G.R. No.

180050 : May 12, 2010

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the SENATE PRESIDENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the Mother Province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE
ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

PEREZ, J.: DISSENTING OPINION

Before us are two Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010 − one filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of public respondents, and the other filed by respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo
Villaroman, representing the Province of Dinagat Islands. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election
of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.

The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds for reconsideration of Governor Villaroman can be subsumed under
the grounds for reconsideration of the OSG, which are as follows:

I.

The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991. Article 9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely interpretative of Section 461 of
the Local Government Code.

II.

The power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature. The acts of the Legislature and Executive in
enacting into law RA 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or
constitutionality.

III.

Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the operative fact doctrine as a reason for upholding the validity and
constitutionality of laws involving the creation of a new local government unit as in the instant case.

As regards the first ground, the movants reiterate the same arguments in their respective Comments that aside from the
undisputed compliance with the income requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands,
has also complied with the population and land area requirements.

The arguments are unmeritorious and have already been passed upon by the Court in its Decision, ruling that R.A. No.
9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed to comply with either the territorial or population requirement contained in Section
461 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951
based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), which population is short of the
statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat Islands in
2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local
Government Code.1cralaw Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population
of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to

less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province.2cräläwvirtualibräry

Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population. The NSO
certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813,3cralaw which was still below the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants as certified
by the NSO.

Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. R.A. No.
9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers.
This was not disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province of Dinagat Islands in her Comment. She and the other
respondents instead asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from the land
area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
(IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands." The certificate of compliance issued by the Lands Management Bureau
was also based on the exemption under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.

However, the Court held that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the IRR is null and void, because the exemption is not found in
Section 461 of the Local Government Code.4cralaw There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.5cralaw

The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local Government Code is the one stated in
the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.

In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population requirement.
However, he contends that the Province of Dinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the territorial requirement because it
is composed of a group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance not only with the territorial contiguity requirement,
but also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land area criterion in Section 461 of the Local Government Code, which is
reproduced for easy reference:

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either
of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau;
or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income.6

Justice Nachura contends that the stipulation in paragraph (b) qualifies not merely the word "contiguous" in paragraph (a)
(i) in the same provision, but rather the entirety of paragraph (a) (i) that reads:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau[.]7
He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a) (i) above is the one being referred to in
the exemption from the territorial requirement in paragraph (b). Thus, he contends that if the province to be created is
composed of islands, like the one in this case, then, its territory need not be contiguous and need not have an area of at
least 2,000 square kilometers. He asserts that this is because as the law is worded, contiguity and land area are not two
distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify each other. An exemption from one of the two component requirements
in paragraph (a) (i) allegedly necessitates an exemption from the other component requirement, because the non-
attendance of one results in the absence of a reason for the other component requirement to effect a qualification.

Similarly, the OSG contends that when paragraph (b) of Section 461 of the Local Government Code provides that the
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands," it necessarily dispenses the 2,000-sq.-km. land
area requirement, lest such exemption would not make sense. The OSG argues that in stating that a "territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands," the law could not have meant to define the obvious. The land mass of
two or more islands will never be contiguous as it is covered by bodies of water. It is then but logical that the territory of a
proposed province that is composed of one or more islands need not be contiguous or be at least 2,000 sq. kms.

The Court is not persuaded.

Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units) of the Local Government Code
provides:

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level
to another level shall be based on verifiable indicatorsof viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and
services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit
concerned;

(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned; and

(c) Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for
such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics
Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).8cräläwvirtualibräry

It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in the creation of a local government unit,
states in paragraph (c) thereof that the land area must be contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the land area must be
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in
the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the Local Government Code .

Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the creation of a province, specifically states
the requirement of "a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers."

Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land
area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land

area under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.

However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the requirement of territorial contiguity,
thus:

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province.9cralaw
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It
clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two
or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is composed of two or more
islands, or when the territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the
land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local
Government Code.

Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none is provided from
considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose;10cralaw neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated,11cralaw nor construe its provisions by taking into account questions of expediency, good
faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non-compliance therewith.12cralaw Where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, but only for application.13cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, the OSG contends that since the power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature, the acts
of the Legislature and the Executive branch in enacting into law R.A. No. 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality.

The contention lacks merit.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:

SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."14cräläwvirtualibräry

As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed the criteria for the creation of a
province as contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. No law has yet been passed amending Section 461
of the Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the creation of a province. The
Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province;
hence, any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution.

Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either
the population or territorial requirement prescribed in Section 461 of the Local Government Code for the creation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional.

In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,15cralaw the Court held:

Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and
one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.

It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And where
the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to
nullify the same.

Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,16cralaw the movants further contend that under the
operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of R.A No. 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, should be upheld.

The Court is not persuaded.

In League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the 16 cityhood laws, whose validity
were questioned therein, were constitutional mainly because it found that the said cityhood laws merely carried out the
intent of R.A. No. 9009, now Section 450 of the Local Government Code, to exempt therein respondents local government
units (LGUs) from the P100 million income requirement, since the said LGUs had pending cityhood bills long before the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009. Each one of the 16 cityhood laws contained a provision exempting the municipality covered
from the P100 million income requirement.
In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared unconstitutional because there was utter failure to comply with either the population
or territorial requirement for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the Local Government Code.

The Court, while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot renege on its duty to determine whether the other
branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution, and determine whether illegality
attached to the creation of the province in question. To abandon this duty only because the Province of Dinagat Islands has
began its existence is to consent to the passage of a law that is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, rendering the law and the province created null and void. The Court cannot tolerate such nullity to be in
existence. Where the acts of other branches of the government go beyond the limit imposed by the Constitution, it is the
sacred duty of the judiciary to nullify the same.17cralaw

Tan v. Comelec18cralaw held:

x x x [T]he fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before
Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province,
which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed,
illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such
wrong. For this court to yield to the respondents urging that, as there has been fait accompli then this Court should passively
accept and accede to the prevailing situation, is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose, is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents submission will create a dangerous precedent.
Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might
tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide
and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from
entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010 are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R.
CABUYADAO, Petitioners, v. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HON.
BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and
MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, Respondents,

GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent
component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the
status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words an independent
thereon so that said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be
known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory of
the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and
bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute
the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any
Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela.- The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified to
vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other
elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for such
provincial positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528
submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of
Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng
Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They
assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political question
over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
 Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor General also
contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528
merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of
the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao,3 a member of the provincial board
of Isabela.4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite to
approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local
Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their standing.
They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality
of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda was the
mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he
did not need the consent of the city council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of
Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown
hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere
generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm
foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their
city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing
to strike the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it
involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases
and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to
be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws
passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The
proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of
a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of
the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper
plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160),
thus:
 Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to
Congress.8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress.9 The exercise
of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading
of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of
Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning
of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change in
the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely
for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected. It is not difficult
to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA
revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were
created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the
consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It
is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of
the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the
philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political
unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The
resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes
that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching
changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had merely re-classified Santiago City
from an independent component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would
be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial changes in the political culture and
administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component
city will revert to the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of
Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of
the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue allotment
(IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based
on land area and population of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely
to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes
on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160),
or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City.
Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of reduced
shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of the R.A. No. 7160. The City Governments
share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain portions shall accrue
to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c],
R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to
ensure that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of
its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No.
7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements
with respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city
officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the
great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the
Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No.
7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise,
the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A. No.
7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent
component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor
reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No.
8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially
diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS
shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs
affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change
in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground
that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is limited by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected
is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city.
Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed
above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected
to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading
of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically
change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the classification
involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to
be approved by the people x x x."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution
imposes two conditions - - - first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local
government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area
and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they
involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure
the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity
for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite
after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of
the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political
unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the
plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria
fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose.
They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these
"indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve
a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering.
There is no better check against this excess committed by the political representatives of the people themselves than the
exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries are "xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not
only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in
their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed
for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government units."13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the debates
in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent
component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes.
Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no
significant change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people
of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the
essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of officials
of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to
be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to
submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted
upon when a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee anounced the withdrawal of the
amendment "after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under Committee
Report No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only
the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY
OF SANTIAGO
_______________________________________________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
_______________________________________________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on
Local Government be recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its
principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of
the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of Isabela.
As an independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said province as a
local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an island
in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any elective positions
in the Province of Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision
over the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is
very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or the other,
by the happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill
to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee Report No.
971 of the Committee on Local Government , recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment,
of House Bill No. 8729.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the period of
interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of interpellations? [Silence]
There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we were
with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a half years
ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be independent. Now we are deleting that word
independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation
on what happened between then and now that has made us decide that the City of Santiago should cease
to be independent and should now become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are no longer
vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and authority is now being
exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in the
provincial elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there was a
majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter some degree
of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change of political will, then so be it.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by Senator Roco,
and I will have to place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee amendment
is that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local officials and those who oppose it by incorporating
a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were
opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city into a component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in the city -- is
that I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to make it an independent
city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
 "Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol, on
the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the Sanggunian
on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city.
"This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as
mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law
takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader -- is that,
at this time we should not be passing it for a particular politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory be
added to the election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information.
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the
provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in
the provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership.
This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the resolution were not
the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a constituency,
the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to
fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given
account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said, just
two-and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized--if we want to use that phrase-- the
citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half years after, we are
changing the rule.
"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to approve
the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised
by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed
bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent to a
component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal coming
from the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The word conversion appears in that provision
wherein we must call a plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya was insisting
that this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the
members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to
incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we
 would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership
of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To them, this is
the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela deciding for them.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION
AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE
PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS
FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH
PLEBISCITE.
"The President. Is there any objection?
"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
"SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none]
"It was 7:54 p.m.
"RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
"The President. The session is resumed.
"Senator Sotto is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I withdraw my
amendment.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment.
"Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela
-- but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a
resident and registered voter.
"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands
that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters
affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
 "The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the gentleman from
Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly become
his great fan for the evening.
"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want
it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the
province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?
"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee amendments be
closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word independent preceding component city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is An
Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think
that we should amend that anymore.
"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of individual
amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments is closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on
House Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the city of Santiago.
There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros Occidental without
consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice
Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the
time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other
officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and Vice-
President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was
set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor Armando
Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in place
to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the elections
- the unashamed use of naked power and resources - contributed in no small way to arousing peoples power and steel the
ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of,
viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally
void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the
Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three
cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra,
Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni),
grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no
province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without the approval of a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected. It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental,
not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire
province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole province is
affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the
areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote
for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent component cities
were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis
Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan17 whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote and
be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a
plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago.
The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were
chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were
considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the
Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to
vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San
Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and
prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city.
It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote
in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason
that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial
elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being given
to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a component city.20 Indeed, during the debates, former
Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining xxx where voters of one
component city can vote in the provincial election while the voters of another component city cannot vote simply because
their charters so provide.21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities prohibiting their people
from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 103328. October 19, 1992.]

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Jose J. Lapak for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; DELETION OF PHRASE "UNIT OR" IN SEC. 10, ART. X,
1987 CONSTITUTION, DOES NOT AFFECT RULING IN TAN V . COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727; REASONS. — Petitioner’s
contention that our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus
reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan v. COMELEC was based
on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or." We do not agree. The deletion
of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution has not affected our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite
shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the
plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

Pursuant to Republic Act 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312
which reads.

"WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit,
Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.

WHEREAS, under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a municipality shall be subject to approval
by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;

WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the plebiscite shall be taken out
of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves to promulgated (sic) the following guidelines
to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays comprising the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte (Tan
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).

x x x"

In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while
3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political
exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of voters. 3

Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite
conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as
provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained
were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been
conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-asa, Maot, and
Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4

In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article
X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passé, thus reinstating
the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary 6 which held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only
the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite. 7

Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is
valid.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite,
which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.

Petitioner’s contention that our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan v. COMELEC was
based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution8 our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10
of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or."cralaw virtua1aw library

We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor,
Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution has not affected our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC as explained by then
CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the Committee that under
the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do
not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform
the Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units" ? will there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen
from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted,
it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate in the plebiscite
because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. 9 (Emphasis supplied)

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it
means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have
a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality
of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.chanrobles law library

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118577. March 7, 1995.]

JUANITO MARIANO, JR., Et Al., Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 118627. March 7, 1995.]

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN NG MAKATI, Respondents.

Villamor Legarda & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 118627.

Acosta & Corvera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 118577.

Emmanuel P.J . Tamase for Private Respondents.

The Solicitor General for public Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7859 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing
as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision
requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census;chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails
section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land area of the proposed city of Makati, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest
by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and the northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary
disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government
units. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which
require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government
unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits
of its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare. This is the evil sought
to be avoided by the local government unit requiring that the land area of local government unit must be spelled out in metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in
section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area
of Makati. In language that cannot be any cleared, section 2 stated that the city’s land area "shall comprise the present
territory of the municipality."cralaw virtua1aw library

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati
was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the
territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a
becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, the legislations felt that the dispute should be left to
the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide
the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an unsurmountable difficulty which will prevent
Congress form defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of as local government unit. In the cases at
bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them
subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that
section 2 of R.A. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard,
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz:
‘the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions’ — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In
other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government
units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative
intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar
to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine
qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog No. 7854 on
the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the
Code. It then becomes a case of a master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the
intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule
must indubitable apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The present elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the
officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and
the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continue exercising the functions and
duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati."cralaw virtua1aw library

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which
provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

x x x

Sec. 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representatives,
have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that
by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the
present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve by them. In particular, petitioners
point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who was already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous
three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has
been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge
the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections;
and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. 7854. Section 52 of
the Charter provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two
(2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under section 3(a) of republic Act
No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas, and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district." (Emphasis supplied)

They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot
made by a special law; (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill; 7 and (3) Makati’s
population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by
law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create
an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. 10 That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3); Article VI
12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000). 13 Said Section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood
at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to
at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners’ contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should
have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit, we reiterated the policy of the
Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, the
Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details.
Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to such general subject."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE. the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G. R. No. 146319 - October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, Respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G. R. No. 146342 - October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., Petitioner, v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, Respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor."1

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,2 the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000,
conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.

On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed3 the creation of the City of Sorsogon
as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.4

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on
January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following
grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806,
in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.

Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this
time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in
essence, that:

1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and

2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution.

Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.5

Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created
Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly
discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.
We shall first delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R No. 146342.

Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's
acts.7 The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to
ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law.8 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one.9 In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt,10 for to doubt is to sustain.11

Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:

"SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." (Emphasis ours)

The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:

"SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00)
for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours)

Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by
the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under
Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays,"
not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

This contention is devoid of merit.

Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may
be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture,
allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:

"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same
requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below
its current income classification prior to such division. . . . ." (Emphasis ours)

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units
is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed
by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be
upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent
to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,12 this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are
allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"13 and "may not
annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. "14

Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article
VI of the Constitution, to wit:

"SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." (Emphasis ours)

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of
Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs
the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition
of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the
law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary
means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by
Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot
be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the
public of fair information on this consequence.

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.15 The rule
is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect,16 and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation.17 Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
"so as not to cripple or impede legislation."18

Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the
ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City.

Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of
said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz:

"SECTION 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation by a
majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. x x x ." (Emphasis ours)

The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December
16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act.
This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be
ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the
effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:

"SECTION 65. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general and local
circulation."
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September
01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law
was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in
determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000)
when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity
of a law, citing the landmark case of Tañada vs. Tuvera,19 it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect.
Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity
of the law on September 1, 2000.

The COMELEC is correct.

In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:

"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose
in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date." (Emphasis ours)

Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date
of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date"
for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law.

Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity
of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is
in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be read together and
reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in Tañada:

"ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant
motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication." (Emphasis supplied)

To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even before its publication, which
scenario is precisely abhorred in Tañada.

Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon
cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation.
Consequently, we sustain the presumption20 that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law
in conducting the plebiscite.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.