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Footnotes 22 Id., 92-97. on Appeals from Resolutions in
1 Rollo, 90. 23 Id., 100. Preliminary
2 Id., 51-52. 24 Id., 118. Investigations/Reinvestigations."
3 Original Record (OR), 9. 25 OR, 139-141. Sec. 4 thereof states:
4 Id., 19-21. 26 Id., 129-136. [N]o appeal shall be entertained
5 OR, 20-21. 27 Id., 142-143. where the appellant had already
6 Id., 5. 28 Id., 146-149. been arraigned. If the appellant is
7 OR, 6. 29 Id., 210. arraigned during the pendency of
8 Id., 7. 30 Id., 150-151. the appeal, said appeal shall be
9 Id., 9-18. 31 OR, 224. dismissed motu proprio by the
10 OR, 36-50. 32 Id., 213-215. Secretary of Justice.
11 OR, 4. 33 Id., 218. 41 OR, 256-257.
12 Id., 1. 34 Id., 227-228. 42 Id., 260-265.
13 Id., 33. 35 OR, 231-237. 43 Id., 266-269.
14 OR, 52-53. 36 Id., 244. 44 OR, 270-273.
15 Id., 54-56. 37 Id., 247-252. 45 Id., 274-275.
16 Id., 59. 38 OR, 250-251. 46 OR, 300-301.
17 Id., 62. 39 Id., 253-255. 47 Id., 302.
18 Id., 63-71. 40 The YABUTs must have had in 48 Id., 306-307.
19 151 SCRA 462 [1987]. mind DOJ Department Order 49 Id., 310-320.
20 176 SCRA 287 [1989]. (D.O.) No. 223 dated 30 June 1993 50 Supra note 43.
21 OR, 78-83. and entitled "1993 Revised Rules 51 OR, 346-362.
52 Id., 335-337. Platon, 69 Phil. 556, 565 [1940]; 81 People v. Balicasan, 17 SCRA
53 Id., 339. People v. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453, 1119, 1123 [1966]; People v. Court
54 Id., 368-373. 459 [1948]; Crespo v. of Appeals, supra note 79; Galman
55 OR, 376-379. Mogul, supra note 19; Allado v. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 78 at
56 Id., 380. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192, 206, 210 89.
57 Id., 382-385. [1994]. 82 People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121,
58 Id., 386. 72 Supra note 71. 127 [1934]; People v. Gomez, 20
59 Id., 390. 73 Supra note 71. SCRA 293, 298 [1967]; People v.
60 254 SCRA 307 [1996]. 74 Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, 404
61 278 SCRA 656, 676-678 [1997]. 705, 711 [1994]. [1971]; Serino v. Zosa, 40 SCRA
62 The 1987 Revised 75 People v. Bedia, 83 Phil. 909, 433, 438-440 [1971]; People v.
Administrative Code, Executive 916 [1949]. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 273
Order No. 292. 76 Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 19 [1975]; Silvestre v. Military
63 235 SCRA 39, 48-49 [1994]. at 471. Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10,
64 Supra note 19. 77 See, e.g., Herras Teehankee v. 18-19 [1978]; People v. Bocar, 138
65 Supra note 60. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, SCRA 166, 170-171 [1985]; People
66 OR, 100. 773 [1946]. v. Castañeda, 165 SCRA 327, 343
67 OR, 146-149. 78 Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 19 [1988]; Portugal v. Reantaso, 167
68 Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 19 at 170, citing People v. Zabala, 58 SCRA 712, 720 [1988]; Aquino v.
at 471. OG 5028 and Galman v. Sison, 179 SCRA 648, 651-652
69 Supra note 63. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, 101 [1989]; Gorion v. Regional Trial
70 United States v. Montaner, 8 [1986]. Court of Cebu, Br. 17, 213 SCRA
Phil. 620, 629 [1907]. 79 People v. Court of Appeals, 101 138, 148 [1992].
71 United States v. Mamintud, 6 SCRA 450, 467 [1980].
Phil. 374, 376 [1906]; Suarez v. 80 Supra note 78 at 86.
[ ]
 27 41
Footnotes Venus vs. Desierto, 298 SCRA Department of Justice Order No.
1
ANNEX "G"; Rollo, p. 53. 196 (1998); and Dimatulac vs. 223 (June 30 1993), 1993 Revised
2
ANNEX "C-1"; Rollo, p. 24. Villon, supra note 21. Rules on Appeals from Resolutions
3 28
ANNEX "K"; Rollo, p.71. Supra note 20. in Preliminary
4 29
Ibid. Venus vs. Desierto, supra note Investigation/Reinvestigations
5
Ibid. 27, p. 214. xxx
6 30
ANNEX "P"; Rollo, p. 84. See Bonifacio vs. Tolentino, 139 "Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases:
7
ANNEX "Q"; Rollo, p. 86. SCRA 307 (1985) and Exceptions. – No appeal may be
8
ANNEX "A"; Rollo, p. 21. Dimatulac vs. Villon, supra note taken from a resolution of the Chief
9
Ibid. 21. State Prosecutor finding probable
10 31
ANNEX "B"; Rollo, p. 22. Supra note 21. cause except upon showing of
11 32
Rollo, p. 14. Supra note 18. manifest error or grave abuse of
12 33
Ibid. Dimatulac vs. Villon, supra note discretion. Notwithstanding the
13
Ibid. 21, p. 712. showing of manifest error or grave
14 34
Ibid., p. 3. Venus vs. Desierto, supra note 2 abuse of discretion, no appeal shall
15
Ibid. 7, p. 220. be entertained where the appellant
16 35
Ibid., p.9. Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, had already been arraigned. If the
17
Ibid., p. 10. Inc., G.R. No. 126210, March 9, appellant is arraigned during the
18
235 SCRA 39 (1994). 2000. pendency of the appeal, said
19 36
254 SCRA 307 (1996). Rollo, p. 12. appellant said appeal shall be
20 37
151 SCRA 462 (1987). JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE dismissed motu propio by the
21
Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA CONSTITUTION OF THE Secretary of Justice.
679 (1998), pp. 709-710. REPUBLIC OF THE An appeal/motion for
22
278 SCRA 656 (1997) PHILIPPINES, A reinvestigation from a resolution
23
The 1987 Revised Administrative COMMENTARY, Vol. 1, (1987), finding probable cause, however,
Code, Executive Order No. 292. p. 421. shall not hold the filing of the
24 38
Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, Dansal vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. information in court."
supra note 22, pp. 676-678. 126814, March 2, 2000. xxx
25 39 42
Dimatulac vs. Villon, supra note Dimatulac vs. Villon, supra note Dimatulac vs. Villon, supra note
21, p. 712. 21, pp. 707-708. 21, p. 709.
26 40 43
Supra note 18. BERNAS, supra note 37, p. 388. Supra note 18, p. 50.
44
Supra note 6.
45 52
Supra note 10. Reconsideration on Denial of Due FLORENZ D. REGALADO,
46
Supra note 6, p. 85. Course and Motions for REMEDIAL LAW
47
Ibid. Reconsideration on Extended COMPENDIUM, VOL. II, 7th
48
Supra note 10, p. 22. Resolutions shall be ten (10) days REV. ED., p. 236.
49 53
Ibid. and fifteen (15) days, respectively. See Bonifacio vs. Tolentino,
50 51
Memorandum Circular No. 12 Cabral vs. Puno, 70 SCRA 606 supra note 30 and
also prescribes that the period for (1976), p. 610. Dimatulac vs. Villon, supra note
the disposition of Motions for 21.
 19
Footnotes U.S. vs. Narvas, 14 Phil. 410. Procedure; Estrella vs. Orendain,
1 20
Copy of information, Annex A to People vs. Sope, 75 Phil. 810; Jr., 37 SCRA 650-652, 654-655;
Annex E; pp. 54-55, Rollo People vs. Liggayu, 97; PhiL 865; Gonzales vs. Serrano, L-25791.
2
Annex C to Annex E; pp. 70-71, Zulueta vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Sept. 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 64; Caeg
Rollo. People vs. Natoza, G.R. L-8917, vs. Abad Santos, N-40044, March
3
Annex D to Annex E; p. 72, supra. Dec. 14, 1956. 10, 1975, 63 SCRA 96; Oliveros vs.
4 21
Annex E to Annex E; pp. 73- Bagatua vs. Revilla, G.R. L- Villaluz, L-33362, July 30, 1971,
108, supra. 12247, August 26, 1958. 40 SCRA 327; Noblejas vs. Salas,
5 22
Annex F to Annex C; p. Zulueta vs. Nicolas, supra. L-31788 and 31792, Sept. 15, 1975,
23
109, supra. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 112 of 67 SCRA 47; Vda. de Jacob vs.
6
Annex G to Annex E; pp. 110-118, the Rules of Court; Presidential Puno, 131 SCRA 144; Circular No.
Rollo. Decree 911; Sections 1-4, Rule 112 13, April 19, 1976 of the Secretary
7
Annex H to Annex E; pp. 119- of the 1985 Rules on Criminal of Justice.
32
129, supra. Procedure. Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phils.
8 24
Annex I to Annex E; pp. 130-132, People vs. De Moll, 68 Phil. 626. 245; U.S. vs. Limsiongco, 41 Phils.
25
supra. Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan 94; De la Cruz vs. Mujer, 36 Phis.
9
Annex J to Annex E; pp. 133- vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914; People 213; Section 1 Rule 110, Rules of
139, supra. vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-26222, July Court, now Section 1 also Rule 110,
10
Annex K to Annex E; p. 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
26 33
140, supra. People vs. Natoza, supra; Pangan 21 C.J.S. 123; Carrington.
11 34
Annex L to Annex E; pp. 141- vs. Pasicolan, G.R. L-12517, May U.S. vs. Barreto, 32 Phils. 444.
35
142, supra. 19, 1958. Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan
12 27
Annex E; pp. 42-53, supra. People vs. Jamisola, No. L- vs. Dollete, Supra.
13 36
P. 145, supra. 27332, Nov. 28, 1969; People vs. People vs. Zabala, 58 O. G. 5028.
14 36
Annex A to petition; pp. 23- Agasang, 66 Phil.182. Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144
28
26, supra. People vs. Pineda, supra. SCRA 43, 101.
15 29 37
Annex D, pp. 40-41, supra. Kwong Sing vs.City of Manila, People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA
16
Pp. 5-21, supra 41 Phil. 103,112. 361 (1976).
17 30 38
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules Dimayuga vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phils.
of Court, now Section 5, Rule 110 384, 307; University of the 442; U.S. vs. Gallego, 37 Phils.
of 1985 Rules on Criminal Philippines vs. City Fiscal of 289; People vs. Hernandez, 69
Procedure, People v. Valdemoro, Quezon City, G.R. No. L-18562, Phils. 672; U.S. vs. Labil 27 Phils.
102 SCRA 170. July 31, 1961. 82; U.S. vs. Fernandez, Phils. 539;
18 31
Gonzales vs. Court of First PD 911, now Section 4, Rule 112 People vs. Velez, 77, Phils. 1026.
Instance, 63 Phil. 846, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
—
 Footnotes 18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).
1 Rollo, 5, 29. 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 25 The said pronouncements
2 Ibid., 6, 29. SCRA 565, 569 (1971); People vs. foreshadowed and are adopted in
3 Ibid., 7. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, the Family Code of the Philippines
4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A- 1988. (Executive Order No. 209, as
1, Petition. 19 Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 amended by Executive Order No.
5 Ibid., 7, 178. SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. 227, effective on August 3, 1988),
6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B- Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980). Article 26 whereof provides that
2, id. 20 Samilin vs. Court of First "(w)here marriage between a
7 Ibid., 8-9, 178. Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves, et al. vs. validly celebrated and a divorce is
9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id. Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 thereafter validly obtained abroad
10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id. (1984). by the alien spouse capacitating him
11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id. 21 Rollo, 289. or her to remarry, the Filipino
12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id. 22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State spouse shall likewise have capacity
13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id. vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re to re under Philippine law.
14 Ibid, 105. Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. 1099; 26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490
15 Ibid., 11. State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 (1911).
16 Ibid., 311-313. NW 915. 27 Footnote 20, ante.
17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of 23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427
Court. (1956).
—
Footnotes
1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 18-19.
2 Annex B, id.; ibid., 20-21.
3 Annex C, id.; ibid., 22-23.
4 Annex G, id.; ibid., 37-38.
5 Annex D, id.; ibid., 27-29.
6 Annex F, id.; ibid., 34-36.
7 Annex E, id.; ibid., 30-33.
8 Rollo, 4-5.
9 Ibid., 10.
10 Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766
(1950); Section 5, Rule 120, 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11 Almeda vs. Villaluz, et al., 66
SCRA 38 (1975).
12 Id., ibid.
13 Guinto vs. Veluz, et al., 77 Phil.
801 (1946).
14 Vega vs. Panis, et al., 117 SCRA
269 (1982).
15 People vs. Montenegro, et al.,
159 SCRA 236 (1988).
16 42 C.J.S., Indictment and
Information 1250.
17 People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176
(1940).
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Footnotes
* Designated additional member
per Raffle dated 22 September
2010.
1 3
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules In a Resolution dated 4 October
of Civil Procedure. 2004.
2 4
Dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May In an Order dated 17 May 2005
2006. (Records, p. 142).
5
In a Resolution dated 24 May
2005.
6
Denied in an Order dated 2 May
2006.
7
Rollo, pp. 30-33.
8
The provision states: "Dismissal
of appeal for abandonment or
failure to prosecute. – x x x x
The Court of Appeals may also,
upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to
a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal."
9
329 Phil. 339 (1996).
10
Id. at 350.
11
The provision states: "Forfeiture
of bail. – When the presence of the
accused is required by the court or
these Rules, his bondsmen shall be
notified to produce him before the
court on a given date and time. If
the accused fails to appear in person
as required, his bail shall be
declared forfeited and the
bondsmen given thirty (30) days
within which to produce their
principal and to show why no
judgment should be rendered
against them for the amount of their
bail. Within the said period, the
bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their
principal or give the reason for his
non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not
appear before the court when first
required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a
judgment shall be rendered against
the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail.
The court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of
the bondsmen, unless the accused
has been surrendered or is
acquitted."
12
Rollo, p. 40.
13
Section 21, Article III, 1987
Constitution.
14
Section 7, Rule 117 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
right has, of course, broader scope
to cover not only prior guilty pleas
but also acquittals and unconsented
dismissals to bar prosecutions for
the same, lesser or graver offenses
covered in the initial proceedings
(id.)
15
Rollo, p. 97.
16
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 345 (1955)
(emphasis in the original).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 345-346.
19
We observed in Quizon: "Much
of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive
phrases as ‘homicide through
reckless imprudence,’ and the like;
when the strict technical offense is,
more accurately, ‘reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide’;
or ‘simple imprudence causing
damages to property.’’’ (Id. at 345;
emphasis supplied)
20
In People v. Buan, 131 Phil. 498,
500-502 (1968), which applied
Quizon’s logic, the Court
canvassed relevant jurisprudence,
local and Spanish:
[T]he quasi-offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and cannot be split
into different crimes and
prosecutions. This has been the
constant ruling of the Spanish
Supreme Court, and is also that of
this Court in its most recent
decisions on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974,
January 30, 1962, where as a result
of the same vehicular accident one
man died, two persons were
seriously injured while another
three suffered only slight physical
injuries, we ruled that the acquittal
on a charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless
imprudence, was a bar to another
prosecution for homicide through
reckless imprudence. In People vs.
Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the
ruling was that the dismissal by the
Municipal Court of a charge of
reckless driving barred a second
information of damage to property
through reckless imprudence based
on the same negligent act of the
accused. In People vs, Belga, 100
Phil. 996, dismissal of an
information for physical injuries
through needless imprudence as a
result of a collision between two
automobiles was declared, to block
two other prosecutions, one for
damage to property through
reckless imprudence and another
for multiple physical injuries
arising from the same collision. The
same doctrine was reasserted in
Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669,
April 30, 1959. In none of the cases
cited did the Supreme Court regard
as material that the various offenses
charged for the same occurrence
were triable in Courts of differing
category, or that the complainants
were not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence,
Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal
(12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this to
say:
Aun cuando de un solo hecho
imprudente se originen males
diversos, como el hecho culposo es
uno solo, existe un solo delito de
imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia
constante del Tribunal Supremo.
De acuerdo con esta doctrina el
automovilista imprudente que
atropella y causa lesiones a dos
personas y ademas daños, no
respondera de dos delitos de
lesiones y uno de daños por
imprudencia, sino de un solo delito
culposo.
The said author cites in support of
the text the following decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain
(footnotes 2 and 3).
xxxx
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa
la muerte de una persona y ademas
se ocasionan daños, existe un solo
hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el
acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse
dos enorden a la responsabilidad
civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a
consecuencia de un solo acto
imprudente se produjeron tres
delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de
daños, como todos son
consecuencia de un solo acto
culposo, no cabe penarlos por
separado, 2 abril 1932. (Emphasis
supplied)
21
E.g. Samson v. Court of Appeals,
103 Phil. 277 (1958); People v.
Cano, 123 Phil. 1086 (1966);
Pabulario v. Palarca, 129 Phil. 1
(1967); Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil.
429 (1969).
22
67 Phil. 529 (1939) (affirming a
conviction for malicious mischief
upon a charge for "damage [to
property] through reckless
imprudence"). A logical
consequence of a Fallerian
conceptualization of quasi-crimes
is the sanctioning of the split
prosecution of the consequences of
a single quasi offense such as those
allowed in El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona, 70 Phil. 513 (1940)
(finding the separate prosecutions
of damage to property and multiple
physical injuries arising from the
same recklessness in the accused’s
operation of a motor vehicle not
violative of the Double Jeopardy
Clause).
23
67 Phil. 529 (1939).
24
E.g. Lontok v. Gorgonio, 178
Phil. 525, 528 (1979) (holding that
the "less grave offense" of "damage
to property through reckless
imprudence" (for ₱2,340) cannot be
complexed under Article 48 of the
penal code with a prescribed " slight
offense" of "lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence," citing
Faller); Arcaya v. Teleron, 156
Phil. 354, 362 (1974) (noting, by
way of dicta in a ruling denying
relief to an appeal against the
splitting of two charges for "less
serious physical injuries and
damage to property amounting to
₱10,000 though reckless
imprudence" and "slight physical
injuries though reckless
imprudence," that the Quizon
doctrine, as cited in Corpus v. Paje,
139 Phil. 429 (1969) and People v.
Buan, 131 Phil. 498 (1968), "may
not yet be settled in view of the
contrary dictum" in Faller).
25
94 Phil. 715 (1954).
26
100 Phil. 996 (1957) (barring
subsequent prosecutions for
physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence following
an acquittal for "reckless
imprudence with physical injury").
27
105 Phil. 1307 (1959) (Unrep.)
(barring subsequent prosecution for
"serious physical injuries"
following an acquittal for "reckless
driving").
28
107 Phil. 737 (1960) (barring
subsequent prosecution for
"damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" following a several victims [or, roughly,
conviction for "multiple slight and
serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence.")
29
No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4
SCRA 95 (barring subsequent
prosecution for "homicide thru
reckless imprudence" following an
acquittal for "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence").
30
123 Phil. 48 (1966) (barring
subsequent prosecution for
"damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" following an acquittal
for two counts of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence.")
31
131 Phil. 498 (1968) (barring
subsequent prosecution for "serious
physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence"
following an acquittal for "slight
physical injuries thru reckless damage to property amounting to
imprudence"). ₱10,000 though reckless
32
200 Phil. 486 (1982) (reversing a imprudence" and "slight physical
subsequent conviction for "damage injuries though reckless
to property thru reckless imprudence" arising from the same
imprudence" following a facts); Lontok v. Gorgonio, 178
conviction for "slight and serious Phil. 525 (1979) (granting a petition
physical injuries thru reckless to split a single charge for "reckless
imprudence"). imprudence resulting in damage to
33
206 Phil. 555 (1983) (barring property and multiple [slight]
subsequent prosecution for physical injuries" by limiting the
"homicide thru reckless petitioner’s trial to "reckless
imprudence" following a imprudence resulting in damage to
conviction for "serious physical property"). See also Reodica v.
injuries thru reckless imprudence"). Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 90
34
131 Phil. 498, 500 (1968). (1998) (holding that the "less grave
35
Id. felony of reckless imprudence
36
70 Phil. 513 (1940), also cited in resulting in damage to property"
other sources as People v. Estipona. (for ₱8,542) cannot be complexed
37
Supra note 32. under Article 48 of the Revised
38
Supra note 31. Penal Code with "the light felony of
39
Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 200 reckless imprudence resulting in
Phil. 486, 491 (1982). physical injuries," citing
40
Id. at 491-492. Lontok); People v. De Los Santos,
41
No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 407 Phil. 724 (2001) (applying
SCRA 95. Article 48 of the penal code to hold
42
Supra note 26. the accused liable for the "complex
43
No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 crime of reckless imprudence
SCRA 95, 97-100 (internal resulting in multiple homicide with
citations omitted). serious physical injuries and less
44
Id. at 100. serious physical injuries" (upon an
45
Id. information charging "multiple
46
Defined under Article 9, murder, multiple frustrated murder
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal and multiple attempted murder.") In
Code, as amended, thus: "Light a dicta, the decision stated that
felonies are those infractions of law separate informations should have
for the commission of which a been filed for the slight physical
penalty of arresto menor or a fine injuries the victims sustained which
not exceeding 200 pesos or both is cannot be complexed with the more
provided." serious crimes under Article 48.)
47 50
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Section 2 of RA 7691 provides:
Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 345 "Section 2. Section 32 of [Batas
(1955). Pambansa Blg. 129] is hereby
48
E.g. People v. Lara, 75 Phil. 786 amended to read as follows:
(1946) (involving "homicidio por ‘Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of
imprudencia temeraria" with Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
"multiple homicide thru reckless Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
imprudence"]); People v. Agito, 103 Criminal Cases. — Except in cases
Phil. 526 (1958) (involving "triple falling within the exclusive original
homicide and serious physical jurisdiction of Regional Trial
injuries through reckless Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
imprudence"). the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
49
E.g. People v. Turla, 50 Phil. Municipal Trial Courts, and
1001 (1927) (sustaining a dismissal Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
on demurrer of a criminal case for exercise:
the prosecutor’s failure to amend a xxxx
charge for "damage to property and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
of lesions leves [slight physical over all offenses punishable with
injuries] through negligence and imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
imprudence" to remove the charge years irrespective of the amount of
for the slight offense, under Article fine, and regardless of other
89 of the penal code, the precursor imposable accessory or other
of Article 48); Arcaya v. Teleron, penalties, including the civil
156 Phil. 354 (1974) (finding no liability arising from such offenses
grave abuse of discretion in the or predicated thereon, irrespective
filing of separate charges for "less of kind, nature, value or amount
serious physical injuries and thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to
property through criminal
negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.’" (Underlining supplied)
51
E.g. Angeles v. Jose, 96 Phil. 151
(1954) (reversing the ruling of the
then Court of First Instance of
Manila which dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction a complaint for
"damage to property in the sum of
₱654.22, and with less serious
physical injuries through reckless
negligence," holding improper the
splitting of the charge). We relied
on Angeles for our ruling in People
v. Villanueva, 111 Phil. 897 (1962)
resolving similar jurisdictional
issue and People v. Cano, 123 Phil.
1086, 1090 (1966) (reversing a
dismissal order which found the
complexing of "damage to property
with multiple [slight] physical
injuries through reckless
imprudence" improper, holding that
the Information did not and could
not have complexed the effect of a
single quasi-offense per Quizon.
The Court noted that "it is merely
alleged in the information that, thru
reckless negligence of the
defendant, the bus driven by him hit
another bus causing upon some of
its passengers serious physical
injuries, upon others less serious
physical injuries and upon still
others slight physical injuries, in
addition to damage to property").
52
Angeles v. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, 152
(1954).
53
Thus, we were careful to label the
crime in question as "what may be
called a complex crime of physical
injuries and damage to property"
(id., emphasis supplied), because
our prescription to impose
"additional penalty" for the second
consequence of less serious
physical injuries, defies the
sentencing formula under Article
48 requiring imposition of "the
penalty for the most serious crime x
x x the same to be applied in its
maximum period."
54
Supra note 31 at 502 (internal
citation omitted). This also explains
why in People v. Cano we described
as "not altogether accurate" a trial
court and a litigant’s assumption
that a charge for "damage to
property with multiple [slight]
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence" involved two crimes
corresponding to the two effects of
the single quasi-crime albeit
complexed as a single charge:
[A]ppellee and the lower court have
seemingly assumed that said
information thereby charges two
offenses, namely (1) slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence;
and (2) damage to property, and
serious and less serious physical
injuries, thru reckless negligence —
which are sought to be complexed.
This assumption is, in turn,
apparently premised upon the
predicate that the effect or
consequence of defendants
negligence, not the negligence
itself, is the principal or vital factor
in said offenses. Such predicate is
not altogether accurate.
As early as July 28, 1955 this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, had the occasion to state, in
Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of
Bacolor, Pampanga x x x, that:
The proposition (inferred from Art.
3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of
criminal liability" is too broad to
deserve unqualified assent. There
are crimes that by their structure
can not be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason,
robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In
truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi-offense, and dealt
separately from willful offenses. It
is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the "imprudencia
punible." Much of the confusion
has arisen from the common use of
such descriptive phrases as
"homicide through reckless
imprudence", and the like; when the
strict technical offense is more
accurately, "reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide", or "simple
imprudence causing damages to
property." (People v. Cano, 123
Phil. 1086,1090 (1966), (Emphasis
supplied), reiterated in Pabulario v.
Palarca, 129 Phil. 1 (1967)
(reversing a lower court which
quashed a charge alleging reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to
property and multiple slight
physical injuries).
55
See Section 32(2), Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691.
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9 19
Footnotes See letter dated October 20, 2000; Id. at. 253-257; penned by Judge
1
Rollo, pp. 11-18. id. at 22. Benjamin T. Antonio.
2 10 20
CA rollo, pp. 82-104; penned by Id. at 2-7. Id. at 256.
11 21
Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. Id. at 6. Id.
12 22
and concurred in by Associate Id. at 18-20. Id. at 256-257.
13 23
Justices Rosalinda Asuncion- Id. at 40-42. Id. at 258.
14 24
Vicente and Arturo G. Tayag. Id. at 40. CA rollo, p. 82.
3 15 25
Id. at 103. Id. at 80-81. Id. at 98.
4 16 26
Id. at 118. Id. at 81. Id. at 100-101.
5 17 27
Records, pp. 8-9. See Order dated July 30, 2003; id. Id. at 102.
6 28
Id. at 120. Id. at 103.
7 18 29
Id. at 11. See Order dated November 21, Id.
8
See letter dated October 13, 2000; 2003; id. at 181. 30
₱1,500,000 on October 1, 1993;
id. at 13. ₱1,500,000 on April 14, 1994;
₱300,000 on October 7, 1998 and
₱200,000 on November 2, 1998;
see records, p. 10.
31
Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 363 Phil. 701, 703
(1999).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 709. Emphasis supplied.
34
Article 1933 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1933. By the contract of loan,
one of the parties delivers to
another, either something not
consumable so that the latter may
use the same for a certain time and
return it, in which case the contract
is called a commodatum; or money
or other consumable thing, upon the
condition that the same amount of
the same kind and quality shall be
paid, in which case the contract is
simply called a loan or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially
gratuitous.
Simple loan may be gratuitous or
with a stipulation to pay interest.
₱
In commodatum the bailor retains
the ownerships of the thing loaned,
while in simple loan, ownership
passes to the borrower.
35
G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994,
234 SCRA 78.
36
Supra note 31.
37
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 35 at
95-97. Emphasis supplied.
38
Id.
39
223 Phil. 472 (1985).
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22 40
Footnotes People v. Bautista, 682 Phil. 487, Id at 21.
1 41
Spelled as "Mercilita" in the 498 (2012), citing People v. People v. Chingh, 611 Phil. 208,
records of the trial court. Naquita, 582 Phil. 422, 442-443 220 (2011).
* 42
Designated Additional Member in (2008); People v. Del Monte, 575 Section 3, Rule 117, Revised
lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Phil. 579, 587 (2008); People v. Rules on Criminal Procedure
Jardeleza, per Raffle dated Santiago, 564 Phil. 181, 193 provides:
September 8, 2014. (2007). Section 3. Grounds. - The accused
2 23
Penned by Associate Justice 476 Phil. 513 (2004). may move to quash the complaint
24
Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with TSN, October 26, 2010, pp. 3-8. or information on any of the
25
Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro- Mic/at, Jr. v. People, 672 Phil. following grounds:
Javier and Pedro B. Corales, 191, 209 (2011). (a) That the facts charged do not
26
concurring; rollo, pp. 3-16. People v. Belocura, 693 Phil. constitute an offense;
3
Records, p. I. 476, 490 (2012). (b) That the court trying the case
4 27
Id. TSN, October 26, 2010, p. 8. has no jurisdiction over the offense
5 28
Id. at 27. Guidelines of the Custody and charged;
6
TSN, October 26, 2010, pp. 3-5. Disposition of Seized Dangerous (c) That the court trying the case has
7
Id. at 6-8. Drugs, Controlled Precursors and no jurisdiction over the person of
8
Id at 9-13. Essential Chemicals and the accused;
9
TSN, August 23, 2011 pp. 2-3. Laboratory Equipment. (d) That the officer who filed the
10 29
Exhibit "E," records, p. 10. TSN, October 26, 2010, p. 9; information had no authority to do
11
TSN, February 7, 2011, pp. 3-9. TSN, June 13, 2011, p. 4; TSN, so;
12
Exhibit "F," records, p. 11. September 19, 2011, p. 9. (e) That it does not conform
13 30
Exhibit "H," id at 54. TSN, October 26, 2010, p. 6. substantially to the prescribed form;
14 31
TSN, February 7, 2011, p. 8. Id. at 9. (f) That more than one offense is
15 32
Id. Id. at 10-13. charged except when a single
16 33
TSN, July 18, 2011, p. 6. TSN, June 13, 2011, p. 9. punishment for various offenses is
17 34
TSN, January 31, 2012, pp. 3-9. TSN, February 7, 2011, pp.4-5. prescribed by law;
18 35
TSN, February 20, 2012, pp. 5-9. Id. at. 8. (g) That the criminal action or
19 36
Per Judge Teodoro C. Fernandez, TSN, June 13, 2011, pp. 2-3. liability has been extinguished;
37
CA rollo, pp. 44-53. Rollo, pp. 8-10. (h) That it contains averments
20 38
Id. at 52-53. TSN, June 13, 2011, p. 8. which, if true, would constitute a
21 39
Rollo, p. 16. TSN, September 19, 2011, pp. legal excuse or justification; and
19-20.
(i) That the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
43
Section 9, Rule 117, Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 9. Failure to move to quash
or to allege any ground therefor. -
The failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
44
344 Phil. 100, 120 (1997)
45
Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act. No. 9165 provides:
Article II, Section 5. Sale, Trading,
Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to
Ten million pesos (₱l0,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
46
People v. Anabe, 644 Phil. 261,
286 (2010); Viray v. People, 720
Phil. 841, 854 (2013).
47
Section 11, Article II, RA No.
9165 provides:
Section 11. Possession of
Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to
Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of
the degree of purity thereof:
x x x x.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved
is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalties shall be graduated as
follows:
x xxx.
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (I 2)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if
the quantities of dangerous drugs
are less than jive (5) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine
or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy,"
PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly-
introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
—
—
 4
Footnotes appears corrected in the Id. at 1.
1 5
Spelled as Pakoy in Information, records, p. 1. Id. at 82.
2 6
Certification/Verification attached Id. at 96-99. Id. at 83.
3 7
to the Petition, rollo, p. 24 and as it Id. at 162-163. Id. at 1.
8 20
Records, p. 85. Teehankee v. Madayag, supra committed in the dwelling of the
9
Id. at 88-92. note 17, at 139-141. offended party, if the latter has not
10 21
Id. at 96-99. People v. Navarro, 159 Phil. 863, given provocation (emphasis
11
We note that the Motion to Quash 869-870 (1975). supplied).
22 24
was filed on October 28, 2002 but Poblete v. Sandoval, G.R. No. People v. Cawaling, 355 Phil. 1,
the Order was dated October 25, 150610, March 25, 2004, 426 24 (1998) citing Guerrero v. Court
2002. SCRA 346, 356 citing People v. of Appeals, 327 Phil. 496, 506
12
Records, pp. 162-163. Montenegro, No. L-45772, March (1996) and People v. Leviste, 325
13
Id. p. 163. 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 236, 241. Phil. 525, 537.
14 23 25
Should have been aggravating. Article 14 of the Revised Penal People v. Cawaling, supra note
15
Rollo, p.13. Code provides: 22, at 24.
16 26
Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Bulaong v. People, 124 Phil. 141,
474 SCRA 153, 161 (2005). circumstances- The following are 144 (1966).
17 27
Id. at 162. aggravating circumstances: People v. Molero, 228 Phil. 375,
18
Memorandum (For the xxx 384 (1986).
28
Petitioner), rollo, p. 136. 3. That the act be committed with Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 5.
19 29
G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, insult or in disregard due to the Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 354
207 SCRA 134. offended party on account of Phil. 463, 472 (1998).
his rank, age, or sex, or that it be