Progressive Development Corp. Pizza Hut vs.
Laguesma  Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition seeking the cancellation of
GR No. 115077
Plaintiff: Progressive Development Corporation – Pizza Hut
Defendant: Laguesma, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-
Katipunan
Date: April 18, 1997
Ponente: Kapunan
Topic:
Facts:
 This is a case wherein NLM Katipunan, respondent union filed a
petition for certification election with the DOLE-NCR in behalf of the
rank and file EEs of the Progressive Development Corporation
(Pizza Hut)
 A month later, petitioner filed a verified MTD, alleging fraud,
falsification and misrepresentation in he respondent Union’s
registration making it void and invalid:
o Registration was tainted with false, forged, double or
multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in the
ratification of the respondent Union’s constitution and by-
laws in the election of its officers
o There were 2 sets of supposed attendees to the alleged
organization meeting
o Alleged chapter is claimed to have been supported by 318
members when in fact the persons who actually signed
their names were much less
o While the application for registration of the charter was
supposed to have been approved on the organizational
meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter certification
issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated June 26,
1993
 Citing other instances of misrepresentation and fraud, petitioner
filed a supplemental MTD
o election of officers was held on June 27, 1993; however, it
appears that the Union's constitution and by-laws were
adopted only on July 7, 1993 (i.e. no positions to which the
officers could be validly elected yet on the date of
supposed election)
o voting was not conducted by secret ballot
o constitution and by Laws submitted in support of its
petition were not properly acknowledged and notarized
the Union's registration on the grounds of fraud and falsification;
Motion was likewise filed requesting suspension of proceedings in
the certification election case until after the prejudicial question of
the Union's legal personality is determined
 However, Med-Arbiter Abdullah directed the holding of a
certification election among petitioner's rank and file EEs explaining
that “Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a legitimate
labor org (LLO) in contemplation of law and shall remain as such
until its very charter certificate is canceled or otherwise revoked by
competent authority. The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and
false statement in connection with the issuance of the charter
certificate are collateral issues which could be properly ventilated in
the cancellation proceedings”
 Petitioner’s appeal to the office of the Sec. of Labor, denied. MR
was also denied, hence this SCA for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUES/HOLDING/RATIO:
1. W/N, after the necessary papers and documents have been filed by
a labor organization, recognition by the BLR merely becomes a
ministerial function. NO.
 The requirements of the law in relation to the recognition of
unions as LLO are intended as preventive measures against
the commission of fraud. After a labor org has filed the
necessary papers and documents for registration, it becomes
mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under
Art 2341 have been sedulously complied with… if a
certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the
1
Art. 234. Requirements of registration. - Any applicant labor organization,
association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall
be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of
the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings
and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to
operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years,
copies of its annual financial reports; and
pg. 1
 labor org's registration could be assailed directly through
cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Art
238 and 239 of the LC, or indirectly, by challenging its petition
for the issuance of an order for certification election.
 Registration requirements specifically afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into
joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose
is to control union funds or use the labor organization for
illegitimate ends. Such requirements are a valid exercise of the
police power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged
directly affect the public interest and should be protected.
 Furthermore, the LC itself grants the BLR a period of 30
days within which to review all applications for
registration (see Art 2352)
for cancellation before issuing an order calling for certification
election.
 Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had
been seriously challenged, it would have been more
prudent for the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to have
granted petitioner's request for the suspension of
proceedings in the certification election case, until the issue of
the legality of the Union's registration shall have been
resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and public respondent
to heed the request constituted a grave abuse of
discretion.

2. W/N the public respondent committed GAD in affirming the Med-

Arbiter's order to conduct a certification election among petitioner's
rank and file EEs, considering that: (1) respondent Union's legal
personality was squarely put in issue; (2) allegations of fraud and
falsification, supported by documentary evidence were made; and
(3) a petition to cancel respondent Union's registration is pending
with DOLE-NCR. YES.

 The LC requires that in organized and unorganized

establishments, a petition for certification election must be filed
by a LLO. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor
org, particularly the right to file a petition for certification
election depends on w/n the labor org has attained the
status of a LLO.
 In this case, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the
petitioner's prayer that the former look into the legitimacy of
the respondent Union by a sweeping declaration that the union
was in the possession of a charter certificate. The grounds
invoked by petitioner for the cancellation of respondent Union's
registration fall under paragraph (a) and (c) of LC Art 2393. The
Med-Arbiter should have looked into the merits of the petition
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant
union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it.
2
Art. 235. Action on application. - The Bureau shall act on all applications for
registration within thirty (30) days from filing.
Progressive Development Corporation vs. DOLE Sec., Med-Arbiter Dela
Cruz, Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN)-TUCP
3
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption
or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes
of ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the
list of members who took part in the ratification;
xxx
(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of
officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit
these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and
their postal addresses within thirty (30) days from election

pg. 2

Plaintiff: Progressive Development Corporation
Defendant: DOLE Sec., Med-Arbiter Dela Cruz, Pambansang Kilusan ng
Paggawa (KILUSAN)-TUCP
Date: February 4, 1992
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
Topic: Governement Regulation, Union Requirements
Facts:
 This is a case wherein the respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng
Paggawa (KILUSAN) – TUCP filed with the DOLE a petition for
certification election among the rank and file employees of the
petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local
chapter, Progressive Development Employee Union, was issued
charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153
 Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP
claimed that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement
and that no other legitimate labor organization existed in the
bargaining unit.
 Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local
union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the
submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names,
addresses and list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of
accounts.
 Respondent KILUSAN-TUCP submitted a rejoinder to PDC's
motion to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary
documentary requirements for registration, such as the constitution
and by-laws of the local union, and the list of officers/members with
their addresses. Kilusan further averred that no books of accounts
could be submitted as the local union was only recently organized.
 Petitioner PDC insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the
organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members
did not bear the corresponding signatures of the purported
members, and the constitution and by-laws did not bear the
signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It argued
that the private respondent KILUSAN-TUCP therefore failed to
substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by
the rules.
 MED-ARBITER Dela Cruz: held that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements for the formation of the chapter.
He further stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the
federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering
that the establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a
certification election should be conducted to resolve the question of
representation.
 Petitioner filed an MR to the Office of the Secretary.
 SECRETARY Laguesma: denied the MR.
 Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was correct that a labor organization
such as the respondent (KILUSAN)-TUCP may not validly invest the status
of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through the mere expedient of issuing a
charter certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR and as such
local or chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of
submission of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, list of officers and
books of accounts
RULING:
1.     YES, because, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify
the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate
status.
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted
documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer,
as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent.
The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00
registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application
for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality
and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate
labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it
is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false
statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the
certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false
statement and misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration
(see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of
perjury.
In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary
requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing
Rules, which we again quote as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and
maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of
accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of
independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
pg. 3
observed. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered

unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in
Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must
likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring
the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists
in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact
compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as
previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union
registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or
chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon
labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive
measures against the commission of fraud.

DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation won.

DOCTRINE: Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any

labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or
local thereof."
Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a
legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with
the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.
Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration
with the BLR. A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor
organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter
does not become a legitimate labor organization.

The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures

against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for dubious ends.

San Miguel Foods Inc. Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant vs. Laguesma, Ilaw at
Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM)

pg. 4
GR No. 116172
Plaintiff: San Miguel Foods Inc. Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant
Defendant: Laguesma, Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM)
Date: October 10, 1996
Ponente: Hermosisima
Topic:
Facts:
 This is a case wherein petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition
for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the
supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis
 Med-Arbiter Danila Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct
of certification election among the abovementioned employees of
the different plants as one bargaining unit
 San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum
on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in
grouping together all 3 separate plants, into one bargaining unit and
in including supervisory levels and above whose positions are
confidential in nature.
 The public respondent, Secretary Laguesma, granted respondent
company’s Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-
Arbiter of origin for determination of the true classificiation of each
of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit.
 Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted
the reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate
certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory
levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the
three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Issue:
 Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt
employees of the company are considered confidential employees,
hence ineligible from joining a union.
 If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the
three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
Ruling:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within
the term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a
union.
\
They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under
Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership in
a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or
form separate labor organizations of their own.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle
the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course
of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
”confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of
interests. “Management should not be required to handle labor relations
matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the
company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their
duties may obtain advance information of the company’s position with regard
to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor
relations matters.”
The Court held that “if these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the
Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership.”
An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s
need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the
confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is
the employee’s necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places,
namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San
Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be
completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the
employees are not sacrificed.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees of
a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
pg. 5
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law.”

A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have

substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.

Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) vs. Noriel

GR No. L-41955

pg. 6

Plaintiff: Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) and its Officers and Mebers
of the Board of Directors
Defendant: BLR Director Noriel; Elizalde Steel Consolidated; National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
Date: December 29, 1977
Ponente: Tehankee, J.
Topic:
Facts:
 This is a case wherein Elisco-Elirol entered into a CBA with
respondent Elizalde Steel.
o It was later discovered that Elisco-Elirol Labor Union was
not registered with the Bureau of Relations DOLE and
therefor not entitled to the benefits and privileges
embodies in the CBA
o That the members of the petitioner union later decided in a
resolution to register their union to protect and preserve
the integrity of the CBA between Elisco and Elizalde.
 Petitioner union then applied for registration with the BLR
o A Certification of Registration was later issued, and upon
such issuance the petitioner union acquired a personality
separate and distinct from any other labor union.
o Through its newly-acquired personality, petitioner enforced
its CBA with Elizalde as the principal party to the same,
representing the workers covered by such CBA
 Sometime later, the general membership of petitioner union, in a
resolution, decided that their mother union, the National Federation
of Labor Unions, can no longer safeguard the rights of its members
and that the interests and welfare of petitioner can be served best if
it will stay independent and disaffiliated from said mother union
o Petitioner, through its president informed the respondents
of said disaffiliation by means of a letter and subsequently
requested respondents to recognize petitioner as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees
thereof
 Respondent, without justifiable reason refused to recognize
petitioner union as the sole exclusive bargaining representative of
its employees and subsequently dismissed the petitioner union’s
officers and board member.
o A complaint for unfair labor practice was later filed by the
petitioner against the respondent
o Also filed a petitioner before the BLR against respondent
Elizalde Steel and National Federation for Labor Unions
be ordered to stop from presenting itself as the CBA agent
 Members of the petitioner union, who were still affiliated with the
mother union, negotiated and executed with respondent company a
CBA
o Later, the same members have formed themselves into an
organization and applied for registration as a union.
o A certificate of registration was later issued, and through a
resolution, the same members disaffiliated from the
mother union
Issue: W/N the petitioner union must be recognized as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative, and not the mother union NAFLU,
YES
Ruling:
Respondent director correctly perceived in his Resolution that "to grant to
the former mother union (NAFLU) the authority to administer and enforce
their collective bargaining agreement without presumably any members in
the bargaining unit is quite absurd" but fell unto the grave error of holding
that "When the employees disaffiliated from the mother union and formed
themselves into a new union, their status as employees was also
terminated."
His error was in not perceiving that the employees and members of the local
union did not form a new union but merely registered the local union as was
their right. Petitioner Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of
employees and members of the local union was the principal party to the
agreement. NAFLU as the "mother union" in participation in the execution of
the bargaining agreement with respondent company acted merely
as agent of the local union, which remained the basic unit of the association
existing principally and freely to serve the common interest of all its
members, including the freedom to disaffiliated when the circumstances so
warranted as in the present case.
2. Contrary to respondent director's misimpression, our jurisprudence fully
supports 'petitioner's stand. In Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty
Cotton Mills, Inc.4 , the Court expressly cited and affirmed the basic principle
that "(T)he locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure
and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and
pg. 7
their employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint
productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into
the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These
associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal
relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affirmation of
the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the
common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of
labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve
their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed
by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to
renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the
agreement which brought it into existence."

Corollarily, the "substitutionary" doctrine likewise fully supports petitioner's

stand. Petitioner union to whom the employees owe their allegiance has
from the beginning expressly avowed that it "does not intend to change
and/or amend the provisions of the present collective bargaining agreement
but only to be given the chance to enforce the same since there is a shift of
allegiance in the majority of the employees at respondent company." As was
stressed by the Court in Benguet Consolidated Inc. vs. BCI Employees & W
Union-PAFLU5 —

... This principle, formulated by the NLRB as its initial compromise solution to
the problem facing it when there occurs a shift in employees' union
allegiance after the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer,
merely states that even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining
agreement executed between employer and employees thru their agent, the
employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind then up
to its expiration date.  They may bargain however for the shortening of said
expiration date.

In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved

as the employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement.
The agent's interest never entered the picture. In fact, the justification for
said doctrine was:

... that the majority of the employees, as an entity under the statute, is the
true party in interest to the contract, holding rights through the agency of the
union representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is
defeasible at the will of the principal.

pg. 8
Chrysler vs. Estrella
GR No. L-46509
Plaintiff: Chryler Philippines Labor Union (CPLU)
Defendant: BLR Sec. Estrella; Associated Labor Union (ALU), Chrysler
Philippines Corporation (CPC)
Date: November 16, 1978
Ponente: Santos, J.
Topic:
Facts:
 This is a case wherein CPLU has been duly registered as a Labor
organization as early as 1965 with an independent certificate of
registration No. 4664-IP.It retained the same registration number
when it affiliated with ALU sometime in 1974 and had its name
changed accordingly to CPLU-ALU.
 On January 17, 1977, petitioner filed a "Petition for Direct
Certification with Preliminary Injunction" with Regional Office No. 4,
Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor.
o It alleged that "there is another union claiming to represent
the workers as the bargaining unit proposed and this is the
Associated Labor Union, - but it represents the minority."
o It prayed, therefore, that the Bureau, after proper
proceedings, "directly certify the Chrysler Philippines
Labor Union, (i.e. petitioner) as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the workers on hourly basis employed by the
Chrysler Phil. Corporation."
 Attached to the aforesaid petition was a general membership
resolution 10 signed by three hundred fifty (350) out of the alleged
total of "five hundred and fifty (550) more or less' employees in the
bargaining unit. In said resolution, the signatories alleged-
o That we have no knowledge and have not authorized the
Associated Labor Union to amend and change the name
of our local union with another registration certificate which
was issued on the 23rd (should be 13th) day of March,
1974. We do hereby resolve and petition the Bureau of
Labor Relations to restore the original name in the
registration issued on August 20, 1965.
o That we the undersigned members of the Chrysler (Phil.),
Labor Union do hereby maintain the said labor union as an
independent labor organization and we hereby disaffiliate
from the Associated Labor Union (ALU) and maintain our
membership with Chrysler (Phil.) Labor Union.
 Med-Arbiter dismissed CPLU’s petition. BLU affirmed the dismissal.
Issue:
W/N CPLU has legal personality to file a petition for certification
election, despite disaffiliation from ALU, YES
W/N there is merit in CPLU-ALU’s allegation that the petition for
certification election has become moot and academic, NO
Whether there is merit in CPLU-ALU's allegation that the petition for
certification election has become moot and academic because of the
ratification by a majority of the hourly-paid employees of CPC of the new
CBA effective during the period November 1, 1977 to October 31, 1980.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Petitioner has legal personality to file a petition for certification
election, notwithstanding its disaffiliation from ALU. First, there is nothing in
the Labor Code nor in the implementing rules which provides that a duly
registered local union which affiliates with a national union or federation
loses its legal personality, much less is there any provision which requires
that upon the disaffiliation of said local union, it should register anew to be
entitled to all the rights and privileges of a duly registered labor union. On the
contrary, the Labor Code expressly allows disaffiliation for the purpose of
operating as an independent labor organization (Art. 241). The change of
name from CPLU to CPLU-ALU was only a matter of form which did not
affect in the least the legal personality of both affiliating unions. And it follows
that if, upon its disaffiliation, petitioner was required to secure a registration
certificate in its original name (without the suffix ALU), the same was only for
record purposes and nothing more. Second, the only way by which a duly
registered labor (union) can be disenfranchised is upon an order of
cancellation issued by the Bureau of Labor Relations and only after due
hearing in a proceeding instituted for said purpose. Thus, Article 239 of the
Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 239. Cancellation of registration; appeal. The certificate of registration of
any legitimate labor organization, whether national, or local, shall be
cancelled by the Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that
the said labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements
herein prescribed.
2. No. There is no merit in CPLU-ALU's allegation that the petition for
certification election has become moot and academic because of the
pg. 9
ratification by a majority of the hourly-paid employees of CPC of the new
CBA effective during the period November 1, 1977 to October 31, 1980.

It was not sought for the purpose of choosing the exclusive bargaining
representative of the hourly-paid employees. Although the ratification slips
provide that "the ratification shall constitute a bar to any petition for
certification election that has been or may be filed by any party or union, "
the same cannot and should not be given force and effect, because it will
defeat petitioner CPLU's claim of majority representation.

It should be added that the execution of a new Collective Bargaining

Agreement does not necessarily foreclose the issue of representation. It is
only when the Collective Bargaining Agreement is certified that no petition
for certification election shall be entertained, except within the so-called
freedom period of sixty (60) days prior to its expiration.

In this case, the new Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be certified

precisely because of the restraining order issued to the public respondent
Acting Director enjoining him from certifying any Collective Bargaining
Agreement which may be concluded by and between private respondents
CPC and CPLU-ALU. The Collective Bargaining Agreement not being
certified, there is no legal obstacle against the holding of a certification
election.

both contending unions claim majority representation, there is no better way

than the holding of a certification election to ascertain which union really
commands the allegiance of the hourly- paid employees at CPC. Thus We
held that . . . "(T)he important factor is the true choice of the employees, and
the most expeditious and effective manner of determining this is by means of
the certification election, as it is for this very reason that such procedure has
been incorporated in the law.

The Bureau of Labor Relations is directed to call a certification election so

that the question of representation of the hourly-paid employees at Chrysler
Philippines Corporation be resolved. The TRO is lifted.

pg. 10

Oca vs. Trajano
GR No. 76189
Plaintiff: Roberto Oca, Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (PTGWO-OCA GROUP)
Defendant: Cresenciano Trajano, BLR-MOLE Dir, Dinglasan, Philippine
Transport and Geneal Workers Organization (PTWGO-DINGLASAN
GROUP) and Carlos Rullamas (PTGWO-III)
Date: August 8, 1991
Ponente: Fernan
Topic:
Facts:
 This is a case wherein during the 11th PTGWO national convention,
respondent Dinglasan was elected national president while
petitioner Oca was elected National Executive Vice President –
both 3year term
 That on February 26, 1982, Dinglasan convened an executive
board meeting to thresh out the mechanics of the national
convention of PTWGMO for the said year, 31 out 33 voting member
were present
o HOWEVER, before the body could agree on the date of
the convention – a number of participants questioned
the qualifications of some members to sit on board –
there ensued a heated argument
 19 members remained and asked Dinglasan to reconvene – which
he did
o passed a resolution to hold the national convention on
April 18
 While on the other hand, Oca and his group – in a special board
meeting, decided to hold their convention on April 4 thereby
prompting Dinglasan and his group to advance their convention
date
 Both held their conventions at different venues and elected their
own set of officers
 Dinglasan filed a petition with the BLR to declare the
convention and election of officers held by the Oca group as
illegal, null and void
 Respondent Trajano, rendered a decision declaring both
conventions with doubtful validity
o That the riff between the has no other alternative solution
but to split them
o Sad fact that the PTGWO once a monolithic labor
confederation, has to be split into two: PTGWO-Oca and
PTGWO-Dinglasan
Issue: W/N PTWGO-Oca held a valid convention, NO
Ruling:
The crux of the petition hinges on the validity of either group's election of
officers. On the other hand, the latter depends upon the validity of the
respective Executive Board Meetings and National Conventions called.
Elementary is the rule that the Constitution and By-laws of an organization
serve as a contract that binds its members.1
Petitioner has apparently misread section 40. An analysis of the cited section
shows that what alternates are the instances when the Board shall meet, not
the authority as to who can call for such meeting. It would seem that
petitioner has confused this discretionary power properly lodged in the
President with that of the Secretary's ministerial duty to "call" or inform the
Board members of a forthcoming meeting. Considering the anomalous "call"
for a special meeting made by the National Secretary, matters taken up
during said special meeting, such as the calling of a national convention, are
likewise tainted.
Still further, both Conventions were in violation of the sixty-day requirement
imposed by section 24 of the By-Laws. Said section clearly provides that the
National Convention's dates, time and place shall be fixed by the National
Executive Board which shall be at least sixty (60) days before the holding. As
succinctly found by the public respondent Labor Director:
... On this score alone, the validity of the conventions called by
petitioner and respondents on 4 April 1982 is subject to question.
The group headed by petitioner Dinglasan fixed the final date of the
convention barely three (3) days before the holding, while
respondents Oca did so only sixteen (16) days prior to their
convention.
The word used in the underscored phrase is "shall." According to Webster's
Third International Dictionary of the English Language the word "shall"
means "ought to, must, ... obligation-used to express a command or
exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is
mandatory.Thus, it was imperative for both petitioners and private
pg. 11
respondents to strictly follow the command therein with respect to the period
for calling a National Convention.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that respondent Labor Director's refusal to

declare the validity of the election of officers of either parties is not tainted
with abuse of discretion. However, that part of the decision which ordered
the parties to "secure new registration certificates as Philippine Transport
and General Workers Organization PTGWO-Oca and Philippine Transport
and General Workers Organization PTGWO-Dinglasan within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this decision" is without basis. No provision in the Labor Code
sanctions such an act. For the cancellation of a labor union's certificate of
authority under Article 239 of the Labor Code, the causes provided therein
must be substantially proved, with the requisite notices given and hearings
held. In this case, such elementary elements of due process were not
observed.

Since we have ruled that the Conventions/Board Meetings of both petitioners

and private respondents are tainted, then it necessarily follows that the
incumbent officers constituting the National Executive Board are entitled to
remain in office, until their successors have been elected, qualified and duly
installed at a National Convention.

It appears from the manifestations filed by the parties that pending resolution
of this case, the two (2) factions had been able to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements with various companies. Considering that these
CBA's were entered into in good faith, each faction acting in the honest
belief that it is entitled to operate as the legitimate PTGWO and so as not to
disturb the rights, benefits and privileges accorded by the CBA's to the
parties therein, the CBA's entered into by PTGWO-Dinglasan and PTGWO-
Oca are recognized as valid and binding until their respective expiry dates.

Magbotohan na lang sila ulit, supervised by the BLR

pg. 12
Philips Industrial Dev’t. vs. NLRC
GR No. 88957
Plaintiff: Philips Industrial Development Inc
Defendant:NLRC, Philips Employees Organization
Date: June 25, 1992
Ponente: Davide
Topic:
Facts:
 PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and
marketing of electronic products. Since 1971, it had a total of 6
collective bargaining agreements with private respondent Philips
Employees Organization-FFW (PEO-FFW), a registered labor union
and the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of
PIDI.
 In the first CBA, the supervisors (referred to in RA 875), confidential
employees, security guards, temporary employees and sales
representatives were excluded in the bargaining unit. In the second
to the fifth, the sales force, confidential employees and heads of
small units, together with the managerial employees, temporary
employees and security personnel were excluded from the
bargaining unit. The confidential employees are the division
secretaries of light/telecom/data and consumer electronics,
marketing managers, secretaries of the corporate planning and
business manager, fiscal and financial system manager and audit
and EDP manager, and the staff of both the General Management
and the Personnel Department.
 In the sixth CBA, it was agreed that the subject of inclusion or
exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and confidential
employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit would be
submitted for arbitration. The parties failed to agree on a voluntary
arbitrator and the Bureau of Labor Relations endorsed the petition
to the Executive Labor Arbiter of the NCR for compulsory
arbitration.
 March 1998, Labor Arbiter: A referendum will be conducted to
determine the will of the service engineers and sales
representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining
unit. It was also declared that the Division Secretaries and all staff
of general management, personnel and industrial relations
department, secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are
confidential employees are deemed excluded in the bargaining unit.
 PEO-FFW appealed to the NLRC; NLRC declared PIDI's Service
Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General
Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department,
Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included
within the rank and file bargaining unit, citing the Implementing
Rules of E.O 111 and Article 245 of the Labor Code (all workers,
except managerial employees and security personnel, are qualified
to join or be a part of the bargaining unit)
Issue: W/N service engineers, sales representatives and confidential
employees of the petitioner are qualified to be part of the existing
bargaining unit
W/N globe doctrine should be applies
Ruling:
The exclusion of confidential employees:
The rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist
or join a labor union equally applies to confidential employees. With the
presence of managerial employees in a union, the union can become
company-dominated as their loyalty cannot be assured. In Golden Farms vs
Calleja, the Court states that confidential employees, who have access to
confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage.
As regards to the sales representatives and service engineers, according to
the OSG, there is no doubt that they are entitled to form a union as they are
not disqualified by law from doing so.
Globe Doctrine:
Globe Doctrine states that in determining the proper bargaining
unit, the express will or desire of the employees shall be considered, they
should be allowed to determine for themselves what union to join or form.
The best way is through a referendum, as decreed by the Executive Labor
Arbiter. However, in this case, since the only issue is the employees'
inclusion in or exclusion from the bargaining unit in question, the Globe
Doctrine has no application in this case. The doctrine applies only in
instance of evenly balanced claims by competitive groups for the right to be
established as the bargaining unit. (many unions 'competing' to be the
bargaining representative?)
CARMELITO L. PALACOL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PURA FERRER-
pg. 13
CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANILA
CCBPI SALES FORCE UNION, and COCA-COLA G.R. No. 85333
February 26, 1990
BOTTLERS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents.
FACTS: On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force
Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union), as the collective bargaining
agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the
Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of the respondent Coca-Cola
Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Company)
concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the latter. Among the
compensation benefits granted to the employees was a general salary
increase to be given in lump sum including recomputation of actual
commissions earned based on the new rates of increase.
On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to the Company the
ratification by the union members of the new CBA and authorization for the
Company to deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00 every payday or P20.00
every month and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment, from the
CBA lump-sum pay granted to the union members.
As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated September 29,
1987, the purpose of the special assessment sought to be levied is "to put up a
cooperative and credit union; purchase vehicles and other items needed for
the benefit of the officers and the general membership; and for the payment
for services rendered by union officers, consultants and others."
This "Authorization and CBA Ratification" was obtained by the Union
through a secret referendum held in separate local membership meetings on
3
various dates. The total membership of the Union was about 800. Of this
number, 672 members originally authorized the 10% special assessment,
while 173 opposed the same. 4
Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the Union
submitted documents to the Company stating that although they have
ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing or disauthorizing the deduction
of any amount from their CBA lump sum. Later, 185 other union members
submitted similar documents expressing the same intent. These members,
numbering 355 in all (170 + 185), added to the original oppositors of 173,
turned the tide in favor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with a
total of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272 supporters.
Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241in
relation to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code. The Union however contended
that the deductions not only have the popular indorsement and approval of
the general membership, but likewise complied with the legal requirements
of Article 241.
ISSUE: Whether or not a special assessment be validly deducted by a labor
union from the lump-sum pay of its members, granted under a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), notwithstanding a subsequent disauthorization
of the same by a majority of the union members.
The deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was not made in
accordance with the requirements provided by law.
Under Article 241, the Union must submit to the Company a written
resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership meeting
duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary of the organization
must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn, must include, among
others, the list of all the members present as well as the votes cast.
pg. 14
The Union, however, failed to comply with the requirements of Article 241 of
the Labor Code. It held local membership meetings on separate occasions, on
different dates and at various venues, contrary to the express requirement
that there must be a general membership meeting. The contention of the
Union that "the local membership meetings are precisely the very general
meetings required by law" is untenable because the law would not have
specified a general membership meeting had the legislative intent been to
allow local meetings in lieu of the latter.

It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings when what is

required is a written resolution adopted at the general meeting. Worse still,
the minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a union
director and not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the
Company contained no list of the members present and no record of the
votes cast. Since it is quite evident that the Union did not comply with the
law at every turn, the only conclusion that may be made therefrom is that
there was no valid levy of the special assessment

Even assuming that the special assessment was validly levied, and granting
that individual written authorizations were obtained by the Union,
nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that the majority of
the union members had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A
withdrawal of individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at
all. This is so even if the withdrawal of authorization was done in collective
form. There is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorization
must be in individual form.

pg. 15

GALVADORES vs TRAJANO, 144 SCRA 138
Petitioner employees of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers Union, now
the Manggagawa ng  Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (simply referred to
hereinafter as the Union), question the legality of the check-off for attorney's
fees amounting to P1M, more or less, of respondent Atty. Jose C. Espinas
(hereinafter referred to as "Respondent Counsel") from the monetary
benefits awarded to PLDT employees in a deadlocked collective bargaining
agreement negotiations between the PLDT and the Union.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
Respondent Counsel has been the legal counsel of respondent Union since
1964.  For his services, he was hired on a case to case contingent fee basis. 
On September 7, 1983, he received a letter from the Union President reading:
"The Free Telephone Workers Union once again request you to appear as
counsel in the on going labor dispute at PLDT.  In consideration of your
services therein, the union binds itself to compensate you for your fees and
expenses therein on a contingent basis.  The amount shall be 10% of any
improvement, with retroactive effect, of the PLDT's last offer to the deadlock
in CBA negotiations which we know will result in a compulsory arbitration. 
A supporting board resolution will later confirm the letter." [1]
PLDT's "last offer" referred to on the wage increases was P230 for the first
year of the proposed CBA; P100 for the second year; and P90 for the third
year.[2]
On September 9, 1983, the Minister of Labor and Employment assumed
jurisdiction over all unresolved issues in the bargaining deadlock between
PLDT and the Union and proceeded to resolve the same by compulsory
arbitration.
On October 23, 1983, the Minister of Labor awarded across-the-board wage
increases of P330/month effective November 9, 1982; P155/month effective
November 9, 1983, and P155/month effective November 9, 1984, in addition
to the Christmas bonus of 1-1/2 month pay per employee effective December,
1983, and other fringe benefits.  As will be noted, there were improvements
obtained from PLDT's "last offer".
On October 29, 1983, the Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution
requesting PLDT to deduct P115.00 per employee for the legal services
extended to the Union by Respondent Counsel.
On November 2, 1983, petitioners initially numbering 600 and finally 5,258,
filed a letter-complaint before the MOLE through their authorized
representative, petitioner Carlos Galvadores, assailing the imposition of
P130.00 (later corrected to P155.00) per employee as attorney's fees of
respondent counsel.  Annexed to the complaint were the written statements
of the employees authorizing Galvadores to act for and in their behalf. 
Petitioners took the position that the attorney's fees of respondent counsel
were not only unreasonable but also violative of Article 242(o) of the Labor
Code; and that the deductions cannot be given legal effect by a mere Board
pg. 16
resolution but needs the ratification by the general membership of the
Union.
Respondents Union and Counsel, on the other hand, proferred the argument
that the attorney's fees being exacted pertained to his services during
compulsory arbitration proceedings and cannot be considered as negotiation
fees or attorney's fees within the context of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code;
and that contrary to petitioners' claim that Respondent Counsel surfaced
only as lawyer of the Union when the employees themselves engaged in mass
action to force a solution to the deadlock in their negotiations, he appeared
continuously from September 8, 1983 until the decision in the case was
rendered on October 23, 1983.  Petitioners proposed a solution offering to
pay P10.00 per employee, but Respondent Counsel refused.
In the meantime, on November 4, 1983, PLDT filed notice that assessment
had been withheld from the differential pay due petitioners but that the same
would not be turned over to the Union without prior MOLE authority so as
not to involve management in the intra-union disagreement.
On February 13, 1984, the Minister of Labor referred the dispute to the
Bureau of Labor Relations for being intra-union in nature.  Several hearings
were held by that Bureau.
On March 22, 1984, the Union filed a Manifestation to the effect that about
6,067 members of the Union ratified the October 29, 1983 resolution of the
legislative council in a plebiscite called for that purpose.  On the basis
thereof, Respondent Counsel moved for the payment of his legal fees under
the September 7, 1983 contract.
Petitioners questioned the plebiscite on the ground that Question No. 2,
which reads:
"Question No. 2.  Do you approve of the use of P1 million (P500,000.00 to be
withdrawn from PECCI and another P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our CBA
negotiation fund together with the attorney's fees (P1 million) that was
collected and to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU, as our counterpart of the seed
money to start the housing program as agreed by the PLDT management and
our union panel and included in the award of the MOLE?"
was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute
regarding the deduction of attorney's fees from the monetary benefits
awarded to PLDT employees.
On February 18, 1985, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of merit reasoning that "the
outcome of the plebiscite negates any further question on the right of the
union counsel to collect the amount of P115 from each of the employees
involved."
It is this Decision that is assailed by petitioners principally on the ground
that the individual written authorization of all the employees must first be
obtained before any assessment can be made against the monetary benefits
awarded to them pursuant to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that
assuming that Respondent Counsel is entitled to attorney's fees, the same
should be taken from Union funds.
In their Comment, respondents Union and Counsel argue that compulsory
arbitration is a "mandatory activity" and an exception to Article 242(o) of the
Labor Code, and that the Union members approved the questioned
deduction in the plebiscite of January, 1984, under the condition that P1M of
the same would be made available for the Union's housing project.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with petitioners that the issue
presented is squarely covered by Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 1691 so that attorney's fees, if legally payable, can only
be charged against Union funds.
The Court resolved to give due course.
Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides:
"Article 222.  Appearance and Fees.
xxx                      xxx                      xxx
"(b)  No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind
arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the
collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member
of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be
charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. 
Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be
null and void."
While Article 242 of the same Code reads:
"Art. 242.  Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. -
The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
pg. 17
organization:

"xxx                      xxx                      xxx

"(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees
may be checked off "from any amount due an employee without individual
written authorization duly signed by the employee.  The authorization should
specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction."
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that
deductions from wages of the employees may only be made by the employer
in cases authorized by law, including deductions for insurance premiums
advanced by the employer on behalf of the employees as well as union dues
where the right to check-off is authorized in writing by the individual
employee himself.[3]

The provisions are clear.  No check-offs from any amounts due employees
may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the
employees specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the
deduction.  The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting. 
In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting.  The question asked in
the plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed that there was no dispute
relative to attorney's fees.

Contrary to respondent Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits awarded to

PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations
although placed already under compulsory arbitration.  This is not the
"mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individual
written-authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory"
nature.  It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid down by law.  Besides,
Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory
arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition.  The cardinal principle should
be borne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted
practices that diminish their compensation without their knowledge and
consent.[4]

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed Decision of February 18, 1985 rendered by

respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, is hereby SET ASIDE. 
The attorney's fees herein involved may be charged against Union funds
pursuant to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as may be agreed upon
between them.
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN vs BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS

pg. 18
PETITIONER: SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD
REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT, ALFIE ALIPIO
RESPONDENT: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HANJIN HEAVY
INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. (HHIC-PHIL.)
DATE: October 14, 2015
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J
FACTS:
 February 16, 2010, Samahan, through its authorized representative,
Alfie F. Alipio, filed an application for registration "Samahan ng
Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE.
o Attached are the names of officers and members,
Constitution and By-laws. The application stated that they
had a total of 120 members.
 February 26, DOLE issued the corresponding certificate of
registration in favor of Samahan.
March 15, 2010, respondent Hanjin filed a petiton with DOLE-Pampanga
praying for the cancellation of registration of Samahan's association
 On the ground that its members did not fall under any of the types
of workers enumerated in the second sentence of Article 243 (now
249).
 Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural
workers, self-employed, and those without definite employers may
form a workers' association.
o 1/3 of the members had definite employers and the
continued existence
o registration of the association would prejudice the
company's goodwill.
 Subsequently added, alternative ground that Samahan committed a
misrepresentation in connection with the list of members and/or
voters who took part in the ratification of their constitution and by-
laws in its application for registration.
o Made it appear that all the members were qualified
DOLE, ruled in favor of Hanjin found that the preamble, as stated in the
Constitution and By-Laws of Samahan, was an admission on its part that all
of its members were employees of Hanjin.
 Its admission bolstered Hanjin's claim that Samahan committed
misrepresentation in its application for registration as it made an
express representation that all of its members were employees of
the former
 Having a definite employer, these 57 members should have formed
a labor union for collective bargaining.
Samahan filed an appeal before the BLR pointed out that the words "Hanjin
Shipyard," as used in its application for registration, referred to a workplace
and not as employer or company. Hence, Hanjin had no right to petition for
the cancellation of its registration. – the remaining 63 members signed the
Sama-Samang Pagpapatunay which stated that they were either working or
had worked at Hanjn
Bureau of Labor Relations, granted Samahan's appeal and reversed the
ruling of the Regional Director. The law clearly afforded the right to self-
organization to all workers including those without definite employers.
 Nowhere could it be found that to form a workers' association was
prohibited or that the exercise of a workers' right to self-
organization was limited to collective bargaining.
 There was no misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The
phrase, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" if
translated, would be: "We, the workers at Hanjin Shipyard."
 Should Hanjin feel that the use of its name had affected the
goodwill of the company, the remedy was not to seek the
cancellation of the association's registration.
the BLR affirmed its September 6, 2010 Decision, but directed Samahan to
remove the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name.
CA, the registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers' association was
contrary to the provisions of Article 243 of the Labor Code.
 It stressed that only 57 out of the 120 members were actually
working in Hanjin while the phrase in the preamble of Samahan's
Constitution and By-laws, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard" created an impression that all its members were
employees of HHIC.
o Such unqualified manifestation was a clear proof of
misrepresentation.
It also stated that the members of Samahan could not register it as a
legitimate worker's association because the place where Hanjin's industry
was located was not a rural area. Neither was there any evidence to show that
the members of the association were ambulant, intermittent or itinerant
workers.
CA was of the view that dropping the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from the
association name would not prejudice or impair its right to self-organization
because it could adopt other appropriate names.
 Samahan argues that the right to form a workers' association is not
exclusive to intermittent, ambulant and itinerant workers.
pg. 19
 o While the Labor Code allows the workers "to form, join or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing" for the
purpose of collective bargaining, it does not prohibit them
from forming a labor organization simply for purposes of
mutual aid and protection.
 All members of Samahan have one common place of work, Hanjin
Shipyard. Thus, there is no reason why they cannot use "Hanjin
Shipyard" in their name.
ISSUE:
(1) Should they have formed a union instead of an association
(2) Should the name Hanjin be removed
HELD:
(1) Right to self-organization includes right to form a union, workers'
association and labor management council.
 More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes
unionism. Workers, however, can also form and join a workers'
association as well as labor management councils
 Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of all
workers to self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends
two notions, to wit:
(a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees
that the employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
(b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or
refrain from joining an association
A labor organization has two broad rights:
(1) to bargain collectively and
(2) to deal with the employer concerning terms and conditions of
employment.
 Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers'
association belongs to workers themselves
In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion of the CA that
Samahan should have formed a union for purposes of collective bargaining
instead of a workers' association because the choice belonged to it.
 The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes
the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said right.
o It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the
exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be
compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite employers, hence,
they should have formed a union instead of a workers' association. The
Court disagrees.
 There is no provision in the Labor Code that states that employees
with definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.
The Court cannot subscribe either to Hanjin's position that Samahan's
members cannot form the association because they are not covered by the
second sentence of Article 243 (now 249)
Article 243.  Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. All
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises
and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions, whether
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes
of collective bargaining.  Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant
workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without
any definite employers may form labor organizations for their
mutual aid and protection. 
Further, Article 243 should be read together with Rule 2 of Department
Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, which provides:
……. All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other
workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection
and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.
Section 2 thereof even broadens the coverage of workers who can form or
join a workers' association. Thus, the Court agrees with Samahan's argument
that the right to form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers. The option to form or join a union or a
workers' association lies with the workers themselves, and whether they have
definite employers or not.
(2) No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant
cancellation of registration
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation of registration of a labor
organization, is committed "in connection with the adoption, or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
pg. 20
ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, and those in connection
with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of
voters, xxx."

If the union's application is infected by falsification and like

serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the
application and its attachments, a union should be denied recognition
as a legitimate labor organization (In S.S. Ventures International v.
S.S. Ventures Labor Union)

 The Court concludes that misrepresentation, to be a ground for the

cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be done
maliciously and deliberately.
 The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious intent to
commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The use of such
words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the
preamble of the constitution and by-laws did not constitute
misrepresentation so as to warrant the cancellation of Samahan's
certificate of registration.
o Hanjin failed to indicate how this phrase constitutes a
malicious and deliberate misrepresentation.
 Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members misrepresented
themselves as employees or workers of Hanjin, said
misrepresentation does not relate to the adoption or ratification of
its constitution and by-laws or to the election of its officers.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin Shipyard" must be
removed in the name of the association.
 A legitimate workers' association refers to an association of workers
organized for mutual aid and protection of its members or for any
legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining registered with
the DOLE.

As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of the use of name
by a workers' association, the Court refers to the Corporation Code, which
governs the names of juridical persons. Section 18 thereof provides:

No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange

Commission if the proposed name
is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing
corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is patently
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws. When a change in the
corporate name is approved, the Commission shall issue an amended
certificate of incorporation under the amended name.

pg. 21
METROLAB V HONORABLE MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR
PEITIONER: METROLAB INDUSTRIES, INC
RESPONDENT: HONORABLE MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR,
in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment and METRO DRUG CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION - FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
DATE: February 28, 1996
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
 Private respondent Metro Drug Corporation Employees
Association-Federation of Free Workers “the Union” is a labor
organization representing the rank and file employees of petitioner
Metrolab and Metro Drug
 December 1990 CBA between Metrolab and the Union expired.
o The negotiations for a new CBA, however, ended in a
deadlock
 23 August 1991, the Union filed a notice of strike against Metrolab
and Metro Drug Inc. – they failed to settle despite conciliation
efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
SOLE Torres, issued an assumption order – assuming jurisdiction over the
entire labor dispute at Metro Drug, Inc. - Metro Drug Distribution Division
and Metrolab Industries, Inc.
 Accordingly, any strike or lockout is hereby strictly enjoined.  The
Companies and the Metro Drug Corp.Employees Association -
FFW are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing
any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation.
o Ordered submission of position papers within 20 days
27 December 1991, then Labor Secretary Torres issued an order resolving all
the disputed items in the CBA and ordered the parties involved to execute a
new CBA. – the union filed MR
 Jan 1992, while case still pending, Metrolab laid off 94 of its rank
and file employees.
 The Union then filed a motion for a cease and desist order to stop
Metrolab from implementing the mass layoff,
o such act violated the prohibition against committing acts
that would exacerbate the dispute as specifically directed
in the assumption order.
 Metrolab contended that the layoff was temporary and in the
exercise of its management prerogative
o maintained that the company would suffer a yearly gross
revenue loss of approximately 66M due to the withdrawal
of its principals in the Toll and Contract Manufacturing
Department
o further asserted that with the automation of the
manufacture of its product "Eskinol," the number of
workers required for its production is significantly reduced
Acting Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor, issued a resolution declaring
the layoff of Metrolab's 94 rank and file workers illegal and ordered their
reinstatement with full backwages.
 March 1992, Metrolab filed a Partial MR – alleging that the layoff
did not aggravate the dispute since no untoward incident occurred
as a result thereof.
 Filed a motion for clarification regarding the constitution of the
bargaining unit covered by the CBA.
29 June 1992, after exhaustive negotiations, the parties entered into a new
CBA. The execution, however, was without prejudice to the outcome of the
issues raised before the SOLE
 2 October 1992, Metrolab laid off 73 of its employees on grounds of
redundancy. The union again promptly opposed on 5 October 1992.
o Labor Sec again issued a cease and desist order. Metrolab
moved for a reconsiderations
Labor Secretary Confesor issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution
 Denying both of Metro Lab’s MR
 For the parties to incorporate in their respective collective
bargaining agreements the clarifications herein contained
 Confesor also ruled that executive secretaries are excluded from the
closed-shop provision of the CBA, not from the bargaining unit.
The Union filed a motion for execution.
Metrolab opposed. Hence, the present petition for certiorari with
application for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order – GRANTED
ISSUE:
(1) WON THE TEMPORARY LAY OFF IS ILLEGAL
(2) WON EXECUTIVE SEC ARE PART OF THE BARGAINING
UNIT OF RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES
HELD:
pg. 22
 (1) Metrolab argues that the Labor Secretary's order enjoining the
parties from committing any act that might exacerbate the dispute
is overly broad, sweeping and vague and should not be used to
curtail the employer's right to manage his business and ensure its
viability. Court does not agree
 Management prerogative is not absolute but subject to limitations
imposed by law
In PAL v. NLRC,
. . . the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered boundless
 The Secretary of Labor is expressly given the power under the Labor
Code to assume jurisdiction and resolve labor disputes involving
industries indispensable to national interest.
o ART 263 provides … (g) When, in his opinion, there exists
a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration…..
 That Metrolab's business is of national interest is not disputed.
Metrolab is one of the leading manufacturers and suppliers of
medical and pharmaceutical products to the country.
o Metrolab's management prerogatives, therefore, are not
being unjustly curtailed but duly balanced with and
tempered by the limitations set by law.
(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to
the further detriment of the national interest. When a labor dispute has in
fact occurred and a general injunction has been issued restraining the
commission of disruptive acts, management prerogatives must always be
exercise consistently with the statutory objective
 Metrolab insists that the subject layoffs did not exacerbate their
dispute with the Union since no untoward incident occurred after
the layoffs were implemented. There were no work disruptions or
stoppages and no mass actions were threatened or undertaken.
The Secretary of Labor ruled, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise
to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties
should be considered an act of exacerbation
 Metrolab and the Union were still in the process of resolving their
CBA deadlock when petitioner implemented the subject layoffs.
o As a result, motions and oppositions were filed diverting
the parties', attention, delaying resolution of the
bargaining deadlock and postponing the signing of their
new CBA, thereby aggravating the whole conflict.
If Metrolab intended the layoff of the 94 workers to be temporary, it should
have plainly stated so in the notices it sent to the affected employees and the
DOLE
 There is no circumstance at all from which we can infer an intention
from MII not to sever the employment relationship permanently. If
there was such an intention, MII could have made it very clear in
the notices of layoff.
(2)
The exclusion of managerial employees, in accordance with law, must
therefore still carry the qualifying phrase "from the bargaining unit", in
Article I (b) (i) of the 1988-1990 CBA
 In the same manner, the exclusion of executive secretaries should
be read together with the qualifying phrase "are excluded from
membership in the Association" of the same Article and with the
heading of Attachment I.
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form
and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence
has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by
reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a
fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to
sensitive and highly confidential records.
 In the case at bench, the Union does not disagree with petitioner
that the executive secretaries are confidential employees
The dangers sought to be prevented, particularly the threat of conflict of,
interest and espionage, are not eliminated by non-membership of Metrolab's
executive secretaries or confidential employees in the Union. Forming part of
the bargaining unit, the executive secretaries stand to benefit from any
agreement executed between the Union and Metrolab. Such a scenario, thus,
gives rise to a potential conflict between personal interests and their duty as
pg. 23
confidential employees to act for and in behalf of Metrolab. They do not have
to be union members to affect or influence either side.

Finally, confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file. As

previously discussed, the nature of employment of confidential employees is
quite distinct from the rank and file, thus, warranting a separate category.
Excluding confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit,
therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.

pg. 24
SAN MIGUEL INC. VS SAN MIGUEL SUPERVISORS
PETITIONER: SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED
RESPONDENT: SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS and
EXEMPT UNION
DATE: August 1, 2011
PONENTE: PERALTA, J
FACTS:
The issues in the present case, relating to the inclusion of employees in
supervisor levels 3 and 4 and the exempt employees in the proposed
bargaining unit.
 G.R. No. 110399, entitled San Miguel Corporation
Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma: the Court held
that even if they handle confidential data regarding technical and
internal business operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4 and
the exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel are not to be
considered confidential employees, because the same do not pertain
to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of
grievances.
o the employees belonging to the three different plants of
San Miguel having "community or mutuality of interests,"
constitute a single bargaining unit.
o They perform work of the same nature, receive the same
wages and compensation, and most importantly, share a
common stake in concerted activities.
o It was immaterial that the three plants have different
locations as they did not impede the operations of a single
bargaining representative.
Pursuant to this decision, DOLE conducted pre-election conferences.
 However, there was a discrepancy in the list of eligible voters, i.e.,
petitioner submitted a list of 23 employees for the San Fernando
plant and 33 for the Cabuyao plant, while respondent listed 60 and
82, respectively
August 31, 1998 Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan issued an Order
directing Election Officer to proceed with the conduct of certification
election.
 On the date of the election petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections
and Challenge to Voters questioning the eligibility to vote by some
of its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong
to the bargaining unit.
o There being no existence of employer-employee
relationship with petitioner.
o Also they alleged that some employees should not vote
being (1) Confidential employees (2) employees assigned
to live chicken (3) employees whose job grade is level 4,
but are performing managerial work and scheduled to be
promoted; (4) employees who belong to the Barrio Ugong
plant; (5) non-SMFI employees; and (6) employees who
are members of other unions.
Med-Arbiter issued another order directing respondent to submit proof
showing that the employees in the submitted list are covered by the original
petition for certification directing petitioner to substantiate the allegations
contained in its Omnibus Objections
Respondent averred that
(1) the bargaining unit contemplated in the original petition is the Poultry
Division of San Miguel Corporation, now known as San Miguel Foods, Inc.;
(2) it covered the operations in Calamba, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas and
its home base is either in Cabuyao, Laguna or San Fernando, Pampanga; and
(3) it submitted individual and separate declarations of the employees whose
votes were challenged in the election
The Med-Arbiter issued the Resolution, directing the parties to appear before
the Election Officer of the Labor Relations Division for the opening of the
segregated ballots. (Votes, 72 were cast for "Yes" and 3 for "No," with one
"spoiled" ballot)
Based on this results Med-Arbiter issued another order stating that since the
"Yes" vote received 97% of the valid votes cast, respondent is certified to be
the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of
petitioner's three different plants
On appeal, DOLE affirmed the Order dated April 13, 1999, with
modification that George C. Matias, Alma Maria M. Lozano, Joannabel T.
Delos Reyes, and Marilyn G. Pajaron be excluded from the bargaining unit
which respondent seeks to represent.
 Being members of another union and Pajaron is an employee of San
Miguel.
April 28, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55510, entitled San Miguel Foods, Inc. v.
The Honorable Office of the Secretary of Labor, Bureau of Labor Relations,
and San Miguel Corporation: Supervisors and Exempt Union, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the Resolution dated July 30, 1999
of the DOLE Undersecretary, stating that those holding the positions of
pg. 25
Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant are excluded from the
bargaining unit.
ISSUE: WON THE DISPUTED EMPLOYEES BE CONSIDERED
CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES
HELD: The Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only
one bargaining unit for the employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of
Magnolia. involved in "dressed" chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry
Farms engaged in "live" chicken operations.
 Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the
specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there
exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a
single bargaining unit.
 Taking into account the "community or mutuality of interests" –
One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs
them both. There may be differences as to the nature of their
individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to
warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit
As to the exclusion of Payroll Master in the definition of a confidential
employee – prays that the said position and all other positions with access
to salary and compensation data be excluded from the bargaining unit. –
court ruled that this argument must fail.
 Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in
a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor
relations.
o This criteria are cumulative, both must be met by the
employee to be considered confidential employee
o Confidential relationship must exist between the employee
and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the
prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations
 A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on
delicate, or with the custody, handling or care and protection of the
employer’s property
Court agrees with CA that the position of Payroll Master does not involve
dealing with confidential labor relations information in the course of the
performance of his functions.
 Since the nature of his work does not pertain to company rules and
regulations and confidential labor relations, it follows that he
cannot be excluded from the subject bargaining unit.
The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any
labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees,
because if allowed to be affiliated with a union, the latter might not be
assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the union
can also become company-denominated with the presence of managerial
employees in the union membership.
In this regard, the CA correctly ruled that the positions of Human Resource
Assistant and Personnel Assistant belong to the category of confidential
employees
PEPSI COLA V HON. SEC OF LABOR
PETITIONER: PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC
RESPONDENT: HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-
ARBITER NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO & PEPSI-COLA
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-UOEF
DATE: August 10, 1999
PONENTE: PURISIMA, J
FACTS:
 June 1990, the pepsi cola employees union filed a petition for
certification election with the Med-Arbiter to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of supervisors of PEPSI
 July 1990, Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit
statement that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores
de Filipinas (federation) together with two (2) rank and file unions.
o Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola
Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP).
 July 23, 1990, PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition to set aside cancel or revoke Charter Affiliation of the
Union.
o on the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were
managers and (b) a supervisors' union can not
affiliate with a federation whose members include the
rank and file union of the same company.
 PEPSI presented a motion to re-open the case since it was not
furnished with a copy of the Petition for Certification Election.
October 1990, PEPSI filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal
with the Secretary of Labor, questioning the setting of the certification
pg. 26
election on the said date and five (5) days after – presented a motion to
suspend the Certification election
SOLE, Denied the appeal and MR
Even as the Petition to Cancel, Revoke and Suspend Union Charter
Certificate was pending before the BLR, PEPSI found its way to this Court via
Certiorari.
 TRO was granted
Whether or not a supervisors' union can affiliate with the same
Federation of which two (2) rank and file unions are likewise members,
without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended, by
Republic Act 6715, which provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are
not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
 Federation argues that – the law does not prohibit a local union
composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a
federation which has local unions with rank-and-file members as
affiliates.
SOLE through OSG comment:
 A federation of local union is not the labor organization referred to
in Article 245 but only becomes entitled to all the rights enjoyed by
the labor organization (at the company level) when it has complied
with the registration requirements found in Articles 234 and 237.
o the affiliation of the supervisory employee's union with the
same federation with which the rank and file employees
union is affiliated did not make the supervisory employees
members of the rank and file employee's union
SOLE, ordered the conduct of Certification Election to be participated by
and among the supervisory workers of the respondent company, Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City
PEPSI appealed the said Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion – MR DENIED
ISSUE:
(1) WON private respondents officers and members are
managerial employees
(2) WON private respondents is prohibited from affiliating
with a federation affiliated with rank and file employees
HELD:
It must be noted resolution was made by the Union withdrawing from the
Federation.
 The issue of WON supervisors union can be affiliated with a
Federation with two (2) rank and file unions directly under the
supervision of the former, has thus become moot and academic
(1) The prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local union of
rank and file is replete with jurisprudence.
 The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of
supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union.
o The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union
applying for membership in a national federation the
members of which include local unions of rank and file
employees.
o The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this
case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those
employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit.
Whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration is a prejudicial
question to the petition for certification election
 . . . It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceedings is not a
litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an
investigation of a non-adversarial and fact finding character."
 The Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the
public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is
proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the
registration certificate of the respondent union
As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join the
labor union of the rank and file
pg. 27
. . . A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the
employer's property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out
managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential
employees are similarly disqualified.

The Court finds merit in the submission of the OSG that Route Managers,
Chief Checkers and Warehouse Operations Managers are supervisors while
Credit & Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly
confidential employees. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job
description of subject employees. A careful scrutiny of their job description
indicates that they don't lay down company policies. Theirs is not a final
determination of the company policies since they have to report to their
respective superior. The mere fact that an employee is designated manager
does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd
situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be
a member of a union. In the case of National Steel Corporation v. Laguesma,
G.R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996, it was stressed that:

What is essential is the nature of the employee's function and not the
nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the
employee has rank and file or managerial status, or whether he is a
supervisory employee. VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKER'S UNION

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano is a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia
ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.. As such
employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed
shop provision which reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment

for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
Under Republic Act No. 875, the employer was not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein,
if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. "Then
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Being a member

pg. 28
of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation
of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano presented his
resignation to Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking
the latter to separate him from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in
turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless Victoriano could achieve
a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.

ISSUE:
WON Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects
which ban their members from joining labor unions

HELD:
NO. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal,
not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was
intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to 
the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work,
or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of
being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union
security agreements.Congress acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion,
by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by
union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden
when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act(Republic Act 875), and, certainly,
Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. The
means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose
— exempting the members of said religious sects fromcoverage of union
security agreements — is reasonable. It may not be amiss to point out here
that the freeexercise of religious profession or belief is superior tocontract
rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The
Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions
that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion,
enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. Religious freedom,
although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has
a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore,
must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only
to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

(SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO
MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO

pg. 29
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO,
petitioner,  organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS),
HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 85279  show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members
of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered
the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and
that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that
the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the
old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday
pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months
or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right
to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,
provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec.
31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings
of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"]
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by
the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo member, has been an employee of the
Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU.
Under the CBA between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being
enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the
membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said
factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano
tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an
exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of
the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a
member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the
Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then
moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU.
EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop
agreement because RA 3350 is unconstitutional and that said law violates
the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
 
HELD: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such,
an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that
there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his
employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the
majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to
pg. 30
join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. But the RA vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
right. order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
EDILION profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 regulatory program — the lawyers.
Facts: Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
“stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
constitution notwithstanding due notice. not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
Issue:
WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO
Held:
All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice
of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at
large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him
to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some
of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

pg. 31