ie) ETUC S21)THE COMMISSAR’S HOUSE HISTORICAL ASL Scenario A2 VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Russians win f they have on unbroken Behind the BARRIKADY, 9 November 1942: I¢ was inevitable, I suppor Given the wonderfully accurate maps of RED BAKRICADES, a group of 1g: time playtesters could not resist the challenge of adapting ihe one ASL sce rari (4) set inthe wes t that format. Thee efforts rested in this, the see ‘ond version, of the popular scenario found in BEYOND VALOR ithe (ist ‘module released for te system). Although the OBs and situation have tex beew dramatically altered, players will find that this version has a distinctly Aifterentpace thie the original due Wo the ferro. As the question of which imay be “better”, I appears te be a matter af individual taste—for certainly both ar challenging to pay BOARD CONFIGURATION: A N BALANCE: # All Rosson occupaits of building BBIS we Fanatic Sood er pve eer bling X9 or BB or ed. Sun whan ic arn cevaresry, ee TURN RECORD CHART Saar ALARA tp Pe I foe ——t4lalalal[s[6|7/3/ a= Remnants ofthe 118 Rifle Regiment (EL 1 setup east of she Perimeter (see SSR): (SAN: 6) * fF | fe | = at h}.2 6¢ 6 19 + ar 13 12 = t=] 2] aa Elements of Panzerpionier Bataillon $0 and remaanis of Infanterie Regiment S77 [ELR: see SSR6] setup west ofthe Perimeter (sxe SSID): (SAN: 3} (| [ha > a. SPECIAL RULE! 4. All RBSSSR (found ox the back of seenaio RBS) are in effect, 22.The Perimeter is defied as running along the folowing roads: VO-V V4 Vs.vo.wis-W2-Y21-Y28 13. All Locations of building BIS are Fortified. Withia seven hers, inc dive, of any tex of builing BB, the Russian player has Maximum (Level ‘A) Booby Trap capability 4 The Rostian may se HIP for thee squads (and all SMCYSW that stack vith ther. § Kindiag is NA forthe Russian player. 6 The Germen 8.3.8 (or equivalent HS) have an ELR ofS"; all oher Gor ‘a wits begin play with at ELR of "4 [AFTERMATH The veteran plonsers of Majer Retennair hd never wen «Dae he anal of at ce e "Red House Aliough 18 were Ee bya booby ap een bere the atack bean, one of te exenty songpenithe“Chems's Shop" asl. However, the Comms s House” proved ta he a Yrie dealing. The eed bk frac bad bon trad toa fers wih evry opening logd wth i leis tie Rowan defenders with erly shh poy beee teak which they Fe i ‘he Commsar's Howe. Toe vitor) had bree fy, however Tessa engineer who vache the shove were Scat Wie ‘lor eae he te bain hd om sted ta seagate reat wa With awe fem rove eflecune combat gop lott ssa sll tcenecoe te om pepe Tne ro Ge Copa emer ko vnaan ino aman gun oe nate new nett nh (Aya tinge race cote © ret Fey SOLDIERS OF THE SUN 4 ‘The Japanerein ASL By Chai Maan SERIES REPLAY 19 Scenato AM—OP Hil By Chuck Gots, Pery Cocke ard Pat oeke PIGI-PIGI 33 Reference Netes for ASL, By Steven Swann THE COMMANDO CAMPAIGN GAME 37 ‘A\Nes Challenge fo SL PLayers ByRex A. Main THE DOOMED BATTALIONS 53 The Allied Minor in ASL By Charles Markus AND HERE WE DAMNED WELL PLAYED 65 "The Plato af Sconaio ASD By Mark Nizon GUILT BY ACCUSATION? 16 A Look she IFT iy Join Fas Jay Kanan and George WindsSHOWDOWN AT ASL SCENARIO A39 TUG ARGAN PASS ‘TUG ARGAN PASS, SOMALILAND, 11 August 1940: Despite MumsaliaTs inclination to remain on the defensive in East Attic, the Deke of Aosi, ix com- rand of Ulian forces in Ethiopin, believed tat Bis best move wood be te ove tun British Somali of the Pench in Djibout. Somaland, part Il lun, past British and pur Freneh, was the most peitive 300,000 square mies in Attia, almost totally devord of resources. But Somaliland also comprised the "Homa Afvicn™ and ths dominated the entrance int the Red Sea. Retains vita lifeline to the Middle East. Accordingly, on 3 August, Italian forsee rensed the open boréct from Exhopia. Spliting inte so colas, te Falans Sirack for French Sorta aad forthe erica! lraish por of Berbera, After ‘aking Hargeita, a small and undefenéed Britsh town, on the Sth ané then spending three daye converting it iato 4 tupply dump, General de Simone, command of the main Hain colum, reumed the alvance, The Brits, mea ‘whe, had moved to black the roste to Bertera at Tug. Argan—v! ach a male epur,overtooked the winding road. Arviving at the ith, do Simone did ot hertate. A heavy artery barrage wae brought down, end then a Taian brigade was hurled at the fist hil, cccupied by 9 company of Tolan inant BOARD CONFIGURATIO! A BALANCE: N © Ads one MMG to the British OR Wh Adi one M1 1/39 the italian OB. se] sz. VICTORY CONDITION: hex 25RRS ond emisjority ofthe other Level TURN RECORD CHART. (© BRITISH Ses Lip Fest (9) Ww TALIA ra Po 1}2/3/4/5/6)7/8 END "lement of the 3/1Sth Panjab Regiment [ELR: 2] set wp on bourd 25: (SAN: 4) © A fis] de] a sp] pa] lel] a) SPECIAL RULES: LEC are Very Dey, with no wind at sa 2. All buildings are wooden, All Orchard and Harmada hexes ate Crags; all ‘Scrub henes are Brash, No roads or ridges exit 23. Me Bris eceive one Module of KUEMEN OBA with Searce ArmUnILO, ‘which can fie HE and Smoke 44 The Halans receive ore mentle OF 104mm OBA (KE ane Smoke) with Pleritul Ammunition, directed by an Otfboard Observer at Lev! (any \wesiedge hex secretly recede prior o Bitsh set. 5. The four inal Naien 4-4-7sare Assault Engineers (HI.22), a ICorererere aia rcisare fee | R) ae | e| e) Rep e|LES | ATE] FD] ae | ad APTERSIATIE Making we of coubined Tulane managed tae tc hl an hen eld gaine vo determined Pua coun ‘erases hat ay. Butasiaus Lune on vo more ils weet bc Be abe etn wh fied ety ic. No fr ln prog wi ale ‘atacks apsest all Britsh positions the nextday, but despite hesvs shelling only ene ‘veran me port on (9 ange But he congas of Bath Sonaiand had bere cst. Ines and une, for Dace: Ata what, se would prove fale for wah 2 Year the ene Tula nat in Eat Aen would reenquee,CODE OF BUSHIDO hae sna Filed te largest “gap in the ASL system, and bas prbebly besh as tapes awaited by hard-core wargamere se Allied fodita one evn ioitoraonenty whee fighting the Japanese. In many respects the orange-gold toon are unique in ASL: they are a warpamer's Tram sn chave the way ws ould have ll ca Sour mops under oar comand at—han 4 break i, sed propey, almost unstoppable. They are ‘micous in defense and in most esse will ght to felt 11S oe SMC, wile the sbandance of exipere ‘stor exrome csconfon and fair foe (sully orn fet in frustrate) to hes epponens, Bu When ASL [ed wih ove han, it alet back with the other: fe ferocioos and mercial Inpanese ae even lst sorrllable than other rationals inthe titer, fs providing players with many new challenges Abo welcome in COB see the extn overly and tiles fr the Pacific Theater of Operations, which pikes most ofthe BTO er North Alden tomain acon, ety nea and tame in comparison. ‘in alerpsing to review COB, this ance pevies sone bicheroind information on te Jepenese elder ‘2d, that proce, wil ty 10 acich a fow myths Sout is cpabiites, wets, waling, vespors and his teatment of capives. Our aeriandang of the UA Creperal Jnpinese Army) and LIN (Imperial ‘apaoas Navy) ent helped bythe death of Eaglch ‘mstions of Japanese accounts of Worat Wat 2, by the profound cultura and religous differences thst filer beween Japa andthe West nce bythe ir fang effects of sli wartime Aled propaganda heltogaber with more rece produce of mass ‘efia—hive 50 colored our pereeyions. Thu, the 2alan solders still unfuiny poneayed ata genial it ove coward (le tt faker among tbe ie sa) the German, lkewite, tan ober an Hutto Es moron; and ihe Japanese asa savage and uatesl- ing “inferior being”: Daring the war, both sides ‘sored to eride bt effective casi propaganda to Feit and debumanize tee foe, bu Be Allis a ‘al imagery was pacticulary mslicious, pervasive sd lonelatin Av early a Toney 1041 Grebe SOLDIERS OF THE SUN The Japanese in ASL By Chares Mauss fore more voes! Allied “tovght conta” moles Ides and exploited prejudices even further), the Trsich Cann C*Far se, Air Chief Marka Si Rober Brooke-Fopham, described the Japarcse he had served in China a “various subshuman specie Many menoirs of Allied voldien" war expzriences ae Tntered with similar comments, demonstrating thes even front-line troops are not alway? more Immune to "hate fdoccrinon” than tiie. Even the ost fatering commen about Japanese ccurase sn woiciom ar ietedaced with rit taper, he ‘Hos prin! whieh ice "robot fates the most foridae Fighing inset in story", x00 "so Geant”. While such language conveys something ofthe undemtandale emticns of fearon loathing, thatthe Japanate ited in thir ener, this (50 ears ate does eohing 1 demolish preutices or ‘ramote understanding (much Tess recogeliation) Tetween former eneriet. Although tome poreal scouts of wartime expences describe the Wallen 55 in silat tom, this dehumanization of the enemy solder is sil langely reserved forthe Taps "The cater of the war bot noon Japan ‘and the Ales need nate discussed hee, bul mys abound ‘even wah respect to the Peat Harbor atack—hich Tat long epmized the apanese at thee most typ cal” fie, engineering “ungestlemasly” ard “unpre Soked” asus on guillse victim), In realy, 26 ‘eeert eresrch thow, the US gaverament knev ‘ell advance, what ast befall te Unked State but chose ogre the warnings for pelea arom ithe woud of one author, Amesien was “tying 10 lever Japan nto the war" Roosevelt's major protien Wat athe himself pt it, how we Uhe USAT shel ‘ancuver the Tapaoss ito the posiien of firing the fs shot widow wo mich darger varielve". in 194, Briain’ Mimiter of Production admited that Jnpan “was proved ini stacking America” and ‘at & war te taveny of ary” te alege tha the USA was eluant forced ino we wa, Th sot 1 question the morality of Roosevelt's stalagem Which by posing Japan, destroyed the peevating ‘eo ef American islatonism and generated insant (and essential) publie suppor for the President's sleealy consiveble materal so the Ale camp. Nar docs te foregoing aerpe to concn or belate Japan's appalang behavior in China (elon large scale drag taficking by the UA), which prosided ihe Tecireundte Amerce's dscision to go 1 war ‘Bat, seen from Jxpu’'s viewpoln, the uighening ‘Wester wade embar ayainst her i Yeiponseto het sity adventures in China and Machi lef Jp ove leaders sith 4 stark choice either bov to ‘Western presure and gt thon areas with a unde epabl oss of “ace” intreaonaly, or olan te ‘tal raw materials being wield by the West by ‘eirng the Dotch Eset Indies and neighboring tere tory. At the demeste eonaeucnczs of tacking dow ‘wee perceived io pes a tet to Jan ¢mularstie ‘epi, war was segardd as a vale fren policy {pion in Japanese delberaient. Mereover Japan fat (Gri sme joticaton) tat her esowomic expla tion of China and other areas was no worse han American or Brlsh behavior in China, ia Tapan Stel and sliawhere for decader previous under pretext like the “Open Door, the "Monroe Dov tree", ard the “Cortmenvealh” (hough ths dit ‘overlick the profound ciffererces inthe Frequency snd acaeof brutality exercised by Jypanese ceronds Compared te mest others) Japan had inary cape, 1 intetion of remaining economically subservient. the USA. To the miltarsts in paver, war became the nly "honeeable™ cours; hy 1940, mors mateeste aves palicins whe stl favored ualogue with te West wore elitr betind bart or as been sowed into silence. Like Hes, most Japarese statsyis's ‘av the Allee at moraly degenerate and belived that they would quickly become war weary wad sue for pease al of which coraine! an eleriet of wis ful thinking since even the mii) had Lie cen dence of winning any prolonged colic Nor wit there any deliberate infcnic of sanng hosts iho firs ceclaring war, tis actualy oezumed due 1o blunder: by the Jepanese diplomaiie salf and fecoling problems, al the Landon Toner sbvernd——— 6 atthe start ofthe Rovsn-apanene War that such polite Tales “have been epertvly rare in modem history” Ifthe evens oi War were not warming ‘cough for America, the US ambassador in Tokyo feported thatthe Pear! Harbor attack was freely fmored inthe Japanere capital before Deconter 194]. The wonder 110 tat Japan went 1 war With the Westin 1941, ba ater that her ani-wa Faction ‘Selayd «forse long, ‘Theres als a perasive myth thatthe Allis then ‘faced Japa’s fll might in 1941-42—wherea i act only TL of her 51 divisions were employed in over ‘ating the Pacific, and her Lsse (ome 14000 men ted 4 Jestoyer) were but fraction of er enemies ‘Throuphou mest ofthe war, the blk of Japan's land free (ond, moreover, her best, qualitatively) were - ‘puri again) end taught (0 obey orders ueques- onngly, and ao ware veiling tools for toi leaders to wiekd, Moreover, the Japanese soldier probably had greater (abet often unjustiied) fui in his sffierthan the usally rare cynical and Tse iypes- lene Aled or oer Avis oops toast uot the tie of wae tamed agains: Japan witha vengeance and tome eases of inscbordinaion sd even “Tagging” of telfith or ovenaggressive lapanese officers were ‘eeorded. lx aden, since most Japanese soldier {voided or shtked ary responsibly, even greater ‘dene were placed on ofiesn—ferterageevaing Sad tactical Iaderthip. The armed fowes of Japan were far ore plaized than est Wester counter pats, vith compacavely smal group of imovatrs ‘who were a revered ard privileged elt (th comms rd officer) on the one hand, and x large and ‘mostly unedacued group with few if any privet (he ree) om the other There was lite comnan {round beswoen these to exiewcs, ard hens hee ‘yas ide fenemy co setten he dferences rank Relow staff rane, most Japanese offices is th ‘eld bad fow reservation abot sharing the hari ‘of tee men. But this egabtcinism was es com: ‘or in barracks, and officers were taught be ad their men encouraged io regard them a) “ihe, and "oldse beosher™ to thie econ incugh by Western vandards (leat) te ‘reament meted oat BY superiors to GOs of 1oner ‘rank was hash and usally downvight brat Inthis ‘apes Jan's ane force i not minor Tpanese sovety, for once inno “whatever his bintge ot social portion the ton of + nobleman mip be ‘lapped ncrss the face by the son of « peat” an {ne higherrankng ofcors would silent tal or ‘Gherwine humiliate subordinate in fl view of he Titer own ment Such means were also eat 19 in “sealing” disputes between wore techy con ‘otent subordinates and their periotse mater ch asthe acta deployment of aillery o annie —ehich goes seme way to explain the Commis lice demand fer obedence tothe eter ats expente (tac lfcency and th performance of cen tho often caries + chip om ther shoulder when ing ite bate (notte best nceniive for betuvag ‘orally "Wah range factor of jae "4" for even the i Jepaneve squad and "3" for the conacept MING, they do badly In comparison to mos: edher nail ‘der in ASL and most ofthe oppenents enya at parity and often have a one or twe-het “age vantage over tem. The poe ange factor sans ‘one dtfiules under whieh apes oops op teh Fiat most All dr aged at oth thi Ane Japanese soier wes «bad het, probably bec Secainiily sir press love pentyl fchieving skill with the bayonet. Ideally, bay [Practice wes conducted for howe on + daly ba ‘hen opponunity allowed (a the expense of pret) ard ever ad recreational stats. Oni a foarce conwited by the vere speaks favorable “Ripponete radksmanchp" an tional in Parell History ofthe Second World War, Vel. 6, No 1968), and his compliment is made inthe come Adsfensive fire againas US smphibicas landing Wher the Jaane would have pony of god une {which (fie. A Drs haiscn ofc serving il Chinese guerillas in Malays observed tt oni ‘oun ieregulars shee worse han the Japanese. Sri Canty, fring From the hip (se, Joss scum) wa fdvocsted in fore published Ninsigeies fr be Japanese sede. ‘Second a already noted eae, Japanese wei Jenderdhip lefts btw be desis, and mort ola teamed albTop-willing (0 squander te lives ote amen fr very meager iactical returns (despite rime ‘Sur exheeatont so kill as many orion devil a | ponnibl) in banzai charges west Aliod opin | ood defensive postions and povsesing heave poster, While colonels aed above usualy (bt Says) had fail good tac cease and wore le hhtcheaded than their subordinates, they wore n> ‘more able Yo exerie aight concal on ir vol Uinderings in the heat of bate than x player in AS (Sn cenfieniy predict how hie once wil bebe Under fre, fewas Sifu fo comand to prev ‘och iitional behavior onthe Datlteld a te fois, confusion, Timid visibility, dstctions ak [peor communications often provalens. Morecre atkictalkic” radios a8 a sid Uo actial conte were rot widely eveabe oe Japanre: te pic tutfi fora whole Japanese division incleded jot ight adion over and above thse for ai-o-geane Tiss, and few were man-porable in the conte d frequent rapid moves of te tor simulated ASL Althouge walkie aks dil exist inthe DAVIN. thswerenot only searcebat of poor quality and generally omy povecied aginst the damp climate, dus thet Defornance was even wore than Allied equipment. Remeers and mestenger were poor hat receetay suet specially ght ia jungle trai, ad the Comparatively lange 13- oF (S-ran Japanese squad (aad similarly proportioned platoon and company TORE) further bardned afices in tei ateres to contol their comparatively unwieldy formaticn in los teri, “Third, poor Japanese taccal doctrine played a role Altiugh they ha experianced some of the hor fers of 20 century warfare daring the 1904-05 Ruseo-Japmese confit und pid some Upservice to ‘he ttical changes that developments In weapons \echnology deemed imperative, in peace the DA Iagged behind mont of is eneics, The Japanese mil ‘try was not ind the stn ie Great War, bat ‘tg det purtepaion Was nots patialy tratmst- ‘aipeticta ae th copies of Gana oer ‘soni inthe Par East had «positive (2, ping) ‘ther than a negative (and lua) Impact on tne Tapaete people, Tere was mo Japanete equivalent of Verda, the Somme oF Galipountl World War 2 Inthsory, Japanese tactical xine advocated ini ‘raion ght alc, speed und surprise at all times, the miximan ase of deception, bold outlanking ‘movements, atacks on the enemy's rear and the Tach coorirated atacks wb the 44th IMB there leo fndored nthe rock of organizations] aro {ance Ta Bursa, he old AMIN evry, so biter ot Higher vel, aio manifesed itself when the 13th [Naval Guard Fore chose to break out fre Rangoon sve (and afer the TA had gow to demensete is Independence, but by the all paths were blocked. and ‘nly thee of 1200 participants survived. Similar ‘examples om a larper scale include the return of UX Itocpe to he Ors Pninala of Okina ater than Sand sidetby-sive with te A elsewhere, ae the LUN commander's decision to turn Mana, declares sv epen iy bythe IA. into athe Stalingrad atthe oat of 21000 men (and Lerd knows how many ipo civilian). nseame ase, Japanese units eve felused the help of neighboring fomnatons for the take of "honor fr “oldies compassion), paricu- lary if they had euffored beavy Toveee im tying © secure some eusive military objective, as at Sange ‘hat Burma But apwnesecommandes alone were ft to blame for thi station, for like the Bris fry the UA was something of teal organization ‘vith regional crating rhe encouraging aa exces” tive spirit of compeation. Off the batllield, 10, ‘Xparing Jpunese unite had a habit of acing enicying any reraiing spplisn that had wo be lett behind rater than lve tem forthe reliving ail senseless policy given Japan's prefourd logistical ‘weskreier andthe relma starvatin a emis song loops. AS morale disintegrated in 195, is ako manifouod sel in undisciplined for zing that eft nahin fr fllowing units, and forma None would not hesitate 4 eos fo ne anther ‘hen opponturity ported asy hese tative ats were reinforce by the JUA's eathusissr for splinting formations and for saainisining « large ruber of independect voile ‘hich were tow togster asad oe feees for one {peraicn a shor ive harpygruppen ba possessing, rather selfish, Brish-stgl, loyaltie rather th ‘more profesional, Geen, ayrouc10 the good of AL Coupled with cften poor Latin, bud coverage of tet boundaries ee the Tapensse abit of thei ‘reinforcements ite bale piecemeal, thee chara teristics impaired the efficient usage of Forces Armorianillersfinfartry cooperation was aot 4 Sopunees strength wither. Foe the foregeing restone (Gnd peshape bncaure many Japanese unk were ove come by excitement for he batde a he expense of reason and cxttemaly nese sider rer tan on ay tamale eligeees fiver the above, the specific exclusion ofthe Spat om ASi's ld Promotion mer io be ‘xpere, The “Seah” advantages of pans Ele fd Fit Line suas is more a reflection of ther Fert in clove combat he forte gion cnn bleh cena the puns cou erin et he fay oped vce (ey view a irung, which hey someuines condhced os # ve Inge sale ine) and wel hen ke great pis {epee ll wes hee" Night Reson DRM fens isan avo hel sly a wings 9 ‘more cow io eer) pons sel 2 ee ah Tesiest in sending men in ones and tos to de IBernly drow enemy fie (in which ro they wa Acomedeapeniae “The "8" morale fcr of Japanese Ele squacs sil dose ure a on, abou sme endo inay wonder wy "6° snot ore propre th 7 oe the Fim-Line and Sewn Line nds wel lower te wide um ang, compen, Keadentin, wenn pipelines ti et (en. tat opr satya poy in vecewing tous $0 subeat duge) dhe ane o orale ven song apes. Thet si eed ode St length on he sic ofthe tier nd AS Ste wkd expect them wo be exempd frm che reed io'akes PAATE, w be immune fem Disropon, Tom surenie by te Ph method, al fo low cred morale peaaie if Eosteled_ Silly, he Spnste MMs wostnent of LLMC as mem ULTC (nck steady broken themselves) and hie eee feneney to go bersee—wiiha DRM to “Hea of atl dice relsnec relation. Tnely he faasicl rorstanoe and reionce uncer fie spayed by te Japanese tered fran a tunber of fon nie ipa te bushido pit ceranded hat ealering a barep be bre vee {y without compli sopotng a fr of sl dnc ne, Sealy, many Jaane beloved th per Exim indocenation ale gre pena ‘entatiiabe wa io die he's dc in le ard ths be wre x pie jn even inked wo theo to that dea wes ing fea ata preter 0 ‘Gahencr. Third, the Bria tiie of laparese ‘nifty if nce rtet lt sone een cre Chet the Miliary Perl Cv, and demanded mide even fo Jpnese FOWS who subecuey espa fd repaid har ov ies. Pet he fc that the Sperone wold os kl tir om orc thy sccnped suede na powerful Sinan be {aon and gate Ad, Japanese edesion ad trepseinda (he two wer sient synonymous) co “inced mont slr that hei foe were rac infer (ror t brbarane—aad sould be rested “toot and nal. Lastly, rexiral renting fstred ‘rong regimen leyahy ae unit chesion ut aloogh pense seer on Bata boasted “We tthe peeptl as] whe we nt ail oi by ole el Wis vas no aways, lil tue At 28 chews Dapmene mole wat nt sree ad te ery 11137 monte in China a low (at ‘Sewn belize ad qearartines). On Basin by Febniary 1942—beore feinoreemerts arrived Iapanete mone wat wo low tat wowpe were ec tent cr the pre a fase sh Alle iho st Suppor. In Kuma to, motte cllpsed ar the defeats at Kehna ad np in 194 and soy ‘units were difiea to control in the retest. BY January 1945, monle everywhere in Burma beta ‘ask, and was completly desreyed by uve, whet ‘scr increased sigafianly. Ia Chine and ot ‘Okina, the fighting miated tat her: were lini to even the Japante wodier« mental and physical ‘rellience, wile inthe Phlppires elements af the foomer Kiventung Army suffered rapid cops i morale sehen the fay oftheir acts was basally exposed by the Americans move rational un poles Sonal spproach to war All thoes instance demon stated ha, given scien pounding, purely by teavy tombirg, limelhrowers or (ronal b he tse of bayonet charges, even the Japanese would break. Nenatheles should be remember that hit process took longer o werk against ihe parse tat ‘ost ober troops, aed their morale recovereénply (son Ratan or—however biefl-—ia Bora ae 1944} given tine and oppo. Ti popelar view of de Tapers vokir’s oar cy unbreakable morale as been colored by the Aiubilty of « compwraively small number of per onal who tefured to surrender ttl wall aher 1974 But this hae drawn attention away from he Cdher aide of oo prove enn Eval the lig eal ofthe Japanese, draft-dodiging in warkine wit ‘ot unknown, and there were aso desertions, abe le tn thoes fem Western trie, incomplete and not dilly eoape tulle with tees for aber armies ia that wed Compilation, cetera and ates donot always cote fie, bat at's rough guide they ae intresting. 1089, the 669 Iapanote defectionsldecervons rep cuted abowt 9.71% of Bish desenionr in 198, TOKS Japanetedesenionscefeciens equated to aba 6 59% thos for Brian and 1.55% of Germany the fiat seven months of 1944 thers mere 20% Sapancse “Tower” fo this cave, o about 20.25% of Bhusn's and 1.71% of Germany's (both te lt percentages ealulnes pro rata from the year’s fi Tre) US Amy figies are ueavalabe, bt over ese rts ted oe leas as high 5 ose fo the Brash mary. “There is seme tvidence tha, fn he longterm, te Jucer of braality within the ZA, far frm promatig ‘it concen or aisepline, actually undreied bos Inially, al Least most soldiers accepted this bal tegime aed wanton meget hat may tt not al) terior lapsete officer aiuplayed towards her mes {she gnu! pretogaive of superior rn. Cen many NCOs—the main protagonist in the pital fiom of Topancee peraeel-—toved the eta fle bocauae (in pevectime at leas) ofeted an see stem the grinding poveny of ra Japan and provide plenty of subordirates to pamper them or ac 3b Alc viet on wher they coals vent her ange ‘The Inter were conditioned, and expected 9 vet ‘heirs on we ener. But Tapan'sdectiing foruns, ‘he often senseless bray inflicted on tem from shows the fact that hon supper ran Tow the eee fe plorty in food while tir men starved wd he {radial exposure of Japanese propaganda at # ste Df lies, coupled with the slow realization tht Allied military prowers and industrial power bad been fronly Uerestinaed, slowly te say at Jape tore, breaking down the power of offices ané be see with which thei men regarded them. The tens, fragile officer man elaionstip grvaly changed (aso punly dic wo the decline i officer quay) end lear wns often replied by contempt andthe more essing concer of finding fod Perhaps he rai of. Sapmnese cfieee man raltinshipe was reached 98 [New Guinea wien vessels caying the op tes 0 salety (vel fed while tei men starved) thew san Jing er wounded ea overbour caning the ection by sea Tlowever atypeal ard Localized, uth ect Sco he myths abou iscipline inte A.ASL io slate the rales in hat, when 9 Japanese MMC fils MC ki flipped trove « lbver power factor with wnenpaired morsie—the ‘oe of «few men being of litle concem to Shani ‘waves ino lange + agund, Only Fier blows wl make the unt crack, wit he 2rl Line and Corsi igeas suffering reduced mole and ether penaies ‘This need for an epponent wo literally cip-away at Japanese MMC sete them apart rom othr foros in ‘he gune (ough is exeasio o her nationalies ‘ASL could pers be sified). But such testment i eerved exclusively forthe Japanese oeaptre the “fel of the howling, seemingly nsteppable groupe of seifstyled neo-sairura The high levels cf unt ‘okescn enjoyed bythe Japanese fr most of ke wat ‘Prflested in ASL by thoin-2 DRM tothe Ratfield Integrity check DR, while the gradual decline in Japanese ELK simulates eie waning forunes over Ihe period 1940-45 and its effet on discipine and roa (pl the necenty of wing Testhar-expei- need weops) Benefiting from their sucess (a lest acueall) in China the gh postin Japanese fla ad LR pales the early suczeses aginst he West Allis in the PTO, but as further victories tluded tiem and enemy preponderaace became Increasingly obviou, Japanese arrogance and opt> ‘nism timel to despair and pram sitcom. By 1044 {be forces ix Chinn und Marcha milked of their est oops-—wvere ina hopeless postin w west the tagected Soviet cffensve, andthe troops Krew tt ‘The varton ir Tnpuness LR vals, based cn 8c=- taro date and cation, reflects this terminal deine In Japan's miiary forunes and its effect on the trop inthe i UNIQUE TRAITS In ASL's published scenarios the Japarese frees sally have x higher SAN value than thelr oppo ‘et, und fs DYO soonaroe the SAN can be sed a If the “noma” cost, wo simulate the historical ‘haeseexusiaim for depoying snipes (or, ore securely, "shapshacten” a improvised sniper, for ‘he vt majoity wee nether eained ner equipped 10 be tre snipers ane were meray infntcymen wo hid inilrsed nt or stayed behind in good inne posi. Hans to eabse tebe}, The common “harpshoat” we often more a nuisance than a danger, sn own, by one Japanese soldier the siege of Koha tn ‘Buriasho missed «Bris hatalion CO siting on a tre stp in brod daylight from 10D yards, only 10 be dee wi tees round by » Bish soldier even though his target was hidden up a tee. The real Japanese sniper was beter cameuaged, had tle- scopic sight his ile (which clarfied rater than Imapniied targets by clearing away haze ané other ‘dntmcsions to ake object stand oat batter, concen teal ratens and perips even binoculars. This far ‘more fomnidableindividul was mach bade to deal with; on Ckinawa one sniper killed of woundet 22 Americans before being eliminaced, ad another, in rms sot eight efGcers ever a dice week period dnd eventually escaped despiue vigorous counter ‘measures. The super or sharpshooter was 8 particu Iily economical and effective pley for ying down ‘ed eroing the strength of cremy uni, at demon ated to persion on Bata in 1962, along de placement of supers there was found Io be "Tepe ‘our ardthar enabled the Allies to conduct soos {sl miper-unts (ven dyeamie wa used to fell the tes concealing then), Such Aled “victories” could ‘be ymhi: on Time in February 1942, all but 78 of {630 Japaneae color parachuted in to snipe athe reireaing Australians were killed, bu hey had Aelyed their foes log enough for other Japanese "oot off thse eee! and force them to sit ‘set. hn Bota to, saved “sniper” were encoun tered and in February 1945 over 100 wer liminieg in ne aes betweer the Welaung and Met roads soe, ‘The *.2" Concealment drm and enhanced {IP ‘apablton given to the Dapanoss inant, aad the ‘Somatic HIP swatded io Japanese pilboxes, sin late the excellent camouflage shill tat became a Hallmatk of the DA. Positions were neil aways 50 tell concealed sto be completely andeletale even ew fee became “invisible” (a a veer Apmerely they lee thee concealment sis fom the Chinese prior to 1941, who even tied flingo 0 the us of eutle to hide Wem from ai attack. The Japatee sll used heavy vehicle camouflage despite ‘enjying almost ttl si siperory in 1941-2. This ‘ai Tor camouDage wet allthe more dangercas given ‘he formile ratte of Japanese plo. and wet defesive wonks—the Japanese ha the aby to con- ttn almost nvuinenble banker wih inerocnec ing tameledaop underground fom uhlover mate {M5 wer locally avalible, and these tod wo the fll the Allies bet effons in trying to reduce them. ‘Because Japanese military persomel (and cvil= ians) were not ayppored to lt themver be cp. ture, they received almost no ister ia howto benave i tht actually eccurrd. Consequently ey null revealed, willingly. moch useful formation thd only rasly was torture or other *pareaseio eset. A umber of Japanese ever Becane, in um, Imerogaot for the Alles oreterwiseolered thet services, and for these ratons non Soviet ntencaa tient of Jpanete prtcners in ASL receive 2 DRM. (The less sule-horee ks electives san methols tended 1 harden captives int further passive resttrce, since they conf the percep [ens gained by the Japusose fom thet on 2 ‘Allied propaganda.) Ths rw dou helped asiurge te feelings of put that a Japanese soldier may have felt for being talen alive, Given that very few of the ‘500000 vc so Japanese POWs in Soviet hands evee Tecumed to Japa (as late asthe 1970s, 300000 of these ve sll Unacenunted fer the specie exslsin fof the Soviets from thir modification to the Tieropstion rl in ASL spear jute. However, {000 Aled weatmen dil no awaa guaranice mck, fubmirsive Japanese POWs, in New Zealand, 240, Japanese pritonert objected to performing labor Autis in Febeuary 1943 and auacked their guseds ‘With stones, eaving 48 Japanese dead and'74 woud: ced: at Cow im Austalia, about 1000 Japanese POWe crchortrated a mace breakout in August 1348 tdci 234 of mn dead (ibe rent ern qe respira ‘Aas, tne specific ineluson ofthe Japanese inthe No Quarer/Maeiacre rales needs Ble explanation, ‘ive that ig jug he btavior of expired top by ter own fay unigue, se of vals, and that the fend was considered to jusify he means in acting so ‘aly. by wining the war auch wanagrstcnt from dillized behavior would 20 have 10 be pn ished), There vas lille real ieenive to stow cam passion, despite bushido having also contained 2 Eftecvolonce” ethic that advocated weating Sefeioé {ues chivalroualy (his nd been convene ered ‘oat of te neo-besico decre of the ate 190 ane oth centres) Varicus reasors have boon sugested {explain Jopeneteatrociton on and off the tile field which, for space reasons, cannot be dscns here, Sufice 1 say tha he Japanese behaved sell towards their POWs in the 1908-05 war against Rass and aginst the Gomeane in 191418, and tae during World War 2 the Allies (eciprocated with sometimes equal cruelty once stones of Japanese hhandiwere pot out For the tke of balance. mas. ‘lho be sted that some Fapanese pertonel shee individually oF cllecively-—ieated thee capves ‘wel hoe on lage scale wcaded ike POW camp Jn Saigon (ueronly te of 2000 mates ed, oth from natural eases) and the gvod treatment meted ‘out to the Woueded members of the 50h Indian Parachute Brigade left behind ate ttle of San shakin Borns in 1044, come nf whom were even 9 hosptlined—a rare “uxury” for most Japanese le Alene thee ence, Morcaver, sve ifthe merit of Jnrtege bombing ae let sc, the Wester Allis (much less the more untesiained Soviets) hardly emerged from Workd War 2 smelling of ross: hey ‘oo upon oeenson took hostages, ered pines taometimer clans, Whi the Axis corainly behaved appallingly towards conquered pense, i am antinsorgeney comtext a least the Allies id ico in varius places before, daring and alter WW2 (bit ‘Ades, Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cha, edo (Ching land, Laie Arteria generally, oc Tiket—0 tame’ few). Although 27% of Allied POWs in Japanese captivity ded (compared to only 4% in Gena. ad alan hands, resent revelaios about the mass-sarvation—through wif negee at less some ofthe cases—af Gemans in Allied POW Sampe afer the war ended showe Unt bray and Inifecnce to suffering among the vanquished wa Dy mo mveans jus apanese, or Axis, tat Final, i ‘ould also be tome in mind atthe Fapasese raed their cwn soldier and civilian litle heey, forte ‘welfare ofthe individual (especially those of lowly ‘ank) was considered of hile consequence In Japa ‘ese thinking “Tn view ofthe comment immediately above, the inter in ASL allowing Japancar pemeanel te cit hara-kir (or more plitly,sepputu) aad eectvely “self-destruct” ae also necessary to prove vor of a faidy unique and ering hind, Wounded troops, specially, were rogue as an impediment to {ary operations and, just a personnel were often py chology presuied into ining mize unis 80 thore wae #batlfield convention of et becoming 4 Durden 1 others dough sickness or wounds. Trad only, of course, suede vas synoeymous Wilh T ditembowelment (hara-kiri meaning "belly liga") ABhough rove modem methods were ux fy used In World War 2, Japanese sles ae few Scruples abcut killing wounded personne or them selves to avoid capture INFANTRY WEAPONS “The exert of Japan's oly i ging to war wih the USA (eve lowing forthe ars precesptin wih bing to Sf ier fin) can be guoged by {ie face tin 194 ap prea ba ration the armaments tat Americ, Te sene te entre ‘liste, manufacture, achieving jo 44 f US mor (er mopar 08 af eal ne toe, [AA amnion and 47 of er tne preston ‘When Japinsse weapons minahcure pated erie: inthe wart hel equalled 108 ef Arca ot pat Even in pence-ine lapan vas el race {nly in up copper, ine sn mice and depended fon moees ef eventing ese (ineding a a mos ther foed). Thanks othe Aled wae of ton eran Tepere che ping (ae whith on ‘est must g010 US submarine), By 1983 he in tty was ening to a hal for anf rar trl, ‘mont of the ammaments that were prodiced wert ihe sanded in open op litring the orn Noo, Sd ne national ict was well below subsinet level is toni ut, whereas UN destoyereaptie trcoring Aled sony inthe Meieraera dng Ske Gren War someimer commited sepa ee “ong” merctantnen to Uo acs, fr most the 1941-45 war few aval lficrs showed serio ‘Scan to play "Mabe Hen tit sn nes {We cago ship, peerage oe 0 rh the Tate of Tsisina wih avert carers. -phng Irncen the UA and LN tardy bebe! mit, sa ‘olnt pene over he locaton o Japan's iru [Shun and steady shrinking siping ererecseen iedto fst ihe areng the tp bret In depen, the LIA wat forced bald and man i en sa tepplyseentoos with no lp wbstaoerr fom TRL an appaling wase of arco rexunes These Hunde were compounded y the fa apa tnchied eve han 1D ofthe coviian scent10 vill othe Alcs an, tke the Germans, vase ‘er lle trough poor coordination and unneaes- sary duplication of effon. The net result wat tht ‘while esch GT in the PTO war mopped by an aver fg Of four oes of equipment, each Tapunese soldier he ast two pounds availble. Even inthe Bataan Campaign. Jnpaneseaicrft Bombe were sometimes inprevisel fem ion pipe with ills ef vp fam tmachincry, clocks of automobile parts—and even ‘were sometimes drepped instead of bombs. Thus. while Tapan mobilized more infantry ‘visions han te USA the doling quality of wal ‘le petsonnel was aggavate bythe geawing nab Ay of her indus to equip, cloth, feed and supply then: behind the veneer of mimbers sa increas ‘gly ramuhacllewarmachine ‘Given this (uormeatively) lage 13 o¢ 15-man infantry squads, the low "4" FP factor of even the bs Japanese MMICs in ASL spears tobe tmgener= ‘as, but in realty the Jepancee solders fears ‘epuuton concealed condderabe hanicas, ard the ‘woeder stat he achieved es mich a he cid again his bater-eqipped foes. The abeence of any sac sith SMGs oF atomutc rifle Gustifying « higher ‘repower far inthe “5°19 78" range) ts Oe, Slory, for even with captered equipment (and. up 1140, imponed European machine pistol of varout ype) the Japanese used such wespum in Combet ‘only on linted sews. Jpan's own Type 100 SMG ‘models were mot purticaay 2054, and poor quality ammunition heey helped, with only 17500-23000 (rer made (ures vary). This was too litle, ov Ie, ‘de Japan's bao oftie SNAG ease Of preduetion and sutabty for jorge wirare and ftherclos-combat—which made ita worthy and ‘overdue euccesce 1 th bayendt. Japanese sevelop rent of SMGs oaly teyan 1933 ad proceeded $0 slbvly, due toa lack of effical enthusiasm, thatthe only large-tesle ute of SMG in Japancce hands appears to have been inthe parachete operations ‘gains the Javan aifields in 1942 (were they were ‘sed to good eet. For thi omiasien fra the ae nal of Span, hoe tps paid dary Inthe ral cf Sit leading (ie, satanic) rifles Japan was even for: deiceat; belted atempe to Copy captured US MI Ganinis vere frustaced by nealturgses! prob- lem sl nly Tee dosen sacs erample ie ol before the war ended ‘Even with convenonal rifles the Japanese folder had problems, ard large numbers of expired types ‘nud to be ised to angmert indigenous stock Althoogh smal arms ammunition vas aoe usually i Son supply, logsueal problems were compounded by the change of calibre from 6.5mm to the more power 7.7mm in 1999 (at Iason pap), 3 that there ere no lest tin sever Fapancse rifles designs in service, spread between these wo ealbees, wih si different (Ve, non-interchangeable) exveidget required fer der al Tn ain, localized bat fly ‘canon wie was mide of capenred Brith, Us, Dutch ard Chinese small arms. The typical Jypanese Mei Arta’ ils were bescaly copies of he 1 German 1898 Masser hoary and sng ut eng fed awkward weapon to handle in jangle terrin, and eadowed with many poor features—especially the “iit in eoedactng apd re dae to the generally ‘aller suture and reach of Iapanese people com pored to Caucasians (ihe Flipinos had Semlarprob- Jens with Enfield and Speinpield rifles). while he chine vertone were ile heavy and diffice te sim. The 65mm round, moreover, rarely iaficied faa injuries G@cconing 19 Aled sues). Later ie the war, ome less fortnate,lower.quaity,sqvids received mach creer weapons made {fom poo mate Flal>—which were probably more dangerous 1p he ‘wert th age. Only Japa surerer prevented the mast-employment of mooth-how Black powder sss fing eel bars ‘et, in some ways, those Japanese soldiers pos sessing ony fears could court themselves 1eky, for the 33-9 MMCs represent the dregs ofthe mn power available: “pressed” civilian including females) ike the Okinawan BacieéHome Guan rear ‘ea oops, shipwrecked persone, and hospital pallens in varying sates of physical inte - ‘marly tured oat of ther bed, all ent sno action With Tne any sraining and beandshing whatover “weapons” wete a had On Guam in July 1944, some “troops” (for want of 2 beter word) faced American arllery and mortars with jst hackers, ‘atoll bat, brake bos, pitchfork end grenade) in Burm, grenades gradually predominated asp les of oer weapons and muriuors dried wp, Some ‘aparesecenserip unis had only makeshift beeboo ‘spear at Shri on Okinawa the UN's 37th To Maintenance Unit (wiped ovt in Nay 1943) lacked ‘ot only comb tanzg but had only enough niles for one man in thee, while on Lizon a company af ‘nw US toupe were broken by th bunsai charg of 43s eight men—of whan caly two had weapons. The Japanese were, naturally avare oftheir deficient infarieyfreoower. Cn Basan in 1942 the men of he (65in Beigude foh dha ie wae the job ofthe MC, not the riflemen, to fre on the encmy—esuling in ‘the poor volume of fie Jn View of allthis, the Jepanese obiesion with lore combit was « asessty as mach as « tdiion, ‘ua even here the Arsak's weight and gest eng) {ith a particalay Long bayonet, 100) ade it un ‘ieldy na confined space. Nor was the sword an ‘eal replucemert. More than anything cic, use of he ‘sword teed the melieva origins ef, and legacies ‘within, the FA, for wae ll hee pi a lav 61853 snd i renee and myetiqne that this weapon evoked emong te Jepancse: Some swords were centuries ol! and hd teen passed down through succestve genera tions, Thy were the very sel othe semua aed vir. ‘ually worshipped ilatraing the “aneasy ain of ‘bamboo spear and modern technology” ard the “peculiar amalgam of medivalattades and modem satel” that wae ao eharstreic ofthe UA. (Tbe ‘tention of reginettal colors andthe Japanese sol ers" perception of the regiments Mag-sall as the equivalent of + Roman legions sscred engl ae fur- ther examples of this reluctance to circard the old ‘ways) The swords wielded wilh 20 mosh relish by Tapas effcers a NCOs (i on the COM caver an) ‘yer, als, two-edged weapons m more tha the Lier al sese. There ae aceaunte af the vet of eword ‘wounds, belt mona, diarming thir areata Dnkruptey of usirg swords in confection with not ver effective nor reliable pista, parsulary aga Seasoned. Allie troops, can bes be lured by a Incident in uma when a berserk Japanese office climbed eto s British tink, killed the cormarder su gotise, After lengthy single, daring which nether crewman died, the unweleome gus ws finally cspatced with nin bles, Had that offst ‘matched his bravery with goo! sense, he would have ‘arid explosives, hand grenades or even s decent firearm wih which wo see « mone favre ou coe; te exchange rte ef one oie for to alc Hal waned sels) was os gl oe given nest Jeers wer an increasingly rare cin a JTaparese hand grenades, to, were less than idea and conained poor explesive, thus sdverely afc {ng fragmentation and relying more cn ie and Has for efi (excep forthe “sich” grenade, a cre bet ‘more lethal version ofthe German "poato-masher" type) Many rifle grnader on Bataan wer, morover, dbs, ard all Japan's grenades had erratic fuses, an por torageharuly improved relabity, Tests by the Allies on captired sick grenades reveled thatthe zee wore so emai de to thw age af the compe nen tht they often exploded as 200% ashe fae mas ‘igntes. tr 1943 a potery grerace, similar Io the German wooden cr sonerse evsos Tite-wt types, ‘was introduced by the LIN to alleviate etal sho ges Othen were inprovted Ir woven banbeo ot ‘ld ailery shes (bviously, lewd). Bat or ene grim purpose Japanese grenides sficod hey were the preferred method of commiting sicie, and Japanese pewonnel normally kept the lst ene for themselves and even “share” One between 8 fe Individuals when neces. Pride of place among Jepan's poosest wespone ‘mt go to her machine gone. I Ads Hier hs bean feseribed as the Allies” greatest general, hen Center Gretna ae i Teagues can be regarded asthe Allis trainee their adoption f the sieedy Pench Totes mectanir, coupled with tl fe explicable reusal vo conser beter (orig dg, Jef he DA and UN Gite their ialisn ales) wih range of MGr ecllectvely rfered to 8 an "up possesting cacction of amigues” and at “sane the most abysmal designs ever 10 see daylight. Considesng that Japan wat amore the first 10 we MGs in action with eownd tactic thi was eather irons: To make matters wore, the Japanese wok 10 ‘estan ele ciferem MG cannes trough te ‘xa all of which suffered fom imperfect eachinng (by Western standards) during production "an snweleome by-product of industal in tersive subeonieting (with the wet vel te of backsnreet woreheps). Ancter ease of te hh incidence of misties was the carp of te PTO's ‘ate affecting the powder (which could also aie smoke candles to fll o igre). Poor packaging ad rage was the rele, hemtialy vealed bones ee son existnt ad waterprcolpaper rarely wel. Far thamore, many of the companies in Japenese a tions a withthe greaaies, were simply inferior thir Wester eguivalets, ad inthe main were che let nates. As eveuthete supplies rn on, ewe of subsites like pigs « Lubricant oly ade the Ist of woes, jms and misfire. Tom a coc viowpeis, Fpanese MCs 401 ely looked wrong fa pesfurmed pstly; the Year Type LMG" compl: ‘ated feed mechanism could at cope vith + ap ROP and needed oiled ond ener proper ren round extation, and 1 guaranie evens mei o ‘abil the power offs San carldge hale reduced (such that could not tse the fds nae ima. fle, anmariton except in axremi) wih aca ‘mepending deterioration in bale performance. Th “Taberatery” mcntaliy of Japanese (among ote) Aesigners relying on led ound ensived that under field conditions thee heeame excllortdt-callecon 1 farther promote jariming and acecetse compe: rem wear. Yet te aging, Yeat-11 Type'srepas rent, the Type 96, never superseded ite preeeeer as tupply never equalled domand—and itil required non-standard, low-povered cartilges (led {€coare). in aden, the ow power telescope igh and the bryoret vee exravigare “estas” f dot fal uly tat Tapan’s ailing inusties could tse done without having to rosie. The bayonet sa the weapon resemble a gan! eat-apenee. ‘The Tye 96's scliary improvement over the Year-11 Tye ‘was the quidk-ckange barr. The Type 99 LMS Finally dispensed witht need for oe toends, bt ‘at mther heavy forts ole and, deste apearing 1959, was bail in relatively small numbers: by delat it war Japan's bot LMG™—bat demanded & te, imlss, nenstandad 77m sound With heavier MGs, the old Year-S Type (ake “Tashio 3") of 1914 vintage was the root of alle quent mechanical woos in Japenere MCs «copy of the Hotchkiss, bu. rechiered forthe smal, not lupering 6.5mm round which (unlike the beter shaped French 8mm Lebel round) compounded Sxtnction problems oven vith ald wns, it had & lov ROF (hence the Allies “Weoepecker" nick fume) and the 3C-found sip-feed (as well as the heavy 172.0h ipod) weve bud festres. Like theme ATR, at lest thee men were necded just 10 ineve the thing. The Tcfram versie, the Type 92, eee the “aandard” Ispancse MMO—in hae at leese—vith al te Year'3 Type's fal, bur wit 2 beter long-range performance. To augment this Advantages ihe Japanere alee weed a 7mm Lewis (MG labo tyed the Type $2) wih, ofcourse ifr xt—incompatible—immunition to the Type 92 Wondpecker", anda Tighter version of the later, sled the Type 1, was inrodaced in 1942 with « ‘tangeable bere but Ging the 12000 Fines earvidge wed inte Type 99 LMG. The Type Tulle the Type 92 Woodpecker, only 1 (Cer dan replaced) dhe Year Type. tn he TMG ‘encgory, the 13.2mm Type 93 Vas a copy of « Hothlisy AANG with a 30-round box-magazine. Nat supiingly the Taper ater stereo ony the US Browning denges to obtain « bei-fod MG; ‘nln de cane 7. Jem, 127oun and 13.200 ver Sens appeared (albet mosly for aircraft ese) wah a fen (offically) ssilahe for round, deployment. Conquer, the ever rsooefal Janez eeipped ‘uch weapons from Weck or unserviceable aircraft and improvised mountings for « ground role vith, Set sey come sees (ermastzr's nightoare, a host of captured Seapns (ice the Bren, BAR, Duch-owned Maen, Ghiese-ult Maxim and ZB, ad othe: types) were Ppetnd into service For all hese reasons the “I” eskdown nanber of Jepanese MGs ir ASL should ‘me #0 surprise and my even be pecions, ‘Compared w te oer pacizipants of World Wat 2, he Japanese wem bay equioped with infantry held AT weapons, as the “Support Wespont ‘Nicmert Char” for DYO scenarios indicates. Only tbe emergence ite) of the Tank Hares Hero in tee tar Tad ply rem hi ap shonco ike eves the poody equipped Tilia, the Japanese have no “atonal” ise of ATK based on MMC purchases ir DYO scenarios, fad playert mast pay for such weapons anf they tres lange ordnance st vehicles Apart from ite eight 20mm Type 97 ATIC ed a savage recoil Dor sents ané shoulder conrelled traverse which facet hard to hi moving aret; 2, not eurpesng- Jy, 4 wae unpopular and ately vcd in ston. Ths ‘is probably jet as wel givens inaity to deal ‘ih even the ely versions of the Swart, let alone the LeekGiaet or Sherman tank. Dette « ROF least equa vo (sources vary) the #18-1000, the Japanese ATR AS ‘he game with 2 "1 tiherthan the formers "2" ROP factor to reflect he verse floc of the heavy resol andi other draw tucks, Moreover, it suffers higher breakdows pnaliy and sfurter ROF reduction if manned by 3 id or HS rather han “prope?” rew counter, sim intng the fact that there weapons were urvally mame by specialist woos ‘Apt from the ATR ard other, improvised, smal calre veapone seed in the AT roe, pan (for want ‘Lanytang bot!) relied en a hodge page of "had- I” deviees wo contac Allied anmor—ike "Mowor ‘cocktilt, the ineffective Type 3 shaped-charge frenade, the somewhat rarer plate cyanie-t88 featcs (ome inprevined fen bates) fo inepech tite enemy APY erews or force them to ball out (Which were developed from a rare instance of Cenman cocperaton) aad the magnetic Type 99 AT ‘More elfesive vere buoby tapped obstacles tnd the "lunge mine”, a large SCW mounted on 8 Tome pole and used like a haman-powered panzerfaut, which on making contac wih a solid Ghject would deatry iis uses to, Unlike many Japan AT weapons, ts las device could destoy aay Alind AFV ase inthe PTO. Less effective wer ‘or aillery ale eed w others unarmed enol deployed in foxols or bunkers to wait an fnamy vehi dnving overtead (fra te the Ales ated to destroy the formidable Japanese bunkers ty crushing tho from above with tanks), AT shells suff ozo walls as makeshift AT gun, bared gaso- [ne drs and the man version ofthe Soviet ine dog (ace the ASL Arnal 1990 For datale of the ‘mine yp’ n desperation, Japanese oldies wih ven withomt Weapons would sometines swarm over ‘Mled AFVe and steep to lock the vision devices, Sire into vision slits or el inside. Not curprsingly, Atypical “exchange tate” for anh hunters against |ARVE protected by nfatry (a at Meck in Burma in March 1045) would be about 200 Iapanese losses Fors orzo Allied unk ‘Comparison of tae DYO “Support Weapon Alloment™ cht shows that the Japanese payer has ‘significant edge over his oppnents only inthe ight tomar catagory whichis no surprising, given that the type Japanese infantry batalin had between 27 and 36 of thete weapors—whereas the most ge ‘ror Allie alloenton wat 12 foe the Briish and then only tt the mont fevred four company TORE. ‘ed by but few uns carly in WW2) However, ASL the margin of Japanese ight morar superset is fll more theoretical then real beesose he effecive- ‘nat of tach wall-e weaponry sat bos palchy- [At anges between OD and 200 Yards te Japanese ‘Type 6 mora actully fired grenades (which as we hhave son, were lose than pesfet), while at ranges betwen 130 aad 711 yards shelly were used. The rahe pula isi ASL nicely eeflea ths the WP round wat a grenade hence the 1-5 hex range) while the take round was 4 thell (ange of 3-10 hex), laid the mandaony we of grenades at a 1-oF 2hex ‘age when fing WP 0: IE is smalated by the low ‘ced ROR. ince Taganese grenades were me-fuzed father than impact fused (and this bad no were ‘Capability she game trac) ad required the aac ‘mer. of & propeliant container befor fring, bth of twhich slowed down the rate of observed fire, alancod gsi ite poor features, the Type 89 hed ‘cacelen range for ls weight compared ois Fercign ‘equivalents ance Japanese designe had ken pain Gnelodingrifing the tbe) 0 ave thei moras the heaviest project for the ghtest propeat charge (nly the heavice Polish 46mm and Soviet SOmm Iypes outranged "The largersalibre Japanese morars included in ASL are the more common, “atandar”, examples; in the cae of te Simm and ran weapons they Wee fent some ofthe beer (and Ligh) members of Inrgerfaly. Why both 8lmen and Om calibre, swcte adopted bepgan endeitanding, and ery lls Armes the poor coordination and haphazard approxch ‘of Japanese weapons procaremceat. The effects on ogitios were, necdles tna), unfortunate. The ‘Dynan Year Il Type was a heavy centapion totally Uusaied to tae PTO"s train which effered ao ava luges over the smaller, newer, and lorger-anged French or US dO (or even he Brash S-inch) mo tar, gvcn tha the Later was #0 pagent say Ite {or te Jerarese weapon, Net inca in th coun mix alse are few Japanese morars that saw retive- Iy lite use: the Bram Type 99 inlended for pars ‘tovp or command type actions, the UN's endl. ‘made Bienm Type 3 which wice baseplates salvage fron 9omm Type 94 oF $7 monars(ather instance of non standanizaionicoope-tion beeen the ITA ‘xd UN), ad the improved designs of 1945 con rising light smoothbore tubes fixed 10 wooden leks hres fred just once, using black powder as 2 ropulant and wore as nherenly wseramiiendly at ‘bey were leacarste), The Japanese also ved wha ‘ver capured equipment they could find ammunition for, and althgh the employment of moras was ‘earcted 10 non deme jungle tran, thsi compar lve Highises, Inherent simplicity, ease of operaion tnd of maintenance made them panicuaty poplar With the Jepances troops, Whereas most aries ‘garded monare a faily accurate weapons, the Japanese quickly won 4 feputation for using them ‘vith neat sil. Their enthusiasm for mortars (pei- ape rivaled only by the Soviets) was juntas wel fiven the steady waning aley, amor and alr sp Pert avaable eae Allied numerical and qualitative {epesioriy bepan to make il fal Wille they are no weapons per se i shou ao bementionod here tat ihe PV cf wench, plboes nu tunnels (wel as of caves for 194445 sna. ios) is halved for the Japanese player. This shows thek rome al cnmcting irrcats defenses, while their igher mine and wire SPV refecs tne peeen cast of hese iters (oe agey logistical asin). ORDNANCE, Like mos italian ordaance, Japanese artillery pisces (almost without exception) resembled, or even frere museum exhibits from the Great War and by West standids long two, belay age hore drawn or (inthe case the heavier guns) towed by slow ‘orarmored isctors. Japan avoided the time asd ‘Sxpence af keeping sleet of foreign design by py ing fim Geman Krupp and then French Sekneicer products which, generally, sffleed for use in te hiner theater.’ On the positive side, Japanese ort tance ofa piven calibre wat usually lighter, with » Slay o¢ eer varge tun is foreign eqivalets— although not necestanly by a margin that was ac tally vee) sgaficaat. In adton, Japanese fir con- two ogeipmott (i rights and range Hinder) were of {00d to excellent quality (AA guns exespred) fuhough ia mest eases no bat than Westere Ips Most sources praise the rare Tigh 70mm T3pe 2 infec grin peli was cay © move and ‘conceal, and was one of the best weapons of sie evermade ‘On the debit sie, Japanese ordnance retained cbrolee fetore ks ial or "divon” spades (Oat ‘metal sakes harmed ru We ground wo aes ie {un}, which slowed down posticn changes and pay ‘lft the eehsnced motaity thatthe relatively low trcight of Iapancae any promod Japan vat sae ‘ow w adopt nade feaues Ike muzze-bakes (© redice the reo) or split rll permiting grester Inrel elevation), the later fist appearing om the 105mm Type 14 Feld gun delivered in 1925 [Moveover, copying te Pench Sener designs was ‘unforumate, for their sophisticated resol system ‘Seman higher macofacaring tolerances and st ‘rds of mcncrance (apecilly on the 75mm Type ‘90 eld gun) tan Japan could acheve. Tac lip co ‘irution of Japanere ordnance sempoanded mates, Iading to recoil malfonctone or eer files (et malted in ASL by the 1)" breaccown narbers en the 75mm Type Wand 10Saum Type 92 cannons and the 150mm Year-4 Type howitzer when firing at txtreme tangs or neat the limit of traverse. The DA's AA guns were cbakte by Wesiem standards (rth an inferior performance) because it fotsnly ‘fen beter wespori— refased to adope the fame toms). Tapanere gone had lower safety factors thn fr sign weapons, which psrly explains the forme be: {er perfonnanceto-veigh ator. The HOS Type 4 field howitzer was crudely finished, wale the ‘15mm Type Amn gum was “virtwally hand-built” fiom pai that needed extensive machining, Some “Toms Type 92 guns captured by the Amereans cn Bataan hid non-nterchangeable small pats, forber revealing the patchy qunlty of Japanese erdhance anefacoring. Dut petape the genet weakness Jagan’ ariery lay in ats AT pans, which lacked ay penetsative power. Although versatile (lhe 37mm "Type 94 prebly caw more actin a infancy sp fo raher dan as an AT weapon, thre guns wer the piel prodas of designers who wseied bir [AT rgaiements onthe bass of thea own AFVs. The ‘xselent rights on the {Tm Type | gun were m0 fea state for inadequate performance or lac fombat debut and general ray. The fallate 1 po fhce srething more powerfl was a ajo Blinder,