G.R. No.

111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.

R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups
and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing
the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation,
Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there
during the Christmas season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING

BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled
that:

Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial
jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation
of casino within the city limits.

Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation
to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation
and other gambling activities.

Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section
shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:

a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense
and a fine of P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second
offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One

(1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses.

Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR

VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution
No. 2295;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its
policy against the establishment of CASINO;

WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of
Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to
be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991
(Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government
Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to
public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to
amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation
undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of
P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person
responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general
circulation.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental
petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued
the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They
aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the
power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the
City's territorial limits.

2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) —
(v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling."

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.
 4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore
invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14,
1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national
economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in
the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare
Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise
of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and
in this connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose

appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy,
mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill
repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent
devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the
printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or
publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in
the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and
even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds
of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos
may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within
its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25,
and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the
nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local
Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling
without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from
the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The
fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within
their territories, including the operation of casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The
Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them.
More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do
not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal
interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules
shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case
of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local
government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in
the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several
decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on
the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v.
Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the
immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in
creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to
the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion,
the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these
branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts,
and not to the courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-
93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down
by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent
or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the
Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with
"and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like
the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts
of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more
than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein
insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D.
1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the
Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has
been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a
casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government
Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto,"
they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has
shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the
Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice
but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the
local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a
prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the
provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose
the omission:
 Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government
Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda
and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3)
and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended;
Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos.
381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of
later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this
intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has
become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be
imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the
question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out,
PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of
Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and
R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes.
This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been
improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as
the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code,
the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is
possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government
Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories
except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to
make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law.
Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners'
suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two
forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of
Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized
by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the
ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character
and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are
only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it
may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent
it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are,
so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we
here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than
under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes
the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on
the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however,
the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view
that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual
gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must
be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child
of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature
to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the
Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone
of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling
prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by
a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance
No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation
of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced
therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 132834 November 24, 2006

RUPERTO LUCERO, JR., PABLO LUCERO and ANTONIO TENORIO, Petitioners,

vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF PASIG, as represented by the Market Administrator, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the review and reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) decision1 and
resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 42131.

Petitioners were granted lease contracts to occupy and operate stalls3 in the public market of Pasig by virtue of Municipal
Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983.

Sometime in 1993, the municipal government of Pasig renovated the market facilities and constructed annex buildings to
the old public market. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig then enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, entitled
"An Ordinance Prescribing the Rules and Regulations in Occupying and Using Market Stalls and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof." The ordinance took effect 30 days after its enactment on October 20, 1993.

Pursuant to the new ordinance, municipal officials urged all stall occupants to fill up and submit the necessary application
forms. The application form contained the terms and conditions for the occupation and operation of the stalls. If approved,
the application would serve as the lease contract.

Petitioners, however, refused to apply for a new lease on their market stalls. They were given a deadline to comply with the
new ordinance but petitioners were adamant.

On November 14, 1995, the city government of Pasig4 filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners in the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC), Branch 68, Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5043.

In its complaint, the city government alleged that petitioners failed to pay the required ₱10,000 performance bond and their
rental fees since January 1994 as required by the municipal ordinance.

In their answer, petitioners claimed that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as set forth in their 1983 lease
contracts. They alleged that it was the city government which refused to accept their rental payments from January 1994
onwards because of petitioners’ failure to submit new applications to lease their market stalls. They did not pay the
performance bond because, as previous stall occupants, they were not required to do so. With due notice to the city
treasurer, petitioners deposited their payments in a bank when their offer to pay was not acted upon.

Finding the ejectment suit to be without merit, the MTC ruled in favor of petitioners and dismissed the complaint.5

Dissatisfied with the lower court’s decision, the city government appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162,
Pasig City.6 The RTC reversed the MTC decision and decided in favor of the city government.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby renders judgment in this case in favor of [the City Government
of Pasig] and against [petitioners] by:

(1) Reversing, amending and/or modifying the decision of the trial court dated March 29, 1996 subject of this appeal,
and entering a new judgment directing the herein [petitioners] and all persons claiming right under them to vacate
the Market Stalls Nos. 28 and 29, Commercial Section, and Stall [Nos.] 456 and 457, Grocery Section, and to
restore possession thereof to [the city government];

(2) Ordering the [petitioners] to pay the rent for the use and occupancy of the subject stalls, as follows:

(a) Ruperto Lucero – the amount of ₱49,980.00 representing arrearages for the whole year of [January
1994 up to September 1995]; and the further sum in the same amount representing rents for the inclusive
period of [October 1995 up to and until September 1996];
 (b) Pablo Lucero – the amount of ₱20,050.00 representing arrearages from [February 1995 up to
September 1995]; and the further sum in the same amount representing rents for the duration of October
1995 to September 1996;

(c) Antonio Tenorio – the amount of ₱38,587.50 representing arrearages from January 1994 to September
1995; and the further sum in the same amount representing rents for the inclusive period [of] October 1995
to September 1996.

(3) Ordering [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the amount of ₱15,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.

With costs against [petitioners].

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The appeal was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.8 Their motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied;9 hence, this petition.

Petitioners mainly assail the non-renewal of their lease contracts on stalls in the public market when they did not comply
with the requirements of Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993.10 They claim to have a vested right to the possession,
use and enjoyment of the market stalls based on their 1983 lease contracts. This, they assert, could not be impaired by the
enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 56 in 1993.

The only issue for our resolution is: can petitioners claim a vested right to the market stalls they were occupying by virtue
of their lease contracts under Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983? They cannot.

"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest."11 It is unalterable, absolute, complete and unconditional.12 This right is perfect in itself; it is not dependent upon a
contingency.13 The concept of "vested right" expresses a "present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action."14 It includes not only legal and equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.15

Contrary to petitioners’ contention that they were no longer covered by the 1993 ordinance requiring payment of a
performance bond and submission of new application forms, their 1983 lease contracts did not grant them irrefutable rights
to the market stalls. They were mere grantees of a privilege to occupy and operate such booths.

What petitioners had was a license to occupy and operate particular stalls over a period of time. Their possession and use
of these facilities could not be characterized as fixed and absolute. Indeed, petitioners did not have any vested right to the
stalls.

It was within the ambit of the Sanggunian’s authority in the exercise of police power to regulate the enjoyment of the privilege
to lease the market stalls. The enactment of the Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993 repealing Municipal Ordinance
No. 25, series of 1983 (the basis of petitioners’ lease) was a valid exercise of such governmental authority to

regulate the possession and use of the public market and its facilities.16

The lease (and occupation) of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege governed by laws and
ordinances.17 The operation of a market stall by virtue of a license is always subject to the police power of the city
government.18 An application for this privilege may be granted or refused for reasons of public policy and sound public
administration.19 The city government, through its market administrator, is not duty-bound to grant lease privileges to any
applicant, least of all those who refuse to obey the new ordinance prescribing the rules and regulations for the market stalls.

Moreover, a public market is one dedicated to the service of the general public and operated under government control and
supervision as a public utility.20 Hence, the operation of a public market and its facilities is imbued with public interest.
Petitioners’ 1983 lease contracts contained an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order.21 This power could be exercised any time to change the provisions of the contracts or even abrogate them entirely,
for the protection of the general welfare.22 Such an act did not violate the non-impairment clause which is anyway subject
to and limited by the paramount police power.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H.
JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO CLEMEN
PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers of the Phil.
Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.1 Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City,
Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly
inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the
Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG).2 The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail.
News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then organized
a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee.3 The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed
forces component was headed by respondents General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The
PNP component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for
Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).4

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different
municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.5 The organization of the CEF was embodied in a
"Memorandum of Understanding"6 entered into

between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas
clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the
municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved."7

This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the responsibilities of each of the party
signatories, as follows:

Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:

1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed for the activation of the CEF;

2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units which shall participate in the operations
and to propose them for the approval of the parties to this agreement;

3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral action(s) by the CEF without the
knowledge and approval by both parties.

Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):

1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military operations and law enforcement;

2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the performance of their assigned task(s);

3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified areas of operation(s);
 4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as called for in the course of
operation(s)/movements of the CEF.8

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, announced to the media
that government troops had cornered some one hundred and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3)
hostages.9 However, the ASG made

contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the jungle area.10 The government
troops yielded and went back to their barracks; the Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp, while police and civilian forces
pulled back from the terrorists’ stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen (15) kilometers. Threatening that one of the hostages will be
beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military camps and bases in the different barangays in
Jolo.11 The authorities were given no later than 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply.12

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu.13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a
terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security

Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities,
and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.

In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent
portion of the proclamation states:

NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I, ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL TAN,
GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF SULU, DO HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE PROVINCE
OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:

1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;

2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may be issued by proper authorities;

3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters;
and

4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure public safety.

DONE AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL, PROVINCE OF SULU THIS

31STDAY OF MARCH 2009. Sgd. Abdusakur M. Tan Governor.14

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim.15 Upon
arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were
all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours,
former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3
Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani, were also arrested.16 The
affidavit17 of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under
Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG.

On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines for the
Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of Sulu."18 These
Guidelines suspended all Permits to Carry

Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians to seek exemption from
the gun ban only by applying to the Office of the Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said
guidelines also allowed general searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.
On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal
H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,19 claiming that Proclamation 1-
09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void,
for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.20 Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed
forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.

In his Comment, Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts when they filed the
instant petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC)
possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the

Supreme Court under Rule 65.21 This is the only procedural defense raised by respondent Tan. Respondents Gen. Juancho
Saban, Col. Eugenio Clemen, P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim, and P/SUPT. Bienvenido Latag did not file their respective
Comments.1âwphi1

On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan allegedly
acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry
out emergency measures during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition.22 Furthermore, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency as evidenced by Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31
March 2009 during its regular session.23

The threshold issue in the present case is whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government
Code authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under
Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question
of whether or not the provincial governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the CEF under the said provisions.

We grant the petition.

I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

We first dispose of respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which allegedly prevents judicial review by
this Court in the present case, citing for this specific purpose, Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok Bagong Silang
Association, Inc. v. Yuipco.24 Simply put, the

doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is
in either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be sought
unless special and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this Court
is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition. It cannot be burdened with deciding cases in the first instance.25

The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari,26 the Court stated:

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of
hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional questions of transcendental
importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also,
the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.27

The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court possesses original
jurisdiction.28 More crucially, this case involves acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody, and is thus
impressed with transcendental public importance that would warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The Court would be
remiss in its constitutional duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims of judicial hierarchy.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,29 the Court highlighted the transcendental public importance involved in cases that concern
restrictive custody, because judicial review in these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense of civilians ‘in
police power’ cases due to the diminution of their basic liberties under the guise of a state of emergency."30 Otherwise, the
importance of the high tribunal as the court of last resort would be put to naught, considering the nature of "emergency"
cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are inherently short-lived. In finally disposing of the claim that the issue
had become moot and academic, the Court also cited transcendental public importance as an exception, stating:

Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at
pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na
interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito,

(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

…There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights
to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the

Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function
of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
petitions are subject to judicial review.

Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad,
unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to
them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners
themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is bound
to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now
for the education and guidance of all concerned.31 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental public importance.

II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic

i. One executive, one commander-in-chief

As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior,32 it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,
and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else.33 As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily
visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first
section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle
that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines
is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.34

Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section
23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof.

ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president

Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which,
by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is
the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s
Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second
paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:

Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.35

Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.36

The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis
thereof. 37 By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is
bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will
validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.38

Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article
II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,

Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution
does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has
the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the
actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.40 As Commander-in-Chief, he is
authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in
the manner he may deem most effectual.41

In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,42 the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers belong
solely to the President as commander-in-chief:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of
the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out
the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.43 (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.44
That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president is clear from the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-
in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment
is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National
Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my
opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

x x x Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.45 (Emphasis Supplied)

In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,46 the Court characterized these powers as exclusive to the President,
precisely because they are of exceptional import:

These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential
powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning
power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must
be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.47

In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the country’s police
forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." During
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the
word "control," employing the same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as the only Executive under the
presidential form of government.48

Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: "The State shall establish and
maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
law."49

A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police,50 and may
exercise control only in day-to-day operations, viz:

Mr. Natividad: By experience, it is not advisable to provide either in our Constitution or by law full control of the police by
the local chief executive and local executives, the mayors. By our experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and
sanctuaries for vices and abuses. If the national government does not have a mechanism to supervise these 1,500 legally,
technically separate police forces, plus 61 city police forces, fragmented police system, we will have a lot of difficulty in
presenting a modern professional police force. So that a certain amount of supervision and control will have to be exercised
by the national government.
For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order problems or police problems, such as riots,
conflagrations or organized crime, the national government may come in, especially if requested by the local executives.
Under that situation, if they come in under such an extraordinary situation, they will be in control. But if the day-to-day
business of police investigation of crime, crime prevention, activities, traffic control, is all lodged in the mayors, and if they
are in complete operational control of the day-to-day business of police service, what the national government would control
would be the administrative aspect.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. de los Reyes: so the operational control on a day-to-day basis, meaning, the usual duties being performed by the
ordinary policemen, will be under the supervision of the local executives?

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. de los Reyes: But in exceptional cases, even the operational control can be taken over by the National Police
Commission?

Mr. Natividad: If the situation is beyond the capacity of the local governments.51 (Emphases supplied)

Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control over the
police, through the National Police Commission:

Mr. Rodrigo: Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose they come under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the Philippines.

Mr. Natividad: They do, Madam President. By law, they are under the supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.

Mr. Natividad: He is the President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the President is the Commander-
in-Chief of all the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.

Mr. Rodrigo: There are two other powers of the President. The

President has control over ministries, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under which does the
police fall, under control or under supervision?

Mr. Natividad: Both, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Control and supervision.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the President.52

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended
for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to
their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the
police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the
government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of
the power of executive control.53

iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive,
is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed
subsequently.

Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v. Arroyo, which dealt
squarely with the issue of the declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit the said authority to the President alone.
Respondents contend that the ruling in David expressly limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition
which covers the entire country, and does not include emergency situations in local government units.54 This claim is belied
by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security, such as lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers.
As reflected in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission:

Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase OR PUBLIC DISORDER in lieu of "invasion or rebellion."
Mr. Sumulong stated that the committee could not accept the amendment because under the first section of Section 15, the
President may call out and make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless violence but even invasion
or rebellion without declaring martial law. He observed that by deleting "invasion or rebellion" and substituting PUBLIC
DISORDER, the President would have to declare martial law before he can make use of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless invasion or rebellion.

Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation where there is some lawless
violence in a small portion of the country or public disorder in another at which times, the armed forces can be called to
prevent or suppress these incidents. He noted that the Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor degree but he can also
exercise such powers should the situation worsen. The words "invasion or rebellion" to be eliminated on line 14 are covered
by the following sentence which provides for "invasion or rebellion." He maintained that the proposed amendment does not
mean that under such circumstances, the President cannot call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress the
same.55 (Emphasis supplied)

III. Section 465 of the Local

Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09

Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident to
justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09.56 He invokes Section 465, in relation to Section 16,
of the Local Government Code, which purportedly allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said proclamation shows that there
is no provision in the Local Government Code nor in any law on which the broad and unwarranted powers granted to the
Governor may be based.

Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and
their supporters,"57 as being violative of the constitutional proscription on general search warrants and general seizures.
Petitioners rightly assert that this alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and
seizures are proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, particularly:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.58

In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the President,
because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ."59

We find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under the said
Proclamation. Not even Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16, which states:

Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial
government, and in this connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural
disasters and calamities;

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the exercise of the appropriate corporate
powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and
activities of the province and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or
sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces of the component city or
municipality where the disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators.

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphases supplied)

Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision expressly refers to
calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly
empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the
case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this
provision to justify their actions.

Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines does not fall under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to which the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong.

Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all
enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory.60

Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with
the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the
assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national
law enforcement agencies.
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National
Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and
defense.

The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in
nature.1âwphi1 The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to
the constituents,61 and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.

In the sponsorship remarks for Republic Act 7160, it was stated that the devolution of powers is a step towards the autonomy
of local government units (LGUs), and is actually an experiment whose success heavily relies on the power of taxation of
the LGUs. The underpinnings of the Code can be found in Section 5, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, which allowed LGUs
to create their own sources of revenue.62 During the interpellation made by Mr. Tirol addressed to Mr. de Pedro, the latter
emphasized that "Decentralization is an administrative concept and the process of shifting and delegating power from a
central point to subordinate levels to promote independence, responsibility, and quicker decision-making. … (I)t does not
involve any transfer of final authority from the national to field levels, nor diminution of central office powers and
responsibilities. Certain government agencies, including the police force, are exempted from the decentralization process
because their functions are not inherent in local government units."63

IV. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF

Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private citizen armies is proscribed. Section
24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:

Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary
forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this
Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.

Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with
applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government."

Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private
armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves
wary of armed citizens’ groups, as shown in the following proceedings:

MR. GARCIA: I think it is very clear that the problem we have here is a paramilitary force operating under the cloak, under
the mantle of legality is creating a lot of problems precisely by being able to operate as an independent private army for
many regional warlords. And at the same time, this I think has been the thrust, the intent of many of the discussions and
objections to the paramilitary units and the armed groups.

MR. PADILLA: My proposal covers two parts: the private armies of political warlords and other armed torces not recognized
by constituted authority which shall be dismantled and dissolved. In my trips to the provinces, I heard of many abuses
committed by the CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Forces), specially in Escalante, Negros Occidental. But I do not know
whether a particular CHDF is approved or authorized by competent authority. If it is not authorized, then the CHDF will have
to be dismantled. If some CHDFs, say in other provinces, are authorized by constituted authority, by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of National Defense, if they are recognized and authorized, then
they will not be dismantled. But I cannot give a categorical answer to any specific CHDF unit, only the principle that if they
are armed forces which are not authorized, then they should be dismantled. 64 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF)
in the present case, is also invalid.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding respondents to desist from further
proceedings m implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation
and guidelines are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979

ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.

Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.

SANTOS, J.:

An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership, from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes presiding, which dismissed its complaint in Civil
Case No. 7706, entitled, "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and Trust Company, defendant,"
for lack of merit.

The following facts — a reproduction of the lower court's findings, which, in turn, are based on a stipulation of facts entered
into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and
defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway
Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1

On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into
separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway
Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests
over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff
executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the
deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:

1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes,
and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to
the Seller.

2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said
lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations
connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less
than two (2) meters from its boundary lines. 2

The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, covering
the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez.3

Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092 issued in its name,
respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from
Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', 5 while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic
Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". 6 TCT No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills likewise
contained the same restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that Republic Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6
"in good faith. free from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in the Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma
Chavez.

Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719, 101613, and 106092 were
imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills
Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also
designated or established. 8

Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27,
dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It alleges that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold
and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" 10 and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area ... had been declared a
commercial and industrial zone ... 11

On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building
on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to,
and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-
appellee stop the construction of the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand,
contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant-appellee having
filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building
and planning permits to proceed with the construction.12

On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for decision. The complaint
sought, among other things, the issuance of "a writ of preliminary injunction ... restraining and enjoining defendant, its
agents, assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf from continuing or completing the construction of a commercial bank
building in the premises ... involved, with the view to commanding the defendant to observe and comply with the building
restrictions annotated in the defendant's transfer certificate of title."

In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue, whether or not the resolution of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question. 13 The records do
not show that a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject restrictions were
subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27, supra. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said
municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and welfare. " In short, it upheld the
classification by the Municipal Council of the area along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue as a commercial and industrial
zone, and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant-
appellee.14 The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is
no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void. 15

On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, 16 which motion was opposed
by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965.17 It averred, among others, in the motion for reconsideration that defendant-
appellee "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of the contract of sale in its favor, which conditions were duly
annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Title issued in her (Emma Chavez) favor." It also invited the trial court's attention
to its claim that the Municipal Council had (no) power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant
corporation." 18

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965. 19

On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the complaint and from the order
of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal bond." 20 On April 14,
the appeal was given due course 21 and the records of the case were elevated directly to this Court, since only questions of
law are raised. 22

Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred —

I. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial
zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its police power; and

II. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not make a finding that the building was erected
along the property line, when it should have been erected two meters away from said property line. 23

The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In this connection, We already had occasion to hold
in Relativo v. Castro 24 that "(I)t is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position, and is seeking
no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error, "
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power; and
(2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.

1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of police power is
without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is that the question
of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the
court below, and are within the issues framed by the parties. 25 The object of requiring the parties to present all questions
and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable the lower court to pass thereon,
so that the appellate court upon appeal may determine whether or not such ruling was erroneous. The requirement is in
furtherance of justice in that the other party may not be taken by surprise. 26 The rule against the practice of blowing "hot
and cold" by assuming one position in the trial court and another on appeal will, in the words of Elliot, prevent
deception. 27 For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised 28 or properly litigated 29 or pleaded 30 in the Court below
cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.

In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below. when
plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated by the trial court was whether or not the
resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as a part of the
commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots
in question. 31 Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now
change its position on appeal.

But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of the
municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264,
otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," 32 empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or
ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "

An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise reveals that the
implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The
same section further mandates that the general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more
power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people in the
community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province,
city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions of the
contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-
appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates
of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare
of the people. 35 Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" 36 and "in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government, 37 the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected
only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance
Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39 police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not,
confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 40 when
We declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to
prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from
Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes
have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the
health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if
not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this Court, speaking thru Justice Laurel in
the leading case of Calalang v. Williams et al., 41 Thus-

As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed. 169), 'the right to exercise
the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and
be required to yield to the public good.' And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was observed
that 'advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police power of the state today things which were
not thought of as being with in such power yesterday. The development of civilization), the rapidly
increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and
of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within
the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. 42 (Emphasis,
supplied.)

Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort
health and prosperity of the state 43 and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. 44

The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid exercise of police power may also be
gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict "between one
welfare and another, between particular and general, thus —

Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be
interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation What is critical or urgent changes with the times. 46

The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a " legitimate response to a
felt public need," 47 not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the
municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when he declared: "Police power
legislation then is not likely to succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory." 48

Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General49 that laws and reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties. Thus —

Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile – a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society.

Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 50 through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that ... the
law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion
is allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations Commission, 51 written for the Court by
Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, restates the rule.

One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and authorities 52 to bolster its
theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify or supersede the agreement of the parties embodied in the
sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution. Such reliance is
misplaced.

In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the
laws of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent may be
deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al v.
Magarian, et al., 55 two Of the cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e.
that the municipal resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual undertaking between the parties. Dolan v. Brown,
states that "Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of property by injunction where the property has so
changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for use should the restriction be enforced, but will,
in such a case, leave the complainant to whatever remedy he may have at law. 56 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the remedy
of injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on the specific holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions
or restrictions which are not against public policy and do not materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the
estate. 57 Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a
hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendants- appellees should
be permitted, on the strength of the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for
commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are binding
on all subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein contained
a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements,
covenants or other agreement between parties." 58 In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution.

It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of
Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092,
the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which
has validly exercised its police power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots
Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED. "without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198860 July 23, 2012

ABRAHAM RIMANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., represented by its President, ROSEMARIE LLARENAS and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside
Decision2 dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP NO. 112152.

The Facts

The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Rosemarie
Llarenas (respondent) against Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting mayor
of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.

The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor of
the respondent.

In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly
belonged to the national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its business of emission testing on
the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed an application for the renewal of its business permit
and paid the corresponding fees therefor.

The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent executes a contract of lease
with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to signing such contract subject to some proposed
revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence, the
petition for mandamus.

The Ruling of the RTC

On May 26, 2009, the RTC denied the petition3 for lack of merit based on the ratiocinations that: (a) the Municipality of
Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section
6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a
contract of lease because its business operation is being conducted on a real property owned by the municipality; and (c)
a mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.4

The Ruling of the CA

Unwaivering, the respondent appealed to the CA. In its Decision5 dated March 30, 2011, the CA held that the appeal was
dismissible on the ground of mootness considering that the period for which the business period was being sought had
already lapsed. As such, any ruling on the matter would bring no practical relief. Nonetheless, the CA proceeded to resolve
the issues involved in the appeal for academic purposes.

The CA disagreed with the RTC and found that the factual milieu of the case justifies the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
The CA reasoned that the tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of
a contract of lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit. The CA further observed that
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void
because it failed to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

The CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction, for that matter, was done in
the performance of official duties that are legally protected by the presumption of good faith. The CA likewise stressed that
the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the expiration of his term as the
mayor of Naguilian, La Union.

Despite its incessant declarations on the mootness of the case, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 26 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Bauang, La Union,
Branch 67, in Special Civil Action Case No. 72-BG, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.6

The petitioner moved for reconsideration7 questioning the pronouncement of the CA that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
No. 2007-81 was void and arguing that a petition for mandamus is not the proper vehicle to determine the issue on the
ownership of the subject land. The motion was denied in the CA Resolution8 dated September 30, 2011.

The petitioner is now before this Court reiterating the arguments raised in his motion for reconsideration.

Our Ruling

We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and academic owing to the expiration of
the period intended to be covered by the business permit.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination
thereof would be without practical use and value9 or in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.10 In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.11 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.12

The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of respondent
corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the
petitioner’s term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondent’s business permit ceased to present a justiciable controversy
such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be issued, the petitioner can no longer abide
thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business permit no longer subsists.

While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find that the
decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.

The CA’s conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
No. 2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of the
petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal was its mootness and the CA should
have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus that spawned it.

More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is
a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc.
v. Hon. Villaflor13 where a determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under
the Local Government Code,14 viz:

Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which provides, thus:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
 xxxx

3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of
development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly
those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress,
and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said
licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.

As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments.1âwphi1 Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently,
the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x

xxxx

Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license
and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the
exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is
within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.15 (Citations omitted)

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel the
exercise of a mayor’s discretionary duty to issue business permits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152
is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 166744, November 02, 2006 ]

AC ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 82166,
affirming the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City in Civil Case No. 3742-MH, which denied the Motion
to Dismiss of petitioner AC Enterprises, Inc. (ACEI), as well as the Resolution of the CA denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.

Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under domestic laws doing business in the Philippines, owns the 10-storey Feliza
Building located along Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. The building was subdivided into commercial/office units
which were leased to private persons and entities. There are 36 blowers from 18 air-cooled type airconditioning units in the
building, four blowers on each floor, from the 2nd to the 10th floors. The blowers are aesthetically covered by vertical
concrete type baffles.

Respondent Frabelle Properties Corporation (FPC), formerly FTL & Sons Development Corporation,[3] is the developer of
Frabella I Condominium (Frabella I), a 29-storey commercial/residential condominium located at 109 Rada Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City. It owned some units in the condominium which it leased to its tenants. The building is managed by the
Frabella I Condominium Corporation (FCC).

Rada and Herrera streets lie parallel to each other such that Feliza Building is situated at the back of Frabella I. Feliza
Building is at the back of Frabella I and is separated by Rodriguez Street, a two-lane road approximately 12 meters
wide[4] The street is bounded by the Thailand Embassy on the side of the street of Frabella I. The exhaust of the blowers
from the airconditioning units at the Feliza Building were directed towards the rear of Frabella I.

On April 11, 1995, respondent wrote petitioner demanding that the latter abate the daily continuous, intense and ''unbearable
noise" and the hot air blast coming from the 36 blowers in the Feliza Building. Petitioner rejected the demand in a letter
dated May 15, 1995. Respondent reiterated its demand for ACEI to abate the nuisance in a letter dated June 6, 1995.

On June 29, 1995, respondent requested that the 36 blowers of Feliza Building be tested by the NCR Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). On August 11, 1995, it
received a report from the EMB that the noise generated by the blowers of Feliza Building is beyond the legal allowable
level under Section 78(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 984, as amended. FPC had the blowers tested anew by the
EMB on December 8, 1995 and July 1, 1996 with the same results. Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to act on
the matter.

On August 14, 2000, respondent again wrote petitioner, demanding that it abate the nuisance. Petitioner ignored the letter
anew. Respondent then had the blowers tested again by the EMB with same results as evidenced by its report dated August
29, 2000 and November 4, 2000.

On March 11, 2001, Frabelle I Condominum Corporation, through counsel, Ang & Associates, as complainant, filed a
complaint against petitioner with the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) for the abatement of noise and/or air pollution and
damages with a plea for injunctive relief. The complainant alleged therein that it managed the Frabella 1 and that its
members own units in the condominium. It alleged, inter alia, that:

6. Feliza Building's airconditioning system is served by some 36 blowers, installed 4 blowers to each floor, all located
on the same sidedirectly facing Frabella I.

7. Everytime the Feliza Building's airconditioning system is turned on, all or a good number of the 36 blowers operate
at the same time. As a direct result of the operation of the blowers, unbearable hot air is generated and blown
towards Frabella I.

8. Apart from the hot air, the blowers also generate a continuous, deafening, intolerable and irritating, vibrating noise
which makes normal conversation across the street and at the Frabella I difficult if not impossible.
 9. As a consequence of such hot air, vibrating and intolerable noise, the occupants of Frabella I have been, and still
are, prevented from enjoying peaceful and comfortable use of their property thereby forcing them to vacate and/or
transfer elsewhere.

10. Such intolerable noise, hot air, and vibration constitute noise and/or air pollution violative of P.D. 984, the Clean Air
Act and other related environmental laws.

11. In all good faith without any desire to cause any unnecessary inconvenience or trouble, the complainant, for the last
several years, has written and made numerous contacts with the respondent complaining about this pollution, even
soliciting the help and intercession of the Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA) and the Metro
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to try to settle the matter amicably.

12. On the other hand, the DENR, over a span of several years, has conducted several tests. As shown by the results,
the noise and vibration generated by the Feliza Building blowers exceeds the DENR and Local Government ambient
noise standards hence, it undoubtedly constitutes pollution.[5]

The complainant prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after notice and hearing, a Decision be rendered in favor of complainant and
against the respondent:

1. Declaring the intolerable noise, hot air and vibration generated by the Feliza Building blowers as a noise and/or air
pollution and ordering the respondent to abate the same and in case of failure to do so, that the establishment be
closed or ordered to cease operations.

2. After arbitration, ordering the respondent to indemnify the complaint for actual damages at not less
thanP5,000,000.00 and to reimburse it for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation at not less than P400,000.00.

3. Condemning the respondent to pay the corresponding fines and other administrative penalties for each day of
continuing pollution.

Complainant prays for other relief just and equitable in the premises.[6]
While the case was pending, respondent, through its Vice-President, wrote Dr. Maria Leonor B. Soledad, City Health Officer
of Makati City, requesting her intervention to order petitioner to abate the noise and hot air coming from the blowers of the
Feliza Building. On March 5, 2002, Dr. Soledad replied that a panel must be formed to settle the matter.

In a letter dated March 7, 2002, respondent requested Makati City Mayor Jejomar C. Binay not to renew or to cancel the
Mayor's License and Business Permits of Feliza Building and to compel petitioner to comply with the law.[7] Copies of the
letter were forwarded to Engr. Nelson B. Morales, the City Building Official, and Atty. Enrico Lainez, City Attorney.

Engr. Morales acted on the letter and wrote the EMB on April 30, 2002, requesting the investigation of the complaint relative
to the noise from the airconditioning units of the Feliza Building.[8] A panel from the EMB conducted tests on the 36 blowers
of Feliza Building from 10:30 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. on May 24, 2002. On June 28, 2002, the Panel submitted its Investigation
Report, stating that the passing of vehicles along the street and the blowers of nearby building contributed to the ambient
noise quality in the area. The report stated that since DENR Administrative Order No. 30 devolved the functions of the
DENR on the abatement of noise nuisance to the Local Government Unit, the case should be endorsed to the City
Government of Makati for appropriate action.[9]

Regional Director Sixto E. Tolentino, Jr. of the EMB forwarded the report to Engr. Morales on July 2, 2002.[10] In a letter
dated July 19, 2002, Engr. Morales informed respondent that based on the result of investigation conducted by the DENR
Management Bureau on Sound Pressure Levels (SPL) measured on the different sampling stations, the excess in the noise
quality standard within the vicinity does not come from the airconditioning system with 36 blowers of Feliza Building alone;
there were other prevailing factors to consider," which is beyond the control of said building and since the final result has
been rendered and resolved by the concerned government agency, it is properly advised that further inquiry or anything
involving a sound environment process which is not sanctioned by this office, be addressed directly to the said agency. "[11]

Copies of the letter were furnished to the City Mayor, the City Attorney and petitioner. Respondent then wrote Engr. Morales
seeking clarification, wanting to find out why the matter should be referred to the EMB when the latter had already endorsed
the matter to the City of Makati. A conference was held between the executives of respondent and Engr. Morales. The latter
insisted on the report of the EMB and his July 19, 2002 letter and dared it to go to court if it was not satisfied with the report
and his resolution of the matter.
Respondent then wrote another letter to the EMB relative to the May 24, 2002 Report of the Panel. The EMB conducted
SPL measurements anew on February 4, 2003. Per its Report submitted on November 24, 2003, the EMB declared that,
from the table, it is evident that the SPL measurements were high when the doors were opened compared to the readings
when the doors were closed. However, the EMB emphasized that the standards in Section 78 (b) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 984 could not be applied since the provisions were for ambient noise. It pointed out that the
SPL measurements were taken inside the building. The EMB opined that since the nature of complaint is regarding noise
nuisance generated from the firm's blowers, the SPL measurements were not the critical factor in the resolution of the issue.
It stated that the noise needs not to be high or low to annoy or cause nuisance to the receptor, for as long as the complainant
is disturbed with the level of sound coming from the firm, it was considered a nuisance.[12]

On July 1, 2003, respondent filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance with damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction before the RTC of Malabon City against petitioner. The complaint alleged the
following:

6. The Feliza Building's airconditioning units are served by some 36 blowers, 4 blowers to each floor located outside
the windows of the building facing directly towards the Frabella I Condominium. The 36 blowers were installed from
the 2nd floor to the 10th floor of the building and these blowers are aesthetically covered by a vertical concrete sun
baffles.

7. [Every time] the Feliza Building's airconditioning system is turned on, all or a good number of the 36 blowers are
made to operate simultaneously. The operation of the Feliza's blowers generates a continuous deafening
unbearable vibrating and stressful noise affecting the tenants of the Frabella I Condominium. Hot air is also blasted
from the [Feliza] Building's blowers to the direction of the Frabella 1Condominium.

8. The tenants occupying the 5th to the 16th floors of the Frabella I Condominium facing Feliza Building are directly
subjected to a daily continuous intense noise and hot air blast coming from the blowers of the[10-storey] Feliza
Building. Some are tenants of plaintiff, who have complained to plaintiff about the matter. Tenants who could not
bear the nuisance any longer have vacated their units, and as a result, many units of plaintiff have remained vacant,
and unoccupied or uninhabitable, thereby depriving plaintiff with rental income that it should have otherwise be
receiving.

9. In all good faith, without any desire to cause any unnecessary inconvenience or trouble, plaintiff has written and
made numerous contacts with defendant to complain about this nuisance, even soliciting the help and intercession
of the Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA), Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), Makati City Government, Makati Pollution Office and Department of Environment and Natural
Resources(DENR), to try to settle the matter amicably. Several meetings have taken place, as well as many
correspondences made by plaintiff to defendant. But reasonable and lawful demands by plaintiff to abate the
nuisance have been repeatedly ignored/refused by defendant. The demand letters, and the response of defendant
to these letters, are herein attached and made integral part of this Complaint as follows:

Date
Remarks
Annex
11 April 1995
Demand letter to abate nuisance
"A"
15 May 1995
Response to demand letter
"B"
06 June 1995
Follow-up demand letter
"C"
14 August 2000
Follow-up demand letter
"D"

10.
11. There [are] more letters that were exchanged between plaintiff and defendant and/or their lawyers, but they will not
be attached to this Complaint at this time to simplify the facts.

12. Even the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA)
wrote defendant letters urging it to rectify and abate the nuisance. Copies of the letters of the MMDA dated 29 April
1996 and the MACEA dated 10 October 1996 are herein attached and marked as Annexes - "E" and "F"[,]
respectively.
 13. On the other hand, the DENR, over a span of 7 years, has conducted several noise sampling tests. As shown by
the results, the unbearable noise generated by the Feliza's blowers is beyond the legally allowable level under Sec.
78(b) of P.D. 984, as indicated in their reports, hence[,] it undoubtedly constitutes nuisance. Copies of the test
results are herein attached and made an integral part of this Complaint as follows:

Date Annex
29 June 1995 "G"
11 August 1995 "H"
08 December 1995 "I"
01 July 1996 "J"
04 November 1996 "K"
29 August 2000 "L"

14.
15. Please note that the testing done on 08 December 1995 (Annex - "I") was even requested by defendant.

16. On 04 February 2003, another test by the DENR was conducted, and a copy of the results are herein attached and
marked as Annex -"M." Although the latest test would seem to indicate that there was a reduction in the decibel
readings as compared with the previous tests, this is actually misleading. For one, 28 blowers were operational at
the time of the testing, as opposed to the previous testing done when all 36 blowers were functioning. This is rather
exceptional because ordinarily, all 36 blowers of the Feliza Building are in operation. The fact that only 28 blowers
were operational at the time of the testing resulted in the lower decibel reading.

17. Plaintiff will also demonstrate by expert testimony during the course of the trial that there were lapses committed
during the latest testing that materially influenced the results. But be that as it may, defendant did not perform any
remedial or rectification works to lower the noise being generated by the blowers, hence[,| it was not responsible
for any imagined or actual reduction in the decibel readings.

18. As a consequence of such unbearable, hot air and stressful noise, the occupants of the Frabella I, including the
tenants of plaintiff, have been and still are, prevented from enjoying peaceful and comfortable use of their property
thereby forcing them to vacate and or to transfer elsewhere.

19. Notwithstanding the foregoing results, repeated requests/demands from the plaintiff and recommendations of the
DENR, MACEA and MMDA to abate the pollution and nuisance, the defendant has ignored and still continues to
ignore such requests/demands/ recommendation.[13]

Respondent prayed for injunction and the following other reliefs, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that upon the filing of this Complaint, after notice and hearing,
and after the payment of a bond in an amount to be fixed by the Honorable Court, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued
enjoining defendant from operating the airconditioning system of the Feliza Building and/or turning on the blowers subject
matter of this suit while the instant case remains pending.

After trial and hearing, judgment be rendered against the defendant and for the plaintiff, ordering the former:

1. To abate the noise and air pollution being generated by all the blowers of the airconditioning system of Feliza
Building, and/or to make the Writ of Preliminary Injunction permanent;

2. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 in temperate or moderate damages[;]

3. To pay the plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;

4. To pay the plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and

5. [To pay] the cost of the suit.[14]

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the complaint; (2) the complaint does not state a cause of action; and (3) the action is barred by res
judicata, litis pendentia, and forum shopping.[15]

Petitioner averred that it was the Makati City Government that had jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7160. It also pointed out that DENR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 30 issued on June 30, 1992 devolved to the
local government units the power to determine matters pertaining to environmental management such as: (a) enforcement
of pollution control and environmental protection laws, rules and regulations; (b) abatement of noise and other forms of
nuisance; and (c) implementation of cease and desist orders issued by the PAB. It maintained that respondent had filed a
similar action before the Makati City Government concerning the same issues presented in the complaint and that the City
Building Official, Engr. Morales, had ruled in his letter dated July 19, 2002 that the excess in the noise quality standard
within the vicinity was caused not only by the air-conditioning system of Feliza Building but also by other prevailing factors
which were beyond its control. Respondent had failed to appeal the resolution; hence, the resolution of the City Building
Official barred the complaint.

Petitioner further averred that, aside from the action brought before the City Government, the Frabella Condominium
Corporation (FCC) filed a case for Abatement of Noise and/or Air Pollution and Damages with Prayer for Interim Cease and
Desist Order, docketed as PAB Case No. 01-0009-NCR. As gleaned from the material averments of the two complaints,
both involved the same set of facts and issues. Consequently, the petition is barred by litis pendentia, and respondent was
guilty of violating Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court for failure to include in its certification against forum-shopping of
the pendency of the PAB case or the prior resolution by the City Government of the complaint before the City Building
Official/City Engineer.

Petitioner further claimed that the complaint stated no cause of action because it failed to allege any right of respondent
which it was obliged to respect, and any act or omission of defendant in violation of such right. As gleaned from the EMB's
report to the City Engineer on May 24, 2002, the passing of vehicles along the street and blowers in the nearby building
contributed to the ambient noise quality in the area.[16]

In compliance with the order of the court, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers. Respondent averred that
the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 cited by petitioner apply not to abatements of nuisance but to pollution control cases.[17] The
local government units (LGUs) are only granted administrative and executive powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial functions
to abate a nuisance. While admitting that DENR A.O. No. 30 devolved to the LGUs the function of abating noise and other
forms of nuisance as defined by law, plaintiff posited that said A.O. is not a law and the DENR cannot deprive the court of
its jurisdiction over the abatement of nuisance.

Respondent alleged that in filing a motion to dismiss, petitioner hypothetically admitted the factual allegations in the
complaint and, thus, only questions of law remained; hence, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the need for exhaustion
of administrative remedies do not apply. Moreover, petitioner itself had even admitted that respondent had tried to seek
administrative relief before the Makati City Government, but the City Building Official denied the same. It insisted that to
require the further exhaust of administrative remedies beyond what it had tried in the past years would be an injustice. It
claimed that the proper application of P.D. No. 984 was in issue, specifically Section 78(b) of the Rules and Regulations of
the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were adopted and promulgated pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. No.
984 and Title VIII of the Civil Code. Respondent maintained that Engr. Morales' letter to it could not be considered as final
as to constitute res judicata between the parties. It was only a reply-letter. Besides, the City Engineer/Building Official could
not exercise quasi-judicial functions. Due process was not also observed because no proceedings were conducted. It
insisted that it wrote follow-up letters to know the basis of his findings and to confirm the fact that the Makati City Government
did not issue a permit to operate its airconditioning unit. However, Engr. Morales refused to acknowledge the same and did
not reply thereto.

Respondent asserted that it did not engage in forum shopping as the complainant in the PAB case was FCC, a corporation
of unit owners of Frabella I. ft is a totally different corporate entity, the stockholders and officers of which are not similar to
FPC. On petitioner's claim that there was no cause of action for the abatement of nuisance, it declared that the material
allegations of its complaint and the answer thereto show otherwise. Petitioner had the obligation to abate the nuisance
caused by the blowers of Feliza Building. Although under the DENR Report on May 24, 2002, the DENR conducted noise
sampling, and noted that the passing vehicles along the street and blowers of nearby building contributed to the noise, the
basis of its complaint was the noise generated by the blowers of Feliza Building.

Before the RTC court could resolve the motion to dismiss of petitioner, the PAB resolved, on July 29, 2003[18] to dismiss the
complaint filed by Frabelle. The matter was then endorsed to the LGU concerned in accordance with Section IV, Rule III of
PAB Resolution 1-C, Series of 1997, as amended. It noted that based on the pleadings of the parties, and the testimonial
evidence, the case is more of a nuisance, and "[e]xcept where such would constitute a pollution case, local government
units shall have the power to abate nuisance within their respective areas pursuant to the Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code
of the Philippines), Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code), Presidential Decree 856 (the Code of Sanitation of
the Philippines), DENR Department Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 and other pertinent laws, rules and
regulations" without prejudice to the institution of a pollution case, upon proof that respondent had failed to comply with
DENR standards and the presentation of other evidence that would warrant the PAB to take cognizance of and assert
jurisdiction over the case.[19]
Thereafter, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss in an Order[20] dated September 15, 2003. It ruled that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction simply calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of facts
and not of law. Likewise, the trial court is not divested of its jurisdiction simply because of plaintiff's failure to observe the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moreover, as gleaned from the averments of the complaint, there was an
urgency of abating the noise and air pollution generated by the blowers of petitioner's airconditioning system such that
respondent prayed for injunctive relief. The RTC took note of the allegations of respondent that it would suffer great and
irreparable injury; hence, to require it to exhaust further administrative remedies would be, in effect, a nullification of its
claim.

According to the RTC, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of administrative powers. Thus, no forum shopping was also committed. Since the findings of the City Building
Official appear to be a complete disavowal of the previous results gathered from the numerous tests conducted by the EMB,
the court could not be deprived of its inherent power to review the factual findings of the administrative official in order to
determine the regularity of the procedure used.

On the merits of the complaint, the RTC declared that the factual allegations were sufficient in themselves to constitute a
cause of action against respondent and, if admitting the facts, the court can render valid judgment on the basis thereof in
accordance with the relief prayed for:
Undeniably, the instant complaint is one for abatement of nuisance. Plaintiff alleges that the operation of defendant's blowers
generates a continuous, deafening, unbearable, vibrating and stressful noise affecting its tenants. Some have already
vacated their units while others refused to pay rents and threaten plaintiff to be sued because of the unabated nuisance.
Plaintiff has been deprived of rental income. It had written and made numerous contacts with the defendant to complain
about the nuisance and further solicited intervention from government agencies including the Government of Makati City.
Defendant allegedly failed or refused to abate the nuisance which is in total disregard of the right of the plaintiff over its
property. Contested findings of the EMB and City Building Official of Makati City are, likewise, put in issue. These are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant and, if admitting the facts, this Court can render valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the relief prayed for.[21]
The court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner[22] and the latter sought: relief from the CA via a petition
for certiorari. Petitioner averred that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION SO
GRAVE AS TO LOSE JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING AND EXERCISING ITS JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 03-
3745-MN, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT.
JURISDICTION IS VESTED WITH THE MAKATI CITY GOVERNMENT, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT
CONCERNED.

B. THE COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. THE MAKATI CITY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY
DECIDED A COMPLAINT FILED BY FRABELLE. FRABELLE DID NOT ELEVATE THE SAME ON APPEAL, OR,
IN ANY WAY, QUESTION SUCH DECISION. THUS, THE DECISION BY THE MAKATI CITY GOVERNMENT IS
NOW FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

C. AT THE TIME THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED, IT WAS BARRED BY LITIS PENDENTIA. A SIMILAR ACTION WAS
PENDING WITH THE POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD (PAB) WHICH, SUBSEQUENTLY, FOUND NO
LIABILITY ON THE PART OF AC. FRABELLE IS CLEARLY AND UNDENIABLY GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING.

D. PLAINTIFF FRABELLE HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST AC ENTERPRISES.[23]

Petitioner asserted that, by express provision of law, the City of Makati has primary jurisdiction over the complaint and is
the competent authority to determine the existence of any incidence of pollution, the special standards and regulations
controlling the same and the resolution whether a party has complied with the regulations. The complaint does not fall under
any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondent is guilty of short-circuiting the whole
process without requisite justification. Contrary to the contention of respondent, the proceedings before the City Government
are quasi-judicial in nature. It pointed out that the City Government had already made its findings, which respondent did not
contest in the proper tribunal within the reglementary period. It did not appeal the decision of the City Building Official
conformably with DENR Administrative Order No. 37-45 (General Manual of Operations for Devolved Functions from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to the Local Government Units); hence, the resolution became final and
executory. It insisted that the complaint is but a desperate attempt to revive what is otherwise a dead issue.

On September 21, 2004, the CA rendered judgment denying the petition.[24] The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition
rendered the application for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.[25]
The CA ruled that the action of respondent was one for the abatement of a nuisance within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC. It agreed with respondents' contention that, under R.A. No. 7160, the LGUs are not divested of its jurisdiction over an
action for the abatement of a nuisance. Section 17, sub-paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) in relation to (b)(4) of the law pertain to the
enforcement of pollution control law and not to the abatement of nuisance. While DENR A.O. No. 30 devolved to the LGUs
the abatement of noise and other forms of nuisance as defined by law, this does not necessarily deprive the courts to hear
and decide actions pertaining thereon. It was thus proper for respondent to bring the case before the court since it had
already sought the intercession of Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati Commercial Estate Corporation (MACEA), DENR, and
the Makati City Government to no avail.

Further, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered
to when the question between the parties is purely legal. In this case, petitioner, in filing a motion to dismiss, is deemed to
have hypothetically admitted all the factual averments of respondent. Hence, what is left for the court to adjudicate is only
the application of laws dealing with nuisance. The CA also declared that the filing of the case below was not barred by res
judicata for the reason that the decision adverted to by petitioner was only a letter of the City Building Official to respondent;
no adversarial proceedings or submission of evidence and position papers took place before said office. At best, the letter
is only an exercise of the City Government's administrative powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the City
Building Official does not possess. Respondent's filing of the complaint before the Malabon RTC is also not barred by litis
pendentia. FCC, as complainant, initiated the action before the PAB, while the respondent filed the pending case before the
court; there is no identity of parties since FCC has a personality separate and distinct from that of respondent.

Finally, the CA held that all the requisites for the existence of a cause of action were present in the case at bar. Due to the
unbearable noise and hot air allegedly produced by the blowers installed at petitioner's building, tenants of respondent have
been complaining, forcing them to vacate their units while others refused to pay their rent and threatened to take legal
action. Respondent had the right to abate such nuisance in order to avert future business losses. Since petitioner refused
to heed its demands, respondent was well within its right to file a case protecting its property and proprietary rights.

On January 18, 2005, the appellate court resolved to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration[26] for lack of merit.[27]

Petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA decision and resolution
on the following grounds:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CASE, CONSIDERING THAT THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN
THE CASE A QUO LIES WITH THE CITY OF MAKATI.
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE POWER TO ABATE NUISANCES AND CONTROL
NOISE POLLUTION HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT CONCERNED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT CASE
NECESSARILY INVOLVE A QUESTION OF FACT, AND, THEREFORE, THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
AND THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARE BOTH APPLICABLE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT IS NOT BARRED BY (1) LITIS
PENDENTIA; (2) RES JUDICATA; AND (3) FORUM-SHOPPING.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION.[28]
Petitioner insists that, under Section 17(b)(4) in relation to Section 17(b)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160, the City of Makati is obliged
to enforce the Pollution Control Law, and under Section 458(4)(I) of the said law, the Sanggnniang Panghmgsod is
empowered to declare, prevent or abate any nuisance. Thus, the City of Makati has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
complaint for the abatement of the noise from the blowers of the airconditioning unit of the Feliza Building and of the hot air
generated by the said blowers. Petitioner avers that the issues before the trial court were factual in nature. By its motion to
dismiss the complaint, it did not hypothetically admit the allegations of respondent in its complaint that the noise and hot air
emitted by the blowers of the Feliza Building constitute a nuisance or air pollution because the allegations are mere
conclusions of law and not mere statements of facts. Respondent's complaint before the trial court and its several complaints
against petitioner before quasi-judicial bodies is an implied admission of the availability of administrative remedies under
the law. Since respondent failed to pursue and exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its complaint below, its
action was premature. While there were exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
nevertheless, respondent failed to establish any of them. Moreover, respondent's action before the RTC was barred by the
letter of the City Engineer's Office of Makati City on July 19, 2002 which ruled that there was no factual basis for respondent's
complaint; hence, respondent's complaint was barred by res judicata. The complainant in PAB Case No. 01-0009-NCR
involved the same set of issues and circumstances, and the complainant therein and respondent represented the same
interests, alleged the same rights and prayed for the same reliefs. Consequently, the RTC erred in denying its motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, litis pendentia and forum shopping.

Finally, respondent had no cause of action against petitioner because, as shown by the tests conducted by the EMB on
May 24, 2002, based on noise sampling tests, the noise and air pollution did not emanate from Feliza Building but from
passing cars.

In its comment on the petition, respondent maintained that the assailed orders of the RTC and decision of the CA are in
accord with law and the rulings of this Court. Respondent maintains that the only issue before the trial court was how to
apply P.D. No. 984 and Section 78(b) and the Rules and Regulations of the NPCC and the provisions of the New Civil Code
governing the abatement of nuisance. By filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of
action, the petitioner thereby hypothetically admitted the factual allegations therein. The court must hear the case to be able
to finally resolve the factual issues that may be raised in the Answer of the petitioner after the denial of its motion to dismiss.

Respondent avers that it was not obliged to first exhaust all administrative remedies. It pointed out that the Building Official
of Makati City ignored its right to due process when he dismissed its complaint without conducting an investigation based
solely on the July 2, 2002 Report of the EMB Panel. The issues between the parties are legal, that is, whether there is
irreparable injury. It likewise points out that to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable as the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It insists that it could not have appealed the letters of the City
Mayor and the Building Official of Makati because there are no rules promulgated by the City governing appeals from said
letters. It points out that the City Engineer and City Mayor did not grant its letter requesting for a clarification of petitioner's
letters denying its letter-complaint.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The Order of the RTC dated September 15, 2003 denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner (as defendant below) is
interlocutory in nature. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint cannot be questioned via
a special civil action for certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. A party must exhaust all
remedies available before resorting to certiorari. A writ for certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling. It is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. It is a remedy narrow in scope, limited only to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to
relieve persons from arbitrary acts which courts have no power or authority to perform.[29] The remedy of petitioner was to
go to trial and appeal from an adverse decision.

Moreover, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent. Indeed, the assailed orders of the RTC are in accord with the law and rulings of this Court, taking into
account the averments of the complaint and the answer appended thereto and the other pleadings of the parties.

The RTC Has Jurisdiction

Over the Action of the
Respondent for Abatement
Of Nuisance

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over such action are to be
determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character
of the relief sought irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would be dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendants.[30]

We agree with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that as gleaned from the material averments of the complaint
as well as the character of the relief prayed for by respondent in its complaint before the RTC, the petition is one for the
judicial abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically the noise generated by the blowers of the airconditioning system
of the Feliza Building owned by petitioner, with a plea for a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction, plus damages.
Such action of respondent is incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money. Although respondent prayed for judgment for temperate or moderate damages and exemplary
damages, such claims are merely incidental to or as a consequence of, the principal relief sought by respondent. An action
incapable of pecuniary estimation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.
Blg.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.[31] In Tatel v. Municipality of Virac,[32] the Court ruled that a simple suit for
abatement of a nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the RTC.

Article 694 of the New Civil Code defines a nuisance as follows:

Art. 694. A nuisance is any act., omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

The term "nuisance" is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights
of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.[33] According to Article 695 of the
Civil Code, a nuisance may be either public or private:
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private
nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.
A private nuisance has been defined as one which violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few
persons.[34] A nuisance is public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public property
or by causing a common injury.[35] It is an unreasonable interference with the right common to the general public.[36]

Under Article 705 of the New Civil Code, a party aggrieved by a private nuisance has two alternative remedies: (1) a civil
action; or (2) abatement, without judicial proceedings. A person injured by a private nuisance may abate it as provided in
Article 706:
Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary by destroying the thing which
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable
that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.
A private nuisance action is the remedy for an invasion of a property right. On the other hand, the action for the abatement
of a public nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipality.[37] A private person may institute an action for the
abatement of a public nuisance in cases wherein he suffered a special injury of a direct and substantial character other than
that-which the general public shares.[38] The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.[39]

In the present case, respondent opted to file an action in the RTC for abatement of the private nuisance complained of and
damages under Article 697 of the New Civil Code for its past existence.

One has an action to recover personal damages arising from a private nuisance. The gist of the action is the unreasonable
interference by the defendant with the use and enjoyment of properties. Indeed, petitioner may be compelled to adopt the
necessary measures to reduce or deaden the nuisance emanating from the blowers of the airconditioning system at the
Feliza Building.

The PAB has no primary jurisdiction over the noise complained of by ihe respondent. The resolution of the issue before the
RTC, which is whether the noise complained of is actionable nuisance, does not require any special technical knowledge,
expertise and experience of the PAB or even of Makati City requiring the determination of technical and intricate matters of
fact. Indeed, the PAB dismissed the complaint of the Frabelle I Condominium Corporation declaring that, based on the
pleadings before it and the evidence of the parties, the case is more of an abatement of a nuisance under the New Civil
Code and DENR Order No. 30, Series of 1992. It declared that it was not a pollution case. The Resolution reads:
After considering the evidence adduced and the arguments of both parties in their pleadings, the Board, likewise giving due
importance to the technical findings giving rise to the conclusion that the nature of the case is more of a nuisance, hereby
resolves to DISMISS the pending complaint of pollution in accordance with Rule III, Section IV of PAB Resolution 1-C,
Series of 1997 as amended, which categorically states that "Except where such would constitute a pollution case, local
government units shall have the power to abate a nuisance within their respective areas pursuant to the Republic Act No.
386 (Civil Code of the Philippines), Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code), Presidential Decree 856 (the Code on
Sanitation of the Philippines), DENR Department Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 and other pertinent laws,
rules and regulations. " (underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, the issues raised by the complainant are hereby endorsed to the Local Government Unit concerned for
appropriate action consistent with above cited laws, and without prejudice to the institution of a pollution case upon definite
findings that herein respondent had failed to comply with the DENR Standards, and presentation of other evidence that
would warrant the Board to take cognizance of the matter as a pollution case.[40]
The power of the NPCC to resolve pollution cases under Section 6, paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (j), (k) and (p) of P.D. No. 984
is vested in the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under Title XIV, Chapter 2, Section 13 of the 1987 Administrative Code,
which reads:
SEC. 13. Pollution Adjudication Board. - The Pollution Adjudication Board, under the Office of the Secretary, shall be
composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary, the Director of
Environmental Management, and three others to be designated by the Secretary as members. The Board shall assume the
powers and functions of the Commission Commissioners of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the
adjudication of pollution cases under Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984, particularly with respect to Section 6
letters (e), (f), (g), (j), (k) and (p) of P.D. 984. The Environment Management Bureau shall serve as the Secretariat of the
Board. These powers and functions may be delegated to the regional officers of the Department in accordance with the
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board.
The cases referred to in Section 6 of P.D. No. 984 are as follows:
(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within such
discontinuance must be accomplished.

(g) Issue, renew or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works
and industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however, That the Commission, by rules and regulations, may
require subdivisions, condominium, hospitals, public buildings and other similar human settlements to put up appropriate
central sewerage system and sewage treatment works, except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage works
or changes to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or sanitary wastes from a single residential
building provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. The Commission may impose reasonable fees and charges for the
issuance or renewal of all permits herein required.

xxx

(j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.

(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decision of the Commission.

xxx

(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Decree.
Section 2(a) of P.D. No. 984 defines pollution as:
(a) "Pollution" means any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of any water, air and/or land resources
of the Philippines, or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create or to render
such water, air and land resources harmful, detrimental or injuries to public health, safety or welfare or which will adversely
affect their utilization for domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate purposes.
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating
noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular
thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing
is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction
of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the
ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined
by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.[41]

Section 17 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that local government units shall discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to the law; and such other powers, functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities in the
Code. Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers powers and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

What were devolved by the DENR to the LGUs under DENR Administrative Order No. 30 dated June 30, 1992, in relation
to R.A. No. 7160, were the regulatory functions/duties of the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were
absorbed and integrated by the EMB, as provided in Title No. XIV, Chapter 2, Section 17 of the 1987 Administrative Code.
However, the DENR exercises administrative supervision and control over the LGUs. Enumerated in Chapter IV, Article 1,
Sections 74 to 79 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the NPCC implementing P.D. 984 are the regulations
relative to noise control, specifically, the noise quality standards.

Under Section 78 of said Rules, as amended by NPCC Memorandum Circular No. 002, dated May 12, 1980, the
Environmental Quality Standards for Noise in General Areas are:melo

Category Morning&
Daytime Nighttime
Of Area Evening
AA 50 dB 45 dB 40 dB
A 55 " 50 " 45 "
B 65 " 60 " 55 "
C 70 " 65 " 60 "
D 75 " 70 " 65 "

Class ''A" area refers to that section or contiguous area which is primarily used for residential purposes, while Class "B"
refers to that section or contiguous area which is primarily a commercial area. Frabelle I and Feliza Buildings are located in
Makati City, an area which is classified as a commercial district.

The division of the 24-hour period shall be as follows:

Morning..............5:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.
Daytime............. 8:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M.
Evening.............. 6:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M.
Nighttime......... 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M.
The LGUs may conduct inspections, at all reasonable times, without doing damage, after due notice to the owners of
buildings to ascertain compliance with the noise standards under the law; and to order them to comply therewith if they fail
to do so; or suspend or cancel any building permits or clearance certificates issued by it for said units/buildings after due
hearing as required by P.D. No. 984.

However, the LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such as thing is a nuisance per se;
nor can they effect the extrajudicial abatement of that as a nuisance which in its nature or use is not such. Those things
must be resolved by the courts in the ordinary course of law.

Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the airconditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is to be resolved
only by the court in due course of proceedings. The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the consequences
thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may be of such a character as to constitute a nuisance, even though it arises from
the operation of a lawful business, only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an
unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not
render the noise an actionable nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of
many necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in which that word is used, but in the absence
of statute, noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality
and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of
quantity or quality; they depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They may be affected, but are not controlled,
by zoning ordinances. The delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing, industry or general business is not a
license to emit every noise profitably attending the conduct of any one of them.

The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the
sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of
holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care
is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a noise,
is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.[42]

Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the
senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be
substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or
excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or
volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of
ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said
to be substantial and unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the
circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.[43]

The courts have made it clear that in every case the question is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of one's
property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable invasion of another's use and enjoyment of his property so as to
constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules, but must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each
case, such as locality and the character of the surroundings, the nature, utility and social value of the use, the extent and
nature of the harm involved, the nature, utility and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded, and the like.[44]

Persons who live or work in thickly populated business districts must necessarily endure the usual annoyances and of those
trades and businesses which are properly located and carried on in the neighborhood where they live or work. But these
annoyances and discomforts must not be more than those ordinarily to be expected in the community or district, and which
are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades and businesses. If they exceed what might be reasonably expected and
cause unnecessary harm, then the court will grant relief.[45]

A finding by the LGU that the noise quality standards under the law have not been complied with is not a prerequisite nor
constitutes indispensable evidence to prove that the defendant is or is not liable for a nuisance and for damages. Such
finding is merely corroborative to the testimonial and/or other evidence to be presented by the parties. The exercise of due
care by the owner of a business in its operation does not constitute a defense where, notwithstanding the same, the business
as conducted, seriously affects the rights of those in its vicinity.[46]

We reject petitioner's contention that respondent's complaint does not state a cause of action for abatement of a private
nuisance and for damages. Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a complaint may be dismissed upon motion
if the complaint states no cause of action, or that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.[47]

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.[48] A cause of action exists if the following
elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]

The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is whether, admitting the veracity of what appears on the face and
within the four corners of the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. Stated otherwise, may the court render a
valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein?[50] Indeed, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material
allegations.[51] If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be presented by defendants.[52] As the Court emphasized:
In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that
the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will
have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain.

Equally important, a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having
hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof.[53]
The general rule is that the facts asserted in the complaint must be taken into account without modification although with
reasonable inferences therefrom.[54] However, all the pleadings filed may be considered, including annexes, motions and
the other evidence on record, to wit:
However, in so doing, the .trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such
documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these documents
would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of
whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably
arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.[55]
Section 2, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)
"Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in essence to be affected by the judgment as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.[56] A real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party defendant is one who has a
correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violate the legal right of the former.[57]

A person injured by a nuisance may bring an action in his own name and in behalf of others similarly affected to abate the
same.[58] One who has an interest in the property affected such as the owner thereof or fix interest therein are proper parties
as plaintiffs.[59] Possession alone of real estate is sufficient to sustain an action to recover damages from the maintenance
of a nuisance by the adjoining property in such manner as to injure the enjoyment of the former.

In the present case, respondent made the following allegations in its complaint below:
[Every time] the Feliza Building's airconditioning system is turned on, all or a good number of the 36 blowers are made to
operate simultaneously. The operation of the Feliza's blowers generates a continuous defeaning unbearable vibrating and
stressful noise affecting the tenants of Frabella I Condominium. Hot air is also blasted from the [Feliza Building's blowers to
the direction of the Frabella 1 Condominium.

xxxx

The tenants occupying the 5th to the 16th floors of the Frabella 1 Condominium facing Feliza Building are directly subjected
to a daily continuous intense noise and hot air blast coming from the blowers of the [10-storey] Feliza Building. Some are
tenants of plaintiff, who have complained to plaintiff about the matter. Tenants who could not bear the nuisance any longer
have vacated their units, and as a result, many units of plaintiff have remained vacant, and unoccupied or uninhabitable
thereby depriving plaintiff with rental income that it should have otherwise be receiving.

xxxx

Defendant did not perform any remedial or rectification works to lower the noise being generated by the blowers;

As a consequence of such unbearable, hot air and stressful noise, the occupants of the Frabella I, including the tenants of
plaintiff, have been and still are, prevented from enjoying peaceful and comfortable use of their property thereby forcing
them to vacate and or to transfer elsewhere.

Notwithstanding the foregoing results, repeated requests/demands from the plaintiff and recommendation of the DENR,
MACEA and MMDA to abate nuisance, the defendant has ignored and still continues to ignore such
requests/demands/recommendation.
Appended to respondent's complaint are its letters of demand to the petitioner for the latter to abate the nuisance complained
of, as well as the results of the tests conducted by the DENR showing that the noise generated by the blowers of the Feliza
Building is beyond the legally allowable level standards under Section 78 of P.D. No. 984.

By filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action for
abatement of nuisance and damages, petitioner hypothetically admitted the material allegations of the complaint. A plain
reading of the material averments therein and its appendages will readily show that respondent had a cause of action for
abatement of a private nuisance and for damages.

Respondent is the real party-in-interest as party plaintiff in the complaint below because it owned several units in Frabelle I
and, as a result of the defeaning and unbearable noise from the blowers of the airconditioning units of the Feliza Building
owned by petitioner, many tenants of the respondent vacated their units. The units remained unoccupied, thereby depriving
respondent of income. Some of the tenants even threatened to sue respondent on account of the noise from the Feliza
Building. In fine, respondent is obliged to maintain its tenants in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the units.[60]

Under Article 697 of the New Civil Code, the aggrieved party is entitled to damages for the present and past existence of a
nuisance.[61] He is entitled to actual or compensatory damages[62] or indemnification for damages inclusive of the value of
the loss suffered and profits which respondent failed to obtain.

Liability for nuisance may be imposed upon one who sets in motion the force which entirely caused the tortuous act; upon
one who sets in motion a force or a chain of events resulting in the nuisance. In an action for damages resulting from a
nuisance, responsibility arises not only from the creator of the nuisance but from its continued maintenance as well[63]. One
is entitled to damages on account of the conduct by another of his business which unreasonably and substantially interferes
with the quiet enjoyment of his premises by himself or of his tenants.[64] It is sufficient to maintain an action for abatement
of a nuisance if his buildings is rendered valueless for the purpose it was devoted.

A negligent act may constitute a nuisance. An intentional act may also constitute a nuisance. A nuisance may be formed
from a continuous, known invasion, where, after complaint, and notice of damage, the defendant continues to offend and
refuses to correct or discontinue the nuisance. In such a case, the nuisance is deemed intentional.[65] An unreasonable use,
perpetrated and uncorrected even after complaint and notice of damage is deemed intentional.[66]
In this case, as alleged in the complaint, the subject nuisance had been existing continuously since 1995 and, despite
repeated demands by respondent, petitioner intransigently refused to abate the same.

We reject petitioner's contention that considering the Report of the EMB Team dated July 2, 2002 that the noise complained
of by the respondent did not necessarily come from the blowers but also from passing cars, it follows that respondent has
no cause of action against it for abatement of nuisance. As gleaned from the Report, the panel of investigators found that
the passing of vehicles along the street and blowers of nearby buildings were merely contributory to the ambient noise
quality in the area. To what extent the passing of vehicles contributed to the noise is not indicated in the Report, nor is it
stated that the noise coming from the blowers of the airconditioning unit of the Feliza Building were at par with or lower than
the Level Standards under the property Rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984.

The July 2, 2002 Report of the EMB Panel should not be considered in isolation of other Reports of the EMB since 1995 up
to 2000, showing that the noise level from the blowers of the Feliza Building exceeded the allowable level under P.D. No.
984. The July 2, 2002 Report is not decisive on the issue of whether petitioner had abated the nuisance complained of by
respondent or that the nuisance does not exist at all. Indeed, in Velasco v. Manila Electric Company,[67] this Court cited the
ruling in Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson,[68] thus:
xxx The determinating factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the
noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. 20
R.C.L. 445, 453; Wheat Culvert Company v. Jenkins, supra. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise
constitutes a nuisance. xxx
Besides, even if it is assumed for the nonce that petitioner had abated the nuisance in 2002, still the complaint of the
respondent states a cause of action for damages based upon the past existence of the nuisance, from 1995. Where the
injury from the alleged nuisance is temporary in its nature; or is of a continuing or recurring character, the damages are
ordinarily regarded as continuing and one recovery against the wrongdoer is not a bar to sanction an action for damages
thereafter accruing from the same wrong.[69]

The Complaint of the

Respondent Not Premature

Admittedly, respondent did not appeal the July 19, 2002 letter of Engr. Morales. However, the letter was not appealable. It
bears stressing that the letter-complaint of the respondent to Mayor Jejomar Binay against petitioner was referred to Engr.
Morales for investigation of the complaint; the latter was required to submit his Report thereon to the City Mayor for final
disposition. Engr. Morales did secure the July 2, 2002 Report of the EMB but failed to make a Report on his findings. Until
after the City Mayor shall have acted on the findings and recommendation of Engr. Morales an appeal therefrom would be
premature.

Obviously, Engr. Morales gave respondent another chance to have the EMB reverse or revise its July 2, 2002 Report.
However, when the officials of respondent sought a clarification of his Order, Engr. Morales was piqued and even dared
them to go to court if they were not satisfied with the EMB Report. Respondent then sought another test by the EMB. In its
November 24, 2003, Report, the EMB confirmed that the SPL was higher when the doors were open; as it was, the SPL
readings were taken from inside the Frabelle I. The EMB added that the noise quality standards in Section 78 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 984 could not be applied since it is for ambient noise. It even emphasized
that the SPL are not the actual factors in the resolution of the issues. Conformably with case law, the EMB opined, noise
need not be high or low to annoy or cause nuisance to the receptor; as long as the complainant is disturbed with the level
of sound coming from the firm, the same is a nuisance. Clearly, the EMB was of the view that the EMB Reports are not
decisive on the issue between petitioner and respondent, and that said issue is one beyond the competence of the LGUs,
by implying that the issue is a matter to be presented to and resolved by the ordinary courts. By returning the records to
Makati City, the EMB expected the City to dismiss the complaint and just allow respondent, as complainant, to seek relief
from the courts. Respondent then took its cue from the EMB Report and filed its complaint in the RTC. There is, thus, no
basis for the contention of petitioner that respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its complaint
with the RTC.

Also barren of merit are the petitioner's contention that the action of respondent was barred by the decision of the PAB AM
No. 01-0009-FLC. While it is true that the Frabella 1 Condominium Corporation filed its complaint against petitioner before
the PAB for and in behalf of the tenants/owners of units of Frabella I, including those owned by respondent, however, the
PAB dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and without prejudice. The PAB ruled that respondent's
action was for abatement of a nuisance which was already devolved to the local government.

As gleaned from the Resolution, the dismissal was without prejudice. Since the PAB had no jurisdiction over the complaint
and the dismissal was without prejudice, respondent's action before the RTC was not barred by res judicata or litis
pendentia[70]. The decision of the PAB was not a decision on the merits of the case.[71] Consequently, the contention of
petitioner that respondent is guilty of forum shopping has no factual basis.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141010 February 7, 2007

UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ROMEO T. VILLAMEJOR, RAUL S. LANUEVO, ROBERTO

ARNALDO, FLORENTINO CONCEPCION, BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., KK
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., and BF (CRAB) HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
THE (MUNICIPAL) CITY MAYOR, THE (MUNICIPAL) CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING
OFFICER OR ZONING ADMINISTRATOR, THE (MUNICIPAL) CITY ENGINEER AND/OR BUILDING OFFICIAL, THE
CHIEF OF THE PERMITS AND LICENSES DIVISION, THE SANGGUNIANG (BAYAN) PANGLUNGSOD, and
BARANGAY BF HOMES, ALL OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, METRO MANILA, Respondents,
EL GRANDE AGUIRRE COMMERCE AND TRADE ASSOCIATION (EL ACTO), Respondent-Intervenor.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 28 June 1999 Decision2 and the 16 November 1999 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46624. The Court of Appeals held that Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power
by the Municipality of Parañaque.4

The Facts

BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision (BF Homes Parañaque), with a land area straddling the cities of Parañaque, Las Piñas,
and Muntinlupa, is the largest subdivision in the country.

On 11 November 1997, the Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan & Zoning of the Municipality of Parañaque Pursuant to the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws." Sections 11.5 and 11.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08,
reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial areas, read:

11.5 C-1 LOW INTENSITY COMMERCIAL ZONES

xxxx

BARANGAY BF HOMES

Lot deep both side[s] along Aguirre Avenue from Governor A. Santos Street eastward to Gng. Elsie Gatches Street

Lot deep both side[s] along El Grande Avenue from Lopez Avenue gate southward to corner Aguirre Avenue

xxxx

11.6 C-2 MAJOR COMMERCIAL ZONES

xxxx

BARANGAY BF HOMES

Lot deep both side[s] along Aguirre Avenue from Dallas to El Grande Avenue

Lot deep both side[s] along Aguirre Avenue from El Grande Avenue to Gov. A. Santos Street

BF Parañaque Commercial Plaza

Area bounded on the

 North - Pres. Quezon Street

South - A. Aguirre Avenue

East - President’s Avenue

West - MMP, Creek along BF Homeowner’s Association clubhouse

Lot deep east side along President’s Avenue from Mac Donald southward to M. Rufino Street

Area bounded on the

North - A. Aguirre Avenue

South - A. Soriano Sr. & M. Rufino Street

East - President’s Avenue

West - Gng. Elsie Ga[t]ches Street

x x x x6

On 27 January 1998, the United BF Homeowners’ Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI),7 several homeowners’ associations, and
residents of BF Homes Parañaque (collectively petitioners) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with an
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Sections
11.5, 11.6, 15,8 17,9 and 19.610 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08.

Petitioners alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone
is unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and
the lot buyers. Petitioners cited the annotation on the lot buyers’ titles which provides that "the property shall be used for
residential purposes only and for no other purpose."

On the other hand, public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of
police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer.

Meanwhile, El Grande Aguirre Commerce and Trade Organization (EL ACTO), a non-stock, non-profit corporation,
intervened as respondent. EL ACTO claimed that its members are lot owners, residents, and operators of commercial
establishments along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque, who will be affected if Municipal Ordinance
No. 97-08 is declared unconstitutional. EL ACTO asserted that Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police
power and that petitioners are guilty of estoppel since petitioners endorsed the opening of many of these commercial
establishments in BF Homes Parañaque. EL ACTO further alleged that the instant petition should have been initially filed
with the Regional Trial Court in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of courts.1awphi1.net

On 28 June 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing the General Welfare Clause11 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), the Court of Appeals held that the enactment of
Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 which, among others, reclassified El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque
as commercial zones, was a valid exercise of police power by the Municipality of Parañaque.

The Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the fact that El Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main streets of BF Homes
Parañaque which have long been commercialized, thus:
The declaration of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues as commercial zones through Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is an
exercise of police power.

Obviously, because of the rapid and tremendous increase in population, the needs of the homeowners in the BF Parañaque
Subdivision grew. The commercial zones in the area proved inadequate to service the needs of its residents. There was
therefore a need to open more commercial districts. In fact, records show that several homeowners along El Grande and
Aguirre Avenues converted their residences into business establishments. El Acto’s members are among them.

Aside from the increasing number of commercial establishments therein, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that El
Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main thoroughfares of BF Homes Parañaque which have long been commercialized. The
local government therefore responded to these changes in the community by enacting Ordinance No. 97-08 x x x.12

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether R.A. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 has repealed PD 957, the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree;

2. Whether the power of local government units to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances has legal limitations;

3. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power;

4. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is constitutional considering that it impairs a contractual obligation
annotated in homeowners’ titles and violates the doctrine of separation of powers;

5. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is enforceable pending review by the MMDA, the Metro Manila Mayor’s
Council and the HLURB.13

The resolution of these issues turns on the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Power to Enact Zoning Ordinances

The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 pursuant to the provisions of RA 7160 and
Executive Order No. 72.14

Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative body of the municipality,
has the power to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants.

Among the functions of the Sangguniang Bayan enumerated under Section 447 of RA 7160 are:

(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the development plans, program objectives and priorities
of the municipality as provided for under Section 18 of this Code with particular attention to agro-industrial development and
countryside growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality: Provided, That the formulation, adoption, or
modification of said plan shall be in coordination with the approved provincial comprehensive land use plan;

(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the municipality subject to the pertinent provision of this
Code;
 (ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establish fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers;
and regulate the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with
the provisions of the Fire Code; (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Executive Order No. 72 provides:

SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating. – (a) Cities and municipalities shall continue to formulate or update their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in conformity with the land use planning and zoning standards and
guidelines prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to national policies.

As a policy recommending body of the LGU, the city or municipal development council (CDC/MDC) shall initiate the
formulation or updating of its land use plan, in consultation with the concerned sectors in the community. For this purpose,
the CDC/MDC may seek the assistance of any local official or field officer of NGA’s operation in the LGU.

The city or municipal planning and development coordinator (CPDC/MPDC) and/or the city or municipal agriculturist, if there
is any, shall provide the technical support services and such other assistance as may be required by the CDC/MDC to
effectively carry out this function.

The comprehensive land use plan prepared by the CDC/MDC shall be submitted to the sangguniang panglungsod
or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, for enactment into a zoning ordinance. Such ordinance shall be enacted
and approved in accordance with Articles 107 and 108 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the LGC.

(b) The comprehensive land use plans of component cities and municipalities shall be formulated, adopted, or modified in
accordance with the approved provincial comprehensive land use plans.

(c) Cities and municipalities of metropolitan Manila shall continue to formulate or update their respective comprehensive
land use plans, in accordance with the land use planning and zoning standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLURB
pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1990, and other pertinent national policies.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that public officers performed their official duties
regularly and legally and in compliance with applicable laws, in good faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment.15

We find no sufficient evidence disputing the regularity of the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08. Before the
Municipal Council of Parañaque passed Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08,16 it has been the subject of barangay consultations
and committee hearings in accordance with Executive Order No. 72.

Reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues

Contrary to petitioners’ allegations, we find Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 reasonable and not discriminating or oppressive
with respect to BF Homes Parañaque. As held by the Court of Appeals, the increasing number of homeowners in BF Homes
Parañaque necessitated the addition of commercial areas in the subdivision to service the needs of the homeowners. In
fact, several homeowners along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues already converted their residences into business
establishments. Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main thoroughfares in
BF Homes Parañaque which have long been commercialized.

Even petitioner UBFHAI, the recognized umbrella organization of all homeowners’ associations in BF Homes Parañaque,
acknowledged the need for additional commercial area. Records reveal that as early as 30 July 1989, UBFHAI
recommended for approval an "Amended Integrated Zoning Policies and Guidelines for BF Homes Parañaque."17 UBFHAI
proposed another commercial zone in BF Homes Parañaque to accommodate the growing needs of the residents, thus:

Subject to the approval of BF Homes, Inc., the Local Zoning Official/Planning Officer of Parañaque and the Metro Manila
Commission and in recognition of the fact that the subdivision has tremendously grown in size and population since
1983 when the above-mentioned guidelines of the MMC [Ordinance 81-01] were promulgated, such that one
commercial zone for the entire subdivision is now inadequate vis-a-vis the needs of the residents, the UBFHAI is
proposing another commercial zone in Phase III of the Subdivision, in the vicinity of the Parish of the Presentation
of the Child Jesus as follows:

One lot deep along Aguirre Avenue from Gov. Santos St., to the end of Aguirre Avenue and two lots deep along El
Grande from where it intersects Aguirre Avenue.

Pending approval of the aforesaid proposal, commercial buildings constructed and existing in the aforesaid area
will be given temporary-use permits good for five (5) years from December 31, 1986 or until December 31, 1991,
after which, the same must revert to residential status, unless, in the meantime the proposal is approved, provided all such
buildings must comply with the set-back and parking provision of the Metro Manila Commission Ordinance 81-01; I.M. 09-
83.

xxxx

The term for temporary use permits of the designated commercial area shall be considered extended for 8 years
from December 31, 1991 to December 31, 1998; without prejudice to the official conversion of the area under
existing MMA/LGC guidelines to commercial.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, UBFHAI’s proposed new commercial area, encompassing El Grande and Aguirre Avenues, is substantially the same
area, which Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 later reclassified as a commercial zone.

Furthermore, in the subsequent years, UBFHAI and its member homeowners’ associations endorsed the issuance of
municipal and barangay permits for commercial establishments along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues. Contrary to
petitioners’ allegations, the commercial establishments endorsed by UBFHAI were not mere convenience stores, which
Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-0119 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 allow in residential areas. Among the
commercial establishments which UBFHAI endorsed were a trading business,20 electronics repair shop,21 mini-grocery
store,22 beauty salon,23 school,24 dress shop,25 and consultancy or management services business.26

Clearly, the reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque as commercial area was reasonable
and justified under the circumstances.

Non-Impairment of Contract

Petitioners invoke Presidential Decree No. 957 (PD 957),27 otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
Protective Decree. Petitioners maintain that PD 957 is intended primarily to protect the buyers and to ensure that subdivision
developers keep their promises and representations. Petitioners allege that one of the promises of the developer of BF
Homes Parañaque is that the property shall be used for residential purposes only. Petitioners assert that the reclassification
of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it impairs the
contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers.

The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment clause.28 The constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare.29

In Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.,30 the Court held that contractual restrictions on the use
of property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power through zoning regulations. The Court held:

With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-
appellee–referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates
of Title issued to defendant-appellee–it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers"
and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through
Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company v. City of Davao, et al., police power "is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past
conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. De Genuino
v. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We do not see why the public welfare when clashing with
the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power."

Resolution No. 27. s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from
Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes
have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the
health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if
not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.31 (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, in Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court,32 the Court upheld Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-
01, which reclassified Jupiter Street in Makati into a high-density commercial zone, as a legitimate exercise of police power.
The Court held that the power of the Metro Manila Commission and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances
for the general welfare prevails over the deed restrictions on the lot owners in Bel-Air Village which restricted the use of the
lots for residential purposes only. The Court held:

It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective.
As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts,
subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate
exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the
contracting parties," but while it is so, it cannot contravene "law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy." Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety,
peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. x x x33 (Emphasis
supplied)

Similarly, in this case, Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power and the reclassification of El
Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque is not arbitrary or unreasonable.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 1999 and the Resolution dated 16 November 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46624.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187836 November 25, 2014

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187916

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M. ISIP-GARCIA, RAFAEL P. BORROMEO
JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION, minors MARIAN REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN, RICHARD
KENNETH B. TARAN, represented and joined by their parents RICHARD AND MARITES TARAN, minors CZARINA
ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS, CEZARAH ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, and CRISTEN AIDAN C. RAMOS represented and joined
by their mother DONNA C. RAMOS, minors JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA AND ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV, represented and
joined by their mother MAUREEN C. TOLENTINO, Petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE MAYOR FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES T.
LIM, JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA, VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN MARVIN C. NIETO, ROLANDO M.
VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO, EDWARD VP MACEDA, RODERICK D. V ALBUENA, JOSEFINA M.
SISCAR, SALVADOR PHILLIP H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M. VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ, ERNESTO F.
RIVERA,1 DANILO VICTOR H. LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA-PANGAN, ERNESTO M.
DIONISO, JR. and ERICK IAN O. NIEVA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION, Intervenors.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Challenged in these consolidated petitions2 is the validity of Ordinance No. 81873 entitled "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING
ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ‘THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING
ORDINANCE OF 2006,’ BY CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3),
AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT" enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila (Sangguniang
Panlungsod) on 14 May 2009.

The creation of a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone (1-3) effectively lifted the prohibition against owners
and operators of businesses, including herein intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron), Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell), and Petron Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to as the oil companies, from operating in the
designated commercial zone – an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 80274 entitled "AN ORDINANCE
RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT PORTION OF LAND BOUNDED BY THE PASIGRIVER IN THE NORTH,
PNR RAILROAD TRACK IN THE EAST, BEATA ST. IN THE SOUTH, PALUMPONG ST. IN THE SOUTHWEST AND
ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE WEST, PNR RAILROAD IN THE NORTHWEST AREA, ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN
THE NORTHEAST, PASIG RIVER IN THE SOUTHEAST AND DR. M. L. CARREON IN THE SOUTHWEST, THE AREA
OF PUNTA, STA.ANA BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER, MARCELINO OBRERO ST., MAYO 28 ST. AND THE F.
MANALO STREET FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO COMMERCIAL I," and Ordinance No. 81195 entitled "AN ORDINANCE
ADOPTING THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING REGULATIONS OF 2006 AND
PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT THERETO."

The Parties

Petitioners allege the parties’ respective capacity to sue and be sued, viz:
 Petitioners Residence Suing capacity aside from being
in Manila residents of Manila other personal
circumstances

G.R. No. 187836

SJS Officer Samson S. Alcantara Not mentioned in Manila taxpayer;

(Alcantara) the petition; One of the petitioners in SJS v. Atienza
holding office in (G.R. No. 156052);*
Ermita, Manila Pesident of ABAKADA GURO
PARTY LIST with members who
are residents of the City of Manila

SJS Officer Vladimir Alarique T. Pandacan One of the petitioners in SJS v. Atienza
Cabigao (Cabigao) (G.R. No. 156052)

* The allegation is inaccurate. SJS Officer Alcantara is actually one of the counsels for petitioner SJS in G.R. No. 156052.
The petitioners in that case are the SJS itself, Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon (Tumbokon).

G.R. No. 187916

Former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. San Andres Former Mayor of Manila;
(Mayor Atienza) Secretary of Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR)

Bienvinido M. Abante Sta. Ana Citizen and taxpayer;

member of the House of
Representatives

Ma. Lourdes M. Isip-Garcia San Miguel Incumbent City Councilor of the

City of Manila

Rafael P. Borromeo Paco Incumbent City Councilor of the

City of Manila

Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion Sta. Mesa Incumbent City Councilor of the

City of Manila

Minors Marian Regina B. Taran, Paco Citizens, real estate owners and
Macalia Ricci B. Taran, Richard taxpayers
Kenneth B. Taran, represented and
joined by their parents Richard and
Marites Taran

Minors Czarina Alysandra C. Ramos, Tondo Citizens, real estate owners and
Cezarah Adrianna C. Ramos, and taxpayers
Cristen Aidan C. Ramos represented
and joined by
their mother Donna c. Ramos

Minors Jasmin Syllita T. Vila and Sta. Ana Citizens, real estate owners and
Antonio T. Cruz IV, represented and taxpayers
joined by their mother Maureen C.
Tolentino

Respondents Sued in their capacity as

G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916

Former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) Incumbent Mayor of Manila at

the time of the filing of the
present petitions

Respondents Sued in their capacity as

G.R. No. 187916

Vice-Mayor Francisco Domagoso (Vice-Mayor Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer

Domagoso) of the City Council of Manila

Arlene Woo Koa Principal author of City

Ordinance No. 8187

Moises T. Lim, Jesus Fajardo, Louisito N. Chua, Victoriano Personal and official capacities as
A. Melendez, John Marvin Nieto, Rolando M. Valeriano, councilors who voted and approved
Raymondo R. Yupangco, Edward VP Maceda, Roderick D. City Ordinance No. 8187
Valbuena, Josefina M. Siscar, Phillip H. Lacuna, Luciano M.
Veloso, Carlo V. Lopez, Ernesto F. Rivera,6 Danilo Victor H.
Lacuna, Jr., Ernesto G. Isip, Honey H. Lacuna-Pangan,
Ernesto M. Dionisio, Jr., Erick Ian O. Nieva

The following intervenors, all of which are corporations organized under Philippine laws, intervened:7

Intervenors Nature of Business

Chevron Philippines, importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products

Inc. (CHEVRON) in the Philippines since 1922

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and

(SHELL) marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines

Petron Corporation (PETRON) manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and

marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines

They claim that their rights with respect to the oil depots in Pandacan would be directly affected by the outcome of these
cases.

The Antecedents

These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.8 (hereinafter referred to asG.R. No.
156052), where the Court found: (1) that the ordinance subject thereof – Ordinance No. 8027 – was enacted "to safeguard
the rights to life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila;"9 (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and
(3) that it is not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119.10 Declaring that it is constitutional and valid,11 the Court accordingly
ordered its immediate enforcement with a specific directive on the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan oil terminals.12

Highlighting that the Court has soruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein petitioners now seek the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which contains provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027.
Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a healthful and balanced environment are also included.
For a better perspective of the facts of these cases, we again trace the history of the Pandacan oil terminals, aswell as the
intervening events prior to the reclassification of the land use from Industrial II to Commercial I under Ordinance No. 8027
until the creation of Medium Industrial Zone and Heavy Industrial Zone pursuant to Ordinance No. 8187.

History of the Pandacan

Oil Terminals

We quote the following from the Resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 156052:

Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the Pasig [R]iver. Atthe turn of the
twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the industrial center of Manila. The area, then largely
uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the transportation of goods and
products. In the 1920s, it was classifiedas an industrial zone. Among its early industrial settlers werethe oil companies. x x
x On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the Philippine Islands. x x x [I]n their zealous attempt
to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the Pandacan Terminals and hastily made
plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics weapon. The U.S.
Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:

After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The flames
spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze, endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. … For
one week longer, the "open city" blazed—a cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by night.

The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network of depots and service stations
inoperative.

After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies
resumed the operation of their depots. But the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial zone; it had evolved
into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000
people, majority of whom are urban poor who call it home. Aside from numerous industrial installations, there are also small
businesses, churches, restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated there. Malacañang Palace, the official
residence of the President of the Philippines and the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers away. There is a
private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers. More than 15,000
students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near these facilities. A university with a student population of
about 25,000 is located directly across the depot on the banks of the Pasig [R]iver.

The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies’ distribution terminals and depot facilities.1âwphi1 The
refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are connected to the Pandacan
Terminals through a 114-kilometer underground pipeline system. Petron’s refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also
services the depot. The terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel requirements of Metro
Manila, 50% of Luzon’s consumption and 35% nationwide. Fuel can also be transported through barges along the Pasig
[R]iver ortank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.13 (Citations omitted)

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

dated 12 October 2001 between the oil companies
and the Department of Energy (DOE)

On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the DOE entered into a MOA14 "in light of recent international developments
involving acts of terrorism on civilian and government landmarks,"15 "potential new security risks relating to the Pandacan
oil terminals and the impact on the surrounding community which may be affected,"16 and "to address the perceived risks
posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals, consistent with the principle
of sustainable development."17 The stakeholders acknowledged that "there is a need for a comprehensive study to address
the economic, social, environmental and security concerns with the end in view of formulating a Master Plan to address and
minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan
oil terminals without adversely affecting the security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products to Metro
Manila and the rest of Luzon, and the interests of consumers and users of such petroleum products in those areas."18

The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027

against the continued stay of the oil depots

The MOA, however, was short-lived.

On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Mayor Atienza) – nowone of the
petitioners in G.R. No. 187916 – the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 802719 reclassifying the use of the
land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I.

The owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the reclassification were given six months from the date of
effectivity of the Ordinance within which to stop the operation of their businesses.

Nevertheless, the oil companies weregranted an extension of until 30 April 2003 within which to comply with the Ordinance
pursuant to the following:

(1) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)20 dated 26 June 2002 between the City of Manila and the Department
of Energy (DOE), on the one hand, and the oil companies, on the other, where the parties agreed that "the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option"21 and committed to adopt specific
measures22 consistent with the said objective;

(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which ratified the 26 June 2002 MOU
but limited the extension of the period within which to comply to six months from 25 July 2002; and

(3) Resolution No. 13 dated 30 January 200324 of the Sanguniang Panlungsod, which extended the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to 30 April 2003, authorized then Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies, and called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052):

The filing of an action for mandamus
before the Supreme Court
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027

In the interim, an original action for mandamus entitled Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. docketed as G.R. No.
15605225 was filed on 4 December 2002 by Tumbokon and herein petitioners SJS and Cabigao against then Mayor Atienza.
The petitioners sought to compel former Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and cause the immediate removal
of the terminals of the oil companies.26

Issuance by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction,
and status quo order in favor of the oil companies

Unknown to the Court, during the pendency of G.R. No. 156052, and before the expiration of the validity ofResolution No.
13, the oil companies filed the following actions before the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (1) an action for the annulment
of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction –
by Chevron; (2) a petition for prohibition and mandamus also for the annulment of the Ordinance with application for writs
of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction – by Shell; and (3) a petition assailing the validity
of the Ordinance with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) –
by Petron.27

Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in favor of Chevron and Shell
on 19 May 2003. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo order on 4 August 2004.28

The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 defining the Manila land use plan and zoning regulations

On 16 June 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An Ordinance Adopting the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment thereto."29

Pertinent provisions relative to these cases are the following:

(a) Article IV, Sec. 730 enumerating the existing zones or districts in the City of Manila;
 (b) Article V, Sec. 2331 designating the Pandacan oil depot area as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone"
(O-PUD); and

(c) the repealing clause, which reads:

SEC. 84. Repealing Clause. – All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby
repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired.32

7 March 2007 Decision in G.R. No. 156052;

The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan terminals

On 7 March 2007, the Court granted the petition for mandamus, and directed then respondent Mayor Atienza to immediately
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.33

Confined to the resolution of the following issues raised by the petitioners, to wit:

1. whether respondent [Mayor Atienza]has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.34

the Court declared:

x x x [T]he Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He
has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. x x x

xxxx

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions
passed by the Sanggunianhave made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain.
xxx

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the Cityof Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance
is toprotect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.35 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional

The oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, filed their motions for leave to intervene
and for reconsideration of the 7 March 2007 Decision. During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to the power of the
Court torule on the constitutionality and validity of the assailed Ordinance despite the pendency of the cases in the RTC.36

On 13 February 2008, the Court granted the motions for leave to intervene of the oil companies and the Republic of the
Philippines but denied their respective motions for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, x x x
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the
appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer
of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.37

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119

The Court also ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119. On this score, the Court
ratiocinated:

For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. There is no conflict
between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial II to Commercial I.
Ordinance No. 8119, Section 23, designated it as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex "C"
which defined the zone boundaries, the Pandacan area was shown to be within the "High Density Residential/Mixed Use
Zone (R-3/MXD)." x x x [B]oth ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from
industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential commercial (Ordinance No. 8119)

xxxx

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot
area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it covers the entire city of Manila.

xxxx

x x x The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the legislative intent to repeal all prior
inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes
(an official record of the discussions in the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of
Ordinance No. 8027.38

Filing of a draft Resolution amending Ordinance No. 8027 effectively allowing

the oil depots to stay in the Pandacan area; Manifestation and
Motion to forestall the passing of the new Ordinance filed in G.R. No. 156052

On 5 March 2009, respondent then Councilor Arlene W. Koa, filed with the Sangguniang Panlungsod a draft resolution
entitled "An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 8119 Otherwise Known as ‘The Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan
and Zoning Ordinance of 2006’ by Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing
for its Enforcement."39 Initially numbered as Draft Ordinance No. 7177, this was later renumbered as Ordinance No. 8187,
the assailed Ordinance in these instant petitions.

Considering that the provisions thereof run contrary to Ordinance No. 8027, the petitioners in G.R. No. 156052 filed a
"Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of Manila from further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance
No. 8027; [and] b) Transfer the monitoring of the enforcement of the Resolution of the Honorable Court on this case dated
13 February 2008 from Branch 39, Manila Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court."40

28 April 2009 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Second Motion for Reconsideration denied with finality;
succeeding motions likewise denied or otherwise noted without action

On 28 April 2009, pending the resolution of the Manifestation and Motion, the Court denied with finalitythe second motion
for reconsideration dated 27 February 2008 of the oil companies.41

It further ruled that no further pleadings shall be entertained in the case.42

Succeeding motions were thus deniedand/or noted without action. And, after the "Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of
the City of Manila from Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do So" filed on 19 May
2009 was denied on 2 June 2009 for being moot,43 all pleadings pertaining to the earlier motion against the drafting of an
ordinance to amend Ordinance No. 8027 were noted without action.44
The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8187
allowing the continued stay of the oil depots

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187.45

The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance
No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith46 thereby allowing, once again, the operation of
"Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments" and "Highly
Pollutive/Non-Hazardous[,] Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous[,] Non-Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing
establishments" within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) in the Pandacan
area.

Thus, where the Industrial Zoneunder Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone (I-1), Ordinance No. 8187
appended to the list a Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone (I-3), where petroleum refineries and oil
depots are now among those expressly allowed.

Hence these petitions.

The Petitions

G.R. No. 187836

To support their petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187, the petitioner Social Justice Society
(SJS) officers allege that:

1. The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power because the measures provided
therein do not promote the general welfare of the people within the contemplation of the following provisions of law:

a) Article III, Section 18 (kk)47 of Republic Act No. 409 otherwise known as the "Revised Charter of the City
of Manila," which provides that the Municipal Board shall have the legislative power to enact all ordinances
it may deem necessary and proper;

b) Section 1648 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local Government Code, which defines the scope
of the general welfare clause;

2. The conditions at the time the Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional in G.R. No. 156052 exist to this
date;

3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and notwithstanding that the conditions and circumstances
warranting the validity of the Ordinance remain the same, the Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance,
thereby refusing to recognize that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part
of the legal system of the Philippines;"49 and

4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines on the duty
of the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people"50 and "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology."51 Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the City of Manila be
declared null and void, and that respondent, and all persons acting under him, be prohibited from enforcing the
same.

G.R. No. 187916

The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction against
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187 of former Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources and then
Mayor Atienza, together with other residents and taxpayers of the City of Manila, also alleges violation of the right to health
of the people and the right to a healthful and balanced environment under Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in violation of the following health and environment-related municipal laws,
and international conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a state party:

1. Municipal Laws –

(a) Sections 4,52 12,53 1954 and 3055 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine Clean Air
Act;

(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No. 1152);

(c) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); and

(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

2. International Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a state party –

a. Section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "[e]veryone has the right to
life, liberty and security of person;"

b. Articles 6,56 2457 and 2758 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, summarized by the petitioners in
the following manner:

1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]

2. human right to the highest attainable standard of health[;]

3. the human right to ecologically sustainable development[;]

4. the human right to an adequate standard of living, including access to safe food and water[;]

5. the human right of the child to live in an environment appropriate for physical and mental development[; and]

6. the human right to full and equal participation for all persons in environmental decision-making and development
planning, and in shaping decisions and policies affecting one’s community, at the local, national and international
levels.59

Petitioners likewise posit that the title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 when it
actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. According to them, Ordinance No. 8027 was never mentioned in the title
and the body of the new ordinance in violation of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that every
bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Also pointed out by the petitioners is a specific procedure outlined in Ordinance No. 8119 that should be observed when
amending the zoning ordinance. This is provided for under Section 81 thereof, which reads:

SEC. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance. The proposed amendments to the Zoning Ordinance asreviewed and
evaluated by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)shall be submitted to the City Council for approval of the
majority of the Sangguniang Panlungsod members. The amendments shall be acceptable and eventually approved:
PROVIDED, That there is sufficient evidence and justification for such proposal; PROVIDED FURTHER,That such proposal
is consistent with the development goals, planning objectives, and strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan.
Said amendments shall take effect immediately upon approval or after thirty (30) days from application.

Petitioners thus pray that:

1. upon filing of [the] petition, [the] case be referred to the Court [E]n Banc, and setting (sic) the case for oral
argument;

2. upon the filing of [the] petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the respondents from publishing
and posting Manila City Ordinance No. 8187 and/or posting of Manila City Ordinance No. 8187; and/or taking any
 steps to implementing (sic) and/or enforce the same and after due hearing, the temporary restraining order be
converted to a permanent injunction;

3. x x x Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and void for being repugnant to the Constitution and
existing municipal laws and international covenants;

4. x x x the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from enforcing and/or implementing Manila City Ordinance No. 8187;

5. x x x respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined] from issuing any permits (business or otherwise) to all
industries whose allowable uses are anchored under the provisions of Manila Ordinance No. 8187; and

6. x x x respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be ordered] to comply with the Order of the Honorable Court in
G.R. 156052 dated February 13, 2008.60

The Respondents’ Position on the Consolidated Petitions

Respondent former Mayor Lim

In his Memorandum,61 former Mayor Lim, through the City Legal Officer, attacks the petitioners’ lack of legal standing to
sue. He likewise points out that the petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.

Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional, he expounds on the following arguments:

On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the function of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact zoning ordinances,
for which reason, it may proceed to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board
of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as prescribed under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of Ordinance No. 8119,
especially when the action actually originated from the Sangguniang Panlungsod itself; (2) the Sangguniang Panlungsod
may, in the later ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the zoning ordinance sought to be modified; and (3) the provision
repealing Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not violative of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which requires
that every bill must embrace only one subject and that such shall be expressed in the title.

On the substantive issues, he posits that the petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general welfare clause and public policy, and is not unreasonable; that
it does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal laws, and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance.

Respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed ordinance

On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the respondents several chances to submit their Memorandum,62 they, through
the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing thereof.

In their Comment,63 however, respondents offered a position essentially similar to those proffered by former Mayor Lim.

The Intervenors’ Position on the Consolidated Petitions

On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal of the petitions based on alleged procedural infirmities,
among others, incomplete requisites of judicial review, violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts, improper remedy,
submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping, and forum shopping.

As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among others, that the assailed ordinance is constitutional and valid; that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents; that it is a valid exercise of
legislative power; that it does not violate health and environment-related provisions of the Constitution, laws, and
international conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a party; that the oil depots are not likely targets of terrorists;
that the scaling down of the operations in Pandacan pursuant to the MOU has been followed; and that the people are safe
in view of the safety measures installed in the Pandacan terminals.
Incidentally, in its Manifestation dated 30 November 2010,64 Petron informed the Court that it will "cease [the] operation of
its petroleum product storage facilities"65 in the Pandacan oil terminal not later than January 2016 on account of the
following:

2.01 Environmental issues, many of which are unfounded, continually crop up and tarnish the Company’s image.

2.02. The location of its Pandacanterminal is continually threatened, and made uncertain preventing long-term planning, by
the changing local government composition. Indeed, the relevant zoning ordinances have been amended three (3) times,
and their validity subjected to litigation.66

Intervening Events

On 28 August 2012, while the Court was awaiting the submission of the Memorandum of respondents Vice-Mayor
Domagoso and the councilors who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which
composition had already substantially changed, enacted Ordinance No. 828367 entitled "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING
SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL
DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE
(C3/MXD).

The new ordinance essentially amended the assailed ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum refineries and oil
depots are located from the Industrial Zone.

Ordinance No. 8283 thus permits the operation of the industries operating within the Industrial Zone. However, the oil
companies, whose oil depots are located in the High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD), are given until the
end of January 2016 within which to relocate their terminals.

Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent mayor, did not support the amendment. Maintaining that the removal of
the oil depots was prejudicial to public welfare, and, on account of the pending cases in the Supreme Court, he vetoed
Ordinance No. 8283 on 11 September 2012.68

On 28 November 2012, former Mayor Lim filed a Manifestation informing this Court that the Sangguniang Panlungsod voted
to override the veto, and that he, in turn, returned it again with his veto. He likewise directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod
to append his written reasons for his veto of the Ordinance, so that the same will be forwarded to the President for his
consideration in the event that his veto is overridden again.69

On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar Manifestation.70

Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim vetoed the new ordinance, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr. (Atty. Gempis),
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, writing on behalf of respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors
of Manila who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, finally complied with this Court’s Resolution dated 17 July 2012
reiterating its earlier directives71 to submit the said respondents’ Memorandum.

In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent Manifestation72 dated 13 September 2012, Atty. Gempis explained that it was
not his intention to show disrespect to this Court or to delay or prejudice the disposition of the cases.

According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by respondents Vice-Mayor and the City Councilors only to attest that
the pleading was personally signed by the respondents. He clarified that he was not designated as the legal counsel of the
respondents as, in fact, he was of the impression that, pursuant to Section 481(b)(3) of the Local Government Code,73 it is
the City Legal Officer who isauthorized to represent the local government unit or any official thereof in a litigation. It was for
the same reason that he thought that the filing of a Memorandum may already be dispensed with when the City Legal Officer
filed its own on 8 February 2010. He further explained that the Ordinance subject of these cases was passed during the 7th
Council (2007-2010); that the composition of the 8th Council (2010-2013) had already changed after the 2010 elections;
and that steps were already taken to amend the ordinance again. Hence, he was in a dilemma as to the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time he received the Court’s Resolution of 31 May 2011.

Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing of the required memorandum in view of the passing of
Ordinance No. 8283.

Issue
The petitioners’ arguments are primarily anchored on the ruling of the Court in G. R. No. 156052 declaring Ordinance No.
8027 constitutional and valid after finding that the presence of the oil terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the life and security
of the people of Manila. From thence, the petitioners enumerated constitutional provisions, municipal laws and international
treaties and conventions on health and environment protection allegedly violated by the enactment of the assailed
Ordinance to support their position.

The resolution of the present controversy is, thus, confined to the determination of whether or not the enactment of the
assailed Ordinance allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.

Our Ruling

We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down insofar as the presence of the oil depots in
Pandacan is concerned.

We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the respondents and the oil companies.

At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has already pronounced that the matter of whether
or not the oil depots should remain in the Pandacan area is of transcendental importance to the residents of Manila.74

We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities, if any, as we had in the past, and take cognizance of the cases75 if only
to determine if the acts complained of are no longer within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws in place.76

Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to this Court’s discretion to waive one or some procedural requirements if
only to remove any impediment to address and resolve the serious constitutional question77 raised in these petitions of
transcendental importance, the same having farreaching implications insofar as the safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila, and even its neighboring communities, are concerned.

Proper Remedy

Respondents and intervenors argue that the petitions should be outrightly dismissed for failure on the part of the petitioners
to properly apply related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available to them.

To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule 6578 of the Rules of Court to assail the validity and constitutionality of
the Ordinance.

… there is no appeal, or any plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law…

Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be availed of only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."79

Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought recourse before the first and second level courts under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases,80 which govern "the enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws,
rules and regulations."81 Petron additionally submits that the most adequate remedy available to petitioners is to have the
assailed ordinance repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In the alternative, a local referendum may be had. And,
assuming that there were laws violated, the petitioners may file an action for each alleged violation of law against the
particular individuals that transgressed the law.

It would appear, however, that the remedies identified by the intervenors prove to be inadequate toresolve the present
controversies in their entirety owing to the intricacies of the circumstances herein prevailing.
The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the
Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Regional Trial Courts involving
enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to the
following:

(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;

xxxx

(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;

xxxx

(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, x x x; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation, development,
preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.82 (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of environmental laws in
the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners – the protection
of the rightto life, security and safety. Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation of the said Rules was specifically
intended to meet the following objectives:

SEC. 3. Objectives.—The objectives of these Rules are:

(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology;

(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of environmental rights and
duties recognized under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and regulations, and international agreements;

(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the effective enforcement of remedies and
redress for violation of environmental laws; and

(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and judgments in environmental cases.83

Surely, the instant petitions are not within the contemplation of these Rules.

Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to consider that these petitions are already a sequel to G.R. No. 156052, and that
there are some issues herein raised that the remedies available at the level of the Sangguniang Panlungsod could not
address. Neither could the filing of an individual action for each law violated be harmonized with the essence of a "plain,
speedy, and adequate" remedy.

From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court when, pursuant to Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.84 Thus:

Section 5.The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courtsin:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied)

To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila,85 where the
petitioners sought the nullification of the mayor’s executive order and the council’s ordinance concerning certain functions
of the petitioners that are vested in them by law. There, the Court held:
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court
of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.86 Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides: x x x

As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief even if only questions of law are involved.87

Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the petitions should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court, we have, time and again, resolved to treat such a petition as one for prohibition, provided that the case
has far-reaching implications and transcendental issues that need to be resolved,88 as in these present petitions.

On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the petitions should have been filed with the Regional
Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a special civil action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory relief. However, as we have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.89 In the case of Jaworski v. PAGCOR,90 the Court
ratiocinated:

Granting arguendothat the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that weset aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)

…persons aggrieved thereby…

As to who may file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, Petron posits that petitioners are not among the
"persons aggrieved" contemplated under Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Chevron argues that petitioners, whether as "citizens," taxpayers," or legislators," lack the legal standing toassail the validity
and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8187. It further claims that petitioners failed to show that they have suffered any injury
and/or threatened injury as a result of the act complained of.91

Shell also points out that the petitions cannot be considered taxpayers’ suit, for then, there should be a claim that public
funds were illegally disbursed and that petitioners have sufficient interest concerning the prevention of illegal expenditure
of public money.92 In G.R. No. 187916, Shell maintains that the petitioners failed to show their personal interest in the case
and/or to establish that they may represent the general sentiments of the constituents of the City of Manila so as to be
treated as a class suit. Even the minors, it argues, are not numerous and representative enough for the petition to be treated
as a class suit. Asto the city councilors who joined the petitioners in assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187, Shell posits
that they cannot invoke the ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,93 where the Court held that legislators may
question the constitutionality of a statute, if and when it infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators, because of the
absence of the allegation that the assailed ordinance indeed infringes upon their prerogatives.

Former Mayor Lim submitted a similar position supported by a number of cases on the concept of locus standi,94 the direct
injury test,95 an outline of the stringent requirements of legal standing when suing as a citizen,96 as a taxpayer,97 as a
legislator and in cases where class suits are filed in behalf of all citizens.98

Their arguments are misplaced.

In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct interest in
the implementation of the ordinances of the city. Thus:

To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states
that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many
members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right
and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct
interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances.99 x x x (Citations omitted)

No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed ordinance, and who deal with the
same subject matter that concerns a public right. Necessarily, the people who are interested in the nullification of such an
ordinance are themselves the real parties in interest, for which reason, they are no longer required to show any specific
interest therein. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer Alcantara, has been recognized
by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue in connection with the same subject matter herein considered.
The rest of the petitioners are residents of Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct interest in the prohibition proceedings
against the enforcement of the assailed ordinance.

In the case of Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) v. Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM),100 involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
permanently enjoin PSALM from selling the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources
Corporation (K-Water), the Court ruled:

"Legal standing" or locus standihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a
generalized grievance. x x x This Court, however, has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where
the petitioner is able to craft anissue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public. Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is one of paramount importance
to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds
with the privatization of the hydroelectric power plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal
stake in the resolution of legal issues in a petition to stop its implementation.101 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is indisputably a right of utmost importance to
the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief from this Court
to protect such right.

… in excess of its or his jurisdiction,

or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction…

Petron takes issue with the alleged failure of the petitioners to establish the facts with certainty that would show that the
acts of the respondents fall within the parameters of the grave abuse of discretion clause settled by jurisprudence, to wit:

x x x "[G]rave abuse of discretion" means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross asto amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.102

It is pointless to discuss the matter at length in these instant cases of transcendental importance in view of the Court’s
pronouncement, in Magallona v. Ermita.103 There it held that the writs of certiorariand prohibition are proper remedies to
test the constitutionality of statutes, notwithstanding the following defects:

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on
the part of petitioners.

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of
judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorariand prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to
test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional
importx x x carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, noncompliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.104 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Requisites of judicial review

For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review, the following requisites shall concur: (1) the existence of a legal
controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) a plea that judicial review be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.105

Only the first two requisites are put in issue in these cases.

On the matter of the existence of a legal controversy, we reject the contention that the petitions consist of bare allegations
based on speculations, surmises, conjectures and hypothetical grounds.

The Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 valid and constitutional and ordered its implementation. Withthe passing of the
new ordinance containing the contrary provisions, it cannot be any clearer that here lies an actual case or controversy for
judicial review. The allegation on this, alone, is sufficient for the purpose.

The second requisite has already been exhaustively discussed.

Proof of identification required in the notarization

of the verification and certification against forum
shopping in G.R. No. 187916

At the bottom of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping of the petition in G.R. No. 187916 is the statement
of the notary public to the effect that the affiant, in his presence and after presenting "an integrally competent proof of
identification with signature and photograph,"106 signed the document under oath.

Citing Sec. 163 of the Local Government Code,107 which provides that an individual acknowledging any document before a
notary public shall present his Community Tax Certificate (CTC), Chevron posits that the petitioner’s failure to present his
CTC rendered the petition fatally defective warranting the outright dismissal of the petition.

We disagree.

The verification and certification against forum shopping are governed specifically by Sections 4 and 5,Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court.

Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required to be verified, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading if it lacks a proper
verification while Section 5 requires that the certification to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party be under oath.

These sections, in turn, should be read together with Sections 6 and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Section 6108 of the latter Rules, specifically, likewise provides that any competent evidence of identity specified under
Section 12 thereof may now be presented before the notary public, to wit:

SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an
individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual, such as but not limited to passport, driver’s license, Professional Regulations
Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID,
Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System
(SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID,
OFW ID, seaman’s book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government
office ID, certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or

(b) x x x.109
Forum shopping

Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No. 187836 violated the rule against forum shopping allegedly because all the
elements thereof are present in relation to G.R. No. 156052, to wit:

1. "identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions" – According to Shell,
the interest of petitioner SJS in G.R. No. 156052 and the officers of SJS in G.R. No. 187836 are clearly the same.
Moreover, both actions implead the incumbent mayor of the City of Manila as respondent. Both then respondent
Mayor Atienza in G.R. No. 156052 and respondent former Mayor Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued in their capacity
as Manila mayor.

2. "identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same fact(s)" – Shell contends
that, in both actions, petitioners assert the same rights to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology relative to
the fate of the Pandacan terminal, and seek essentially the same reliefs, that is, the removal of the oil depots from
the present site.

3. "the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other" – Relative to the filing of the Manifestation
and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of Manila from further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No.
8027 x x x (Manifestation and Motion) and Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing
Draft Ordinance No. 7177 [now Ordinance No. 8187] and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do So (Urgent
Motion) both in G.R. No. 156052, Shell points out the possibility that the Court would have rendered conflicting
rulings "on cases involving the same facts, parties, issues and reliefs prayed for."110

We are not persuaded.

In Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos,111 the Court expounded on the nature of forum shopping. Thus:

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.
It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The established rule is that for forum shopping to exist, both
actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of
actions, subject matter, and issues. x x x112 (Citations omitted) It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed,
not to secure a judgment adverse to the first decision, but, precisely, to enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots
from the Pandacan area.

As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners’ Manifestation and Urgent Motion in G.R. No. 156052, which wereboth
incidental to the enforcement of the decision favorable to them brought about by the intervening events after the judgment
had become final and executory, and which involve the same Ordinance assailed in these petitions, we so hold that the
filing of the instant petitions is not barred by res judicata.

In the same case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos involving the refiling of a complaint, which had been earlier dismissed
without qualification that the dismissal was with prejudice, and which had not been decided on the merits, the Court declared
that such re-filing did not amount to forum shopping. It ratiocinated:

It is not controverted that the allegations of the respective complaints in both Civil Case No. 95-1387 and Civil Case No. 96-
0225 are similarly worded, and are identical in all relevant details, including typographical errors, except for the additional
allegations in support of respondents’ prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 95-1387. It is
similarly not disputed that both actions involve the same transactions; same essential facts and circumstances; and raise
identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues.

xxxx

x x x The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was without prejudice. Indeed, the Order dated 20 November 1995, dismissing
Civil Case No. 95-1387 was an unqualified dismissal. More significantly, its dismissal was not based on grounds under
paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which dismissal shall bar the refiling of the same
action or claim as crystallized in Section 5 of Rule 16 thereof, thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. – Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f),
(h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.

From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
constitute res judicata, to wit:

(f) That the cause of action isbarred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;

xxxx

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;

(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds.

Res judicata or bar by prior judgmentis a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation
between the same parties and for the same cause. Res judicata exists when the following elements are present: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter; (3)it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) and there must be, between the first and second actions, identity
ofparties, subject matter, and cause of action.113 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Here, it should be noted that this Court denied the said Manifestation and Urgent Motion, and refused to act on the
succeeding pleadings, for being moot.114 Clearly, the merits of the motion were not considered by the Court. The following
disquisition of the Court in Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraosis further enlightening:

The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 95-1387 does not constitute res judicata to sufficiently bar the refiling thereof
in Civil Case No. 96-0225. As earlier underscored, the dismissal was one without prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment
on the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right,
as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. The dismissal of the
case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in
a subsequent action asthough the dismissed action had not been commenced.115 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Considering that there is definitely no forum shopping in the instant cases, we need not discuss in detail the elements of
forum shopping.

II

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to
"reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city"116 subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an
ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance.117 These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052,
where the Court upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the Ordinance,118 and
declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts.119 In the same case, the Court also used the principle that
the Sanguniang Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs of its Constituents120 – that the removal of the oil
depots from the Pandacan area is necessary "to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals."121

Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at bar involving the same subject matter to justify the contrary provisions
of the assailed Ordinance?

We answer in the negative.

We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsodon the matter subject of these petitions. In 2001, the
Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary. Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.

In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the
retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the previous members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-
Mayor still holding the same seat, and pending the resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give
the oil depots until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim stood his groundand
vetoed the last ordinance.

In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to alleviate the economic
condition of its constituents.122

Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the extent of detailing the steps123 he took prior to the signing
of the Ordinance, if only to show his honest intention to make the right decision.

The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing
prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council
and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the "general welfare" of the city does not
after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on
the personal preference of the members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes
to favor.

Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the
city’s economic related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and
safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as
to which specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals that there
is truly no such thing as "the will of Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned.

If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara124 by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates we do notin reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

III

The measures taken by the intervenors to lend support to their position that Manila is now safe despite the presence of the
oil terminals remain ineffective. These have not completely removed the threat to the lives of the in habitants of Manila.

In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a guarantee for the protection
of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There, the Court said that the enactment of the said ordinance
was a valid exercise of police power with the concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject – "to safeguard the rights
to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;"125 and a lawful method – the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027
reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial, which effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in
Pandacan.126

In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal has never been one of
the targets of terrorist attacks;127 that the petitions were based on unfounded fears and mere conjectures;128 and that the
possibility that it would be picked by the terrorists is nil given the security measures installed thereat.129

The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken to ensure the safety of the people even with the presence of the
Pandacan Terminals. Thus:

1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron, continues to enhance the safety and security features of
the terminals. They likewise adopt fire and product spill prevention measures in accordance with the local standards
set by the Bureau of Fire Protection, among others, and with the international standards of the American Petroleum
Industry ("API") and the National Fire Prevention and Safety Association ("NFPSA"); that since 1914, the oil depots
had not experienced "any incident beyond the ordinary risks and expectations"130 of the residents of Manila; and
that it received a passing grade on the safety measures they installed in the facilities from the representatives of
the City of Manila who conducted an ocular inspection on 22 May 2009; and

2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between the City of Manila and the DOE, on the one hand, and the oil
companies, on the other, where the parties thereto conceded and acknowledged that the scale-down option for the
Pandacan Terminal operations is the best alternative to the relocation of the terminals, Shell enumeratesthe steps
taken to scale down its operations.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire Pandacan Terminal has already decommissioned twenty-eight out of sixty-
four tanks. Speaking for Shell alone, its LPG Spheres, which it claims is the only product that may cause explosion, was
part of those decommissioned, thereby allegedly removing the danger of explosion. Safety buffer zones and linear/green
parks were likewise created to separate the terminal from the nearest residential area. Shell’s portion of the oil depot is
likewise allegedly equipped with the latest technology to ensure air-quality control and waterquality control, and to prevent
and cope with possible oil spills with a crisis management plan in place in the event that an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell
claims that the recommendations of EQE International in its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which it says is
one of the leading independent risk assessment providers in the world and largest risk management consultancy, were
sufficiently complied with; and that, on its own initiative, it adopted additional measures for the purpose, for which reason,
"the individual risk level resulting from any incident occurring from the Pandacan Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty
(20) times lower compared to the individual risk level of an average working or domestic environment."131

We are not persuaded.

The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has already been passed upon
in G. R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the
City of Manila and the then position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,132 the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism
is imminent. It remains so convinced.

Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots where millions of liters of
highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of whether ornot the composition may cause explosions, has no
place in a densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, beit related to terrorism of whatever origin
or otherwise, would definitely cause not only destruction to properties within and among the neighboring communities but
certainly mass deaths and injuries.

With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the Pandacan Terminals, which the oil companies continue to insist to
have been validated and recognized by the MOU, the Court,in G.R. No. 156052, has already put this issue to rest. It
specifically declared that even assuming that the terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were inconsistent, the
resolutions ratifying the MOU gave it full force and effect only until 30 April 2003.133

The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain insufficient to convince the Court that the dangers posed by the
presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area have already been completely removed.

For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived
by one or some, we cannot allow the right to life to bedependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of
probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of residents of big neighborhoods is at
stake.

IV

It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and made us favor Ordinance
No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.

In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, we follow
the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052, to wit: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila
which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products which include
petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;

(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;

(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace; and
 (4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring communities.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just
of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that
it is a terrorist target. As long as it (sic) there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to respondent:

Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed that what was perceived to be impossible to
happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible. The destruction of property and the loss of
thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a public need. Inthe aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats
of terrorism continued [such] that it became imperative for governments to take measures to combat their effects.

xxxx

Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its
leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control
their own destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday
scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.134

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if
the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and
safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No.
8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest of the issues.

Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power against the assailed ordinance. Suffice it to state that
the objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the constituents’ general welfare in terms of economic
benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of the people.

In. G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained:

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand tolose billions of pesos if
forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence
over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of
police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.135

We thus conclude with the very final words in G.R. No. 156052:

On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel exploded
in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan Terminals, causing death, extensive damage
and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the incident. Need we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated
162 to 211 million liters [or whatever is left of the 26 tanks] of petroleum products in the terminal complex will blow up?136

As in the prequel case, we note that as early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with the DOE obliging
themselves to:

... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall include the preparation ofa Master Plan, whose aim
is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and
infrastructure including government support essential for the relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure,
land and right of way acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability which shall
be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.

such that:
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign unreadiness
considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.137

On the matter of the details of the relocation, the Court gave the oil companies the following time frames for compliance:

To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a nonextendible period of ninety (90) days, submit
to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly
been prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict enforcement of this resolution.138

The periods were given in the Decision in G.R. No. 156052 which became final on 23 April 2009. Five years have passed,
since then. The years of non-compliance may be excused by the swing of local legislative leads. We now stay the sway and
begin a final count.

A comprehensive and well-coordinated plan within a specific timeframe shall, therefore, be observed in the relocation of the
Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies shall begiven a fresh non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days from notice within
which to submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule.
The relocation, inturn, shall be completed not later than six months from the date of their submission. Finally, let it be
underscored that after the last Manifestation filed by Shell informing this Court that respondent former Mayor Lim vetoed
Ordinance No. 8283 for the second time, and was anticipating its referral to the President for the latter’s consideration,
nothing was heard from any of the parties until the present petitions as to the status of the approval or disapproval of the
said ordinance. As it is, the fate of the Pandacan Terminals remains dependent on this final disposition of these cases.

VI

On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to immediately comply with the directives of this Court to file the Memorandum
for the Vice-Mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, the records do not bear proof that
he received a copy of any of the resolutions pertaining to the filing of the Memorandum.

A narration of the events from his end would show, however, that he was aware of the directive issued in 2009 when he
stated that "when the City Legal Officer filed its Memorandum dated 8 February 2010, [he] thought the filing of a
Memorandum for the other respondent city officials could be dispensed with."139 There was also a categorical admission
that he received the later Resolution of 31 May 2011 but that he could not prepare a Memorandum defending the position
of respondents vice-mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of Ordinance No. 8187 in view of the ongoing drafting
of Ordinance No. 8283, which would change the position of the Sanggunian, if subsequently approved.

The reasons he submitted are notimpressed with merit.

That he was not officially designated as the counsel for the vicemayor and the city councilors is beside the point. As an
officer of the court, he cannot feign ignorance of the fact that"a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order
which should be complied with promptly and completely."140 As early as 2009, he should have immediately responded and
filed a Manifestation and therein set forth his reasons why he cannot represent the vice-mayor and the city councilors. And,
even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution was the first directive he personally received, he had no valid excuse for
disregarding the same. Worse, the Court had to issue a show cause order before he finally heeded.

Atty. Gempis should "strive harderto live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the respect dueto the courts, respect
for law and for legal processes and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in order to perform his
responsibilities asa lawyer effectively."141

In Sibulo v. Ilagan,142 which involves a lawyer’s repeated failure to comply with the directives of the Court, the penalty
recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was reduced from suspension to reprimand and a warning. The Court
ratiocinated:

Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of the administrative charge against him and is being taken to task
for his intransigence and lack of respect, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension would not be warranted under the
circumstances.

xxxx
To the Court’s mind, a reprimand and a warning are sufficient sanctions for respondent’s disrespectful actuations directed
against the Court and the IBP. The imposition of these sanctions in the present case would be more consistent with the
avowed purpose of disciplinary case, which is "not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation
of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court."143

We consider the participation of Atty. Gempis in this case and opt to be lenient even as we reiterate the objective of
protecting the dispensation of justice. We deem it sufficient to remind Atty. Gempis to be more mindful of his duty as a
lawyer towards the Court.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID
with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.

The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing Ordinance No.
8187.1âwphi1 In coordination with the appropriate government agencies and the parties herein involved, he is further
ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the Pandacan area.

As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,
and Petron Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later
than six (6) months from the date the required documents are submitted. The presiding judge of Branch 39 shall monitor
the strict enforcement of this Decision.

For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
is REMINDED of his duties towards the Court and WARNED that a repetition of an act similar to that here committed shall
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015

JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, and
CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-
2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively, which are being imposed by the respondents.

The Case

On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011,2 or the Socialized
Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:

SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed value of land in
excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to
the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General
Fund under a special account to be established for the purpose.

Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax ( SHT ) shall be utilized by the Quezon City Government for the
following projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land
development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e)
financing of public-private partners hip agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Housing Authority ( NHA )
with the private sector.3

Under certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying the special assessment:

SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment tax as imposed by this ordinance shall enjoy
a tax credit. The tax credit may be availed of only after five (5) years of continue[d] payment. Further, the taxpayer availing
this tax credit must be a taxpayer in good standing as certified by the City Treasurer and City Assessor.

The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner,
which shall be given as follows:

1. 6th year - 20%

2. 7th year - 20%

3. 8th year - 20%

4. 9th year - 20%

5. 10th year - 20%

Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be continued by the subsequent property
owners even if they are buyers in good faith, heirs or possessor of a right in whatever legal capacity over the subject
property.4

On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took effect ten days after
when it was approved by respondent City Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the garbage fees on residential properties
shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
collections.7 Section 1 of the Ordinance se t forth the schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:
SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in relation to Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND MANNER FOR
THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF GARBAGE FEES, AS FOLLOWS: On all domestic households in Quezon City;

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00

201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00

501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00

1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00

1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00

On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;

FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00

41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00

61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00

101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP 100.00

151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00

On high-rise Condominium Units

a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- rise condominiums shall pay the annual garbage
fee on the total size of the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be
collected based on area occupied for every unit already so ld or being amortized.

b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot
size of the entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit
occupied.

The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be paid simultaneously with the payment
of the real property tax, but not later than the first quarter installment.8 In case a household owner refuses to pay, a penalty
of 25% of the garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof, shall be charged.9

Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in Quezon City which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No. 216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already
included the garbage fee in the sum of

Php100.00.10

The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February 5, 2014, which enjoined the enforcement
of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and required respondents to comment on the petition without necessarily giving
due course thereto.11

Respondents filed their Comment12 with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on February 17, 2014. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a Reply and a Memorandum on March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014, respectively.
Procedural Matters

A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari

Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they are not tribunals, boards or officers
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and
SP-2235, the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial function because the ordinances ruled against the property
owners who must pay the SHT and the garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic essential public services that they
should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65 petition is improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases
like in Rosario v. Court of Appeals,13 has taken cognizance of an improper remedy in the interest of justice.

We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial
or quasi-judicial prerogatives.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the
legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives
rise to some specific rights of person s or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
en suing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.14

For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the assailed
ordinances was done in the exercise of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under Republic Act (R.A.)
No.7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod for the city.15Said law likewise is specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge , or to
generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an appropriate
ordinance.16

Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare the unconstitutionality
and illegality of the questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief, over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.17

Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus, over which we exercise
original jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching implications or one which raises transcendental issues or questions that need
to be resolved for the public good.18The judicial policy is that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress
sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of Our primary jurisdiction.19

Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a petition for prohibition may be filed:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding
in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person – whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions – who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner
prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondents to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter
specified in the petition. In this case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent respondents from implementing Ordinance
Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235. Obviously, the writ being sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding desistance.

We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are performing ministerial functions. A
ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner
and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.20 Respondent Mayor, as chief executive of the city government, exercises such powers and performs such duties
and functions as provided for by the LGC and other laws.21 Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other
revenues of the city are collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations
of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance.22 On the other hand, under the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall
be collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or their duly-authorized deputies, while the assessor
shall take charge, among others, of ensuring that all laws and policies governing the appraisal and assessment of real
properties for taxation purposes are properly executed.23 Anent the SHT, the Department of Finance (DOF) Local Finance
Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more specific:

6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Identified LGU shall:

a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its jurisdiction which shall be subject to the
levy of the Social Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian concerned;

b. inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands and
registered owners shall also be posted in 3 conspicuous places in the city/municipality;

c. furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local sanggunian concerned of the list of lands affected;

6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:

a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property Tax, SEF Tax and other special
assessments;

b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government Finance, and the Mayor’s office the
monthly collections on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An annual report should likewise be submitted
to the HUDCC on the total revenues raised during the year pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the
manner in which the same was disbursed.

Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to us should be allowed. Aside from
presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances adversely affect
the property interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test case for the guidance
of other local government units (LGUs).Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim ,24the Court cited the case of
Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar . x x x This is in accordance with the well entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed.26

B. Locus Standi of Petitioner

Respondents challenge petitioner’s legal standing to file this case on the ground that, in relation to Section 3 of Ordinance
No. SP-2095, petitioner failed to allege his ownership of a property that has an assessed value of more than Php100,000.00
and, with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what standing or personality he filed the case to nullify the same. According
to respondents, the petition is not a class suit, and that, for not having specifically alleged that petitioner filed the case as a
taxpayer, it could only be surmised whether he is a party-in-interest who stands to be directly benefited or injured by the
judgment in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify
a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced."27

"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance.28 The concept has been define d as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
government al act that is being challenged.29 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.30

A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he
has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must be shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute complained of.31

Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file the petition. He is a real party-in-interest to
assail the constitutionality and legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 because respondents did not dispute that
he is a registered co-owner of a residential property in Quezon City an d that he paid property tax which already included
the SHT and the garbage fee. He has substantial right to seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future
imposition. While he is a lone petitioner, his cause of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial
and of paramount interest to similarly situated property owners in Quezon City.

C. Litis Pendentia

Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis pendentia. They claim that, as early as February
22, 2012, a case entitled Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Herbert Bautista, et al. , docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-12- 7-820, has been pending in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, which assails the
legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095. Relying on City of Makati, et al. v. Municipality (now City) of Taguig, et al.,32 respondents
assert that there is substantial identity of parties between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the civil
case filed their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon City.

For petitioner, however, respondents’ contention is untenable since he is not a party in Alliance and does not even have the
remotest identity or association with the plaintiffs in said civil case. Moreover, respondents’ arguments would deprive this
Court of its jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.33

Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis
pendens and auter action pendant.34 While it is normally connected with the control which the court has on a property
involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action
pending in court.35 In Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We elucidated:

Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where two actions are pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the
policy against multiplicity of suit and authorizes a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.

xxxx

The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding
the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject
matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may
be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident
to numerous suits.

Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1)
whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the
defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.

The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis pendentia is inextricably linked with
that of res judicata , each constituting an element of the other. In either case, both relate to the sound practice of including,
in a single litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to a cause of action that is before a court.37

There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party
in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.38 Moreover, the fact that the positions of the parties
are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice-versa, does not negate the
identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia .39

In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading connected with the alleged civil case pending before
the Quezon City trial court.1âwphi1 Granting that there is substantial identity of parties between said case and this petition,
dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia still cannot be had in view of the absence of the second and third requisites. There
is no way for us to determine whether both cases are based on the same set of facts that require the presentation of the
same evidence. Even if founded on the same set of facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be different.
Moreover, there is no basis to rule that the two cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other.

D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his non-compliance with Section 187 of
the LGC, which mandates:

Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings.
– The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of
this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting
upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim ,40 has been construed as
mandatory41 considering that –

A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective
instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery
of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of
the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this
reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. x x x.42

The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market Vendor Asso. v. Municipality of Hagonoy:43

x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law fo r parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a "mere
technicality" that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. x x x Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for
the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and
collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time.
Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances."44

Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones,45held that there was no need for petitioners therein to
exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts, considering that there was only a pure question of law, the
parties did not dispute any factual matter on which they had to present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and
Light Co., Inc. v. City of Cagayan de Oro,46 We relaxed the application of the rules in view of the more substantive matters.
For the same reasons, this petition is an exception to the general rule.

Substantive Issues

Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of garbage are basic and
essential duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage fee, the latter has
shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that could be covered by its revenues from taxes
imposed on property, idle land, business, transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA ) from
the National Government. For petitioner, it is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon City
Government is in dire financial state and desperately needs money to fund housing for informal settlers and to pay for
garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue collection in 2012 is in the sum of ₱13.69 billion.

Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the Quezon City Government as an exercise
of its power to create sources of income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.47 According to petitioner, the
constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as
the provision itself admits of guidelines and limitations.

Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the assessed value of the
property, which is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the property.
The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases in the property tax which are not based on the assessed value of the
property or its reassessment every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC.48

For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-
2235, invoking Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49 People v. Siton, et al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon.
Aldecoa-Delorino .51 They argue that the burden of establishing the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party
challenging its constitutionality. They insist that the questioned ordinances are proper exercises of police power similar to
Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
Jr.53 and that their enactment finds basis in the social justice principle enshrined in Section 9,54 Article II of the 1987
Constitution.

As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character, citing Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of Education, et
al.55 and Askay v. Cosalan .[56]] Thus, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-
2235 became effective after its approval on December 26, 2013.

Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:

On the Socialized Housing Tax

Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle found in Sections 1 and 2, Article XIII57 of
the 1987 Constitution and Sections 2 (a)58 and 4359 of R.A. No. 7279, or the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992
( UDHA ).

Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente,60and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of
Victorias, etc.,61respondents assert that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real property owners without
discrimination. There is no way that the ordinance could violate the equal protection clause because real property owners
and informal settlers do not belong to the same class.

Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA. While the law
authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than ₱50,000.00, the questioned ordinance
only covers properties with an assessed value exceeding ₱100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit
equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the
effectivity of the ordinance.

On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount to a penalty imposed on real property owners
due to the failure of respondent Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform their duty to secure and protect real property
owners from informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the expenses to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the
SHT cannot be viewed as a "charity" from real property owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class legislation that violates the right of property owners
to equal protection of the laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy property not their own and pay no taxes over
law-abiding real property owners w ho pay income and realty taxes.

Petitioner further contends that respondents’ characterization of the SHT as "nothing more than an advance payment on
the real property tax" has no statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be collected before it is due because, under the
LGC, chartered cities are authorized to impose property tax based on the assessed value and the general revision of
assessment that is made every three (3) years.

As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was based on Section 43 of the UDHA, petitioner
asserts that there is no specific provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear
a social function. And even if there is, it is seriously doubtful and far-fetched that the principle means that property owners
should provide funds for the housing of informal settlers and for home site development. Social justice and police power,
petitioner believes, does not mean imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for the benefit of another.
At best, the principle that property ownership and enjoyment bear a social function is but a reiteration of the Civil Law
principle that property should not be enjoyed and abused to the injury of other properties and the community, and that the
use of the property may be restricted by police power, the exercise of which is not involved in this case.

Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected. Bistek is the monicker of respondent
City Mayor. The Bistekvilles makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will take the credit for the tax imposed on real property
owners.

On the Garbage Fee

Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police power, collects on the average from every
household a garbage fee in the meager amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per day compared with the sum of ₱1,659.83
that the Quezon City Government annually spends for every household for garbage collection and waste management.62

In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee. Even assuming that the garbage fee is a tax,
the same cannot be a direct duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different subject matter and is of a different kind or character.
Based on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo63 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,64 there is no
"taxing twice" because the real property tax is imposed on ownership based on its assessed value, while the garbage fee
is required on the domestic household. The only reference to the property is the determination of the applicable rate and
the facility of collection.

Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an exercise of police power. The cases of
Calalang v. Williams,65 Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,66 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
Jr.,67 which were cited by respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed ordinance is a revenue measure and does not
regulate the disposal or other aspect of garbage.

The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee only from domestic households and not
from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more than
residential property owners.

Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double taxation because garbage collection
is a basic and essential public service that should be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax,
community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the
revenue collection of the Quezon City Government reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A small portion of said amount could
be spent for garbage collection and other essential services.

It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 4768 of R.A. No. 9003, or
the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay
the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan, and that LGUs have access to the
Solid Waste Management (SWM) Fund created under Section 4669 of the same law. Also, according to petitioner, it is
evident that Ordinance No. S2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003 for whil e the law encourages segregation, composting,
and recycling of waste, the ordinance only emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee; while the law calls for
an active involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such
mandate. Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee was collected even if the required
publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already
included the garbage fee.
The Court's Ruling

Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open to judicial inquiry.
Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as
unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory.
A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and
the nature of the business made subject to imposition.70

For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the
Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.71 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are
divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was
passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive ( i.e., involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).72

An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.73 If
not, it is void.74

Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution.75 As to conformity with existing statutes,

Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals76 has this to say:

It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An
ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The
principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt
ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass
ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general
law. In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are
only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves
are concerned. They are so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we
here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than
under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes
the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on
the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.77

LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local
governments was never intended by the drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install an
intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign state.78

"[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of local self-government, but as
governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of
any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself
of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted."79

LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature; they are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation.80 "Congress enacted the LGC as the
implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power
of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations
to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully
functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations."81

Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues in
financing and supporting myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the
general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people.82 As this Court opined in National
Power Corp. v. City of Cabanatuan:83

In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and taxation has become
a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local
industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assume s even greater significance with the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies
are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution,
viz: "Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees
and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments."

This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by strengthening local
autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country’s highly centralized government
structure has bred a culture of dependence among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also
"dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local
government leaders." The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of
basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal,
Section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that will, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomy , set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x84

Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet85 that:

The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is summarized in Icard v. City Council
of Baguio :

It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter
or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when
granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris . Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power
must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no place in the
interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation. [Underscoring supplied]

xxxx

Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local
legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges." Nevertheless, such authority is
"subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."

In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters.86

Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the
basic law or by the statute.87 "Under the now prevailing Constitution , where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by
statute , the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The
basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly
granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute
and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being
strengthened and made more autonomous , the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened
or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available
resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair,
uniform, and just."88

Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, every LGU is now empowered
and authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively to
the local government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes,
in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions.89 The relevant provisions of the
LGC which establish the parameters of the taxing power of the LGUs are as follows:

SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. – The following fundamental principles shall govern th e exercise of the taxing and
other revenue-raising powers of local government units:

(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;

(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;

(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;

(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade;

(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be left to any private person;

(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject
to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided herein; and,

(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.

SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided herein,
the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following:

(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;

(b) Documentary stamp tax;

(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise provided
herein;

(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds of
customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government
unit concerned;

(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through, the
territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise,
or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;

(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermen;

(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period
of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively from the date of registration;
 (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees
or charges on petroleum products;

(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services
except as otherwise provided herein;

(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;

(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;

(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits
for the driving thereof, except tricycles;

(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as otherwise provided herein;

(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and cooperatives duly registered
under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938) otherwise known
as the "Cooperative Code of the Philippines" respectively; and

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local
government units.

SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees,
and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied
and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.

The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not
more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.

SECTION 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise the power to levy
taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges
shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the
ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the
purpose.

On the Socialized Housing Tax

Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a social
function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.90 The Court already recognized this in Social
Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:91

Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also a social function
insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society. The principle is this:

Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title,
holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, no r injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing an d controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.92

Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law), is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.93 Property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. 94 In this jurisdiction,
it is well-entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power.95
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of
Php100,000.00. This special assessment is the same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or the UDHA.96 The SHT is one of
the sources of funds for urban development and housing program.97 Section 43 of the law provides:

Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax . – Consistent with the constitutional principle that the ownership and enjoyment of property
bear a social function and to raise funds for the Program, all local government units are hereby authorized to impose an
additional one-half percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00).

The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance, to wit:

WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City Government with sufficient funds to initiate,
implement and undertake Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary activities;

WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing Programs and Projects of the City Government,
specifically the marginalized sector through the acquisition of properties for human settlements;

WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market value of properties in the city[.]

The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their respective localities in
coordination with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the national housing agencies, the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other non-government organizations.98 It is the declared
policy of the State to undertake a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program that shall, among
others, uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in resettlement areas, and
provide for the rational use and development of urban land in order to bring a bout, among others, reduction in urban
dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health, safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by
the underprivileged and homeless citizens.99 Urban renewal and resettlement shall include the rehabilitation and
development of blighted and slum areas100 and the resettlement of program beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions
of the UDHA.101 Under the UDHA, socialized housing102 shall be the primary strategy in providing shelter for the
underprivileged and homeless.103 The LGU or the NHA, in cooperation with the private developers and concerned agencies,
shall provide socialized housing or re settlement areas with basic services and facilities such as potable water, power and
electricity, and an adequate power distribution system, sewerage facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste
disposal system; and access to primary roads and transportation facilities.104 The provisions for health, education,
communications, security, recreation, relief and welfare shall also be planned and be given priority for implementation by
the LGU and concerned agencies in cooperation with the private sector and the beneficiaries themselves.105

Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in coordination with the NHA, are directed to
implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros , railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places like sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.106 In
coordination with the NHA, the LG Us shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and
access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families.107

Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Aside from the
specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass
dwellings.108 The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects.

The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is
primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest.
Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but
advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments,
fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor,
making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.

Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations and is subject to the requirement
that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.109 In the words of City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.:110

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to
the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty and property.

xxxx

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights – a violation of the due process clause.111

As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject
and a lawful method or, to be precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the mean s employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.112

In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real property owners because it burdens them with
expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors the latter who
occupy properties which is not their own and pay no taxes.

We disagree.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.113 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.114 Similar subjects should not be treated
differently so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.115 The law may, therefore, treat and
regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class
from another.116

An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the
law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.117For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and
housing program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too
obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and
is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the
motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another.118 It is inherent in the power to tax
that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation.119 Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.120

Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the
tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. As pointed out by respondents, while the law authorizes
LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more than ₱50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands
with an assessed value exceeding ₱100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit
equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from
being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.

On the Garbage Fee

In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to regulate garbage falls within its police
power to protect public health, safety, and welfare.121 As opined, the purposes and policy underpinnings of the police power
to regulate the collection and disposal of solid waste are: (1) to preserve and protect the public health and welfare as well
as the environment by minimizing or eliminating a source of disease and preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to
defray costs and ensure financial stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with the sum of all charges
marshalled and designed to pay for the expense of a systemic refuse disposal scheme.122

Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of

validity.123 Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of U.S. cases addressing a city's authority to impose mandatory
garbage service and fees have upheld the ordinances against constitutional and statutory challenges.124

A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage within its corporate limits.125 The
LGC specifically assigns the responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid waste to local governing bodies because the
Legislature determined that such bodies were in the best position to develop efficient waste management programs.126 To
impose on local governments the responsibility to regulate solid waste but not grant them the authority necessary to fulfill
the same would lead to an absurd result."127 As held in one U.S. case:

x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject matter, the manner and means of exercising
those powers, where not specifically prescribed by the legislature, are left to the discretion of the municipal authorities. x x
x Leaving the manner of exercising municipal powers to the discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of
reasonableness within which a municipality's exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary."128

In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers under Section 22
of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the genera l welfare of the city and its inhabitants.129Section 16
of the LGC provides:

SECTION 16. General Welfare . – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.130 The provisions
related thereto are liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people in the community.131 Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not
only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests since
the Sanggunian is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.132

One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of the LGC and national policies, the
LGUs shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance
within their territorial jurisdiction.133 In this regard, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities which include, among others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and
services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation.134 R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act of 2000,135 affirms this authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of its provisions within their respective jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative effort among the national
government, other local government units, non-government organizations, and the private sector.136

Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services
rendered.137 "Charges" refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while "Fee" means a charge
fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity.138

The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity.
The basis for this could be discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance, to wit:

WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in terms of population and urban geographical
areas, apart from being competent and efficient in the delivery of public service, apparently requires a big budgetary
allocation in order to address the problems relative and connected to the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services
such as the effective system of waste management, public information programs on proper garb age and proper waste
disposal, including the imposition of waste regulatory measures;

WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city’s waste management system, the City Government through
the Sangguniang Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of reasonable fees or charges for the garbage
collection services for residential (domestic household) that it renders to the public.

Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of
Malvar, Batangas ,139the Court had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts:

In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that "if the generating of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax."

In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect of the imposition
determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives the presumption that the
same is a tax.

We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the imposition is
properly a license tax or a license fee.1awp++i1 The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as
may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, "[w]hen no police inspection, supervision, or regulation is
provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to establish, or that he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons
engaged in the business designated, without qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the
stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye, but according
to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong that the power of taxation,
and not the police power, is being exercised."

In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been consistently treated as a fee and not a tax.140

In another U.S. case,141 the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax as it was actually a fee for
a service given by the city which had previously been provided at no cost to its citizens.

Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double
taxation142 must necessarily fail.

Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal corporation, it must be
reasonably commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service.143 To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must
not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the
revenue generated by the regulation exceeds the cost of the regulation.144

Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, which
authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid
waste management plan, and that it has access to the SWM Fund under Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance
No. S-2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003, because the ordinance emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage
fee with no concern for segregation, composting and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law calling for the
active involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage.

We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.

Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste
management program which shall, among others, ensure the proper segregation, collection, transport, storage, treatment
and disposal of solid waste through the formulation and adoption of the best environmental practices in ecological waste
management.145 The law provides that segregation and collection of solid waste shall be conducted at the barangay level,
specifically for biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and
special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or city.146 Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily
be conducted at the source, to include household, institutional, industrial, commercial and agricultural
sources.147 Segregation at source refers to a solid waste management practice of separating, at the point of origin, different
materials found in soli d waste in order to promote recycling and re-use of resources and to reduce the volume of waste for
collection and disposal.148 Based on Rule XVII of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001,149 which is the Implementing Rules and Regulations ( IRR ) of R.A. No.
9003, barangays shall be responsible for the collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable, recyclable ,
compostable and reusable wastes.150

For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), which shall receive biodegradable wastes for composting and mixed
non-biodegradable wastes for final segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be established in every barangay or cluster of
barangays.151

According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board, is mandated by law to prepare a 10-year
solid waste management plan consistent with the National Solid Waste Management Framework.152 The plan shall be for
the re-use, recycling and composting of wastes generated in its jurisdiction; ensure the efficient management of solid waste
generated within its jurisdiction; and place primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling, and
composting programs while identifying the amount of landfill and transformation capacity that will be needed for solid waste
which cannot be re-used, recycled, or composted.153 One of the components of the so lid waste management plan is source
reduction:

(e) Source reduction – The source reduction component shall include a program and implementation schedule which shows
the methods by which the LGU will, in combination with the recycling and composting components, reduce a sufficient
amount of solid waste disposed of in accordance with the diversion requirements of Section 20.

The source reduction component shall describe the following:

(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;

(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary to carry out such activities;

(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be considered, provide d that such technologies
conform with the standards set pursuant to this Act;

(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;

(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid wastes to be diverted from disposal at a
disposal facility through re-use , recycling and composting; and

(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to implement re-use, recycling and
composting.

The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and identification of rate structures and fees for the
purpose of reducing the amount of waste generated, and other source reduction strategies, including but not limited to,
program s and economic incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this Act to reduce the use of non-recyclable materials, replace
disposable materials and products with reusable materials and products, reduce packaging, and increase the efficiency of
the use of paper, cardboard, glass, metal, and other materials. The waste reduction activities of the community shall al so
take into account, among others, local capability, economic viability, technical requirements, social concerns, disposition of
residual waste and environmental impact: Provided , That, projection of future facilities needed and estimated cost shall be
incorporated in the plan. x x x154

The solid waste management pl an shall also include an implementation schedule for solid waste diversion:

SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. – Each LGU plan shall include an implementation schedule which
shows that within five (5) years after the effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid waste from waste
disposal facilities through re-use, recycling, and composting activities and other resource recovery activities: Provided , That
the waste diversion goals shall be increased every three (3) years thereafter: Provided , further, That nothing in this Section
prohibits a local government unit from implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to exceed the
goal.

The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste characterization result155 that each LGU is
mandated to undertake.156In accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail of the SWM Fund
on the basis of their approved solid waste management plan. Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees under
Section 47 of the law, which states:
SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees – The local government unit shall impose fees in amounts
sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan prepared pursuant to
this Act. The fees shall be based on the following minimum factors:

(a) types of solid waste;

(b) amount/volume of waste; and

(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting the local fees. In determining the amounts
of the fees, an LGU shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the plan and the
setting and collection of the local fees.

Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:

Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees . – The Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall
impose fees on the SWM services provided for by the LGU and/or any authorized organization or unit. In determining the
amounts of the fees, a Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall include only those costs directly related to the
adoption and implementation of the SWM Plan and the setting and collection of the local fees. This power to impose fees
may be ceded to the private sector and civil society groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM Boar d/Local
SWM Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be covered by a Contract or Memorandum of Agreement between the
respective boa rd and the private sector or civil society group.

The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM Plan prepared pursuant to the Act. Further,
the fees shall also be used to pay the actual costs incurred in collecting the local fees and for project sustainability.

Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees

Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the following minimum factors:

a) Types of solid waste to include special waste

b) amount/volume of waste

c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility

d) capacity or type of LGU constituency

e) cost of construction

f) cost of management

g) type of technology

Section 3. Collection of Fees. – Fees may be collected corresponding to the following levels:

a) Barangay – The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and
reusable wastes from households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of Barangay
MRFs. The computation of the fees shall be established by the respective SWM boards. The manner of collection
of the fees shall be dependent on the style of administration of respective Barangay Councils. However, all
transactions shall follow the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.

b) Municipality – The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the barangay MRFs for the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. The level and
procedure for exacting fees shall be defined by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board and supported by
LGU ordinances; however, payments shall be consistent with the accounting system of government.
 c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group – On the basis of the stipulations of contract or Memorandum of Agreement,
the private sector or civil society group shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping in their SLFs. Receipts
and invoices shall be issued to the paying public or to the government.

From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection
and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the
other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable
wastes from households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This is but
consistent with

Section 10 of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes
shall be conducted at the barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the
responsibility of the municipality or city.

In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage fee is the volume of waste currently
generated by each person in Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of
waste generation for the past three years.157 Respondents

did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes generated – whether
residential, market, commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agro-industrial, institutional,
etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount pertains to the totality of wastes, without any
distinction, generated by Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the authority of a municipality or city to impose
fees extends only to those related to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.

Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers only to non-recyclable and special
wastes, still, We cannot sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as practicable on the
taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.158

In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant
of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is again quoted below:

On all domestic households in Quezon City;

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00

201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00

501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00

1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00

1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00

On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;

FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00

41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00

61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00

101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PH₱100.00

151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00

On high-rise Condominium Units

a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high rise condominiums shall pay the annual garbage
fee on the total size of the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be
collected based on area occupied for every unit already so ld or being amortized.

b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot
size of the entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit
occupied.

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand,
and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage
output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee
is both just and equitable.159

The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or
socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of
garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.

Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of "promoting shared
responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in
generating waste."160 Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could
truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others,
household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and
actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, WM service fees
may be computed based on minimum factors such as type s of solid waste to include special waste, amount/volume of
waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility, capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of
construction, cost of management, and type of technology. With respect to utility rates set by municipalities, a municipality
has the right to classify consumers under reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service, the
purpose for which the service or the product is received, the quantity or the amount received, the different character of the
service furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of
distinction.161[A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The establishment of
classifications and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable and does not violate the
requirements of equality and uniformity. Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance
between those in like circumstances having equal rights and privileges. Discrimination with respect to rates charged does
not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a reasonable fact basis or justification.162

On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-2235, which states:

SECTION 3. Penalty Clause – A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction
thereof (interest) shall be charged against a household owner who refuses to pay the garbage fee herein imposed. lacks
the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which provides:

SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges. – The sanggunian may impose a surcharge
not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and an interest at the rate not
exceeding two percent (2%) per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully
paid but in no case shall the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months. (Emphasis
supplied)

Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.

Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He
notes that he paid his realty tax on January 7, 2014 which already included the garbage fee. Respondents counter that if
the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not penal in nature.
Allegedly, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its
approval on December 26, 2013.

The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:

SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. – (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution
approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from
the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capital or city, municipal, or barangay
hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.

(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin
board at the entrance of the provincial capital and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two

(2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.

The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language
or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the
sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.

(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within
the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general
circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the
province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.

(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of
general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be
published in any newspaper of general circulation.

SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified
true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3)
consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where
there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible
places. (Emphasis supplied)

On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, which provides that it would take
effect after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.163 On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, which was
passed by the City Council on December 16, 2013, provides that it would be effective upon its approval.164

Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on December 26, 2013, respondent City Mayor approved the same.165

The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that respondents did not comply with
the posting and publication requirements of the law. Thus, We are constrained not to give credit to his unsupported claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011,
or the "Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City," is· SUSTAINED for being consistent ·with Section·43 of Republic Act No.
·7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to
REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected relative to its enforcement. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2095. In contrast, respondents are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011

EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner,

vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177933

METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUSTICE EMILIO A. GANCAYCO (Retired), Respondent,

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 promulgated
on 18 July 2006 and the Resolution2 dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648.

The Facts

In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue
(EDSA),3 Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.

On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction
of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of
Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof."4

An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey
wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.5

Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of
5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before
Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no
building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion
of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by
constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building
owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the
first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it
for their own purposes.

The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary
were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was further amended by
Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance
No. 6603 dated 1 March 1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings along V. Luna
Road, Central District, Quezon City.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be
exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.

On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-
66, "subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the
enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands."6

Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear
obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Council’s (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28,
Series of 2002.7 The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues,
alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions."8

On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated
the National Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code)9 in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice
Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.10
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to
demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the "wing walls," of the ground floor structure. The records of the present
case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time
of the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.

On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition11 with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit
the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. In his Petition,12 he alleged that the
ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the
construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that
the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings
located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at
their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he
prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.

The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of
property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.

Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already
violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property
was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely
implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.13

The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco.14 It held that the questioned ordinance
was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The RTC
said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of property were being taken without
compensation for the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance
violated owners’ right to equal protection of laws. The dispositive portion thus states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares Quezon City Ordinance No. 2094,15 Series of
1956 to be unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing
and implementing the said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of
the party wall or wing wall of the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) partly
granted the appeal.16 The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement
and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local
government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the
ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective
properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner
still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property, to wit:

Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his commercial lot, appellee still retains the
beneficial ownership of the said property. Thus, there is no "taking" for public use which must be subject to just
compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for providing safety and comfort to passersby,
the ultimate benefit from the same still redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront of a busy
thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their nature, assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat
some kind of protection from accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon to the
business activity therein engaged. 17

Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found
that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro
Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the
authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 224, Quezon City, is MODIFIED, as follows:
 1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,18 Series of 1956, issued by the City Council of Quezon
City, is UPHELD; and

2) The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration.19

On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not present new issues nor offer grounds that would
merit the reconsideration of the Court.20

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective Petitions for Review before
this Court. The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE NO. 2904.

II. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

The Court’s Ruling

Estoppel

The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was estopped from challenging the
ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of the ordinance. According to them, Justice
Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings.

To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance
"takes" private property without due process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal
protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its application.

On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to determine
whether or not the ordinance constitutes a "taking" of private property without due process of law and just compensation. It
was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building.
Because he was granted an exemption in 1966, there was no "taking" yet to speak of.

Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,21 we held:

It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special
conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition,
which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly
beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot
operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)

Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,22 we likewise held:

We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR,
which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act. Indeed,
petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C),
and only later on filing the subject case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change
and the law results in what it perceives to be unlawful discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the
past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from
assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be
raised later. (Emphasis supplied.)

Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection
when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption
from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption
at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be
attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the
proper person to do so.

Zoning and the regulation of the

construction of buildings are valid

exercises of police power .

In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,23 we discussed the nature of police powers exercised by local government units, to
wit:

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body.

To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there was a valid delegation
of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of the
delegation.

It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section
12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City,24 which states:

To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or
penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly
provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within
fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.25

With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice
Society v. Atienza.26 In that case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance on 28 November 2001
reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals
located in those areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies contended that they stood to lose billions of pesos,
this Court upheld the power of the city government to pass the assailed ordinance, stating:

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be
reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals,
safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the
depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which
logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their
present location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is
derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently,
the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any
resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust... (Emphasis supplied)

In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,27 we also held:

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy
of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners
that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned
ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of
their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades
provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon
City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business
zone along EDSA.

Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,28 which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for
the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:

Section 102. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it
the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements
to regulate and control their location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and maintenance.

Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently,
the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their respective jurisdictions.

Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the arcade should be
constructed above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not need to address this argument inasmuch as
it raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we will not and need not delve into.

To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city
council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of
buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.

The "wing walls" of the building are not

nuisances per se.

The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.

We disagree.

The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication
that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect
the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make
that structure a nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or
anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street,
or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A
nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under
the undefined law of necessity.29

Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not
consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should
have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine
whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,30 we held:

We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating
noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular
thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing
is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction
of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the
ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined
by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA illegally demolished

the property of Justice Gancayco.

MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice
Gancayco’s property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear
the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and
obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No.
2904 as amended.

However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The authority to order the
demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:

SECTION 205. Building Officials. — Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building Official shall be responsible for
carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant
thereto.

Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City
Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.

The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular positions of Building Official are
provided or unless sooner terminated for causes provided by law or decree.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. — In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily
responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued
therefor. He is the official charged with the duties of issuing building permits.

In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all reasonable times to inspect
and determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building
permit as issued.

When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official may order the work
stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official
is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be
occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. — When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous
or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life,
health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694
to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.31 is applicable to the case at bar. In that case,
MMDA, invoking its charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising media installed on the Metro Rail
Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held:

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks' billboards, signages and
other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages
and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,
and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were
limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.

Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:

...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of
local government units concerning purely local matters.

The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09
did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation
and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the
prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and
other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the
construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included
MRT3 in its prohibition.

MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its implementing rules
and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the law's following provision, thus:

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. -

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for administrative
violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter
referred to as the "Secretary."

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed
buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of "a fine of not more than two hundred pesos
(₱200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the Court, Provided, that if the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the Manager,
managing partner, or any person charged with the management thereof shall be held responsible therefor." The ordinance
itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.

As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the
provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.

Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have approved the demolition of
the structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect,
the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The powers referred to are those that include the power to
declare, prevent and abate a nuisance32 and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or
structure by the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner.33

MMDA’s argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the
MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its Answer,34 the city government
stated that "the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City."
Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice
Gancayco’s building.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Br. 1, Iligan City; SAMAHANG OPTOMETRIST Sa PILIPINAS — Iligan City Chapter,
LEO T. CAHANAP, City Legal Officer, and Hon. CAMILO P. CABILI, City Mayor of Iligan, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of
the original petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the herein petitioner against the City Mayor and City
Legal Officer of Iligan and the Samahang Optometrist sa Pilipinas — Iligan Chapter (SOPI, for brevity).

The antecedent facts leading to the filing of the instant petition are as follows:

Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's
application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No.
5342 subject to the following conditions:

1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store;

2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are
functions of optical clinics;

3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an
independent optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public,
without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses;

4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and
frames;

5. Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist. 1
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, through its Acting
President, Dr. Frances B. Apostol, lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging
that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation
of such permit.

Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor Camilo P. Cabili designated City Legal Officer Leo T. Cahanap to conduct an
investigation on the matter. On July 12, 1989, respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the
herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner
from operating its business in Iligan City. The report further advised that no new permit shall be granted to petitioner for the
year 1989 and should only be given time to wind up its affairs.

On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of
said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

On October 17, 1989, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for restraining
order/preliminary injunction against the respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and Samahan ng Optometrists sa
Pilipinas-Iligan City Chapter (SOPI), docketed as Civil Case No. 1497 before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch
I. Petitioner alleged that (1) it was denied due process because it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence during
the investigation conducted by the City Legal Officer; (2) it was denied equal protection of the laws as the limitations imposed
on its business permit were not imposed on similar businesses in Iligan City; (3) the City Mayor had no authority to impose
the special conditions on its business permit; and (4) the City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation as
the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry.

Respondent SOPI interposed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
but on November 24, 1989, Presiding Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara deferred resolution of such Motion to Dismiss until
after trial of the case on the merits. However, the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Thereafter,
respondent SOPI filed its answer.1âwphi1.nêt

On May 30, 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dissolved the writ
of preliminary injunction it earlier issued. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration met the same fate. It was denied by an
Order dated June 28, 1990.

On October 3, 1990, instead of taking an appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the questioned Order of Dismissal, branding the same as tainted with grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court.

On January 24, 1991, the Ninth Division 2 of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion
reconsideration was also denied in the Resolution dated May 15, 1991.

Undaunted, petitioner has come before this court via the present petition, theorizing that:

A.

THE RESPONDENT COURT, WHILE CORRECTLY HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR ACTED
BEYOND HIS AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN THE PERMIT AS THEY HAD NO
BASIS IN ANY LAW OR ORDINANCE, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SAID SPECIAL CONDITIONS
NEVERTHELESS BECAME BINDING ON PETITIONER UPON ITS ACCEPTANCE THEREOF AS A PRIVATE
AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT.

B.

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND THE CITY OF ILIGAN WAS ENTERED INTO BY THE LATTER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
ITS PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Although petitioner agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond the scope of
his authority in imposing the assailed conditions in subject business permit, it has excepted to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that the said conditions nonetheless became binding on petitioner, once accepted, as a private agreement or
contract. Petitioner maintains that the said special conditions are null and void for being ultra vires and cannot be given
effect; and therefore, the principle of estoppel cannot apply against it.

On the other hand, the public respondents, City Mayor and City Legal Officer, private respondent SOPI and the Office of
the Solicitor General contend that as a valid exercise of police power, respondent City Mayor has the authority to impose,
as he did, special conditions in the grant of business permits.

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. 9 The State, through the legislature, has delegated
the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of their creation. 4 This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the
Local Government Code which provides:

Sec. 6. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health,
safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature
and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is
within the ambit of this power. 5

The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided for by law. Section
171, paragraph 2 (n) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983, reads:

Sec. 171. The City Mayor shall:

xxx xxx xxx

n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law, city licenses or permits, and revoke the same for violation of law or
ordinance or the conditions upon which they are granted.

However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with
utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

Succinct and in point is the ruling of this Court, that:

. . . While a business may be regulated, such regulation must, however, be within the bounds of reason, i.e., the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise
of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
land or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 6

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with
several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his
authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public
respondents and private respondent SOPI, on the other hand, are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions
on petitioner's business permit is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.
As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes
the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power
to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case of Austin-Hardware, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 7 it was
held that the power to license carries with it the authority to provide reasonable terms and conditions under which the
licensed business shall be conducted. As the Solicitor General puts it:

If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license, which is a broader power, it stands to reason
that he can also exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to his express power, i.e. to restrict a license
through the imposition of certain conditions, especially so that there is no positive prohibition to the exercise of such
prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any particular official or body vested with such authority. 8

However, the present inquiry does not stop there, as the Solicitor General believes. The power or authority of the City Mayor
to impose conditions or restrictions in the business permit is indisputable. What petitioner assails are the conditions imposed
in its particular case which, it complains, amount to a confiscation of the business in which petitioner is engaged.

Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage
in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the
Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or
otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant
of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.

In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running
an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity,
although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.

The case of Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas vs. Acebedo International Corporation, G.R. No. 117097, 9 promulgated
by this Court on March 21, 1997, is in point. The factual antecedents of that case are similar to those of the case under
consideration and the issue ultimately resolved therein is exactly the same issue posed for resolution by this Court en banc.

In the said case, the Acebedo International Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor an application for a
business permit for the operation of a branch of Acebedo Optical in Candon, Ilocos Sur. The application was opposed by
the Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas-Ilocos Sur Chapter, theorizing that Acebedo is a juridical entity not qualified to
practice optometry. A committee was created by the Office of the Mayor to study private respondent's application. Upon
recommendation of the said committee, Acebedo's application for a business permit was denied. Acebedo filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court but the same was dismissed. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's disposition, prompting the Samahan ng Optometrists to elevate the matter to this Court.

The First Division of this Court, then composed of Honorable Justice Teodoro Padilla, Josue Bellosillo, Jose Vitug and
Santiago Kapunan, with Honorable Justice Regino Hermosisima, Jr. as ponente, denied the petition and ruled in favor of
respondent Acebedo International Corporation, holding that "the fact that private respondent hires optometrists who practice
their profession in the course of their employment in private respondent's optical shops, does not translate into a practice
of optometry by private respondent itself," 10 The Court further elucidated that in both the old and new Optometry Law, R.A.
No. 1998, superseded by R.A. No. 8050, it is significant to note that there is no prohibition against the hiring by corporations
of optometrists. The Court concluded thus:

All told, there is no law that prohibits the hiring by corporations of optometrists or considers the hiring by corporations
of optometrists as a practice by the corporation itself of the profession of optometry.

In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained
by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the
Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City
Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a
function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

It is significant to note that during the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on R.A. 8050 (Senate Bill No. 1998 and House Bill No. 14100), the committee failed to reach a consensus
as to the prohibition on indirect practice of optometry by corporations. The proponent of the bill, former Senator Freddie
Webb, admitted thus:
 Senator Webb: xxx xxx xxx

The focus of contention remains to be the proposal of prohibiting the indirect practice of optometry by
corporations.1âwphi1 We took a second look and even a third look at the issue in the bicameral conference, but a
compromise remained elusive. 11

Former Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani likewise voted her reservation in casting her vote:

Senator Shahani: Mr. President.

The optometry bills have evoked controversial views from the members of the panel. While we realize the need to
uplift the standards of optometry as a profession, the consesnsus of both Houses was to avoid touching sensitive
issues which properly belong to judicial determination. Thus, the bicameral conference committee decided to leave
the issue of indirect practice of optometry and the use of trade names open to the wisdom of the Courts which are
vested with the prerogative of interpreting the laws. 12

From the foregoing, it is thus evident that Congress has not adopted a unanimous position on the matter of prohibition of
indirect practice of optometry by corporations, specifically on the hiring and employment of licensed optometrists by optical
corporations. It is clear that Congress left the resolution of such issue for judicial determination, and it is therefore proper
for this Court to resolve the issue.

Even in the United States, jurisprudence varies and there is a conflict of opinions among the federal courts as to the right
of a corporation or individual not himself licensed, to hire and employ licensed optometrists. 13

Courts have distinguished between optometry as a learned profession in the category of law and medicine, and optometry
as a mechanical art. And, insofar as the courts regard optometry as merely a mechanical art, they have tended to find
nothing objectionable in the making and selling of eyeglasses, spectacles and lenses by corporations so long as the patient
is actually examined and prescribed for by a qualified practitioner. 14

The primary purpose of the statute regulating the practice of optometry is to insure that optometrical services are to be
rendered by competent and licensed persons in order to protect the health and physical welfare of the people from the
dangers engendered by unlicensed practice. Such purpose may be fully accomplished although the person rendering the
service is employed by a corporation. 15

Furthermore, it was ruled that the employment of a qualified optometrist by a corporation is not against public
policy. 16 Unless prohibited by statutes, a corporation has all the contractual rights that an individual has 17 and it does not
become the practice of medicine or optometry because of the presence of a physician or optometrist. 18 The manufacturing,
selling, trading and bartering of eyeglasses and spectacles as articles of merchandise do not constitute the practice of
optometry. 19

In the case of Dvorine vs. Castelberg Jewelry Corporation, 20 defendant corporation conducted as part of its business, a
department for the sale of eyeglasses and the furnishing of optometrical services to its clients. It employed a registered
optometrist who was compensated at a regular salary and commission and who was furnished instruments and appliances
needed for the work, as well as an office. In holding that corporation was not engaged in the practice of optometry, the court
ruled that there is no public policy forbidding the commercialization of optometry, as in law and medicine, and recognized
the general practice of making it a commercial business by advertising and selling eyeglasses.

To accomplish the objective of the regulation, a state may provide by statute that corporations cannot sell eyeglasses,
spectacles, and lenses unless a duly licensed physician or a duly qualified optometrist is in charge of, and in personal
attendance at the place where such articles are sold. 21 In such a case, the patient's primary and essential safeguard lies in
the optometrist's control of the "treatment" by means of prescription and preliminary and final examination. 22

In analogy, it is noteworthy that private hospitals are maintained by corporations incorporated for the purpose of furnishing
medical and surgical treatment. In the course of providing such treatments, these corporations employ physicians, surgeons
and medical practitioners, in the same way that in the course of manufacturing and selling eyeglasses, eye frames and
optical lenses, optical shops hire licensed optometrists to examine, prescribe and dispense ophthalmic lenses. No one has
ever charged that these corporations are engaged in the practice of medicine. There is indeed no valid basis for treating
corporations engaged in the business of running optical shops differently.
It also bears stressing, as petitioner has pointed out, that the public and private respondents did not appeal from the ruling
of the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the holding by the Court of Appeals that the act of respondent City Mayor in imposing
the questioned special conditions on petitioner's business permit is ultra vires cannot be put into issue here by the
respondents. It is well-settled that:

A party who has not appealed from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other
than what he had obtain from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. 23

. . . an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment
on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has
also appealed. 24

Thus, respondents' submission that the imposition of subject special conditions on petitioner's business permit is not ultra
vires cannot prevail over the finding and ruling by the Court of Appeals from which they (respondents) did not appeal.

Anent the second assigned error, petitioner maintains that its business permit issued by the City Mayor is not a contract
entered into by Iligan City in the exercise of its proprietary functions, such that although petitioner agreed to such conditions,
it cannot be held in estoppel since ultra vires acts cannot be given effect.

Respondents, on the other hand, agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the business permit in question is in the
nature of a contract between Iligan City and the herein petitioner, the terms and conditions of which are binding upon
agreement, and that petitioner is estopped from questioning the same. Moreover, in the Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals held that the contract between the petitioner and the City of Iligan was
entered into by the latter in the performance of its proprietary functions.

This Court holds otherwise. It had occasion to rule that a license or permit is not in the nature of a contract but a special
privilege.

. . . a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property
in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of
contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what
is within its terms. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute. 25

It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special
conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition,
which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly
beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot
operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.

The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging subject business permit as having been issued by responded City Mayor in the
performance of proprietary functions of Iligan City. As hereinabove elaborated upon, the issuance of business licenses and
permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government
units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995 REVERSED: and
the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioner's business permit in accordance with law and with this
disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his
capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A.
NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO
DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON.
NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G.
RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L.
QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P.
MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA.
PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON.
ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C.
SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON.
ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors
of the City of Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.

Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if performed
by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.

J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is foremost
a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make
the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws
that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.

The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal
of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the
validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4

The antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower
court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and
the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels
and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8

Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING

CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person,
partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in
the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to
P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and
which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors

2. Massage Parlors

3. Karaoke Bars

4. Beerhouses

5. Night Clubs

6. Day Clubs

7. Super Clubs

8. Discotheques

9. Cabarets

10. Dance Halls

11. Motels

12. Inns

SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from
issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the
operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in
Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which
to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:

1. Curio or antique shop

2. Souvenir Shops

3. Handicrafts display centers

4. Art galleries

5. Records and music shops

6. Restaurants

7. Coffee shops
 8. Flower shops

9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family entertainment
that cater to both local and foreign clientele.

10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and
theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.

11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning
ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor
repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of
operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction,
the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited
establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for
"amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as
"tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community."11

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council
has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the
Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone
with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure
of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4)
The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business
prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes
an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a
nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area.14

In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to
"prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code,16 which reads, thus:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

....

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
general welfare and for said purpose shall:
 ....

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy
the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted
provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement.18

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No.
409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads, thus:

ARTICLE III

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

. . .

Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

. . .

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the burden to
prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.21

Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply
disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial
zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation
as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.24

On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining
order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.26

After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing
the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of Manila
null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this Court against
the defendant. No costs.

SO ORDERED.28

Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the case
to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower
court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 49931 which
allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32

In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court.
They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and
the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter
of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.35

In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void
for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power;
that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is
violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in
the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home
for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished its glory days and
endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its
lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds,
that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional
provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution.
The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.37

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the
laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.39

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.40

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting
as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.41 This delegated police power is found in Section
16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

SECTION 16. General Welfare.¾Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang
panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.42 The
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.43 In the case at bar, the
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.44

SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.45

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.46

Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.47

A. The Ordinance infringes

the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. . . ."48

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly
described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,49 and as such it is a
limitation upon the exercise of the police power.50

The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals;
to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure
to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.51

The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are "persons"
within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process"
and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.53

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away
a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification
for the government's action.54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends
very much on the level of scrutiny used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an
area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due
process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.56

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due
to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty and property.59

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.61

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights62 ¾a violation of the due process clause.

The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-
Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs,
bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case
of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had already taken judicial notice of
the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of
motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."64

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police
powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the
promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the
eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication
nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like which
the City Council may lawfully prohibit,65 it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns.
This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits
which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no
moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent
of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the
flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church
cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court
concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition.
Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of
Christians churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history.66

The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the
health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur within its
premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It
cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that
were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would
be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid
bare to the estimation of the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to
shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a
building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs
inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of
democracy.

While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the
proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of
personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those
motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of
Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise
its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;67 and it may even impose increased license fees. In
other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day
clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof,
owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of
the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of
subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and
padlocked permanently."

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental
interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person
of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."68 In accordance with this case, the rights
of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.69

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,70 sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for
a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.

In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
 These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion
of the State.71

Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may
seek autonomy for these purposes.

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual
conduct within the motel's premises¾be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any
fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with
others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice.73 Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law.
Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom¾it is the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.74

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the
case of Morfe v. Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon
the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out
of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by
the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is
in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.76

There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise restraint
and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted
as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only
reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should
suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of
its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate
area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert
said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be
used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction
on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government
does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes
away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.79
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates
or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.80

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held that a taking also could be found if government regulation
of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.82

No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require
that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as
a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.83

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.84 A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view,
equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make
the use prohibitable.85 When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.86

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings
clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking
nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character
of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.87

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner.88

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months from its approval within
which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts
to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner
converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed the previous business will
be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment
idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner
reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

The second and third options¾ to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businesses¾are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section
4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. In
every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build
another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the "problem," it merely relocates
it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just
as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without
essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The burden on
the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be
borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice
as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating that the property
taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while the property
taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome."89 If it be of
public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public
should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use.90

Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides
the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions
when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as
the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a
rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.91

Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules
and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise,
of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.92

Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v. Nazario,94 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never
know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the community,"
"annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." The cited case supports the
nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause.
These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping
exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an
interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand
to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill-
considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.

In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented
businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as well
as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such
businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits
challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce
adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other
secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an
unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was adequate to support
the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the
licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have
no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10)
hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs.

The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable
restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,96 it needs pointing out, is
also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels
may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there
was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels.
The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.97

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights
of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police
power, be upheld as valid.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.99 The "equal protection
of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."100 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.101

The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:

… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The ideal situation is for
the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could
chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of
the very essence of the idea of law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of
the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in
fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut
into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment
of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support
in reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest.102

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate
only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.103 The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other
services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and
fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but
not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitution¾one of the hinted
ills the Ordinance aims to banish¾is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity
to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is
an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government
objectives.105 Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels
and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
general welfare and for said purpose shall:

. . .

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports . . . .

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which
reads as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
general welfare and for said purpose shall:

. . .

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy
the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the
general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila106 that:

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes the
power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "suppress"
or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper
police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised.107

And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited the
selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and not
prohibit. The Court therein declared that:

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license
and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.109

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils
prohibitory powers.

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its
powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly
those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses,
respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code,
it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these
powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration
or paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a
conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition.112

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation
among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments
(Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other
events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied
or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be
construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be
construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium.
This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the
construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under
the rule of strict construction.114

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code
and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court
in People v. Esguerra,115 is instructive. It held that:

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can
not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is
granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by
section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of section
2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power
to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail
and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute
repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably
inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will.116 If there is an
inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by
any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must prevail and
override the earlier.117

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an
existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two general classes: those
which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain
in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute
therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should
prevail.118

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the
Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be
considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory
powers.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels
are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.119

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in another
section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this
connection, shall:

. . .

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in
public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute,
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug
addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of
obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
the inhabitants of the city;

. . .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may
prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of
ill-repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an
effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment,
operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments are
recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local
Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths,
hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also
defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or
fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where
one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the
Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula
singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to
each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or
are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.120

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued
by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed
the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact
but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.121 As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v.
Metropolitan Manila Authority:122

The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able
to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the
power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactment in question, which are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute.123

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already been
held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption
must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is
established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.124

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the
cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary ¾we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council,
cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion
without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws ¾not even under the guise of
police power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.