People vs Larangga

FACTS:

On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the
expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were
torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were
covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as
Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police
having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy
as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court:

1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with
them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a
red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen
handcuffed them jointly.

2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where
they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards south
of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.

3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started
to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.

4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine.

The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became a
state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants
guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia,
that court erred in finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16
years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.

2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.

3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.

HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated,
or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. The appellants’ actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and
detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from
complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to
dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the
victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty
to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old
when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion
perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest
of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above.

Charge: kidnapping and illegal detention

RTC: guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. conspiracy

CA:

SC: kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the
victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline. conspiracy

People vs Garchitorena

Facts:

September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 in the evening, Dulce Borero along with hisbrother Mauro Biay y
Almarinez was

selling “balut” at Sta. Inez Almeda

Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Biñan, Laguna.

Dulce Borero was about seven (7) arms length away from her brother MauroBiay.

Accused Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay and as Mauro Biay approached Jessie,

the latter twisted the hand of Mauro and Jessie’s companions (co

-accused) Arnold Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing Mauro repeatedly witha shiny bladed
instrument. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to freehimself while being stabbed by the (3)
accused, until her brother slumped facedown on the ground.

Arnold instructed his two co-accused to run away.

Borero claims she wanted to shout but nothing came out from her mouth.

Witness went home to call for her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when theyreturn to the scene the
victim was no longer there as he had been brought to thePerpetual Help Hospital.

Trial Court: Guilty of murder, Court of appeals: Affirmed, Supreme Court: Affirmed
andModificationsDefense:Joey Pamplona

denied that he participated in the stabbingJessie Garcia

defense of alibi Arnold Garchitorena

defense of insanity

Issue/s:

Is there conspiracy shown in the case? (Art. 8 RPC)

Held:

Yes, accuse appellants were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit

of their common objective. Jessie Garcia grabbed the victim’

s hands and twistedhis arms; in turn, Joey Pamplona, together with Arnold Garchitorena,
strangledMauro Biay and straddled the Mauro Biay on the ground, then stabbed him.

Charge: Murder

RTC: Murder

CA: Murder

SC: Murder
People vs Carandang

FACTS: In the afternoon of April 2001, La Loma Police Station received a request from the
sister of accused Milan that there is a drug trade that is happenning on their house in Quezon
City. At arounf 4:00 PM, SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar (Red) along with Police Officer 2 Dionisio
Alonzo, SPO1 Estores, and SPO1 Montecalvo went to Milan’s house and surrounded the area.
The door of the house was open, enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan, and Chua
inside.

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, and shouted “Walang gagalaw!”. They are
instantly shot and failed to return fire causing their instant death. SPO1 Montecalvo fell on the
ground, SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan “Sugurin mo na!”. Milan lunged Montecalvo but
failed to maul him because the police officer was able to fire his gun to Milan. Thereafter,
Estores went inside the house to pull Montecalvo out.

RTC found the three guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Likewise, they were
also found guilty of attempted murder in Relation to Article 6 par 2, having been acted in
conspiracy. CA affirmed the decision.

Accused appealed to SC, arguing that the court a quo erred in holding that ther is conspiracy
among the appellants.

ISSUE: WON accused-appelants are guilty of conspiracy to commit murder against SPO1
Montefalco.

RULING: YES. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual
agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of
the crime.  Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates
their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is
the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established
by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door when the police
officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such
instruction). These facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the
minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike
evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient
period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead,
conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
subject felony.

Charge: : 2 counts of murder and frustrated murder

RTC: 2 counts of murder and frustrated murder

CA: Affirmed

SC: Affrimed

People vs Dadao

FACTS: On the eveing of July 1993, Marcelino Dadao, with his three other men, conspired,
confederated, and mutually helped each other with intent to kill by means of treachery, assaulted
victim Piono Yacpin using a gun and two bolos, hitting him on his back and leg, which
ultimately caused his death.

Prosecution’s first witness, Ronie Dacion, a 14-year old stepson of the victim, Pionio Yacapin,
testified that on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao,
Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and [A]lfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of
firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot,
Talakag, Bukidnon.

Prosecution presented six witnesses, all with congruent testimonies, and the defense presented
the accused as witnesses, with one Police Inspector Armada, stating that two of the accused
yielded negative for parafin.

RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and were
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. CA affirmed the decision, hence the petition.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellands are guilty of consipirating Piono’s murder.

RULING: YES. The evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a
community of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired with
one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal liability attached
to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which delivered the fatal
wounds that ended the life of the victim.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. . As such, it does not matter
who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because
the act of one is the act of all.

CA’s decision was affirmed.

Charge: Murder

RTC: Murder

CA: Murder
SC: Murder

People v. Estanly Octa

Facts:
4 armed men stopped and boarded a Honda Civic car being driven by Johnny
Corpuz who was with his brother Mike Adrian Batuigas. Johnny was then
forced to the backseat and was blindfolded and handcuffed. The armed men
first contacted Johnny's mother-in-law and informed her that they were just
on a trip. The victims were later brought to a safe house where one of the
kidnappers contacted Johnny's wife, Ana Marie Corpuz. Upon confirmation
that his husband was kidnapped, Ana Marie sought the assistance of the
PACER where several communications were had. The kidnappers demanded
for a ransom of P20M but was reduced to P538K. She was then instructed to
meet a man with a red cap who would ask her "saan yung padala ni boss".
She saw the man but first asked for confirmation from one of the kidnappers
by talking to the man. The man with the red cap turned out to be the accused
and was described by Ana Marie as good looking, lightly built, in his early 20s
around 5'4" in height and with dimples. After the ransom was given, the
victims were released.

The accused invoked the defense of denial and alibi and that he was a victim
of the kidnapping as well. On appeal, he argued that he was not a co-
conspirator since he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping
in the absence of concrete proof that he actually participated in the
execution of the essential elements of the crime by overt acts indispensable
to its accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money transpired only after
the kidnapping had been consummated and was not an essential element of
the crime.

Crime charged: Kidnapping for ransom

RTC: Guilty as charged
CA: Affirmed the RTC

Issue:
Is the accused liable for the felony charged as a co-conspiratorz.

Held:
Yes. As held in People v. Bautista:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in
concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and
 it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose
or common design and were united in its execution,
conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown
that all participants performed specific acts with such
closeness and coordination as to indicate a common
purpose or design to commit the felony.

Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by

reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.

Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of

Dexter, who testified that accused-appellant was the one
who received the ransom money then the commonality of
purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the
other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have
the common design or purpose to commit the felony of
kidnapping for ransom.

Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-

appellant received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still
continuing, since both victims were still being illegally detained by the
kidnappers. While his receipt of the ransom money was not a material
element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was in
fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims. Ransom is money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person or
persons; or payment that releases from captivity. Without ransom money, the
freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved.

charged: Kidnapping for ransom

RTC: Guilty as charged
CA: Affirmed the RTC
SC: Affirm

People vs Feliciano

Facts: On December 8, 1994, while seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating
lunch near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, they were suddenly attacked with
baseball bats and lead pipes by men believed to be members of Scintilla Juris Fraternity. The assailants’ heads
were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts and the commotion lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five (45)
seconds. The victims were brought to the UP Infirmary while the attackers fled. Dennis Venturina, one of the
victims, was transferred to St. Luke’s Hospital that very night. He died on December 10. On the 11 th, an
autopsy was conducted on his cadaver and the NBI medico-legal concluded that Venturina died of traumatic
head injuries.
An information for murder was filed against twelve members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity with the RTC of
Quezon City. Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of 3 Sigma Rho
fraternity members, and the frustrated murder of 2 Sigma Rho fraternity members. Only 11 of the accused
stood trial since one of the accused remained at large.
In 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the findings that only 5 of the twelve accused were guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The case against one accused was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension.
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to the SC on automatic
appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal, the case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, but downgraded the attempted murder case to slight physical injuries. The decision of
the Court of Appeals was then brought to the SC for review.
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the prosecution should not
have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since they were
presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the

information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks
despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
2. Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that
accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge
against him to enable him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that the information
filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them holds no water. The Court found no merit on the appellants’ arguments
that the prosecution should not have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise” in the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the
accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such
It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced
to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused
were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance.

What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a

concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they
were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is
also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of
one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their
identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that the accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution.
It was held that the trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. Slight inconsistencies in their statements were
immaterial considering the swiftness of the incident.

Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this
case

According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they
were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res
gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is
a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately
after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different
points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that
the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked.

When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed
the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore,
must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.

Accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery in the
commission of the crime

The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they
would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.

The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only
way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being
able to help them until after the incident.

The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or
even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.

W/N conspiracy? Yes

Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime

According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants
were correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:

ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball
bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.

As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against
Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and
with the aid of armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of
treachery in the commission of the offense.

It has been stated previously by this court that:

[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.152

Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.154 (Emphasis supplied)

The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to
the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that
although the attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of
people who could see them"155 and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought
back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the victims."156

This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They
were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden
attack by rival fraternity men.

The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only
way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being
able to help them until after the incident.

The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or
even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy
makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder

In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of
Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro
Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

The appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused-appellants
were guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang,
Lachica, and Gaston.

It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer
chased by the attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from
pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to
do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out that the
wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill."159

Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical
injuries.

This is erroneous.

It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of
their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective
active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for
the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one
is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in
one case where this Court held that

... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view
of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act
of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.162
(Emphasis supplied)

The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the
highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover,
but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already
present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike
when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between
the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of
their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to
kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be
appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight
physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of
the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended
to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment
the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to
kill.1âwphi1

For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and
the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel
Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

Charge: Murder, Attempted Murder, frustrated Murder

RTC: finding all
that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren
Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among
other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo
Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. The court ordered the case against
Benedict Guerrero archived until his apprehension.
CA:some AM and SPI
SC: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010
is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano,
Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the
MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal
Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
Peoplevs Morilla

FACTS:
During a checkpoint, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla were caught
illegally transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride by means of two (2)
motor vehicles, namely a Starex van with commemorative plate to read
"Mayor" and a municipal ambulance. 

During the trial, Mayor Mitra argued that he was without any knowledge of
the contents of the sacks and explained that he only accommodated the
request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat.
Likewise, Morilla insisted that he thought what he was transporting were
wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other
passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire
about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated
passenger of the ambulance.

ISSUES: 

1) Whether or not intent or knowledge is material in determining the

culpability of an accused in drug cases (NO)

2) Whether or not the finding of conspiracy is correct (YES)

HELD:

1) NO, intent or knowledge is not material in determining the

culpability of an accused in drug cases.

The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum

prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. Morilla
and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting
the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another."
It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance
following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to
Manila. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs
need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

2) YES, the finding of conspiracy is correct.

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. A conspiracy exists when

two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a
common design to commit a felony.

Morilla’s argument that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date
he was apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a
syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is
misplaced. 

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The
assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the
totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla
conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous
drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on
convoy from Quezon to Manila. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy
with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with
the mayor.
Charge: illegal trsportationof dangerous drugs

RTC: illegal trsportation of dangerous drugs

CA: illegal trsportationof dangerous drugs

SC: illegal trsportationof dangerous drugs

People v. Bokingo – G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

FACTS:

The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac Arthur
Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house.
He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house. The first row had
six (6) units, one of which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio
(Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while the other row was still under construction at the time
of his death. Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction
workers employed by Pasion.

The prosecution’s evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was
spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by
him and went out of the back door.

A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to
check. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon
seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a
hammer in his hand.

A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and
managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a
co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead
in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3.

Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor.
Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while
Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.

Elsa testified that she was in the master’s bedroom on the second floor of the house when she
heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans. She immediately got off the bed and went
down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way.

Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas
on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was wounded when she bowed her
head to avoid the tear gas. Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa
informed him that she does not know the combination lock.

Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck
and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen
door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na siya." Col immediately let her go and ran away with
Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor,
bathed in his own blood.

Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during
the preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to
kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up" with
Pasion.

Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment
No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared
to be intoxicated.

The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28 February
2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion
suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They
both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the
incident. He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000. During the cross-
examination, Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.

For review is the Amended Decision dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, Bokingo and Col guilty as conspirators
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. D
An Information was filed against Bokingo and Col, charging them of the crime
of murder wherein they “conspired together armed with a claw hammer and
with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his
head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon
said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his
death.”
During the preliminary investigation. Bokingco admitted that he conspired
with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before
because they got "fed up" with Pasion. On arraignment, Bokingco entered a
guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco
confessed to the crime charged.
The trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, there being the two aggravating circumstances
of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both accused
and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of
accused Bokingo only, sentencing them to Death.
The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court however
lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 7659.

ISSUES:
Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator
based on Bakingo’s admission that Col is a co-consiprator

HELD:
No. Col is hereby ACQUITTED beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before

us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish
the existence of conspiracy.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco
had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not
coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-
up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved
by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to
the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we
did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and
Col’s plan to kill Pasion. Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken without
the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value
and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide.

Charge: Murder
RTC: Murder Conspiracy
CA: Murder Conspiracy
SC: Homicide No Conspiracy

Peoplevs Castillo

Facts

On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of Mr. and Mrs. Luis
De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F. Paraaque, Metro Manila (p. 26, tsn, August
3, 1995). In the morning of said date, Femie, another housemaid of the Cebreros and Barias relative,
bathed and dressed up Rocky, the couples six year old son and afterwards advised Baria that someone,
who was also a Cebrero househelper, will fetch Rocky (p. 28, supra). At about 8:00 a.m., a tricycle
arrived. On board was a woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline
Padayhag (p. 26, supra). Baria assisted Rocky to board the tricycle. The tricycle brought Rocky and the
woman, whom Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 9, tsn,
August 3, 1995), to a nearby Mcdonalds. Thereat, they were joined by another woman (p. 13, supra)
whom Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo (p. 9, supra). The three
proceeded to a house far from the Mcdonalds (p. 13, supra) where Rocky slept four times (p. 14, supra).
At about 5:30 p.m. of March 1, 1995, Luis Cebrero arrived home from work. When his son DJ arrived, he
informed his father that Rocky did not attend school. Luis Cebrero asked Baria (pp. 4-5, tsn, August 22,
1995) who told him that Rocky was fetched at home by a woman to attend a birthday party (p. 5, supra).
Informed thereof, Mr. Cebrero then called up his friends and went to the police station to report that his
son was missing (p. 9, supra).

At about 7:30 p.m. that night, Luis Cebrero received a telephone call from a woman saying, Ibigay mo sa
akin ang ATM card mo o ang bata (p. 10, supra). Luis replied, Kailangan ko ang bata. The woman asked
how much money was in his ATM and Luis replied P40,000.00. Luis then requested to talk to his son but
the woman said, Hindi puwede, malayo dito ang anak mo at tatawag na lang uli ako (p. 10, supra).

Informed of the place for the pay-off, on March 4, 1995, Major Ronnie Eleazar, Commanding Officer of
the Intelligence Security Group (ISG), Philippine Army, briefed his men on Rockys kidnapping and
assigned them their respective tasks in the stakeout they will undertake around the pay-off area (pp. 6-7
tsn, January 30, 1996). At about 11:00 p.m. of March 4, 1995, Sgt. Alejandro Delena and his ISG team,
proceeded to Obando, Bulacan for the stakeout. After positioning themselves near the stakeout site, a
car arrived and stopped in front of the chapel. The man alighted and placed a bag in front of the chapel
and immediately left (p. 10, supra). After about forty (40) minutes, two women appeared, proceeded to
where the bag was dropped. On seeing the bag, the women laughed and left. After about two (2)
minutes, the two women returned, picked up the bag and immediately left (pp. 11-12, supra). The ISG
team searched the area around the drop-off place but the two women were nowhere to be found (p. 17,
supra). In court, Sgt. Delena pointed to and identified Castillo and Padayhag as the two women he saw in
front of the chapel in Obando, Bulacan and who, later on, picked up the bag dropped by Luis Cebrero (p.
12, supra).

Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the two women, Sgt. Delena and his team remained at the
stake-out area. The team befriended the residents of the place, one of whom was a certain Joselito
Torres who claimed to be the former boyfriend of Elizabeth Castillo whom he recognized from the
picture shown to him by Sgt. Delena. Torres informed the ISG team that Castillo had already left for
Mindanao. Sgt. Delena immediately communicated the information, including the address of Gigi
Padayhag in Navotas, to his commanding officer

At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero was at home when a tricycle stopped in front of his
house. Somebody knocked at the door and when Luis Cebrero opened it, he saw his son, Rocky (

At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero was at home when a tricycle stopped in front of his
house. Somebody knocked at the door and when Luis Cebrero opened it, he saw his son, Rocky (

Upon assumption from work, Castillo was promised by Mrs. Sandra Cebrero a monthly salary of one
thousand two hundred pesos (P1,200.00);
 The appellant, Elizabeth Castillo, and co-defendant, Evangeline Padayhag, have been previously
charged of kidnapping. The two allegedly conspired to kidnap a certain Luis Cerebro and demanding
ransom money for the return of the same, that is, coming to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and deciding to commit it. In this instant petition for automatic review, the court would like
to see if conspiracy did attend the commission of the crime, which gave merit to the previous
judgement.

Issues

Whether or not there was conspiracy to kidnap and extort ransom money.

Held

No. There was no conspiracy to kidnap and extort ransom money. In so far as the existence of
conspiracy is concerned, there must be the sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and
definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without space for baseless suppositions or
frenzied theories to filter through. Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1)
singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of the unlawful objective. In this case, the only
participation of Padayhag is to fetch Luis Cerebro from school, not knowing the intent of co-defendant
Castillo of kidnapping the same. In so far as extortion is concerned, Padayhag’s acts of not being in the
scene of the taking of the money, and not going with Castillo to dipolog, shows otherwise the conspiracy
between them.

The supreme court thus affirms the conviction of Elizabeth Castillo, but acquits Evangeline
Padayhag.

adayhag’s act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillo’s plan, a plan
Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo
told Padayhag that Padayhag’s boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit
Padayhag’s boyfriend that the two met. When they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived
her:

Charge: both kidnapping

RTC: finding appellants Elizabeth Castillo ("Castillo") and Evangeline Padayhag ("Padayhag") guilty of
Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

CA:

SC: affirm acquit padayag

Feranan vs People

Facts:
 COA Regional Director solicited for the authentication and report on the sub-allotment advises issued to
highway engineering districts in Cebu particularly Cebu City, Cebu 1 st, Cebu 2nd and Mandaue City Highway
Engineering Districts. Apparently, the two sets of LAA’s were received by the districts. One set consists of regular
LAA’s in authenticated and normally processed manner while the other set consists of fake LAA’s all of these were
approved for the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to
approve them because he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. It was found out that the practice of
using fake LAA’s had been going on for years.

Four of the accused hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from the government
coffers using fake LAA’s, vouchers and other documents to conceal the traces.

The anti-graft court has found the case has merit and that Fernan Jr. and Expedito Torrevilas along with the
other accused guilty as co-principals in the crime of Estafa through falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, sentenced each of them to imprisonment and payment of the penalties.

Issue:

Whether or not the honourable sandiiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners as co-conspirators despite the
prosecution’s failure to specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts and circumstances that would implicate
them as co-conspirators and justify their conviction.

Ruling:

No. The Sandigan Bayan has accurately ruled on conviction of the petitioners as co-conspirators
in spite of the prosecution’s failure to prove such. The court explained why direct proof of prior
agreement is not necessary: “Secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,
showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed their acts toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were in fact,
connected and cooperative, which indicates closeness of personal association and concurrence of
sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must have shown to
have performed a concerted act to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Charge: Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents

SB: Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents

SC: affirm

GMA vs People

FACTS:

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and
Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and  PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other
officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and
Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under
Section 2 (b)  of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the
Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public
treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which
were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was
strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas  then separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to
show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration
filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective
petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the State sufficiently   established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and
Uriarte?

Ruling:

The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege
that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel
conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February
26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient
if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking
about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but
rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080
as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not
only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was
essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the
charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to
suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constituted the offense charged.

Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the
mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even
worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to
the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be
informed of the charges against each of them.

Charge: Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law)

SB: guilty

SC:no conspiracy

Go-Tan vs Tan

Go-Tan vs Tan

Facts:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two female
children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No.
9262.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included
in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.
Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the
offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section
47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles
developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

Charge:file TPO RA 9262

Rtc: ismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

SC:revrsed

Vasquez vs People

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution

According to the prosecution, on May 24, 2003, at about 10:00 p.m., the spouses Jesus (the
victim) and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut,
which was about 100 meters away. Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses saw
Ampong and Nora Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having sex.

Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo (Jesus) shouted
invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away. Jesus decided to pursue Ampong
and Nora, while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to fetch their son, who was then elsewhere. Jesus
went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there. He began making
his way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused.

Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone.
Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone. Accused Felix did the same, hitting
Jesus above his left ear. Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo, hitting him at the back,
below his right shoulder. Ampong punched Jesus on his left cheek. The accused then left Jesus
on the ground, bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused
might return. He then got up and staggered his way back to their house.

Jesus testified on his own ordeal. In support of his version of the events, the prosecution also
presented the testimony of Maria Teresita Viado (Maria Teresita). Maria Teresita was initially
approached by Jesus' wife, Ana, when Jesus failed to immediately return home. She and Ana
embarked on a search for Jesus but were separated. At the sound of a man being beaten, she hid
behind some bamboos. From that vantage point, she saw the accused mauling Jesus. The
prosecution noted that about four (4) or five (5) meters away was a lamp post, which illuminated
the scene.

At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what she had witnessed
(Jesus had managed to return home by then). Ana and Maria Teresita then brought Jesus to
Barangay Captain Pili ta Villanueva, who assisted them in bringing Jesus to the hospital.

Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries required medical attention for four (4) to six (6)
weeks. Jesus was also advised to undergo surgery. He was, however, unable to avail of the
required medical procedure due to shortage of funds

Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of themselves, and also in defense
of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother. Thus, they invoke the first and second justifying
circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code

Issue:w/n claim accudsed is valid?

SUPREME COURT

We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be

sorely wanting.

Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by barging into
the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening physical harm
upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires,

petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus
appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present
independent and credible proof to back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it
was highly dubious that Jesus would go all the way to petitioners' residences to initiate an attack
for no apparent reason.

The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that Jesus
launched an assault despite the presence of at least seven (7) antagonists: petitioners,
Mercedes, and the four (4) other accused. They further assert that Jesus persisted on his
assault despite being outnumbered, and also despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts to
restrain Jesus. His persistence was supposedly so likely to harm them that, to neutralize him, they
had no other recourse but to hit him on the head with stones for at least three (3) times, and to hit
him on the back with a bamboo rod, aside from dealing him with less severe blows.

Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by
petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to
neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression.
Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a
relative.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 31333 is AFFIRMED.

Charge: Attempted Murder

RTC: In its July 25, 2007 Decision, the Regional Tnal Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City found
petitioners and Felix Caballeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder. The court
also found Sonny Boy Velasquez guilty beyond reasorable doubt of less serious physical
injuries. He was found to have hit Jesus on the back with a bamboo rod. Jojo Del Mundo was
acquitted. The case was archived with respect to Ampong, as he remained at large.

CA: serious physical injuries

SC: affirm ca

People vs Olarbe

Facts: On May 2006, Olarbe and his common-law wife were sleeping in their house in
Luisiana,Laguna, when at midnight, they were awakened by the seemingly drunk Arca,
carrying a rifle and a bolo, shouting insults and threatening to kill them from outside their
home. Arca then forcibly entered their home and held the two at gunpoint, but Olarbe
grabbed the gun and from Arca and fought for its possession, and the accused won the
gun and shot Arca.

However, Arca still managed to get his bolo from his waist and attack them, until the
fight had moved to the outer portion of the house, where accused and deceased fought
again for the possession of the bolo, which Olarbe managed to acquire, and hack Arca,
and after the killing incident, surrendered himself to the authorities.

Olarbe was charged and convicted of the murder of Romeo Arca on the year of 2014 by
the Regional Trial Court, and this conviction was also reaffirmed by the Court of
Appeals in 2016, and again invokes self defense and defense of stranger in his case.

Issue: Whether or not Olarbe may be acquitted on grounds of self-defense.

Ruling: Yes, the court rules that Olarbe may be acquitted on grounds of self-defense,
and reverses the statements of the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals, pursuant
to Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Penal Code, where “Any person acting in defense of
the person or rights of the stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person
defending may not be induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.”

The first and second requisites from the first paragraph of justifying circumstances are
“Unlawful Aggression”, and “Reasonable necessity of the means provided to prevent or
repel it.” The Court held that Olarbe had established the justifying circumstances
invoked, as Arca’s act was a culmination of consistent aggression towards Olarbe and
his common-law wife, and Olarbe’s actions were of someone driven to protect himself
and his spouse, and repel the unlawful aggression towards them, as the danger to their
lives was imminent.

The Court’s rationale also holds in his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger,
that they should not demand that he conduct himself in a rational manner as the threat
to their lives were fatally close, and he had to respond quickly to them. Thus, pursuant
to Article 11, paragpraph 3, Olarbe was acquitted on grounds of self-defense and
defense of stranger.
Charge: Murder
RTC: Murder
CA: Murder
SC: acquit

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.REGALARIO notes

FACTS:

On the night of February 22, 1997, a public dance and singing contest was held in Ligao,
Albay.

On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the barangay pavilion
of Natasan, Libon, Albay. At around ten o’clock that evening, Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were
enjoying the festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them (TSN, December 7, 1998, p.4).
To avoid trouble, the two distanced themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. (ibid.,
p. 5). Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with
their respective nightsticks, locally known as bahi. (TSN, November 16, 1998, pp. 13-17, 32, 34, 36-37).
The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he was able to get up
(ibid., pp. 16-17). He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the
barangay captain (ibid., pp. 18-38). Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla (ibid., p. 38, TSN,
December 7, 1998. p. 6). When Sevilla was already near Marciano’s house, he was waylaid by appellant
Ramon Regalario and at this point, Marciano Regalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their
house (TSN, December 7, 1998, pp. 7-9 and 35). Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife. The five appellants
caught the victim in front of Marciano’s house. Armed with their nightsticks, they took turns in hitting
the victim until he slumped to the ground face down (ibid., pp. 8, 35 and 38). In that position, Sevilla was
boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first ordered
the others to kill the victim and to tie him up (ibid., pp. 36-37). Upon hearing the order, Bienvenido, with
the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for
tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching. died

RTC, finding accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel, all
surnamed Regalario guilty of murder.

ISSUE:

WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DECEASED WAS KILLED IN SELF-
DEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVE

HELD:

When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he

necessarily owns up to the killing but may escape criminal liability by proving that it was
justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of
self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. However, without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-
defense, either complete or incomplete.

By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head
and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the
inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation
of the offensive stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no
longer any danger, but still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v.
Cajurao, SC held:

…The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no
longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying
circumstance. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life
and limb, the necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases.
If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is
retreating from the fray.

Ramon’s claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on
the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and
contusions on different parts of the victim’s body. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim
fired a gun at Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim
indicated that the force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to
disarm the victim or prevent him from doing harm to others.

Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack against Rolando was
carried out, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the
accused-appellants as the assailants, SC concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of
the trial court, in (a) disregarding Ramon Regalario’s declaration that he attacked the victim
in self-defense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants acted in concert and killed
Rolando.

Charge: homicide

RTC: Murder

CA: Murder

SC:Murder

People vs Fontanilla

Facts: Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union
when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang.
Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone.
Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan,
the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed
their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had
been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be
drunk, had boxed him in the stomach. Although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows. Olais, a karate expert, had
also kicked him with both his legs. He had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a
stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down
to the ground. He had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer
moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC.

Issue: Standard of proof required in order for self defense to be appreciated

Held: In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the
death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted
his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal
liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to
bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he
would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory
proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because
the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of
the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the
State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s
head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

Charge:Murder

RTC:Murder

CA:Murder

SC:Guilty

Jose vs People

JOSUE vs People

Facts: On May 1, 2004, at around 11:15 in the evening, Macario, a barangay

tanod, was buying medicine from a store near the petitioner’s residence in

Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila when he saw the petitioner going towards him, while shouting to ask him
why he ha

d painted the petitioner’s vehicle. Macario denied the petitioner’s accusation, but petitioner still pointed
and shot his gun at Macario. The gunshots fired by the petitioner hit Macario’s

elbow and fingers. As the unarmed Macario tried to flee from his assailant, the petitioner still fired his
gun at him, causing him to sustain a gunshot wound at his back. Macario was then rushed to the Chinese
General Hospital for medical treatment. Dr. Tiongson confirmed that Macario sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds: (1) one on his right hand, (2) one on his left elbow, and (3) one

indicating a bullet’s entry point at the posterior of the chest, exiting at the

anterior line. Dr. Calalang took note of the tiny metallic foreign bodies
found in Macario’s x

-ray results, which confirmed that the wounds were

caused by gunshots. Further, she said that the victim’s injuries were fatal, if

not medically attended to. Macario incurred medical expenses for his treatments.

For his defense, the petitioner declared to have merely acted in self-defense. He claimed that on the
evening of May 1, 2004, he, together with his son Rafael, was watching a television program when they
heard a sound indicating that the hood of his jeepney was being opened. He then went to the place
where his jeepney was parked, armed with a .45 caliber pistol tucked to his waist. There he saw
Macario, together with Eduardo Matias and Richard Akong, in the act of removing the locks of his

vehicle’s battery. When the petitioner sought the attention of Macario’s group, Macario pointed his .38

caliber gun at the petitioner and pulled its trigger, but the gun jammed and failed to fire. The petitioner
then got his gun and used it to fire at Macario, who was hit in the upper arm. Macario again tried to use
his gun, but it still jammed then fell on the ground. As Macario reached down for the gun, the petitioner
fired at him once more, hitting him at the back. When Macario still tried to fire his gun, the petitioner
fired at him for the third time, hitting his hand and causing Macario to drop his gun. The petitioner got

Macario’s gun and kept it in his residence.

The petitioner’s son, Rafael Josue, testified in court to corroborate his father’s testimony.

On October 22, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision

finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It gave full
credit to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, further noting that the defense had failed to prove
that the .38 caliber revolver that was turned over to SPO4 Palmero actually belonged to Macario.

Unsatisfied, the petitioner appealed from the RTC’s decision to the CA, which affirmed the rulings of the

RTC and thus, dismissed the appeal.

Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assails the CA’s dismissal of the appeal, arguing that the

prosecution had failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor. HELD: As
against the foregoing parameters, the Court finds, and so holds, that both the trial and appellate

courts have correctly ruled on the petitioner’s culpability for the crime of frustrated homicide, which has

the following for its elements: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of
timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code is present. These elements were duly established during the trial.

The trial court’s factual findings, when taken collectively, clearly prove the existence of the crime’s first
and second elements, pertaining to the petitioner’s intent

to kill and his infliction of fatal wound upon the victim. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, among other things

of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or

immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim.

Significantly, among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Villanueva, who, while being a
friend of the petitioner, had testified against the petitioner as an eyewitness and specifically identified
the petitioner as the assailant that caused the wounds sustained by the victim Macario. Even the petit

ioner cites in the petition he filed with this Court the prosecution’s claim that at the time he

fired the first gunshot, he was shouting, "

Papatayin kita! (I will kill you!)

"

The doctors who attended to

the victim’s injuries also affirmed before the trial court that Macario had sustained gunshot wounds, and

that the injuries caused thereby were fatal if not given medical attention. The trial court then held: Wei

ghing the evidence thus proffered, this Court believes the prosecution’s version.

x x x x The Court gives credence to the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution as it
did not find any fact or circumstance in the shooting incident to show that said witnesses had falsely
testified or that they were actuated by ill-motive. What is also noteworthy is that the petitioner invoked
self-defense, after he had admitted that he

caused the victim’s wounds when he shot the latter several times using a

deadly weapon, i.e., the .45 caliber pistol that he carried with him to the

situs
of the crime. In

People v. Mondigo

11

we explained:

By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was charged albeit
under circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of the crimes.

Thus,

the burden of proof is shifted to appellant who must show

, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were attended by the
following circumstances:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

12

(Citations omitted and emphasis ours) In order to be exonerated from the charge, the petitioner then
assumed the burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that he merely acted in self-defense. Upon
review, we agree with the RTC and the CA that the petitioner failed in this regard. While the three
elements quoted above must concur, self-defense relies, first and foremost, on proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded.

13

"Unlawful aggression" here presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
of the attack, from the victim.

14

In the present case, particularly

significant to this element of "unlawful aggression" is the trial court’s

finding that Macario was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with
him a .45 caliber pistol. According to prosecution witness Villanueva, it was even the petitioner who
confronted the victim, who was then only buying medicine from a

sari-sari
store. Granting that the

victim tried to steal the petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal

safety. At one point during the fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet the
petitioner continued to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the

mortal wound on his chest. Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appear

ed to be no "real

danger to his life or personal safety,"

15

for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise justified him in inflicting the gunshot wound

s for his defense, emanated from Macario’s end.

Charged: frustrated homicide

RTC: frustrated homicide

CA: frustrated homicide

SC: Guilty

TOLEDO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 158057            
September 24, 2004

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming on
appeal, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82
convicting the petitioner of homicide.

On September 16, 1995, Noe Toledo y Tamboong (Noe) went to a black-smith who made
the design of his bolo. When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the
afternoon, he saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte
drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents. His house is
about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte.

He requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise and proceeded inside
his house and went to sleep. Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s brother arrived
at the Guarte house and asked for any left-over food. Eliza prepared dinner for him and after
Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky. Gerardo’s home is about 12
meters away from the Guarte home. Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex
and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down for long when they
heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times. Ricky
rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw Noe stoning their house. Ricky went out of
the house and proceeded to Noe’s house. Ricky asked Noe, his uncle, why he was stoning their
house. Noe did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his house and, without any warning,
stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo. Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing
that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help. Lani heard Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed
outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body with his
hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who
stabbed him and Ricky replied that it was Noe who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez arrived at
the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and taken to the
Romblon Provincial Hospital.

At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night.
Ricky had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being
operated on. Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing the injuries sustained by
Ricky wherein there is a stab wound on the left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration
measuring 6 cms. long, irregular-edged at 8th ICS, left penetrating.

RTC rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged.

The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA
also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court ruled that
the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-defense.

The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-
defense with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal,
the decision of the RTC is correct.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in
not finding that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that
he be acquitted of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide based on the
evidence on record.

HELD:

YES, he is guilty of homicide. The contention of the petitioner Noe has no

merit.

Petitioner Noe testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally.

He asserted in the RTC and in the CA that he is exempt from criminal liability for the
death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal

liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it:
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

The petitioner also avers that he was able to prove the essential elements
of complete self-defense.

The essential requisites of self-defense are:

1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
2) reasonable scrutiny of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim.
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal. The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he
adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the
victim in complete self-defense. He relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he
killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is
justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo
accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the
said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in
the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily
implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He
is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is
the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity,
and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and
ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is
in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law
and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. 

On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or
the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not
commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no
criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free
will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.

Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence.The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident,
without fault or intention on his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear
and convincing evidence, the essential requisites for the exempting circumstance
under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz:
1) A person is performing a lawful act;
2) With due care;
3) He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4) Without fault or intention of causing it.

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. It presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete.

Charged: homicide
RTC: homicide
CA: homicide
SC:homicide

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution

According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner
went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit
Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City.

When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased
victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness
Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back
towards the aisle.

As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at
the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner
holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter.

Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed
the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the
bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey,
petitioner fled the office.

Version of the Defense

Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less,
petitioner, together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene
Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to
fetch the latter so that their family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day.
Before entering the Robinson’s Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular security
check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said
building and no firearm was found in his possession. He registered his name at the security
logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.

Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance once
again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he was allowed to
enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards
his wife’s table.

However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and asked
the latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked
towas the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene,
Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo
kasi sa akin."The response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng
asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"

Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he
was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his
chair which happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a
clicking sound. The gun, however, did not fire.

Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the
gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not
fire.

Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further
confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path and
shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed
and was about to smash the same on petitioner’s head.

Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of
parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand
had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey,
which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.

Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the
elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he
was not able to answer.

After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young
children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he
received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.

RTC RULING

WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of
Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages in the amount
of ₱1 Million, and to pay the costs.

CA RULING

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
147 dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the following MODIFICATIONS
(pay lots of damages)

SUPREME COURT RULING

There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is
left for determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate
petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.

Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his
petition must be denied.

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression
was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.

In the case at bar, other than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show
that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation
before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner
but failed — an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life.
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.1avvphi1 Accused
admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted
"guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from
the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the
aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased
when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when
unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the
former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed. A person making
a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased.

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.

More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was
unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner

Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun from his
chair and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. Pitted against
the testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses
probative value.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela
Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS: (pay lots of damages)

Charged:Homicide

RTC: Homicide

CA: Homicide

SC: Homicide

Guevarra vs People

As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the
hacking.

Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David
and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound. He was
walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him
saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the
stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by
Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged
Erwin inside the petitioners' compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed
thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's
tricycle.1âwphi1 They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was only damaged
when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their
compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually
rained on them and people outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers.
Allow them to come out."(defense)

After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died
in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.

- Rodolfo and Joey Guevarra were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide on the
person of Erwin and homicide on the person of David.
- Guevarras interposed self–defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct reverse trial of
the case.
- Defense presented as its witnesses Rodolfo and Joey and their neighbor.
- Prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking.
- RTC gave credence to the prosecution’s version of the incident and found the
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide.
o It disbelieved the defense’s version of the events due to material inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners’ claim of
self–defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.
- On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment and convicted the petitioners of the
crimes charged.
o CA found that Erwin and David committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to
provoke the actions of the petitioners
o The CA further held that the petitioners’ plea of self–defense was belied by the
nature and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13)
stab wounds on his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab
wounds on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds logically
indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self–defense but a determined
homicidal aggression on the part of the petitioners.
- Guevarras filed Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC on the ground that it did
not appreciate the evidence proving self-defense and it gave full credence to the
testimony of the lone witness for prosecution.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in failing to appreciate the presence of the Justifying Circumstance of self-
defense as established by the petitioners and instead give full credence to the testimony of the
prosecution’s lone witness?

RULING:

- No. There was no self-defense.

o By invoking self–defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission
of the acts for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if
proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof
shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David
and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self–defense.
o Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the
element of unlawful aggression. The element of unlawful aggression must be
proven first in order for self–defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no
self–defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self–defense.
o The Court found the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part
of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, that the petitioners did not
act in self–defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
fact, the real aggressors.

Charge: Frustrated Homicide and Homicide

RTC: guilty

CA:Guity

SC: Guilty

People vs Sevillano

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution

Prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, 67 and 46 years old, respectively,
testified that at around 3:00 p.m. of 11 March 2007, they, together with Victim Pablo Maddauin,
were seated on a long bench having their usual chit-chat at the vacant lot situated at 4th Street
Guadal Canal, St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. Witness Jose was the watchman of this property. While
conversing, they saw appellant coming towards their direction. Appellant could not walk straight
and appeared to be drunk. Without warning, appellant pulled out a knife from his waist and
stabbed the victim on the chest. Jose and Carmelita tried to restrain the appellant from attacking
the victim, but Jose experienced leg cramps and lost his hold on appellant. Appellant turned
again on the victim and continued to stab him several times more. The victim was heard asking
appellant, "Bakit?". Carmelita shouted for help. The victim’s wife came to the scene and
embraced appellant as she wrestled for the knife. Thereafter, [the] victim was brought to the
University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical center; but unfortunately, he died
that same day.

Version of the defense

Appellant, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to absolve
himself from criminal liability. He averred that on that fateful afternoon, he went to the vacant
lot where the victim and his friends usually hang-out to feed his chicken. While thereat, the
victim, whom he described to have bloodshot eyes, walk towards him and stepped on his injured
foot. While he was on his knees because of the pain, he saw the victim draw a knife. The latter
thereafter stabbed at him while uttering: "Ikaw pa, putang ina mo," but missed his target. As he
and the victim grappled for the knife, the latter was accidentally stabbed. When he saw blood
oozing out of the victim, he became apprehensive of the victim’s relative to such extent that he
fled the scene and hid to as far as Bulacan where he was eventually apprehended.

RTC RULING

In a Judgment5 dated 4 December 2009, the trial court found appellant guilty of murder for the
death of Pablo Maddauin (Pablo) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility of parole and to pay the heirs of the deceased ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that appellant, who
appeared to be intoxicated, unexpectedly arrived and stabbed Pablo seven times with a knife. The
trial court disregarded appellant’s denial as his testimony was outweighed by the positive
statements of the prosecution witnesses. It likewise ruled that treachery attended the
commission of the crime, as demonstrated by the fact that the victim was seated and
engaged in a conversation when suddenly attacked by the appellant. The trial court ruled that
such situation foreclosed any opportunity on the part of the victim to ward off the impending
harm.

CA RULING

The CA found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling but with
modification on the amount of damages awarded. The CA ordered appellant to indemnify the
heirs of Pablo in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages;
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The appellate court held that the eyewitness accounts of
prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, and their positive identification of
appellant as the perpetrator, aptly complemented by the findings of the postmortem examination,
are more plausible than the appellant’s claim of self-defense.7 The CA likewise sustained the
trial court’s findings that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the case.
It held that although the attack on the victim was frontal, it was deliberate, sudden and
unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to
resist or to defend himself.

SUPREME COURT

We find the appeal bereft of merit.

By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds which
killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing was done in
self-defense.

Appellant’s version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him
was found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower court’s conclusion.
Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the knife
from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the
need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an accused
still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of
self-defense.13 The fact that the victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his
demise, and the nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-
defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 August 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 finding Oscar Sevillano y Retanal guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
of parole, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Pablo Maddauin in the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION (pay the damages with 6% interest per
annum).

Charge:Murder

RTC:guilty

CA;guilty

SC:guilty

People vs Genosa
Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA,
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for
the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she
had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She
claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-
defense.
Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense
is applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient
evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample
evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How
did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to
try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben
would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words,
she would return to their common abode.

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she
believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel
helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts
that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed,
they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality
of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings
inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which
were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at
all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would
establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case
of the Genosas.

BWS as Self-Defense

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual,

sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person.64 In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was
a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based
on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and
inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have
ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of
actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery
usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly
attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by
installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering
episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.66 Considering such circumstances
and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In
the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the
part of the victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the
circumstances.

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
"cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving
her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of
action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating facto

Charged: Parricide

RTC: Parricide

CA:

SC:Parricide

Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of the batterer in previous violent
episodes was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This, juxtaposed to Marivic's affliction
with BWS justified the killing of the deceased. The danger posed or created in her mind by the
latter's threats using bladed weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the circumstances, the
natural response of the battered woman would be to defend herself even at the cost of taking the
life of the batterer.

The ponencia's acknowledgement of "Battered Woman Syndrome" as a valid form of self-

defense, is a noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for battered women who are
trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and fear. This would however be an empty victory if we
deliberately close our eyes to the antecedents of this case. The facts are simple. Marivic was
suffering from the "Battered Woman Syndrome" and was defending herself when she killed her
husband. Her acquittal of the charge of parricide is therefore in order.

People vs Haloc

People v. Jessie Haloc

G.R. No. 227312, 5 September 2018
Bersamin J.
TOPIC: Murder/Attempted Murder

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Jessie Haloc y Codon, then fifty-one (51) years old, was apprehended
by barangay officials after he hacked Allan de la Cruz, nine (9) years and his brother Amel, four
(4) years old, inside the de la Cruz's yard at Barangay Union, Gubat, Sorsogon on June 22, 2008
at around 12 noon. Amel died as a result of the hacking blow to his neck, while Allan sustained
injuries on his upper arm.

ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not the accused could be held guilty of murder and attempted murder.
(b) Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity will apply in this case.

HELD:

(a) Yes, there is no denying that the crimes committed by the accused-appellant were
murder and attempted murder. Allan dela Cruz, the victim in the attempted murder, declared
that the accused-appellant had stormed into their house in order to hack Ambrosio, the victims'
father, but Ambrosio had been able to escape the assault by running away. His escape
prompted his five sons, including Amel and Allan, to run away after him. The accused-
appellant pursued them, and he first hacked the 9-years old Allan, hitting him in the arm, and
then seized the 4-year old Amel, hacking him in the neck causing his instantaneous death.

The informations charged the accused-appellant with murder and attempted murder,
averring that the crimes were committed with treachery. The convictions were warranted. The
killing of or assault against a child by an adult assailant is always treated as treacherous, even if
the treacherous manner of the assault is not shown. Indeed, the weakness of the minor victim
because of his tender years results in the absence of any danger or risk to the adult assailant.

(b) No, the accused failed to establish the exempting circumstance of insanity.

The defense of insanity rests on the test of cognition on the part of the accused. Insanity,
to be exempting, requires the complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in
committing the criminal act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.
He must be deprived of reason, and must be shown to have acted without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of
the will.
 The accused-appellant did not establish the exempting circumstance of insanity. His
mental condition at the time of the commission of the felonies he was charged with and found
guilty of was not shown to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or
intelligence when he committed the felonies charged.

Based on the records, he had been administered medication to cure his mental illness,
but there was no showing that he suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence. On the
contrary, the medical professionals presented during the trial conceded that he had been treated
only to control his mental condition. There was also no showing that the accused-appellant's
actions manifested his insanity immediately after the hacking incidents. His own sister, Araceli
Haloc-Ayo, declared that he had recognized her and had surrendered the bolo to her after his
deadly assault. Clearly, he had not been totally deprived of the capacity of cognition.

Charge: Attempted Murder/Murder

RTC: Attempted Murder/Murder

CA: Attempted Murder/Murder

SC: : Attempted Murder/Murder

People vs. Marzan

SUMMARY: To exonerate himself of murder and frustrated homicide, Marzan invoked insanity.
The SC did not believe him. He also argued that treachery was absent.

DOCTRINE: Two conditions must necessarily occur before treachery or alevosia may be
properly appreciated, namely: "(1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution
that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party,
who has, thus, no opportunity for self- defense or retaliation; [and] (2) deliberate or conscious
choice of means, methods, or manner of execution. The essence therefore of treachery is the
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack on an unsuspecting victim thereby depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor.

FACTS:

To prove Marzan's guilt, the prosecution presented Bernardo, Erlinda Cabiltes (Erlinda),
Lolita Rombaoa (Lolita), and Dr. Valentin Theodore Lumibao (Dr. Lumibao). Their testimonies
can be summarized as follows:

On May 22, 2003, at around 1:30 p.m., Erlinda saw Marzan enter the house of her
bedridden father, Apolonio, while uttering "agda kalaban ko" (I have an enemy). Not long after,
Erlinda heard her father screaming "apay Aping?" (why Aping?) and "uston Aping!" (enough
Aping) Thereafter, Erlinda saw Marzan emerge from her father's house wearing a blood-stained
shirt and holding a bladed instrument dripping with blood. Erlinda ran to the barangay captain's
house to ask for help.

Lolita also saw Marzan come out from Apolonio's house holding a blood- stained
weapon. Out of fear, however, Lolita hid herself in the comfort room.

Bernardo tried to placate Marzan but the latter furiously said, "you are also one of them"
and stabbed Bernardo in the stomach.

Marzan was charged in separate Informations with Murder and Frustrated Murder. The
defense claimed that Marzan was insane at the time of the incident. To prove Marzan's insanity,
the defense presented his wife Isabel Marzan. Despite this, Marzan was convicted of murder
and frustrated homicide. CA affirmed.

ISSUES:

 WoN Marzan is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity

o NO. In rejecting Marzan's argument that he should be declared criminally exempt
from the murder charge, considering that he was suffering from psychosis when
he stabbed his brothers, the RTC correctly held that:
 “Even assuming that the testimony of the wife of Marzan is true, [Marzan]'s
abnormal behavior immediately prior [to] the stabbing incident and at the time of
the incident while suggestive of an aberrant behavior[,] can not be equated with a
total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. On the contrary,
Marzan was even sane enough to help his mother stand up after falling on the
ground and seated her in front of a house and surrender himself and his bolo to
the responding policemen. x x x”
o Like the RTC, the CA found the defense of insanity as unavailing:
 “Clearly, schizophrenia does not fall within the stringent standard
contemplated by law as an exempting circumstance. In fact, even
Marzan- appellant's psychological report supports this conclusion. The
salient portion of which provides:
 ‘ASSESSMENT AND REMARKS:
 Based on the history, mental status examinations, observations
and psychological test, the patient was found to be suffering from
psychosis classified as Schizophrenia. This mental disorder is
characterized by the presence of delusions, hallucinations,
disorganized/irrelevant speech, disorganized/bizarre behavior and
disturbance in [e]ffect. Likewise, the patient's impulse control,
frustration tolerance and judgment are affected. In addition, there
is a significant impairment in functioning in areas of work, social
relations and self-care. This psychiatric disorder runs a chronic
course marked by periods of remissions and exacerbations.’
 The foregoing findings evidently show that Marzan's alleged sickness is
merely temporary and occurs only intermittently.”
  WoN treachery was present
o YES. The sudden attack on the victim who was then at home, bedridden,
recuperating from sickness, completely unaware of any danger and unable to
defend himself constituted treachery because Marzan was thereby ensured that
the victim would not be in any position to ward off or evade his blows, or strike
back at him. Evidently, the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was
rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. There is thus no doubt that
treachery attended the killing.
 WoN voluntary surrender may be considered a mitigating circumstance in this case
o NO. In the case at bar, there was no showing that Marzan unconditionally and
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledged his guilt or because he wished to save them the trouble and
expense in looking for and capturing him. Marzan was just nonchalantly sitting at
the curb when the police force responded and handcuffed him.
o In any case, as the Court ruled in People v. Lota, "the consideration of any
mitigating circumstance in [Marzan's] favor would be superfluous because,
although the imposable penalty under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion perpetua to death, the prohibition to impose the death penalty pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346 rendered reclusion perpetua as the only penalty for
murder, which penalty, being indivisible, could not be graduated in consideration
of any modifying circumstances." In fine, there being no modifying circumstance,
the proper penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua.

NOTES: Marzan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Case No. 04-36 and
frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 04-37

Charge: murder and frustrated murder

RTC: murder/ frustrated homicide

CA: murder/ frustrated homicide

SC: murder/ frustrated homicide

Madali vs People

Facts: Raymund, 14 years old, and Rodel Madali, 16 years old, along with Jojo Bernardino, were charged
with homicide for the killing of AAA of Romblon.

Jovencio, a cousin of the victim who witnessed the killing, claims that on the night of April 13, 1999
Raymund and Rodel Madali, Bernardino, AAA and him were gathered near the National high school up
in the hagdan-hagdan. Bernardino blindfolded AAA with a handkerchief from Raymund. Bernardino gave
the first blow using a coconut frond, next by Raymund and when AAA wobbled, Rodel punched him
while wearing brass knuckles. All Jovencio could muster was say “enough” twice. Yet the three did not
stop but instead hanged AAA on the tree using the handkerchief and the dog chain. Before leaving the
area, Rodel threatened Jovencio to not tell anyone or else he will be next. The corpse of AAA was found
a few days later. The body was decomposing and stinking.

Jovencio filed an information against the three but recanted it and refiled it again. After the final
judgement was pronounced, Bernardino filed for probation. Raymund’s case on the other hand was
dismissed due to RA 9344 also known as Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 for being only 14 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense. Rodel’s case however, was sustained but was
suspended pursuant to RA 9344.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability.

Ruling: Yes, the petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability by virtue of RA 9344.

Petitioners should be exempt from criminal liability due to the provisions of RA 9344. Although it was
only passed on 2006, it can be applied to petitioners since laws favorable to the accused can have
retroactive effect. Section 38 of the act also provides for the automatic suspension of sentence. The
exemptions however, differ. Raymond’s case is dismissed for being only 15 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. Rodel’s case was sustained since he was 16 at the time of the commission. His
sentence was however suspended. And since he acted with discernment, he shall be under an
intervention program.

Charge:Murder

RTC:Homicide

CA:Homicide

1) Appellant Raymund Madali is declared EXEMPT from criminal liability and the case, insofar
as he is concerned is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.

2) Appellant Rodel Madali is found guilty of homicide, the proper penalty for which is fixed at
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor. Imposition of this penalty should, however, be SUSPENDED, also pursuant to
R.A. No. 9344.

SC:Affirm

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 August
2007 in CA-G.R. No. 27757, exempting Raymund Madali from criminal liability is hereby
AFFIRMED. With respect to Rodel Madali, being a child in conflict with the law, this Court
suspends the pronouncement of his sentence and REMANDS his case to the court a quo for
further proceedings in accordance with Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. However, with
respect to the civil liabilities, Rodel Madali and Raymund Madali are solidarily liable to pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

People vs Sarcia

People of the Philippines vs. Richard Sarcia Facts:

Accused was 17 years old when he rapedthe victim who was then a minor. He was convictedof rape
with a penalty of death which was affirmedby the Court of Appeals in 2005. During thependency of the
appeal in the Supreme Court, RA9344 took effect. Before the promulgation of SCdecision, accused was
already 31 years old.

ISSUE

Whether SEC 38 and 40 of RA 9344 to thesuspension of sentence apply to the instant case.

HELD

The application of suspension of sentenceis now moot and academic. Sec 38 does not distinguish as to
which crimes the suspension of sentence is applicable. It applies even to heinouscrimes such as in this
case even if the child inconflict with the law is already 18 years of age ormore at the time of the
pronouncement of his guilt.However, Sec. 40 limits the suspension of sentenceuntil the child reaches
the maximum age of 21.Though the accused is already 31 yearsold, he is entitled to appropriate
disposition underSec. 51 of RA 9344 where in lieu of confinement ina regular penal institution, he may
be ordered toserve in an agricultural camp and other trainingfacilities that may be established,
maintained,supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, incoordination with the DSWD.The civil liability
remains the same andunaffected

Charge:Rape

RTC:Rape

CA:Rape

SC:Affirm

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is
reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of
₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the
court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

People vs Mantalaba
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the
time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City.  Thus,... a buy-bust
team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers
who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation.  The
two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act... of
selling shabu.

PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other.  Afterwards, the appellant
handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the
appellant.  The poseur-buyers went back to the police... officers and told them that the
transaction has been completed.  Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and
handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.

The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard
S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu.  PO1
Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money,... two pieces of P100 bill,
thrown by the appellant on the ground.

After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made
an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu
which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they... marked as
RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso
(P50) bill

The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright
orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets,...
separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against
appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:... sell zero... point
zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu which is a dangerous drug.

Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165... possess zero... point six one three one (0.6131)
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous
drug.

Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165

Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him.  Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

In its Omnibus Judgment [5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

As provided for in

Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death.  As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA

In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing
0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
accused... being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC

Issues:

Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the
crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. 
He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he
asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of... proof is on the
prosecution.

Ruling:

The petition is unmeritorious

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof
of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold... and the payment
therefor. [9]  From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that
the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified.  The subject dangerous drug, as... well as the marked money used, were also
satisfactorily presented.  The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust
operation was conducted.

To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic
containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and
that... the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation... this
Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned
by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. [11] It is... often utilized by law
enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their
nefarious activities

In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the
appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of
dangerous drug.  As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the... consummation of
the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the
appellant.  In the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu.
In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.

Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of
custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo... and Simon
were present in the buy-bust operation.

Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:

The PDEA shall take charge... and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following... manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or... seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there
is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.
[25] Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible. [26] What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized... items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused

In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the
buy-bust operation team.  The fact that it... was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the
letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items
confiscated.  All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been observed.

As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated
item which, in the present case, was complied with

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking [29] of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the... seized contraband are immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized... from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.

The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the
said offense was... committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the
RTC's Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The
RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and

Youth Welfare Code [31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law, [32] the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for... violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence
under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia [33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the... time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt,
Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of
the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such
is already moot and academic.  It is highly noted that this would not have happened... if the CA,
when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant

The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence,
when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case... having been
elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he
was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to... the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA

No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98 [36] of the
same law.  A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits... the penalty of life imprisonment to
death; however,  in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor,  the penalty for
acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.  Basically,... this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has
adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority [39] can now be appreciated in
fixing the penalty that should be imposed.  The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without considering the... minority of the appellant.  Thus, applying the
rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which
is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated.

Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty
should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no... other
mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.

The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an
indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became... a
divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day... of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5... of RA
9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Charge: violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165

RTC:guilty possession and selling

CA:Affirm

SC:Affirm reclusion temporal

Hubilla vs People

Facts:

Rosal Hubille was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed Jayson Espinola with a knife. He
was charged with Homicide.

RTC - convicted him of homicide and imposed the penalty of indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
four years and one day of prision correcional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

CA – Rosal’s sentence was modified in that he was sentenced to six months and one day of prision
correctional as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. The civil aspect was
also modified

On motion for reconsideration, the CA partially granted the appeal and imposed on him the penalty of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

Facts:

petitioner with homicide under

Alejandro Dequito testified that... he, together with his compadre... was at
the gate of

Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony of the high school

students. While watching, his cousin

Jason Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant

approached the victim and stabbed the latter.

with the appellant's left arm around the neck of the... victim, appellant
stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.

the mother of the deceased... stated that her son stayed for more than a
month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later,...
however, when her son went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was
discovered that her son's stab wound had a complication. Her son was
subjected to another operation, but died the day after.
the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim,...
was organ failure overwhelming infection.

the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.

The appellant,... narrates his statement of facts in this manner:

He testified that... he was at the Dalupaon High School campus watching

the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking
towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was
ganged up by a group of... four (4) men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy
and fell to the ground. He was not able to see or even recognize who
attacked him

Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he

thought was one of the four men who... ganged up on him. He stabbed the
person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in
possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his
friend,... who was graduating that day.

Issue:
WON the CA should have suspended Rosal’s sentence in accordance with RA 9344; that he is entitled to
probation or suspension of sentence?

Held:

Article 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. His minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.

In Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty
next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional. So the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

Petitioner insists that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence should be reduced to only six years of
prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under PD 968.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC - the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum

Sec. 38 of RA 9344 which allows the suspension of the sentence is available only until the child offender
turns 21 years of age.

Since he is over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction in the RTC, suspension was no longer
feasible.
RA 9344 reveals that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited.
Restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment:
(a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and
(b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time

Imprisonment was imposed on the petitioner as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from
probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest
duration permitted by the law.

Charge:homicide

RTC:homicide

CA:homicide

SC:guilty

to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training
facilities under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.

People vs Agacer

FACTS:
 Appellants' Motion for Recon of our Decision2Ï‚affirming their conviction for the murder of Cesario Agacer,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the CA
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, Aparri, Cagayan, finding appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor,
Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the
following modifications:(1) actual damages is DELETED; (2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay as
temperate damages; and (3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer interest

 Appellants assert that their mere presence at the scene of the crime is not evidence of conspiracy;Ïthat there
was no treachery since a heated argument preceded the killing of the victim; and that even assuming that
their guilt was duly established, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should have been
appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin who was only 16 years and 106 days old at the time of the
incident, having been born on December 21, 1981.‚rνl1

 Meanwhile, appellant Florencio died, indicating cardio pulmonary arrest secondary to status asthmaticus in
prison ‚rνl1 

 The OSG, in its Comment, asserts that there exists no cogent reason to disturb our findings and conclusions
as to the guilt of the appellants - established conspiracy and treachery. However, it did not oppose and even
agreed with appellants' argument that minority should have been appreciated as a privileged mitigating
circumstance in favor of Franklin, duly supported by Certificate of Live Birth secured from NSO‚rνl1 

ISSUES:

1.   Should the mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin? YES
2.   Does the death of appellant Florencio extinguish his criminal and civil liabilities?

HELD:

There is partial merit in appellants' MR 

½l1 
As a Minor, Franklin is Entitled to the
Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of 
Minority.

Nevertheless, we agree with appellants that Franklin is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.  
Franklin's Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16 years old
at the time of the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the
offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed
on the accused but always in the proper period.   The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and compassion
is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with less discernment. This is regardless of the
fact that his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for our
consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.
 
Penalty to be Imposed Upon Franklin.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.   A degree lower is reclusion temporal.16Ï‚There being no
aggravating and ordinary mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on Franklin should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum, which ranges from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. 17Ï‚rApplying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor, the medium period of which ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.  
Due to the seriousness of the crime and the manner it was committed, the penalty must be imposed at its most
severe range.

The Death of Florencio Prior to Our 

Final Judgment Extinguishes His
Criminal Liability and Civil Liability
Ex Delicto.

On the effect of the death of appellant Florencio on his criminal liability, Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that: Art. 89.   How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished. 1.  
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; x x x x

It is also settled that "[u]pon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto  is  ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
‚rνl1 
While Florencio died way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was not timely relayed to the Court, such
that we were unaware of the same when we rendered our December 14, 2011 Decision.   It was only later that we
were informed of Florencio's death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the Officer of the New Bilibid Prison.   Due to
this development, it therefore becomes necessary for us to declare Florencio's criminal liability as well as his civil
liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.

Charge:Murder

RTC:Murder

CA:Murder

SC:Murder appreciate mitigating

Ty vs People

Facts:

This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty
before the RTC of Manila. The said accused drew and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital
to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino several post-dated checks. The said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such checks in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for “Account Closed” and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors
Hospital the amount of the checks or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.  

Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury.”  She claims that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release of her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated, and would not discharge
unless the hospital bills are paid.

The trial court rendered judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appeal with the CA and
reiterated her defense that she issued the checks “under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury.”    The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification.  It set aside the
penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos
P 60,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.

Issue: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liability?  

Held: No.

Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the

following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear
must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal
to that committed.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated.  If
the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, this defense is not applicable

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a
real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is
not enough.  It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced
him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must
be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

Speculative fear

The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent.  Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her mother’s health might
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother
might commit suicide.  This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.

Charge: 7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22

RTC:guilty

CA:guilty

SC:guilty