canvassers and transmitted to Congress by them, (b)
each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and in
figures, and (c) there is a discrepancy between the words and figures
in the votes of any of thecandidates; and (2) a physical comparison to determine
any discrepancies between the certificates transmitted to the Congress
and the other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass.
These tasks are purely mechanical and therefore clearly ministerial in nature and
do not require "the exercise of sound discretion based upon informed judgment
through the use of the faculty of the intellect."
Second, a reading of the questioned Rules on Canvassing shows that there has
been no delegation by Congress of its duties as the National
Board of Canvassers to an entity separate and distinct from Congress itself. To
delegate means to transfer authority from one person to another; to empower
one to perform a task in behalf of another; 20 to transfer authority by one
branch of government in which such authority is vested to some other branch or
administrative agency. 21
By promulgating the questioned Rules on Canvassing, all Congress has done is
refer to the Joint Committee the mechanical and ministerial
tasksof (1) physically examining the certificates of canvass for irregularities or
discrepancies, as provided for in Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, and
(2) tabulating the votes of the respective candidates:
SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions,
shall satisfy itself that each certificate of canvass was duly
executed, signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and
 Members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned; that it
contains the names of allthe candidates for President and
Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and
in figures; and there exists no discrepancy in other
authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy
in the votes or any candidate in words and figures
in the same certificate.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall
tabulate the votes and, for this purpose, may
avail of the services of an independent accounting/auditing
firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.
After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes
have been tabulated, any Member of Congress may
request in writing for copies thereof from the Secretariat
prior to the consideration of any interim or final report
to the joint session.
However, the same Rules on Canvassing clearly provides that Congress, as a
whole, retains control over the canvassing process. Thus, any determination
made by the Joint Committee as well as the preliminary canvass itself is subject
to the final approval of both House ofCongress, voting separately, thus: IHCSTE

SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in

divisions, shall decide any question
involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such
decision shall be subject to approval by the joint
session, theSenate and the House of Representatives
voting separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in
consultation
with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions,
shall meet eight (8) hours a day from Monday to Friday until
all the certificates ofcanvass referred to it by the joint public
session shall have been canvassed. The final report shall
be submitted by the Joint Committee en
banc to the joint public session for its approval, each
House voting separately.
SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all
certificates of canvass have been received, the Joint
 Committee may submit to the joint public session its final
report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass
if the total number of registered voters corresponding
to theprovince, city or district covered
by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the results of the election. Congress in joint
public session, voting separately, shall immediately act
on the final report.
The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim
report to the joint public session whenever there is a need
for guidance or direction from Congress: Provided, That
objections raised and rulings made thereon shall no longer
be included in the final report.
SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each
House panel shall sign the final report of the Joint
Committee. Every Member shall be provided with a
copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four (24)
hours within which to submit his concurring or dissenting
opinion.
SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member
designated by the Joint Committee shall speak for not more
than one hour on thereport and the accompanying
resolution approving the report of the Joint Committee,
declaring the results of the canvass and
proclaiming thePresident-elect and Vice-President-
elect. The Member designated by those against the report
shall also speak for not more than one hour. Subsequent
speakers for or against the resolution shall be allowed to
speak for not more than three hours: Provided, That one (1)
speaker for each candidate shall be given the opportunity to
speak for not more than twenty minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and
approval of the Joint Committee report
and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Members of both Houses voting
separately in the joint public session, Congress
through the President of theSenate and the Speaker of t
he House of Representatives shall forthwith
proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provisions also make it abundantly clear that it is Congress, as a
whole and meeting in joint session, and not the Joint Committee, which
has the ultimate authority to proclaim the winning candidates for President and
Vice-President.
Petitioner nonetheless insists that even such a referral by Congress to its own
Joint Committee is proscribed since the Constitution allegedly requires
that the functions of the National Board of Canvassers should be performed
by all the members of both Houses of Congress acting together. Thus, so he
argues, there is nothing in the Constitution which allows Congress to
refer the physical inspection and comparison of thecertificates of canvass
and the mechanical tabulation of the votes cast for each candidate to the Joint
Committee. 22 TCacIA

Petitioner's argument stands a basic principle of Constitutional law on its head. It

is axiomatic that the presumption is in favor of constitutionality.23 To strike down a
law or rule as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing
that what the fundamental law prohibits, thelaw or rule permits. 24
While there is nothing to prevent Congress from undertaking the authentication
and canvassing of the certificates through a committee of thewhole, if it so
chooses, there is also nothing in the text of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution that prohibits Congress from referring theauthentication
and tabulation of the certificates of canvass to a bicameral committee.
Indeed, the only task expressly required by the Constitution to be done
in the presence of the all the Senators and representatives is the opening
by the Senate President of all the certificates of canvass atthe start of the joint
session of Congress.
Petitioner's attempt to draw parallels between the canvassing procedure provided
for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and theimpeachment procedures
provided for in Sections 1 to 3 of Article XI 25 does not persuade. A
reading of the provisions of Article XI readily demonstrates the detailed manner
by which the Constitution sets forth the procedures for impeachment, even
to the extent of specifying thenumber of session days between each
phase of the impeachment process. In contrast, aside from
specifying the manner by which the certificatesof canvass are transmitted to
Congress, the date for the opening of the certificates by the Senate President,
and that the person with the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, 26 Section 4 of Article VII gives wide latitude to Congress to
determine the manner by which to undertake the canvass of votes. HcACTE

To be sure, there is nothing irregular or sinister in the referral by

Congress of the authentication and tabulation functions to the Joint Committee.
As a matter of convenience and expediency, both Houses of Congress regularly
refer matters to their respective Committees for study and recommendation.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 27 where the validity of amendments
introduced by a bicameral conference committee ofboth Houses of Congress in a
tax bill was put into question, this Court, speaking through Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, held:
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference
committee to insert new provisions as long as these are
germane to the subject of theconference. As this Court held
in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703
(1993), in an opinion written by then Justice
Cruz,the jurisdiction of the conference committee is not
limited to resolving differences
between the Senate and the House. It may propose an
entirely new
provision. What is important is that its report is subsequ
ently approved by the respective houses of Congress.
This Court ruled that it would not entertain allegations that,
because new provisions had been added by the conference
committee, there was thereby a
violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look
into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading ofthe bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not
distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2), of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe,
at the very least, a becoming courtesy. (Id., at 710.
[Emphasis added]) CSDAIa

It is interesting to note the following

description of conference committees in the Philippines in a
1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or
instructed. These committees may be given
instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left
without instructions. Normally the conference
committees are without instructions, and this is why
they are often critically referred to as "the little
legislatures." Once bills have been sent to
them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority
to change the clauses of the bills and in fact
 sometimes introduce new measures that were not
in the original legislation. No minutes are kept, and
members' activities on conference committees are
difficult to determine. One congressman known for
his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on export
incentives for my interest group [copra]
in the conference committee but I could not have
done so anywhere else." The conference committee
submits a report to both houses, and usually it is
accepted. If the report is not accepted,
then the committee is discharged and new members
are appointed. (R. Jackson, Committees
in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163
(J.D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.))
In citing this study, we pass no judgment
on the methods of conference committees. We cite it only
to say that conference committees here are no different
from their counterparts in the United States whose vast
powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association v.
Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI, §16(3) each
house has the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings," including those of its committees. Any
meaningful change in the method and
procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore
be sought in that body itself. 28
DSETcC

If parts of the legislative process, which are unquestionably both sovereign and
discretionary in character, may be referred to a bicameral committee
in the interest of efficiency and expediency, there is no reason why the ministerial
tasks of authentication and tabulation of certificatesof canvass cannot similarly
be referred to the Joint Committee created by the Rules on Canvassing.
As a second line of argument, petitioner claims that the Rules on Canvassing
unduly deprives him of his rights and prerogatives to be present at, observe and
participate in the determination of the authenticity and due execution of all
certificates of canvass. 29
Petitioner's claim is without constitutional basis. The rights he asserts are not to
be found within the four corners of the Constitution. In fact theonly individual
member of Congress on whom the Constitution imposes specific duties with
regard to the canvass is the Senate President, who is responsible
for the reception and opening of the certificates of canvass.
More importantly, and contrary to petitioner's assertions, the Rules on
Canvassing adequately provides each member of Congress with an opportunity
to observe the canvassing and to make known his views on the Report of Joint
Committee:
Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created
composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the President of theSenate and eleven (11)
members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of each House
panel shall elect among themselves their respective
Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee
may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two (2)
divisions of eleven members each composed of a
chairman, five (5) members from the Senate and five (5)
from the House ofRepresentatives: Provided, That a
Member of Congress who is a candidate for President or
Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment
to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a
Chairman of the Committee.
The Joint Committee shall, upon
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily
canvass thevotes of candidates for the offices of President
and Vice-President.
The Representative of the province or city whose
certificate of canvass is being canvassed shall be
an ex-officio member of theJoint Committee, without
voting rights,
for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.
SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in
divisions, shall decide any question
involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such
decision shall be subject to approval by the joint
session, theSenate and the House of Representatives
voting separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in
consultation
with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall
tabulate the votes and, for this purpose, may
avail of the services of an independent accounting/auditing
firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.
After the certificates of canvass
and the statement of votes have been tabulated, any
Member of Congress may request in writing for copies
thereof from the Secretariat prior
to the consideration of any interim or final report
to the joint session.
SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions,
shall meet eight (8) hours a day from Monday to Friday until
all the certificates ofcanvass referred to it by the joint public
session shall have been canvassed. The final report shall
be submitted by the Joint Committee en
banc to the joint public session for its approval, each
House voting separately. CAacTH

SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all

certificates of canvass have been received, the Joint
Committee may submit to the joint public session its final
report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass
if the total number of registered voters corresponding
to theprovince, city or district covered
by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the results of the election. Congress in joint
public session, voting separately, shall immediately act
on the final report.
The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim
report to the joint public session whenever there is a need
for guidance or direction from Congress: Provided, That
objections raised and rulings made thereon shall no longer
be included in the final report.
SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each
House panel shall sign the final report of the Joint
Committee. Every Member shall be provided with a
copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four
(24) hours within which to submit his concurring or
dissenting opinion.
SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member
designated by the Joint Committee shall speak for not more
than one hour on thereport and the accompanying
resolution approving the report of the Joint Committee,
declaring the results of the canvass and
proclaiming thePresident-elect and Vice-President-
elect. The Member designated by those
against the report shall also speak for not more than
one hour. Subsequent speakers for or
against the resolution shall be allowed to speak for not
 more than three hours: Provided, That one (1) speaker
for each candidate shall be given the opportunity to
speak for not more than twenty minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and
approval of the Joint Committee report
and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Members of both Houses voting
separately in the joint public session, Congress
through the President of theSenate and the Speaker of t
he House of Representatives shall forthwith
proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect. (Emphasis supplied) IacHAE

The Rules on Canvassing likewise provides for mechanisms by

which the candidates, through their representatives, may participate
in thecanvassing process:
Section 8. Each candidate shall be entitled to two
watchers from a team of five watchers who shall have
access to an unimpeded view of the entire canvassing
proceedings. They shall register their attendance
before the Joint Committee and shall keep vigilant watch
over the ballot boxes from the time the same are received
in the House of Representatives until the canvassing
proceedings are terminated.
Each candidate shall likewise be entitled to attorneys
who shall serve during the entire canvassing
proceedings. The attorneys shall register their
appearances before the Joint Committee: Provided, That
only one attorney for every candidate may argue and qu
estion anycertificate of canvassconsidered by the Joint
Committee for not more than five (5) minutes which may
be extended for a similar period bythe chairman
when the need arises without prejudice
to the right to submit a written memorandum not later t
han twenty-
four (24)hours from the time the objection was raised.
No extension of the period to submit shall be allowed, and if
no memorandum is submitted with the said period, the right
shall be considered waived. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
as well as remedies in case patent irregularities and
discrepancies are discovered in the certificates of canvass: AaDSEC
 Section
17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass
or supporting statement of votes by precinct bears eras
ures or
alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity of t
he number of votes stated therein and may affect the re
sult of the election,
upon request of the Presidential or Vice-
Presidential candidate
concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
purpose ofverifying the actual number of votes cast for
President and Vice-
President, count the votes as they appear in the copies
of the electionreturns submitted to it. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
The procedure adopted by Congress is not without rational basis. The procedure
embodied in the questioned Rules on Canvassing is evidently intended to
accomplish both a speedy and accurate canvass. On the other hand, while there
appears to be little to be gained in the way ofaccuracy if the authentication and
canvass of the certificates were undertaken by both Houses of Congress as a
whole, much time may be lost by such a procedure.
It may not be amiss to point out that the timeliness of the canvassing
and the proclamation of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect is
alsoof concern. It is a general policy of our elections laws that controversies
arising before the proclamation of winning candidates should be dealt with in a
summary manner so that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as
possible. Hence, questions involving the appreciation ofvotes
and the conduct of the election campaign and the voting itself, which require
more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are properly the subject
matter of election protests before the appropriate adjudicatory
body. 30 In the recent case of Sandoval v. Commission on Elections, 31 this Court
had occasion to state:
On the first issue, we
uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions
filed by private respondent. As a general rule, candidates
and registered political parties involved in an election are
allowed to file pre-proclamation cases
before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any
question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which
may be raised by any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in
 relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns. The COMELEC has
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies. As an exception, however, to the general
rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits
candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential,
senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-
proclamation cases. It states: AacSTE

"SECTION 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed

in Elections for President, Vice-President, senator,
and Members of the House ofRepresentatives. —
For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation ofelection returns
or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass or election returns before
it."
The prohibition aims to avoid delay
in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which
delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts.
. . . 32 (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the will of the people is no less frustrated by undue delays in the canvass
and proclamation of the winning candidates as by other forms ofelectoral fraud.
Finally, it may be observed that, because there can only be one winner, elections
naturally provoke intense competition among the candidates vying for elective
office. And in a close race for the highest executive position, fierce partisan
political activity is but to be expected. But once theelectoral process has moved
beyond election day itself and all that is left to be done is to
ascertain the will of the people as expressed through theballot, it is to be hoped
that the members of both Houses of Congress, politicians though they may be,
will remember the words of Manuel Luis Quezon, first
President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and realize that loyalty to their
party ends where loyalty to their country begins.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
CALLEJO, SR., J., concurring:
I concur with the encompassing separate opinion of my esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno.
I am convinced that Congress, when it acts as the National Board of Canvassers
in the presidential and vice-presidential elections conformably with Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, does not merely perform a ministerial function, but
exercises quasi-judicial powers when it determines the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass. In fact, this is one of the substantial
changes introduced in the 1987 Constitution. In his sponsorship speech,
Commissioner Lorenzo M. Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee of the 1986
Constitutional Commission which drafted the Article on the Executive
Department, explained:
The first constitutional change that I will mention
is the canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President.
In the 1973 Constitution, theprovision on
canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is as
follows:
The returns of every election for President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province
or city, shall be transmitted
to theSpeaker of the Batasang Pambansa, who
shall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, and
in the presence of theBatasang Pambansa, open
all the certificates, and the votes shall then be
counted.
It will be remembered that
many of the certificates of canvass received from each
province and city by the Batasang Pambasa were objected
to by the supporters of Aquino and Laurel. But based on
this provision of the 1973 Constitution,
after the certificates of canvass had been
opened, the Speaker immediately
announced the results of the canvass and proclaimed
President Marcos and Mr. Tolentino as elected President
and Vice-President, respectively.aSADIC

In the Article on the Executive that is submitted for

consideration, it is now provided that
after the certificates of canvass had been
opened, thecounting and canvassing of votes
for the President and Vice-President shall not immediately
be made because, first, there should be a
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass before the votes
 may be canvassed. That appears in Section 4 of the Article.
...1
The discussion between Messrs. Regalado E. Maambong and Jose N. Nolledo,
both members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, on this point is, likewise,
particularly instructive:
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2, referring
to the certificates of canvass of the President and
Vice-President. Am I right if I say that
because of the use of these
words, theduty of the legislature to canvass is no
longer ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as applicable
to the canvass made by theNational Assembly,
and the reason why we did not put the word
"ministerial" in the Article is, it has been understood
in Roxas v. Lopezand in other cases. When we
used the words "authenticity" and
"genuineness," the question refers
to the problem of whether or not theministerial
function is already non-ministerial. The answer is, it
is still ministerial but when we say "authenticity and
due execution," what it really means is
that the National Assembly will look
at the certificates of canvass and find out
from the face of the document whether there are
flaws in the execution and
authenticity of the document. That is what it
means. HDTSCc

MR. NOLLEDO:
Madam President, in the event that the legislature finds out
that there are serious defects
in the certificates of canvass — as when theseals
are broken, there are a lot of erasures and then
many of them are unsigned and, therefore,
authenticity appears to be questionable — what will
happen?
MR. MAAMBONG:
 The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided
by law." The Committee had to insert the phrase
"in the manner provided by law" so
that the legislature itself will find out and will make it
very specific as to what flaws or deficiencies
in the certificates of canvass can be taken
cognizance of by the canvassing board of tellers,
because as of now, the guiding regulations that
govern the National Assembly, as I mentioned
in the Committee, are: the rules and
regulations of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election
Code, thejurisprudence
from the decisions of the Supreme Court. All these
things taken together, the legislature is given a
notice by using thephrase "in the manner provided
by law," so that it will make a determination
now of what are the points which the board of tellers
can take cognizance of, because it is not very clear
right now under the laws and regulations, and as a
matter of fact, that was one of thecontroversies
which arose
during the canvassing of the votes of President
Aquino and former President Marcos in the last
Batasan. 2
A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to themandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment,
upon the propriety of the act done. 3 As my esteemed colleague, Justice Jose C.
Vitug, in his separate opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, 4 succinctly put it, "a ministerial duty is an
obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not
allow the use of further judgment or discretion." Congress, as thesole body
tasked to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President, is mandated to
make a "determination of the authenticity and due
execution" of the certificates of canvass before it proceeds to canvass the same.
As such, it cannot be said to perform a purely ministerial function but it exercises
a quasi-judicial function as well. It has been said that where a power rests in
judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not
involve the exercise of function of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other
than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. 5
In this sense, the function of Congress, as the National Board of Canvassers
in the presidential and vice-presidential elections, is akin to that ofthe municipal,
provincial or city boards of canvassers. These boards of canvassers are said to
exercise quasi-judicial powers as they are tasked to determine the due execution
and authenticity of the certificates of canvass or the election returns as the case
may be before them:
. . . We do not discern in the law a purpose to
throw the burden on courts where it is patent — as
in the case here — that tampering of thereturns
occurred after they have left the hands of the election
inspectors, just to pave the way for the proclamation of a
candidate in whose favor falsification was resorted to. To tie
up the hands of the board of canvassers in the situation
here presented is to wink at a brazen form ofwrong-doing to
subvert the people's will, and in mockery crown the loser
with victory. Correctly then, canvassers are given quasi-
judicial powers to determine whether the return is genuine
and to disregard one which is obviously a forgery. Along
parallel lines, this Court, inNacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections . . ., declared that the canvassing
board could accept as correct those returns transmitted to it
"which are in due form;" that they must "be
satisfied of the genuineness of the returns — namely,
that the papers presented to them are not forged and
spurious;" and that "where the returns are obviously
manufactured, . . . the board will not be compelled to
canvass them. 6
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
TINGA, J.:
The tradition of judicial review is as old as the essences of the democratic
system of government we practice today. 1 This Court has consistently
affirmed the doctrine, dating as far back as the Commonwealth era. 2 Judicial
review arises from the inherent judicial power, and has traditionally relied on no
statutory grant other than the source law that created the judicial system. 3 DTaAHS

At the same time, the notion of separation of powers is a linchpin of our

constitutional order. Coordinate political departments are accorded their
respective spheres over which they exercise discretion to manage. It is a rule
that promotes efficient governance, and, perhaps more importantly,
institutionalizes the system of checks and balances within the government.
These two doctrines are hardly antithetical. Judicial review ensures that the other
branches of government obey the Constitution. 4 It also shields one branch from
undue interference by another. On the other hand, the Court should restrain itself
from unduly interfering in the affairs of co-equal branches of government.
Indeed, the unwarranted exercise of the judicial power would be judicial activism
at its most egregious.
Cognizant that unwarranted judicial review may breach both the traditional
deference accorded by the judiciary to the coordinate political departments
and the presumption of validity accorded to their actions, jurisprudence has
fostered the evolution of the "political question" doctrine as a
form of autolimitation of the judicial power. The traditional stance of the Court has
been to desist from deciding issues that may properly be classified as political
questions. A political question refers to a question of policy or to issues which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided bythe people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch ofthe government. 5
In our country, the "political question" doctrine has undergone some rethinking,
particularly in light of the misuse of the doctrine during the martial law
era. The incorporation of Article VIII, Section 1 6 in the 1987 Constitution has
especially affected this Court's thinking on the political question doctrine. 7
Yet while nobody pretends that Section 1, Article VIII invented judicial review
in the Philippines, I likewise submit that the same article did not
render the "political question" inconsequential. Section 1, Article VIII has
crystallized into a constitutional command decades of jurisprudence affirming this
Court's exercise of judicial review, as balanced by the political question doctrine.
Neither have the contours of judicial review been altered by the new provision. Its
effect is simply this: with judicial duty cast not only as a power but also as a duty,
no longer can this Court refuse to correct a coordinate branch's act of grave
abuse of discretion simply on the premise that it constitutes a political question,
as it had done in thepast. 8
The petition is unable to show any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Congress in promulgating the canvassing rules. Shorn of this
essential element, the Court is left with nothing to review but an act of a
coordinate branch of government which is textually committed to Congress by
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution. 9 This is a political question,
and the Court should not extend due course to the petition.
This leads to an important point which the Court should not overlook. The mere
incantation by a petitioner of "grave abuse of discretion" is not a passport to this
Court's jurisdiction. If upon initial review, it appears that no grave
abuse of discretion attends the questioned political act, theCourt should say so,
and say nothing more.
Moreover, an express rejection of jurisdiction over political questions
bereft of grave abuse of discretion serves not only as an act of courtesy tothe co-
equal branch, but also as an act of deference to the Constitution. While the Court
should not hesitate to compel an errant branch into obeying the Constitution, it
should also acknowledge when the other branches are obeying the Constitution,
and that the Court itself is observing its own constitutional mandate by reusing to
interfere.HcTSDa

The present petition serves as a perfect opportunity to desist and reject.

The basic issue proposed by petitioner is whether the rules of canvass ("Rules")
promulgated relative to the 10 May 2004 elections are constitutional. 10 In
support of his thesis that the Rules are unconstitutional, petitioner makes four
arguments; that the Rules are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to a joint committee of Congress; that the Rules amend Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution; that the Rules deprive petitioner of his rights and
prerogatives as a member of congress; and by enforcement of the Rules,
Congress neglects performing its constitutionally enjoined duty. 11
On the arguments raised by the petitioner, the result is clear-cut. The petition is
palpably without merit.
First, the Rules does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. The power to canvass votes is not inherently legislative, as it does not
pertain to the enactment of legislation. 12 By traditional concept, the non-
delegation rule means that
Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another
branch of government. 13
At the same time, pursuing this point is ultimately needless, as despite
petitioner's claim, there really is no delegation made by Congress. A clear
examination of the Rules reveals that therein, Congress retains the right to
open the certificates of canvass and canvass the votes. cACDaH

Second, the Rules does not amend Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution by
providing for an unconstitutional method for canvassing the votes.
Congress is expressly granted the power to promulgate rules
for the canvassing of the certificates. 14 By virtue of this express
right, the Ruleswere promulgated by Congress. The Joint Committee does not
have any authority or power except that granted to it under the questioned Rules.
Even then, its power is limited only to functioning as a preparatory or preliminary
body to speed up and make more
efficient the canvassing of thevotes. 15 The Joint Committee's acts and
determinations do not have any force and effect unless approved
by the whole of Congress. 16
The canvassing of the votes under the questioned Rules is
still the act of Congress as one whole body. The findings of the Joint Committee
do not bind Congress unless approved in a joint public session. 17 Accordingly,
Congress may choose to overrule the findings and determinations made
by the Joint Committee.
The assailed Rules, and the procedure laid therein, are but an
offshoot of legislative practice. 18 Congress, as a matter of legislative practice,
functions by way of delegation towards
committees. The formation of congressional committees arises from plenary
power possessed by thelegislative body for all purposes of civil
government. 19 The entire House or Senate is too large to conduct basic
functions, such as to conduct investigations in aid of legislation, and thus must
always use a committee. 20 A bill that is filed in Congress is always referred for
preliminary consideration to the particular congressional committee which would
have specialized competence to examine the merits of the proposed law. Yet,
while the final report of the congressional committee as to the proposed bill may
have persuasive effect on the body as a whole, it is by no means binding. In fact,
Congress as a whole has the power to revive a bill that has been tabled due to
unfavorable action by the congressional committee. 21 HDCTAc

The assailed Rules is premised on realistic considerations that also

govern the daily legislative grind: that owing to the sheer volume of work
andthe number of legislators, it would be counter-productive to have every and
any preliminary matter to be voted upon by every member of theHouse
or Senate.
The procedure outlined in the questioned Rules does not in any way contravene
Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution. In fact, it strictly adheres tothe provision.
Under the Rules, the Senate President opens the certificates of canvass
in the presence of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives in joint public
session. 22 Upon approval by Congress in joint public session of the Joint
Committee report, Congress as one whole body is deemed to have
determined the authenticity and due execution of the certificates and
canvassed the certificate of votes.
Third, the questionedRules does not emasculate the representatives who are not
members of the Joint Committee since the Rules specifically provides avenues
for each member of Congress to voice out any dissent to the opinions and
conclusions of the Joint Committee. Petitioner will be entitled to avail of all his
legislative privileges and exert his persuasive powers during that time certain
when the Congress as a whole would deliberate on and approve the Joint
Committee's resolution of any question involving a
certificate of canvass, 23 the final report of the Joint
Committee, 24 and the resolution proclaiming the President and Vice-President-
elect. 25
In light of my earlier discussion, petitioner's fourth argument hardly bears
discussion. Contrary to his claim, Congress did not abdicate from its
constitutional duties to canvass the presidential and vice-presidential
elections. The Joint Committee canvass is merely a preliminary canvass,
with the final canvass results subject to approval by the entire Congress.
These are the only issues for resolution before the Court, and they can be
concisely dispensed with. Given the scope and limitations of these issues
presented before us, it would be improvident of this Court to discuss issues
which are not raised, or to engage in a "preemptive strike" based on
speculative musings that in its wisdom, Congress will be misguided by
erroneous principles in the future conduct ofits canvass. By doing so, this
Court will act in excess of its jurisdiction, by ruling upon matters which have not
been duly raised before us. TheCourt does not issue advisory
opinions. 26 This holds true, especially in the face of temptation to dictate to a
co-equal branch how it should act, despite the absence of any justiciable
question that would warrant such intrusion.
In fine, it is not the business of the Court to dictate on Congress as to how it
should perform its task as the national canvassing board, as its mandate was
derived from no less than the fundamental law. Should it fail to fulfill its mandate,
it is accountable not to this Court, but to thesovereign people.
Of course, there are laws which governs the conduct of the national canvass.
Republic Act No. 7166, passed in 1991, is one such law. Section 15 thereof
provides:
Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections
for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Members of the House ofRepresentatives. — For
purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no
pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns
or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
bodymotu propio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
SIaHDA

It is clear that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 prohibits pre-proclamation

cases in elections for President and Vice-President. This would extend to
questions pertaining to the appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass. The only exception would be to correct manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass. The Court in Chavez v. COMELEC 27 defined
"manifest errors" as those that must appear
on the face of thecertificates of canvass or election returns sought to be
corrected, and an objection thereto must have been made
before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings. For the purpose of the presidential/vice-presidential
canvass, the Court's definition in Chavez must be qualified, since Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution mandates that Congress inspect
only the certificates ofcanvass. Verily, I submit that such manifest errors which
may be corrected only pertain to the certificates of canvass
in the case of presidential and vice-presidential elections.
The Court, through Justice Puno, explained the reason for Section 15
in Sandoval v. COMELEC:
The prohibition aims to avoid delay
in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which
delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive
posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception
to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15
allows the filing ofpetitions for correction of manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in
elections for president, vice-president and
members of the House of Representatives for the simple
reason that the correction of manifest error will not
prolong the process ofcanvassing nor
delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.
This rule is consistent with and
complements the authority of theCOMELEC
under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an, election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to
"decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections. 28(emphasis supplied)
The limitations imposed on the national board of canvassers are thus
clear. The question which must be resolved by the canvassers is whether
there is prima facie basis for the proclamation of the president
and the vice-president. Matters which may be inquired into through a pre-
proclamation protest, as laid down in Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code,
are not justiciable by Congress acting as the Board ofCanvassers. 29
Populist arguments aside, there are fundamental policy considerations why
Congress is proscribed by law from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies,
or inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the certificates of canvass. First, there
is the abhorrence of vacuum in the "sensitive posts"30 of President and Vice-
President. The Constitution provides that the term of office of the president shall
begin on the thirtieth day of June. 31While the Constitution provides for
contingencies should no president be proclaimed before that date, all efforts
should be exerted to avoid these "emergency provisions" from coming into play,
as they would necessarily affect political stability. In fact, the June 30th
"deadline" should be appreciated by Congress as an imperative that should
guide the body in the formulation of the rules for canvassing.
There is also the fact that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. 32 As the eminent
constitutionalist Justice Vicente V. Mendoza has explained:
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and
membersof the House of Representatives. The purpose is
to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges"
under the constitution of the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress of the President and
Vice President, as the case may be. (citations omitted) 33
IcESaA

It is clear that such questions in the province of the Supreme Court to decide in
its capacity as the sole judge of election contests for thepresidency and vice-
presidency are distinct from those within the mandate of Congress
as the canvassing body. They include the appreciation ofelection returns and
questions pertaining to the intrinsic
validity of the certificates of canvass. The power to be the "judge of contests
relating tothe election, returns, and qualifications" of any public officer is
essentially judicial, and as such, under the principle of separation of powers, it
belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar
as the Constitution provides otherwise. 34
I VOTE to DISMISS the petition.
Footnotes
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
1.Petition, p. 2 [emphasis supplied].
2.103 Phil. 1051, 1068 [1957].
3.Javellana v. Executive Secretary, L-35154, 31 March 1973, 50 SCRA 30,
84, citing In re McConaughy, 119, N.W. 408, 417.
4.Petition, p. 12, citing 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission 419
[hereinafter RECORDS].
5.Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979.
6.People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 112-113 [1937].
7.Sec. 1., Article II, 1987 Constitution.
8.U.S. v. Hampton, 276 US 394 [1928]. See also Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 13260, 12 October 1998, 297 SCRA
754; People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939].
9.Throughout the Constitution are examples of such encroachment, such as
in the House of Representatives, Senate, or Presidential Electoral
Tribunals, with members from their respective Houses as well as
from the Supreme Court, or else when the President exercises the veto
power regarding legislation.
10.Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed shall not exceed sixty days.
[Emphasis supplied]
11.Discussing the authority of Congress to provide its rules of proceedings,
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Arroyo v. De Venecia, (G.R. No.
127255, 14 August 1997, 277 SCRA 268), cites Crawford v. Gilchrist,
13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 [1912], where it was held:
"The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of thebody in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional
restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional
quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and
effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds
in the exercise of any power, inthe transaction of any business, or
in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."
[Emphasis supplied]. See also United Statesv. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 79
Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 [1906]: "The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. . . .Thepower to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
withinthe limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
12.RECORDS at 433.
13.2 RECORDS at 391.
14.Republic Act No. 7166, An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations
Therefor, and Other Purposes, 26 November 1991.
15.See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1995,
235 SCRA, 666-672 where it was held that amendments to bills
proposed by conference committees held in executive session that
were not found in the original bills approved
by the House of Representatives or the Senate, were deemed valid
 because they were "[o]ften the only way to reach agreement an
conflicting provisions. . . with only the conferees present.
Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made." Regardless, such
amendments were deemed valid as they could only be passed
with the approval ofCongress.
16.Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871, citing 67 Corpus Juris
Secundum 870.
17.Citing Sanson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198.
18.2 RECORDS at 433.
19.124 Phil. 168.
20.Id. at p. 182.
21.Record and Journal of the Joint Session of Congress as National
Board of Canvassers, Tenth Congress of the Philippines.
22.Id., 1.
23.Id., 1 & 2.
PUNO, J.:
1.A delegated power cannot be delegated.
2.103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
3.Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 80 (2000).
4.Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967).
5.281 SCRA 330, 348 (1997).
6.277 SCRA 268 (1997).
7.144 U.S. 5, 36 L ed., 324-325.
8.G.R. No. 160261. See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno.
9.Ibid.
10.Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.
11.The New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, 1995 International
Edition, p. 790.
12.Section 14.
13.40 Phil. 246, 251 (1919).
14.Aquino v. COMELEC, 22 SCRA 288, 293 (1968).
QUISUMBING, J.:
*Annex "A" to the petition.
*Arguments, p. 10 of petition.
*A member of the Joint Committee, Hon. Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin,
also filed a motion for leave to file attached Comment, which we
granted and noted on 8 June 2004.
**Comment, House of Representatives, p. 12.
***Comment, Senate of the Philippines, p. 40.
*See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.
**See also Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452.
*See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and Gore v. Bush, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
*Petition, p. 13.
*Note from the Publisher: Missing footnote text.
*Petition, p. 22.
**Citing Congressional Records for these years.
*See Records, Constitutional Com., pp. 391, 401.
**Comment of the OSG, p. 15.
***Comment, House of Representatives, p. 10.
*Comment of OSG, p. 15.
CARPIO MORALES, J., concurring:
1.Petition at 2-3.
2.Id. at 10.
3.CONST. art. VIII, sec. 1.
4.Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156-159 (1936).
5.Vide: In re Prautch, 1 Phil. 132 (1902); U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1
(1922); Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991).
6.Vide: Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997), Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr., 298 SCRA 756 (1998).
7.Petition at 18.
8.Id. at 7-9.
9.17 SCRA 756 (1966).
10.Id. at 769.
11.Petition at 15-16.
12.Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280, 284 (1991) citing Symaco v.
Aquino, 106 Phil. 1130 (1960).
13.21 SCRA 1462, 1466 (1967).
14.Id. at 1466-1467.
15.22 SCRA 1317 (1968).
16.Id. at 1318-1320.
17.180 SCRA 509 (1989).
18.Id. at 514-515.
19.II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS
AND DEBATES 390-391 (1986).
20.Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. at 426.
21.Ibid.
22.Petition at 14-15.
23.Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 (1970); Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424
(1968); Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30 (1978).
24.David v. Commission on Elections, 271 SCRA 90 (1997); vide: Arroyo v.
De Venecia, supra; Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., supra.
25.
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and theOmbudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution ofendorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred
to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding
 resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by theHouse within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles ofImpeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators
shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall
not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republicof the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.
26.Unless two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes. In
which case, one of them shall be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all theMembers of both Houses of Congress, voting
separately.
27.249 SCRA 628 (1995).
28.Id. at 649-650.
29.Petition at 21.
30.Abella v. Larrazabal, supra.
31.323 SCRA 403 (2000).
32.Id. at 417-418.
CALLEJO, SR., J., concurring:
1.II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 385.
2.Id. at 390-391.
3.Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280 (1991).
4.248 SCRA 300 (1995).
5.Sandoval v. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 403 (2000).
6.Espino v. Zaldivar, 21 SCRA 1204 (1967); Salvacion v. Commission on
Elections, 170 SCRA 513 (1989). (Underscoring supplied.)
TINGA, J.:
1.See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 L. ed [1803].
2.Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
3."The United States Constitution. . . does not explicitly grant the judicial
review power asserted in Marbury." K. Sullivan & G. Gunther,
Constitutional Law 13, 14th ed. (2001). See also L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 207, 3rd ed. (2000). "Although the Constitution is
silent as to whether federal courts have [the authority for judicial
review], the power has existed ever since Marbury". E. Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 39, 2nd ed.; (2002). U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Byron White has been on record in opining that
it was the U.S. Constitution, and not Marbury v. Madison that created
judicial review in the United States.
4."When [judicial] supremacy is invoked, it compels the errant
branches of government to obey not the Supreme Court,
but the Constitution." Franciscov. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos.
160261, etc., 10 November 2003, J. Tinga, concurring.
5.Generally, political questions are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure Tañada v.
Cuenco, 100 Phil. 101 [1957], as cited in Tatad v.
Secretary of Finance, 346 Phil. 321.
The formulation made in Baker v. Carr by the late American Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan as to what constitutes a political question has
long gained a foothold both in the United States and in the Philippines.
"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision' already made; or
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217. (1962)
6."Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution, in relation to Bakerv. Carr, supra note 5.
7.See, e.g., Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989, 177
SCRA 668.
8.See e.g., Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).
9."The returns of every election for President and Vice-President . . . . shall be
transmitted to the Congress . . . and the Congress, upon
determination ofthe authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes." See Section 4,
Article VII, Constitution.
10.Petition, p. 9.
11.Id. at 10.
12.The essential of the legislative function
is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and
promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. Occeña v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-2265, 28 January 1980, citing Yakus v. United
States 321 US 414, 88 L. ed. 834.
13.See K. Sullivan and G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 351, 14th ed. (2001)
"The non-delegation doctrine forces a politically accountable Congress
to make the policy choices, rather than leave this to unelected
administrative officials." E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles
and Policies 2nd ed 319 (2002).
14."The Congress shall promulgate its rules
for the canvassing of the certificates." Par. 6, Sec. 4, Article VII, 1987
Constitution.
15.In fact, the 2nd paragraph of Section 13 of the Rules quite baldly states:
"The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and
due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the vote
s of candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.
16.See Secs. 19, 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
17.See Section 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
18.Congress has the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings,
and by legislative practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such
orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its
dignity. See Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212. (1946)
19.See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three
Departments of the Philippine Government 205 (1985).
20.See E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 2nd ed
303 (2002).
21.See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three
Departments of the Philippine Government 205 (1985).
22.See Section 9, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
23.See Section 19, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
24.See Section 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
25.See Section 27, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
26.Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, 10 July 1998, 292 SCRA
402, 413; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 25
August 1994, 235 SCRA 630, 686; De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-
57883, 12 March 1982, 112 SCRA 294, 385, Plana, J., concurring and
dissenting.
27.Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105323, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 315, 322.
28.380 Phil. 375, 389-390 (2000).
29.Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation
controversy. The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in
a preproclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies
inthe same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were
canvassed, the results of which materially
affected the standing of theaggrieved candidate or candidates.
30.Sandoval v. COMELEC, supra note 28.
31.Article VII, Section 1, par. 1, Constitution.
32.See Section 4, Article VII, Constitution.
33.Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300,
397; J. Mendoza, concurring.
34.Lopez v. Roxas, 124 Phil. 168, 177 (1965).
 1
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