Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning PDF
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning PDF
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning PDF
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Potential
Fractiousness Economic
of Society Development
Available
Perceived Workforce
Security
External Material
A government that is established, Support
recognized, and that maintains a secure Insurgent Acts
environment is in a position to of Violence
• Send a positive, credible message of
success to the populace.
• Provide an environment that enhances
stable employment of the workforce.
• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to
consider becoming supporters.
Coalition
An appropriate
Satisfaction with force mix, and correct operational
Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
tempo, timing, and synchronization
Governance
will have very
Developing and Essential Services
Restoring Essential significant impacts on
Services
Expectations The restoration of essential services. Economic
• for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
• The populace’s perception of security.
Time to Develop
Essential Services • The Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in
Potential
Psychological their communications efforts with the populace.
Operations Fractiousness Economic
Effectiveness of Society Development
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Govt vs.
SUPPORT Insurgent Path
Fear of Ins.
Attack,
Relative WOM Message
Repercussions
Amplification Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of Coalition
Intent & Commitment
Perception of Gov’t
Strength of Strength and Intent
Religious Ability to
Ideology & Tribal Reconcile Satisfaction w/ Gains
Structures Religious in Security, Services &
Ideology, Employment
Cultural Erosion/ Tribal
Displacement Structures w/ Visible Gains
Expectations
Gov’t Path In Security,
for Security,
Services & Services &
Employment Employment
Perceived
Ethnic/Tribal Average
Security
Rivalry Connectedness
of Population
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Perceived Relative
Damages/Use Popular
of Force by Support/
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance
Insurgent Govt vs
Insurgents
Strength &
Intent
POPULATION
Population
CONDITIONS Actively
Supporting
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
& BELIEFS
Relative WOM
Message
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Insurgency
Amplification Repercussions
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT Insurgent Path
Outside
Fear of Gov’t / Support /
ANSF / Coalition Enablement Insurgent
Insurgent Repercussions Havens / of Ins. Terrain
Damages & Ability to
1 Advantage
Casualties Operate
Insurgent Coordination Insurgent
Offensives & Among Ins Leadership Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Training, Skill Recruiting,
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) & Exper Retention, Criminal/
Control 2 Manpower, Trafficking
Ins Strategic
Ins Provision Insurgent & ISR Capability &
Comm/IO & Ties to
of Gov’t & Capacity, Coercion
Affiliation w/ Narcotics
Services Priorities &
Population & Other Funding &
Effectiveness Material
Ins Targeted Criminal
Attacks on Funding Support to Likelihood
Insurgents Narcotics &
Progress/ of Crime/
Criminal
Support for Gov’t Violence/
Activity Levels
Ins Support
for Payment
Illegit Agric
Production
Trade &
Feedback Loop Examples: Employment
1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their
presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory.
(Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from
separate sector).
2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed Terrain
territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests Harshness
align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent & Breadth
operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12
ability to operate
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of FACTIONS
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Intent Activity
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels
Legit Agric
Production Fraction of
Workforce
and Agric.
2 Legit vs Illegit
Private Sector
Workforce Population
Skill & Avail Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Infrastructure Civilian
Legit vs Illegit
Dev. Adequacy Legit Other Services
Relative
& Sustainment Production (SWET,
Economic
& Services Healthcare,
Opportunity
Non-Agric Education)
1
Ability to Move Private Sector
Infr. Services, Econ, Legit Economic
People & Capital Mgmt,
Policy & Execution/ Activity, Trade &
Goods Rapidly Investment &
Perceived Fairness Employment
Spending
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TOTO
INSURGENT
INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Intent Activity
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector Legit Economic
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
SERVICES & Rapidly
Capital Mgmt.,
& Goods Investment &
Spending
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
/Perceived Fairness
ECONOMY
Transparency of Gov’t
Professionalism, ’
Gov’t Processes
& Investments Policy Quality &
Fairness
Overall Gov’t
Reach,
Execution,
Gov’t/Contractor Recognition/
Capacity &
Corruption & Engagement to
Investment
Tribal Favoritism Integrate Tribal
Structures &
Tax Beliefs
Revenues
Feedback Loop Example:
Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can
improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a
skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is
also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement /
Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TOTO
INSURGENT
INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
Security of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Policy Relative Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Quality & Message Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Gov’t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity
OVERALL Gov't/ANSF
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Legit Economic
Activity,
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
& Goods
Rapidly
Investment &
Spending
Trade &
Employment
ECONOMY
ECONOMY
Duration of Coalition
Operation Appropriate
Coalition Balance of
Avg COIN Coalition Dev.
Effort & Force
Experienc Ops-ANSF
e & Skill Advisory & Coalition
Coalition
Aid Visibility to
Execution
Resource Population
Capacity &
Levels (Mil. & Western
Priorities
Civ. Forces Affiliation
and Levels) Backlash
Coalition Coalition Dev.
Ops-Gov’t Coalition/Homeland
StratComm/IO
Advisory & Acceptance of
US Gov’t
Afghan Methods
Support for Breadth of Aid
Operation Coalition
& Support
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
US Domestic/
& Support
Int’l StratComm
& Diplomacy
Coalition Dev. Ops-
Media
Infrastructure,
Sensationalism
Services, Econ
Bias Advisory & Aid Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TOTO
INSURGENT
INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition
Coalition Repercussions
Knowledge Outside
Coalition Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst Operate Enablement
of Social COIN
Structures Support of Ins.
Strategy & Ins. Coordination
Duration of Unity Coalition Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Operation Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Adjustment Under Gov’t Insurgent
Coalition of Approach (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of & Experience Manpower Criminal/
Effort & & ISR Trafficking
Ins. Provision
Force
Coalition
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Avg COIN ANSF Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
& Skill Capacity &
Priorities
& Aid & Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
COALITION Coalition
Visibility to
Population
Gov't
Security
Policy Relative
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
for Gov’t Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Perception of
CAPACITY &
Resource Coalition
Levels Strategic
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Quality &
Investment
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Insurgent
Strength &
Govt vs
Insurgents Narcotics
& Criminal
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Intent Activity
PRIORITIES
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods
POPULATION Levels
Aid Levels) & Aid
OVERALL
OVERALL Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
POPULATION Population Population Neutral/On Population Population
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution GOVERNMENT
Commun/
IO
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
Support for
Operation Gov't
Capacity
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
Relative
Message
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Breadth of
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Gov't
Integration of Western
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness
US Domestic Coalition & Duration
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
Support Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov't
Workforce
Local Tribal
Structures Affiliation
Backlash Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Operation
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology &
COALITION
Media
& Fairness Capacity &
Investment Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Production
Sensationalism
DOMESTIC
Bias
TRIBAL
Displacement Reconcile
Religious
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Population
SUPPORT Gov't/
Contractor
TRIBAL Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate Ethnic/Tribal
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
In Security,
Services &
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Coalition
Dev.Ops-
Infrastructure,
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism GOVERNANCE Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Rivalry
w/ Gov’t
Path Expectations
for Security,
Employment
Legit Other
Production
Civilian
Services
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)
& Aid
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Legit Economic
Activity,
Provide
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
& Goods
Rapidly
Investment &
Spending
Trade &
Employment
Humanitarian
Relief ECONOMY
ECONOMY
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
ISR / Open
Total
ANSF Source Ops
Security
Force
Targeted
Strikes
TOTO INSURGENT
INSURGENT Counter Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Capacity &
TACTICAL ANSF Unit
Focus Sweep Ops
(Clear)
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
Knowledge & Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside
Coalition Capacity Priorities & (Hold) Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst Operate Enablement
of Social COIN Effectiveness
Support ANSF of Ins.
Structures Manpower
Strategy & ANSF Avg. Ins. Coordination
Duration of Unity Recruiting & Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Coalition Retention Professionalism Territory Not
Operation Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Coalition of Approach & Morale ANSF Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of
Effort & ANSF
ANSF
Training & ANSF Appropriate
Use of Force
& Pakistan)
Ins. Provision
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
& ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Mentoring
INSTITUTIONAL
ANSF
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
& Skill Capacity &
Priorities
& Aid
Favoritism Execution &
Perceived
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
ANSF Fairness Perceived Support Likelihood of
Relative Insurgents
COALITION
COALITION
Coalition
Population
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Gov't
Security
Policy Relative
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
for Gov’t Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Perception of
CAPACITY
CAPACITY &
Levels &
Resource Coalition
Strategic
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Quality &
Investment
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Insurgent
Strength &
Govt vs
Insurgents Narcotics
& Criminal
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Intent Activity
PRIORITIES
PRIORITIES
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods
POPULATION Levels
Aid Levels) & Aid
OVERALL
OVERALL Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
POPULATION Population Population Neutral/On Population Population
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution GOVERNMENT
Commun/
IO
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
Support for
Operation Gov't
Capacity
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
Relative
Message
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Breadth of
Coalition &
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Gov't
Integration of Western
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness Duration
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
Support Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov't
Workforce
Local Tribal
Structures Affiliation
Backlash Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Operation
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology & Production
Media COALITION
Sensationalism
& Fairness Capacity &
Investment Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Displacement Reconcile
Bias
DOMESTIC Gov't/ TRIBAL
TRIBAL Recognition/
Engagement to
Religious
Ideology,
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Population
Basic Needs
Tribal Service Levels
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Contractor Integrate Ethnic/Tribal
Structures Services & & Employment
Coalition
Dev.Ops-
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Infrastructure,
GOVERNANCE Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Rivalry
w/ Gov’t
Path Expectations
for Security,
Employment
Legit Other
Production
Civilian
Services
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)
& Aid
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Legit Economic
Activity,
Provide
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
& Goods
Rapidly
Investment &
Spending
Trade &
Employment
Humanitarian
Relief ECONOMY
ECONOMY
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT
ANSF
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security Targeted
TO INSURGENT Counter- Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Force
Capacity &
Strikes
Ins. Damages FACTIONS
TACTICAL ANSF Unit
Focus Sweep Ops
(Clear) & Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside
Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities & (Hold)
‘COIN Effectiveness Operate Enablement
of Social ANSF of Ins.
Structures Support’
Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination
Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins.
Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent
Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Insurgent
Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of
Effort & ANSF
ANSF
Training & ANSF Appropriate
Use of Force
& Pakistan)
Ins. Provision
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
& ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Mentoring
INSTITUTIONAL Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Dev. Ops- ANSF Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Corruption & Damages & Narcotics &
Avg COIN Coalition ANSF Ins. Strategic Effectiveness
Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Commun/IO Use of Force
& Skill Capacity &
Priorities
Advisory
& Aid
Favoritism
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins.
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
NARCOTICS
Fairness Support to
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
COALITION Coalition Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
Gov't
Security
Policy Relative
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
for Gov’t Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Perception of
CAPACITY &
Resource Coalition
Levels Strategic
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Quality &
Investment
Message
Quality
Gov’t ’vs Ins.
Insurgent
Strength &
Gov’t vs
Insurgents Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Intent
PRIORITIES
Forces,
Aid Levels)
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
OVERALL POPULATION Levels
Gov't/ANSF Population
Central Gov't
GOVERNMENT
Strategic
Commun/ CONDITIONS Actively
Supporting
Population
Sympathizing
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
Population
Actively
Supporting
US Gov't
CENTRAL Institutional &
Execution
IO
& BELIEFS Fear of Ins.
Gov’t & SF w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents
Insurgency IllegitAgric
Production,
Support for
Operation GOV’T
Gov't
Capacity
CAPACITY Relative
Message
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Breadth of
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Gov't
Integration of
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Terrain
Western Harshness
US Domestic Coalition &
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
Support Mentoring,
Vetting, and Gov't
Workforce
Local Tribal
Structures Affiliation
Backlash Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth
Duration
of
Operation
Hiring
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology &
COALITION
Media
& Fairness Capacity &
Investment Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Private Sector Production
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Sensationalism
DOMESTIC
Bias
TRIBAL
Recognition/
Displacement Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
& Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population
Basic Needs
Gov't/ In Security,
SUPPORT
Coalition
Contractor
Corruption &
Engagement to
GOVERNANCE
Integrate
Tribal
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Services &
Employment
Service Levels
& Employment
Dev.Ops- Tribal Favoritism Structures& Expectations Legit Other Civilian Legit vs.Illegit
Path for Security, Relative
Infrastructure, Beliefs Production Services
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues Perceived
of Population Security Education)
& Aid
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector Legit Economic
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
SERVICES & Rapidly
Capital Mgmt.,
& Goods Investment &
Spending
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
/Perceived Fairness
ECONOMY
WORKING DRAFT – V3
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security Targeted
Force Strikes
2 1 Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of
Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties
(Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/
ANSF Unit Coalition
Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside
Capacity Priorities & (Hold) Havens / Ability to Support/
Effectiveness Operate Enablement
ANSF of Ins.
Manpower Ins. Coordination
Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins.
Coalition Retention Professionalism Territory Not Presence Factions
Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Ins.
of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership,
ANSF Control (Afghan Training, Skill
to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan)
ANSF Use of Force & Experience
ANSF Training & Ins. Provision
Institutional & Mentoring Insurgent
Execution Of Gov’t &
Coalition Capacity Services Capacity,
ANSF Perceived Priorities & Ties to
Dev. Ops- Corruption & Narcotics &
ANSF Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness
Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Advisory Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding
& Aid Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on
Perceived Population Progress/
ANSF Fairness Perceived Support
Coalition Relative
Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular
Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/
Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition /Tolerance
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
alition Message Insurgent
Investment Quality Insurgents
Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength &
ov’t Acceptance of Gov’t ’vs Ins. Intent
visory Afghan Methods
Aid Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the
population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF
Central Gov't
actively
Strategic supporting the Population
Actively Population
Sympathizing
Neutral/On
the Fence S
Commun/ Supporting
Government.
Institutional & IO Gov’ t & SF w/ Gov’t w
Execution
Securing populated territory (clear and hold
Capacity
Relative
ops) can reduce
Relative
Message
WOM Fear of Ins.
Attack/
t
ng
insurgent ability to target and intimidate the
Message population
Impact Gov’t
such
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Repercussions
Potential
acy that Gov’t sympathizers Integration ofare willing
Gov't to be vsactiveIns supporters. Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
•
Gov't Training Western
HUMINT:
Mentoring,
Vetting, and Gov't
The population
Local Tribal
Structures
will be more
Affiliation willing to provide intel
Perception of
Insurgent Path
Backlash
if they Skill
Hiring do¬
Workforce
Avail
fear insurgent repercussions. Coalition Intent
Perception
sparency• ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development
& Commitment
Of Gov’t
Strength
Gov’t
cesses & isProfessionalism
facilitated byGov't
the expansion Strength of secure regions. (ANA and
Gov't Overall of & Intent
Reach, Religious
stments ANP Policyleaders,
Quality families,
Execution facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or
& Fairness Capacity & Ideology &
Tribal Private
Satisfaction
overrun. Investment Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Workf
Skill &
Displacement Reconcile Security Services Dev Adequacy
WORKING DRAFT
WORKING DRAFT
Relief
Reconciliation
Effectiveness
WORKING DRAFT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 28
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who
– Claim the Information Initiative is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message
quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not
made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of
progress has undermined message credibility.
ANSF &
Coalition Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural
Damages/
Casualties populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security
most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM).
Targeted Counter-WOM
Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Force
Capacity & tends
Strikes
Sweep Ops
to
Ins. amplify
Damages negative
Fear of
messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to
Focus
(Clear)be biased towards
& Casualties
current sentiments.
Gov’ t/ANSF/
ANSF Unit Coalition
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside
Knowledge
& Underst. Coalition
‘ COIN
Capacity Priorities (Hold) “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine OperateGovernment
Havens / Ability to Support/
Enablement
messages if they are
of Social
Structures Support’
Strategy &
ANSF
Manpower
ANSF Avg.
seen as puppets who lack Ins. the strength to
Coordination deliver progress
of Ins. or have taken an
Recruiting &
Duration of
Operation
Unity Coalition
Adjustment
Retention Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
overly Western posture
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Offensives &
Presence
Among Ins.
Factions Ins. Insurgent
Insurgent
Terrain
Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/
Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability &
Execution Services Capacity, Coercion
Coalition Capacity ANSF Perceived Ties to
Coalition Dev. Ops- Priorities & Narcotics &
Coalition ANSF Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness
Avg COIN Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding &
& Skill & Aid Attacks on
Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Material
Fairness Support to
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Active Ins.
Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ Support for
Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Tolerance Payment
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics
Levels Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal
Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength &
(Military Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels
Civilian & Aid
Forces, Gov't/ANSF Population Population
Aid Levels) Strategic Population Neutral/On Population
Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Central Gov't Commun/ Supporting
Institutional & w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting
IO Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production,
Capacity Relative WOM
Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade &
Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment
Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain
Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness
US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration
Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of
Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation
Hiring Coalition Intent
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach,
Investments Policy Quality Religious Legit Agric Illegit
& Diplomacy Execution Ideology &
& Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production
Investment Tribal Satisfaction
Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Workforce
Sensationalism w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
Bias Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population
Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs
Gov't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels
Contractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Integrate Structures & Employment
Coalition Corruption & Tribal Rivalry Employment
Tribal Favoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs. Illegit
Dev.Ops- Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian
Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)
& Aid
Ability to Private Sector
Move Capital Legit Economic
People Management, Activity,
Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade &
Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment
Provide /Perceived Fairness
Humanitarian
Population/Popular Support Relief
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics Significant WORKING DRAFT
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
= Delay