See

discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247516776

Experimental manipulations of self-affirmation:

A systematic review

Article in Self and Identity · October 2006

DOI: 10.1080/15298860600805325

CITATIONS READS

192 2,186

2 authors:

Amy Mcqueen William MP Klein

Washington University in St. Louis National Institutes of Health
58 PUBLICATIONS 1,499 CITATIONS 154 PUBLICATIONS 3,856 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by William MP Klein on 13 December 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. All in-text references underlined in blue are added to the original document
and are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.
Sezf and Identity, 5: 289—354, 2006
Copyright © 2006 Psychology Press
Psychology Press
Taylor & Francis Group
ISSN: 1529-8868 print/1529-8876 online
DOT: lO.1080/15298860600805325

Experimental Manipulations of Self-Affirmation:

A Systematic Review

AMY McQUEEN
University of Texas-Houston, School of Public Health, Houston, Texas,
USA

WILLIAM M. P. KLEIN
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA

The objective of this systematic review of studies using self-affirmation manipulations

was to identify research gaps and provide information to guide future research. We
describe study characteristics, categories of manpulations, and report effrcts on
various dependent variables. Our search strategies yielded 47 eligible articles (69
studies). Manipulations varied by affirtnation domain (values or personal characteris
tics), attainment (participant- or investigator-identified), and procedure (scale,
essay,feedback, etc.). Most dependent variables were cognitive. Strong efjcts ofself-
affirmation werefoundfor attitudes and persuasion/bias, butfuture work is neededfor
variables with mixed results including risk cognitions, intentions, and behavior.
Suggestions and considerations fur flaure research involving sef affirmation
manipulations are discussed.

Self-enhancement theorists (Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988) suggest that individuals have
a fundamental need or motive to maintain a positive, global self-evaluation. When
the self-concept is threatened, people experience psychological discomfort that they
are motivated to reduce. Several strategies for reducing such discomfort have been
proposed. Tesser’s (1988) self-evaluation maintenance model posits that threatened
individuals may minimize the importance of the threatened domain or distance
themselves from a superior-performing individual or close other. General self-
enhancement involves seeking out or interpreting situations in order to attain a
positive self-view. Self-enhancement may be achieved from within (i.e., intraperso
nal) or by making downward social comparisons (i.e., interpersonal) (Aspinwall &
Taylor, 1993; Wood, Giordano-Beech, & Ducharme, 1999). In contrast, Steele’s
(1988) self-affirmation theory outlined one method for maintaining or restoring one’s
global positive self-image from threats, which required affirming some important
aspect of the self that is unrelated to the threatened domain. Thus, self-affirmation
can serve as a buffer or coping resource when the self is threatened (Steele, Spencer,
& Lynch, 1993) and is not simply an ephemeral positive feeling or activation of the
self-concept (Steele & Liu, 1983).

Received 3 August 2005; accepted 16 May 2006

Correspondence should be addressed to: Amy McQueen. University of Texas-Houston, School of
Public Health, Center for Health Promotion & Prevention Research, 7000 Fannin, Suite 2568, Houston
Texas 77030, USA. E-mail: Amy.Mcqueen@uth.tmc.edu

http://www.psypress.com/sai 289
290 A. McQueen & W. M. P. Klein

Self-affirmations are expected to reduce the psychological discomfort associated

with cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), even though they may not resolve or
dismiss the actual problem or cause of the inconsistency. People may not attempt
to dismiss every threat, but instead accept or acknowledge some, as long as their
global self-evaluation remains positive. Thus, the motivation for self-affirmation
may depend on the importance or magnitude of the threat and current evalu-
ations of self-worth. Although countless strategies for self-affirmation may exist,
Steele (1988) posited that after a threat to their self-image, people would affirm
their self-adequacy through whatever means were most readily available or
salient.
The outcome of interest in early self-affirmation studies was attitude change
following a dissonant act (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995; Steele & Liu, 1983).
The same induced-compliance paradigm that is common in studies inducing
cognitive dissonance was used in self-affirmation studies. Cognitive dissonance was
increased when participants were led to believe that they freely chose to write a
counter-attitudinal essay on a topic of personal importance, such as a large tuition
increase at their university. Self-affirmation was manipulated in the laboratory by
having participants complete a scale that affirmed a strongly-held value. Such
manipulations were introduced after dissonance was aroused, but before attitudes
were reassessed. The degree of attitude change in the direction of the position
taken in the essay was a measure of cognitive dissonance. The attenuation of such
change, when given the opportunity to affirm an important value or characteristic,
represented the effect of self-affirmation.
Later empirical work identified additional boundary conditions for the effect of
self-affirmation on the reduction of dissonance. Some dissonant behaviors (e.g.,
hypocrisy) may only be resolved by attempting to directly change the behavior,
despite the attractiveness and importance of alternative affirmation opportunities
(Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997). Situations also may arise in which
one’s chosen affirmation fails. Failed self-affirmation attempts restore dissonance
and produce attitude change (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000). Similarly, evidence
suggests that affirming self-attributes (i.e., compassion) that are related to the self-
threat (i.e., essay advocating decreased funding for handicapped students) may
increase dissonance (Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997; Stone & Cooper,
2003). Individual differences may also influence the effect of self-affirmation. Self-
affirmation may produce greater attitude change (Steele et al., 1993, study 2; Stone &
Cooper, 2003) and greater perceived stress (Creswell, Welch, Taylor, Sherman,
Gruenewald, & Mann, 2005) among individuals with low self-esteem compared to
those with high self-esteem. However, other evidence suggests that the effects of self-
affirmation manipulations are similar for individuals with high and low self-esteem
(Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001, study 2).
Recent work suggests that self-affirmation of important values may decrease
biased information processing and influence behavioral intentions to reduce risks
when presented with negative (i.e., self-threatening) health information (Sherman,
Nelson, & Steele, 2000). Such positive findings may promote the adoption of similar
self-affirmation manipulations by a diverse audience of researchers attempting to
influence behavior change processes through large-scale interventions. However,
there are multiple manipulations in use, no indication of which technique is “best”,
and numerous outcome variables being investigated. Consequently, a review of
studies involving self-affirmation manipulations seems necessary. Others have
reviewed self-affirmation theory (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; Sherman & Cohen,
 Self-Affirmation Manipulations 291

2002, 2006; Steele, 1988); however, our goal was to review the manipulations of self-
affirmation that are employed to test the theory.
Of note, most of the research examining self-affirmation has been conducted to
support or refine the theory; however, no published study has closely examined the
specific methods by which self-affirmation is manipulated in the laboratory. Using
the methods for a systematic review of the literature (The Campbell Collaboration,
2001; Weed, 1997), we specified our goals, search methods, inclusion/exclusion
criteria, and methods for summarizing data from primary studies in order for others
to be able to critically evaluate and be able to replicate the work. The goal of this
review was to: (I) describe the studies that use self-affirmation manipulations; (2)
categorize and describe self-affirmation manipulations being used in the literature;
and (3) examine the effects of self-affirmation manipulations on dependent measures
using standard effect size estimates. An expected contribution of this review is to
provide investigators interested in using a self-affirmation manipulation ample
references and considerations for conducting their experiments, and to contribute to
the refinement, measurement, and application of self-affirmation theory by
describing gaps in the experimental research.

Method
Inclusion Criteria and Search Strategy
Although many strategies or techniques could be self-affirming, we sought to focus
our review on studies employing experimental manipulations designed specifically to
invoke self-affirmation. In addition, eligible studies had to examine the effect of self-
affirmation on dependent variables such as attitudes, mood, and behavior. Following
Steele and Liu’s (1983) suggestions, we defined self-affirmation as any affirmation of
some important aspect of the self (i.e., personal values, characteristics, or positive
qualities). We excluded studies that: (1) did not include an equivalent comparison
condition not exposed to the self-affirmation manipulation (Boney-McCoy,
Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999; Kaplan & Krueger, 1999; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes,
& Spencer, 2001); (2) did not involve a self-threat, but used strategies believed to
induce positive self-evaluations (Harber, 2005; McGuire & McGuire, 1996); (3) used
an experimental manipulation eliciting self-enhancement strategies other than self-
affirmation (such as derogation of others; Beauregard & Dunning, 1998); or (4) used
measures to assess self-affirmation as a dependent variable—either survey-based
(Lockwood, Dolderman, Sadler, & Gerchak, 2004; Murray, Bellavia, Feeney,
Holmes, & Rose, 2001; Murray, Holmes, MacDondald, & Ellsworth, 1998) or
behavioral (Stone et al., 1997). Behaviors such as donating to charity, volunteering
one’s time, or helping someone could be self-affirming. However, to be included in
our review as a self-affirmation manipulation, the presence or absence of the
behavior would have to be associated with some dependent variable. Although we
included several studies identified in our literature search that used the completion of
a self-esteem scale as a self-affirmation manipulation (Kimble, Kimble, & Croy,
1998), we did not perform additional searches for all studies using self-esteem scales,
because we felt the vast self-esteem literature goes beyond the scope of this review
(and, as noted earlier, many such studies do not involve an explicit self-threat).
Similarly, we included studies identified in our literature search that used positive
feedback as a self-affirmation manipulation, but did not conduct an additional
292 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

search of all studies employing bogus feedback. Such studies go well beyond the
scope of our review because they were not specifically designed to test self-
affirmation theory and many such studies do not employ a self-threat unrelated to
the ostensibly affirming positive feedback. We did not restrict eligible studies to a
particular age group, study setting, population, outcome variable, or year of
publication. However, for practical purposes, the search was limited to English
language published articles in peer-reviewed journals involving human participants.
The search for published articles began with a keyword search using the terms
“self-affirm$ or self affirm$” in the PsycINFO database (1967-current) on 10 April
2005. The keyword “affirmation” did not yield any unique, relevant articles. The
authors independently reviewed the database search results and agreed on study
eligibility. To find eligible articles in addition to those identified through
PsycINFO, the first author scanned the reference lists from eligible articles, as
well as tables of contents for the two most recently published issues and any in-
press articles available online from the journals from which we already identified at
least two eligible articles: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, Motivation and Emotion, and Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin. A direct request to authors for recent or in press studies
involving a self-affirmation manipulation was posted to the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology (SPSP) electronic Internet listserv, 2 February 2005. A final
search was conducted on 6 March 2006 using PsycINFO and a hand search of the
journals listed.

Data Extraction Procedure and Effect Size Calculation

The following information was extracted from all eligible studies within each
relevant article: (a) the study paradigm or procedure; (b) study setting, population,
and any selection criteria; (c) the threat to the self; (d) specifics of the self-affirmation
manipulation; (e) the measures used as a manipulation check for the self-affirmation
manipulation; (1) the type of control or comparison condition; (g) the primary
independent and dependent variables: (h) the results relevant to the self-affirmation
manipulation; and (i) data needed to calculate effect sizes, including exact cell sizes of
the number of participants included in analyses. All data extraction and effect-size
calculations were performed by the first author. The second author recalculated 10%
of the effect sizes and found no errors. We concluded that no systematic errors were
made.
We attempted to summarize all analytical findings relevant for our review
regardless of statistical significance, as reflected most often by p-values. Given that
p-values are influenced by both the actual effect size and the sample size, the effect
size is needed to interpret whether the results from significance tests are meaningful.
Additionally, because effect size measures are based on standard metrics, they are
useful for making comparisons across studies. Because most analyses examined
mean differences across experimental conditions, we calculated a standardized effect
size statistic (Cohen’s a1 using an Excels program (Wilson, 1996) and other formulas
as needed (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Rosenthal, 1994) to divide the group mean
difference by the pooled standard deviation. Whenever possible, interactions were
broken down into specific contrast effects as recommended by Rosnow and
Rosenthal (1996, 2003). Cohen’s dis a directional coefficient and ranges from — to
+. As a rule of thumb, these effect sizes can be interpreted as small (d= 0.20),
medium (d=0.50) and large (d=0.80; Cohen, 1988). Effect sizes can be combined
 SeiiAffirmation Manipulations 293

using meta-analytic techniques when quantitative results are conceptually and

statistically comparable (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).

Results
Search Results
In ‘total, the keyword search of the PsycINFO database produced 275 hits, which
were reduced to 238 by limiting inclusion to publications in English with human
participants. The number of publications was reduced after we limited inclusion to
peer reviewed journals (n 122) and deleted duplicate references (ii = 120). After
careful evaluation of abstracts and full text when further details were needed, we
found that 92 articles did not report results from a study employing a self-affirmation
manipulation and were excluded. Twenty-eight articles were eligible for review.
Additional eligible articles were found through hand searches of recent or in-press
articles available online (n = 1), direct solicitation using the SPSP listserv (n = 7), and
from references cited in selected articles (n 5). In the final search on 6 March 2006,
additional eligible articles were obtained from PsycINFO (n =4) and a hand search
(n 2). Therefore, 47 eligible articles were found in total; 32 from PsycINFO and 15
through alternative search methods, which contained a total of 69 eligible studies.

Systematic Review Results

Data extracted from eligible studies are summarized in text and table form and
include descriptions of the studies using self-affirmation manipulations, categoriza
tions of the types of manipulations used, and their effects on various dependent
variables. Additionally, we discuss the role of constructs that emerged in our review
of the literature as important variables for consideration.

Study Characteristics
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the final sample size, any specific selection criteria
used, the study location, the threat to self, and whether a self-affirmation
manipulation check was used in each study. The studies are presented in the same
order as Appendix Table 2 for ease of comparison across tables.

Samples. With the exception of two studies, the majority of participants

exposed to eligible self-affirmation manipulations were undergraduate college and
university students. Additionally, the majority of the studies (51 of 69) were
conducted in the United States. Although the study populations appear similar,
many studies involved selection criteria that restricted their sample based on
attitudes, self-esteem, sex, race/ethnicity, and other characteristics relevant to the
study topic (see Appendix Table 1).
Most studies failed to report the exact cell sizes, but the 17 studies that did so are
noted (*) in Appendix Table 1. Many studies indicated that “random assignment”
was used; therefore, for all studies that did not specify exact cell sizes, equal cell sizes
were assumed and fractions were used in 22 cases as noted (#) in Appendix Table 1.
We report these details because cell sizes were often needed to calculate the reported
effect sizes in Appendix Table 2.
294 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

Threat. The forced-choice or induced-compliance paradigm common in studies

of cognitive dissonance was used in 15 studies. Of these 15, 11 presented the
cognitive dissonance and self-affirmation manipulations as independent studies,
sometimes employing the use of separate experimenters and separate rooms. The
variety of self-threats, other than dissonance, that were employed made categorizing
across studies difficult (see Appendix Table 1). While some threats were more overt
such as negative feedback on an important attribute and losing an athletic match,
others were more implicit to the task such as evaluating outgroup members,
assessing job security after recent layoffs, evaluating risk information, and
responding to laboratory stress-inducing tasks.
Additionally, the order of manipulating self-affirmation varied (Appendix Table
1). Most studies manipulated self-affirmation before (n = 27) or after (n = 38) the self
had been threatened; however, three studies introduced the self-threat then
manipulated self-affirmation prior to completing the self-threat. One study presented
a self-affirmation prior to the threat in one condition, and in conjunction with the
threat in another condition.

Control conditions. Various control conditions were used. Most studies asked
non-affirmed participants to complete a value scale of low importance or write an
essay about why a value of low importance to them might be important to someone
else or to another student at their university (see Appendix Table 1). Alternatively,
Cohen, Aronson, and Steele (2000) suggested that participants may use any self-
reflective writing opportunity to self-affirm (p. 1154); therefore, they instructed
participants in the non-affirmation condition to write everything that they had eaten
or drunk in the past 48 hours (see also Harvey & Oswald, 2000, study 2). Several
studies used similar non-self-focused tasks, whereas other studies did not employ
filler tasks for non-affirmed participants (see Appendix Table 1).

Manipulation checks. Thirteen of the 20 studies employing the Allport-Vernon

values scales (discussed below) examined whether participants with a greater
orientation to the specific value addressed in the scale endorsed more items than
participants with lower orientations (Appendix Table 1). Endorsing more items was
described as an indication of appropriate selection of high- and low-oriented
participants, as well as greater self-affirmation. However, in two studies reporting
significant effects of self-affirmation manipulations, one found no differences
between groups (Liu & Steele, 1986, studies I & 2), and one excluded from analyses
the five participants who did not endorse more value items (Creswell et al., 2005).
Few studies that did not use the value scales included manipulation checks. Reed
and Aspinwall (1998) cited Steele et al.’s (1993) use of a self-esteem inventory as self-
affirming to individuals with high self-esteem as a reason for their inability to
perform a traditional manipulation check without risking contamination among
control participants (p. 105; see also Blanton, Pelham, DeHart, & Carvallo, 2001,
p. 376). Other manipulation checks varied by study. Two studies used survey items
to assess whether participants believed the feedback (Cohen et al., 2000; Heine &
Lehman, 1997). Two studies assessed post-manipulation self-evaluations with a
single question, “In general, how do you feel about yourself?” (Cohen et al., 2000,
study 3; Sherman et al., 2000, study 1). Three studies used judges’ ratings of
participant’s essays (Dillard, McCaul, & Magnan, 2005; Harris & Napper, 2005;
Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook, 2004). One study asked participants. “How
meaningful did you find the essay?” to assess participants’ reactions to their assigned
 Sef-Affirmarion Manipulations 295

study condition (Siegel, Scillitoe, & Parks-Yancy, 2005), and another study asked,
“How important was it for you to do well?” (Kimble et al., 1998).

Categorization of Se(f-Affirination Manipulations

Various methods were used to manipulate self-affirmation, but most consistently
varied by affirmation domain, attainment, and procedure. The affirmation domain
usually focused on a specific value or personal characteristic. Attainment of a value
or positive characteristic was either provided (usually in a short’ list) to the
participant by the study investigator or participants were asked to identify a positive
personal characteristic or experience on their own. The procedure or method of
manipulating self-affirmation also varied; some participants were asked to respond
to specific scales or a short list of questions, some were asked to write a list or an
essay, and others were asked to use imagery techniques or think about their positive
qualities. Other methods used to manipulate self-affirmation included the provision
of self-esteem scales, positive feedback, indirect methods, and an expected
opportunity to perform a positive behavior.
The value scale self-affirmation manipulation used in Steele and Liu’s (1983) first
study was the manipulation type used most often in subsequent studies (21 of 69
studies). All value scales employed some version of the list of values from Allport,
Vernon, and Lindzey (1960) including: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social,
political, and religious. What defines this type of self-affirmation manipulation is the
list of values provided to participants from which they chose their most important.
However, the way in which the value scales were administered varied across studies.
Steele and Liu (1983; Liu & Steele, 1986) screened college students using Schorr’s
80-item Test of Value Activities, which measured the six general value orientations
contained in the Ailport—Vernon Study of Values Scale. Participants were
specifically selected based on their high (top third) or low (bottom third) scores on
Schorr’s economic and political subscale. Steele and Liu (1983) reported that
participants who completed the Ailport—Vernon economic—political subscale after
a dissonance manipulation were self-affirmed only when they had high economic and
political values. Lower attitude-change scores among self-affirmed compared with
non-affirmed participants was reported as evidence of a successful self-affirmation
manipulation. Liu and Steele (1986) noted that identifying important aspects of
participants’ self-concepts ahead of time allowed for more personalized manipula
tions of the self-affirmation process. In later studies, participants were not selected
based on specific orientations. Instead of selecting participants who reported specific
values, Tesser and Cornell (1991, study 1) were the first to match participants’ value
ratings with the appropriate value scale to be completed (i.e., affirmation par
ticipants: highest value; control participants: low value).
Alternative scales with individualized written responses were also used. Two
studies asked participants to choose a self-definition from a list provided, insert the
term into six sentence stems, and complete each sentence; sentences were varied
according to the experimental condition (Schimel et al., 2004, studies 1 & 2). This list
of “self-definitions” varied from the list of general values because it included 12
professions: engineer, entrepreneur, mathematician, comedian, doctor, nurse,
lawyer, musician, artist, athlete, scientist, and student. In another study, all parti
cipants in the self-affirmation condition were given a single value scale that asked
participants if they had ever performed 10 kindness behaviors, and, if so, to write a
description of the event (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998).
296 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

A value essay self-affirmation manipulation was used in 19 of the 69 studies.

Self-affirmation participants were asked to circle their most important value from
a list provided (similar to those included in Ailport et al., 1960) and write a few
paragraphs about why it was important to them. Similarly, another value essay
technique required participants to rank a list of 11 values and personal charac
teristics developed by Harber (1995) in order of personal importance. Then
participants wrote an essay describing why their highest-ranked value was
important to them and a time when it, had been particularly important (Sherman
et al., 2000, study 2), how it had made them feel good about themselves (Cohen
et al., 2000, study 1), or a time in their lives when it had proved meaningful
(Cohen et al., 2000, study 3). Other participants were asked to write why the
selected value was important to them and how they had acted consistently with it
in the past and planned to act consistently with it in the future (Shrira & Martin,
2005) or why it was important and how they used it in their everyday life, if
possible describing specific occasions on which the value determined what they
did (Harris & Napper, 2005). To create an interdependent self-affirmation,
Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, Spencer, Zanna, Kitayama, and Lackenbauer (2005)
asked participants to, “Select the most important value for themselves and their
families and explain the reasons why they and their families share that particular
value” (p. 303).
Thirteen self-affirmation manipulations involved writing tasks whereby partici
pants were asked to identify and write about a positive characteristic or experience.
Example instructions included writing about a life event that made participants feel
proud (Klein, Blier, & Janze, 2001, study 1) or four examples of times when
participants had demonstrated their most cherished personal characteristic (Matz &
Wood, 2005, study 2). Another study asked participants to, “Write a short
description of an area of your life that is both important to you and makes you
feel proud. It can be any aspect of your identity, a talent, a relationship, or a basic
value” (Blanton et al., 2001, p. 375). Three studies asked participants to list three
positive aspects of themselves (Van den Bos, 2001, study 2) and one asked them to
think about these positive characteristics for a few minutes (De Cremer & Sedikides,
2005, study 6). Two studies asked participants to list positive things about
themselves for five minutes (Harvey & Oswald, 2000, studies I & 2). Wiesenfeld,
Brockner, Petzall, Wolf, and Bailey (2001) asked affirmation participants to write an
essay about an incident at work or an aspect of their job that made them feel good
about themselves or understand themselves better. This is one example of an
affirmation focus within the same domain as the outcome variables being examined.
Two studies employed two different self-affirmation manipulations. One study
included two self-affirmation manipulations: one to reflect intrinsic values, one to
reflect extrinsic values (Schimel et al., 2004, study 3). For the intrinsic affirmation,
participants were asked to, “Describe in detail two qualities that most reveal who
you are as a person (e.g., values, hobbies, or personality traits).. and to describe
.

how each of these qualities reflects your true self” (p. 90). For the extrinsic
affirmation, participants were asked to, “Think of at least two achievements that
reveal how competent and talented you are (e.g., good grades, winning an award, or
getting promoted at work) and to describe what you have achieved and how each
accomplishment reflects your competence and success as a person” (p. 90). Another
study asked participants in one condition to, “Think of a time you felt this way
and write it down,” for eight affirmations (intelligent, kind, honest, strong-willed
and persistent, friendly, good-hearted and caring, a good significant other, and
 Self-Affirmation Manipulations 297

compassionate) prior to reading eight tobacco-product warning messages (Dillard

et al., 2005). In another condition, participants viewed one affirmation along with
each warning message.
Thirteen studies used self-affirmation manipulations that substantively differed
from those previously discussed (Appendix Table 2). Two studies had participants
complete self-esteem measures to make self-resources salient. Six studies affirmed
participants by providing bogus feedback from tests of personality (n = 4), social
perceptiveness (n = 1) or social skills and ambition (n = 1). One study affirmed a
valued skill by verbally saying, “Good! You are driving well. Please continue for
another two trials” (Ben-An, Flonian, & Mikulincer, 1999, p. 41). One study had
participants visualize someone who either: (a) liked them contingent on certain
standards (comparison condition); (b) liked them uncontingently (self-affirmed
condition); or (c) they knew but did not interact with socially (control condition).
One study had participants complete sentence scrambles that created affirming
sentences either related or unrelated to the self-threat (Stone & Cooper, 2003), one
study asked participants about their likelihood of seeing a movie about an issue they
had previously rated for general and personal importance (Simon et al., 1995), and
one study had participants complete a scale of Motivation to Control Prejudiced
Reactions to reduce stereotype threat before completing a measure of implicit
attitudes (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004). In an early study, before
participants wrote counter-attitudinal essays against increased funding for treatment
and facilities for the handicapped, they were told that they would have the
opportunity to record exams onto audio-cassettes for blind students during a break
in the study (Steele & Liu, 1981). This is the only study that examined the effects of
an anticipated self-affirmation strategy.

Effects of S4f-Affirmation Manipulations on Dependent Variables

The use of multiple dependent measures violates the assumption of stochastic
independence of effect size estimates (Hedges & 01km, 1985); a requirement for
meta-analysis. Therefore, instead of combining studies that measured their primary
dependent variable in similar ways, we present effect sizes for multiple dependent
variables per study in Appendix Table 2 for a more thorough comparison across
studies. To examine whether the effect sizes were consistently larger for certain types
of manipulations compared with others, we organized categories of dependent
variables by manipulation type (Appendix Table 2). The range of absolute effect sizes
for specific contrasts between self-affirmation and control conditions varied by
dependent variable (Appendix Table 2). However, some categories of self-affirmation
manipulations contain only a few studies, statistical contrasts vary by study, and not
all categories of dependent variables are examined within each category of the
manipulations. Therefore, comparisons of results and interpretations should be
made with caution. For these reasons, meta-analyses were deemed inappropriate for
many dependent variables and uninformative for others. For example, for the 10
studies that assessed attitude and reported self-affirmed vs. not-affirmed contrasts, an
insufficient number (<3) of different manipulation types were available to make
statistical comparisons. Although a sufficient number (>3) of studies were available
to compare presentation order (before or after self-threat) on weighted effect size, no
significant difference was detected (z = 0.36, p > .05). Similar results were found for
the six studies that assessed persuasion similarly, but other dependent variables had
even fewer directly comparable studies.
298 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

Self-affirmation consistently reduced attitude change and psychological discom

fort following a dissonant act, as long as the self-affirmation manipulation was not
challenged or negated (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2000). However, self-affirmation may
only decrease bias when the issue is of high personal importance (Cohen et al., 2000;
Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). Compared with non-affirmed participants, self-
affirmed participants were more accepting of counter-attitudinal arguments (Cohen
et a!., 2000; Correll et al., 2004), demonstrated less prejudice (Fein & Spencer, 1997;
Zarate & Garza, 2002, study 1), but viewed a non-stigmatized other more
stereotypically when the left hemisphere was activated (Shrira & Martin, 2005),
chose upward social comparisons or fewer downward comparisons (Spencer et al.,
2001, study 3; Wood et al., 1999, study 3), and made fewer external attributions for
other’s behaviors (Liu & Steele, 1986) and team performance (Sherman & Kim,
2005).
Self-affirmation also may influence the associations among cognitions. In Klein
et al. (2001), self-affirmation in the presence of social-comparison threat dis
associated risk perceptions from risk factors. Additionally, Sherman and Kim (2005)
concluded that self-affirmation eliminated the link between self-judgments and
judgments of one’s group (athletic team).
As illustrated in Appendix Table 2, the majority of dependent variables
examined have been cognitive in nature. However, eight studies measured task
performance; four of which found no effect of self-affirmation. In two studies,
intrinsic self-affirmations improved performance on a subtraction task, but
extrinsic affirmations did not (Schimel et al., 2004, studies 1 & 2). Three studies
assessed changes in behavior following the presentation of personally-relevant
health-risk information (Harris & Napper, 2005; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998;
Sherman et al., 2000, study 2), but only one reported a significant positive,
immediate influence of self-affirmation on health behaviors (Sherman et al., 2000,
study 2). Another study involved repeated measures for heart rate, blood pressure,
and cortisol levels before, during, and after a laboratory stress-inducing task, but
only found significant differences in cortisol levels (Creswell et al., 2005).
Specifically, non-affirmed participants exhibited a significant increase in saliva
cortisol levels from pre- to 20 minutes post-stress onset, whereas the change was
not significant among self-affirmed participants.
A review of the mixed effects of self-affirmation on cognitions and behaviors
related to health can also be found in Harris and Napper (2005). Although Sherman
et al. (2000) found only positive support for self-affirmation on perceived risk and
intention to change one’s risky behavior, other studies showed mixed effects of self-
affirmation on risk cognitions (Klein et al., 2001, study 1; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998).
Harris and Napper (2005) reported increased perceived risk and intention to reduce
heavy alcohol consumption, but only among self-affirmed participants who were
heavy drinkers. However, they found no differential effect of self-affirmation on
drinking behavior at follow-up. Another study that used two self-affirmation
manipulations found no effect of either method on smokers’ recall of risk
information, evaluation of risk messages, mood, or motivation to quit smoking
(Dillard et al., 2005).

Re-Evaluation of the Effects of Self-Affirmation Manipulations on Dependent Variables

When sufficient data were presented, effect sizes were calculated for mean differences
reported as non-significant by authors. In some cases, our estimates produced some
 SeUAffirmarion Manipu1ations 299

meaningful results (d> 0.30) that were previously overlooked. For example, Matz
and Wood (2005, study 2) reported no significant differences for positive and
negative emotional reactions, but we suggest that self-affirmation increased positive
emotions and to some degree decreased negative emotions. Harris and Napper
(2005) examined effects of self-affirmation on drinking risk over time, which
produced fewer significant findings than our estimated effect sizes for Time 1 only.
Specifically, we found that compared with non-affirmed heavy drinkers, self-affirmed
heavy drinkers had lower self-esteem, higher negative affect, and reported greater
perceived evidence strength. Among lighter drinkers, being self-affirmed decreased
perceived evidence strength, negative mood, and slightly increased self-esteem. The
differences in results illustrate that when accounting for repeated measures in a
factorial design, the effects of self-affirmation on specific dependent measures are
smaller than cross-sectional approaches to data analysis. Lastly, Sherman and Kim
(2005) reported a non-significant interaction between game outcome and self-
affirmation status. Our estimate of effect size (d= 0.37) suggested a small, but
meaningful difference; the direction could not be determined with the information
provided.

Role of Mood
Steele and Liu (1983) argued that the effects of self-affirmation on attitude change
were not due to changes in positive mood. In fact, self-affirmed individuals reported
less positive mood. Later studies suggested that self-affirmation buffered the negative
effects of helplessness training on mood (Liu & Steele, 1986). However, some
researchers have reported a positive effect of self-affirmation on mood relative to
comparison conditions (Galinsky et al., 2000, study 1; Koole, Smeets, van
Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999, study 3; Van den Bos, 2001, study 2) and
others reported no significant effect (Cohen et al., 2000, study 3; Klein et al., 2001,
study 1; Sherman et al., 2000, study 1, 2005, study 1; Shrira & Martin, 2005;
Wiesenfeld, Brockner, & Martin, 1999, study I). One study found no significant
differences in self-justifying attitude change as a function of positive or negative
induced mood (Steele et al., 1993, study 3); therefore, the authors concluded that
mood induction does not serve as a proxy for self-affirmation. However, according
to mood-manipulation checks, participants did not maintain their induced mood
state throughout the experiment.

Role of SelEsteem
The role of self-esteem varied across studies involving self-affirmation manipulations
and was examined as both an independent and dependent variable. Three studies
selected participants based on self-esteem scores (Schimel et al., 2004, study 2;
Spencer et al., 2001, study 2; Wood et a!., 1999, study 3), and one study measured
self-esteem and categorized participants based on scores (Gramzow & Gaertner,
2005, study 3). Various measures were used to identify participants with high
and low self-esteem including Rosenberg, Janis Field, and the Self-Rating
—

Scale (Flemming & Courtney, 1984). In Creswell et a!. (2005) their index of self
resources for personal growth included self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), tendency
to self-enhance (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), and optimism (Scheier, Carver, &
Bridges. 1994) scales. The reliability of median self-esteem scores across samples is
unknown.
300 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

Five studies measured some form of self-esteem as a dependent variable. One

study that used an implicit measure of self-esteem was the only one to find a positive
effect of self-affirmation (Koole et al., 1999, study 3). Another study found higher
collective self-esteem in athletic game winners compared with losers, but only among
those not affirmed (Sherman & Kim, 2005, study 2).

Discussion
This is the first attempt to closely examine the specific methods by which self-
affirmation has been manipulated in the laboratory. This review provided support
for self-affirmation theory, but also raised questions to be examined in future
research. We review our understanding of the self-affirmation construct, the effects
of self-affirmation manipulations, and possible causal mechanisms, and offer
suggestions for future studies involving self-affirmation manipulations. Our review
describes several different approaches that have been used in the literature to induce
self-affirmation, which consistently vary by affirmation domain (value or positive
personal characteristics), attainment (participant- or investigator-identified), and
procedure (scale, essay, imagery, feedback, priming).

What is Se(f Affirmation?

Self-esteem is defined as a global self-evaluation (on a positive negative continuum),
—

whereas self-affirmation is the active affirmation of some important aspect of one’s

self-concept that is unrelated to a self-threat. Only one study that examined the effect
of self-affirmation on self-esteem found a positive association, so it is unclear whether
affirming an important aspect of the self will increase one’s global self-evaluation. In
fact, according to Steele (1988), self-affirmation strategies are used to reduce the self-
threat by maintaining or restoring an overall positive sense of self so perhaps no
substantive change in global self-esteem should be evident. Future studies using more
implicit measures of self-esteem (as used in Koole et al., 1999) may provide either
more support for this argument or demonstrate differences in implicit and explicit
self-esteem after self-affirmation or positive self-evaluation.
A type of self-enhancement that occurs after a public threat to self-esteem
is compensatory self-inflation (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). Although both self-
affirmation and compensatory self-inflation are believed to restore one’s self-regard
after a threat, compensatory self-inflation may generate a “lofty self-image” that
requires additional defensive strategies to be maintained (p. 279). Self-affirmation
posits that individuals draw on unthreatened, but important aspects of their self-
concept to maintain rather than maximize positive self-worth.
Self-affirmation may serve as a “buffer” or resource to cope with a self-threat
(Liu & Steele, 1986); therefore, self-affirmation without a threat to self may be more
appropriately referred to as a positive self-verification or self-evaluation strategy. We
excluded several studies from our review because their manipulation of the self
concept was not in conjunction with a self-threat (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 2002; Harber, 2005; McGuire & McGuire, 1996). Similar to the
buffering model’s relationship between perceived social support and health outcomes
during times of stress, self-affirmation, by definition, may be most applicable in times
of self-threat (Cohen & Wills, 1985). Positive self-evaluation in general, like low
social isolation, is expected to promote positive outcomes through different causal
mechanisms.
 SelJAffirination Manipulations 301

Defining an esoteric concept like self-affirmation is difficult and being able to

control its presence or absence in an experiment hinges on such definitions. Our
inclusion of studies using self-affirmation manipulations of different methods (i.e.,
positive feedback compared with value scales or essays) obscures the notion of what
constitutes a self-affirmation. For example, can an individual be self-affirmed by
positive comments or evaluations from someone else? Results from Steele et al.
(1993) support the assertion that positive feedback after dissonance is aroused has
effects on attitude change similar to other self-affirmation manipulations. However,
the effects of feedback may be moderated by culture (Heine & Lehman, 1997).
Future studies should compare positive feedback against other types of self-
affirmation manipulations within the same study to determine whether their effects
on the same dependent variables are similar or different. Further consideration
should also be given to the nature of the positive feedback, because affirmation of the
individual’s success or status (e.g., academic competence) may be more external to
the self and feel more conditional. Specifically, self-affirmations of intrinsic or self-
determined values (i.e., learning for self-betterment) may have a greater positive
effect on behavior compared with affirmations of extrinsic or socially imposed values
(i.e., academic achievement; Schimel et al., 2004). Similarly, affirmations on
characteristics that are amenable to change may be different from those perceived
to be more innate or trait-like.
Studies have shown that when self-affirmations are in a domain related to the
self-threat, dissonance or defensiveness is increased, which supports Steele’s
(1988) theory that self-affirmation must occur in an unrelated domain (Blanton
et al., 1997; Stone & Cooper, 2003). Unambiguous self-threat may require self-
affirmation in an explicitly unrelated domain. Alternatively, it has been
hypothesized that self-affirmations compatible with a persuasive message will
reduce resistance to persuasion (Jacks & O’Brien, 2004). The majority of self-
affirmation manipulations reviewed here were in domains unaffected by the self-
threat. However, one study in our review used a writing task related to the
threatened domain and found that self-affirmation eliminated the effect of job
insecurity on mood (Wiesenfeld et al., 2001). Future studies may seek to further
explore whether self-affirmations in a related or compatible domain can be equally
effective as those in an unrelated domain. Related domains may only be effective if
the self-threat is more ambiguous or less injurious. It may be that the domains
within an aspect of the self are more discrete than first envisioned and affirming
oneself on one’s broad job skills and applicability/marketability may buffer against
the threat of a specific job layoff.

What Are the Effects of SeFAffirmation Manipulations?

Self-affirmation manipulations of various types appear to have more consistently
positive effects on attitude change after dissonance arousal, acceptance of counter-
attitudinal arguments, and reductions in prejudice, downward comparisons, and
external attributions of others’ behavior compared with other dependent variables
reviewed. Evidence is mixed concerning the effects of self-affirmation manipulations
on risk cognitions, intention, behavior, task performance, physiological stress
responses, mood, and self-esteem. Insufficient numbers of studies employing different
manipulation types and assessing similar dependent variables for similar self
affirmed and non-affirmed groups were available to determine whether any one
manipulation type significantly affected observed effect sizes.
302 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

What Are the Causal Mechanisms That Explain the Effects of Seif-Affirmation
Manipulations?
Self-affirmation is posited to reduce individuals’ defensiveness to a self-threat, but
the specific causal mechanisms remain unknown.

Mediators. Trivialization and mood have been examined as potential mediators

of the effect of self-affirmation, but results are inconsistent across studies. Simon
et al. (1995) found support for trivialization of counter-attitudinal behavior in
conjunction with self-affirmation, whereas Koole et al. (1999) found no effect of self-
affirmation on measures of trivialization across three studies.
Despite multiple reports that self-affirmation manipulations did not affect mood,
Koole et al. (1999, study 3) reported that the effect of self-affirmation on
recognition accuracy was mediated by positive mood, but not self-esteem. Further,
self-esteem was not related to positive mood, supporting the independence of the
two constructs. However, implicit measures were used for both positive mood and
self-esteem, and such measures are not yet well established. Results reported by
Koole et al. (1999) are consistent with ideas that self-defensive processes (i.e.,
dissonance reduction, self-evaluation maintenance, self-affirmation) are mediated
by affect of which people are not explicitly aware (Tesser, Martin, & Cornell,
1996).

Moderators. Self-affirmation manipulations are effective when they are not

negated (Galinsky et al., 2000) and when they are related to an issue of high personal
importance (Cohen et al., 2000; Correll et al., 2004). Self-affirmation manipulations
may be less effective for more chronically activated dissonance-arousing behaviors
such as smoking or risky alcohol use for which individuals have already developed
defensive strategies. Additionally, cultural factors may moderate the effect of self-
affirmation. Individuals from collectivistic cultures may require dissonance and self-
affirmation manipulations that respectively threaten and affirm important aspects of
the self-concept that is relevant to a collective or shared identity (Heine & Lehman,
1997; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005).

Order. A methodological factor that may influence how self-affirmation affects

cognitions and behaviors is whether the self-affirmation manipulation is presented
before or after the self-threat. Multiple studies showed positive effects of self-
affirmations presented either before or after the self-threat; therefore, one may
conclude that the order of presentation is not important and that the effect is robust
(Sherman et al., 2000). Information processing and evaluation may be equally
affected by either presentation order if sufficient time is provided before dependent
measures are assessed. Similarly, given the short time intervals between delivery of
the self-threat and self-affirmation manipulation in most laboratory experiments
immediately prior to measurement of dependent variables, little difference in order
may be expected. Alternatively, different mediators may be responsible for the effect
of self-affirmation manipulations depending on whether the effect is one of
prevention or repair of harms to the self-concept.

Self-Esteem. As noted earlier, little support exists for the effect of self
affirmation on dependent measures of self-esteem. However, self-esteem appears to
moderate the effect of self-affirmation, which also supports the independence of
 Setf-Affirmation Manipulations 303

these constructs. Several studies have shown that self-affirmations in a domain

unrelated to the self-threat produce greater attitude change (Steele et al., 1993,
study 2; Stone & Cooper, 2003) and greater perceived stress (Creswell et al., 2005)
among individuals with low self-esteem compared to those with high self-esteem.
These findings question the use of self-affirmation manipulations with select
populations (low self-esteem) and calls for both further research and appropriate
debriefing procedures.
Conversely, Stone and Cooper (2003) tested the Self-Standards Model of
cognitive dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 200l) and found support for self-esteem as
a moderator of the association between salient positive personal attributes and
attitude change following a discrepant act. When positive self-attributes related to
the discrepant behavior were primed, more attitude change was exhibited by
participants with high self-esteem compared with low self-esteem. This may suggest
that individuals with low self-esteem may feel less threatened by negative feedback
that conforms to their consistent, negative self-view. However, other results
suggest that self-affirmation produces equivalent effects for individuals with low
and high self-esteem (Spencer et al., 2001, study 2).
Some discrepancy in study findings may be due to the different self-affirmation
manipulations used. Steele et al. (1993) administered Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale
to half of the participants in the low and high self-esteem groups to make personal
resources salient. Spencer et al. (2001) employed Aliport—Vernon value scales of
high and low importance, and Creswell et al. (2005) used value scales. Stone and
Cooper (2003) used a scrambled sentence task to prime related (compassion), non-
related (creativity), and neutral self-attributes.

Social comparison. The linkage between self-affirmation and social comparison

processes deserves more attention given that people often engage in social
comparison in order to affirm a positive sense of self (Wood, 1989). Although
several studies have demonstrated effects of self-affirmation on the direction of social
comparison (e.g., Spencer et al., 2001), fewer have evaluated the interaction between
comparison processes and self-affirmation. For example, it is possible that
threatening social comparisons may be processed less defensively in the presence
of self-affirmation opportunities, and favorable comparisons may themselves serve as
self-affirmations. Also, given that people often believe that they are better than
others on a wide variety of traits (Alicke, 1985), one might expect social comparisons
to often serve a self-affirmational function. Finally, no work has addressed whether
the processes underlying self-affirmation include a comparative function. For
example, research has shown that comparative processes are often automatic
(Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995), suggesting the possibility that inducing self-
affirmation may produce automatic comparisons with one’s peers. Future research
should examine the independent and interactive effects of social comparison and self-
affirmation processes.

What Questions Remain?

Despite ours and other reviews of self-affirmation research (Aronson et al., 1999;
Sherman & Cohen, 2002, 2006), several questions remain. First, it is unclear which
self-affirmation manipulation is most similar to individuals’ natural self-affirmation
processes and which technique is preferred (or seen as less suspicious, more
psychologically realistic) by study participants. In natural settings, when one’s
304 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

self-concept is threatened, an opportunity to self-affirm may be sought out or may be

readily available through implicit reminders. Second, it is not clear how best to
measure the degree to which each participant self-affirmed. Besides the differences
noted in the items endorsed on value scales and a few attempts to quantify differences
between affirmed and non-affirmed groups using a single item (Cohen et al., 2000,
study 3; Sherman et al., 2000, study 2; Siegel et al., 2005), little attention has been
paid to quantitative measures of self-affirmation. To date, authors have primarily
relied on significant differences in outcome variables between experimental groups to
convince others of the importance and impact of self-affirmation manipulations.
Manipulation checks used by Tesser and colleagues (Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell,
& Beach, 2000) or Harris and Napper (2005) may provide a starting point for
measures designed to use judges’ or participants’ ratings of the qualities of self-
affirming value essays, but we wonder whether they may be better measures of the
extent to which participants followed directions. Third, we know very little about why
some variables are influenced differently than others in any given study. For example,
Reed and Aspinwall (1998) showed that self-affirmed individuals oriented more
quickly to threatening information suggesting their caffeine use was unhealthy, yet
they reported intentions to increase rather than decrease their consumption. Self-
affirmation also may enhance or disrupt standard associations among variables
thought to be related such as the link between attitudes and intentions in the Theory
of Planned Behavior. Future studies are needed to measure process variables that
underlie these discrepancies, and we urge researchers to examine the relations among
their dependent variables as a function of self-affirmation rather than just reporting
main effects.

Suggestions for Future Research Involving Seif-Affirmation Manipulations

Future research employing self-affirmation manipulations should focus on important
issues or threats that are relevant for participants. Additional studies involving
control groups for whom the issue is not relevant or important are not needed.
Future studies employing self-affirmation manipulations should assess mood, self-
esteem, and other potential mediators and moderators using reliable measures.
Additional data are needed to understand whether self-affirmation manipulations
are only beneficial for people with higher self-esteem.
There appears to be no consensus among researchers on the “best” way to
experimentally manipulate self-affirmation processes. However, we offer several
conclusions and suggestions for future research. Although it may be ideal to have
individuals’ self-affirm their most highly-valued personal attribute or characteristic,
some studies suggest that it may be sufficient to have all participants affirm their
kindness or honesty. If a researcher’s goal is to compare with previous self-affirmation
studies, then he/she may choose to use value scales or value essays because most self-
affirmation manipulation studies have used these methods successfully. However,
value scales have only been developed for global values (aesthetics, politics, religion,
social, and theoretical) and some items may be antiquated and difficult for
populations with low literacy or education. Example items from the Allport—Vernon
scales include, “Do you think it is justifiable for great artists, such as Beethoven,
Wagner and Byron to be selfish and negligent of the feelings of others? (Yes/No)” or
“When witnessing a gorgeous ceremony (ecclesiastical or academic, introduction into
office, etc.), are you more impressed by (a) the color and pageantry of the occasion
itself or (b) the influence and strength of the group?” (complete scales are available
 Se(f-AJj’irmation Mani,u1ations 305

from the authors). In addition to literacy and education requirements, one might
consider the physical skills needed to write an essay if conducting a study with older
adults. Audio-taped self-affirmations might equate to an essay; however, speaking
aloud may increase the salience of the self and produce unintended effects. If the goal
is to further examine the differences between manipulation types, then we reported on
several different options: feedback, essays, scales, imagery, and priming. Future
research is needed to test different self-affirmation manipulations within the same
study to examine whether different methods of eliciting self-affirmation produce
different effects on the same dependent variables. Only two published studies have
tested competing self-affirmation manipulation techniques alongside each other in the
same experiment (Dillard et al., 2005; Schimel et al., 2004). Similar comparisons in
future studies would help determine if different self-affirmation manipulations differ
in psychologically meaningful ways.
Future research involving self-affirmation manipulations may seek to further refine
or support self-affirmation theory by comparing the effects of self-affirmation and
general self-validation or self-enhancement strategies. It is not known the extent to
which self-affirmed individuals who experienced a threat to their self-concept will
respond to dependent measures the same as an individual who validates his/her
positive self-image in the absence of a self-threat. For example, when self-affirmed
adolescents were given threatening social comparison information about their alcohol
behaviors, there was a decrease in the association between their consumption and
their perceived risk for alcohol problems (Klein et al., 2001). However, when
participants were self-affirmed without having received the threatening comparison
information, they did not differ from a no-comparison information, no-affirmation
control group. Future research may also seek to compare the effect of affirmations
from within (internally or self-defined) compared with affirmations from without
(externally or other-defined). For example, can individuals feel equally self-affirmed
by thinking of how others perceive them, of social supports in their life, or through
others’ comments or compliments as compared with personally identified value
affirmations?
Future research also should investigate how conscious individuals are of their use
of self-affirmation strategies in natural settings, and whether their use can be
identified in real-time without prompting the self-affirmation process itself.
Technology such as hand-held computers and experience sampling data collection
and analysis techniques may provide a unique way of examining self-affirmation in a
more natural context. Extending the recent work of Creswell et al. (2005), prospective
studies could examine whether the frequency of self-affirming strategies positively or
negatively relates to health outcomes (e.g., perceived stress, depressive symptoms,
fatigue, immune functioning, and illness) and whether the associations vary by self-
esteem. Additionally, few studies have examined the effects of self-affirmation
manipulations over time (Harris & Napper, 2005; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998);
therefore, additional research is needed to document the stability of findings reviewed
here.

Limitations
Cooper and Hedges (1994) have reviewed
synthesis of primary research studies. They
such as unreliability and restriction of range
including effect sizes. Few studies reported
the threats to inferences made from
highlight problems in primary studies
in outcome measures and missing data
effect sizes, and estimating effect sizes
306 A. McQueen & W. M. P. Klein

was more difficult when exact cell sizes and other details from statistical analyses
were not adequately reported. All studies reported sample size (and distribution
by gender), but assumptions were often made concerning the stability of the
sample over time (i.e., attrition) and the loss of participants across data analyses
(i.e., due to listwise deletion). When sufficient data were presented, some effect
sizes were calculated for mean differences reported as non-significant by authors.
In some cases, our estimates produced some meaningful results (d 0.30) that were
overlooked. Future publications of primary studies involving self-affirmation
manipulations will hopefully include effect sizes of specific contrasts using useful
effect-size measures (see Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996, 2003). Experiments conducted
in the field of psychology are not unlike intervention trials conducted in medicine
and public health; therefore, greater attention and adherence to reporting guidelines
such as CONSORT (Moher, Schulz, & Altman, 2001) and TREND (Des Jarlais,
Lyles, Crepaz, & The TREND Group, 2004) is recommended.
All the data extracted from primary studies included in this review were
collected through an iterative coding process, which is susceptible to human error.
Similarly, the calculation of effect sizes may be limited by inadequate reporting in
primary studies, the formulas available for estimating effect sizes, and human
error. Additionally, just as primary studies may capitalize on chance with selection
bias, research syntheses may be limited by their inclusion of primary studies for
review. Because of resource constraints, we did not attempt to incorporate
unpublished studies involving self-affirmation manipulations, nor contact authors
for information not reported in their article. The results were generally positive,
which may suggest a bias toward publications with positive effects. Similarly, 40 of
the 69 studies used either the value scale or value essay self-affirmation manipu
lations, suggesting that a preponderance of published studies used the same
manipulations. There may be a publication bias in favor of these two types of
manipulations; however, future use of alternative types may prove more useful in
field settings and provide new insight when comparing results and causal
mechanisms across manipulations.

Summary and Conclusions

Reflecting on the thirty years since the conception of cognitive dissonance theory,
Aronson et al. (1999) reviewed self-affirmation theory and suggested that its impact
on the study of dissonance-like phenomena has been to: “uncover new areas in which
self-image maintenance affects beliefs and behaviors” (p. 136). Most of the research
examining self-affirmation has been conducted to refine the theory; however, prior to
our systematic review, no published study had examined the specific method by
which self-affirmation is manipulated in the laboratory. We identified the different
self-affirmation manipulation procedures being used, which can be characterized by
domain, attainment method, and procedure. Most dependent variables studied to
date have been cognitive in nature, but a few recent studies have examined
behavioral and physiological variables. Numerous positive findings in the literature
regarding the effects of self-affirmation on attitude change and persuasion/bias
support continued research on less studied dependent variables, some of which have
produced mixed results, including risk cognitions, intention, and behavior. Stability
of effects over time has only been examined in a few studies that primarily assessed
changes in health behaviors, and most studies involved samples of undergraduate
students in the United States.
 SeiX-Affirination Manipulations 307

We identified several gaps in our knowledge regarding the use of self-affirmation

manipulations. Although basic conclusions can be drawn across multiple manipula
tions and samples, further work is needed to understand the differences between
these manipulations, particularly in terms of the processes they instigate. Sherman
and Cohen (2006) suggest that there may be several affective, cognitive, and
motivational processes that facilitate self-affirmation effects (p. 222) and future
studies are needed to examine potential mediators and moderators. Additionally,
new experimental paradigms and self-affirmation manipulations may need to be
developed in order to extend past work to different’ cultures, as well as to “real
world” applications. Manipulations of self-affirmation outside the laboratory may
require less convoluted cover stories and procedures than those used with the
induced-compliance paradigm. Improved measurement and construct validity may
be needed before researchers outside of social psychology investigate or adopt self-
affirmation manipulations for interventions designed to reduce prejudice or failure to
adopt recommended health precautions.

References
Adams, G., Tormala, T. T., & O’Brien, L. T. (in press). The effect of self-affirmation on
perception of racism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and
controllability of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49,
1621—1630.
Aliport, G. W., Vernon, P. E., & Lindzey, G. (1960). Study of values (3rd ed.). Boston:
Houghton Muffin.
Arndt, J., Schimel, J., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2002). The intrinsic self and
defensiveness: Evidence that activating the intrinsic self reduces self-handicapping and
conformity Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28 671 —683
Aronson, J., Cohen, G., & Nail, P. R. (1999). Self-affirmation theory: An update and appraisal.
In E. Harmon Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on apivotal theory in
social psychology (pp. 127—147). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Aspinwall, L. G., & Taylor, S. E. (1993). Effects of social comparison direction, threat, and
self-esteem on affect, self-evaluation, and expected success. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 64, 708—722.
Beauregard, K. S., & Dunning, D. (1998). Turning up the contrast: Self-enhancement motives
prompt egocentric contrast effects in social judgments. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 606—621.
Ben-An, 0. T., Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. (1999). The impact of mortality salience on
reckless driving: A test of terror management mechanisms. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 76, 35—45.
Blanton, H., Pelham, B. W., DeHart, T., & Carvallo, M. (2001). Overconfidence as dissonance
reduction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 373—385.
Blanton, H., Cooper, J., Skurnik, I., & Aronson, J. (1997). When bad things happen to good
feedback: Exacerbating the need for self-justification with self-affirmations. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 684—692.
Boney-McCoy, S., Gibbons, F. X., & Gerrard, M. (1999). Self-esteem, compensatory self-
enhancement, and the consideration of health risks. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25, 954—965.
Cohen, G. L., Aronson, J., & Steele, C. M. (2000). When beliefs yield to evidence: Reducing biased
evaluation by affirming the self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1151 1164.
—

Cohen, J. (1988). Stat istical power analysis Jbr the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hilisdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
308 A. Mc Queen & W. M. P. Klein

Cohen, S., & Wills, T. A. (1985). Stress, social support, and the buffering hypothesis.
Psychological Bulletin, 98, 310— 357.
Cooper, H., & Hedges, L. V. (1994). The handbook of research synthesis. New York: Russell
Sage Foundation.
Correll, J., Spencer, S. J., & Zanna, M. P. (2004). An affirmed self and an open mind: Self-
affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 40, 350—356.
Creswell, J. D., Welch, W. T., Taylor, S. E., Sherman, D. K., Gruenewald, T. L., & Mann, T.
(2005). Affirmation of personal values buffers neuroendocrine and psychological stress
responses. Psychological Science, 16, 846—851.
De Cremer, D., & Sedikides, C. (2005). Self-uncertainty and responsiveness to procedural
justice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 157— 173.
Des Jarlais, D. C., Lyles, C., Crepaz, N., & The TREND Group. (2004). Improving the
reporting quality of nonrandomized evaluations of behavioral and public health
interventions: The TREND statement. American Journal of Public Health, 94, 361 —366.
Dillard, A. J., McCaul, K. D., & Magnan, R. E. (2005). Why is such a smart person like you
smoking? Using self-affirmation to reduce defensiveness to cigarette warning labels.
Journal of Biobehavioral Research, 10, 165—182.
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self
through derogating others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 31 —44.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
Flemming, J. S., & Courtney, B. E. (1984). The dimensionality of self-esteem: II. Hierarchical
facet model for revised measurement scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
46, 404—421.
Frantz, C. M., Cuddy, A. J., Burnett, M., Ray, H., & Hart, A. (2004). A threat in the
computer: The race Implicit Association Test as a stereotype threat experience.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1611— 1624.
Fry, R. B., & Prentice-Dunn, S. (2005). Effects of coping information and value affirmation on
responses to a perceived health threat. Health Communication, 17, 133— 147.
Galinsky, A. D., Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2000). The reinstatement of dissonance and
psychological discomfort following failed affirmation. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 30, 123—147.
Gilbert, A. D., Giesler, R. B., & Morris, K. A. (1995). When comparisons arise. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 227—236.
Gramzow, R. H., & Gaertner, L. (2005). Self-esteem and favoritism toward novel in-
groups: The self as an evaluative base. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88,
801—815.
Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). Compensatory self-inflation: A response to the threat
to self-regard of public failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 273 —280.
Harber, K. (1995). Sources of Validation Scale. Unpublished scale.
Harber, K. D. (2005). Self-esteem and affect as information. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 31, 276—288.
Harris, P. R., & Napper, L. (2005). Self-affirmation and the biased processing of threatening
health-risk information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1250— 1263.
Harvey, R. D., & Oswald, D. L. (2000). Collective guilt and shame as motivation for White
support of Black programs. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 1790— 1811.
Hedges, L. V., & 01km, I. (1985). Statistical methods Jbr meta-analysis. Orlando, FL:
Academic Press.
Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. (1997). Culture, dissonance, and self-affirmation. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 389—400.
Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., & Zanna, M. P. (2004). Investigating
attitudes cross-culturally: A case of cognitive dissonance among East Asians and North
Americans. In G. Haddock & G. R. Maio (Eds.), Contemporary perspectives on the
psychology of attitudes (pp. 375—397). New York: Psychology Press.
 Se(fAffirination Manipulations 309

Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & Lackenbauer,
S. (2005). On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of Easterners and
Westerners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 294—310.
Jacks, J. Z., & O’Brien, M. E. (2004). Decreasing resistance by affirming the self. In
E. S. Knowles & J. A. Linn (Eds.), Resistance and persuasion (pp. 235—258). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Eribaum Associates, Inc.
Kaplan, A., & Krueger, J. (1999). Compliance after threat: Self-affirmation or self-
presentation? Current Research in Social Psychology, 4(7).
Kimble, C. E., Kimble, E. A., & Croy, N. A. (1998). Development of self-handicapping
tendencies. Journal of Social Psychology, 138, 524— 534.
Klein, W. M. P., Blier, H. K., & Janze, A. M. (2001). Maintaining positive self-evaluations:
Reducing attention to diagnostic but unfavorable social comparison information when
general self-regard is salient. Motivation and Emotion, 25, 23— 40.
Koole, S. L., Smeets, K., van Knippenberg, A., & Dijksterhuis, A. (1999). The cessation of
rumination through self-affirmation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
111—125.
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2001). Practical meta-analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Liu, T. I., & Steele, C. M. (1986). Attributional analysis as self-affirmation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 531 —540.
Lockwood, P., Dolderman, D., Sadler, P., & Gerchak, E. (2004). Feeling better about doing
worse: Social comparisons within romantic relationships. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 87, 80—95.
Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J., & Schimel, J. (2006). Combating stereotype threat: The
effect of self-affirmation on women’s intellectual performance. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 42, 236—243.
Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2005). Cognitive dissonance in groups: The consequences of
disagreement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 22— 37.
McGregor, I., Zanna, M. P., Holmes, J. G., & Spencer, S. J. (2001). Compensatory conviction
in the face of personal uncertainty: Going to extremes and being oneself. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 472—488.
McGuire, W. J., & McGuire, C. V. (1996). Enhancing self-esteem by directed-thinking tasks:
Cognitive and affective positivity asymmetries. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 70, 1117—1125.
Moher, D., Schulz, K. F., & Altman, D. G. (2001). The CONSORT statement: Revised
recommendations for improving the quality of reports of parallel-group randomized
trials. Journal of the American Medical Association, 285, 1987—1991.
Murray, S. L., Bellavia, G., Feeney, B., Holmes, J. G., & Rose, P. (2001). The contingencies of
interpersonal acceptance: When romantic relationships function as a self-afflrmational
resource. Motivation and Emotion, 25, 163—189.
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., MacDonald, G., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1998). Through the looking
glass darkly? When self-doubts turn into relationship insecurities. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 75, 1459— 1480.
Reed, M. B., & Aspinwall, L. G. (1998). Self-affirmation reduces biased processing of health-
risk information. Motivation and Emotion, 22, 99—132.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent seif image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rosenthal, R. (1994). Parametric measures of effect size. In H. Cooper & L. V. Hedges
(Eds.), The handbook of research synthesis (pp. 23 1—244). New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. (1996). Computing contrasts, effect sizes, and counternulls on
other people’s published data: General procedures for research consumers. Psychological
Methods, 1,331—340.
Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. (2003). Effect sizes for experimenting psychologists. Canadian
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 57, 221—237.
310 A. McQueen & W. M. P. Klein

Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., & Bridges, M. W. (1994). Distinguishing optimism from
neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): A reevaluation of the Life
Orientation Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1063— 1078.
Schimel, J., Arndt, 3., Banko, K. M., & Cook, A. (2004). Not all self-affirmations were created
equal: The cognitive and social benefit of affirming the intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) self. Social
Cognition, 22,. 75—99.
Schmeichel, B. J., & Martens, A. (2005). Self-affirmation and mortality salience: Affirming
values reduces woridview defense and death-thought accessibility. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 31, 658—667.
Schwinghammer, S. A., Stapel, D. A., & Blanton, H. (2006). Different selves have different
effects: Self-activation and defensive social comparison. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 32, 27—39.
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting threatening information: Self-affirmation
and the reduction of defensive biases. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11,
119—123.
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation
theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 138 —242.
Sherman, D. A., Nelson, L. D., & Steele, C. M. (2000). Do messages about health risks
threaten the self’? Increasing the acceptance of threatening health messages via self-
affirmation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1046— 1058.
Sherman, D. K., & Kim, H. 5. (2005). Is there an “I” in “team”? The role of the self in group
serving judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 108— 120.
Shrira, I., & Martin, L. L. (2005). Stereotyping, self-affirmation, and the cerebral hemispheres.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 846—856.
Siegel, P. A., Scillitoe, J., & Parks-Yancy, R. (2005). Reducing the tendency to self-handicap:
The effect of self-affirmation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 589—597.
Simon, L., Greenberg, J., & Brehm, J. (1995). Trivialization: The forgotten mode of
dissonance reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 247—260.
Spencer, S. J., Fein, S., & Lomore, C. D. (2001). Maintaining one’s self-image vis-â-vis others:
The role of self-affirmation in the social evaluation of the self. Motivation and Emotion,
25, 41—65.
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self.
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 261—302).
New York: Academic Press.
Steele, C. M., & Liu, T. 3. (1981). Making the dissonant act unreflective of self: Dissonance
avoidance and the expectancy of a value-affinning response. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 7, 393—397.
Steele, C. M., & Liu, T. J. (1983). Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 5— 19.
Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Lynch, M. (1993). Self-image resilience and dissonance: The role
of affirmational resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 885—896.
Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 228—243.
Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2003). The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem
moderates attitude change in dissonance processes. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 39, 508—515.
Stone, J., Wiegand, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails:
Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
72, 54—65.
Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). The effects of mindset on positive illusions. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 165— 176.
Tesser, A. (1988). Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. In
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 181 —227). New York:
Academic Press.
 SeUAffirmation Manipulations 311

Tesser, A., Crepaz, N., Collins, J. C., Cornell, D., & Beach, S. R. H. (2000). Confluence of self-
esteem regulation mechanisms: On integrating the self-zoo. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1476— 1489.
Tesser, A., Martin, L. L., & Cornell, D. P. (1996). On the substitutability of self-protective
mechanisms. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking
cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 48— 68). New York: Guilford.
Tesser, A., & Cornell, D. p. (1991). On the confluence of self processes. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 501 —526.
The Campbell Collaboration. (2001). Guidelines for the preparation of review protocols.
Available from http://www.campbellcolIaboration.org/Fraguidelines.html
Van den Bos, K. (2001). Reactions to perceived fairness: The impact of mortality salience and
self-esteem on ratings of negative affect. Social Justice Research, 14, 1—23.
Weed, D. L. (1997). Methodologic guidelines for review papers. Journal of the National Cancer
Institute, 89, 6—7.
White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2005). Looking on the bright side: Downward counterfactual
thinking in response to negative life events. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31,
1413—1424.
Wiesenfeld, B. M., Brockner, J., & Martin, C. (1999). A self-affirmation analysis of survivors’
reactions to unfair organizational downsizings. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 35, 441 —460.
Wiesenfeld, B. M., Brockner, J., Petzall, B., Wolf, R., & Bailey, J. (2001). Stress and coping
among layoff survivors: A self-affirmation analysis. Anxiety, Stress and Coping: An
International Journal, 14, 15— 34.
Wilson, D. B. (1996). Effect size determination program (Version 1.0) [Computer software].
Available from http:J/www.jmu.edu/assessment/wm_IibraryjES_Calculator.xls
Wood, J. V. (1989). Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal attributes.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 231—248.
Wood, J. V., Giordano-Beech, M., & Ducharme, M. J. (1999). Compensating for failure
through social comparison. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1370— 1386.
Zarate, M. A., & Garza, A. A. (2002). In-group distinctiveness and self-affirmation as dual
components of prejudice reduction. Sdf and Identity, 1, 235—249.
APPENDIX TABLE 1 Summary of Primary Studies That Used a Self-Affirmation Manipulation (SAM)
Sample Selection Study SAM
Reference N Criteriaa Location Threat Check SAM Control
Value Scale SAMs
Steele & Liu, 1983, 76* Selected Ps based on USA bI1duced compliance; Y Low value
study 1 value orientation and dissonance
strong feelings about
topic
Steele & Liu, 1983, 24* Selected Ps based on USA binduced compliance & Y Low
study 2 value orientation dissonance reminder
Steele & Liu, 1983, 24* Selected Ps based on USA binduced compliance; V Low
study 3 value orientation dissonance
Simon et al., 1995, 40’s USA b1Iduced compliance; V Lowest
study 3 dissonance
Galinksy et al., 2000, 55 USA bIV: Induced compliance, N NoSA
study 2 negative feedback on
selected value of
highest importance
Sherman et al., 2000, 60 All female Ps USA bDisease risk V Lowest
study 1
Correll et al., 2004 39# Selected Ps based on Canada blExposure to debate about N Lowest
strong feelings about tuition increase
topic
Koole et al., 1999, 57 — Netherlands bNegative false feedback Y Lowest
study I (intelligence)
Koole et aL, 1999, 68# Netherlands bIV: negative false V Lowest
study 2 feedback (intelligence)
Koole et al., 1999, 66 Netherlands biNegative false feedback Y Lowest
study 3 (intelligence)

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued)
Sample Selection Study SAM
Reference N Criteria Location Threat Check SAM Control
Liu & Steele, 1986, 78* Selected Ps based on value USA bHelplessness training No SA
study I orientation
Liu & Steele, 1986, 32* Selected Ps based on value USA bHelpless1ess training Y Low
study 2 orientation
Sherman & Kim, 48 White, male intramural USA bLosing game N Lowest
2005, study 1 sports team players were
recruited prior to a
game
Sherman & Kim, 44 White, male intramural USA hLosilg game N Lowest
2005, study 2 sports team players were
recruited prior to a
game
Creswell et al., 2005 80 Excluded Ps with USA biLaboratory Y 5th lowest
preexisting health stress task
conditions or who
engaged in behaviors
that influence cortisol
Wiesenfeld et al., 65# USA bLayoff of similar other N NoSA
1999
(ialinksy et al., 2000, 34# USA blV: induced compliance, N NoSA
study 1 negative feedback on
selected value of
highest importance
Tesser & Cornell, 48 Ps were 24 pairs of male USA biFalse feedback about task Y, but Lowest
1991, study I friends; some Ps performance; ranked data
recruited by ad in below peer was lost
university paper

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (Continued)
Sample Selection Study SAM
Reference N Criteria’ Location Threat Check SAM Control
Wood et at., 1999, 36 Selected Ps based on high Canada bNegative false feedback N Lowest
study 3 self-esteem (social accuracy)
and IV: negative
comparison with peer
Spencer et al., 2001, 64 Ps were 33 women & USA or bps anticipated N Lowest
study 2 31 undergraduates Canada immediate feedback froni
intelligence test
Fry & Prentice-Dunn, j97# Ps were female USA bBreast cancer threat Y Lowest
2005 undergraduates with no information
history of breast cancer
Alternative Scale SA Ms
Reed & Aspinwall, TI 66# All female Ps USA 2
h
Disease risk N Opinion
1998 T2 65 statements
49* bi
Schimel et at., 2004, Canada Math subtraction N Mundane
study 1 task performance activities
Schimel et at., 2004, 46* Selected female Ps Canada b2IV: label of math task N Mundane
study 2 who knew math- (“Quantitative Exam” vs. activities
gender stereotype “Problem Solving
and who had Exercise”)
higher academic
self-esteem
Value Essay SAMs
Cohen et al., 2000, 72# Selected Ps based USA biForced choice; read N 48hr food
study 1 on strong feelings about counter-attitudinal report recall
topic

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued)
Sample Selection Study SAM
Reference N Criteria
4 Location Threat Check SAM Control
Cohen et al., 2000, 64 Selected Ps based USA 1
E xposure to debate about Y 9th lowest,
study 3 on strong feelings abortion rights student
about topic
Harris & Napper, 82* All female Ps UK biDisease risk Y Lowest, student
2005
Schmeichel & 65 USA bIIV: Mortality salience N Lowest, student
Martens, 2005,
study 1
Hoshino-Browne 54 Selected Ps born in East Canada biForced choice; dissonance Nd Independent
et al., 2005, Asian country who were and no SA
study 3 students in Canada with a
strong identification with
Asian culture
Hoshino-Browne 101 Selected Ps born in East Canada biForced choice; dissonance Nd No SA
et al., 2005, Asian country who were
study 4 students in Canada with a
strong identification with
Asian culture
Schrneichel & 54 USA bllV: Mortality salience N Lowest, student
Martens, 2005,
study 2
Sherman et al., 2000, 61# Selected Ps who reported USA biDisease risk N 9th lowest,
study 2 recent sexual intercourse student
Siegel et al., 2005 ii I Undergraduate business USA bBusiIess competence test Y Lowest
students; 80.5% were feedback
employed at least
part-time

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (Continued)
Sample Selection Study SAM
Reference N Criteria’ Location Threat Check SAM Control
Spencer et at., 2001, 24 — USA Negative false feedback N Lowest, other
study 3 (intelligence)
White & Lehman, 70#t Only White & Asian Ps Canada bps wrote about traumatic N 9th lowest,
2005, study 3 life event student
Fein & Spencer, 1997, 54# Excluded Jewish Ps USA biprejudice N Lowest, other
study 1
Zarate & Garza, 120* Ps categorized as: USA bprejudice N Lowest, other
2002, study 1 Mexican-Americans,
Mexican-Nationals, others to
Shrira & Martin, 101# Selected right-handers USA biprejudice N Lowest, other ft
ft
2005, study I
Shrira & Martin, 180 Selected right-handers USA biprejudice N Lowest, other
2005, study 2
Gramzow&Gaertner, 115 — USA bingroup bias N Lowest, other
2005, study 3
Adams et al., in press, 98 study 1 Selected Whites born USA biprejudice N 9th lowest,
meta-analysis of 63’ study 2 in the US who spoke typical
2 studies English at home and student
Latinos
Martens et al., 2006, 32 females Selected Ps reporting 500+ USA bStereotype threat N 9th lowest,
study 1 27 males quantitative scores on other
SAT/ACT and who
acknowledged the
female math stereotype
Martens et al., 2006, 52 females (assume same as USA bStereotype threat N (assume same
study 2 53 males study 1) as study 1)

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (Continued)
Sample Selection Study SAM
Reference N Criteriaa Location Threat Check SAM Control

Writing task SAMs

Harvey & Oswald, l33# Ps were White USA ‘Reactions to IV: Video N List all the uses of
2000, study I undergraduates (civil rights protest, a knife
from private Jesuit Alzheimers’ patient,
university neutral documentary)
1-larvey & Oswald, 40 Ps were White USA bReactions to video about a N I week food
2000, study 2 undergraduates from civil rights protest recall
private Jesuit (prejudice)
university
Van den Bos, 2001, I 60# Netherlands blV: Mortality salience N NoSA
study 2
Wiesenfeld et aL, 161# Ps were part-time students USA bJob layoffs N NoSA
2001, study I employed full-time; all
I
were recent survivors of
job layoffs
Wiesenfeld et al., 60 Ps were recent survivors of USA b(luethod of N NoSA
2001, study 2 job layoffs and full-time communicating)
employees, not Job layoffs
undergraduates
Matz & Wood, 2005, 48 USA bAnticipated negative peer N NoSA
study 2 evaluation
Schirnel et al., 2004, 38* Canada bipeer evaluation N Extrinsic SA
study 3
Klein et al., 2001, 94# 5
bIp
Ps were high school USA reported personal risk N NoSA
study 1 students who factors for alcohol
completed surveys poisoning and heart
2 months apart disease

(continued) .—.
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (Continued) 00

Sample Selection Study SAM

Reference N Criteria” Location Threat Check SAM Control

McGregor et al., 87 — Canada bUncertaintyrelated N Lowest, other

2001, study I self-integrity threat
Schwinghammer 70 All females Netherlands bUpward social comparison N Negative
et al., 2006, (attractiveness) self-activation
study 3
Dillard et al., 2005 130* Ps were smokers USA cTobacco warnings N NoSA
and non-smokers
Blanton et al., 2001, 141 USA bTaste test N List 1st 30
study 1 USA states
recalled
Imagery SAMs
Dc Cremer & g3# Netherlands bIV: importance N Think about
Sedikides, 2005, of opinion environment
study 6
Self-esteem scales as SAM
Kimble et al., 1998 81# Catholic school USA 2
b
TaSk performance on IV: Y SE test after
elementary students; game vs. IQ test evaluation
3rd & 6th graders task
Steele et al., 1993, 60* USA biForced choice; N SE scale not
study 2 dissonance administered
Feedback SAM
Steele et al., 1993, 114 USA biForced choice; N Negative or
study I dissonance neutral
feedback on
“personality”
test

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued)

Sample Selection Study SAM

Reference N Criteriaa Location Threat Check SAM Control
Heine & Lehman, l30# Japanese visitors & Canada hForced choice; Y No feedback
1997 Canadian Ps; mostly dissonance
undergraduates
Ben-An et al., 1999, 108* Male soldiers in Israel bIJV. mortality salience N No feedback
study 4 Israeli Defense
Forces
Cohen et al., 2000, 80 Selected Ps based on USA biRead counter- Y No feedback
study 2 strong feelings attitudinal report
about topic
—
Schwingharnrner 60 Netherlands hUpward social N No feedback
et aL, 2006, study 2 comparison
(attractiveness)
Blanton et al., 1997e 91* — USA bFeedback relevant to N unrelated
threatened domain feedback
Indirect Methods SAM
Stone & Cooper, l55# Selected Ps based on USA bCounterattitudinal N Low choice,
e
2003 strong feelings about topic essay neutral
priming
Schimel et al., 2001,
study 1
78* — USA bFeedback to social
sensitivity survey
N Priming
visualization
of neutral
I.
other
Simon et al., 1995, 46# — USA bForced choice, high y
study 4 dissonance

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued)
Sample Selection Study SAM
Reference N Citeria’ Location Threat Check SAM Control
Frantz et al., 2004, 89* Excluded USA bStereotype threat! N MCPR scale
study 3 non-White Ps Prejudice after IAT
Anticipated SAM
Steele & Liu, 1981 33 — USA blinduced compliance; N SA not
dissonance anticipated

participants were undergraduate college or university students of mixed gender unless otherwise noted.
manipulations were completed after the self-threat; hi = SAM before threat, b2 half before, half after.
cOle affirmation manipulation was prior to the threat; one affirmation manipulation was presented with the threatening information.
dA pilot study was conducted to test a new self-affirmation manipulation (Hoshino-Browne et
al., 2005, 2004).
eAffirmed participants on domain related to self-threat.
*exact cell sizes are reported in the article text; fraction cell sizes were used to estimate effect size(s); teffect size(s) reported in article text.
Notes: Ps = participants; IV = independent variable; USA = United States; UK = United Kingdom; Y = yes, SAM manipulation check was reported in the
article text; TI = time I; T2 = time 2; MCPR = Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions; IAT = implicit association test (implicit attitudes); SE = self-
esteem.
APPENDIX TABLE 2 Summary of Primary Studies’ Standardized Effects of Self-Affirmation Manipulations (SAM) on Categories of
Dependent Variables

Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)

Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
Value Scale SAM
Steele & Liu, 1983, 2 x 3: Value VO: SA> opposed to
study I Orientation (VO)/ NonSA tuition
Non x Order: (A) hike
high choice (hc) 1.22
essay, SAM,
attitude DV SA: VO> 1.48
(B) hc essay, NonVO
attitude DV, SAM;
(C) low choice
essay, attitude DV

Steele & Lin, 1983, Order IV: (A) SA < SA + —0.55

study 2 essay, SAM, reminder
attitude
SA > NonSA 2.69
measure; (B)
essay, SAM,
reminder,
attitude DV;
SA+>
NonSA
3.16
I
(C) essay,
attitude DV

(continued)
cJ
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
Steele & [.iu, 1983, 4 conditions: (A) VO, SA: opposed to low perceived
study 3 Value Orientation lic vs. Ic funding for strength of own
(VO), hc, SAM; (B) handicap writing
VU, low choice (Ic), research 1.57
SAM; (C) VU, he, —0.49
NonSA (D)
NonVO hc SAM VO, hc: SA vs. —0.32 2.65
NonSA
hc, SA: VU vs. —0.29 2.87
NonVU

Simon et al., 1995, 3 conditions: SA/ SA < NonSA support triviaIize’

study 3 NonSA/Value tuition —0.56
Salience (VS) (fill hike
out #1 value scale as —0.91
someone who
SA > VS 0.36 0.36
doesn’t value it)
VS < NonSA — 1.27 —0.92

Galinksy et al., 5 conditions: (A) SA + neg FB: support nude

2000, study 2 High choice (hc), he < Ic olympics
Speech only; (B) ban
High choice, SA; —0.30
(C) High choice, he, SA + neg FB — 1.00
SA + neg < Ic NonSA

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
feedback (FB); hc, SA: neg —0.22
(D) Low choice FB < no FB
(Ic), SA + neg
feedback; (E) Low he, SA+neg —0.67
choice, Speech only FB < he, NonSA

he, SA=Ic, —0.07

SA+neg FB
NonSA: Ic > hc 0.33 SE eq

Sherman et al., 2 x 2: self- SA > NonSA belief

2000, study I affirmation in link
(SA/NonSA) 0.73
x Issue
Drinkers: SA > 0.89 intent
relevance
(non/coffee NonSA 1.86
drinker)

Correll et al., 2004 Randomized IV:

Self-affirmation
High Importance:
Pro: SA < —0.68
I
(SA/NonSA); NonSA
Continuous
quasi-JV: Opp: SA> 0.36
NonSA

(continued)
 I’)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
Importance of issue SA: pro > opp
(mean centered); 0.59
Within-Ps IVs: strong> weak pro
Advocate position 0.64
(pponent/ strong> weak opp
2pponent to Ps 036
opinion), Argument
strength (weak/
NonSA: pro > opp
moderate/ strong) 1.62
strong> weak pro
0.32
strong < weak opp
—0.06
Lou’ Importcnce:
Pro: SA < —0.05
NonSA
Opp: SA < —0.21
NonSA
SA: pro > opp
0.29
NonSA: pro > opp
0.13

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Koole et at., 1999, 3 conditions, non FF: SA < rumination

study 1 factorial: (A) SA+ NonSA —0.75
IQ failure feedback
(FF); (B) NonSA + FF, NonSA> 0.36
IQ failure feedback; unlinking
(C) Control: FF, SA= 0.06
Immediate unlinking unlinking
(telling Ps truth
about bogus IQ test) trivialize eq SC eq

Koole et al., 1999, 3 conditions: (A) trivialize eq

study 2 SA+IQ FF;(B)
FF > no Fl decision
NonSA + IQ FF;
latency for —
(C) No failure, no
SAM control neutral
words
0.32
NonSA: IQ —0.79
< control
word

Koole et at., 1999,

study 3
SA/NonSA NonSA>
SA
recognition
accuracy
0.50
I
SA > NonSA pos 0.56 SE 0.50
trivialize eq neg eq

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Con Unuedl
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Liu & Steele, 1986, 2 x 4: internal: high, low external depression

study 1 Attribution HL < none, attribution —2.66,
—
(internal! SA + low HL 1.46 hostility
—
external) x 1.79,
Helplessness (HL) anxiety
—
(none/low/high! 2.22
SA+low)
external: high HL 1.60 depression
vs. none, SA+low —3.19,
HL hostility
—2.82,
anxiety
—2.32

TP eq

L.iu & Steele, 1986, 2 x 2: Value high < low VO —0.60 depression
study 2 orientation (high/ —0.89, -

low) x Helplessness hostility

(low/low + SA) —0.70,
anxiety
—1.13
low HL: high= 0.06 depression
low VO —0.09,

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
hostility
0.11,
anxiety
0.21
High VO: low —0.84 depression
HL+ SA < —0.75,
low H1 hostility
—0.74,
anxiety
— 1.52
low HL+SA: —0.78 depression
high < low VO —0.79,
hostility
—0.81,
anxiety
—1.35

TP eq I
Sherman & Kim, Game outcome NonSA: winners performance
2005, study 1 (winners/ > losers attributions:
losers) x Self- team
affirmation (SA/ 1.24,
NonSA) self
0.83
NonSA: winners luck self neg
—
< losers —0.34 1.48

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d) 00

Reference TV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

SA: winners team self neg
< losers —0.03 —0.73
SA: winners self
> losers 0.18,
luck
0.73

self pos eq
to
Sherman & Kim, Game outcome NonSA: winners team collective SE
2005, study 2 (winners/ > losers 1.71, 1.66
losers) x self
Self-affirmation 1.83
(SA/NonSA)
SA: winners team 0.32
> losers 0.39
SA: winners self
< losers —0.36
luck implicit SE eq
NS
037

Creswell et al., Self-affirmation NonSA: post> cortisol

2005 (SA/NonSA); pre 1.59
measured
NonSA > SA 0.55
self-esteem,
tendency to SA: post> pre 0.28
self-enhance, and

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference EffccL Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
optimism for self- SAM*SR effect 0.33
resources
(SR) index as pre-stress heart
moderator IV appraisal rate
0.11, 0.08,
SA vs. NonSA post-stress SBP
rating 0.12,
0.06 DBP
0.34
Neg .4ssn seif-resources & stress:
SA: pre
1.77,
post
1.09
NonSA: pre
0.11,
post
0.20

Wiesenfeld et al., 3 layoff . TP eq

1999 conditions: fair/
fair < unfair neg
unfair/unfair + SA;
— 0.69
measured
Private Self seif-neg eq
Consciousness unfairSA < fair neg
(PSC)
—0.48
self-neg eq I’)
“C

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)

Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

unfairSA < neg

unfair —1.11
seif-neg
—0.79

Assn PSC & mood:

Unfair neg
. —I.58

UnfairSA neg
0.95

Fair neg
—0.45

Galinksy et at., 4 conditions: (A) hc: NonSA > SA dissonance

2000, study I High choice, speech I .94
only (B) High
hc, NonSA> Ic, 1.23
choice SA (C)
High choice, SA + SA + neg FB
negative feedback hc, SA: neg 1.77
(FB); (D) Low FB > no FB
choice, SA +
SA + neg FB: 1.09 —
negative feedback
hc> Ic
(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
hc: SA + neg self-relevant
FB > NonSA neg
1.44
hc, SA: neg 1.05
FB> no FB
Ic, SA + neg 0.97
FB> hc,
NonSA

pus eq attitude,
persuasion,
state SE eq

Tesser & 2 x 2 x 2: Self- High relevance, easy clues

Cornell, 1991, affIrmation SA: friend> 1.70
study 1 (SA/NonSA) stranger
x Closeness
High relevance,
of competitor
(friend/
stranger) x
friend: SA >
NonSA
1.83
I.
Task relevance Low relevance, 0.51
(low =game/ SA: friend>
high = IQ) stranger

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
L.ow relevance, 009
friend: —

SA=NonSA

Wood et al,, 1999, SA/NonSA NonSA> SA SC

study 3 1.21
Spencer et al., 2 x 2 factorial: Self- low SE: self eval
2001, study 2 affirmation (SA/ NonSA < SA —0.44
NonSA) x Self-
esteem (low/high) low SE, NonSA —0.34
< high SE, SA

TP, other
evals eq

Fry & Prentice- 2 x 2: self- SA: prior Maladaptive

Dunn, 2005 affirmation exposure> Coping:
(SA/NonSA) no exposure Avoidance
x coping info 0.89
(present, Helplessness
absent) Also 1.10
measured prior Religiosity,
exposure to breast adaptive
cancer (friends, coping, BSE
family) intention, info
seeking eq

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
Alternative Scales e’ith Written Responses SAM
Reed & 2 x 2 factorial: Self- High belief in perceived intent to
Aspinwall, 1998 affirmation drinkers: SA vs. link control decrease use
(SA/NonSA) NonSA 0.41, 0.78, —0.86
x Issue risk-confirm time to orient
relevance (low info eval to risk info
caffeine use 0.13 —1.05
0-I/day vs. high use
2+/day) belief perceived intent
—0.28, control 0.20
0.53,
Low drinkers: SA risk eval time to
vs. NonSA —0.60 orient
0.17
SA: high < low belief eq perceived intent
drinkers control —0.86
—0.67
NonSA: high vs. belief perceived intent
lowdrinkers —0.64, control 0.20
risk eval —1.07
—0.67
SA<NonSA - f/u caffeine use
— 0.26

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Behavior Mood Other
Schimel et al., 3 conditions: inSA > exSA correct
2004, study 1 intrinsic SA/ subtractions
extrinsic SA/ 1.00
neutral (N)
inSA > N 0.40

exSA < N —0.56

inSA > exSA total responses
1.02
to
inSA > N 0.26
exSA > N 0.75

inSA < exSA SH

—0.78
inSA < N —0.92
exSA < N —0.07

Schimel et al., 2 x 2 Threat inSA: IQ > # correct

2004, study 2 (IQ/game) game 0.57
x SA
exSA: IQ < —0.91
(itrinsic/
extrinsic) game
IQ: inSA 0.39
> exSA
Game: — 1.09
inSA < exSA

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Behavior Mood Other
Value Essay SAM
Cohen et aL, 2000, NS
03
2 x 2: Self- SA > NonSA < 063
study 1 affirmation (SAl
NonSA) x Ps
partisanship
(proponent/
opponent)
of capital
punishment

Cohen et al., 2000, 2 x 2: Sell’- biased source

study 3 affirmation perception
(SA/NonSA) —0.55
x Ps abortion
partisanship advocate
(proponent/ rating
opponent) —0.50
Covariate: SA < NonSA polarization pos eq
topic —0.59
importance
SA > NonSA opponent eval
0.3 l”
I.
Harris & Self-affirmation High belief in link perceived neg SE
Napper, 2005 (SA/NonSA) drinkers: SA vs. oS
N
6 si
eq, evidence risk
x drinking (low/ NonSA strength 0.87, intent
NSi
056
high) x time imagination 1.67,
0.97 f/u alcohol
—0.07

(continued)
APPENDIX TABlE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Behavior Mood Other
L.ow drinkers: SA belief in link perceived neg SE
vs. NonSA —0.17, risk
evidence 0.04, intent
strength imagination —0.22,
—0.23 17u alcohol
0.27

Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Schrneichel & 2 x 2 x 2: NonSA: MS > C pro-US SE eq

Martens, 2005, Mortality 0.97 ft
ft
study 1 salience (MS)/
SA: MS > C 027
control (C) x Self-
affirmation (SA/ MS SA= 0.01
NonSA); NonSA
Within-Ps
variable: C: SA Favorability of
Pro- or > NonSA author
Anti-US essay 0.67
NonSA: MS < C anti-US
— 0.60
SA: MS > C 0.62
MS: SA —0.83
< NonSA

C: SA Favorability of
> NonSA author
N5
039

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Hoshino-Browne SA: Independent < —0.27

et a!., 2005, interdependent, none
study 3 independent, none
Interdependent —0.76
< none

— N5
049
Interdependent
< independent

Hoshino-Browne 2 x 2: Self- Canadian: SA 0.43

et al., 2005, affirmation assoc with DV
study 4 (independent SA
none) x Cultural Asian -j- —0.68
identification Canadian:
(Canadian, Asian independent
Canadian) SA < NonSA

Schmeichel & SA/NonSA SA < NonSA death thoughts SE eq

Martens, 2005, —0.59
study 2
Sherman et al., SeW-affirmation SA > NonSA perceived risk buy condoms
2000, study 2 (SA/N0nSA) 0.66; 0.54,
Covariates: perceived take brochures
Pre-test HIV similarity 0.54
concern and 0.6l’
perceived risk

(continued)
 00

APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)

Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Siegel et al., 2005 Gender x Self- Non-contingent: SH

affirmation (SA/ SA > NonSA 0.55
NonSA) x
Success (non/ Contingent: SA = SH’
contingent) NonSA 0.09
to
Spencer et al., SA SC pos > neg
2001, study 3 1.79
NonSA SC neg> P05
1.79
SA > NonSA up SC
0.72
SA/NonSA NonSA > SA down SC
1.15

White & SA/NonSA, White! NonSA> SA downward

Lehman, Asian; Within-Ps counter-
2005, study 3 variable: factuals
Direction of O.S8

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
counteifactual: NonSA: down> t
4
.
0 8
up, down; up —

Order: up/down,
down/up

Reference IV Contrast Prejudice Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Fein & Spencer, 2 x 2 factorial: Self- NonSA, 1.05

1997, study I affirmation (SA/ Jewish>
NonSA) x Race rest
(Jewish/Italian) of
mock job
applicant
I
Zarate & Garza, 2 x 2 factorial: Self- SE eq
2002. study I affirmation (SA/
SA < NonSA —0.33
NonSA)
Between-(ethnic) Difference: SA < —0.64
group comparison NonSA
focus (similarity/
difference)
Covariate: gender
Shrira & Martin, SA/NonSA SA > NonSA stereotypes pos, left
2005, study 1 0.46 neg eq hemisphere
activation
0.64

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Prejudice Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Shrira & Martin, Self-affirmation SA vs. NonSA librarian pos, 0.46

2005, study 2 (SA/NonSA) x non/ 0.44, neg eq
stigmatized target Arab male
(librarian, —0.55
Arab male)

Gramzow & Group Assn RWA & DV other assns,

Gaerlner, 2005, categorization (in/ SE eq
study 3 out) x Self-
affirmation NonSA: ingroup eval
0.50, —
(SA/NonSA);
measured 10 outgroup eval
individual —0.08
difference lVs SA: ingroup eval
including —0.15,
right wing outgroup eval
authoritarianism 0.12
(RWA)

Adams et al., 2 x 2: race! White: SA > Perceived racism

in press, ethnicity (White, NonSA 0.54,
meta-analysis of Latino), self- Ave White
2 studies affirmation (SA, is racist
NonSA) 0.57,
Whites
understate
racism
0.81

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Prejudice Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
Latino: SA < Perceived
NonSA racism

Martens et al., 2 x 2: gender x Females, Math

2006, study 1 stereotype threat stereotype threat: performance
(yes, no) + 1 threat SA > NonSA 0.24
& SA group for
females only

Martens et at., 2 x 2: gender x self- SA > NonSA Math

2006, study 2 affirmation (SA/ performance
NonSA) Females
0.61
Males
0.18
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Writing Task SAM

Harvey & 2 x 3: Self- SA > NonSA support for black
Oswald, 2000,
study 1
affirmation
(SA/NonSA)x
Video (blacks hurt
in civil rights
protest, white
Assn with SA
programs
0.58

shame
—0.37;
I
Alzheinier’s guilt
patient, —0.16;

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)

Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)

Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
neutral distress
documentary) 1.35;
empathy
0.85
Assn ii’ith NonSA shame
1.09;
guilt
1.54;
to
distress
1.54;
empathy
0.58

Harvey & SA/N0nSA SA > NonSA support

Oswald, 2000, 0.77
study 2

Van den Bos, 2 x 2 x 2: Self- SA < NonSA neg

2001, study 2 affirmation —0.77
(SA/NonSA)
Mortality NonSA, voice: —0.46
(salient/not), MS < NonMS
Procedure NonSA, no voice: 0.48
(voice/no voice) MS > NonMS

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
SA, voice: MS> 0.25
NonMS
SA, no voice: —0.29
MS < NonMS
Voice, MS: SA= eq —

NonSA

Voice, NonMS: —0.65

SA < NonSA
No voice, MS: —0.78
SA <NonSA
No voice, NonMS: 0.07
SA=NonSA

Wiesenfeld et al., Self-affirmation Neg Assn job insecurity & PUS mood
2001, study 1 (SA/NonSA) NonSA —0.98
SA 0.02

Wiesenfeld et al., Self-affirmation Assn layoff communication method & organizational commitment
2001, study 2 (SA/NonSA) NonSA 0.70
SA —0.28

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Matz & Wood, 3 conditions: (A) ic vs. hc, NonSA dissonance pressure to
2005, study 2 Low perceived —0.87, conform
choice on neg —0.94
verdict; (B) High
choice + SA; (C) pos
NS
035
High choice

hc: SA vs. dissonance —0.93

to
NonSA —0.83,
neg

pos
0.72”
hc, SA vs. Ic dissonance eq, —0.03
neg
0.18”,
pos
NS
035

consensus,
compromise,
intent to
persuade,
perceived
similarity eq

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
Schimel et al., Feedback No Feedback: social
2004, study 3 (positive! none) x exSA > inSA rejection
Self-affirmation thoughts
(intrinsic! 0.82
extrinsic)
exSA: pos< —1.37
no feedback
inSA: pos=no —0.05
feedback

Klein et a!., 2001, Self regard SC*SA*T1 risk alcohol

study I salience or self- ratings predicting poisoning
affirmation (SA/ T2 risk ratings 0.36,
NonSA) x Peer heart disease
norm information 0.35
(present/absent)
pos eq

McGregor et al., 5 groups: (A) Group d > e Conviction

2001, study 1 own dilemma; (B) 0.64
a + integrity
Group d > c 0.83
repair exercise; (C)
a+attitude Group a> rest Felt
hardening uncertainty
opportunity; 0.42
(D) h+c; (F)

(continued) -J
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)

Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

friend’s dilemma;
Covariates: sex, SE,
personal need for
structure
L

Schwingharnrner 2 x 2: self- Attractive: Neg Perceived

et a!., 2006, activation SA vs. Pos SA attractiveness
study 3 (pos, neg) x (self)
comparison other 1.09
(un/attractive) (other)
— 1.02
Unattractive: Neg (self)
SA vs. Pos SA 0.64
(other)
—0.73

Dillard et al., 2005 Smokers: self- Smokers: SA Warning Pos eq, self- Info recall eq
affirmation (none, NonSA ratings eq feelings eq
connected
NonSA: Info recall
disconnected) vs.
smokers> 0.64
non self-affirmed
non-smokers non-smokers

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other
Smokers: motive to quit
connected NS
008

SA=NonSA
SA: connect> motive to quit
disconnect 0.19

Blanton ci al., Self-affirmation Assn cola preference & taste test confidence controlling for accuracy
2001, study I (SA/NonSA) NonSA 0.54
.
SA NS, ES?

Imagery Task SA1I

Dc Cremer & 2 x 2 x 2: cooperation
Sedikides, 2005, Procedural intention ES?
study 6 justice (opinion
voiced/not),
Self-affirmation
(SA/NonSA),
measured
I.
self-concept clarity
(high, low)

(continued)
 00
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

SeiiEsteeni Scales as SAM

Kimble et al., 1998 2 x 2 x 2 x 2: Self- SE: High> Practice time
esteem (low, Low (less SH)
high), x Grade 0.73
(3, 6)xOrder of SE
test (before, after SE test: first —1.04
< last
eval task) x
Personal 3rd, SE test 1st: 0.89
importance of eval low > high SE
task (low, high)
—
3rd, SE test last: 1.36
low < high SE
6th, SE test 1st: —0.56
low < high SE
6th, SE test last: 0.29
low> high SE
< —
Boys: low 1.72
high SE
6th boys SE first: —2.00
low < high SE

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Standardized Mean Difference Effect Size (d)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Mood Other

Steele et al., 1993 2 x 2: Self-esteem Salient < not —0.68

Study 2 (low, high)
xsalience High SE: —1.37
(repeated scale, salient < not
did not) Low SE: 0.74
salient> not

Salient: High — 1.87

SE < low SE
Not salient: High 0.08
SE= Low SE I.
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Behavior
Feedback SAM
Steele et al., 1993, 2 x 2: self-esteem SE: high < low Album
study I (low, high) x desirability
Feedback (FB) —0.80
(positive,
FB: pos < neg —0.99
negative,
neutral) FB: pos < neutral —0.78
FB: neg > neutral 0.21
Neg EB: high < —0.84
low SE

(continued)
APPENDIX TABlE 2 (Continued)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Behavior

Heine & 2x3: Nationality Japanese < —2.49

Lehnian, 1997 (Japanese, Canadian
Canadian) x
Canadian: no 1.05 —
Feedback
(positive, feedback
negative, none) C: Pos feedback NS
C: Neg feedback 1.66
C: Neg> 0.67
Pos feedback
Japanese: eq
feedback

Ben-An et al., 2 x 2 x 2: No FB, High Driving speed

1999, study 4 mortality DRS: MS> 0.90
salience, nonMS
driving
relevant to No FB, Low DRS: 0.01
SE (DRS), MS=nonMS
positive NS
050
Pos FB, High
feedback DRS: MS <
(FB) (yes,no) nonMS
Pos FB, Low 0.04
DRS: MS=
nonMS

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Behavior

Cohen et at., 2000, 2 x 2: Opinion of Pro> Opp Support

study 2 capital counter-
punishment attitudinal view
(pponent, 0.51
2pEonent) x
Pos FB > None 0.45 0.44
Feedback
(positive, none)

Schwinghammer 2 x 2: self- Pos FB: Perceived

et al., 2006, activation (pos/no attractive vs. attractiveness
study 2 feedback [FBI) x unattractive other (self)
—
comparison other 1.59
(un/attractive) (other)
2.26
No FB: (self)
attractive
> unattractive (other)
other NS
057

No FB vs. (self)
Pos FB 2.25
(other)
—2.21

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Behavior

Blantori et al., 2 x 3: Choice He> Ic Handicap

1997 (high, low) x funding
Feedback (none, favorability
related, 1.15
unrela ted)
Related > 0.38
unrelated
Related > none 0.14

Unrelated < none 0.24 10

None: Ic < hc 0.62

Unrelated: Ic < hc NS
Related: Ic < hc 0.78

Indirect methods SAM

Stone & Cooper, SE x 4 groups: Relevant: high 0.64
2003 High choice x > low SE
attribute
priming task Non relevant: —0.76
(relevant, non high < low SE
relevant,
neutral) + low
choice, neutral
priming control

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition — Behavior

Schimel et al., 3 (relationship Higher scores: Social

2001, study I prime: Non > comparison
contingent, Contingent info seek
noncontingent, 0.62
neutral) x 2 (social
comparison: Non> - 0.32
lower, higher Neutral
scores) Lower scores: - 1.31
Non <
Contingent
Non < Neutral —0.35
Simon et al., 1995, 4 conditions: (A) Hc: SA < support trivialization
study 4 SA, high choice Control mandatory —0.55
(hc); (B) finals
Control, hc; (C) —0.77
Issue salience (IS)
he; (D) Control, SA=1S —0.01 —0.10
low choice (Ic)
SA = interest in
SA vs. Ic
Control
0.22 —0.87
I
generally and
personally IS < hc —0.76 —0.45
important Control
movie
IS vs. lc 0.22 —0.77
Control

(continued)
APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Continued)
Reference IV Contrast Attitude Persuasion Cognition Behavior
Frantz et al., 2004, Threat (masked, explicit: SA < IAT RT
study 3 suspected, NonSA —067
explicit) x Self-
affirmation (SA/ Masked: SA> 0.14
NonSA) NonSA
SAMCPR explicit, SA < —0.26
before TAT masked, SA
explicit, — 0.56
V
NonSA> to
masked,
NonSA a

Anticipated SAM
Steele & Liu, 1981 Counter- Essay only> 1.75
attitudinal others
essay, essay
+ SA expectation,
Essay + SA = eq
no essay no essay

Notes: SA = self-affirmed, NonSA = not self-affirmed, IV = independent variable, DV = dependent variable, Ps = participants, RC = reverse coded; lower
scores = higher variable characteristic, pos positive, neg = negative, SE = self-esteem, eq equal; no mean group differences, SC = social comparison,
TP = task performance, SBP = systolic blood pressure, DBP = diastolic blood pressure, assn = association/correlation between, = converted r reported in
text to d, eval = evaluation, ‘= only females from co-ed sample included in analysis, BSE = breast self-exam, f/u follow-up, NS = non significant effects
reported in article text, NSI NS effects in text but simple effects of SA at time 1 only are presented, SH self-handicapping, ES? = effect size could not be
calculated, j = effect size included in article text.