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ISSUE 1

1. SANNO DEVI V. BALRAM 2007, ACJ 1881 (MP) DB.

Equivalent Citation:  2007 ACJ 1881

In The Madhya Pradesh High Court

Decided On: 10 March, 2005

Sanno Devi

v.

Balram

Judges/Coram: S Jha, A Gohil.

Subject: Criminal

Acts/Rules/Orders:

 Constitution of India - Article 32

Disposition: Petition : Appeal Allowed

5. The case of Union of India v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , is held to be no longer good
law by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Bhagwati Prasad , wherein it has been
held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the application for claim of compensation in
respect of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle depends essentially on the fact
whether there had been any use of motor vehicle and once that is established the Tribunal's
jurisdiction cannot be held to be ousted on a finding being arrived at a later point of time that it is
negligence of the other joint tortfeasor and not negligence of the motor vehicle in question.
Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judgment we hold that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to
entertain the dispute.
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2. UNION OF INDIA VS UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. &. ORS.

Equivalent Citation: AIR1981SC344, [1981(42)FLR192], 1980LabIC1367, (1981)ILLJ193SC,

(1981)1SCC568, [1981]2SCR52

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition No. 3804 of 1980

Decided On: 22 October, 1997

Union Of India.
Vs.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. &.Ors.

Judges/Coram: S. B. Majmudar, M. Jagannadha Rao

Subject: Civil

Acts/Rules/Orders:

 Constitution of India - Article 32

Disposition:
Leave granted in the SLPS.

It is stressed for the appellant that because of the specific reference here to the insurer, owner and
driver, an award cannot be passed by the Tribunal against anybody else. In our view, the second
part` of Section 110-P extracted above is purely procedural when it refers to the specification of
the amounts payable by the insurer or owner driver and has no bearing on the scope of the
jurisdiction red by Section 110(1) upon the Tribunals. That question has to be decided by
interpreting the plain words, "arising out of the use of the vehicle" occurring in Section 110 (1)
and is not in any manner controlled by Section 110 (B). The scope of the jurisdiction is clear. In
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Shanti Mishra 1975 (2) SCC 840, this court stated that the
provisions in Chapter VIII of the 1939 Act contained a law "relating to change of forum". It was
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specifically held that the "jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal
is constituted and the filing of the application before the Tribunal is the only remedy available
for the claimant". It was again held in Gujarat State RTC vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai 1987 (3)
SCC 234 that Chapter VIII provided for an "alternative forum" to the one provided under the
Fatal Accidents Act for realisation of compensation payable on account of motor vehicle
accidents.In our view, the Tribunal is clearly an alternative forum in substitution for the Civil
Court for adjudicating upon claims for compensation arising out of the "use of motor vehicles".
This is further made clear from Section 110-F of the Act which states that no Civil Court shall
entertain any question "relating to any claims for compensation which may be adjudicated upon
by the Claims Tribunal". In our view, when we are concerned only with Section 110 (1) and
when Section 110 B does not and cannot control Section 110(1), a claim is entertainable by the
Tribunal, if it arises out of the use of the use of a motor vehicle and if it is claimed against
persons or agencies other than the driver, owner or insurer of the vehicle provided in tort, such
other persons or agencies are also claimed to be liable as point tort-feasors. It is obvious that
prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, such compensation could be decreed by the Civil Court
not only against the owner\driver and insurer of the motor vehicle but also against others who are
found to be joint tort feasors. The words "use of the motor vehicle" are also be construed in a
wide manner. The above words were interpreted by this Court in Shivaji Davanu Patil vs.
Vatschala Uttam More: 1991 (3) SCC 530, in the context of Section 92A. This Court in that
connection referred to the Australian case in Government Insurance Office of N.S.W vs. R.J.
Green & Lloyds Pvt. Ltd. (1965) 114 C.L.R 437 and to the observations of Barwick CJ that those
words have to be widely construed. We may also refer to the observations of Windeyer J. in
same case to the following effect:-

"........ no sound reason was given for restricting the phrase, "the use of a motor vehicle" in this
way. The only limitation upon its ........... that I can see is that the injury must be one in any way
a consequence of a use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle".
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3.VATTICHERUKURU VILLAGE PANCHAYAT V. NORI VENKATARAMAN

DEEHSITHULU

Equivalent Citation: MANU/SC/0691/1991

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Decided On: 26.04.1991
Appellants: Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat
Vs.
Respondent: Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.M. Kasliwal and K. Ramaswamy, JJ.

Counsels:

For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: B. Kanta Rao, Adv

For Respondents/Defendant: C. Sitaramiah and B. Parthasarthi, Advs.

Subject: Property

Disposition : Petition Dismissed

18. The Constitution intends to herald an egalitarian social order by implementing the goals of
socio-economic justice set down in the Preamble of the Constitution. In that regard the
Constitution created positive duties on the State in Part IV towards individuals. The Parliament
and the State legislatures made diverse laws to restructure the social order; created rights in
favour of the citizens; conferred power and jurisdiction on the hierarchy of Tribunals or the
authorities constituted thereunder and given finality to their orders or decisions and divested the
jurisdiction of the established civil courts expressly or by necessary implication. The Inam Act is
a step in that direction as part of Estate Abolition Act. Therefore, departure in the allocation of
the judicial functions would not be viewed with disfavour for creating the new forums and
entrusting the duties under the statutes to implement socio-economic and fiscal laws. We have to
consider, when questioned, why the legislature made this departure. The reason is obvious. The
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tradition bound Civil Courts gripped with rules of pleading and strict rules of evidence and tardy
trial, four tier appeals, endless revisions and reviews under CPC are not suited to the needed
expeditious dispensation. The adjudicatory system provided in the new forums is cheap and
rapid. The procedure before the Tribunal is simple and not hide bound by the intricate procedure
of pleadings, trial, admissibility of the evidence and proof of facts according to law. Therefore,
there is abundant flexibility in the discharge of the functions with greater expedition and
inexpensiveness.

4. GURBAX SINGH V. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER AIR,1991 SC 435.

Equivalent Citation: MANU/SC/0114/1991

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4718 of 1990

Decided On: 21.09.1990

Appellants:Gurbax Singh
Vs.
Respondent: The Financial Commissioner and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: S. Ranganathan and K.N. Saikia, JJ.

Counsels:

For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: K. Parasaran, A.D.N. Rao and A. Subba Rao, Advs.

For Respondents/Defendant: K.G. Bhagat, B.S. Malik and Galshan, Advs.

Subject: Civil

Acts/Rules/Orders: Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 9; Displaced Persons

Compensation And Rehabilitation Act 1954 [repealed] - Section 14, Displaced Persons
Compensation And Rehabilitation Act 1954 [repealed] - Section 15, Displaced Persons
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Compensation And Rehabilitation Act 1954 [repealed] - Section 20, Displaced Persons
Compensation And Rehabilitation Act 1954 [repealed] - Section 27; Registration Act, 1908 -
Section 89

Disposition: Disposed off

17. Section 14 of the Act provides for Constitution of the compensation pool. Section 15 of the
Act exempts the property in compensation pool from processes of courts. Section 20 of the Act
empowers the Managing Officer or managing corporation to transfer any property within the
compensation pool-(a) by sale of such property to a displaced person or any association of
displaced person whether incorporated or not, or to any other person, whether the property sold
by public auction or otherwise. Under Sub-section (2) of that section every Managing Officer or
managing corporation selling any immovable property by public auction under Sub-section (1)
shall be deemed to be a Revenue Officer within the meaning of Sub-section (4) of Section 89 of
the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Under Section 27 of the Act save as otherwise expressly
provided in the Act every order made by any officer or authority under the Act, including a
managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of
appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. The jurisdiction of
the Civil Court was therefore barred in the matter of the sale. It is true that where the special
tribunal or authority acts ultra vires or illegally, the Civil Court has by virtue of Section 9 of the
Civil Procedure Code power to interfere and set matters right. As was laid down by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. MANU/PR/0022/1940, if
the provisions of the Statute have not been complied with or the Statutory Tribunal has not acted
in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the Civil Courts have
jurisdiction to examine those cases. This rule was reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of
Kerala v. N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons AIR 1966 SC 1938. In the instant case the second
respondent's civil suit against Budha Singh for declaration of possession was not against any
order passed by any officer under the Act. That decree, even if it was not declared collusive
could not have collaterally affected the auction sale order.
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5. KISHANLAL V. STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR,(1994) 4 SCC 422..

Equivalent Citation: AIR1981SC344, [1981(42)FLR192], 1980LabIC1367, (1981)ILLJ193SC,

(1981)1SCC568, [1981]2SCR52

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CASE NO.:Appeal (civil) 964 of 1991

Decided On: 25 February, 1994

Appellants:Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors.

Vs.
RESPONDENT:UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS.

JUDGES/CORAM: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY & B.L. HANSARIA

Counsels:

Subject: Civil

Acts/Rules/Orders: Constitution of India - Article 32

Disposition: Appeal Allowed

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6.THAN SINGH AND OTHERS V. SUPTT. OF TAXES,DHUBRI, AIR 1964 SC

1419,

Equivalent Citation 1964 AIR 1419 1964 SCR (6) 654

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Decided On: 3 February, 1964

PETITIONER:
THANSINGH NATHMAL AND ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES

Judges/Coram:
Gajendragadkar, P.B. (Cj), Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Shah, J.C., Ayyangar, N.
Rajagopala

Subject: Civil

Acts/Rules/Orders:

Art. 226-Constitution of India

Disposition: Dismissed

 The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms
and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restric- tions which
are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not
exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands
that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that
jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or
other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ
under Art. 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly
onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter
upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to
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establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as
a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not
by assuming jurisdiction under Art. 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute
for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even
itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High
Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the
machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to
seek resort to the machinery so set up.

7. T.R. Bhatia v. State of Punjab CWP.No.1349 of 1982

Equivalent Citation: MANU/SC/0510/1986

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition No 630-32 of 1984

Decided On: 17.12.1986

Appellants: T.R. Kapur and Ors.

Vs.

Respondent: State of Haryana and Ors.

Judges/Coram: A.P. Sen and S. Natarajan, JJ.

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Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: M.K. Ramamurthi, Shanti Bhushan, U.R. Lalit, S.K. Mehta
and M.R. Sharma, Advs

Subject: service

Acts/Rules/Orders:

 Constitution of India - Article 32, Constitution Of India - Article 14, Constitution Of India -
Article 16(1),

Disposition:
Petition allowed
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6. Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 SC 381, p. 409.

Equivalent Citation: MANU/PH/0324/2006, 1964 AIR 381, 1964 SCR (4) 797

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition No. 8747 of 2000

Decided on 02/09/1952

Makhan Singh

v.

State of Punjab,

Judges/Coram:
Gajendragadkar, P.B.

Subject: service

Acts/Rules/Orders:

 Constitution of India - Article 226, 32

Disposition:
Petition allowed

To appreciate the contentions from a correct perspective it is necessary at the outset to notice the
nature of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and the remedy or remedies
provided for their enforcement. It would be pedantic to go into the question whether fundamental
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rights provided for under our Constitution are natural rights or primordial rights : whatever their
origin might have been and from whatever source they might have been extracted, they are
enshrined in our Constitution in Part III and described as fundamental rights. The constitution
declared under Art. 13(2) that the State shall not make any law taking away or abridging the said
rights and any law made in contravention of this clause shall be void to the extent of the
contravention. After declaring such a law void, it proceeds to provide for the mode of
enforcement of the said rights. Article 32(1) makes the right to move the Supreme Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the said rights a guaranteed right. Appropriate
proceedings are described in cl. (2) thereof, that is to say, a person can move the said Court for
directions, orders, or writs in the nature described thereunder for the enforcement of any of the
said rights. The right to move, therefore, is regulated by the procedure prescribed
thereunder. Article 226, though it does not find a place in Part III of the Constitution, confers a
power on every High Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction
to issue such directions, orders, or writs in the nature described thereunder for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by Part III. There is a material difference between Art. 32 and Art.
226 of the Constitution, namely, while in Art. 32 the right to move the court is guaranteed,
under Art. 226 no such guarantee is given. But a fair construction of the provisions of Art.
226 indicates that the right to move, though not guaranteed, is necessarily implied therein. As I
have pointed out, under Art. 32 the right to move the Court is given a practical content by the
provision indicating the different modes open to the person who has the said right to approach
the Supreme Court. Article 226 employs the same procedure for approaching the High Court and
that procedure must necessarily be for the exercise of the right to move that court. When a power
is conferred upon the High Court and a procedure is prescribed for a party to approach that court,
it is reasonable to imply that the person has a right to move that court in the manner prescribed
thereunder. The only difference between Art. 32 and Art. 226 is that the Supreme Court cannot
say, if it is moved in the manner prescribed, that it will not decide on merits, but the High Court,
in exercise of its jurisdiction can do so. The decision on merits is left to its discretion, though the
exercise of that discretion is regulated by convention and precedent. Further, Art. 32(3) also
enables Parliament to make a law empowering any other court to exercise within the local limits
of itsjurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by theSupreme Court under cl. (2) thereof.
One thing to benoticed is that Parliament can only empower any othercourt to exercise any of the
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powers exercisable under cl.(2) ; it cannot confer the guaranteed right mentioned in cl. (1) on any
person to move that court. That is to say, the court or courts to which such powers are given
would be in the same position as the High Court in respect of the enforcement of the
fundamental rights. To put it shortly, no person will have a guaranteed right to move any such
other court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. A discretionary jurisdiction similar to that
of the High Court can only be conferred on them. For the same reason given in the case of the
High Court, an aggrieved party will also have a right to move those courts in the manner
prescribed.