SMWX: INTERVIEW WITH JO-ANSIE VAN WYK

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SIZWE: Just after five past ten. Thanks for a lit open line and now in the next hour we
are gonna move onto a really fascinating conversation. One that I cannot wait
to have. We’re gonna be asking the following question: Why did South Africa
give up nuclear weapons? I know some of you just fell off your chairs. You
didn’t even know we had nuclear weapons in the first place, let alone gave
them up; and we’re actually the only country to voluntarily give up nuclear
weapons in the world. And so this makes South Africa a unique country, but we
often don’t speak about this.

And to join me to have this discussion I’m really, really excited to be joined by
an expert on this question: One of the foremost scholars working on nuclear
questions in South Africa, Professor Jo-Ansie van Wyk who is Professor of
International Politics at UNISA. Professor van Wyk, firstly thank you so much for
joining us.

VAN WYK: Thank you very much Sizwe.

SIZWE: And before we kick off on the hard facts, what got you interested in South
Africa’s nuclear weapons program in the first place?

VAN WYK: I grew up close to the Vaalpruit Radioactive Site in Namaqualand and always
there’s been some secrecy around what happens there. And over the years I
have met people that are also interested in the topic and I met a few
interesting people at conferences and started reading on it.
 And ja, some of the archives are opening up and are coming into the open so
ja, it’s a fascinating topic and surely one that we still deal with today and
especially in the context of government’s plans to possibly develop more
nuclear [indistinct] capacity.

SIZWE: Indeed and looking forward to thinking about what this means for the present,
but I’d like to take you back to the context if you will. When did South Africa’s
nuclear weapons start? And can you take us through the genesis of this secret
program.

VAN WYK: Thank you, yes obviously it started way back before the main decade of the
1970s. During the World War, the United Kingdom asked South Africa to
conduct a survey of the uranium deposits in our country. Remember that we
were part of the Second World War, air force very close to the UK. That’s early
stages; there was sort of an atomic race going on.

So there were interest started to develop, then in the fifties, the development
of the Atomic Energy Agency and then slowly, slowly it was formalized,
institutionalized and then of course South Africa was still a founding member of
the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and then also took part of
negotiations for various treaties; and then by the seventies a marked shift
happens with PJ Vorster becoming the Prime Minister and the nuclear weapons
program really taking serious shape.

And we must see this within a bigger context. Obviously of South Africa
becoming more isolated; the domestic opposition growing; international voices
becoming more curious about South Africa’s intentions; apartheid has been
formalized. So it became really an instrument now to fight the Cold War within
Southern Africa with the border war that we had in South West Africa and
Angola, and Namibia; the presence of Cuban soldiers, Soviet Union soldiers.

So that became sort of a cheque book and an insurance policy for South Africa
and obviously it was conducted in secrecy. But there were few incidences
where South Africa was sort of caught out by the international community.
SIZWE: I think that’s a very useful sketch of the way things worked. Take us through
some of the incidents. Like you say, after you know, the decision was made
around the seventies … especially with the Vorster regime which actually
influenced the way the international community started looking and started to
get worried about this potential nuclear weapons program.

VAN WYK: Let me backtrack a little bit. In 1965, Wervoed inaugurated South Africa’s first
atomic nuclear reactor – the SAFARI (South African Atomic Research
Institution). Long word! Established at Phelindaba. At that stage it was very
much a peaceful nuclear weapons program and then of course in the 1970s it
became much, much more evident.

So during that time two or three very important developments took place okay?
The one is that the ANC in exile, and here Abdul Menteel became our
ambassador at the IAEA – he’s very instrumental. He organized the anti-
apartheid movement in the UK and elsewhere across the world and slowly,
slowly international intelligence services started to pick up some of the
activities that are going on.

So that’s on the one hand at the domestic opposition that is in exile started to
figure out what is happening. And then came the two tests: the one is the so
called double-flash incident, which we now know South Africa and Israel had a
joint test in the South Atlantic. And then the discovery of the tests hide at
Vastrab in the Kalahari.

SIZWE: That was underground testing?

VAN WYK: Yes, it was intended to be an underground test but the facilities were
discovered by satellite from the Soviet Union, who detected the typical kind of
activities around a specific area and then of course alerted the international
community that then started to put pressure on South Africa.
SIZWE: It’s amazing that at Phelindaba, you know just North West of where we’re
sitting in the 702 Studios there was actually an entire secret nuclear weapons
program. Just briefly take us through the scale of the program. Was it one
nuclear weapon? Was it a thousand? What was the scale of this program that
was being secretly developed at Phelindaba.

VAN WYK: Can I go back to the name Phelindaba?

SIZWE: Ah, yes!

VAN WYK: It comes from “iphelile indaba”; “klaar ge praat” in Afrikaans or “We’ve
finished the conversation”. Now we know that atomic weapons are sort of a
conversation stopper, right? It is sort of a final weapon. And it was also a way
of course for South Africa to say, “Look: we are not going to give in. We are
going to develop the ultimate weapon.”

So for a long time we didn’t know exactly know what happens at Phelindaba
and elsewhere. There were a large number of facilities obviously where some
of these activities were taking place; some of the bombs were kept in
mineshafts for example, or in mines to protect them.

What became evident when De Klerk made the official announcement in March
1993, in parliament, that was the first time that the South African government
admitted that we have nuclear weapons. And what is so interesting – he used
the word ‘devices’. Six and a half devices.

SIZWE: Six and a half?

VAN WYK: The half is tricky because it’s something that was at that stage being
dismantled or was it something that is going to be completed? So six and a half
which we built by busting sanctions which we built to a large extent with our
own capabilities. Of course international assistance from Israel. Even the
Germans and the Americans assisted us.
 So these six and a half devices of course they were sort of conventional bombs,
but there were also missiles that could be fitted on a G5 or G6 canon.

SIZWE: And what would that mean? Kind of reaching … would that be able to reach
outside our shores? Would it be able to reach within the continent?

VAN WYK: At the time the discussion seemed to have been that it could have been used in
the border war. But now, the difficulty is when you use the bomb it’s in your
backyard and the fallout will obviously affect you. So from the literature and
also from the archives it seems like the South African government never intend
to use these bombs, but as we see now with Iran and even North Korea, you
never know what a regime that is in a corner or an ambitious regime; what
extremes can it go to.

SIZWE: Well thanks so much for just taking us through the context and the background
of this program. Really incredible and just fascinating stuff. I’d like to come
now to the decision to give up this program, which in many ways makes South
Africa unique. Can you take us through what the timelines were as South Africa
started to decide that it wanted to actually give up the secret nuclear weapons
program that it had built.

VAN WYJ: Right, so I just alluded to for example what the ANC in exile and what the anti-
apartheid movement was doing by opening up this issue. In fact the ANC
became the first, and I think the only liberation movement that was able to sit
at the UN various committees and be able to explain to the community what
was happening here.

Also in ’78 South Africa lost its seat to Egypt at the International Atomic Energy
Agency. We also experienced tremendous sanctions which also put us in a
corner. The border was very costly. The domestic opposition also consolidated
very strongly despite the harsh conditions. So it became very clear that South
Africa needs to do something.
 Remember in the mid ‘80s there were also discussions taking place … initial
discussions with Nelson Mandela, some of the other ANC leaders in exile and
now we also see this is the end of the Cold War where something of a tide was
now turning, and South Africa realized that if we want peaceful and meaningful
change, there are some things which we need to give up.

Now there is sort of the jury that is out. It’s whether South Africa gave it up
voluntarily; or whether the US or other international actors perhaps pushed us
in a corner and said, “Look, you give up your weapons. We don’t want it to be
in a black majority government. Or we will not invest in your country once all
is settled.”

So South Africa was sort of in a corner and also the tide (as I said) was turning
in terms of the legality, the morality of nuclear weapons and the fact that
when Namibia became independent 1989; the release of President Mandela and
very importantly, the rise of FW De Klerk in 1989 after PW Botha’s stroke. And
De Klerk, that was one of the issues that he put on the table was to start the
dismantling project.

SIZWE: I think what’s really fascinating about this timeline that you’re sketching for us
is that as South Africa was starting to make the transition from apartheid into
the democratic order, so the secret negotiation about how these nuclear
weapons would be disposed of was actually happening in many ways, in parallel
with that democratic transition.

VAN WYK: Yes, but the snag here is that South Africa, unlike other states that have
dismantled their programs, South Africa started to do that in-house. De Klerk
appointed a committee under Professor Mouton that started this process. So
this was very much a secret that started the discardment of the program and
the destruction of some of the documentation during what we know to have
been called Operation Masada.

And it was by 1991 that the International Atomic Energy Agency and with the
changes that was taken in South Africa at the time, was that South Africa now
returned to the IAEA, not formally yet but now started to sign the NBTA …
SIZWE: Which is the big Non-nuclear proliferation treaty?

VAN WYK: That’s correct, ja. And also South Africa now signed the additional project and
the safeguards agreement with the IAEA which meant the books have now been
opened and the facilities have to be inspected. So when the IAEA came the first
time they were unhappy that the books did not balance and they asked the
South African government to go back because there were some unaccounted
for devices, uranium etcetera.

So it was only by 1993 that the IAEA said, “Look we are now sufficiently happy
that the program has been dismantled. The equipment, the bombs, the devices
have been dismantled and some of the facilities have been rendered not being
able to be used anymore.”

SIZWE: Fascinating! We are speaking to Professor of International Politics at UNISA, JO-

Ansie van Wyk about South Africa’s decision to give up nuclear weapons. We
gave up our nuclear weapons roughly between 1989 and 1993. We’re looking
into that program and thinking through what it meant then and what it means
for South Africa in the world now. We’ll be back soon after this break to delve
into further questions about our Nuclear Weapons Program.

[BREAK]

SIZWE: Twenty two minutes past ten, we’re in a fascinating discussion with Professor
of International Politics at UNISA, Jo-Ansie van Wyk on why South Africa gave
up nuclear weapons. Yes, we had six and a half according to former President
De Klerk, nuclear weapons which we secretly dismantled and now we’ve gone
through the historical background how this program developed and when it
came to an end.

And now I wanna speak to Professor van Wyk about the reasons, because there
are lots of different theories about why we gave up these weapons. So
Professor van Wyk let me come to you. There’s a theory that you know, this
was all about the National Party not wanting to hand over nuclear weapons to a
democratic black government. Do you think there’s any merit in that view?
VAN WYK: I think it was a common-fluence of many factors. We spoke about the sanctions
that was at that stage very costly for South Africa. The border war became
simply too expensive; the domestic opposition was really putting a lot of
Pressure on South Africa; and it became sort of a position where there is only
one way; and it’s to start negotiations. And remember that we should not
forget De Klerk as a personality.

SIZWE: What role would you give to De Klerk?

VAN WYK: De Klerk obviously was a contender to the throne for quite some time, and PW
Botha we now know has had a very strong hand, hence his name is The
Corocdile as we remember him. And when he had that stroke (and it’s one of
those unexpected gifts from history that a leader’s health can make such a
change), and here come De Klerk. He realized this is a moment that he can see
is for his own legacy.

By then the discussions with the ANC have started in exile. There were some
relationship with Mandela through the interaction with Kobie Coetzee at that
stage. So there were a lot of trust building going on at the moment … at that
specific moment. So De Klerk appointed that committee that I referred to and
then now the trick was to convince the military because this program was very
much under the military because it was a military program; and to convince the
scientists so there is a lot of history to be written about the position of
scientists – they wanted to give it up and De Klerk had to play that role very
tricky.

And then also something that is now also coming up in discussions and research
is the role the ANC played, in the ANC – because we know today that there
were a pro-nuclear faction in the ANC as well as an anti-nuclear faction in the
ANC. Even within the larger Africa continent, there were pro- and anti-
individuals on the continent.

SIZWE: Absolutely.
VAN WYK: Just to go back a little bit, we should remember that in the OAU (the
Organization for Africa Unity) was established. Two of the mains tasks it set
amongst many others was: 1) to end apartheid as a form of colonialism in the
continent; 2) to make the continent a nuclear weapons free zone in the
interest of yours. And we know that these two issues remain illusive for the
next decades until the 1990s.

So the issue was now to convince the international community is how we return
so to speak, and 1990 we remember the euphoria with Mandela being released;
the return of exiles. Some of these exiles like Abdul Mentee and others were of
course very much involved in the nuclear issue. They know what was happening
and these talks started to develop and obviously convinced the National Party
government. But now the jury is still out whether it was a voluntary decision or
not.

SIZWE: Can I ask you there, on that because you said like forty fascinating things that I
wanna like, continue to probe but how much do you think the ANC knew about
this program, number one? And then how much do you think the ANC knew
about the decision to give up the program? Were they instrumental in the
decision to give it up or did the National Party really present the ANC with a
[indistinct] to the extent that they said, “Listen we had these, we’ve decided
to give them up. Now we need to talk”?

VAN WYK: Look, that was one of the bones of contention during the talks at CODESA and
even afterwards, is that some of the negotiators and even some of the political
individuals in the party said, “Look, but this has taken place … such a
fundamental decision has taken place without our involvement.” Even for the
international community there were some questions like, “How can you
dismantle on your own? What happened to these things?” The government said,
“We destroyed it.” But what happened? Is there a way to verify that?

So within the ANC I think there were a lot more known by the ANC than we
perhaps know today. Remember that at the time the ANC relied and first of all
had very good relations. At that stage the ANC had many more embassies (if I
can call it that) or interest offices across the globe than the National Party
government had embassies and High Commissions.
SIZWE: Okay.

VAN WYK: So the international network was to such an extent that obviously there was a
lot of intelligence that was shared; governments that were pro ANC etcetera;
and another element that the ANC had a number of spies within South Africa.
One is Dito Gerhard …

SIZWE: Now you’re following President Zuma’s lead hey.

VAN WYK: Well, these have been … well Dito Gerhard, he was a Commander in the South
African Navy at the time. He obviously was involved and he shared some for the
documentation with the Soviet Union …

SIZWE: Wow.

VAN WYK: There were other individuals that were also jailed – Reinfurhard Christie, and
also the individuals that were involved in the bombing of the Koberg Nuclear
Power Station that also used, or at least got hold of some of these plans – the
nuclear plans.

SIZWE: Wasn’t Mac Maharaj somehow involved in that?

VAN WAYK: Mac Maharaj, yes. He was the handler so to speak, of the individual Wilkinson
that stole the documentation and then eventually became part of a group that
… or a sort of an ANC back-team that then planted the bomb but then was
obviously taken out of the country. But Mac Maharaj was in Zimbabwe at that
stage and he facilitated the documentation to go to the Soviet Union for
verification.

SIZWE: So fascinating! Another question raised by just some of what you’ve been
explaining is about the scientists, and the nuclear scientists. I mean this
requires a degree of expertise. All that expertise was in the country at the
time and presumably many of those nuclear scientists are still with us.
 How does that work? And how does this network of nuclear scientists you know
influence South Africa today?

VAN WYK: We must remember that South Africa’s nuclear weapons program was part of a
larger military, industrial complex war effort of a country that was in a corner,
that wanted itself out. Some research still needs to be conducted on the
position of the scientists. There has been books written by scientists and the
military that were involved, but it’s not the finer story that has been written.

I get the feeling that there was some non-disclosure agreements that had to be
signed; some of the scientists joined international organizations such as the
IAEA; some of them perhaps retired; some of them were fired but there’s a lot
of research that still needs to researched. It seems like some of those scientists
or at least all of them were not necessarily involved in the nuclear black
market. We only saw that later on towards the 2000s that one of these
individuals obviously was caught up in this and sent to jail.

SIZWE: Okay, gonna stop you there. We have the headlines with Ayanda Nyathi and
we’ll be back with this fascinating discussion about South Africa’s nuclear
weapons program and how we gave it up after the headlines.

[BREAK]

SIZWE: It’s just gone half past ten, it’s ten thirty two in fact. I’m Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh
standing in for Eusebius McKaiser for the next three weeks, and we’re having a
really interesting conversation with Professor Jo-Ansie van Wyk who is an
expert on South Africa’s nuclear weapons program.

If you didn’t know, South Africa had nuclear weapons, can you believe it? And
we gave them up secretly between 1999 and 1993, and we think it through –
why we did that; what it meant then; what it means now. Also, we’re really
keen to take your calls. Give us some of your thoughts. Did you know we had
nuclear weapons? Why do you think we gave them up? Do you think it was a
good idea? Do you think it was a bad idea? Give us a call on 011 883 0702; send
us a WhatsApp – 072 702 1702, or tweet me @SizweMpofu-Walsh.
 Some of you have already been tweeting and, “It’s simple enough. The West
were not having Africans owning or having the means to build nuclear
weapons” says one of you. A number of your tweets coming through. A number
of your calls I’m sure will be fielding soon but we had a really interesting point
of our conversation where we ended the discussion talking about the nuclear
scientists.

Let’s go back into this question as to what were the causes of this decision to
give up nuclear weapons, and can you take us through the United States
because the US played a great role conversing with the apartheid government,
and in some ways putting pressure on the apartheid government. And what role
do you think the United States played in our decision to give up nuclear
weapons?

VAN WYK: Obviously the United States at that stage was very much involved in South
Africa, and for a long time were one of our partners despite the fact that there
were international sanctions against South Africa. So a lot of things happened
under the radar so to speak. The role of the US was very much economic also.
The trade that could for example take place should South Africa give it up.

And there’s also sort of a conspiracy of silence. I don’t want to be paranoid but
some of the archives are still not open to really see what happened. But for the
US it was seemingly also the fact that they did not want to have nuclear
weapons in the hands of a black majority government. Remember that round
about by the eighties, we are still in the throws of the Cold Wars; it’s very
much still and atomic era with the superpowers armed to their teeth.

I mean now we have forty thousand nuclear weapons spread across the globe.
There were much more. There was a detante [indistinct] taking place between
the US at that stage so the US obviously was very keen to have this also as part
of that. And remember also that we got a lot of our highly enriched uranium
from the US – the weapons grade uranium. Some has been repatriated only
now, fairly recently and the jury is still out also, how much we still have in our
own stockpile.
SIZWE: What happened with the highly enriched uranium? This is the stuff you need to
build to nuclear weapons. You know, we built, we have this highly enriched
uranium. What did we do with it? Some of it, you say was repatriated?

VAN WYK: Yes, it was repatriated in terms of an agreement that South Africa had with the
United States, but there’s still a little bit confusion. Those that know don’t
speak, and those who speak don’t know necessarily. So we don’t know the
extent of what South Africa still has. Some sources say three hundred and fifty
kilograms of highly enriched and that goes a long way. Round about the early
2000s South Africa converted the SAFARI atomic research that I spoke to earlier
from using highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium, which was a
unique process.

We should recognize our scientists that we’re able now to convert this
installation to use lower enriched uranium, which has now also contributed to
our international status and prestige. So we don’t know exactly where we are.
South Africa is also not keen to be part of the international fuel reserve – one
under the IAEA and one under the Russians that was started under Vladimir
Putin.

And then another element is also now that uranium has been declared a
strategic resource, and if you look at the government’s nuclear policy round
about 2008, it hasn’t been updated yet. It states that South Africa intends to
develop its nuclear capabilities and enriched uranium. Remember also that
uranium … there are other isotopes – radioactive isotopes can now be used for
medical diagnosis.

SIZWE: Right.

VAN WYK: Which also earns us a lot of money so there seems so there seems to be a little
bit of a resource nationalism that has developed subsequently. And all of this
obviously then has this history of Africa having uranium resources; having the
capability to enrich it to weapons grade; now more recently to lower grade
obviously; and now whether we still have it or not and that remains sort of an
insurance policy.
 If it exists, if not I suppose we can sleep safer but remember also that the IAEA
often does unannounced inspection sites. There are more formal ones where
the government is informed, but there are also ones where they just rock up at
the gates of Phelindaba and then ask the place to be inspected. We can talk
about the safety and security at Phelindaba.

SIZWE: Yes, we will get onto that because I know there was a break-in at Phelindaba
which caused a great deal of confusion and worry, but we actually have a call
coming in and I’d like to take this call and go to Ian, who I believe would like
reference to a book. Ian thanks so much for calling in.

IAN: Hi, you’re welcome. Ja, just a question about a book by Hennie van Vuuren –
Apartheid Guns and Money I think it’s called. He refers quite a bit to nuclear
weapons being developed in South Africa, but on behalf of the French. They
were transported out of South Africa by way of diplomatic bags to France and
at the end of the erstwhile regime, the French were actually the world’s leader
in nuclear weapons according to this book - because of South Africa’s systems
and development here at Phelindaba, can the Professor have any comment on
that? Perhaps its validity and to expand on it perhaps?

SIZWE: Okay, thanks a lot Ian. It’s an interesting question. Reference to Hennie van
Vuuren’s book, Apartheid Guns and Money and the way that there was a
relationship with France.

VAN WYK: Hennie van Vuuren wrote this book exposing various other issues that
happened, some dodgy deals that took place. The French were very important
that despite sanctions and the national isolation of South Africa they still
remained very active in our program. Remember the French built the Kouberg
nuclear weapons, well the nuclear power station so what you do is when you go
and build an installation like that, you don’t just get an installation / nuclear
power station.

You get a relationship of forty, fifty years because it’s only the French
technology that you can use; French expertise; French equipment that you can
use. So the French had sort of their foot through the door. And remember also
that France lost some of its face in North Africa. It used to test in the Sahara,
which was obviously stopped towards the late sixties.
 The Germans also played a role with international interaction with the South
African government and Germans. The Israelis, we had deals with them. Some
say Taiwan; the United Kingdom. So South Africa is an example of a case where
sanctions in this particular area do not necessarily achieve the results that it
want to because it was also in the interests of these countries that they
maintain the relationship. So two other issues that we need to remember also
is the Alderburgh case of the plane.

SIZWE: Okay, take us through that.

VAN WYK: Some say there were probably yellow cake or heavy water on the plane.

SIZWE: And those are crucial inputs into … or at least those are related materials?

VAN WYK: Yes, yes and of course in terms of the International Aviation Authorities it’s not
supposed to be transported in that manner. So we know that story has not been
told sufficiently. The other issue is that South Africa had the Ufferburgh test at
that stage, in the Ufferburgh close to Hermanus, where we tested a lot of
missiles for these international customers like the French, Germans. But also
near Saint Lucia and kwaZulu Natal we tested the Jericho missiles with the
Israelis, and that was even after 1990 when the discussion were still place,
some of the dismantling process has taken place. So yes, there’s a lot of
paradoxes and skinuileguit. I’m not getting the English word.

SIZWE: Skinuilegiut and s’phithi-phithi.

VAN WYK: Yes, yes, yes so … and this is typical of nuclear politics; nuclear diplomacy. It I
that it is simply about national interests and it was for example in the French
interests and some of the archives are now coming open, where it states that
the French for sure were very much involved in our nuclear weapons program.
SIZWE: Speaking of the archives, you’ve made reference to archives which tell us
something about our decision to give up nuclear weapons but you also made
mention that a lot of these archives remain closed, which is a bit of a worry
because we are approaching what, twenty to thirty years since this decision
was taken? What’s your view on whether South Africa has been transparent
enough with this decision and whether the archives are open enough? Let’s
start domestically.

VAN WYK: There is a big loss that we incurred with, that Operation Masala – the
destruction of a lot of documentation that were part of the process.

SIZWE: So people destroyed documents first and foremost?

VAN WYK: Ja. Shredded, burnt etcetera. The second one is sadly the ANC’s archives on
the nuclear position that it took, is also spread across a number of univiersities
in the US. Abdul Mentee has a good private collection. The ANC archives as we
know, in Fort Hare is also not necessarily in a good condition. The South Africa
government obviously has with the Department of Foreign Affairs, and now
more recently DIRCO, a very stringent process, where in the past you could
access the archives very easily.

SIZWE: Reallyg?

VAN WYK: Now, despite the PAIA – the Promotion of Access to Information Act, it still is
very tricky to get access to that. And then of course the archives is also not in
a good state and two other issues is important. A year or so ago, Ronnie Kasrils
spoke at a conference on opening the apartheid archives and a made a plea
that all archives should be open. Not only those of the National Party
government or the current government, but also everybody that knows or were
involved or has enough papers on it, referring to the ANC should also come to
the party and explain their role. Another thing that is important is that these
issues of the nuclear weapons program were never brought to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.

SIZWE: Very interesting!

VAN WYK: So, some suggest that …

SIZWE: I never even thought that you know it might but of course! Surely that’s a
crucial thing we need truth on.

VAN WYK: Look, Wilkinson who was involved in the bombing of the Koeburgh Power Plant,
he received amnesty. That’s the only reference to it. There were also
reference to the Dolphin Unit that was sort of the ANC intelligence unit that
sort of backed him up. But the individuals involved were mentioned as involved
in this process, but were not sort of indicted or then received amnesty for that.

So there is still a lot that needs to be discussed around that, and obviously also
our chemical weapons program – Project Coast etcetera was also not part of
that discussions and the revelations at the TRC.

SIZWE: I’m gonna take you up on that and a few other questions. I also see a number
of callers. We’re gonna go to a quick break and then we’ll be back with
Professor Jo-Ansie van Wyk discussing why South Africa gave up nuclear
weapons.

[BREAK]

SIZWE: It’s about to hit ten minutes to eleven and we’re in conversation with Professor
Jo-Ansie van Wyk of UNISA about South Africa’s nuclear weapons program and
why it was shut down. I’ve got a few calls coming in, and I’m gonna go to
Sarashni now. Sarashni thanks for holding for us, and what’s your question?

SARASHNI: Hi Sizwe, it’s great to be speaking to you and your Professor. The first question
that I had, and now the question now when I heard her refer to the chemical
weapons as well: In terms of Phelindaba I heard that the International Atomic
Association came to South Africa; they did an inspection at some point; and
they told the ANC government that it should close down because in was in a
very bad state and it was leaking, but this was kept under wraps.
 The other thing is, that I heard, is she spoke about the chemical weapons. I’ve
heard that most of the [indistinct] laboratories, and that type of thing have
just been kept as they were. The people working there and the people working
in these labs, that it still continues up to this day. You know things I’ve heard, I
can’t back them up. I want her to tell us …

SIZWE: Ha, but Sarashni you sound like President, former President Zuma at the State
Capture Commission. You have information but you can’t tell us where it came
from? No we won’t ask you for your soy network.

SARASHNI: I agree.

SIZWE: Thanks a lot. No, fascinating question Sarashni.

VAN WYK: Very good questions and one, well there’s a few questions that we need to
discuss. One issue which the South African public does not talk about. That is
the health issues in Phelindaba and that is also sort of silent issue that the
health concerns of some of the individuals that worked within Phelindaba, but
also the communities around it.

And it’s typical that these facilities are put where they are isolated,
marginalized communities. For example in Koeburgh it was built around, close
to Atlantis which was also one of apartheird’s cities that were built. In Vaalputs
our nuclear waste site; also within a coloured community there in Phelindaba
around the dam, and some of the communities there.

So typically these installations are very isolated and in these marginalized

communities. The Nuclear Energry Regulator once said to Phelindaba, “We are
not going to renew your license.” Remember that all of the nuclear facilities
have to be regulated by this organization. Both Phelindaba and the nuclear
waste site at Vaalputs were not receiving very good feedback from the nuclear
Regulator, so there are questions about the safety and the security of these
installations. And the IAEA has in its reports stated that our security needs to
be beefed up. And also the fact that, you know, the break-ins that are taking
place.
SIZWE: Tell us about that break-in because I think this quite an interesting question.
The South African government said that, you know, it was just an incident of
crime but you really don’t want break-ins to be happening at really important
nuclear facilities.

VAN WYK: In my view there are still too many radioactive material floating around.
Hospitals for example that use radioactive material for medical purposes: What
happens to that waste? A few years ago some materials were found in
somebody’s backyard. We had the case of Visser that was involved in the AQ
Khan ring of Pakistan for example.

We had the break-ins in Koeburgh, there were some shut downs and some
exercises taking place. So there is a lot of concerns still remaining and whether
it is crime, or whether it is for other issues – intelligence for example, it
remains a problem. Every break-in at a nuclear installation is a problem. And
then the fact that the government is very silent on it; for example what
happens if there is a nuclear incident at Phelindaba? Johannesburg will be
affected, Pretoria.

SIZWE: Absolutely, both cities.

VAN WYK: Ja, so in my mind I don’t even know what to do in instants like that. There is a
community involvement around Phelindaba, but for the rest of us (I don’t want
to be alarmist but), our national warning system is not very good and ja, so
what do we do? And I think there need to be greater awareness, not only of the
safety but also what happens. And surely there are health concerns that seem
to be not put into the open.

SIZWE: Absolutely. We’ve got another call coming in. We’ve got … oh I think Selma just
jumped the gun. Sorry Selma, we know you were waiting for a long time there
but everything you’re saying just has to be said. I’m hanging on every word
here. And I’d also like to bring this into the present because, you know, South
Africa’s had a big debate recently about the re-introduction of the role of at
least nuclear energy into our country. Do you think this has anything to do with
the nuclear weapons or the military itself?
VAN WYK: South Africa signed very important international treaties as well as IAEA
Safeguards Agreement and the additional protocol, which means that there is
no way that we can go back. If we do it will be a devastating blow. We have
also recently signed the treaty that bans nuclear weapons.

So we’ve made a number of international commitments repeatedly, that we do

not support the nuclear weapons programs and that it is basically those three
pillars that we support nuclear disarmament; nuclear proliferation; and then
coming to the electricity generation for the peaceful uses – be they be for
medical reasons and for the generation of power.

So we have gone through this nuclear energy / power generation debate for
many years. It comes up, it goes away. Government realizes it’s too costly or
the time is not right. We still have big coal interests in South Africa. Eskom is
very strong, so it is an issue that comes up that is costly. That’s the thing – that
it’s costly and of course the fact that people sometimes are against it,
sometimes are pro-nuclear. A government cannot make a decision on it
because of the insecurities – financial insecurities that come along with it.

So even the last round during President Zuma we had the vendors program and
some say that the Russians were very much in front of who will now be
appointed. Some say Chinese also and that debate has quietened down. But it
seems like the Ramaphosa government has said that they will investigate and
some developments hopefully will come out so that we have finally, clarity.

The thing is also that Koburgh is reaching a good old age now. It’s now … it
became critical in the eighties, eighty two, eighty three and it’s an old
installation. It has been given facelifts, nuclear Botox, whatever – and it is an
old installation and in terms of our energy needs, we surely need either solar or
wind energy. Coal is expensive in the sense that it has a huge environmental
impact will affect our commitments that we made internationally.

So what remains? We have very good uranium resource. The government has
declared in 2008 a policy document that we are going this route and as I said
earlier that document … that policy has not been amended. So it’s still on the
books but we wait for the political masters to make that decision.
SIZWE: Just finally as we close out this conversation, what do you think the overall
impact of the nuclear weapons program and the decision to renounce it means
for us in the present South Africa today?

VAN WYK: It has given South Africa a lot of status and prestige at international fora. We
have become the point of reference for how to dismantle for even in the case
of North Korea of Iran – the dismantlement of that is to say, “But look, follow
the South African process and see what we can learn from that.” It is an issue
that is not much discussed. I think there is a little bit of political amnesia;
perhaps sometimes a little bit of political nostalgia is, “You know we were so
strong, we could do it on our own.”

So there’s also a narrative that has been built around that, and the fact that
government goes onto international for a and say, “We are a country that have
voluntarily dismantled it.” And then it’s so interesting that even the ANC as I
said, there were divisions on which way we go, but that issue has been taken
into post-apartheid South Africa as an issue that is still something that gives us
(despite al the negative things that have been said against us) a lot of
international credit for it.

And then of course our involvement in the medical isotope business: We make a
lot of money from that and export a lot. We are the largest producer in Africa,
we export all over the world so that is an area where we can still make a good
contribution in terms of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

SIZWE: Well, what a fascinating discussion we’ve had here with Professor Jo-Ansie van
Wyk, who is Professor of International Politics at UNISA. We’ve been discussing
South Africa’s decision to give up nuclear weapons. Professor van Wyk, I just
wanna thank you so much for taking a full hour of your busy schedule to speak
to us about this question of nuclear weapons.

VANY WYK: It’s been a pleasure, thank you very much.